

A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY

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PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT, GOVERNMENT COLLEGE, CHITTAGONG, BENGAL,
LECTURER IN BENGALI IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

IN FIVE VOLUMES

**CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS**

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VOLUME I

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निखिलमनुजचित्तं ज्ञानसूत्रैर्नैर्वैर्यः
स्वजमिव कुसुमानां कालरन्ध्रैर्विधत्ते ।
स लघुमपि ममैतं प्राच्यविज्ञानतन्तुं
उपहृतमतिभक्त्या मीदतां मे गृहीत्वा ॥

May He, who links the minds of all people,
through the apertures of time, with new threads
of knowledge like a garland of flowers, be pleased
to accept this my thread of Eastern thought, offered,
though it be small, with the greatest devotion.

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TO
HIS EXCELLENCY
LAWRENCE JOHN LUMLEY DUNDAS, G.C.I.E.,
EARL OF RONALDSHAY, CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALCUTTA AND THE GOVERNOR OF BENGAL.

May it please your Excellency,

The idea of writing this work was first suggested to me by the Rectorial address which your Excellency delivered some years ago at a Convocation of the University of Calcutta, in which you emphasised the special need of the study of Indian philosophy by Indian students. I shall ever remember with gratitude the encouragement that I received from the kind interest that you showed in my work by going through the manuscript, in the conversations that I had the honour of holding with you on various occasions, and in your subsequent letters to me. Your Excellency's honoured name has thus already become peculiarly connected with the composition of this work. With your Excellency's kind permission, I therefore wish to take advantage of this opportunity in associating your Excellency's name with this volume as a mark of deepest respect and esteem.

The present work is an attempt to present the thought of Ancient India at its best. This thought still holds the spirit of India, and the more it is studied the more do we see that the problems are often identical with those of European thinkers. That both East and West should realise each other's tasks and find that they are often identical is an auspicious omen for the future. The great work of uniting India with Europe can only be gradually accomplished through mutual appreciation of what is best in each country. I shall be very happy if this humble volume may even in a very small measure aid this process which is already begun in various ways and may represent to your Excellency after your return to this country something of the ancient ideals of India.

I remain, your Excellency,

Loyally and sincerely yours,

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA.

NOTE ON THE PRONUNCIATION OF
TRANSLITERATED SANSKRIT
AND PĀLI WORDS

The vowels are pronounced almost in the same way as in Italian, except that the sound of *a* approaches that of *o* in *bond* or *u* in *but*, and *ā* that of *a* as in *army*. The consonants are as in English, except *c*, *ch* in church; *t*, *d*, *n* are cerebrals, to which English *t*, *d*, *n* almost correspond; *t*, *d*, *n* are pure dentals; *kh*, *gh*, *ch*, *jh*, *ṭh*, *ḍh*, *ṭh*, *ḍh*, *ph*, *bh* are the simple sounds plus an aspiration; *ñ* is the French *gn*; *ṛ* is usually pronounced as *ri*, and *ś*, *ṣ* as *sh*.

PREFACE

THE old civilisation of India was a concrete unity of many-sided developments in art, architecture, literature, religion, morals, and science so far as it was understood in those days. But the most important achievement of Indian thought was philosophy. It was regarded as the goal of all the highest practical and theoretical activities, and it indicated the point of unity amidst all the apparent diversities which the complex growth of culture over a vast area inhabited by different peoples produced. It is not in the history of foreign invasions, in the rise of independent kingdoms at different times, in the empires of this or that great monarch that the unity of India is to be sought. It is essentially one of spiritual aspirations and obedience to the law of the spirit, which were regarded as superior to everything else, and it has outlived all the political changes through which India passed.

The Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans and the Moguls who occupied the land and controlled the political machinery never ruled the minds of the people, for these political events were like hurricanes or the changes of season, mere phenomena of a natural or physical order which never affected the spiritual integrity of Hindu culture. If after a passivity of some centuries India is again going to become creative it is mainly on account of this fundamental unity of her progress and civilisation and not for anything that she may borrow from other countries. It is therefore indispensably necessary for all those who wish to appreciate the significance and potentialities of Indian culture that they should properly understand the history of Indian philosophical thought which is the nucleus round which all that is best and highest in India has grown. Much harm has already been done by the circulation of opinions that the culture and philosophy of India was dreamy and abstract. It is therefore very necessary that Indians as well as other peoples should become more and more acquainted with the true characteristics of the past history of Indian thought and form a correct estimate of its special features.

But it is not only for the sake of the right understanding of

India that Indian philosophy should be read, or only as a record of the past thoughts of India. For most of the problems that are still debated in modern philosophical thought occurred in more or less divergent forms to the philosophers of India. Their discussions, difficulties and solutions when properly grasped in connection with the problems of our own times may throw light on the course of the process of the future reconstruction of modern thought. The discovery of the important features of Indian philosophical thought, and a due appreciation of their full significance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy as the discovery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of modern philological researches. It is unfortunate that the task of re-interpretation and re-valuation of Indian thought has not yet been undertaken on a comprehensive scale. Sanskritists also with very few exceptions have neglected this important field of study, for most of these scholars have been interested more in mythology, philology, and history than in philosophy. Much work however has already been done in the way of the publication of a large number of important texts, and translations of some of them have also been attempted. But owing to the presence of many technical terms in advanced Sanskrit philosophical literature, the translations in most cases are hardly intelligible to those who are not familiar with the texts themselves.

A work containing some general account of the mutual relations of the chief systems is necessary for those who intend to pursue the study of a particular school. This is also necessary for lay readers interested in philosophy and students of Western philosophy who have no inclination or time to specialise in any Indian system, but who are at the same time interested to know what they can about Indian philosophy. In my two books *The Study of Patanjali* and *Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought* I have attempted to interpret the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems both from their inner point of view and from the point of view of their relation to other Indian systems. The present attempt deals with the important features of these as also of all the other systems and seeks to show some of their inner philosophical relations especially in regard to the history of their development. I have tried to be as faithful to the original texts as I could and have always given the Sanskrit or Pāli technical terms for the help of those who want to make this book a guide

for further study. To understand something of these terms is indeed essential for anyone who wishes to be sure that he is following the actual course of the thoughts.

In Sanskrit treatises the style of argument and methods of treating the different topics are altogether different from what we find in any modern work of philosophy. Materials had therefore to be collected from a large number of works on each system and these have been knit together and given a shape which is likely to be more intelligible to people unacquainted with Sanskritic ways of thought. But at the same time I considered it quite undesirable to put any pressure on Indian thoughts in order to make them appear as European. This will explain much of what might appear quaint to a European reader. But while keeping all the thoughts and expressions of the Indian thinkers I have tried to arrange them in a systematic whole in a manner which appeared to me strictly faithful to their clear indications and suggestions. It is only in very few places that I have translated some of the Indian terms by terms of English philosophy, and this I did because it appeared to me that those were approximately the nearest approach to the Indian sense of the term. In all other places I have tried to choose words which have not been made dangerous by the acquirement of technical senses. This however is difficult, for the words which are used in philosophy always acquire some sort of technical sense. I would therefore request my readers to take those words in an unsophisticated sense and associate them with such meanings as are justified by the passages and contexts in which they are used. Some of what will appear as obscure in any system may I hope be removed if it is re-read with care and attention, for unfamiliarity sometimes stands in the way of right comprehension. But I may have also missed giving the proper suggestive links in many places where condensation was inevitable and the systems themselves have also sometimes insoluble difficulties, for no system of philosophy is without its dark and uncomfortable corners.

Though I have begun my work from the Vedic and Brāhmanic stage, my treatment of this period has been very slight. The beginnings of the evolution of philosophical thought, though they can be traced in the later Vedic hymns, are neither connected nor systematic.

More is found in the Brāhmaṇas, but I do not think it worth while to elaborate the broken shreds of thought of this epoch. I could have dealt with the Upaniṣad period more fully, but many works on the subject have already been published in Europe and those who wish to go into details will certainly go to them. I have therefore limited myself to the dominant current flowing through the earlier Upaniṣads. Notices of other currents of thought will be given in connection with the treatment of other systems in the second volume with which they are more intimately connected. It will be noticed that my treatment of early Buddhism is in some places of an inconclusive character. This is largely due to the inconclusive character of the texts which were put into writing long after Buddha in the form of dialogues and where the precision and directness required in philosophy were not contemplated. This has given rise to a number of theories about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of early Buddhism among modern Buddhist scholars and it is not always easy to decide one way or the other without running the risk of being dogmatic; and the scope of my work was also too limited to allow me to indulge in very elaborate discussions of textual difficulties. But still I also have in many places formed theories of my own, whether they are right or wrong it will be for scholars to judge. I had no space for entering into any polemic, but it will be found that my interpretations of the systems are different in some cases from those offered by some European scholars who have worked on them and I leave it to those who are acquainted with the literature of the subject to decide which of us may be in the right. I have not dealt elaborately with the new school of Logic (Navya-Nyāya) of Bengal, for the simple reason that most of the contributions of this school consist in the invention of technical expressions and the emphasis put on the necessity of strict exactitude and absolute preciseness of logical definitions and discussions and these are almost untranslatable in intelligible English. I have however incorporated what important differences of philosophical points of view I could find in it. Discussions of a purely technical character could not be very fruitful in a work like this. The bibliography given of the different Indian systems in the last six chapters is not exhaustive but consists mostly of books which have been actually studied or consulted in the writing of those chapters. Exact references to the pages of the

texts have generally been given in footnotes in those cases where a difference of interpretation was anticipated or where it was felt that a reference to the text would make the matter clearer, or where the opinions of modern writers have been incorporated.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest gratefulness to the Hon'ble Maharaja Sir Manindrachandra Nundy, K.C.I.E. Kashimbazar, Bengal, who has kindly promised to bear the entire expense of the publication of both volumes of the present work.

The name of this noble man is almost a household word in Bengal for the magnanimous gifts that he has made to educational and other causes. Up till now he has made a total gift of about £300,000, of which those devoted to education come to about £200,000. But the man himself is far above the gifts he has made. His sterling character, universal sympathy and friendship, his kindness and amiability make him a veritable Bodhisattva—one of the noblest of men that I have ever seen. Like many other scholars of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for the encouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of my studies and researches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness for him are too deep for utterance.

I am much indebted to my esteemed friends Dr E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library and Mr Douglas Ainslie for their kindly revising the proofs of this work, in the course of which they improved my English in many places. To the former I am also indebted for his attention to the transliteration of a large number of Sanskrit words, and also for the whole-hearted sympathy and great friendliness with which he assisted me with his advice on many points of detail, in particular the exposition of the Buddhist doctrine of the cause of rebirth owes something of its treatment to repeated discussions with him.

I also wish to express my gratefulness to my friend Mr N. K. Siddhanta, M.A., late of the Scottish Churches College, and Mademoiselle Paule Povie for the kind assistance they have rendered in preparing the index. My obligations are also due to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for the honour they have done me in publishing this work.

To the Hon'ble Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., M.A., D.L., D.Sc., Ph.D., the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta,

I owe a debt which is far greater than I can express here, especially for the generous enthusiasm with which he had kindly agreed to accept this work for publication by the Calcutta University, which would have materialised if other circumstances had not changed this arrangement.

To scholars of Indian philosophy who may do me the honour of reading my book and who may be impressed with its inevitable shortcomings and defects, I can only pray in the words of Hemacandra:

*Pramāṇasiddhāntaviruddham atra
Yatkiñciduktam matimāndyadoṣāt
Mātsaryyam utsāryya tadāryyacittāḥ
Prasādam ādhāya viśodhayantu¹.*

¹ May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill feeling kindly correct whatever errors have been here committed through the dullness of my intellect in the way of wrong interpretations and misstatements.

S. D.

TRINITY COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.
February, 1922.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy are but very imperfectly known to the world at large, and it is unfortunate that the condition is no better even in India. There is a small body of Hindu scholars and ascetics living a retired life in solitude, who are well acquainted with the subject, but they do not know English and are not used to modern ways of thinking, and the idea that they ought to write books in vernaculars in order to popularize the subject does not appeal to them. Through the activity of various learned bodies and private individuals both in Europe and in India large numbers of philosophical works in Sanskrit and Pāli have been published, as well as translations of a few of them, but there has been as yet little systematic attempt on the part of scholars to study them and judge their value. There are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems of Indian thought and scarcely a hundredth part of them has been translated. Indian modes of expression, entailing difficult technical philosophical terms are so different from those of European thought, that they can hardly ever be accurately translated. It is therefore very difficult for a person unacquainted with Sanskrit to understand Indian philosophical thought in its true bearing from translations. Pāli is a much easier language than Sanskrit, but a knowledge of Pāli is helpful in understanding only the earliest school of Buddhism, when it was in its semi-philosophical stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficult language. But no one from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literary Sanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and abstruse parts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who can easily understand the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Purāṇas, the Law Books and the literary works, and is also well acquainted with European philosophical thought, may find it literally impossible to understand even small portions of a work of advanced Indian logic, or the dialectical Vedānta. This is due to two reasons, the use of technical terms and of great condensation in expression, and the hidden allusions to doctrines of other systems. The

tendency to conceiving philosophical problems in a clear and unambiguous manner is an important feature of Sanskrit thought, but from the ninth century onwards, the habit of using clear, definite, and precise expressions, began to develop in a very striking manner, and as a result of that a large number of technical terms began to be invented. These terms are seldom properly explained, and it is presupposed that the reader who wants to read the works should have a knowledge of them. Any one in olden times who took to the study of any system of philosophy, had to do so with a teacher, who explained those terms to him. The teacher himself had got it from his teacher, and he from his. There was no tendency to popularize philosophy, for the idea then prevalent was that only the chosen few who had otherwise shown their fitness, deserved to become fit students (*adhikārī*) of philosophy, under the direction of a teacher. Only those who had the grit and high moral strength to devote their whole life to the true understanding of philosophy and the rebuilding of life in accordance with the high truths of philosophy were allowed to study it.

Another difficulty which a beginner will meet is this, that sometimes the same technical terms are used in extremely different senses in different systems. The student must know the meaning of each technical term with reference to the system in which it occurs, and no dictionary will enlighten him much about the matter¹. He will have to pick them up as he advances and finds them used. Allusions to the doctrines of other systems and their refutations during the discussions of similar doctrines in any particular system of thought are often very puzzling even to a well-equipped reader; for he cannot be expected to know all the doctrines of other systems without going through them, and so it often becomes difficult to follow the series of answers and refutations which are poured forth in the course of these discussions. There are two important compendiums in Sanskrit giving a summary of some of the principal systems of Indian thought, viz. the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, and the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra with the commentary of Guṇaratna; but the former is very sketchy and can throw very little light on the understanding of the ontological or epistemological doctrines of any of the systems. It has been translated by Cowell and Gough, but I

¹ Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technical philosophical terms called *Nyāyakośa* has been prepared by M. M. Bhīmācārya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press.

am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible. Guṇaratna's commentary is excellent so far as Jainism is concerned, and it sometimes gives interesting information about other systems, and also supplies us with some short bibliographical notices, but it seldom goes on to explain the epistemological or ontological doctrines or discussions which are so necessary for the right understanding of any of the advanced systems of Indian thought. Thus in the absence of a book which could give us in brief the main epistemological, ontological, and psychological positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for a good Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature, even though he may be acquainted with many of the technical philosophical terms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties of studying Indian philosophy, but if once a person can get himself used to the technical terms and the general positions of the different Indian thinkers and their modes of expression, he can master the whole by patient toil. The technical terms, which are a source of difficulty at the beginning, are of inestimable value in helping us to understand the precise and definite meaning of the writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting or misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I think well-known that avoidance of technical terms has often rendered philosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpretation. The art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every philosopher cannot expect to have it. But when technical expressions are properly formed, even a bad writer can make himself understood. In the early days of Buddhist philosophy in the Pāli literature, this difficulty is greatly felt. There are some technical terms here which are still very elastic and their repetition in different places in more or less different senses heighten the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to be conveyed.

But is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should be written? There are some people who think that the Indians never rose beyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they cannot have any philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term. Thus Professor Frank Thilly of the Cornell University says in his *History of Philosophy*¹, "A universal history of philosophy would include the philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however

¹ New York, 1914, p. 3.

have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of only a few can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise beyond the mythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental peoples, the Hindus, Egyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of mythological and ethical doctrines, and are not thoroughgoing systems of thought: they are shot through with poetry and faith. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to the study of the Western countries, and begin with the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests." There are doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed and untrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters. It is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views, for what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. If they are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and elaborately about the contents of the different systems, I am afraid they will have to go to the originals referred to in the bibliographical notices of the chapters.

There is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for an attempt to write a history of Indian philosophy. Two different reasons are given from two different points of view. It is said that the field of Indian philosophy is so vast, and such a vast literature exists on each of the systems, that it is not possible for anyone to collect his materials directly from the original sources, before separate accounts are prepared by specialists working in each of the particular systems. There is some truth in this objection, but although in some of the important systems the literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them are more or less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious selection of twenty or thirty important works on each of the systems could certainly be made, which would give a fairly correct exposition. In my own undertaking in this direction I have always drawn directly from the original texts, and have always tried to collect my materials from those sources in which they appear at their best. My space has been very limited and I have chosen the features which appeared to me to be the most important. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult problems and diverse important bearings of each of the systems to many interesting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be excused in a history of philosophy which does not aim at completeness. There are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and

these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler than the present one. At any rate it may be hoped that the imperfections of the present attempt will be a stimulus to those whose better and more competent efforts will supersede it. No attempt ought to be called impossible on account of its imperfections.

In the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper and accurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection is also partially valid. But this defect does not affect us so much as one would at first sight suppose; for, though the dates of the earlier beginnings are very obscure, yet, in later times, we are in a position to affirm some dates and to point out priority and posteriority in the case of other thinkers. As most of the systems developed side by side through many centuries their mutual relations also developed, and these could be well observed. The special nature of this development has been touched on in the fourth chapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings and a continuous course of development through the succeeding centuries, and it is not possible to take the state of the philosophy of a particular system at a particular time and contrast it with the state of that system at a later time; for the later state did not supersede the previous state, but only showed a more coherent form of it, which was generally true to the original system but was more determinate. Evolution through history has in Western countries often brought forth the development of more coherent types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the types remained the same, their development through history made them more and more coherent and determinate. Most of the parts were probably existent in the earlier stages, but they were in an undifferentiated state; through the criticism and conflict of the different schools existing side by side the parts of each of the systems of thought became more and more differentiated, determinate, and coherent. In some cases this development has been almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms have been lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite could be made out of them. Wherever such a differentiation could be made in the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do it. But I have never considered it desirable that the philosophical interest should be subordinated to the chronological. It is no

doubt true that more definite chronological information would be a very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little chronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in forming a general notion about the growth and development of the different systems by mutual association and conflict. If the condition of the development of philosophy in India had been the same as in Europe, definite chronological knowledge would be considered much more indispensable. For, when one system supersedes another, it is indispensably necessary that we should know which preceded and which succeeded. But when the systems are developing side by side, and when we are getting them in their richer and better forms, the interest with regard to the conditions, nature and environment of their early origin has rather a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried as best I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlier stages of some of the systems, but though the various features of these systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable, yet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating the whole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the correct dates of the thinkers of the same system we could not treat them separately, as is done in European philosophy, without unnecessarily repeating the same thing twenty times over; for they all dealt with the same system, and tried to bring out the same type of thought in more and more determinate forms.

The earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist mostly of hymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc. Excepting in some of the hymns of the later parts of the work (probably about 1000 B.C.), there is not much philosophy in them in our sense of the term. It is here that we first find intensely interesting philosophical questions of a more or less cosmological character expressed in terms of poetry and imagination. In the later Vedic works called the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas written mostly in prose, which followed the Vedic hymns, there are two tendencies, viz. one that sought to establish the magical forms of ritualistic worship, and the other which indulged in speculative thinking through crude generalizations. This latter tendency was indeed much feebler than the former, and it might appear that the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up what little of philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were trying to express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency

existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written in prose and verse called the Upaniṣads, which contain various sorts of philosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic but also some pluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not reasoned statements, but utterances of truths intuitively perceived or felt as unquestionably real and indubitable, and carrying great force, vigour, and persuasiveness with them. It is very probable that many of the earliest parts of this literature are as old as 500 B.C. to 700 B.C. Buddhist philosophy began with the Buddha from some time about 500 B.C. There is reason to believe that Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or other of its vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or eleventh century A.D. The earliest beginnings of the other Indian systems of thought are also to be sought chiefly between the age of the Buddha to about 200 B.C. Jaina philosophy was probably prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlier days, when it came in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, it does not seem to me that the Jaina thought came much in contact with other systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vaiṣṇava thought in later times, Jaina thought is seldom alluded to by the Hindu writers or later Buddhists, though some Jains like Haribhadra and Guṇaratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist systems. The non-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal may to a certain extent explain it, but there may be other reasons too which it is difficult for us to guess. It is interesting to note that, though there have been some dissensions amongst the Jains about dogmas and creeds, Jaina philosophy has not split into many schools of thought more or less differing from one another as Buddhist thought did.

The first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina philosophy and the six systems of Hindu thought. These six systems of orthodox Hindu thought are the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā (generally known as Pūrva Mīmāṃsā), and the Vedānta (known also as Uttara Mīmāṃsā). Of these what is differently known as Sāṃkhya and Yoga are but different schools of one system. The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya in later times became so mixed up that, though in early times the similarity of the former with Mīmāṃsā was greater than that with Nyāya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost the same systems. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika have therefore been treated

together. In addition to these systems some theistic systems began to grow prominent from the ninth century A.D. They also probably had their early beginnings at the time of the Upaniṣads. But at that time their interest was probably concentrated on problems of morality and religion. It is not improbable that these were associated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no works treating them in a systematic way are now available. One of their most important early works is the *Bhagavadgītā*. This book is rightly regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu thought. It is written in verse, and deals with moral, religious, and metaphysical problems, in a loose form. It is its lack of system and method which gives it its peculiar charm more akin to the poetry of the Upaniṣads than to the dialectical and systematic Hindu thought. From the ninth century onwards attempts were made to supplement these loose theistic ideas which were floating about and forming integral parts of religious creeds, by metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic and pluralistic, and so are all these systems, which are known as different schools of Vaiṣṇava philosophy. Most of the Vaiṣṇava thinkers wished to show that their systems were taught in the Upaniṣads, and thus wrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and also wrote commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra*, the classical exposition of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. In addition to the works of these Vaiṣṇava thinkers there sprang up another class of theistic works which were of a more eclectic nature. These also had their beginnings in periods as old as the Upaniṣads. They are known as the Śaiva and Tantra thought, and are dealt with in the second volume of this work.

We thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thought can be traced to some time between 600 B.C. to 100 or 200 B.C. It is extremely difficult to say anything about the relative priority of the systems with any degree of certainty. Some conjectural attempts have been made in this work with regard to some of the systems, but how far they are correct, it will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during the earliest manifestation of a system some crude outlines only are traceable. As time went on the systems of thought began to develop side by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an unbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system of Hindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now

care to write any new works upon them. In the history of the growth of any system of Hindu thought we find that as time went on, and as new problems were suggested, each system tried to answer them consistently with its own doctrines. The order in which we have taken the philosophical systems could not be strictly a chronological one. Thus though it is possible that the earliest speculations of some form of Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Mīmāṃsā were prior to Buddhism yet they have been treated after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of these systems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my opinion the Vaiśeṣika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic, but it has been treated later, partly on account of its association with Nyāya, and partly on account of the fact that all its commentaries are of a much later date. It seems to me almost certain that enormous quantities of old philosophical literature have been lost, which if found could have been of use to us in showing the stages of the early growth of the systems and their mutual relations. But as they are not available we have to be satisfied with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawn my materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of the literature of each system which I have put in before beginning the study of any particular system of thought.

In my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original sources as accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old and unfamiliar modes of expression, but this course seemed to me to be preferable to the adoption of European modes of thought for the expression of Indian ideas. But even in spite of this striking similarities to many of the modern philosophical doctrines and ideas will doubtless be noticed. This only proves that the human mind follows more or less the same modes of rational thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indian thought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my present attempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction, I might say that many of the philosophical doctrines of European philosophy are essentially the same as those found in Indian philosophy. The main difference is often the difference of the point of view from which the same problems appeared in such a variety of forms in the two countries. My own view with regard to the net value of Indian philosophical development will be expressed in the concluding chapter of the second volume of the present work.

CHAPTER II

THE VEDAS, BRĀHMAṆAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

The Vedas and their antiquity.

THE sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be the earliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It is indeed difficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions came into existence. Many shrewd guesses have been offered, but none of them can be proved to be incontestably true. Max Müller supposed the date to be 1200 B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. and Bāl Gaṅgādhara Tilak 4000 B.C. The ancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their literary, religious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down from mouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity; and the Hindus generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was therefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God to the sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages who were the “seers” (*mantradraṣṭā*) of the hymns. Thus we find that when some time had elapsed after the composition of the Vedas, people had come to look upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had, theoretically at least, no beginning in time, though they were believed to have been revealed at some unknown remote period at the beginning of each creation.

The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind.

When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no system of writing prevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous zeal of the Brahmins, who got the whole Vedic literature by heart by hearing it from their preceptors, that it has been transmitted most faithfully to us through the course of the last 3000 years or more with little or no interpolations at all. The religious history of India had suffered considerable changes in the latter periods, since the time of the Vedic civilization, but such was the reverence paid to the Vedas that they had ever remained as the highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus at all times. Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindus at birth, marriage, death, etc., are performed according to the old

Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times a day are the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as prayer verses two or three thousand years ago. A little insight into the life of an ordinary Hindu of the present day will show that the system of image-worship is one that has been grafted upon his life, the regular obligatory duties of which are ordered according to the old Vedic rites. Thus an orthodox Brahmin can dispense with image-worship if he likes, but not so with his daily Vedic prayers or other obligatory ceremonies. Even at this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money for the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals. Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas base upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as authority. Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their allegiance to the Vedas, but the adherents of each one of them would often quarrel with others and maintain its superiority by trying to prove that it and it alone was the faithful follower of the Vedas and represented correctly their views. The laws which regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious customs and rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be but mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are held to be obligatory on their authority. Even under British administration, in the inheritance of property, adoption, and in such other legal transactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this claims to draw its authority from the Vedas. To enter into details is unnecessary. But suffice it to say that the Vedas, far from being regarded as a dead literature of the past, are still looked upon as the origin and source of almost all literatures except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may say that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, the orthodox Hindu life may still be regarded in the main as an adumbration of the Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed its light all through the past.

Classification of the Vedic literature.

A beginner who is introduced for the first time to the study of later Sanskrit literature is likely to appear somewhat confused when he meets with authoritative texts of diverse purport and subjects having the same generic name "Veda" or "Śruti" (from *śru* to hear); for Veda in its wider sense is not the name of any

particular book, but of the literature of a particular epoch extending over a long period, say two thousand years or so. As this literature represents the total achievements of the Indian people in different directions for such a long period, it must of necessity be of a diversified character. If we roughly classify this huge literature from the points of view of age, language, and subject matter, we can point out four different types, namely the Saṃhitā or collection of verses (*sam* together, *hita* put), Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas ("forest treatises") and the Upaniṣads. All these literatures, both prose and verse, were looked upon as so holy that in early times it was thought almost a sacrilege to write them; they were therefore learnt by heart by the Brahmins from the mouth of their preceptors and were hence called *śruti* (literally anything heard)¹.

The Saṃhitās.

There are four collections or Saṃhitās, namely Ṛg-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the Ṛg-Veda is probably the earliest. The Sāma-Veda has practically no independent value, for it consists of stanzas taken (excepting only 75) entirely from the Ṛg-Veda, which were meant to be sung to certain fixed melodies, and may thus be called the book of chants. The Yajur-Veda however contains in addition to the verses taken from the Ṛg-Veda many original prose formulas. The arrangement of the verses of the Sāma-Veda is solely with reference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the contents of the Yajur-Veda are arranged in the order in which the verses were actually employed in the various religious sacrifices. It is therefore called the Veda of Yajus—sacrificial prayers. These may be contrasted with the arrangement in the Ṛg-Veda in this, that there the verses are generally arranged in accordance with the gods who are adored in them. Thus, for example, first we get all the poems addressed to Agni or the Fire-god, then all those to the god Indra and so on. The fourth collection, the Atharva-Veda, probably attained its present form considerably later than the Ṛg-Veda. In spirit, however, as Professor Macdonell says, "it is not only entirely different from the *Rigveda* but represents a much more primitive stage of thought. While the *Rigveda* deals almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a com-

¹ Pāṇini, III. iii. 94.

paratively advanced and refined sacerdotal class, the *Atharva-Veda* is, in the main a book of spells and incantations appealing to the demon world, and teems with notions about witchcraft current among the lower grades of the population, and derived from an immemorial antiquity. These two, thus complementary to each other in contents are obviously the most important of the four Vedas¹.”

The Brāhmaṇas².

After the Saṃhitās there grew up the theological treatises called the Brāhmaṇas, which were of a distinctly different literary type. They are written in prose, and explain the sacred significance of the different rituals to those who are not already familiar with them. “They reflect,” says Professor Macdonell, “the spirit of an age in which all intellectual activity is concentrated on the sacrifice, describing its ceremonies, discussing its value, speculating on its origin and significance.” These works are full of dogmatic assertions, fanciful symbolism and speculations of an unbounded imagination in the field of sacrificial details. The sacrificial ceremonials were probably never so elaborate at the time when the early hymns were composed. But when the collections of hymns were being handed down from generation to generation the ceremonials became more and more complicated. Thus there came about the necessity of the distribution of the different sacrificial functions among several distinct classes of priests. We may assume that this was a period when the caste system was becoming established, and when the only thing which could engage wise and religious minds was sacrifice and its elaborate rituals. Free speculative thinking was thus subordinated to the service of the sacrifice, and the result was the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic

¹ A. A. Macdonell's *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 31.

² Weber (*Hist. Ind. Lit.*, p. 11, note) says that the word Brāhmaṇa signifies “that which relates to prayer *brahman*.” Max Müller (*S. B. E.* 1. p. lxvi) says that Brāhmaṇa meant “originally the sayings of Brahmins, whether in the general sense of priests, or in the more special sense of Brahmin-priests.” Eggeling (*S. B. E.* xii. Introd. p. xxii) says that the Brāhmaṇas were so called “probably either because they were intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman) generally; or because they were, for the most part, the authoritative utterances of such as were thoroughly versed in Vedic and sacrificial lore and competent to act as Brahmins or superintending priests.” But in view of the fact that the Brāhmaṇas were also supposed to be as much revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber's view is the correct one.

system, unparalleled anywhere but among the Gnostics. It is now generally believed that the close of the Brāhmaṇa period was not later than 500 B.C.

The Āraṇyakas.

As a further development of the Brāhmaṇas however we get the Āraṇyakas or forest treatises. These works were probably composed for old men who had retired into the forest and were thus unable to perform elaborate sacrifices requiring a multitude of accessories and articles which could not be procured in forests. In these, meditations on certain symbols were supposed to be of great merit, and they gradually began to supplant the sacrifices as being of a superior order. It is here that we find that amongst a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideas began to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature of truth became gradually substituted in their place. To take an illustration from the beginning of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka we find that instead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice (*aśvamedha*) there are directions for meditating upon the dawn (*Uṣas*) as the head of the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse, the air as its life, and so on. This is indeed a distinct advancement of the claims of speculation or meditation over the actual performance of the complicated ceremonials of sacrifice. The growth of the subjective speculation, as being capable of bringing the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession of Vedic ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophic meditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thus we find that the Āraṇyaka age was a period during which free thinking tried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism which had fettered it for a long time. It was thus that the Āraṇyakas could pave the way for the Upaniṣads, revive the germs of philosophic speculation in the Vedas, and develop them in a manner which made the Upaniṣads the source of all philosophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought.

The Ṛg-Veda, its civilization.

The hymns of the Ṛg-Veda are neither the productions of a single hand nor do they probably belong to any single age. They were composed probably at different periods by different sages, and it is not improbable that some of them were composed

before the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were handed down from mouth to mouth and gradually swelled through the new additions that were made by the poets of succeeding generations. It was when the collection had increased to a very considerable extent that it was probably arranged in the present form, or in some other previous forms to which the present arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflect the civilization of the Aryan people at different periods of antiquity before and after they had come to India. This unique monument of a long vanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that is genuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of the primitive society which produced it—the oldest book of the Aryan race. The principal means of sustenance were cattle-keeping and the cultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe, and watering the ground when necessary with artificial canals. “The chief food consists,” as Kaegi says, “together with bread, of various preparations of milk, cakes of flour and butter, many sorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots, is little used, and was probably eaten only at the great feasts and family gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more important part than eating¹.” The wood-worker built war-chariots and wagons, as also more delicate carved works and artistic cups. Metal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. The women understood the plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing; they manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for men and covering for animals. The group of individuals forming a tribe was the highest political unit; each of the different families forming a tribe was under the sway of the father or the head of the family. Kingship was probably hereditary and in some cases electoral. Kingship was nowhere absolute, but limited by the will of the people. Most developed ideas of justice, right and law, were present in the country. Thus Kaegi says, “the hymns strongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the people were persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of the world were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the realm of nature, and that every wrong act, even the unconscious, was punished and the sin expiated².” Thus it is only right and proper to think that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree

¹ *The Rigveda*, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13.

² *Ibid.* p. 18.

of civilization, but nowhere was the sincere spirit of the Aryans more manifested than in religion, which was the most essential and dominant feature of almost all the hymns, except a few secular ones. Thus Kaegi says, "The whole significance of the Rigveda in reference to the general history of religion, as has repeatedly been pointed out in modern times, rests upon this, that it presents to us the development of religious conceptions from the earliest beginnings to the deepest apprehension of the godhead and its relation to man¹."

The Vedic Gods.

The hymns of the Ṛg-Veda were almost all composed in praise of the gods. The social and other materials are of secondary importance, as these references had only to be mentioned incidentally in giving vent to their feelings of devotion to the god. The gods here are however personalities presiding over the diverse powers of nature or forming their very essence. They have therefore no definite, systematic and separate characters like the Greek gods or the gods of the later Indian mythical works, the Purāṇas. The powers of nature such as the storm, the rain, the thunder, are closely associated with one another, and the gods associated with them are also similar in character. The same epithets are attributed to different gods and it is only in a few specific qualities that they differ from one another. In the later mythological compositions of the Purāṇas the gods lost their character as hypostatic powers of nature, and thus became actual personalities and characters having their tales of joy and sorrow like the mortal here below. The Vedic gods may be contrasted with them in this, that they are of an impersonal nature, as the characters they display are mostly but expressions of the powers of nature. To take an example, the fire or Agni is described, as Kaegi has it, as one that "lies concealed in the softer wood, as in a chamber, until, called forth by the rubbing in the early morning hour, he suddenly springs forth in gleaming brightness. The sacrificer takes and lays him on the wood. When the priests pour melted butter upon him, he leaps up crackling and neighing like a horse—he whom men love to see increasing like their own prosperity. They wonder at him, when, decking himself with

¹ *The Rigveda*, by Kaegi, p. 26.

changing colors like a suitor, equally beautiful on all sides, he presents to all sides his front.

All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light,
His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance,
The changing shimmer like that floats upon the stream,
So Agni's rays gleam over bright and never cease¹."

R. V. I. 143. 3.

They would describe the wind (Vāta) and adore him and say

"In what place was he born, and from whence comes he?
The vital breath of gods, the world's great offspring,
The God where'er he will moves at his pleasure:
His rushing sound we hear—what his appearance, no one²."

R. V. x. 168. 3, 4.

It was the forces of nature and her manifestations, on earth here, the atmosphere around and above us, or in the Heaven beyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion and imagination of the Vedic poets. Thus with the exception of a few abstract gods of whom we shall presently speak and some dual divinities, the gods may be roughly classified as the terrestrial, atmospheric, and celestial.

Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism.

The plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirer to think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an intelligent reader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism but a simple primitive stage of belief to which both of these may be said to owe their origin. The gods here do not preserve their proper places as in a polytheistic faith, but each one of them shrinks into insignificance or shines as supreme according as it is the object of adoration or not. The Vedic poets were the children of nature. Every natural phenomenon excited their wonder, admiration or veneration. The poet is struck with wonder that "the rough red cow gives soft white milk." The appearance or the setting of the sun sends a thrill into the minds of the Vedic sage and with wonder-gazing eyes he exclaims:

"Undropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it
That downward turned he falls not downward?
The guide of his ascending path,—who saw it¹?" R. V. IV. 13. 5.

The sages wonder how "the sparkling waters of all rivers flow into one ocean without ever filling it." The minds of the Vedic

¹ *The Rigveda*, by Kaegi, p. 35.

² *Ibid.* p. 38.

people as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable and fresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for them to accord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitude of gods nor to universalize them in a monotheistic creed. They hypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawed them or filled them with gratefulness and joy by its beneficent or aesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the devotion or admiration of their mind was the most supreme for the time. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Müller has called Henotheism or Kathenotheism: "a belief in single gods, each in turn standing out as the highest. And since the gods are thought of as specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special concerns and desires, call most of all on that god to whom they ascribe the most power in the matter,—to whose department if I may say so, their wish belongs. This god alone is present to the mind of the suppliant; with him for the time being is associated everything that can be said of a divine being;—he is the highest, the only god, before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however, no offence or depreciation of any other god¹." "Against this theory it has been urged," as Macdonell rightly says in his *Vedic Mythology*², "that Vedic deities are not represented 'as independent of all the rest,' since no religion brings its gods into more frequent and varied juxtaposition and combination, and that even the mightiest gods of the Veda are made dependent on others. Thus Varuṇa and Sūrya are subordinate to Indra (I. 101), Varuṇa and the Aśvins submit to the power of Viṣṇu (I. 156)...Even when a god is spoken of as unique or chief (*eka*), as is natural enough in laudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheistic force, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the context or even by the same verse³." "Henotheism is therefore an appearance," says Macdonell, "rather than a reality, an appearance produced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropomorphism, by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position of a Zeus as the constant head of the pantheon, by the natural tendency of the priest or singer in extolling a particular god to exaggerate his greatness and to ignore other gods, and by the

¹ *The Rigveda*, by Kaegi, p. 27.

² See *Ibid.* p. 33. See also Arrowsmith's note on it for other references to Henotheism.

³ Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, pp. 16, 17.

growing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. the refrain of 3, 35) each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine¹." But whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggeration of the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that this stage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic, but one which had a tendency towards them both, although it was not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them. The tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called a monotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of different deities as independent of one another and yet existing side by side was a tendency towards polytheism.

Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajāpati, Viśvakarma.

This tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest and highest gradually brought forth the conception of a supreme Lord of all beings (Prajāpati), not by a process of conscious generalization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind, able to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral and physical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be perceived. Thus the epithet Prajāpati or the Lord of beings, which was originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognized as a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is said in R. V. x. 121²:

In the beginning rose Hiraṇyagarbha,
Born as the only lord of all existence.
This earth he settled firm and heaven established :
What god shall we adore with our oblations ?
Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding
All creatures must obey, the bright gods even ;
Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal :
What god shall we adore with our oblations ?
Who by his might alone became the monarch
Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers,
Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal :
What god shall we adore with our oblations ?
Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains,
The ocean and the distant stream exhibit ;
Whose arms extended are these spreading regions :
What god shall we adore with our oblations ?
Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring,
Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens ;
Who measured out the air's extended spaces :
What god shall we adore with our oblations ?

¹ Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, p. 17.

² *The Rigveda*, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89.

Similar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Viśvakarma (All-creator)¹. He is said to be father and procreator of all beings, though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters. It is to him that the sage says,

Who is our father, our creator, maker,
Who every place doth know and every creature,
By whom alone to gods their names were given,
To him all other creatures go to ask him². R. V. x. 82. 3.

Brahma.

The conception of Brahman which has been the highest glory for the Vedānta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged in the R̥g-Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. The meanings that Sāyaṇa the celebrated commentator of the Vedas gives of the word as collected by Haug are: (a) food, food offering, (b) the chant of the sāma-singer, (c) magical formula or text, (d) duly completed ceremonies, (e) the chant and sacrificial gift together, (f) the recitation of the hotṛ priest, (g) great. Roth says that it also means “the devotion which manifests itself as longing and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to the gods.” But it is only in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa that the conception of Brahman has acquired a great significance as the supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods. Thus the Śatapatha says, “Verily in the beginning this (universe) was the Brahman (neut.). It created the gods; and, having created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this (terrestrial) world, Vāyu the air, and Sūrya the sky....Then the Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up to the sphere beyond, it considered, ‘How can I descend again into these worlds?’ It then descended again by means of these two, Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name; and that again which has no name and which one knows by its form, ‘this is (of a certain) form,’ that is form : as far as there are Form and Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeed are the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knows these two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force³. In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in the Universe and is identified with Prajāpati, Puruṣa and Prāṇa

¹ See *The R̥gveda*, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir’s *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. IV. pp. 5-11.

² Kaegi’s translation.

³ See Eggeling’s translation of Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa *S.B.E.* vol. XLIV. pp. 27, 28.

(the vital air¹). In another place Brahman is described as being the Svayambhū (self-born) performing austerities, who offered his own self in the creatures and the creatures in his own self, and thus compassed supremacy, sovereignty and lordship over all creatures². The conception of the supreme man (Puruṣa) in the Ṛg-Veda also supposes that the supreme man pervades the world with only a fourth part of Himself, whereas the remaining three parts transcend to a region beyond. He is at once the present, past and future³.

Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma.

It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic tendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices. On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually growing in their elaborate details. The direct result of this growth contributed however to relegate the gods to a relatively unimportant position, and to raise the dignity of the magical characteristics of the sacrifice as an institution which could give the desired fruits of themselves. The offerings at a sacrifice were not dictated by a devotion with which we are familiar under Christian or Vaiṣṇava influence. The sacrifice taken as a whole is conceived as Haug notes "to be a kind of machinery in which every piece must tally with the other," the slightest discrepancy in the performance of even a minute ritualistic detail, say in the pouring of the melted butter on the fire, or the proper placing of utensils employed in the sacrifice, or even the misplacing of a mere straw contrary to the injunctions was sufficient to spoil the whole sacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it might be performed. Even if a word was mispronounced the most dreadful results might follow. Thus when Tvaṣṭṛ performed a sacrifice for the production of a demon who would be able to kill his enemy Indra, owing to the mistaken accent of a single word the object was reversed and the demon produced was killed by Indra. But if the sacrifice could be duly performed down to the minutest detail, there was no power which could arrest or delay the fruition of the object. Thus the objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled not by the grace of the gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice. The performance of the rituals invariably produced certain mystic or magical results by virtue of which the object desired

¹ See *S. B. E.* XLIII. pp. 59, 60, 400 and XLIV. p. 409.

² See *Ibid.* XLIV. p. 418.

³ R. V. x. 90, Puruṣa Sūkta.

by the sacrificer was fulfilled in due course like the fulfilment of a natural law in the physical world. The sacrifice was believed to have existed from eternity like the Vedas. The creation of the world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice performed by the supreme Being. It exists as Haug says "as an invisible thing at all times and is like the latent power of electricity in an electrifying machine, requiring only the operation of a suitable apparatus in order to be elicited." The sacrifice is not offered to a god with a view to propitiate him or to obtain from him welfare on earth or bliss in Heaven; these rewards are directly produced by the sacrifice itself through the correct performance of complicated and interconnected ceremonies which constitute the sacrifice. Though in each sacrifice certain gods were invoked and received the offerings, the gods themselves were but instruments in bringing about the sacrifice or in completing the course of mystical ceremonies composing it. Sacrifice is thus regarded as possessing a mystical potency superior even to the gods, who it is sometimes stated attained to their divine rank by means of sacrifice. Sacrifice was regarded as almost the only kind of duty, and it was also called *karma* or *kriyā* (action) and the unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for good or for bad, moral or immoral (for there were many kinds of sacrifices which were performed for injuring one's enemies or gaining worldly prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others) were destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here that the first recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in nature under the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in the use of the word *Ṛta* (literally the course of things). This word was also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the "'order' in the moral world as truth and 'right' and in the religious world as sacrifice or 'rite'¹" and its unalterable law of producing effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that it is here that we find the first germs of the law of karma, which exercises such a dominating control over Indian thought up to the present day. Thus we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic hymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complex system of sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their course towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate reality of the universe.

¹ Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, p. 11.

Cosmogony—Mythological and philosophical.

The cosmogony of the Rg-Veda may be looked at from two aspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythological aspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says, "The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical production, the work of carpenter's and joiner's skill; the other represents it as the result of natural generation¹." Thus in the Rg-Veda we find that the poet in one place says, "what was the wood and what was the tree out of which they built heaven and earth?" The answer given to this question in Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa is "Brahman the wood and Brahman the tree from which the heaven and earth were made²." Heaven and Earth are sometimes described as having been supported with posts³. They are also sometimes spoken of as universal parents, and parentage is sometimes attributed to Aditi and Dakṣa.

Under this philosophical aspect the semi-pantheistic Man-hymn⁴ attracts our notice. The supreme man as we have already noticed above is there said to be the whole universe, whatever has been and shall be; he is the lord of immortality who has become diffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate, and all beings came out of him; from his navel came the atmosphere; from his head arose the sky; from his feet came the earth; from his ear the four quarters. Again there are other hymns in which the Sun is called the soul (*ātman*) of all that is movable and all that is immovable⁵. There are also statements to the effect that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the sages⁶. The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the supreme Lord of the world called the golden egg (*Hiraṇyagarbha*⁷). In some passages it is said "Brahmaṇaspati blew forth these births like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent: thereafter the regions sprang, thereafter, from Uttānapada⁸." The most remarkable and sublime hymn in which the first germs of philosophic speculation

¹ Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, p. 11.

² R. V. x. 81. 4.

³ Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. 6.

⁴ Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, p. 11; also R. V. II. 15 and IV. 56.

⁵ R. V. x. 90.

⁶ R. V. I. 115.

⁷ R. V. I. 164. 46.

⁸ R. V. x. 121.

⁹ Muir's translation of R. V. x. 72; Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. v. p. 48.

with regard to the wonderful mystery of the origin of the world are found is the 129th hymn of R. V. x.

1. Then there was neither being nor not-being.
The atmosphere was not, nor sky above it.
What covered all? and where? by what protected?
Was there the fathomless abyss of waters?
2. Then neither death nor deathless existed;
Of day and night there was yet no distinction.
Alone that one breathed calmly, self-supported,
Other than It was none, nor aught above It.
3. Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden;
The universe was undistinguished water.
That which in void and emptiness lay hidden
Alone by power of fervor was developed.
4. Then for the first time there arose desire,
Which was the primal germ of mind, within it.
And sages, searching in their heart, discovered
In Nothing the connecting bond of Being.
.
.
.
6. Who is it knows? Who here can tell us surely
From what and how this universe has risen?
And whether not till after it the gods lived?
Who then can know from what it has arisen?
7. The source from which this universe has risen,
And whether it was made, or uncreated,
He only knows, who from the highest heaven
Rules, the all-seeing lord—or does not He know¹?

The earliest commentary on this is probably a passage in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (x. 5. 3. 1) which says that “in the beginning this (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent; in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did not exist: there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been declared by the Rishi (Rg-Veda x. 129, 1), ‘There was then neither the non-existent nor the existent’ for Mind was, as it were, neither existent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to become manifest,—more defined, more substantial: it sought after a self (a body); it practised austerity: it acquired consistency².” In the Atharva-Veda also we find it stated that all forms of the universe were comprehended within the god Skambha³.

Thus we find that even in the period of the Vedas there sprang forth such a philosophic yearning, at least among some who could

¹ *The Rigveda*, by Kaegi, p. 90. R. V. x. 129.

² See Eggeling's translation of *Ś. B., S. B. E.* vol. XLIII. pp. 374, 375.

³ *A. V.* x. 7. 10.

question whether this universe was at all a creation or not, which could think of the origin of the world as being enveloped in the mystery of a primal non-differentiation of being and non-being ; and which could think that it was the primal One which by its inherent fervour gave rise to the desire of a creation as the first manifestation of the germ of mind, from which the universe sprang forth through a series of mysterious gradual processes. In the Brāhmaṇas, however, we find that the cosmogonic view generally requires the agency of a creator, who is not however always the starting point, and we find that the theory of evolution is combined with the theory of creation, so that Prajāpati is sometimes spoken of as the creator while at other times the creator is said to have floated in the primeval water as a cosmic golden egg.

Eschatology ; the Doctrine of Ātman.

There seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul could be separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it could exist after death, though we do not find there any trace of the doctrine of transmigration in a developed form. In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa it is said that those who do not perform rites with correct knowledge are born again after death and suffer death again. In a hymn of the R̥g-Veda (x. 58) the soul (*manas*) of a man apparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from the trees, herbs, the sky, the sun, etc. In many of the hymns there is also the belief in the existence of another world, where the highest material joys are attained as a result of the performance of the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneath where the evil-doers are punished. In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa we find that the dead pass between two fires which burn the evil-doers, but let the good go by¹; it is also said there that everyone is born again after death, is weighed in a balance, and receives reward or punishment according as his works are good or bad. It is easy to see that scattered ideas like these with regard to the destiny of the soul of man according to the sacrifice that he performs or other good or bad deeds form the first rudiments of the later doctrine of metempsychosis. The idea that man enjoys or suffers, either in another world or by being born in this world according to his good or bad deeds, is the first beginning of the moral idea, though in the Brahmanic days the good deeds were

¹ See Ś. B. i. 9. 3, and also Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, pp. 166, 167.

more often of the nature of sacrificial duties than ordinary good works. These ideas of the possibilities of a necessary connection of the enjoyments and sorrows of a man with his good and bad works when combined with the notion of an inviolable law or order, which we have already seen was gradually growing with the conception of *ṛta*, and the unalterable law which produces the effects of sacrificial works, led to the Law of Karma and the doctrine of transmigration. The words which denote soul in the *Ṛg-Veda* are *manas*, *ātman* and *asu*. The word *ātman* however which became famous in later Indian thought is generally used to mean vital breath. *Manas* is regarded as the seat of thought and emotion, and it seems to be regarded, as Macdonell says, as dwelling in the heart¹. It is however difficult to understand how *ātman* as vital breath, or as a separable part of man going out of the dead man came to be regarded as the ultimate essence or reality in man and the universe. There is however at least one passage in the *Ṛg-Veda* where the poet penetrating deeper and deeper passes from the vital breath (*asu*) to the blood, and thence to *ātman* as the inmost self of the world ; “Who has seen how the first-born, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was born from the Boneless (the shapeless)? where was the vital breath, the blood, the Self (*ātman*) of the world? Who went to ask him that knows it?” In *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 1. 23, however, it is said that *Prajāpati* after having created his self (as the world) with his own self entered into it. In *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* the *ātman* is called omnipresent, and it is said that he who knows him is no more stained by evil deeds. Thus we find that in the pre-Upaniṣad Vedic literature *ātman* probably was first used to denote “vital breath” in man, then the self of the world, and then the self in man. It is from this last stage that we find the traces of a growing tendency to looking at the self of man as the omnipresent supreme principle of the universe, the knowledge of which makes a man sinless and pure.

Conclusion.

Looking at the advancement of thought in the *Ṛg-Veda* we find first that a fabric of thought was gradually growing which not only looked upon the universe as a correlation of parts or a

¹ Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, p. 166 and R. V. VIII. 89.

² R. V. 1. 164. 4 and Deussen's article on *Ātman* in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

construction made of them, but sought to explain it as having emanated from one great being who is sometimes described as one with the universe and surpassing it, and at other times as being separate from it; the agnostic spirit which is the mother of philosophic thought is seen at times to be so bold as to express doubts even on the most fundamental questions of creation—"Who knows whether this world was ever created or not?" Secondly, the growth of sacrifices has helped to establish the unalterable nature of the law by which the (sacrificial) actions produced their effects of themselves. It also lessened the importance of deities as being the supreme masters of the world and our fate, and the tendency of henotheism gradually diminished their multiple character and advanced the monotheistic tendency in some quarters. Thirdly, the soul of man is described as being separable from his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in another world according to his good or bad deeds; the doctrine that the soul of man could go to plants, etc., or that it could again be re-born on earth, is also hinted at in certain passages, and this may be regarded as sowing the first seeds of the later doctrine of transmigration. The self (*ātman*) is spoken of in one place as the essence of the world, and when we trace the idea in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas we see that *ātman* has begun to mean the supreme essence in man as well as in the universe, and has thus approached the great Ātman doctrine of the Upaniṣads.¹

CHAPTER III

THE EARLIER UPANIṢADS¹. (700 B.C.—600 B.C.)

The place of the Upaniṣads in Vedic literature.

THOUGH it is generally held that the Upaniṣads are usually attached as appendices to the Āraṇyakas which are again attached to the Brāhmaṇas, yet it cannot be said that their distinction as separate treatises is always observed. Thus we find in some cases that subjects which we should expect to be discussed in a Brāhmaṇa are introduced into the Āraṇyakas and the Āraṇyaka materials are sometimes fused into the great bulk of Upaniṣad teaching. This shows that these three literatures gradually grew up in one

¹ There are about 112 Upaniṣads which have been published by the "Nirṇaya-Sāgara" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are 1 Íśā, 2 Kena, 3 Kaṭha, 4 Praśna, 5 Muṇḍaka, 6 Māṇḍūkya, 7 Taittiriya, 8 Aitareya, 9 Chāndogya, 10 Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 11 Śvetāśvatara, 12 Kauṣītaki, 13 Maitreyī, 14 Kaivalya, 15 Jābāla, 16 Brahmaparabrahma, 17 Haṃsa, 18 Āruṇika, 19 Garbha, 20 Nārāyaṇa, 21 Nārāyaṇa, 22 Paramahansa, 23 Brahma, 24 Amṛtanāda, 25 Atharvaśiras, 26 Atharvaśikhā, 27 Maitrāyaṇī, 28 Bṛhajjābāla, 29 Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpinī, 30 Nṛsiṃhotataratāpinī, 31 Kālāgnirudra, 32 Subāla, 33 Kṣurikā, 34 Yantrikā, 35 Sarvasāra, 36 Nirālamba, 37 Śukarahasya, 38 Vajrasūcikā, 39 Tejobindu, 40 Nādaḥindu, 41 Dhyānaḥindu, 42 Brahmavidyā, 43 Yogatattva, 44 Ātmabodha, 45 Nārada-parivrajaka, 46 Trīśikhilbrāhmaṇa, 47 Sītā, 48 Yogacūḍāmaṇi, 49 Nirvāṇa, 50 Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇa, 51 Dakṣiṇāmūrti, 52 Śarabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripādvibhūtimahānārāyaṇa, 55 Advaitatāraka, 56 Rāmāraṇya, 57 Rāmapūrvatāpinī, 58 Rāmottaratāpinī, 59 Vāsudeva, 60 Mudgala, 61 Sāṇḍilya, 62 Paingala, 63 Bhikṣuka, 64 Mahā, 65 Śārīraka, 66 Yogaśikhā, 67 Turiyātita, 68 Saṃnyāsa, 69 Paramahansa-parivrajaka, 70 Akṣamālā, 71 Avyakta, 72 Ekākṣara, 73 Annapūrnā, 74 Sūrya, 75 Akṣi, 76 Adhyātma, 77 Kuṇḍika, 78 Sāvitrī, 79 Ātman, 80 Pāśupatabrahma, 81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadhūta, 83 Tripurātāpinī, 84 Devī, 85 Tripurā, 86 Kaṭharudra, 87 Bhāvanā, 88 Rudrahīdaya, 89 Yogakuṇḍali, 90 Bhasmajābāla, 91 Rudrākṣajābāla, 92 Gaṇapati, 93 Jābāladarśana, 94 Tārasāra, 95 Mahāvākya, 96 Pañcabrahma, 97 Prāpāgnihotra, 98 Gopālapūrvatāpinī, 99 Gopālottaratāpinī, 100 Kṣṇa, 101 Yājñavalkya, 102 Varāha, 103 Śāṭhyāyaniya, 104 Hayagrīva, 105 Dattatreya, 106 Garuḍa, 107 Kalisantarāṇa, 108 Jābālī, 109 Saubhāgyalakṣmī, 110 Sarasvatīraṇya, 111 Bahvṛca, 112 Muktika.

The collection of Upaniṣads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb's brother, contained 50 Upaniṣads. The Muktika Upaniṣad gives a list of 108 Upaniṣads. With the exception of the first 13 Upaniṣads most of them are of more or less later date. The Upaniṣads dealt with in this chapter are the earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some which repeat the purport of these, there are others which deal with the Śaiva, Śākta, the Yoga and the Vaiṣṇava doctrines. These will be referred to in connection with the consideration of those systems in Volume II. The later Upaniṣads which only repeat the purport of those dealt with in this chapter do not require further mention. Some of the later Upaniṣads were composed even as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century.

process of development and they were probably regarded as parts of one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter. Deussen supposes that the principle of this division was to be found in this, that the Brāhmaṇas were intended for the householders, the Āraṇyakas for those who in their old age withdrew into the solitude of the forests and the Upaniṣads for those who renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation. Whatever might be said about these literary classifications the ancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upaniṣads as being of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature as dictating the path of knowledge (*jñāna-mārga*) as opposed to the path of works (*karma-mārga*) which forms the content of the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that the orthodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in the Veda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certain actions (*vidhi*) or prohibitions against committing certain others (*niṣedha*). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpreted that the real objects of their insertion might appear as only to praise the performance of the commandments and to blame the commission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to argue why any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for no reason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason fails to find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect that the Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitions to show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongs therefore to that of the Karma-mārga or the performance of Vedic duties of sacrifice, etc. The Upaniṣads however do not require the performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truth and reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man. Readers of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strong controversy on this point between the adherents of the Vedānta (*Upaniṣads*) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogy to the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principle that the Upaniṣads should not be regarded as an exception, but that they should also be so interpreted that they might also be held out as commending the performance of duties; but the former dissociate the Upaniṣads from the rest of the Vedic literature and assert that they do not make the slightest reference to any Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality which reveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving.

Śaṅkara the most eminent exponent of the Upaniṣads holds that they are meant for such superior men who are already above worldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic duties have ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may be such a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or an ascetic, for him the Upaniṣads have been revealed for his ultimate emancipation and the true knowledge. Those who perform the Vedic duties belong to a stage inferior to those who no longer care for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for final emancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear the Upaniṣads¹.

The names of the Upaniṣads ; Non-Brahmanic influence.

The Upaniṣads are also known by another name Vedānta, as they are believed to be the last portions of the Vedas (*veda-anta*, end); it is by this name that the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, the Vedānta philosophy, is so familiar to us. A modern student knows that in language the Upaniṣads approach the classical Sanskrit; the ideas preached also show that they are the culmination of the intellectual achievement of a great epoch. As they thus formed the concluding parts of the Vedas they retained their Vedic names which they took from the name of the different schools or branches (*śākhā*) among which the Vedas were studied². Thus the Upaniṣads attached to the Brāhmaṇas of the Aitareya and Kauṣītaki schools are called respectively Aitareya and Kauṣītaki Upaniṣads. Those of the Tāṇḍins and Talavakāras of the Sāma-veda are called the Chāndogya and Talavakāra (or Kena) Upaniṣads. Those of the Taittiriya school of the Yajurveda

¹ This is what is called the difference of fitness (*adhikāribheda*). Those who perform the sacrifices are not fit to hear the Upaniṣads and those who are fit to hear the Upaniṣads have no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties.

² When the Saṃhitā texts had become substantially fixed, they were committed to memory in different parts of the country and transmitted from teacher to pupil along with directions for the practical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter formed the matter of prose compositions, the Brāhmaṇas. These however were gradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the special tendencies and needs of the people among which they were recited. Thus after a time there occurred a great divergence in the readings of the texts of the Brāhmaṇas even of the same Veda among different people. These different schools were known by the name of particular Śākhās (e.g. Aitareya, Kauṣītaki) with which the Brāhmaṇas were associated or named. According to the divergence of the Brāhmaṇas of the different Śākhās there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the Upaniṣads associated with them.

form the Taittirīya and Mahānārayaṇa, of the Kāṭhaka school the Kāṭhaka, of the Maitrāyaṇī school the Maitrāyaṇī. The Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad forms part of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa of the Vājasaneyi schools. The Īśā Upaniṣad also belongs to the latter school. But the school to which the Śvetāśvatara belongs cannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presumption with regard to these Upaniṣads is that they represent the enlightened views of the particular schools among which they flourished, and under whose names they passed. A large number of Upaniṣads of a comparatively later age were attached to the Atharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to the Vedic schools but according to the subject-matter with which they dealt¹.

It may not be out of place here to mention that from the frequent episodes in the Upaniṣads in which the Brahmins are described as having gone to the Kṣattriyas for the highest knowledge of philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of the Upaniṣad teachings from that of the general doctrines of the Brāhmaṇas and from the allusions to the existence of philosophical speculations amongst the people in Pāli works, it may be inferred that among the Kṣattriyas in general there existed earnest philosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exerted an important influence in the formation of the Upaniṣad doctrines. There is thus some probability in the supposition that though the Upaniṣads are found directly incorporated with the Brāhmaṇas it was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmas alone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have either set the Upaniṣad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assistance to their formulation and cultivation, though they achieved their culmination in the hands of the Brahmins.

Brāhmaṇas and the Early Upaniṣads.

The passage of the Indian mind from the Brāhmanic to the Upaniṣad thought is probably the most remarkable event in the history of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedic hymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence were developed, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism of the Upaniṣads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican

¹ Garbha Upaniṣad, Ātman Upaniṣad, Praśna Upaniṣad, etc. There were however some exceptions such as the Māṇḍūkya, Jābāla, Paingala, Śaunaka, etc.

systems in astronomy. The direct translation of Viśvakarman or Hiranyagarbha into the ātman and the Brahman of the Upaniṣads seems to me to be very improbable, though I am quite willing to admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the ātman doctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughout the earlier Upaniṣads no mention is to be found of Viśvakarman, Hiranyagarbha or Brahmanaspati and no reference of such a nature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upaniṣad ideas with those conceptions¹. The word puruṣa no doubt occurs frequently in the Upaniṣads, but the sense and the association that come along with it are widely different from that of the puruṣa of the Puruṣasūkta of the Ṛg-Veda.

When the Ṛg-Veda describes Viśvakarman it describes him as a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events, to whom they pray for worldly benefits. "What was the position, which and whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Viśvakarman produced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might? The one god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on every side arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth, shapes them with his arms and with his wings.... Do thou, Viśvakarman, grant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest, and the lowest, and the middle... may a generous son remain here to us"²; again in R.V. x. 82 we find "Viśvakarman is wise, energetic, the creator, the disposer, and the highest object of intuition.... He who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knows all spheres and creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names, to him the other creatures resort for instruction"³. Again about Hiranyagarbha we find in R.V. I. 121, "Hiranyagarbha arose in the beginning; born, he was the one lord of things existing. He established the earth and this sky; to what god shall we offer our oblation?... May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the earth, who ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who produced the great and brilliant waters!—to what god, etc.? Prajāpati, no other than thou is lord over all these created things: may we obtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may we become masters of riches"⁴. Speaking of the puruṣa the Ṛg-Veda

¹ The name Viśvakarma appears in Śvet. IV. 17. Hiranyagarbha appears in Śvet. III. 4 and IV. 12, but only as the first created being. The phrase Sarvāhammāni Hiranyagarbha which Deussen refers to occurs only in the later Nṛsimh. 9. The word Brahmanaspati does not occur at all in the Upaniṣads.

² Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. IV. pp. 6, 7.

³ *Ibid.* p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 16, 17.

says "Purusha has a thousand heads...a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it] by a space of ten fingers....He formed those aerial creatures, and the animals, both wild and tame¹," etc. Even that famous hymn (R.V. x. 129) which begins with "There was then neither being nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above" ends with saying "From whence this creation came into being, whether it was created or not—he who is in the highest sky, its ruler, probably knows or does not know."

In the Upaniṣads however, the position is entirely changed, and the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outside but in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic position of the Vedas could have grown into some form of developed theism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only reality and that everything else was far below it. There is no relation here of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers are offered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth, and the true self of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change of philosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest. This change of the mind from the objective to the subjective does not carry with it in the Upaniṣads any elaborate philosophical discussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matter of direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth has been grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of the apparently meaningless speculations of the Brāhmaṇas this doctrine could have developed, might indeed appear to be too improbable to be believed.

On the strength of the stories of Bālāki Gārgya and Ajātaśatru (Brh. II. 1), Śvetaketu and Pravāhaṇa Jaibali (Chā. v. 3 and Brh. VI. 2) and Āruṇi and Aśvapati Kaikeya (Chā. v. 11) Garbe thinks "that it can be proven that the Brahman's profoundest wisdom, the doctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influence on the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its origin in the circle of Brahmins at all²" and that "it took its rise in the ranks of the warrior caste³." This if true would of course lead the development of the Upaniṣads away from the influence of the Veda, Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas. But do the facts prove this? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbe him-

¹ Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. v. pp. 368, 371.

² Garbe's article, "*Hindu Monism*," p. 68.

³ *Ibid.* p. 78.

self has produced. In the story of Bālāki Gārgya and Ajātaśatru (Brh. II. 1) referred to by him, Bālāki Gārgya is a boastful man who wants to teach the Kṣatriya Ajātaśatru the true Brahman, but fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To this Ajātaśatru replies (following Garbe's own translation) "it is contrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instruction from a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman to him¹." Does this not imply that in the natural order of things a Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to the Kṣatriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking a Kṣatriya about the true knowledge of Brahman? At the beginning of the conversation, Ajātaśatru had promised to pay Bālāki one thousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all people used to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman². The second story of Śvetaketu and Pravāhaṇa Jaibali seems to be fairly conclusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines, the way of the gods (*devayāna*) and the way of the fathers (*pitryāna*) had originated among the Kṣatriyas, but it is without any relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledge of Brahman as the true self.

The third story of Āruṇi and Aśvapati Kaikeya (Chā. v. 11) is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing to know what the Brahman and the self were, went to Uddālaka Āruṇi; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompanied them to the Kṣatriya king Aśvapati Kaikeya who was studying the subject. But Aśvapati ends the conversation by giving them certain instructions about the fire doctrine (*vaiśvānara agni*) and the import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about the true self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there are only the few exceptional cases where Kṣatriya kings were instructing the Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins were discussing and instructing the ātman knowledge. I am thus led to think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against the Brahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had been too hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to have been shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the references given by him to the Upaniṣad passages are also the same as we

¹ Garbe's article, "*Hindu Monism*," p. 74.

² Brh. II., compare also Brh. IV. 3, how Yājñavalkya speaks to Janaka about the *brahmaviidyā*.

just examined¹. The truth seems to me to be this, that the Kṣattriyas and even some women took interest in the religio-philosophical quest manifested in the Upaniṣads. The enquirers were so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahman or in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex and birth²; and there seems to be no definite evidence for thinking that the Upaniṣad philosophy originated among the Kṣattriyas or that the germs of its growth could not be traced in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas which were the productions of the Brahmins.

The change of the Brāhmaṇa into the Āraṇyaka thought is signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we find in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (I. 1) that instead of a horse sacrifice the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul, and so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good can its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which is most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolic meditations were taking the place of gross matter and action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productive of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth³.

¹ Winternitz's *Geschichte der indischen Litteratur*, I. pp. 197 ff.

² The story of Maitreyi and Yājñavalkya (Bṛh. II. 4) and that of Satyakāma son of Jabālā and his teacher (Chā. IV. 4).

³ Chā. V. 11.

The Uktha (verse) of Ṛg-Veda was identified in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka under several allegorical forms with the Prāṇa¹, the Udgitha of the Sāmaveda was identified with Om, Prāṇa, sun and eye; in Chāndogya II. the Sāman was identified with Om, rain, water, seasons, Prāṇa, etc., in Chāndogya III. 16–17 man was identified with sacrifice; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initiation; laughing, eating, etc., with the utterance of the Mantras; and asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, with sacrificial fees (*dakṣiṇā*). The gifted mind of these cultured Vedic Indians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precision of thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in the Āraṇyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of things which to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind of instrumentality in producing an effect was often considered as pure identity. Thus in Ait. Āraṇ. II. 1. 3 we find “Then comes the origin of food. The seed of Prajāpati are the gods. The seed of the gods is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done is this man the abode of Brahman².”

The word Brahman according to Sāyaṇa meant mantras (magical verses), the ceremonies, the hotṛ priest, the great. Hillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R.V. as being new, “as not having hitherto existed,” and as “coming into being from the fathers.” It originates from the seat of the Ṛta, springs forth at the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the soma juice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite, endures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is its guardian (R.V. VIII. 37. 1, VIII. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, I. 47. 2, VII. 22. 9, VI. 52. 3, etc.). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies the conjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which can be called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, as the magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation of the hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts³. I am disposed to think that this meaning is closely connected with the meaning as we find it in many passages in the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads. The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between

¹ Ait. Āraṇ. II. 1–3.

² Keith's *Translation of Aitareya Āraṇyaka*.

³ Hillebrandt's article on Brahman, *E. R. E.*

“magical force” and “great,” transition between which is rather easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced by meditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices still remained, and as a result of that we find that in many passages of the Upaniṣads people are thinking of meditating upon this great force “Brahman” as being identified with diverse symbols, natural objects, parts and functions of the body.

When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its actual performance in the external world to certain forms of meditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories of sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functions was regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing could be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretations of the Pañcāgnividyā are so much referred to in the Upaniṣads as a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think that the real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations. When the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is really ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they thought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the gods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for a man if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for the gods that men should know this great truth¹.

In the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers of the gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, Vāyu (wind) to blow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahman that all the gods and all the senses of man could work. The whole process of Upaniṣad thought shows that the magic power of sacrifices as associated with Ṛta (unalterable law) was being abstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power. There are many stories in the Upaniṣads of the search after the nature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first only imperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating power of the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. with bodily and mental functions and with various symbolical representations, and deluded themselves for a time with the idea that these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually found inadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine of the inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahman originated.

¹ Bṛh. I. 4. 10.

The meaning of the word Upaniṣad.

The word Upaniṣad is derived from the root *sad* with the prefix *ni* (to sit), and Max Müller says that the word originally meant the act of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to him. In his introduction to the Upaniṣads he says, "The history and the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt that Upaniṣad meant originally session, particularly a session consisting of pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher¹." Deussen points out that the word means "secret" or "secret instruction," and this is borne out by many of the passages of the Upaniṣads themselves. Max Müller also agrees that the word was used in this sense in the Upaniṣads². There we find that great injunctions of secrecy are to be observed for the communication of the doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to a student or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desires proves himself deserving to hear them. Śaṅkara however, the great Indian exponent of the Upaniṣads, derives the word from the root *sad* to destroy and supposes that it is so called because it destroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing the right knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which the word Upaniṣad occurs in the Upaniṣads themselves it seems that Deussen's meaning is fully justified³.

The composition and growth of diverse Upaniṣads.

The oldest Upaniṣads are written in prose. Next to these we have some in verses very similar to those that are to be found in classical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upaniṣad the more archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upaniṣads have an almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least to Indian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart. We can read and read them over again without getting tired. The lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charm apart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The word Upaniṣad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of "secret doctrine or instruction"; the Upaniṣad teachings were also intended to be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers of high morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving

¹ Max Müller's *Translation of the Upanishads*, S. B. E. vol. I. p. lxxxi.

² S. B. E. vol. I. p. lxxxiii.

³ Deussen's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 10-15.

emancipation. It was thus that the Upaniṣad style of expression, when it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm and attraction for earnest religious people; and as a result of that we find that even when other forms of prose and verse had been adapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upaniṣad form of composition had not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upaniṣads were compiled by 500 B.C., they continued to be written even so late as the spread of Mahomedan influence in India. The earliest and most important are probably those that have been commented upon by Śaṅkara namely Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Íśā, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka and Māṇḍūkya¹. It is important to note in this connection that the separate Upaniṣads differ much from one another with regard to their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some of them are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine of the self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress upon the practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of Śiva, of Viṣṇu and the philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus be respectively called the Yoga, Śaiva, Viṣṇu and Śārīra Upaniṣads. These in all make up the number to one hundred and eight.

Revival of Upaniṣad studies in modern times.

How the Upaniṣads came to be introduced into Europe is an interesting story. Dārā Shiko the eldest son of the Emperor Shāh Jahān heard of the Upaniṣads during his stay in Kashmir in 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, who undertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775 Anquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend-Avesta, received a manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, the French resident in Faizabad at the court of Shujā-uddaulah. Anquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801–1802. This translation though largely unintelligible was read by Schopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauer himself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he

¹ Deussen supposes that Kauṣītaki is also one of the earliest. Max Müller and Schroeder think that Maitrāyaṇī also belongs to the earliest group, whereas Deussen counts it as a comparatively later production. Winternitz divides the Upaniṣads into four periods. In the first period he includes Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya, Kauṣītaki and Kena. In the second he includes Kaṭhaka, Íśā, Śvetāśvatara, Muṇḍaka, Mahānārāyaṇa, and in the third period he includes Praśna, Maitrāyaṇī and Māṇḍūkya. The rest of the Upaniṣads he includes in the fourth period.

writes in the preface to his *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*¹, "And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him....I might express the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as a consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads is by no means the case." Again, "How does every line display its firm, definite, and throughout harmonious meaning! From every sentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit....In the whole world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upaniṣad. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death!"² Through Schopenhauer the study of the Upaniṣads attracted much attention in Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study of Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as well.

The study of the Upaniṣads has however gained a great impetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who not only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and published them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma Samaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were derived directly from the Upaniṣads.

¹ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii.

² Max Müller says in his introduction to the Upanishads (*S. B. E.* I. p. lxii; see also pp. lx, lxi) "that Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upanishads as 'products of the highest wisdom'...that he should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as brought to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their favour."

The Upaniṣads and their interpretations.

Before entering into the philosophy of the Upaniṣads it may be worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverse and even contradictory explanations as to the real import of the Upaniṣads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of past times. The Upaniṣads, as we have seen, formed the concluding portion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called the Vedānta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus that the highest truths could only be found in the revelation of the Vedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a comparatively subservient place, and its proper use was to be found in its judicious employment in getting out the real meaning of the apparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest knowledge of ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as having been once for all declared in the Upaniṣads. Reason had only to unravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readers of Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that it presents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truths are discovered by reason and experience every day, and even in those cases where the old truths remain, they change their hue and character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths no finality can ever be achieved; we are to be content only with as much as comes before the purview of our reason and experience at the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audacious that any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might be should have any right to say anything regarding the highest truths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasons that he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was necessary for him to show from the texts of the Upaniṣads that they supported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thus it was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of their principal duties to interpret the Upaniṣads in order to show that they alone represented the true Vedānta doctrines. Any one who should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of any particular school might say that in following that school he was following the Vedānta.

The difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation is absolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs of diverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upaniṣads

which are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus each interpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his own doctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and tried to repress others or explain them away. But comparing the various systems of Upaniṣad interpretation we find that the interpretation offered by Śaṅkara very largely represents the view of the general body of the earlier Upaniṣad doctrines, though there are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of other systems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Vedānta is generally associated with the interpretation of Śaṅkara and Śaṅkara's system of thought is called the Vedānta system, though there are many other systems which put forth their claim as representing the true Vedānta doctrines.

Under these circumstances it is necessary that a modern interpreter of the Upaniṣads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute claims of these exponents, and look upon the Upaniṣads not as a systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents of thought—the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were still in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of Śaṅkara, or rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport of by far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that a modern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancients that all the Upaniṣads represent a connected system, but take the texts independently and separately and determine their meanings, though keeping an attentive eye on the context in which they appear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs of the thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upaniṣads, and thus find in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts.

The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures.

The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upaniṣads is that underlying the exterior world of change there is an unchangeable reality which is identical with that which underlies the essence in man¹. If we look at Greek philosophy in Parmenides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find the same tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as the reality or the essence. I have said above that the Upaniṣads are

¹ Bṛh. IV. 4. 5, 22.

no systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collations or compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes. There are no doubt here and there simple discussions but there is no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casual reader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasm of the sages. They run from place to place with great eagerness in search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the nature of Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature?

We have noticed that during the closing period of the Saṃhitā there were people who had risen to the conception of a single creator and controller of the universe, variously called Prajāpati, Viśvakarman, Puruṣa, Brahmanaspati and Brahman. But this divine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to the nature of this deity began in the Upaniṣads. Many visible objects of nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the various psychological functions in man were tried, but none could render satisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sages in the Upaniṣads had already started with the idea that there was a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the universe. But what was its nature? Could it be identified with any of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deity at all? The Upaniṣads present to us the history of this quest and the results that were achieved.

When we look merely to this quest we find that we have not yet gone out of the Āraṇyaka ideas and of symbolic (*pratīka*) forms of worship. *Prāṇa* (vital breath) was regarded as the most essential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes are related to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the eye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. This recognition of the superiority of *prāṇa* brings us to the meditations on *prāṇa* as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results. So also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting characters of omnipresence and eternity *ākāśa* (space) is meditated upon as Brahman. So also *manas* and *Āditya* (sun) are meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the visible material representation of Brahman as the pervading *Vāyu*, or the sun and the immaterial representation as *ākāśa*, *manas* or *prāṇa*, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutes for actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest quest after the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought

which shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualistic associations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrifice yet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment of Brahman.

Next to the failure of the meditations we have to notice the history of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought to identify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon, lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc., and failed; for none of these could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It is indeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they are tiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the original as well. They are of value only in this that they indicate how toilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associations could be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had to undergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature of Brahman.

Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method.

It is indeed true that the magical element involved in the discharge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolic worship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity. The minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worship deities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with the idea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman. They tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also many symbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. They did not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only a dim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their souls which could not be translated into permanent terms. But this was enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not be satisfied with anything short of the highest.

They found that by whatever means they tried to give a positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman, they failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could not point out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utterance to that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was not like aught that we find in experience. Yājñavalkya said "He the ātman is not this, nor this (*neti neti*). He is inconceivable, for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed, untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke

of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury¹." He is *asat*, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he is being, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists by him. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever we can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the unlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the great (*mahat*), the fixed. He who knows it is released from the jaws of death²." Space, time and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once forms their essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, yet the smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; no characterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denial to him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. He is independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause which rules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empirical universe. When Bāhva was questioned by Vaṣkali, he expounded the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence—"Teach me," said Vaṣkali, "most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman." Bāhva however remained silent. But when the question was put forth a second or third time he answered, "I teach you indeed but you do not understand; the Ātman is silence³." The way to indicate it is thus by *neti neti*, it is not this, it is not this. We cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited by conceptual thought.

The Ātman doctrine.

The sum and substance of the Upaniṣad teaching is involved in the equation Ātman=Brahman. We have already seen that the word Ātman was used in the Ṛg-Veda to denote on the one hand the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital breath in man. Later on in the Upaniṣads we see that the word Brahman is generally used in the former sense, while the word Ātman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the

¹ Bṛh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Müller and Röer have all misinterpreted this passage; *asito* has been interpreted as an adjective or participle, though no evidence has ever been adduced; it is evidently the ablative of *asi*, a sword.

² Kāṭha III. 15.

³ Śaṅkara on *Brahmasūtra*, III. 2. 17, and also Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 156.

Upaniṣads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one and the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The self of man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses. Thus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i.e. the physical parts of man) he is called *annamaya*. But behind the sheath of this body there is the other self consisting of the vital breath which is called the self as vital breath (*prāṇamaya ātman*). Behind this again there is the other self "consisting of will" called the *manomaya ātman*. This again contains within it the self "consisting of consciousness" called the *vijñānamaya ātman*. But behind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the *ānandamaya ātman*). The texts say: "Truly he is the rapture; for whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who could live, who could breathe if this space (*ākāśa*) was not bliss? For it is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible, Self-surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, he really becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference, between himself and this Ātman there is fear for him¹."

Again in another place we find that Prajāpati said: "The self (*ātman*) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogitations are true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired; he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self." The gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra and Virocana respectively as their representatives to enquire of this self from Prajāpati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to look into a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they could find. They answered: "We see, this our whole self, even to the hair, and to the nails." And he said, "Well, that is the self, that is the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman." They went away pleased, but Prajāpati thought, "There they go away, without having discovered, without having realized the self." Virocana came away with the conviction that the body was the self; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid and pestered with doubts and came back to Prajāpati and said, "just as the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well-dressed when the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when the body is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind when the body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured in one eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes

¹ Taitt. II. 7.² Chā. VIII. 7. 1.

when the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory." Prajāpati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, and said, "He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, this is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and came back and said "that though the dream self does not become blind when the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body is so injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed by its destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if it suffered and as if it wept—in this I see no good." Prajāpati gave a still higher instruction: "When a man, fast asleep, in total contentment, does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was again filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said "the self in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor does he know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost. I see no good in this." And now Prajāpati after having given a course of successively higher instructions as self as the body, as the self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, and having found that the enquirer in each case could find out that this was not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking, ultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about the full truth about the self, and said "this body is the support of the deathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected by pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body cannot get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not touch the bodiless self¹."

As the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and unchangeable essence in man as was beyond the limits of any change. This inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure subject-object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He is the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through entirely of savour; as in truth this Ātman has no inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than

¹ Chā. VIII. 7-12.

son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest *par excellence*, our inmost Ātman. All limitation is fraught with pain; it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe, who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (*ākāśa*)? It is he who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable one, then has he attained peace.

Place of Brahman in the Upaniṣads.

There is the ātman not in man alone but in all objects of the universe, the sun, the moon, the world; and Brahman is this ātman. There is nothing outside the ātman, and therefore there is no plurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made of black iron is known, so when this ātman the Brahman is known everything else is known. The essence in man and the essence of the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman.

Now a question may arise as to what may be called the nature of the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. But we must also remember that the Upaniṣads do not represent so much a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seers who are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do not notice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity and nature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversity attracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is all Brahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will it return. He has himself created it out of himself and then entered into it as its inner controller (*antaryāmin*). Here is thus a glaring dualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller, though in other places we find it asserted most emphatically that these are but names and forms, and when Brahman is known everything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are made for the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, as Śaṅkara the great professor of Vedānta does by explaining away the dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but the real in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman that the fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle in the entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The

world is his body, yet he is the soul within. "He creates all, wills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent and unaffected¹". He is below, above, in the back, in front, in the south and in the north, he is all this². "These rivers in the east and in the west originating from the ocean, return back into it and become the ocean themselves, though they do not know that they are so. So also all these people coming into being from the Being do not know that they have come from the Being.... That which is the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self thou art O Śvetaketu³." "Brahman," as Deussen points out, "was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe as the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of the universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him was represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman." Thus it is said in Muṇḍ. I. 1. 7:

As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads),
As the plants shoot forth on the earth,
As the hairs on the head and body of the living man,
So from the imperishable all that is here.
As the sparks from the well-kindled fire,
In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands,
So, my dear sir, from the imperishable
Living beings of many kinds go forth,
And again return into him⁴.

Yet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highest teaching of the Upaniṣads is "That art thou."

Again the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the "inner controller" in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind as the ātman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are the result of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to a theistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standing aloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, it is said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky and earth stand held together⁵. God and soul are distinguished again in the famous verse of Śvetāśvatara⁶:

Two bright-feathered bosom friends
Flit around one and the same tree;
One of them tastes the sweet berries,
The other without eating merely gazes down.

¹ Chā. III. 14. 4. ² Ibid. VII. 25. 1; also Muṇḍaka II. 2. 11. ³ Chā. VI. 10.

⁴ Deussen's translation in *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 164. ⁵ Brh. III. 8. 1.

⁶ Śvetāśvatara IV. 6, and Muṇḍaka III. 1. 1, also Deussen's translation in *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 177.

But in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occasional use of the word *Īśa* or *Īśāna*, there seems to be no doubt that theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknowledgement of a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exalted position of the ātman as the supreme principle. Thus we read in Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad 3. 9, "He is not great by good deeds nor low by evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom he wants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wants to lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is the master of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul (*ātman*)."¹ Thus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There are again other passages which regard Brahman as being at once immanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is that eternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whose branches grow downward. All the universes are supported in it and no one can transcend it. This is that, "...from its fear the fire burns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, Vāyu and Death the fifth (with the other two) run on"².

If we overlook the different shades in the development of the conception of Brahman in the Upaniṣads and look to the main currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has found expression in the majority of the texts is this that the Ātman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this everything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is to be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that identifies the universe with the Ātman or Brahman. The third current is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord controlling the world. It is because these ideas were still in the melting pot, in which none of them were systematically worked out, that the later exponents of Vedānta, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order to develop a consistent systematic philosophy out of them. Thus it is that the doctrine of Māyā which is slightly hinted at once in Brhadāranyaka and thrice in Śvetāśvatara, becomes the foundation of Śaṅkara's philosophy of the Vedānta in which Brahman alone is real and all else beside him is unreal³.

¹ Kaṭha II. 6. 1 and 3.

² Bṛh. II. 5. 19, Śvet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10.

The World.

We have already seen that the universe has come out of Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back to it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as represented to experience could not be denied. Śaṅkara held that the Upaniṣads referred to the external world and accorded a reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely relatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon as the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however remains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not probably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to the phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the highest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior world, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this reality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only reality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding that this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it is maintained in him and it will return back to him.

The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants, animals or men, have souls¹. Brahman desiring to be many created fire (*tejas*), water (*ap*) and earth (*kṣiti*). Then the self-existent Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their combination that all other bodies are formed². So all other things are produced as a result of an alloying or compounding of the parts of these three together. In this theory of the threefold division of the primitive elements lies the earliest germ of the later distinction (especially in the Sāṃkhya school) of pure infinitesimal substances (*tanmātra*) and gross elements, and the theory that each gross substance is composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And in Praśna IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their subtler natures, e.g. earth (*prthivī*), and the subtler state of earth (*prthivīmātra*). In the Taittirīya, II. 1, however, ether (*ākāśa*) is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other elements, air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each proceeding directly from the one which directly preceded it.

¹ Chā. VI. 11.² *ibid.* VI. 2, 3, 4.

The World-Soul.

The conception of a world-soul related to the universe as the soul of man to his body is found for the first time in R.V. X. 121. 1, where he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creation from the primeval waters. This being has twice been referred to in the Śvetāśvatara, in III. 4 and IV. 12. It is indeed very strange that this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upaniṣads. In the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythical character is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlier products in the process of cosmic creation, but his importance from the point of view of the development of the theory of Brahman or Ātman is almost nothing. The fact that neither the Puruṣa, nor the Viśvakarma, nor the Hiranyagarbha played an important part in the earlier development of the Upaniṣads leads me to think that the Upaniṣad doctrines were not directly developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later Rg-Veda speculations. The passages in Śvetāśvatara clearly show how from the supreme eminence that he had in R.V. X. 121, Hiranyagarbha had been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussen in explaining the philosophical significance of the Hiranyagarbha doctrine of the Upaniṣads says that the "entire objective universe is possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This subject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in all individual objects but is by no means identical with them. For the individual objects pass away but the objective universe continues to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal knowing subject also (*hiranyagarbha*) by whom it is sustained. Space and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accordingly not in space and does not belong to time, and therefore from an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; it has no empirical but only a metaphysical reality¹." This however seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hiranyagarbha doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance in the Upaniṣads.

The Theory of Causation.

There was practically no systematic theory of causation in the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara, the later exponent of Vedānta philosophy, always tried to show that the Upaniṣads looked upon the cause

¹ Deussen's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 201.

as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in reality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he did on the strength of a series of examples in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VI. 1) in which the material cause, e.g. the clay, is spoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot, the jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so many diversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other the pot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions of name and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth which in its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot, plate, or jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeable Brahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to suffer change as the manifold world outside. This world is thus only an unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman, the real *par excellence*.

It seems however that though such a view may be regarded as having been expounded in the Upaniṣads in an imperfect manner, there is also side by side the other view which looks upon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in the cause itself through the action and combination of the elements of diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature have been spoken of in one place as the product of the combination of the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a real change produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as we shall see hereafter) the Pariṇāma theory of causation advocated by the Sāṃkhya school¹.

Doctrine of Transmigration.

When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration had but little developed at the time.

In the Upaniṣads however we find a clear development in the direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one the Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with

¹ Chā. VI. 2-4.

the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine of transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the idea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the digging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers (*pitr̥yāna*), in which the soul after death enters first into smoke, then into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches the moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimilation of food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is born again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense in the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world¹.

The other way is the way of gods (*devayāna*), meant for those who cultivate faith and asceticism (*tapas*). These souls at death enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright half of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into Brahman never to return. Deussen says that "the meaning of the whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions of ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the 'light of lights' " (*jyotiṣāṃ jyotiḥ*)².

The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine of transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of his deeds (*karma*) by passing through the other worlds and without reference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods, the *Yānas*. Thus Yājñavalkya says, "when the soul becomes weak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with which it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses go towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and centres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye turns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become one (with him); (people about him) say he does not see; (the senses) become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not think, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the senses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The

¹ Chā. v. 10.

² Deussen's *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 335.

tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out. When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any other part of the body, the vital function (*prāṇa*) follows and all the senses follow the vital function (*prāṇa*) in coming out. He is then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes out. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (*prajñā*) accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade of grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so this self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a separate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a small bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul after destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a newer and fairer form as of the Pitṛs, the Gandharvas, the gods, of Prajāpati or Brahma or of any other being....As he acts and behaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds, virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is full of desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being attached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he was attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the end) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this world for doing karma¹. So it is the case with those who have desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has freed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in himself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains Brahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and attains Brahma here" (Bṛh. IV. iv. 1-7).

A close consideration of the above passage shows that the self itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer frame by its own activity when it reached the end of the present life. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all senses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge, work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the body at the time of death is only for the building of a newer body either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which thus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse categories. Thus it is said that "he is of the essence of understanding,

¹ It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference here to the doctrine that the fruits of our deeds are reaped in other worlds.

of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of the essence of the five elements (which would make up the physical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of desires, of the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, of the essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma, of the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this (manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)" (Brh. IV. iv. 5). The self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moral and psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements which compose the physical world. The whole process of his changes follows from this nature of his; for whatever he desires, he wills and whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his acts the fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma and its fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moral and psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements of the physical world on the other.

The self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diverse psychological and moral tendencies and the physical elements holds within itself the principle of all its transformations. The root of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruition of it through will and act. When the self continues to desire and act, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performing acts. This world is generally regarded as the field for performing karma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where the fruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. But there is no emphasis in the Upaniṣads on this point. The Pitr̥yāna theory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a part in the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in this world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by the self itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers no rebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature of this doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirth and not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link between desires and rebirth—for it is said that whatever a man desires he wills, and whatever he wills he acts.

Thus it is said in another place "he who knowingly desires is born by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whose desires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all his desires vanish here" (Muṇḍ III. 2. 2). This destruction of desires is effected by the right knowledge of the self. "He who knows

his self as 'I am the person' for what wish and for what desire will he trouble the body,...even being here if we know it, well if we do not, what a great destruction" (Brh. IV. iv. 12 and 14). "In former times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking what shall we do with sons since this our self is the universe" (Brh. IV. iv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine which we find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thought can be found in the Upaniṣads. The whole scheme is worked out on the principle of desire (*kāma*) and karma only serves as the link between it and the actual effects desired and willed by the person.

It is interesting to note in this connection that consistently with the idea that desires (*kāma*) led to rebirth, we find that in some Upaniṣads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a woman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth of man, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth elsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it is said, "It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is but the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts of his body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put in a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomes part of the woman's self like any part of her body; it therefore does not hurt her; she protects and develops the embryo within herself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be protected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth) but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he is taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that the continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This is his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative for performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his after realizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going away he is born again that is his third birth" (Aitareya, II. 1-4)¹. No special emphasis is given in the Upaniṣads to the sex-desire or the desire for a son; for, being called *kāma*, whatever was the desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the desire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (Brh. IV. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as any other desire.

¹ See also Kauṣītaki, II. 15.

Emancipation.

The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connection is that of emancipation (*mukti*). Already we know that the doctrine of Devayāna held that those who were faithful and performed asceticism (*tapas*) went by the way of the gods through successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth. This could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (*pitryāna*) where the dead were for a time recompensed in another world and then had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faithful and perform *śraddhā* had a distinctly different type of goal from those who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a general altruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest development in the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti means in the Upaniṣads the state of infiniteness that a man attains when he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. The ceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who are ignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of all passions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomes Brahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him.

He who beholds that loftiest and deepest,
For him the fetters of the heart break asunder,
For him all doubts are solved,
And his works become nothingness¹.

The knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passions and antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that is ignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us is false. We “do not know” but are “pure knowledge” ourselves. We are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we do not suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is not a new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, but it always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are always emancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so and seem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because we do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the true knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is emancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only so long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural and only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature and essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that

¹ Deussen's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 352.

is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge, all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas, the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice. Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with him, said, "O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget his anger against me." This being granted Naciketas asked the second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be made known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said, "There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death of man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Yama said, "It was inquired of old, even by the gods; for it is not easy to understand it. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not compel me to this." Naciketas said, "Even by the gods was it inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like thee. There is no other boon like this." Yama said, "Choose sons and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of cattle; choose elephants and gold and horses; choose the wide expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest. Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure; those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instruments; the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death." Naciketas replied, "All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as long as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said." Yama said, "One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire, hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is

what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good), are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals. Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly happiness is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee O Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die; he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is not slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle, greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes everywhere. Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals its own nature¹." So long as the Self identifies itself with its desires, he wills and acts according to them and reaps the fruits in the present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and principle of the universe, the immortal and the infinite, he ceases to have desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents of the gross body (*annamaya koṣa*), the vital functions (*prāṇamaya koṣa*) of life, the will and desire (*manomaya*) and the thoughts and ideas (*viññānamaya*), and so long as he keeps himself in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he is one with his experience and there is no change and no movement. What this state is cannot be explained by the use of concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not

¹ Kātha II. The translation is not continuous. There are some parts in the extract which may be differently interpreted.

whatever one knows as this and this (*neti neti*). In this infinite and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no *meum* and *tuum*. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when put in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so, Maitreyī, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal knowledge" (Brh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible ?

IT is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came one after another and offered their independent speculations on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon the influence of one school upon another or upon the general change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy. Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began, or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these were formulated just after the earliest Upaniṣads had been composed or arranged.

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant half-sentences (*sūtras*) which did not elaborate the subject in detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed difficult to guess from the *sūtras* the extent of their significance, or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were originally intended by them. The *sūtras* of the Vedānta system, known as the Śāṅkara-*sūtras* or Brahma-*sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high esteem and respect in which these writers of the *sūtras* were held by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to

offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence of their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school to which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an example, the Nyāya system of philosophy consisting of a number of half-sentences or sūtras is attributed to Gautama, also called Akṣapāda. The earliest commentary on these sūtras, called the *Vātsyāyana bhāṣya*, was written by Vātsyāyana. This work was sharply criticized by the Buddhist Diṇnāga, and to answer these criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary called the *Bhāṣyavārttika*¹. As time went on the original force of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of the school. At this Vācaspati Miśra wrote a commentary called *Vārttika-tātparyāṭikā* on this second commentary, where he tried to refute all objections against the Nyāya system made by other rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary, called *Nyāya-tātparyāṭikā*, had another commentary called *Nyāya-tātparyāṭikā-parīśuddhi* written by the great Udayana. This commentary had another commentary called *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa* written by Vardhamāna the son of the illustrious Gaṅgeśa. This again had another commentary called *Varddhamānendu* upon it by Padmanābha Miśra, and this again had another named *Nyāya-tātparyamaṇḍana* by Śaṅkara Miśra. The names of Vātsyāyana, Vācaspati, and Udayana are indeed very great, but even they contented themselves by writing commentaries on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any

¹ I have preferred to spell Diṇnāga after Vācaspati's *Tātparyāṭikā* (p. 1) and not Dignāga as it is generally spelt.

original system. Even Śaṅkara, probably the greatest man of India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras*, the Upaniṣads, and the *Bhagavadgītā*.

As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared. Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was originally formulated in the sūtras had probably but few problems to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems in which the original views were more or less involved but to which no attention had been given before.

The contributions of the successive commentators served to make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system in the sūtras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if we take it along with its developments down to the beginning of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is necessary that each system should be studied and interpreted in all the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole¹. In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems which had their importance only so long as they lived and were then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history.

¹ In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest one or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be carried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments given by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.

Growth of the Philosophic Literature.

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated, and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the earliest Upaniṣads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final essence or truth was the ātman, that a search after it was our highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we can only feel this truth and remain discontented with everything else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we want (*neti neti*). Philosophical enquires were however continuing in circles other than those of the Upaniṣads. Thus the Buddha who closely followed the early Upaniṣad period, spoke of and enumerated sixty-two kinds of heresies¹, and these can hardly be traced in the Upaniṣads. The Jaina activities were also probably going on contemporaneously but in the Upaniṣads no reference to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than those of the Upaniṣad sages, of which we have but scanty records. It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upaniṣad circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonistic and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probably discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama or Kaṇāda collected the purport of these discussions on various topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and recorded it in sūtras. These sūtras were intended probably for people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases contained in the aphorisms. The sūtras thus contain sometimes allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own

¹ *Brahmajāla-sutta*, *Dīgha*, I. p. 12 ff.

views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary views with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers, for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent. It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system by treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately. This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except when there is a specially new development, the system is to be interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators treating their contributions as forming one whole.

The fact that each system had to contend with other rival systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced

work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular system are expressed in such close interconnection with the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at which they ceased to grow and came to a stop—a purpose for which a work like the present one may only be regarded as forming a preliminary introduction.

Besides the sūtras and their commentaries there are also independent treatises on the systems in verse called *kārikās*, which try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct manner; the *Sāṃkhya kārikā* may be mentioned as a work of this kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations, commentaries, or general observations on any system written in verses called the *vārttikas*; the *Ślokavārttika*, of Kumārila or the *Vārttika* of Sureśvara may be mentioned as examples. All these of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose in which the writers either nominally followed some selected sūtras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example and of the latter the *Praśastapāda bhāṣya*, the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī or the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* of Dharmarājadhvarīndra. The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in which the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly forcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers and genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate them. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India begins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically ends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some minor publications are seen to come out.

The Indian Systems of Philosophy.

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the *nāstika* and the *āstika*. The *nāstika* (*na asti* “it is not”) views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible

nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Cārvāka. The āstika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, generally known as the six systems (*ṣaḍdarśana*¹).

The Sāṃkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kapila, but the earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga system is attributed to Patañjali and the original sūtras are called the *Pātañjala Yoga sūtras*. The general metaphysical position of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (*Īśvara*) as distinct from Ātman and lays much importance on certain mystical practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement of liberation, whereas the Sāṃkhya denies the existence of Īśvara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system of Sāṃkhya associated with Kapila and the Yoga system associated with Patañjali are but two divergent modifications of an original Sāṃkhya school, of which we now get only references here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted as two should more properly be looked upon as two different schools of the same Sāṃkhya system—one may be called the Kāpila Sāṃkhya and the other Pātañjala Sāṃkhya.

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (from the root *man* to think—rational conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy. It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.

¹ The word “*darśana*” in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest use in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* of Kaṇāda (IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhist. The Buddhist piṭakas (400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions “*dīṭṭhi*” (Sanskrit—*dṛṣṭi* from the same root *dr̥ś* from which *darśana* is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century A.D.) uses the word *Darśana* in the sense of systems of philosophy (*sarvadarśanaśāstram*—*Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* 1.). Ratnakīrti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the same sense (“*Yadi nāma darśane darśane nūnāprākāram satvalakṣaṇam uktamasti*.” *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* in *Six Buddhist Nyāya tracts*, p. 20). Mādhyama (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. The word “*mata*” (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word to denote ‘philosophers’ in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views “*tīrthika*.” The words “*siddha*,” “*jñānin*,” etc. do not denote philosophers in the modern sense, they are used rather in the sense of “seers” or “perfects.”

The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices, and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex Vedic context. The Mīmāṃsā formulated some principles according to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul, perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary discussions in the Mīmāṃsā that it may be called a system of philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this day. The sūtras of Mīmāṃsā are attributed to Jaimini, and Śabara wrote a bhāṣya upon it. The two great names in the history of Mīmāṃsā literature after Jaimini and Śabara are Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his pupil Prabhākara, who criticized the opinions of his master so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm, and to this day his opinions pass as *guru-mata*, whereas the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa pass as *bhaṭṭa-mata*¹. It may not be out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (*smṛti*) accepts without any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated by the Mīmāṃsā.

¹ There is a story that Kumārila could not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit sentence "*Atra tunoktam tatrapinoktam iti paunaruktam*" (hence spoken twice). *Tunoktam* phonetically admits of two combinations, *tu noktam* (but not said) and *tunā uktam* (said by the particle *tu*) and *tatrapī noktam* as *tatra api na uktam* (not said also there) and *tatra apinā uktam* (said there by the particle *api*). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, "Not spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice." This puzzled Kumārila, when Prabhākara taking the second meaning pointed out to him that the meaning was "here it is indicated by *tu* and there by *api*, and so it is indicated twice." Kumārila was so pleased that he called his pupil "Guru" (master) at this.

The *Vedānta sūtras*, also called Uttara Mīmāṃsā, written by Bādarāyaṇa, otherwise known as the *Brahma-sūtras*, form the original authoritative work of Vedānta. The word Vedānta means "end of the Veda," i.e. the Upaniṣads, and the *Vedānta sūtras* are so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general views of the Upaniṣads. This work is divided into four books or adhyāyas and each adhyāya is divided into four pādas or chapters. The first four sūtras of the work commonly known as *Catuḥsūtrī* are (1) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth, (4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upaniṣads. The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to justifying the position of the Vedānta against the attacks of the rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individual Upaniṣad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thus limited to the first four sūtras and the first and second chapters of the second book. The other portions are like commentaries to the Upaniṣads, which however contain many theological views of the system. The first commentary of the *Brahma-sūtra* was probably written by Baudhāyana, which however is not available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that of the great Śaṅkara. His interpretations of the *Brahma-sūtras* together with all the commentaries and other works that follow his views are popularly known as Vedānta philosophy, though this philosophy ought more properly to be called Viśuddhādvaita-vāda school of Vedānta philosophy (i.e. the Vedānta philosophy of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic philosophy as represented by the Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas, Rāmāyatas, etc., also claim to express the original purport of the *Brahma-sūtras*. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Madhva, Śrīkaṇṭha, Baladeva, etc., have written independent commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtra* to show that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of the Upaniṣads and as summarized in the *Brahma-sūtras*. These differed largely and often vehemently attacked Śaṅkara's interpretations of the same sūtras. These systems as expounded by them also pass by the name of Vedānta as these are also claimed to be the real interpretations intended by the Vedānta (Upaniṣads)

and the *Vedānta sūtras*. Of these the system of Rāmānuja has great philosophical importance.

The *Nyāya sūtras* attributed to Gautama, called also Akṣapāda, and the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* attributed to Kaṇāda, called also Ulūka, represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor importance. So far as the *sūtras* are concerned the *Nyāya sūtras* lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* deal mostly with metaphysics and physics. In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophies of their own, which however may generally be looked upon largely as modifications of the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta systems, though their own contributions are also noteworthy.

Some fundamental Points of Agreement.

1. *The Karma Theory.*

It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the Cārvāka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general postulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the *summum bonum* of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in thorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of them at this stage.

First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to suffer them.

The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic

details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible agents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed, the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called the *adṛṣṭa* (the unseen) or the *apūrvā* (new), that by it the desired object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the *modus operandi* of the *apūrvā* is unknown. There is also the notion prevalent in the Saṃhitās, as we have already noticed, that he who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures. These were probably associated with the conception of *ṛta*, the inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well established but not emphasized in the Upaniṣads, where it is said that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad births.

To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma doctrine as established in the āstika systems we find that it was believed that the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) potency of the action generally required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the merited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulate and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determined for him by his action are such that they are possible to be realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world process, so there is no time at which any person first began his actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus whenever he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man,

the special instincts of that life (technically called *vāsanā*) come forth. In accordance with these *vāsanās* the person passes through the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by his action. The length of life is also determined by the number and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But even such an emancipated (*mukta*) person has to pass through the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds of actions, white or virtuous (*śukla*), black or wicked (*kr̥ṣṇa*), white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (*śukla-kr̥ṣṇa*) as most of our actions are, neither black nor white (*aśuklākr̥ṣṇa*), i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits. He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed, and as his acts are only of the *aśuklākr̥ṣṇa* type no fresh karma for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone.

The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced. The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul during the infinite number of past lives is technically called *kārmāśarīra*, which encircles the soul as it passes on from birth to birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens and exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by his activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of suffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated in the soul produces a kind of coloration called *leśyā*, such as white, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The

idea of the śukla and kṛṣṇa karmas of the Yoga system was probably suggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from passions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct, his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is then annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously earned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect and be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict adherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and when all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the person rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of contemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever.

Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma theory which however being intimately connected with their metaphysics will be treated later on.

2. *The Doctrine of Mukti.*

Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the inequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case of different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births and rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the basis of the mysterious connection of one's actions with the happenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that this beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and rebirths, this running on from beginningless time has somewhere its end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or in some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma leads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of all such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should find within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys, neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous, artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance

and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginningless time that we connect it with these. The realization of this transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless cycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did not admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final realization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate dissolution called Nirvāṇa, the nature of which we shall discuss later on.

3. *The Doctrine of Soul.*

All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence of a permanent entity variously called ātman, puruṣa or jīva. As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergences of view. Thus while the Nyāya calls it absolutely qualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity, Sāṃkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness, the Vedānta says that it is that fundamental point of unity implied in pure consciousness (*cit*), pure bliss (*ānanda*), and pure being (*sat*). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not form a real part of it. The *summum bonum* of life is attained when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated.

The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic Faith in the end.

Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest utterance in Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable chain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as nearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the meshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures are but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is painful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are anxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much associated with pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped when we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All our experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow-beggetting. Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the

world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable appears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as painful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness to sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin is like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of disturbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot be removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes, for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot also be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually being forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to another life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of it is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge which uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self is intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures, that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoyment of pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through the highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion towards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech from all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self shines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived. When this is once done the self can never again be associated with passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately dissociated from *citta* which contains within it the root of all emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever conquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion to intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of *mukti* as the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic creed of each system have developed from the logical necessity peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through right performance and right understanding. It is only when a man rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which all worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only shrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as sorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from all ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation. In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some

ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the fundamental fact from which not only her philosophy but many of the complex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically deduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic confidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of emancipation.

**Unity in Indian Sādhana (philosophical, religious
and ethical endeavours).**

As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon the general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed for the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be controlled, no injury to life in any form should be done, and that all desire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are almost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very high degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare his mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment of his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with regard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are indeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the means to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essentially the same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only in later times that devotion (*bhakti*) is seen to occupy a more prominent place specially in Vaiṣṇava schools of thought. Thus it was that though there were many differences among the various systems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and the means for the attainment of the goal (*sādhana*) being fundamentally the same, there was a unique unity in the practical *sādhana* of almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been universal in India and this uniformity of *sādhana* has therefore secured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings.

CHAPTER V

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

MANY scholars are of opinion that the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them. It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the systematic Sāṃkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism first.

The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha.

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upaniṣads are well known, and these have already been briefly described. But these were not the only ones. Even in the Upaniṣads we find references to diverse atheistical creeds¹. We find there that the origin of the world and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought that "time" was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these had sprung forth by their own nature (*svabhāva*), others that everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or through matter combinations in general. References to diverse kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upaniṣad type of materialists the two schools of Cārvākas (Dhūrta and Suśikṣita) are referred to in later literature, though the time in which these flourished cannot rightly be discovered². But it seems

¹ Śvetāśvatara, I. 2, *kālaḥ svabhāboniḥ yadītyadyecchā bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam*.

² Lokāyata (literally, that which is found among people in general) seems to have been the name by which all cārvāka doctrines were generally known. See Guṇaratna on the Lokāyatas.

probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained in the Upaniṣads refers to these or to similar schools. The Cārvākas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter, just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses (*madaśakti*). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as everything will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the distribution of the middle term (*hetu*) has not depended upon some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and there is no certitude about it. They were called Cārvāka because they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or moral responsibility. The word comes from *carv* to eat. The Dhūrta Cārvākas held that there was nothing but the four elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no virtue or vice. The Suśikṣita Cārvākas held that there was a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with the destruction of the body. The original work of the Cārvākas was written in sūtras probably by Bṛhaspati. Jayanta and Guṇaratna quote two sūtras from it. Short accounts of this school may be found in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*, Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and Guṇaratna's *Tarkarāhasyadīpikā*. *Mahābhārata* gives an account of a man called Cārvāka meeting Yudhiṣṭhira.

Side by side with the doctrine of the Cārvāka materialists we are reminded of the Ājivakas of which Makkhali Gosāla, probably a renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahāvīra and a contemporary of Buddha and Mahāvīra, was the leader. This was a thorough-going determinism denying the free will of man and his moral responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of Makkhali's system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They

become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy, or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due to fate, to their environment and their own nature¹."

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is no other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that we can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to an end at death².

There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any person could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upaniṣad teaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality and being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the real and true, and this is self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the nebulous Sāṃkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity to come. If the Being of the Upaniṣads, the superlatively motionless, was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of interest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous concourse of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical

¹ *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, *Dīgha*, 11. 20. Hoernlé's article on the Ājivakas, E. R. E.

² *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, 11. 23.

force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha, we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic contribution to philosophy.

Buddha : his Life.

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C. in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Sudhodana, a prince of the Sākya clan, and his mother Queen Mahāmāyā. According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would enter upon the ascetic life when he should see "A decrepit old man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried his best to keep him away from these by marrying him and surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions, issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and realizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to immortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his "Great Renunciation" when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled on foot to Rājagṛha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvelā, where in company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down senseless and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great struggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won by the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course of life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment. Thereafter the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in travelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha realized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered into Dhyāna and passing through its successive stages attained nirvāṇa¹. The vast developments which the system of this great teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will probably take yet many years more before even the materials for

¹ *Mahāparinibbānasuttanta*, *Dīgha*, xvi. 6, 8, 9.

such a study can be collected. But from what we now possess it is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and subtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to over-estimate the debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization of India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding centuries.

Early Buddhist Literature.

The Buddhist Pāli Scriptures contain three different collections: the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the discipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally to the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a scholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhist religious history of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates for the collection or composition of the different parts of the aforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were however composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very probable that almost the whole of the canonical works were completed before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during the reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine (Dhamma) of the Buddhist faith whereas the Vinaya deals only with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks. The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that of the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma. Buddhaghōṣa in his introduction to *Atthasālinī*, the commentary on the *Dhammasaṅgani*, says that the Abhidhamma is so called (*abhi* and *dhamma*) because it describes the same Dhammas as are related in the suttas in a more intensified (*dhammātireka*) and specialized (*dhammavisesatthena*) manner. The Abhidhammas do not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but they deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found in the suttas. Buddhaghōṣa in distinguishing the special features of the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement of the former leads one to attain meditation (*samādhi*) whereas the latter leads one to attain wisdom (*paññāsampadam*). The force of this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the suttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is not to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in enumerating the Buddhist doctrines and defining them in a technical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned

insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving for following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow. The Abhidhamma known as the *Kathāvattthu* differs from the other Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views of the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed in the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the opponents are often shown to be based on contradictory assumptions.

The suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nikāyas. These are (1) *Dīgha Nikāya*, called so on account of the length of the suttas contained in it; (2) *Majjhima Nikāya* (middling Nikāya), called so on account of the middling extent of the suttas contained in it; (3) *Samyutta Nikāya* (Nikāyas relating to special meetings), called samyutta on account of their being delivered owing to the meetings (*samyoga*) of special persons which were the occasions for them; (4) *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, so called because in each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion increase by one¹; (5) *Khuddaka Nikāya* containing *Khuddaka pāṭha*, *Dhammapada*, *Udāna*, *Itivuttaka*, *Sutta Nipāta*, *Vimānavatthu*, *Petavatthu*, *Theragathā*, *Therīgāthā*, *Jātaka*, *Niddesa*, *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, *Apadāna*, *Buddhavaṃsa*, *Caryāpiṭaka*.

The Abhidhammas are *Paṭṭhāna*, *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapapaññatti*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Yamaka* and *Kathāvattthu*. There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts of the above works known as atthakathā. The work known as *Milinda Pañha* (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is of considerable philosophical value.

The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature is generally now known as Sthaviravāda or Theravāda. On the origin of the name Theravāda (the doctrine of the elders) *Dīpavaṃsa* says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council) and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vāda². It does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pāli literature developed much since the time of Buddhaghosa (400 A.D.), the writer of *Visuddhimagga* (a compendium of theravāda doctrines) and the commentator of *Dīghanikāya*, *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, etc.

Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced by the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but it does not appear that Pāli Buddhism had any share in it. I

¹ See Buddhaghosa's *Atthasālinī*, p. 25.

² Oldenberg's *Dīpavaṃsa*, p. 31.

have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could be considered as being acquainted with Pāli.

The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism¹.

The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally in four senses: (1) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (*guṇa*), (3) cause (*hetu*) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (*nissatta nījīva*²). Of these it is the last meaning which is particularly important from the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena and these were called dhammas. The question arises that if there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the phenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing away and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find out "What being what else is," "What happening what else happens" and "What not being what else is not." The phenomena are happening in a series and we see that there being certain phenomena there become some others; by the happening of some events others also are produced. This is called (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) dependent origination. But it is difficult to understand what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as *Samyutta Nikāya* (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started before attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition are the people! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away and are born again; and they do not know the path of escape from this decay, death and misery.

How to know the way to escape from this misery of decay and death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay and death, depending on what do they come? As he thought deeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay and death can only occur when there is birth (*jāti*), so they depend

¹ There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could take the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the *Samyutta Nikāya* as the earliest Buddhist view, as *Samyutta* does not represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine and as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter into conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E. J. Thomas drew my attention to this fact.

² *Atthasālinī*, p. 38. There are also other senses in which the word is used, as *dhamma-desanā* where it means religious teaching. The *Laṅkāvatāra* described Dhamma as *guṇadravyapūrvakā dharmmā*, i.e. Dharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances.

on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth depend? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if there were previous existence (*bhava*)¹. But on what does this existence depend, or what being there is there *bhava*. Then it occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there were holding fast (*upādāna*)². But on what did *upādāna* depend? It occurred to him that it was desire (*taṇhā*) on which *upādāna* depended. There can be *upādāna* if there is desire (*taṇhā*)³. But what being there, can there be desire? To this question it occurred to him that there must be feeling (*vedanā*) in order that there may be desire. But on what does *vedanā* depend, or rather what must be there, that there may be feeling (*vedanā*)? To this it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (*phassa*) in order that there may be feeling⁴. If there should be no sense-contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-contact depend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-contacts, there are the six fields of contact (*āyatana*)⁵. But on what do the six *āyatanas* depend? It occurred to him that there must be the mind and body (*nāmarūpa*) in order that there may be the six fields of contact⁶; but on what does *nāmarūpa* depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness (*viññāna*) there could be no *nāmarūpa*⁶. But what being there would there

¹ This word *bhava* is interpreted by Candrakīrti in his *Mādhyamika vṛtti*, p. 565 (La Vallée Poussin's edition) as the deed which brought about rebirth (*punarbhava-janakam karma samutthāpayati kāyena vācā manasā ca*).

² *Atthasālinī*, p. 385, *upādānanti daḥgahapaṇaṃ*. Candrakīrti in explaining *upādāna* says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast to the materials necessary for attaining it (*yatra vastuni satyānastasya vastuno 'rjanāya viḍhapanāya upādānamupādāte tatra tatra prārthayate*). *Mādhyamika vṛtti*, p. 565.

³ Candrakīrti describes *trṣṇā* as *āsvādanābhinandanādhyavasānasthānādātmapriyārūpavividyogo mā bhūt, nityamaparitṛyāgo bhavedīti, yeyam prārthanā*—the desire that there may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which are dear to us. *Ibid.* 565.

⁴ We read also of *phassāyatana* and *phassakāya*. *M. N.* II. 261, III. 280, etc. Candrakīrti says that *śaḍbhirāyatanadvārāḥ kṛtyaprakṛtyāḥ pravarttante prajñāyante. tannāmarūpapratiyayaṃ śaḍāyatanamucyate. śaḍbhyāścāyatanebhyāḥ śaṭsparśakāyāḥ pravarttante*. *M. V.* 565.

⁵ *Āyatana* means the six senses together with their objects. *Āyatana* literally is "Field of operation." *Śaḍāyatana* means six senses as six fields of operation. Candrakīrti has *āyatanadvārāḥ*.

⁶ I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering *nāmarūpa* as mind and body, *Compendium*, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly correct. The four skandhas are called *nāma* in each birth. These together with *rūpa* (matter) give us *nāmarūpa* (mind and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that there may be knowledge. Cf. *M. V.* 564. Govindānanda, the commentator

be viññāna. Here it occurred to him that in order that there might be viññāna there must be the conformations (*saṅkhāra*)¹. But what being there are there the saṅkhāras? Here it occurred to him that the saṅkhāras can only be if there is ignorance (*avijjā*). If *avijjā* could be stopped then the saṅkhāras will be stopped, and if the saṅkhāras could be stopped viññāna could be stopped and so on².

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) could not have happened if there was no birth³. This seems to be clear. But at this point the difficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was

on Śāṅkara's bhāṣya on the *Brahma-sūtras* (II. ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of Nāmarūpa which may probably refer to the Vijñānavāda view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says—To think the momentary as the permanent is Avidyā; from there come the saṃskāras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first vijñāna or thought of the foetus is produced; from that ālayavijñāna, and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nāma) are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen and blood called rūpa. Both Vācaspati and Amalananda agree with Govindānanda in holding that nāma signifies the semen and the ovum while rūpa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijñāna entered the womb and on account of it nāmarūpa were produced through the association of previous karma. See *Vedāntakalpataru*, pp. 274, 275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijñāna into the womb compare *D. N.* II. 63.

¹ It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word here. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical method and he had often to use the same word in more or less different senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning which we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in *S. N.* III. p. 87, "*Saṅkhatam abhisāṅkharonti*," saṅkhāra means that which synthesises the complexes. In the *Compendium* it is translated as will, action. Mr Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used in a different sense from what we find in the word saṅkhāra khandha (viz. mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming saṅkhāra khandha in *Dhamma Saṅgani*, p. 18, and another different set of 40 mental states in *Dharmasaṃgraha*, p. 6. In addition to these forty *cittasamprayuktasaṃskāra*, it also counts thirteen *cittavi-prayuktasaṃskāra*. Candrakīrti interprets it as meaning attachment, antipathy and infatuation, p. 563. Govindānanda, the commentator on Śāṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra* (II. ii. 19), also interprets the word in connection with the doctrine of *Pratītyasamutpāda* as attachment, antipathy and infatuation.

² *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, II. 7-8.

³ Jarā and maraṇa bring in śoka (grief), paridevanā (lamentation), duḥkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness and miserableness) and upāyāsa (feeling of extreme destitution) at the prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All these make up suffering and are the results of jāti (birth). *M. V.* (B. T. S. p. 208). Śāṅkara in his bhāṣya counted all the terms from jarā, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing the entirety of duḥkha-khandha.

enunciated in the Upaniṣads. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka says that just as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove the doctrine of rebirth¹. All schools of philosophy except the Cārvākas believed in it and so little is known to us of the Cārvāka sūtras that it is difficult to say what they did to refute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does not criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth might be due, had to fall back upon another existence (*bhava*). If *bhava* means karma which brings rebirth as Candrakīrti takes it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only take place on account of the works of a previous existence which determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upaniṣad note "as a man does so will he be born" (*Yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate*, Brh. IV. iv. 5). Candrakīrti's interpretation of "*bhava*" as Karma (*punarbhavaajanakam karma*) seems to me to suit better than "existence." The word was probably used rather loosely for *kammabhava*. The word *bhava* is not found in the earlier Upaniṣads and was used in the Pāli scriptures for the first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this *bhava* depend? There could not have been a previous existence if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordance with desire is called upādāna. In the Upaniṣads we read, "whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" (*Yatkraturbhavati tatkarṇuma kurute*, Brh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to the thing depends upon desire (*trṣṇā*), it is said that in order that there may be upādāna there must be taṇhā. In the Upaniṣads also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake himself to" (*sa yathākāmo bhavati tatkraturbhavati*). Neither the word upādāna nor trṣṇā (the Sanskrit word corresponding

¹ The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu philosophical works such as the Nyāya, etc., are slight and inadequate.

to *taṇhā*) is found in the earlier Upaniṣads, but the ideas contained in them are similar to the words "*kratu*" and "*kāma*." Desire (*taṇhā*) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact. Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation¹. These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together) called *nāmarūpa*. We are familiar with this word in the Upaniṣads but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable reality². Buddhaghosa in the *Visuddhimagga* says that by "Name" are meant the three groups beginning with sensation (i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form" the four elements and form derivative from the four elements³. He further says that name by itself can produce physical changes, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So form also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and effectuate the changes⁴. But there exists no heap or collection of material for the production of Name and Form; "but just as when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound; and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from any such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the cardinal or intermediate points of the compass;...in exactly the same way all the elements of being both those with form and those without, come into existence after having previously been non-existent and having come into existence pass away⁵." *Nāmarūpa* taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found to operate in the six doors of sense (*saḷāyctana*). If we take *nāmarūpa* in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend upon the *viññāna* (consciousness). Consciousness has been compared in the *Milinda Pañha* with a watchman at the middle of

¹ The word *āyatana* is found in many places in the earlier Upaniṣads in the sense of "field or place," Chā. I. 5, Brh. III. 9. 10, but *ṣaḍāyatana* does not occur.

² Candrakīrti interprets *nāma* as *Vedanādayo rūpiṇaścātvarāḥ skandhāstatra tatra bhava nāmayantīti nāma. saha rūpaskandhena ca nāma rūpam ceti nāmarūpamucyate*. The four skandhas in each specific birth act as name. These together with rūpa make *nāmarūpa*. *M. V.* 564.

³ Warren's *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 184.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 185, *Visuddhimagga*, Ch. XVII.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 185-186, *Visuddhimagga*, Ch. XVII.

the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction¹. Buddhaghosa in the *Atthasālinī* also says that consciousness means that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics we must say that it knows (*viñāṇa*), goes in advance (*pubbaṅgama*), connects (*sandhāna*), and stands on *nāmarūpa* (*nāmarūpa-padaṭṭhānam*). When the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of sense are discerned (*ārammana-vibhāvanatṭhāne*) and it goes first as the precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known only by the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of (mind) *mano*, it is known only by the consciousness². Buddhaghosa also refers here to the passage in the *Milinda Pañha* we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states of consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap between the previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appears as connected. When there are the aggregates of the five *khandhas* it is lost ; but there are the four aggregates as *nāmarūpa*, it stands on *nāma* and therefore it is said that it stands on *nāmarūpa*. He further asks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or different from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those in truth ; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that the sun is different from these. So the *citta* or consciousness takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different from them³.

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that *jāti* (birth) is the cause of decay and death, *jarāmaraṇa*, etc. *Jāti* is the appearance of the body or the totality of the five *skandhas*⁴. Coming to *bhava* which determines *jāti*, I cannot think of any better rational explanation of *bhava*, than that I have already

¹ Warren's *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 182. *Milinda Pañha* (62⁸).

² *Atthasālinī*, p. 112.

³ *Ibid.* p. 113, *Yathā hi rūpādini upādāya paññattā suriyādayo na atthato rūpādīhi aññe honti ten' eva yasmin samaye suriyo udeti tasmīn samaye tassa tejā-saṅkhātam rūpaṃ pīti evaṃ vuccamāne pi na rūpādīhi añño suriyo nāma atthi. Tathā cittaṃ phassādayo dhamme upādāya paññapiyati. Atthato paṇ' ettha tehi aññam eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittaṃ uppannam hoti ekaṃsen eva tasmin samaye phassādīhi atthato aññad eva hoti ti.*

⁴ "Jātirdehajanma pañcaskandhasamudāyaḥ," Govindānanda's *Ratnaprabhā* on Śāṅkara's *bhāṣya*, II. ii. 19.

suggested, namely, the works (*karma*) which produce the birth¹. Upādāna is an advanced *trṣṇā* leading to positive clinging². It is produced by *trṣṇā* (desire) which again is the result of *vedanā* (pleasure and pain). But this *vedanā* is of course *vedanā* with ignorance (*avidyā*), for an Arhat may have also *vedanā* but as he has no *avidyā*, the *vedanā* cannot produce *trṣṇā* in turn. On its development it immediately passes into upādāna. *Vedanā* means pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads to *trṣṇā* (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact (*sparsā*). Prof. De la Vallée Poussin says that Śrīlābha distinguishes three processes in the production of *vedanā*. Thus first there is the contact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge of the object, and then there is the *vedanā*. Depending on *Majjhima Nikāya*, iii. 242, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in the case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing, so here also *vedanā* takes place simultaneously with *sparsā* for they are “produits par un même complexe de causes (*sāmagrī*)”³.

Sparsā is produced by *ṣaḍāyatana*, *ṣaḍāyatana* by *nāmarūpa*, and *nāmarūpa* by *vijñāna*, and is said to descend in the womb of the mother and produce the five skandhas as *nāmarūpa*, out of which the six senses are specialized.

Vijñāna in this connection probably means the principle or germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the past karmas (*saṅkhāra*) of the dying man and of his past consciousness too.

We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next

¹ Govindānanda in his *Ratnaprabhā* on Śāṅkara's bhāṣya, II. ii. 19, explains “bhava” as that from which anything becomes, as merit and demerit (*dharmādī*). See also *Vibhaṅga*, p. 137 and Warren's *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 201. Mr Aung says in *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, p. 189, that bhava includes kammabhava (the active side of an existence) and upapattibhava (the passive side). And the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of “*kammabhava*” or Karma—becoming i.e. karmic activity.

² Prof. De la Vallée Poussin in his *Théorie des Douze Causes*, p. 26, says that Śālistambasūtra explains the word “upādāna” as “*trṣṇāvaipulya*” or hyper-*trṣṇā* and Candrakīrti also gives the same meaning, *M. V.* (B. T. S. p. 210). Govindānanda explains “upādāna” as *pravṛtti* (movement) generated by *trṣṇā* (desire), i.e. the active tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upādāna means “support” it would denote all the five skandhas. Thus *Madhyamaka vṛtti* says *upādānam pañcaskandhalakṣaṇam... pañcōpādānaskandhākhyam upādānam. M. V. XXVII. 6.*

³ Poussin's *Théorie des Douze Causes*, p. 23.

birth¹. The manner in which the vijñāna produced in the womb is determined by the past vijñāna of the previous existence is according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple, like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life, so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break, but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the vijñāna resulting from his previous karmas and vijñānas enters into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijñāna thus forms the principle of the new life. It is in this vijñāna that name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*) become associated.

The vijñāna is indeed a direct product of the saṃskāras and the sort of birth in which vijñāna should bring down (*nāmayati*) the new existence (*upapatti*) is determined by the saṃskāras², for in reality the happening of death (*maraṇabhava*) and the instillation of the vijñāna as the beginning of the new life (*upapattibhava*) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijñāna had not entered the womb then no nāmarūpa could have appeared³.

This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus avidyā and saṃskāra of the past life produce the vijñāna, nāma-

¹ The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the plants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said "make your resolution, 'May I be a cakravartti king in a next existence,'" *Samyutta*, IV. 303.

² "sa cedānandavijñānaṃ mātuhkuṣim nāvakrāmeta, na tat kalalam kalalatvāya sannivartteta," *M. V.* 552. Compare *Caraka*, *Śārīra*, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapāduka sattva" which connects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is in a pure condition one can remember even the previous births; character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the combination of many elements, so is the foetus.

³ *Madhyamaka vṛtti* (B.T. S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from *Dīgha*, II. 63, "si le vijñāna ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel la namarupa s'y constituerait-il?" Govindānanda on Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* (II. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness (vijñāna) of the foetus is produced by the saṃskāras of the previous birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nāma) and from that the white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus (*kalala-budhūdvasthā*) is produced.

rūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, sparśa, vedanā, tṛṣṇā, upādāna and the bhava (leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava produces the jāti and jarāmaraṇa of the next life¹.

It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain extending in three sections over three lives are all but the manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturally determine one another. Thus *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* says "each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite term 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences of birth. Again when 'ignorance' and 'the actions of the mind' have been taken into account, craving (*tṛṣṇā*), grasping (*upādāna*) and (*karma*) becoming (*bhava*) are implicitly accounted for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping and (*karma*) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also; and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are accounted for. And thus:

Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold 'fruit.'

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. saṅkhāra and viññāna, 2. vedanā and taṇhā, 3. bhava and jāti) and the four groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes)²."

These twelve interdependent links (*dvādaśāṅga*) represent the paṭiccasamuppāda (*pratītyasamutpāda*) doctrines (dependent origination)³ which are themselves but sorrow and lead to cycles of sorrow. The term paṭiccasamuppāda or pratītyasamutpāda has been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature⁴.

¹ This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pāli texts; but Buddhaghosa mentions it in *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* on *Mahānidāna suttanta*. We find it also in *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, VIII. 3. Ignorance and the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth," "decay and death" to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as trikaṇḍaka (having three branches) in *Abhidharmakośa*, III. 20-24. Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "*sa pratītyasamutpādo dvādaśāṅgastrikaṇḍakāḥ pūrvāparāntayordve dve madhyeṣṭau*."

² Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, pp. 189-190.

³ The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list given in the *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II. 23 f., avijjā and saṅkhāra have been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it has been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes not beyond."

⁴ *M. V.* p. 5 f.

Samutpāda means appearance or arising (*prādurbhāva*) and *pratītya* means after getting (*prati+i+ya*); combining the two we find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending on which there is some kind of arising, are called *hetu* (cause) and *paccaya* (ground). These two words however are often used in the same sense and are interchangeable. But *paccaya* is also used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that *avijjā* is the *paccaya* of *saṅkhāra* it is meant that *avijjā* is the ground (*thiti*) of the origin of the *saṅkhāras*, is the ground of their movement, of the instrument through which they stand (*nimittatthiti*), of their *āyuhana* (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause and of their function as the ground with reference to those which are determined by them. *Avijjā* in all these nine ways is the ground of *saṅkhāra* both in the past and also in the future, though *avijjā* itself is determined in its turn by other grounds¹. When we take the *hetu* aspect of the causal chain, we cannot think of anything else but succession, but when we take the *paccaya* aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the cause as ground. Thus when *avijjā* is said to be the ground of the *saṅkhāras* in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems reasonable to think that the *saṅkhāras* were in some sense regarded as special manifestations of *avijjā*². But as this point was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would be unwise to proceed further with it.

The Khandhas.

The word *khandha* (Skr. *skandha*) means the trunk of a tree and is generally used to mean group or aggregate³. We have seen that Buddha said that there was no *ātman* (soul). He said that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul, they really only found the five *khandhas* together or any one of them. The *khandhas* are aggregates of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us and are divided into five

¹ See *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, vol. I. p. 50; see also *Majjhima Nikāya*, I. 67, *saṅkhārā...avijjānidānā avijjāsamudayā avijjājātikā avijjāpabhavā*.

² In the Yoga derivation of *asmitā* (egoism), *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (antipathy) and *abhiniveśa* (self love) from *avidyā* we find also that all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth of *avidyā* (*pañcaparvā avidyā*).

³ The word *skandha* is used in *Chāndogya*, II. 23 (*trayo dharmaskandhūḥ yajñāḥ adhyayanam dānam*) in the sense of branches and in almost the same sense in *Maitrī*, VII. 11.

classes: (1) rūpa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense data, etc., (2) vedanā (feeling—pleasurable, painful and indifferent), (3) saññā (conceptual knowledge), (4) saṅkhāra (synthetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts), (5) viññāna (consciousness)¹.

All these states rise depending one upon the other (*paṭicca-samuppanna*) and when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself, for he only perceives one or more of these. The word rūpa in rūpakhandha stands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sense data². But “rūpa” is also used in the sense of pure organic affections or states of mind as we find in the *Khandha Yamaka*, I. p. 16, and also in *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. 86. Rūpaskandha according to *Dhammasaṅgraha* means the aggregate of five senses, the five sensations, and the implicatory communications associated in sense perceptions (*vijñapti*).

The elaborate discussion of *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* begins by defining rūpa as “*cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnañca mahābhūtānam upādāya rūpam*” (the four mahābhūtās or elements and that proceeding from the grasping of that is called rūpa)³. Buddhaghosa explains it by saying that rūpa means the four mahābhūtās and those which arise depending (*nissāya*) on them as a modification of them. In the rūpa the six senses including their affections are also included. In explaining why the four elements are called mahābhūtās, Buddhaghosa says: “Just as a magician (*māyākāra*) makes the water which is not hard appear as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold; just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves blue make themselves appear as blue (*nīlam upādā rūpam*), not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red or white (*odātam upādārūpam*), so on account of their similarity to the appearances created by the magician they are called mahābhūta⁴.”

In the *Samyutta Nikāya* we find that the Buddha says, “O Bhikkhus it is called rūpam because it manifests (*rūpyati*); how

¹ *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. 86, etc.

² *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, J. P. T. S. 1884, p. 27 ff.

³ *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, pp. 124-179.

⁴ *Atthasālinī*, p. 299.

does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rūpa¹."

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand what is meant by rūpa, I think we find that that which manifested itself to the senses and organs was called rūpa. No distinction seems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells, etc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as sensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance of the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses but the sense-data and the sensations were "rūpa." Under certain conditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upaniṣads nor in the Sāṃkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic. The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and were therefore called rūpa; the forms of affection that appeared were also called rūpa; many other mental states or features which appeared with them were also called rūpa². The āyatanaś or the senses were also called rūpa³. The mahābhūtaś or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they together with all that appeared in association with them were called rūpa and formed the rūpa khandha (the classes of sense-materials, sense-data, senses and sensations).

In *Samyutta Nikāya* (III. 101) it is said that "the four mahābhūtaś were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the rūpakkkhandha (*rūpakkkhandhassa paññāpanāya*). Contact (sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of feelings (*vedanā*); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the saññākkhandha; sense-contact is also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the saṅkhārakkhandha. But nāmarūpa is the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the viññānakkhandha." Thus not only feelings arise on account of the sense-contact but saññā and saṅkhāra also arise therefrom. Saññā is that where specific knowing or

¹ *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. 86.

² *Khandhayamaka*.

³ *Dhammasaṅgani*, p. 124 ff.

conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.

Mrs Rhys Davids writing on *saññā* says: "In editing the second book of the Abhidhamma piṭaka I found a classification distinguishing between *saññā* as cognitive assimilation on occasion of sense, and *saññā* as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition (*patigha-saññā*). This, writes Buddhaghosa, is perception on occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or name (*adhivachānā-saññā*) and is exercised by the *sensus communis* (*mano*), when e.g. 'one is seated...and asks another who is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through his speech.' Thus there are two stages of *saññā*-consciousness, 1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they are by naming¹."

About *saṅkhāra* we read in *Samyutta Nikāya* (III. 87) that it is called *saṅkhāra* because it synthesises (*abhisāṅkharonti*), it is that which conglomerated *rūpa* as *rūpa*, conglomerated *saññā* as *saññā*, *saṅkhāra* as *saṅkhāra* and consciousness (*viññāna*) as consciousness. It is called *saṅkhāra* because it synthesises the conglomerated (*saṅkhatam abhisāṅkharonti*). It is thus a synthetic function which synthesises the passive *rūpa*, *saññā*, *saṅkhāra* and *viññāna* elements. The fact that we hear of 52 *saṅkhāra* states and also that the *saṅkhāra* exercises its synthetic activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show that probably the word *saṅkhāra* is used in two senses, as mental states and as synthetic activity.

Viññāna or consciousness meant according to Buddhaghosa, as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage at which the intellectual process started and also the final resulting consciousness.

Buddhaghosa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychology says that "consciousness (*citta*) first comes into touch (*phassa*) with its object (*ārammaṇa*) and thereafter feeling, conception (*saññā*) and volition (*cetanā*) come in. This contact is like the pillars of a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it (*dabbasambhārasadisā*). But it should not be thought that contact

¹ *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. 49, 50.

is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole consciousness (*ekacittasmin*) it cannot be said that this comes first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association with feeling (*vedanā*), conceiving (*saññā*) or volition (*cetanā*); it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends objects it is called contact.” “There is no impinging on one side of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its *function*; or it has impact as its *essential property* in the sense of attainment, owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object. For it is said in the Commentary:—“contact in the four planes of existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name ‘having the characteristic of touch’ as well as ‘having the function of impact.’ But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is quoted ‘As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the function of impact’¹. Contact is the manifestation of the union of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its effect is feeling (*vedanā*); though it is generated by the objects it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing (*anubhava*) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out

¹ *Atthasālinī*, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.

whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or experience is its function¹.”

The special feature of *saññā* is said to be the recognizing (*paccabhiññā*) by means of a sign (*abhiññānena*). According to another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion of the totality (of aspects)—*sabbasaṅgahikavasena*. The work of volition (*cetanā*) is said to be coordination or binding together (*abhisandahana*). “Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said ‘Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength and said “Take your sickles” and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.’ The simile should be thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts².” It seems that probably the active side operating in *saṅkhāra* was separately designated as *cetanā* (volition).

“When one says ‘I,’ what he does is that he refers either to all the *khandhas* combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was ‘I.’ Just as one could not say that the fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the pollen, so one could not say that the *rūpa* was ‘I’ or that the *vedanā* was ‘I’ or any of the other *khandhas* was ‘I.’ There is nowhere to be found in the *khandhas* ‘I am’³.”

¹ *Atthasālinī*, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.

² *Ibid.* p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148.

³ *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. 130.

Avijjā and Āsava.

As to the question how the avijjā (ignorance) first started there can be no answer, for we could never say that either ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning¹. Its fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by certain others. This mutual determination can only take place in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into being of the āsavas or depravities that the avijjā came into being, and that through the destruction of the depravities (*āsava*) the avijjā was destroyed². These āsavas are classified in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* as kāmāsava, bhavāsava, diṭṭhāsava and avijjāsava. Kāmāsava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavāsava means desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; diṭṭhāsava means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are different; avijjāsava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its extinction and its means of extinction. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* adds four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior and posterior together, and their mutual dependence³. Kāmāsava and bhavāsava can as Buddhaghosa says be counted as one, for they are both but depravities due to attachment⁴.

¹ Warren's *Buddhism in Translations* (*Visuddhimagga*, chap. XVII.), p. 175.

² *M. N.* I. p. 54. Childers translates "āsava" as "depravities" and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants." The word "āsava" in Skr. means "old wine." It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhaghosa and the meaning that he gives to it is "*cira pārivāsikaṭṭhena*" (on account of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through the eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra. As those wines which are kept long are called "āsavas" so these are also called āsavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that Buddhaghosa gives is that they are called āsava on account of their producing saṃsāradukkha (sorrows of the world), *Atthasālinī*, p. 48. Contrast it with Jaina āsava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding it difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhaghosa, I have translated it as "depravities," after Childers.

³ See *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, p. 195.

⁴ Buddhaghosa's *Atthasālinī*, p. 371.

The *diṭṭhāsavas* by clouding the mind with false metaphysical views stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines. The *kāmāsavas* stand in the way of one's entering into the way of *Nirvāṇa* (*anāgāmi-magga*) and the *bhavāsavas* and *avijjāsavas* stand in the way of one's attaining *arhattva* or final emancipation. When the *Majjhima Nikāya* says that from the rise of the *āsavas* *avijjā* rises, it evidently counts *avijjā* there as in some sense separate from the other *āsavas*, such as those of attachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledge about sorrow.

The afflictions (*kilesas*) do not differ much from the *āsavas* for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar to us, such as covetousness (*lobha*), anger or hatred (*dosa*), infatuation (*moha*), arrogance, pride or vanity (*māna*), heresy (*diṭṭhi*), doubt or uncertainty (*vicikicchā*), idleness (*thīna*), boastfulness (*udhacca*), shamelessness (*ahirika*) and hardness of heart (*anottapa*); these *kilesas* proceed directly as a result of the *āsavas*. In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (*lobha*, *dosa*, *moha*) and these together are called *kilesa*. They are associated with the *vedanākkhandha*, *saññākkhandha*, *saṅkhārakkhandha* and *viññānakkhandha*. From these arise the three kinds of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind¹.

Sīla and Samādhi.

We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the tangles of desire (*taṇhā jāṭā*), and the only way by which these may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (*sīla*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*). *Sīla* briefly means the desisting from committing all sinful deeds (*sabbapāpassa akaraṇam*). With *sīla* therefore the first start has to be made, for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances. This serves to remove the *kilesas*, and therefore the proper performance of the *sīla* would lead one to the first two successive stages of sainthood, viz. the *sotāpannabhāva* (the stage in which one is put in the right current) and the *sakadāgāmi-bhāva* (the stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). *Samādhi* is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old *kilesas* are destroyed and the *taṇhā* or desire is removed and

¹ *Dhammasaṅgani*, p. 180.

by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It directly brings in paññā (true wisdom) and by paññā the saint achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an arhat¹. Wisdom (*paññā*) is right knowledge about the four āriya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause of destruction.

Sila means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the right path. Sila thus means 1. right volition (*cetanā*), 2. the associated mental states (*cetasika*), 3. mental control (*saṃvara*) and 4. the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind by the preceding three silas called avitikkama. Saṃvara is spoken of as being of five kinds. 1. Pāṭimokkhasaṃvara (the control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisaṃvara (the control of mindfulness), 3. Ñānasaṃvara (the control of knowledge), 4. Khantisaṃvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriyasaṃvara (the control of active self-restraint). Pāṭimokkhasaṃvara means all self-control in general. Satisaṃvara means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good associations when using one's cognitive senses. Even when looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness (*sati*) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may lead in the right direction. Khantisaṃvara is that by which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence to sila all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (*kamma*) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (*samādhānam, upadhāraṇam, patitṭhā*)².

The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting, dining, etc., which are called the dhūtaṅgas or pure disciplinary parts³. The practice of sila and the dhūtaṅgas help the sage to adopt the course of samādhi. Samādhi as we have seen means the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (*kusala-cittekaggatā samādhī*) together with its states upon one particular object (*ekāraṃmaṇa*) so that they may completely cease to shift and change (*sammā ca avikkhipamāṇā*)⁴.

¹ *Visuddhimagga Nidānādīkathā*.

² *Visuddhimagga*, II.

³ *Visuddhimagga-sīlaniddeso*, pp. 7 and 8.

⁴ *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 84-85.

The man who has practised *sīla* must train his mind first in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire the chief concentration of meditation called *jhāna* (fixed and steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind for the acquirement of *jhānasamādhi* eventually lead to it and are called *upacāra samādhi* (preliminary *samādhi*) as distinguished from the *jhānasamādhi* called the *appanāsamādhi* (achieved *samādhi*)¹. Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating and drinking (*āhāre paṭikkūlasaṇṇā*) by emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows will come². Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, *kṣiti* (earth), *ap* (water), *tejas* (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase of a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically called *caturdhātuvavatthānabhāvanā* (the meditation of the body as being made up of the four elements)³. Thirdly he has to habituate his mind to think again and again (*anussati*) about the virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the saṅgha (the monks following the Buddha), the gods and the law (*dhamma*) of the Buddha, about the good effects of *sīla*, and the making of gifts (*cāgānussati*), about the nature of death (*marañānussati*) and about the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena (*upasamānussati*)⁴.

¹ As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow what appears to me to be the main line of division showing the interconnection of *jhāna* (Skr. *dhyaṇa*) with its accessory stages called *parikammas* (*Visuddhimagga*, pp. 85 f.).

² *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic attitude, "*Imaṃ ca pana āhāre paṭikkūlasaṇṇāṃ anuyuttassa bhikkhuno rasatanhāya cittaṃ paṭilīyati, paṭikuḷḷati, paṭivallati; so, kantāranittharaṇaṭṭhiko viya puttamaṃsaṃ vigatamado āhāraṃ āhāreti yāvad eva dukkhassa niṭṭharaṇaṭṭhāya*," p. 347. The mind of him who inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from all desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off from them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food without any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to sustain himself in crossing a forest.

³ *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 347-370.

⁴ *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 197-294.

Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparations called the *upacāra samādhi* we come to those other sources of concentration and meditation called the *appanāsamādhi* which directly lead to the achievement of the highest *samādhi*. The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts which lead the mind to its final goal *Nibbāna*. In the first part of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcasses and think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are, and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the dead carcasses are as loathsome as they¹. This is called *asubhakam-maṭṭhāna* or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our bodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter into the first *jhāna* by leading his mind away from his body. This is called the *kāyagatāsati* or the continual mindfulness about the nature of the body². As an aid to concentration the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling (*passāsa*) and the exhaling (*āssāsa*) of his breath, so that instead of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. This is called the *ānāpānasati* or the mindfulness of inhalation and exhalation³.

Next to this we come to *Brahmavihāra*, the fourfold meditation of *mettā* (universal friendship), *karuṇā* (universal pity), *muditā* (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and *upekkhā* (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to the meditation on universal friendship, one should start with thinking how he should himself like to root out all misery and become happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not

¹ *Visuddhimagga*, v1.

² *Ibid.* pp. 239-266.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 266-292.

connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others. He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by anger, he would spoil all his sīla which he was so carefully practising. If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury, should he himself also do the same by being angry at it? If he were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas are momentary (*khaṇikattā*); that there no longer existed the khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the infliction of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was injured was himself an indispensable element in the production of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and there could not thus be any special reason for making him responsible and of being angry with him. If even after thinking in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himself in an attitude of universal friendship¹. This is called the mettā-bhāvanā. In the meditation of universal pity (*karuṇā*) also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to Nibbāna, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow².

We next come to the jhānas with the help of material things as objects of concentration called the Kasiṇam. These objects of concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour, yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space (*paricchinnaṅkāsa*). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes

¹ *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 295-314.

² *Ibid.* pp. 314-315.

with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.

In the first stages of the first meditation (*pathamam jhānam*) the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse relations. This state of concentration is called *vitakka* (discursive meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without any quivering. This state is called *vicāra* (steadily moving). The first stage *vitakka* has been compared in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with a buoyant exaltation (*pīti*) and a steady inward bliss called *sukha*¹ instilling the mind. The formation of this first *jhāna* roots out five ties of *avijjā*, *kāmacchando* (dallying with desires), *vyāpādo* (hatred), *thīnamiddham* (sloth and torpor), *uddhaccakukkuccam* (pride and restlessness), and *vicikicchā* (doubt). The five elements of which this *jhāna* is constituted are *vitakka*, *vicāra*, *pīti*, *sukham* and *ekaggatā* (one pointedness).

When the sage masters the first *jhāna* he finds it defective and wants to enter into the second meditation (*dutiyam jhānam*), where there is neither any *vitakka* nor *vicāra* of the first *jhāna*, but the mind is in one unruffled state (*ekodibhāvam*). It is a much steadier state and does not possess the movement which characterized the *vitakka* and the *vicāra* stages of the first *jhāna* and is therefore a very placid state (*vitakka-vicārakkhobhavirahena atīviya acalatā suppasannatā ca*). It is however associated with *pīti*, *sukha* and *ekaggatā* as the first *jhāna* was.

When the second *jhāna* is mastered the sage becomes disinclined towards the enjoyment of the *pīti* of that stage and becomes indifferent to them (*upekkhako*). A sage in this stage sees the objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all the *āsavas* of the sage become loosened (*khīṇāsava*). The enjoyment of *sukha* however still remains in the stage and the

¹ Where there is *pīti* there is *sukha*, but where there is *sukha* there may not necessarily be *pīti*. *Visuddhimagga*, p. 145.

mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes to turn back to the enjoyment of *pīti* again. The two characteristics of this *jhāna* are *sukha* and *ekaggatā*. It should however be noted that though there is the feeling of highest *sukha* here, the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it (*atimadhurasukhe sukhapāramippatte pi tatiyajjhāne upekkhako, na tattha sukhābhisingena ākaddhiyati*)¹. The earth ball (*paṭhavī*) is however still the object of the *jhāna*.

In the fourth or the last *jhāna* both the *sukha* (happiness) and the *dukkha* (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by supreme and absolute indifference (*upekkhā*) which was slowly growing in all the various stages of the *jhānas*. The characteristics of this *jhāna* are therefore *upekkhā* and *ekaggatā*. With the mastery of this *jhāna* comes final perfection and total extinction of the *citta* called *cetovimutti*, and the sage becomes thereby an *arhat*². There is no further production of the *khandhas*, no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and sufferings—*Nibbāna*.

Kamma.

In the *Kaṭṭha* (II. 6) Yama says that “a fool who is blinded with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he comes again and again within my grasp.” In the *Dīgha Nikāya* also we read how *Pāyāsi* was trying to give his reasons in support of his belief that “Neither is there any other world, nor are there beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done³.” Some of his arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell us that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions we do not find at the time of the death of any person that his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of the departure of his soul, and so on. *Kassapa* refutes his arguments with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of

¹ *Visuddhimagga*, p. 163.

² *Majjhima Nikāya*, I. p. 296, and *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 167–168.

³ *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II. p. 349; *D. N.* II. pp. 317 ff.

Pāyāsi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the Upaniṣads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In the *Milinda Pañha*, we find Nāgasena saying "it is through a difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree, some wise and some foolish¹." We have seen in the third chapter that the same sort of views was enunciated by the Upaniṣad sages.

But karma could produce its effect in this life or any other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation. But "when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise without covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then inasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent and not liable to spring up again in the future²." Karma by itself without craving (*taṇhā*) is incapable of bearing good or bad fruits. Thus we read in the *Mahāsatipatṭhāna sutta*, "even this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and self-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit, the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed life) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth)³." "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible, craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in memory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear, that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it dwell⁴." Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensual gratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes. And this is the first ārya satya (noble truth).

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it⁵."

When the desire or craving (*taṇhā*) has once ceased the sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad

¹ Warren's *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 215.

² *Ibid.* pp. 216-217.

³ *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II. p. 340.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 341.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 341.

fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as Moggallāna did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of his desire¹.

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and mind (*kāyika*, *vācika* and *mānasika*). The root of this kamma is however volition (*cetanā*) and the states associated with it². If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into the forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there even after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for he could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives an order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually carried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (*vācika*) and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (*mānasika*)³. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into four classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity, (2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which contribute to the destruction of kammas⁴.

Final extinction of sorrow (*nibbāna*) takes place as the natural result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallée Poussin has pointed out that in the Pāli texts Nibbāna has sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state⁵.

¹ See *Kathāvatthu* and Warren's *Buddhism in Translations*, pp. 221 ff.

² *Atthasālinī*, p. 88.

³ See *Atthasālinī*, p. 90.

⁴ See *Atthasālinī*, p. 89.

⁵ Prof. De la Vallée Poussin's article in the *E. R. E.* on Nirvāṇa. See also *Cullavagga*, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's *Psalm of the early Buddhists*, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; *Dīgha*, II. 15; *Udāna*, VIII.; *Samyutta*, III. 109.

Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbāna in *Pali Text Society Journal*, 1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space (*ākāsa*) or consciousness (*viññāna*) attained to a state in which they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of Nibbāna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task to explain Nibbāna in terms of worldly experience, and there is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to think of a Tathāgata as existing eternally (*śāśvata*) or not-existing (*aśāśvata*) or whether he is existing as well as not existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbāna is either a positive and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as illegitimate.

Later Buddhistic writers like Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence. Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There is no difference between the worldly stage (*saṃsāra*) and Nibbāna, for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during the saṃsāra so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbāna.

Upaniṣads and Buddhism.

The Upaniṣads had discovered that the true self was ānanda (bliss)¹. We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly presupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was the self (*attā*) it must be bliss. The Upaniṣads had asserted that the self (*ātman*) was indestructible and eternal². If we are allowed

¹ Tait. II. 5.

² Brh. IV. 5. 14. Katha. V. 13.

to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss, because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upaniṣads, but he who carefully reads the Upaniṣads cannot but think that the reason why the Upaniṣads speak of the self as bliss is that it is eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the Upaniṣads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self¹. The point at which Buddhism parted from the Upaniṣads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upaniṣads doubtless considered that there were many experiences which we often identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is found in the Upaniṣads that there was associated with these a permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They considered that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined as this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this (*neti neti*)². But the early Pāli scriptures hold that we could nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me as my self³.

The true self was with the Upaniṣads a matter of transcendental experience as it were, for they said that it could not be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out as "there," behind all the changing mental categories. The Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken of as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (*rūpa*) or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He

¹ *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. pp. 44-45 ff.

² See Bṛh. IV. IV. Chāndogya, VI. 7-12.

³ *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. 45.

experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or experienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of experiences that he considered as the perception of the self¹.

The Upaniṣads did not try to establish any school of discipline or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge. The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow. Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates, ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorance about the means of bringing about this extinction represent the fourfold ignorance (*avijjā*)². The *avidyā*, which is equivalent to the Pāli word *avijjā*, occurs in the Upaniṣads also, but there it means ignorance about the ātman doctrine, and it is sometimes contrasted with *vidyā* or true knowledge about the self (*ātman*)³. With the Upaniṣads the highest truth was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow⁴. This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (*āriya sacca*)—sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto.

There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we may ordinarily be led to suppose.

Thus it is said in the *Visuddhimagga* "inasmuch however as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming into existence and a disappearing from existence...and is empty of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,—...or in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and similarly with reference to Karma and the rest—therefore is it to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with a twelvefold emptiness⁵."

¹ *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, III. 46.

² *Majjhima Nikāya*, I. p. 54.

³ Chā. I. 1. 10. Bṛh. IV. 3. 20. There are some passages where *vidyā* and *avidyā* have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, *Īśā* 9-11.

⁴ *Ang. Nikāya*, III. 85.

⁵ Warren's *Buddhism in Translations* (*Visuddhimagga*, chap. XVII.), p. 175.

The Schools of Theravāda Buddhism.

There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death. Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples, or rather amongst the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesālī decided against the Vṛjīn monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas, they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahāsaṅgha) and came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus came to be called as the Mahāsaṅghikas¹. According to Vasumitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahāsaṅghikas seceded in 400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise first to the three schools Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins, and Kukkulikas and after that the Bahuśrutīyas. In the course of the next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the Prajñaptivādins, Caittikas, Aparasāilas and Uttarasāilas. The Theravāda or the Sthaviravāda school which had convened the council of Vesālī developed during the second and first century B.C. into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas, Mahīśāsakas, Kāśyapīyas, Saṅkrāntikas (more well known as Sautrāntikas) and the Vātsīputtrīyas which latter was again split up into the Dharmottarīyas, Bhadravānīyas, Sammitīyas and Channāgarīkas. The main branch of the Theravāda school was from the second century downwards known as the Hetuvādins or Sarvāstivādins². The *Mahābodhivaṃsa* identifies the Theravāda school with the Vibhajjavādins. The commentator of the *Kathāvatthu* who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometime in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little. Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of

¹ The *Mahāvamsa* differs from *Dīpavamsa* in holding that the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahāsaṅghikas, but it was the Mahāsaṅghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. The *Mahābodhivaṃsa*, which according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.—1000 A.D., follows the *Mahāvamsa* in holding the Mahāsaṅghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.

Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesālī with the third council of Pāṭaliputra. See introduction to translation of *Kathāvatthu* by Mrs Rhys Davids.

² For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids's translation of *Kathāvatthu*, pp. xxxvi-xlv.

certain schools, of the Mahāsaṅghikas, Lokottaravādins, Ekavyavahārikas, Kukkulikas, Prajñaptivādins and Sarvāstivādins, but these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical importance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the Mahāsaṅghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with mind (*citta*) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the Prajñaptivādins held that there was no agent in man, that there was no untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, (3) that the Sarvāstivādins believed that everything existed. From the discussions found in the *Kathāvatthu* also we may know the views of some of the schools on some points which are not always devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism were not so many different systems but only differed from one another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises. These schools are however not very important for a history of later Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct contact, are the Sarvāstivādins including the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas, the Yogācāra or the Vijñānavādins and the Mādhyamikas or the Śūnyavādins. We do not know which of the diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools, the Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika schools. But as these schools were most important in relation to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought, it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can about these systems of Buddhistic thought.

When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling them the Vijñānavādins or the Yogācāras and the Śūnyavādins, they often refer to the Sarvāstivādins by which they mean both the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas, ignoring the difference that exists between these two schools. It is well to mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravāda doctrines

as expressed in the Pāli works. The Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra* of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhāṣika was commented upon by Yaśomitra who was a Sautrāntika. The difference between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas that attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could only be inferred from our diversified knowledge¹. Guṇaratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* on *Śaddarśanasamuccaya* says that the Vaibhāṣika was but another name of the Āryasammitīya school. According to Guṇaratna the Vaibhāṣikas held that things existed for four moments, the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* that the Vaibhāṣikas believed these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of Yaśomitra on *Abhidharmakośa kārīkā*, v. 25). The self called pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was formless and was produced along with its object by the very same conditions (*arthasahabhāṣī ekasamāgryadhīnaḥ*). The Sautrāntikas according to Guṇaratna held that there was no soul but only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, ākāśa and pudgala are but names (*saṃjñāmātram*), mere assertions (*pratijñāmātram*), mere limitations (*samvṛtamātram*) and mere phenomena (*vya-vahāramātram*). By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal and all-pervasive soul. External objects are never directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all compounded things are momentary (*kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ*).

¹ Mādhavācārya's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, chapter II. *Śāstradīpikā*, the discussions on Pratyakṣa, Amalananda's commentary (on *Bhāmati*) *Vedāntakalpataru*, p. 286, "vaibhāṣikasya bāhyor'thaḥ pratyakṣaḥ, sautrāntikasya jñānagatākāravaicitryeṇ anumeyah." The nature of the inference of the Sautrāntikas is shown thus by Amalananda (1247-1260 A.D.) "ye yasmin satyapi kādācitkālāḥ te tadatiriktāpekṣāḥ" (those (i.e. cognitions) which in spite of certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects) *Vedāntakalpataru*, p. 289.

The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is intended to be signified by that word (*anyāpohaḥ śabdārthaḥ*). Salvation (*mokṣa*) comes as the result of the destruction of the process of knowledge through continual meditation that there is no soul¹.

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavādins, Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas or the Sarvāstivādins appears to refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest with Buddhist philosophy. Thus *Abhidharmakośa* (v. 24...) describes the Sarvāstivādins as those who maintain the universal existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavādins are those "who maintain that the present elements and those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and of those among the past that have already produced fruition." There were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrāta maintained that when an element enters different times, its existence changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes though the essence remains the same. Ghoṣa held that "when an element appears at different times, the past one retains its past aspects without being severed from its future and present aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra held that an entity is called present, past and future according as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva maintained the view that just as the same woman may be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the preceding or the succeeding moment.

All these schools are in some sense Sarvāstivādins, for they maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhāṣika finds them all defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrāta's

¹ Guṇaratna's *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, pp. 46-47.

view is only a veiled Sāṃkhya doctrine; that of Ghōṣa is a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the co-existence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would suppose that all the three times were found together and included in one of them. The Vaibhāṣika finds himself in agreement with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in past times could not have produced its effects in the present time. The Sautrāntika however thought that the Vaibhāṣika's doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to exist. He objected to the Vaibhāṣika view that the past is to be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing about the present on the ground that in that case there should be no difference between the past and the present, since both exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are

never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhāṣika suggests, but past passions leave residues which become the causes of new passions of the present moment¹.

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of the Vātsīputtrīyas and the Sarvāstivādins as represented by Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of the existence of soul in *Abhidharmakośa*. The argument of Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining cause of perception, no such cause can be found which may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary. If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and must be something different from the elements or entities of a personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging being would be without any practical efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) which alone determines or proves existence. The soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are only the elements of a personal life. But the Vātsīputtrīya school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is separate from it, so the soul is an individual (*puṭgala*) which has a separate existence, though we could not say that it was altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist. To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a person) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned, and is based on an analogy with their own experience, but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as

¹ I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan of a small portion of *Abhidharmakośa* by my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it.

belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions in different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,' 'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments coming in close succession being called Devadatta)."

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of the remembered object under certain conditions of attention, etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say "this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be known by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away having reached an age." Only so much description can be understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect. This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are

conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation 'individual' but a common name for the different elements of which it is composed."

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question whether the "living being is identical with the body or not" is just because there did not exist any living being as "individual," as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was also denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventional name for a set of constantly changing elements¹.

The only book of the Sammitiyas known to us and that by name only is the *Sammitiyaśāstra* translated into Chinese between 350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however probably lost².

The Vaibhāṣikas are identified with the Sarvāstivādins who according to *Dīpavaṃsa* v. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, branched off from the Mahīśāsakas, who in their turn had separated from the Theravāda school.

From the *Kathāvatthu* we know (1) that the Sabbatthivādins believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual process, (3) that consciousness or even samādhi was nothing but

¹ This account is based on the translation of *Aṣṭamaśāsthanibaddhaḥ pudgala-viniścayaḥ*, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of *Abhidharmakośa*, by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie*, 1919.

² Professor De la Vallée Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitiyas in the *E. R. E.* He there says that in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* the Sammitiyas have been identified with the Vātsīputtrīyas and that many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas of a later age. Some of their views are as follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvāṇa can fall away; (2) there is an intermediate state between death and rebirth called *antarābhava*; (3) merit accrues not only by gift (*tyagānvaya*) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given (*paribhogānvaya puṇya*); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala cannot be said to be transitory (*anīya*) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down the burden (*skandhas*) shouldering a new burden; it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Professor De la Vallée Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Guṇaratna which we have noticed above.

a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away¹. The Sabbatthivādins or Sarvāstivādins have a vast Abhidharma literature still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the Abhidharma of the Theravāda school which we have already mentioned². These are 1. *Jñānaprasthāna Śāstra* of Kātyāyanīputtra which passed by the name of *Mahā Vibhāṣā* from which the Sabbatthivādins who followed it are called Vaibhāṣikas³. This work is said to have been given a literary form by Aśvaghōṣa. 2. *Dharmaskandha* by Śāriputtra. 3. *Dhātukāya* by Pūrṇa. 4. *Prajñāptiśāstra* by Maudgalyāyana. 5. *Vijñānakāya* by Devakṣema. 6. *Saṅgītiparyyāya* by Śāriputtra and *Prakaraṇapāda* by Vasumitra. Vasubandhu (420 A.D.—500 A.D.) wrote a work on the Vaibhāṣika⁴ system in verses (*kārikā*) known as the *Abhidharmakośa*, to which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the name *Abhidharma Kośabhāṣya* in which he pointed out some of the defects of the Vaibhāṣika school from the Sautrāntika point of view⁵. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Guṇamati and later on by Yaśomitra who was himself a Sautrāntika and called his work *Abhidharmakośa vyākhyā*; Saṅghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu wrote *Samaya pradīpa* and *Nyāyānusāra* (Chinese translations of which are available) on strict Vaibhāṣika lines. We hear also of other Vaibhāṣika writers such as Dharmatrāta, Ghōṣaka, Vasumitra and Bhadanta, the writer of *Samyuktābhidharmaśāstra* and *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Diñnāga (480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibhāṣika or a Sautrāntika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, wrote his famous work *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in which he established Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vātsyāyana the celebrated commentator of the *Nyāya sūtras*; but we regret

¹ See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation *Kathāvatthu*, p. xix, and Sections 1. 6, 7; 11. 9 and 11. 6.

² *Mahāvīyūtpatti* gives two names for Sarvāstivāda, viz. Mūlasarvāstivāda and Āryasārvāstivāda. Itsing (671–695 A.D.) speaks of Āryamūlasarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda. In his time he found it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu says (*P. T. S.* 1904–1905) that Paramārtha, in his life of Vasubandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, who studied it there.

³ Takakusu says (*P. T. S.* 1904–1905) that Kātyāyanīputtra's work was probably a compilation from other Vibhāṣās which existed before the Chinese translations and Vibhāṣā texts dated 383 A.D.

⁴ See Takakusu's article *J. R. A. S.* 1905.

⁵ The Sautrāntikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the Vaibhāṣikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines as given in the Suttaṭṭhaka.

to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit, nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into any of the modern European or Indian languages.

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivādins from the Chinese versions of the *Abhidharmakośa*, *Mahāvibhāṣāsāstra*, etc., rather elaborately¹. The following is a short sketch, which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.

The Sabbatthivādins admitted the five skandhas, twelve āyatanas, eighteen dhātus, the three asaṃskṛta dharmas of pratisaṃkhyānirodha apratisaṃkhyānirodha and ākāśa, and the saṃskṛta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rūpa (matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental)². All effects are produced by the coming together (saṃskṛta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the rūpa, citta, etc., are thus called saṃskṛta dharmas (composite things or collocations—*sambhūyakāri*). The rūpa dharmas are eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14 cittaviprayukta saṃskāra dharmas (non-mental composite things); adding to these the three asaṃskṛta dharmas we have the seventy-five dharmas. Rūpa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell, taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum is known as paramāṇu, which is the minutest form of rūpa. It cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible. But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary flash into being. The simple atoms are called *dravyaparamāṇu* and the compound ones *saṃghātaparamāṇu*. In the words of Prof. Stcherbatsky "the universal elements of matter are manifested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramāṇus combine together to form an aṇu, and it is in this combined form only that they become perceptible. The combination takes place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, published by the Calcutta University.

² Śāṅkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins in his bhāṣya on the *Brahma-sūtras* II. 2 notices some of the categories mentioned by Sogen.

others around it. The point which must be remembered in connection with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities of all the mahābhūtas are inherent in the paramāṇus. The special characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to form each of the elements; the difference between the different elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special characteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics though present remained only in a potential form. The mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth. The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, (1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as *dhṛti* or attraction, *saṃgraha* or cohesion, *pakti* or chemical heat, and *vyūhana* or clustering and collecting). These combine together naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction between the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins and other forms of Buddhism is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, owing to their constant change of combination. Avidyā is not regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of pratityasamutpāda; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual, but is rather identical with “moha” or delusion and represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidyā, which through saṃskāra, etc., produces nāmarūpa in the case of a particular individual, is not his avidyā in the present existence but the avidyā of his past existence bearing fruit in the present life.

“The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state.” For example, clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name jar arises¹. The Sarvāstivādins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the case of composite things (*saṃprayukta hetu*) and in the case of

¹ Sogen's quotation from Kumārajīva's Chinese version of Āryadeva's commentary on the *Mādhyamika śāstra* (chapter xx. Kārikā 9).

the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum of "vijñāna" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and the aggregate of the five senses (*indriyas*) is called the perceiver. It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a substratum formed of them.

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow, red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of appearance (*saṃsthāna*) of long, short, round, square, high, low, straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (*kāyendriya*) has for its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness, roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by the objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other energies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse thought (*vijñāna*); each of the five senses is an agent without which none of the five vijñānas would become capable of perceiving an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal senses consists of a combination of paramāṇus, which are extremely pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed on our person which is designated as avijñapti rūpa. It is called rūpa because it is a result or effect of rūpa-contact; it is called avijñapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered as twofold, namely, that as thought (*cetana karma*) and that as activity (*caitasika karma*). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.

that due to body-motion (*kāyika karma*) and speech (*vācika karma*). Both these may again be latent (*avijñapti*) and patent (*viññapti*), giving us the *kāyika-vijñapti karma*, *kāyikāvijñapti karma*, *vācika-vijñapti karma* and *vācikāvijñapti karma*. *Avijñapti rūpa* and *avijñapti karma* are what we should call in modern phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself in future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but are similar to those which are known, they are called *avijñapti*.

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called *cittam*, because it wills (*cetati*), *manas* because it thinks (*manvate*) and *viññāna* because it discriminates (*nir-diśati*). The discrimination may be of three kinds: (1) *svabhāva nirdeśa* (natural perceptual discrimination), (2) *prayoga nirdeśa* (actual discrimination as present, past and future), and (3) *anusmṛti nirdeśa* (reminiscent discrimination referring only to the past). The senses only possess the *svabhāva nirdeśa*, the other two belong exclusively to *manovijñāna*. Each of the *viññānas* as associated with its specific sense discriminates its particular object and perceives its general characteristics; the six *viññānas* combine to form what is known as the *Vijñānaskandha*, which is presided over by mind (*mano*). There are forty-six *caitta saṃskṛta dharmas*. Of the three *asaṃskṛta dharmas* *ākāśa* (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction, establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance (*nirūpākhya*, non-rūpa). The second *asaṃskṛta dharma*, *aprati-saṃkhyā nirodha*, means the non-perception of dharmas caused by the absence of *pratyayas* or conditions. Thus when I fix my attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because they are non-existent but because the conditions which would have made them visible were absent. The third *asaṃskṛta dharma*, *pratisaṃkhyā nirodha*, is the final deliverance from bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These are called *asaṃskṛta* because being of the nature of negation they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution. The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture¹.

¹ Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hinayāna thinker (about 250 A.D.), Hārivarman, who founded a school known as Satyasiddhi school, which

Mahāyānism.

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahāyānism took its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahāsaṅghikas separated themselves from the Theravādins probably some time in 400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be labelled as Mahāyāna were gradually on the way to taking their first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works which are regarded as various Mahāyāna sūtras, some of which are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others as late as 300 or 400 A.D.¹ These Mahāyānasūtras, also called the Vaipulyasūtras, are generally all in the form of instructions given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravāda school.

The word Hīnayāna refers to the schools of Theravāda, and as such it is contrasted with Mahāyāna. The words are generally translated as small vehicle (*hīna*=small, *yāna*=vehicle) and great vehicle (*mahā*=great, *yāna*=vehicle). But this translation by no means expresses what is meant by Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna². Asaṅga (480 A.D.) in his *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* gives

propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nāgārjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.

¹ Quotations and references to many of these sūtras are found in Candrakīrti's commentary on the *Mādhyamika kārikās* of Nāgārjuna; some of these are the following: *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* (translated into Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, *Gogaṇagañja*, *Samādhisūtra*, *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, *Drḍhādhyāsayasāncodanāsūtra*, *Dhyāyitamuṣṭisūtra*, *Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra*, *Mahāyānasūtra*, *Māradamanasūtra*, *Ratnakūṭasūtra*, *Ratnacūḍāpariṣṭhāsūtra*, *Ratnameghasūtra*, *Ratnarāśisūtra*, *Ratnākaraśūtra*, *Rāstrapālapariṣṭhāsūtra*, *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, *Lalitavistarasūtra*, *Vajracchedikāsūtra*, *Vimalakīrtinīrdeśasūtra*, *Śālistambhasūtra*, *Samādhirajasūtra*, *Sukhāvativyūha*, *Suvarṇaprabhāsaśūtra*, *Saddharmapuṇḍarika* (translated into Chinese A.D. 255), *Amitāyurdhyānasūtra*, *Hastikākhyasūtra*, etc.

² The word Yāna is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle (*Lalitavistara*, pp. 25, 38; *Prajñāpāramitā*, pp. 24, 319; *Samādhirajasūtra*, p. 1; *Karuṇapūṇḍarika*, p. 67; *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yāna is as old as the Upaniṣads where we read of Devayāna and Pitryāna. There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear in *Laṅkāvatāra* of Śrāvakayāna (career of the Śrāvakas or the Theravādin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayāna (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha yāna (career of the Buddhas), Ekayāna (one career), Devayāna (career of the gods),

us the reason why one school was called Hīnayāna whereas the other, which he professed, was called Mahāyāna. He says that, considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion, the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hīnayāna occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Mahā (great) Yāna, and hence it is branded as Hīna (small, or low). This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The ultimate good of an adherent of the Hīnayāna is to attain his own nirvāṇa or salvation, whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mahāyāna creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the salvation of all beings. So the Hīnayāna goal was lower, and in consequence of that the instructions that its followers received, the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were narrower than that of the Mahāyāna adherents. A Hīnayāna man had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahāyāna adherent was prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain salvation. So the Hīnayāna adherents required only a short period of work and may from that point of view also be called *hīna*, or lower.

This point, though important from the point of view of the difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Mahāyānists which distinguishes them from the Hīnayānists from the philosophical point of view. The Mahāyānists believed that all things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and void at bottom, whereas the Hīnayānists only believed in the impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than that.

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nāgārjuna first preached the doctrine of Śūnyavāda (essencelessness or voidness of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahāyāna sūtras either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we take some of those sūtras which were in all probability earlier than Nāgārjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nāgārjuna expounded

Brahmayāna (career of becoming a Brahmā), Tathāgatayāna (career of a Tathāgata). In one place *Laṅkāvatāra* says that ordinarily distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (*Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 68).

with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhūti saying to the Buddha that *vedanā* (feeling), *saṃjñā* (concepts) and the *saṃskāras* (conformations) are all *māyā* (illusion)¹. All the *skandhas*, *dhātus* (elements) and *āyatanas* are void and absolute cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void is not different from the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas*, and this absolute cessation of *dharma*s is regarded as the highest knowledge (*prajñāpāramitā*)². Everything being void there is in reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (*śāśvata*) nor non-eternal (*aśāśvata*) but pure void. It should be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness" (*tathatā*) and consider all things as void. The saint (*bodhisattva*) has to establish himself in all the virtues (*pāramitā*), benevolence (*dāna-pāramitā*), the virtue of character (*śīlapāramitā*), the virtue of forbearance (*kṣāntipāramitā*), the virtue of tenacity and strength (*vīryapāramitā*) and the virtue of meditation (*dhyānapāramitā*). The saint (*bodhisattva*) is firmly determined that he will help an infinite number of souls to attain *nirvāṇa*. In reality, however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage. The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his work on the strength of his *pāramitās*, though in reality there is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who is to help him to attain it³. The true *prajñāpāramitā* is the absolute cessation of all appearance (*yaḥ anupalambhaḥ sarva-dharmāṇām sa prajñāpāramitā ityucyate*)⁴.

The Mahāyāna doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that of Śūnyavāda or the Mādhyamika doctrine and Vijñānavāda. The difference between Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda (the theory that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness) is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But while the Śūnyavādins were more busy in showing this indefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijñānavādins, tacitly accepting

¹ *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.* p. 21.

² *Ibid.* p. 177.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 177.

the truth preached by the Śūnyavādins, interested themselves in explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (*vāsanā*).

Aśvaghōṣa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher of a new type of idealism (*viññānavāda*) known as the Tathatā philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in Aśvaghōṣa's *Śraddhotpādaśāstra* as being made from *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, we should think of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* as being one of the early works of the Viññānavādins¹. The greatest later writer of the Viññānavāda school was Asaṅga (400 A.D.), to whom are attributed the *Saptadaśabhūmi sūtra*, *Mahāyāna sūtra*, *Upadeśa*, *Mahāyānasamparigraha śāstra*, *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra* and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*. None of these works excepting the last one is available to readers who have no access to the Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are in all probability lost. The Viññānavāda school is known to Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogācāra, and it does not seem an improbable supposition that Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra* was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu, a younger brother of Asaṅga, was, as Paramārtha (499-569) tells us, at first a liberal Sarvāstivādin, but was converted to Viññānavāda, late in his life, by Asaṅga. Thus Vasubandhu, who wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvāstivādins, *Abhidharmakośa*, devoted himself in his later life to Viññānavāda². He is said to have commented upon a number of Mahāyāna sūtras, such as *Avataṃsaka*, *Nirvāṇa*, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Vimalakīrti* and *Śrīmālāsīṃhanāda*, and compiled some Mahāyāna sūtras, such as *Viññānamātrasiddhi*, *Ratnatraya*, etc. The school of Viññānavāda continued for at least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in possession of any work of great fame of this school after him.

We have already noticed that the Śūnyavāda formed the fundamental principle of all schools of Mahāyāna. The most powerful exponent of this doctrine was Nāgārjuna (100 A.D.), a brief account of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nāgārjuna's kārīkās (verses) were commented upon by Āryyadeva, a disciple of his, Kumārajīva (383 A.D.), Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti (550 A.D.). Āryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at

¹ Dr S. C. Vidyābhūṣana thinks that *Laṅkāvatāra* belongs to about 300 A.D.

² Takakusu's "A study of the Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu," *J. R. A. S.* 1905.

least three other books, viz. *Catuḥśataka*, *Hastabālaprakaraṇa-vṛtti* and *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa*¹. In the small work called *Hastabālaprakaraṇavṛtti* Āryyadeva says that whatever depends for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory; all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependent on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenal appearances. In his *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa* he says that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflection of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination (*vikalpa*). In reality the mind (*citta*) without a touch of imagination (*kalpanā*) in it is the pure reality.

It does not seem however that the Śūnyavādins could produce any great writers after Candrakīrti. References to Śūnyavāda show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers until the time of the great Mīmāṃsā authority Kumārila who flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the Śūnyavādins were no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants.

The Tathatā Philosophy of Aśvaghōṣa (80 A.D.)².

Aśvaghōṣa was the son of a Brahmin named Saimhaguhyā who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probably converted to Buddhism by Pārśva who was an important person in the third Buddhist Council promoted, according to some authorities, by the King of Kashmere and according to other authorities by Punyayaśas³.

¹ Āryyadeva's *Hastabālaprakaraṇavṛtti* has been reclaimed by Dr F. W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa* were published by Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda śāstri in the Bengal Asiatic Society's journal, 1898.

² The above section is based on the *Awakening of Faith*, an English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of *Śraddhotpādaśāstra* by Aśvaghōṣa, the Sanskrit original of which appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence to show that Aśvaghōṣa was a contemporary of Kaniṣka.

³ Tāranātha says that he was converted by Āryadeva, a disciple of Nāgārjuna, *Geschichte des Buddhismus*, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's *Awakening of Faith*, pp. 24-32. Aśvaghōṣa wrote the *Buddhacaritakāvya*, of great poetical excellence, and the *Mahālaṃkāraśāstra*. He was also a musician and had

He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished—the aspect as thatness (*bhūtatathatā*) and the aspect as the cycle of birth and death (*saṃsāra*). The soul as *bhūtatathatā* means the oneness of the totality of all things (*dharmadhātu*). Its essential nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (*smṛti*) appear under the forms of individuation¹. If we could overcome this *smṛti* “the signs of individuation would disappear and there would be no trace of a world of objects.” “All things in their fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They possess absolute sameness (*samatā*). They are subject neither to transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul”—thatness (*bhūtatathatā*). This “thatness” has no attribute and it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as “thatness.” As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of, “this is the stage of thatness.” This *bhūtatathatā* is neither that which is existence, nor that which is non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence; it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehended by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call it negation, “*śūnyatā*,” in this sense. The truth is that which

invented a musical instrument called *Rāstavara* that he might by that means convert the people of the city. “Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-ātmaness of life.” Suzuki, p. 35.

¹ I have ventured to translate “*smṛti*” in the sense of *vāsanā* in preference to Suzuki’s “confused subjectivity” because *smṛti* in the sense of *vāsanā* is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works as *Laṅkāvatāra*. The word “subjectivity” seems to be too European a term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.

subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (*śūnyatā*) is also void (*sūnya*) in its nature, that neither that which is negated nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it, because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory (*smṛti*) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the truth—the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations.

“The soul as birth and death (*saṃsāra*) comes forth from the Tathāgata womb (*tathāgatagarbha*), the ultimate reality. But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other. Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation it is called the all-conserving mind (*ālayavijñāna*). It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment. Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is free from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient memory (*smṛti*). It penetrates all and is the unity of all (*dharmadhātu*). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakāya of all Tathāgatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence.

“When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence—a mere imaginary creation of the perceivers under the influence of the delusive *smṛti*. The multitude of people (*bahujana*) are said to be lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (*avidyā*) prevails there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of *smṛti* (past confused memory working as instinct) from which they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested of this *smṛti* they can then recognize that no states of mentation, viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation with the one soul, for they are not self-existent.

“This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corrupted phenomenal experience as *prajñā* (wisdom) and *karma* (incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we understand that when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of *dharma*, disciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the *dharma*) and accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the *ālayavijñāna*)

which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down and the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and the pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakāya will manifest itself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore ignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense it is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (*avidyā*), the waves of mentality (*viññāna*) make their appearance. These three (i.e. the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear nor are destroyed." It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both affectional (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and intellectual (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), as well as from the mind (i.e. *ālayaviññāna*) which implicates itself with birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal, calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms and unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form of a tathāgata or in some other forms, in order that all beings may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity.

"Non-enlightenment has no existence of its own aside from its relation with enlightenment *a priori*." But enlightenment *a priori* is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as non-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses its significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual relation as enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations of non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (1) as a disturbance of the mind (*ālayaviññāna*), by the avidyākarma (ignorant

action), producing misery (*duḥkha*); (2) by the appearance of an ego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an external world which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditioned by the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation); being affected by the external world the mind becomes conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable. The second phenomenon is succession. Following upon intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states. The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there arises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attachment to names or ideas (*saṃijñā*), etc. By clinging the mind hypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things. The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (*karma*). On account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through *avidyā*.

The relation between this truth and *avidyā* is in one sense a mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay¹. Likewise the undefiled (*anāsrava*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) and their various transient forms all come from one and the same entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all eternity abiding in *Nirvāṇa*.

It is by the touch of ignorance (*avidyā*) that this truth assumes all the phenomenal forms of existence.

In the all-conserving mind (*ālayavijñāna*) ignorance manifests itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (*manas*). Five different names are given to the ego (according to its different modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness (*karmavijñāna*) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or

¹ Compare Chāndogya, VI. 1. 4.

awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is representation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (*manas*) represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously and without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness of attention (*manaskāra*) it (*manas*) retains all experiences and never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things to come. Therefore the three domains (*kāmaloka*, domain of feeling—*rūpaloka*, domain of bodily existence—*arūpaloka*, domain of incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the mind (i.e. *ālayavijñāna* which is practically identical with *bhūta-tathatā*). Since all things, owing the principle of their existence to the mind (*ālayavijñāna*), are produced by *smṛti*, all the modes of particularization are the self-particularizations of the mind. The mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from all attributes is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized and established only through ignorance (*avidyā*) and memory (*smṛti*), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They arise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears. By ego-consciousness (*manovijñāna*) we mean the ignorant mind which by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of I and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the prejudices (*āsrava*), intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believing in the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes

oblivious of the principle of sameness (*samatā*) that underlies all things which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no sign of becoming.

Non-enlightenment is the *raison d'être* of saṃsāra. When this is annihilated the conditions—the external world—are also annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also annihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation of the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an unruffled sea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing the waves have been annihilated.

In describing the relation of the interaction of avidyā (ignorance), karmavijñāna (activity-consciousness—the subjective mind), viśaya (external world—represented by the senses) and the tathatā (suchness), Aśvaghoṣa says that there is an interperfuming of these elements. Thus Aśvaghoṣa says, “By perfuming we mean that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substance with which they are perfumed. Suchness (*tathatā*) is likewise a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness. Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the *raison d'être* of all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness and produces smṛti. This smṛti in its turn perfumes ignorance. On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood. On account of its being misunderstood an external world of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced. And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer as the result miseries mentally as well as bodily.” Again “suchness perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvāṇa. This longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing

but the illusory manifestations of the mind (*ālayavijñāna*) and have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable āsaṅkhyeyakalpas¹ we get ignorance annihilated. As ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (*ālayavijñāna*) is no longer disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all annihilated, it is said that we attain Nirvāṇa and that various spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished." The Nirvāṇa of the tathatā philosophy is not nothingness, but tathatā (suchness or thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance which produces all the diversity of experience.

To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do, Aśvaghōṣa's reply is that though all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the principle of individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and hence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle in one's own being which, embraced and protected by the love (*maitrī*) and compassion (*karuṇā*) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe in nirvāṇa, to cultivate the root of merit (*kuṣalamūla*), to habituate oneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, receiving instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced to practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and enter into Nirvāṇa. This implies that all beings have such perfuming power in them that they may be affected by the good wishes of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path of virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas and sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual) benefits (*hitatā*)" and "entering into the samādhi of purity, they

¹ Technical name for a very vast period of time.

destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all-penetrating insight that enables them to become conscious of the absolute oneness (*samatā*) of the universe (*sarvaloka*) and to see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas."

There is a difference between the perfuming which is not in unison with suchness, as in the case of śrāvakas (theravādin monks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only continue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness. But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with suchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow themselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma. The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from all eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one at once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma (i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interruption. For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great wisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhātu (universe), the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its own nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the pure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called the tathāgatagarbha or the dharmakāya. It may be objected that since thatness or suchness has been described as being without characteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing all merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits, it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all objects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being of one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of particularization or of dualistic character. "Though all things in their (metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are free from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment there originates a subjective mind (*ālayavijñāna*) that becomes conscious of an external world." This is called ignorance or avidyā. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly pure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is called universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to illumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever, though the stage of the perfuming of avidyā comes to an end with the Buddhas when they attain to nirvāṇa. All Buddhas while at

the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) for all beings, practise all virtues (*pāramitās*) and many other meritorious deeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless numbers of *kalpas*, recognize truthfully and adequately the principle of equality (*śamatā*) among people; and do not cling to the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is meant by the activity of tathatā. The main idea of this tathatā philosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" is at once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidyā veils it or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the pure thatness also perfumes the avidyā there is a striving for the good as well. As the stage of avidyā is passed its luminous character shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only illusorily appeared as the many of the world.

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than that of the nihilistic idealism of *Laṅkāvatāra*. Considering the fact that Āśvaghoṣa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upaniṣad influence in this interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably with the Vedānta as interpreted by Śaṅkara. The *Laṅkāvatāra* admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas (heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self (*ātman*). But Āśvaghoṣa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality as the ultimate truth. Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika doctrines which eclipsed the profound philosophy of Āśvaghoṣa seem to be more faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijñānavāda creed of Buddhism as explained in the *Laṅkāvatāra*¹.

The Mādhyamika or the Śūnyavāda school.—Nihilism.

Candrakīrti, the commentator of Nāgārjuna's verses known as "*Mādhyamika kārikā*," in explaining the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) as described by Nāgārjuna starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word *pratītyasamutpāda* means the origination (*utpāda*) of the non-existent (*abhāva*) depending on (*pratītya*) reasons and causes

¹ As I have no access to the Chinese translation of Āśvaghoṣa's *Śraddhotpāda Śāstra*, I had to depend entirely on Suzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation.

(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratītya means each and every destructible individual and pratītyasamutpāda means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pāli Scriptures generally speak of pratītyasamutpāda (e.g. *cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāni ca utpadyante cakṣurvijñānam*) for it does not mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, but the originating of specific individual phenomena (e.g. perception of form by the operation in connection with the eye) depending upon certain specific conditions.

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual percept, we see that there cannot be any contact between visual knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we interpret the maxim of pratītyasamutpāda as this happening that happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason. For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself. To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again without any further qualification it is said that depending on one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any other thing could come into being—from light we could have darkness! Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others, it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them together. A thing also could not originate without any cause, for then all things could come into being at all times. It is therefore to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this so-called dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) it was referred to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance (*avidyā*). The only thing which is not lost (*amoṣadharma*) is nirvāṇa; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena (*saṃskāras*) are false and are lost with their appearances (*sarvasaṃskārāśca mṛṣāmoṣadharmāḥ*).

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appear-

ances are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence of the people that things are true. Those who are really wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus there are neither works nor cycles of births (*saṃsāra*) and also he does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakūṭasūtra that howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness (*citta*); what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist, and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that which has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction. He who through his false knowledge (*viparyāsa*) does not comprehend the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (*saṃsāra*). Like all illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm of rebirth and sorrow.

It may again be objected that if there is nothing true according to the nihilists (*śūnyavādins*), then their statement that there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candrakīrti in replying to this says that with *śūnyavādins* the truth is absolute silence. When the *Śūnyavādin* sages argue, they only accept for the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with them in their own manner to help them to come to a right comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances, that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these phenomena have no true essence.

When the doctrine of *pratityasamutpāda* is described as "this being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have no essence or true nature. Nihilism (*śūnyavāda*) also means just this. The true meaning of *pratityasamutpāda* or *śūnyavāda* is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that

appear¹. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. They are merely the appearance of *māyā* or illusion. The void (*śūnya*) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own (*niḥsvabhāvatvam*).

The Madhyamaka or Śūnya system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (*svabhāva*) of its own; even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot affirm the essence of other things to it (*parabhāva*). If we cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (*abhāva*), but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot speak of anything negative either².

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things; for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere, and so a process (*saṃsāra*) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact there being no relation between the two, the temporal determination as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we

¹ See *Mādhyamikavṛtti* (B.T.S.), p. 50.

² *Ibid.* pp. 93-100.

may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression, for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character and takes up another at the same identical moment which is inconceivable¹.

But then again the question arises that if there is no process, and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what is then the nirvāṇa which is described as the final extinction of all afflictions (*kleśa*)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does not agree to such a definition of nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa on the Madhyamaka theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased or as anything which is produced (*aniruddham anutpannam*). In nirvāṇa all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease to exist in nirvāṇa, but like the illusory snake in the rope they never existed². Nirvāṇa cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (*bhāva*), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes (*samskṛta*) and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are communicated as being in a state of change and process coming one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be determined as existent or non-existent. Nirvāṇa is merely the cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (*prapañcapravṛtti*). It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena (*na cāpravṛttimātram bhāvābhāveti parikalpitum pāryate evam na bhāvābhāvanirvāṇam*, M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings³.

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any bondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like the mirage, the dream, the *māyā*, and the magic without any real nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that

¹ See *Mādhyamikavṛtti* (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.

² *Ibid.* p. 194.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 162 and 201.

one is trying to win a real nirvāṇa¹. It is this false egoism that is to be considered as avidyā. When considered deeply it is found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (*avidyā*), there would have been no conformations (*saṃskāras*), and if there were no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating the saṃskāras," and it can be said of the saṃskāras "we are being produced by the avidyā." But there being avidyā, there come the saṃskāras and so on with other categories too. This character of the pratityasamutpāda is known as the coming of the consequent depending on an antecedent reason (*hetūpanibandha*).

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence on conglomeration or combination (*pratyayopanibandha*). It is by the combination (*samavāya*) of the four elements, space (*ākāśa*) and consciousness (*viññāna*) that a man is made. It is due to earth (*pṛthivī*) that the body becomes solid, it is due to water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due to ākāśa that there is porosity, and it is due to viññāna that there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come the saṃskāras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness (*rāga, dveṣa, moha*); from these proceed the viññāna and the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name and form (*nāmarūpa*), from these proceed the senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*), from the coming together of those three comes contact (*spṛśa*); from that feelings, from that comes desire (*trṣṇā*) and so on. These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all². The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism (*śāśvata-vāda*) or nihilism (*uccheda-vāda*), and it is for this reason

¹ See *Mādhyamikavṛtti* (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.

² *Ibid.* pp. 209-211, quoted from *Śālistambhasūtra*. Vācaspatimiśra also quotes this passage in his *Bhāmātī* on Śāṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra*.

that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (*madhyamaka*)¹. Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth (*samvṛtisatya*) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true reality (*paramārthasatya*) in them or anything else. Morality plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nāgārjuna's *Suhyrlekha* as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from the Tibetan translation.

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (*asāra*) give according to the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there is no better friend than giving.

7. Exhibit morality (*śīla*) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless, for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of the moving and immovable.

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina prince.

9. View as enemies, avarice (*mātsaryya*), deceit (*śāṭhya*), duplicity (*māyā*), lust, indolence (*kausīdya*), pride (*māna*), greed (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and pride (*mada*) concerning family, figure, glory, youth, or power.

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door for anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall attain the degree of an anāgāmin (a saint who never suffers rebirth).

21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her, according to age, like your mother, daughter or sister.

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the wise praise the first as the greater hero.

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour, blame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts.

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend, careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you must) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family.

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity, joy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you (certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (*brahmanivhāra*).

41. By the four dhyānas completely abandoning desire (*kāma*), reflection (*vicāra*), joy (*prīti*), and happiness and pain (*sukha*, *duḥkha*) you will obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman.

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in me; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four aggregates."

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from

¹ See *Mādhyamikavṛtti* (B.T.S.), p. 160.

nature (*prakṛti*), not from themselves (*svabhāvat*), nor from the Lord (*iśvara*), nor yet are they without cause ; know that they arise from ignorance (*avidyā*) and desire (*trṣṇā*).

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (*śilabrataṣarāmaśa*), wrong views (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*) and doubt (*vicikitsā*) are the three fetters.

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality, the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one rules (of the *prātimokṣa*) are combined perfectly in these three.

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (*anitya*) without substance (*anātma*) without help (*aśaraṇa*) without protector (*anātha*) and without abode (*asthāna*) thou O Lord of men must become discontented with this worthless (*aśara*) kadali-tree of the orb.

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no other higher necessity than this.

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignity of the quieting and the subduing nirvāṇa not subject to age, death or decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon.

107. Where there is no wisdom (*prajñā*) there is also no contemplation (*dhyāna*), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom ; but know that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a grove.

Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijñānavāda Buddhism.

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra has often been referred to by such prominent teachers of Hindu thought as Kumārila and Śaṅkara. It agrees to a great extent with the Śūnyavādins whom we have already described. All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists by itself (*nirmunitapratimohi*)¹. There are two functions involved in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions (*khyāti vijñāna*), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions (*vastuprativikalpavijñāna*). The two functions however mutually determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished (*abhinnalakṣaṇe anyonyahetuke*). These functions are set to work on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent in them in relation to the world of appearance (*anādikāla-pra-
pañca-vāsanāhetukaṇca*)².

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse

¹ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, pp. 21-22.

² *Ibid.* p. 44.

unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped (*abhūta-parikalpa-vāsanā-vaicitra-nirodha*)¹. All our phenomenal knowledge is without any essence or truth (*nīḥsvabhāva*) and is but a creation of *māyā*, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing which may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the mind (*svacitta*), which has been accustomed to create imaginary appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movement these creations take place as subject and object has no appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence and extinction (*utpādasthitibhaṅgavarjyam*) and is called the *ālayavijñāna*. The reason why this *ālayavijñāna* itself is said to be without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this, that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existence in the sense in which the term is used and we could not affirm any special essence of it.

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing external but of our own mind (*svacitta*), and there is also the beginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which takes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account of these four reasons there are produced in the *ālayavijñāna* (mind) the ripples of our sense experiences (*pravṛttivijñāna*) as in a lake, and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skandhas called *pañcavijñānakāya* thus appear in a proper synthetic form. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either identical or different from the *ālayavijñāna* just as the waves cannot be said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As the ocean dances on in waves so the *citta* or the *ālayavijñāna* is also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (*vṛtti*). As *citta* it collects all movements (*karma*) within it, as *manas* it synthesizes (*vidhīyate*) and as *vijñāna* it constructs the fivefold perceptions (*vijñānen vijñānāti dṛśyam kalpate pañcabhīḥ*)².

It is only due to *māyā* (illusion) that the phenomena appear in their twofold aspect as subject and object. This must always be regarded as an appearance (*samvṛtisatyatā*) whereas in the real aspect we could never say whether they existed (*bhāva*) or did not exist³.

¹ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.* pp. 50-55.

³ *Asaṅga's Mahāvīnyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, pp. 58-59.

All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (*sada-santaḥ māyopamāḥ*). When we look deeply into them we find that there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even all negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the ultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which the positive and negative are one and the same (*bhāvābhāvasamānatā*)¹. Such a state which is complete in itself and has no name and no substance had been described in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* as thatness (*tathatā*)². This state is also described in another place in the *Laṅkāvatāra* as voidness (*śūnyatā*) which is one and has no origination and no essence³. In another place it is also designated as *tathāgatagarbha*⁴.

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified ultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic ātman or Brahman like the *tathatā* doctrine of Aśvaghoṣa; and we find in *Laṅkāvatāra* that Rāvaṇa asks the Buddha "How can you say that your doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha* was not the same as the ātman doctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics also consider the ātman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all-pervading and unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to reply thus—"Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those heretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction of a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or substance in anything (*nairātmya*) would frighten the disciples, that I say that all things are in reality the *tathāgatagarbha*. This should not be regarded as ātman. Just as a lump of clay is made into various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature of all phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics (*sarvavikalpalakṣaṇavinivṛttam*) that is variously described as the *garbha* or the *nairātmya* (essencelessness). This explanation of *tathāgatagarbha* as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to attract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously inclined to believe in the ātman doctrine⁵."

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned the idealistic Buddhists (*vijñānavādins*) agreed to the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* with certain modifications. There was with them an external *pratītyasamutpāda* just as it appeared in the

¹ Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, p. 65.

² *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 70.

³ *Ibid.* p. 78.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 80.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 80-81.

objective aspect and an internal *pratītyasamutpāda*. The external *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) is represented in the way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the co-operation of diverse elements—the lump of clay, the potter, the wheel, etc. The internal (*ādhyātmika*) *pratītyasamutpāda* was represented by *avidyā*, *trṣṇā*, *karma*, the *skandhas*, and the *āyatana*s produced out of them¹.

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the *pravicayabuddhi* and the *vikalpalakṣaṇagrahābhinivēśapratīṣṭhā-pikābuddhi*. The *pravicayabuddhi* is that which always seeks to take things in either of the following four ways, that they are either this or the other (*ekatvānyatva*); either both or not both (*ubhayānubhaya*), either are or are not (*astināsti*), either eternal or non-eternal (*nityānitya*). But in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The second category consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which it constructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn by its own constructive activity—*parikalpa*) in a logical order of diverse relations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He who knows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that there is no external world of matter and that they are all experienced only in the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of smoothness (*sneha*) that constructs the water as an external substance; it is the sense construction of activity or energy that constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construction of movement that constructs the external substance of air. In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the real (*mithyāsatyābhinivēśa*) five *skandhas* appear. If these were to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as perceivers. It is simply a convention (*vyavahāra*) to speak of things as known². Whatever we designate by speech is mere speech-construction (*vāgvikalpa*) and unreal. In speech one could not speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal

¹ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 85.

² *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 87, compare the term “*vyavahārika*” as used of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the same sense by Śaṅkara.

relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true; the real truth (*paramārtha*) can never be referred to by such speech-construction.

The nothingness (*śūnyatā*) of things may be viewed from seven aspects—(1) that they are always interdependent, and hence have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference to an “other” is also undetermined, and hence they are all indefinable (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*); (2) that they have no positive essence (*bhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā*), since they spring up from a natural non-existence (*svabhāvābhāvotpatti*); (3) that they are of an unknown type of non-existence (*apracaritaśūnyatā*), since all the skandhas vanish in the nirvāṇa; (4) that they appear phenomenally as connected though non-existent (*pracaritaśūnyatā*), for their skandhas have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but yet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that none of the things can be described as having any definite nature, they are all undemonstrable by language (*nirabhilāpyaśūnyatā*); (6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except that which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires which pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existent in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and time in which they are not (*itaretaraśūnyatā*).

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a *māyā*; the two kinds of negation (*nirodha*) are *ākāśa* (space) and nirvāṇa; things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only imagined to be existent by fools.

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of this school, that the reality is called the *tathāgatagarbha* (the womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal appearances of the clusters (*skandhas*), elements (*dhātus*), and fields of sense operation (*āyatanas*) only serve to veil it with impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a universal soul as the reality. But the *Laṅkāvatāra* attempts to explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to the *tathāgatagarbha* as the reality is only a sort of false bait to attract those who are afraid of listening to the *nairātmya* (non-soul) doctrine¹.

¹ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 80.

The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold knowledge of (1) *svacittadṛṣyabhāvanā*, (2) *utpādesthitibhaṅga-vivārjjanatā*, (3) *bāhyabhāvābhāvopalakṣaṇatā* and (4) *svapratyāryyaḥjñānādhigamābhinnalakṣaṇatā*. The first means that all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind. The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination, existence or destruction. The third means that one should know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire (*vāsanā*) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the nature of all things.

The four dhyānas spoken of in the *Laṅkāvatāra* seem to be different from those which have been described in connection with the Theravāda Buddhism. These dhyānas are called (1) *bālo-pacārika*, (2) *arthapracicaya*, (3) *tathatālabana* and (4) *tathā-gata*. The first one is said to be that practised by the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the doctrine that there is no soul (*pudgalanairātmya*), and that everything is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on till all conceptual knowing ceases (*āsaṃjñānirodhāt*); we have what is called the *vālopacārika* dhyāna (the meditation for beginners).

The second is the advanced state where not only there is full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the comprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that appears. This is called the *arthapracicayadhyāna*, for the sage concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out (*pravicaya*) the nature of all things (*artha*).

The third dhyāna, that in which the mind realizes that the thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances, is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness (*tathatā*). This dhyāna is called *tathatālabana*, because it has for its object *tathatā* or thatness.

The last or the fourth dhyāna is that in which the lapse of the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;

and nirvāṇa is that in which all root desires (*vāsanā*) manifesting themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with knowledge and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it cannot be called destruction, for only compounded things (*saṃskṛta*) suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or destruction. This nirvāṇa is different from that of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state nirvāṇa, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to things and cease to make erroneous judgments¹.

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground) of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is said that the world is *māyā* or illusion, what is meant to be emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The phenomena that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathatā or thatness is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or nature of the imagination (*vikalpa*) tainted with the associations of beginningless root desires (*vāsanā*)². The tathatā has no separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind (*cittavimukta*), for here there is no construction of imagination (*sarvakalpanāviraḥitam*)³.

Sautrāntika Theory of Perception.

Dharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmakīrti's⁴ (about 635 A.D.) *Nyāyabindu*, a Sautrāntika logical and epistemological work, describes right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) as an invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man

¹ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 100.

² *Ibid.* p. 109.

³ This account of the Vijñānavāda school is collected mainly from *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, as no other authentic work of the Vijñānavāda school is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may be had in such books as Kumārila's *Śloka vārttika* or Śāṅkara's bhāṣya, II. ii, etc. Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* deals more with the duties concerning the career of a saint (*Bodhisattva*) than with the metaphysics of the system.

⁴ Dharmakīrti calls himself an adherent of Vijñānavāda in his *Santānāntara-siddhi*, a treatise on solipsism, but his *Nyāyabindu* seems rightly to have been considered by the author of *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭīppanī* (p. 19) as being written from the Sautrāntika point of view.

desires to have (*samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvaṣaṅgāśāntasiddhiḥ*)¹. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (*arthādhi-gati*). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it (*arthādhi-gamāt samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāpāraḥ*). Thus there are three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge: (1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it, and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly through the *liṅga* (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to the realization of the object represented by it could not be called right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions, are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived at the moment of perception was not the same as that which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself realized by the realization of other existents of the same series (*nīlādau ya eva santānaḥ paricchinno nīlajñānena sa eva tena prāpitaḥ tena nīlajñānam pramāṇam*)².

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant

¹ Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of *Nyāyabindu*, Vinitadeva and Śāntabhadra (seventh century), are found in *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭīppanī*, a commentary of *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmmottara, but their texts are not available to us.

² *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭīppanī*, p. 11.

that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise of any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences, desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object. Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in connection with our achieving the object presented by perception.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) has been defined by Dharmakīrti as a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated by any names or relations (*kalpanā*) and which is not erroneous (*kalpanāpōḍhamabhrāntam*)¹. This definition does not indeed represent the actual nature (*svarūpa*) of perception, but only shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perception is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it, he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him by his perception (*tasmādgrāhye arthe vasturūpe yadavīparyastam tadabhrāntamiha veditavyam*). It is said that a right perception could not be associated with names (*kalpanā* or *abhilāpa*). This qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented

¹ The definition first given in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (not available in Sanskrit) of Dinnāga (500 A.D.) was "*Kalpanāpōḍham*." According to Dharmakīrti it is the indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpa jñāna*) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate knowledge (*savikalpa jñāna*), as formed by the conceptual activity of the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to the senses.

to the sense (*pūrvadṛṣṭāparadṛṣṭāñcārthamekikurvadvijñānam-asannihitaviṣayam pūrvadṛṣṭasyāsannihitatvāt*). In all illusory perceptions it is the sense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the object correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through the senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those features which are its and its alone (*svalakṣaṇam*). The validity of knowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented by it (*arthena saha yatsārūpyam sādṛśyamasya jñānasya tatpramāṇamiha*). But the objection here is that if our percept is only similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which appears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (*taditi sārūpyam tasya vaśāt*) and our perception of the object becomes possible. It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of causation but of a determinant and a determinate (*vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvena*). Thus it is the same cognition which in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object of perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the percept (*tata ekasya vastunaḥ kiñcidrūpam pramāṇam kiñcitpramāṇaphalam na virudhyate*). It is on account of this similarity with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the definite awareness (*vyavasthāpanaheturhi sārūpyam*), so that by the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the similarity of the sense-datum with the object (*pramāṇa*) we come to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue" (*pramāṇaphala*). If this sameness between the knowledge and its object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from the awareness (*sārūpyamanubhūtam vyavasthāpanaheturhi*). The object generates an awareness similar to itself, and it is this correspondence that can lead us to the realization of the object so presented by right knowledge¹.

¹ See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting the *Nyāyabindu*, *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭīppanī* (St Petersburg, 1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perception are available to us. *Nyāyabindu* is probably

Sautrāntika theory of Inference¹.

According to the Sautrāntika doctrine of Buddhism as described by Dharmakīrti and Dharmmottara which is probably the only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to us in Sanskrit, inference (*anumāna*) is divided into two classes, called *svārthānumāna* (inferential knowledge attained by a person arguing in his own mind or judgments), and *parārthānumāna* (inference through the help of articulated propositions for convincing others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of the external world. Inference copied external realities as much as perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perception of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also, so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the external fact thus inferred (*sārūpyavaśāddhi tannīlapratitirūpam sidhyati*).

The reason by which an inference is made should be such that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint conditions that an unfailing connection (*pratibandha*) between the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the above case. This law (*niyama*) is essential for establishing the unfailing condition necessary for inference². This unfailing natural connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) is found in two types

one of the earliest works in which we hear of the doctrine of *arthakriyākāritva* (practical fulfilment of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakīrti's works and the profuse references by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word *arthakriyā* is found in Candrakīrti's commentary on Nāgārjuna and also in such early works as *Lalitavistara* (pointed out to me by Dr E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has no philosophical significance there.

¹ As the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dinnāga is not available in Sanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except what can be got from the *Nyāya-binduṭīkā* of Dharmmottara.

² *tasmāt niyamavatorevānvayavyatirekayoḥ prayogaḥ kartavyaḥ yena pratibandho gamyeta sādhanaya sādhyena. Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 24.

of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is contained in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines may come to think that pines are called trees because they are tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being a species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could infer the latter from the former but not *vice versa*; this is called the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (*tādātmya*). The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no inference is warrantable.

This natural indissoluble connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*), be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is the ground of all inference¹. The *svabhāvapratibandha* determines the inseparability of connection (*avinābhāvaniyama*) and the inference is made not through a series of premisses but directly by the *liṅga* (reason) which has the inseparable connection².

The second type of inference known as *parārthānumāna* agrees with *svārthānumāna* in all essential characteristics; the main difference between the two is this, that in the case of *parārthānumāna*, the inferential process has to be put verbally in premisses.

Pandit Ratnākaraśānti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century A.D., wrote a paper named *Antarvyāptisamarthana* in which

¹ *na hi yo yatra svabhāvena na pratibaddhaḥ sa tam apratibaddhaviśayamavasyameva na vyabhicaratīti nāsti tasyavyabhicāranīyamah. Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 29.

² The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the *liṅga* satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (1) *pakṣasattva* (existence of the *liṅga* in the *pakṣa*—the thing about which something is inferred); (2) *sapakṣasattva* (existence of the *liṅga* in those cases where the *sādhya* or probandum existed), and (3) *vipakṣasattva* (its non-existence in all those places where the *sādhya* did not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e.g. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike a lake.

he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those cases which possess the *liṅga* or reason with the cases which possess the *sādhya* (probandum) but between that which has the characteristics of the *liṅga* with that which has the characteristics of the *sādhya* (probandum); or in other words the concomitance is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the characteristic of the *liṅga*, viz. the smoke, and that which has the characteristic of the *sādhya*, viz. the fire. This view of the nature of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (*antarvyāpti*), whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing possessing *liṅga* and that possessing *sādhya*, is known as outer concomitance (*bahirvyāpti*) and generally accepted by the Nyāya school of thought. This *antarvyāpti* doctrine of concomitance is indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early as the *Kathāvatthu* (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of the *Yamaka* points out that Buddhist logic at the time of Aśoka "was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses such as the *udāharaṇa* (*Yo yo aggimā so so dhūmavā*—whatever is fiery is smoky), the *upanayana* (*ayam pabbato dhūmavā*—this hill is smoky) and the *niggama* (*tasmādayam aggimā*—therefore that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the method of the arguments which are found in the *Kathāvatthu* as follows:

"Adherent. Is *A B*? (*tthāpanā*).

Opponent. Yes.

Adherent. Is *C D*? (*pāpanā*).

Opponent. No.

Adherent. But if *A* be *B* then (you should have said) *C* is *D*.
That *B* can be affirmed of *A* but *D* of *C* is false.
Hence your first answer is refuted.")

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed *tthāpanā*, because the opponent's position, *A* is *B*, is conditionally established for the purpose of refutation.

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed *pāpanā* because it is got from the antecedent. And the con-

clusion is termed *ropaṇa* because the regulation is placed on the opponent. Next:

“If *D* be derived of *C*.

Then *B* should have been derived of *A*.

But you affirmed *B* of *A*.

(therefore) That *B* can be affirmed of *A* but not of *D* or *C* is wrong.”

This is the *pañiloma*, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted with the former or direct method, *anuloma*. In both methods the consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major in the latter method we get

If *A* is *B* *C* is *D*.

But *A* is *B*.

Therefore *C* is *D*.

By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is re-established¹.”

The Doctrine of Momentariness.

Ratnakīrtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of all existence (*sattva*), first, by the concomitance discovered by the method of agreement in presence (*anvayavyāpti*), and then by the method of difference by proving that the production of effects could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything (*arthakriyākāritva*). The form of the first type of argument by *anvayavyāpti* may be given thus: “Whatever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing are existents and are therefore momentary.” It cannot be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, for those which are done now could not be done again in the future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to

¹ See introduction to the translation of *Kāthāvatthu* (*Points of Controversy*) by Mrs Rhys Davids.

produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case one might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produce at one moment and does not produce at another, this contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have in it two contradictory capacities.

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two moments (*śaktāśaktasvabhāvatayā pratikṣaṇam bhedaḥ*). The capacity of producing effects (*arthakriyāśakti*), which is but the other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatvavyāpta*).

The Nyāya school of philosophy objects to this view and says that the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect produced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded as existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect cannot be known, until that has produced another effect and that another *ad infinitum*. Since there can be no being that has not capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity can demonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossible to know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effects as the definition of existence. Moreover if all things were momentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observe the change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly be any means even of taking to any kind of inference. To this Ratnakīrti replies that capacity (*sāmarthyā*) cannot be denied, for it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observation of any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement in absence, does not require any permanent observer, for under certain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of the concomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditions there is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. This knowledge of concomitance at the succeeding moment holds within

itself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment, and this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer.

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (*sattva*) is indeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed that in all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of being;—seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, and even if this capacity should require further capacity to produce effects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. that the existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing the shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite¹. Though things are momentary, yet we could have concomitance between things only so long as their apparent forms are not different (*atadrūpa-parāvṛttayoreva sādhyasāadhanayoh pratyakṣeṇa vyāptigrahaṇāt*). The vyāpti or concomitance of any two things (e.g. the fire and the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and not on identity.

Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness is this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other collocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect (e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratnakīrtti replies that the seed does not exist before and produce the effect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special effectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both the collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot. How a special seed-moment became endowed with such special effectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which preceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnakīrtti wishes to draw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals a number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number of effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has being is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy.

It is not important to enlarge upon the second part of Ratnakīrtti's arguments in which he tries to show that the production of effects could not be explained if we did not suppose

¹ The distinction between vicious and harmless infinities was known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh century. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly (*Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 22) :

“*mūlakṣaṭikarīmāhuranavasthām hi dūṣanam.*
mūlasiddhau tvarucyāpi nānavasthā nivāryate.”

The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive at the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence vicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regress though one may not be willing to have it.

all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute the doctrines of Nyāya than an elaboration of the Buddhist principles.

The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary of the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all strictly momentary (*kṣaṇika*—i.e. existing only for one moment) was not emphasized in early Pāli literature. Āśvaghoṣa in his *Śraddhotpādaśāstra* speaks of all skandhas as *kṣaṇika* (Suzuki's translation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditation of the khandhas as *khaṇika* in his *Visuddhimagga*. But from the seventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together with the doctrine of arthakriyākāritva received great attention at the hands of the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas. All the Nyāya and Vedānta literature of this period is full of refutations and criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account available of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of Ratnakīrtti. Some of the general features of his argument in favour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it may be found in any of the important Nyāya works of this period such as *Nyāyamañjarī*, *Tātparyyatīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra, etc.

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be permanent. With the development of this doctrine they gave great emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and the next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent is momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived from the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied the existence of any such permanent selves. What appears as self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones appear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker. Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot discover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of these ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of self at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant product as it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any particular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every moment there is no such thing as a permanent self.

The fact that I remember that I have been existing for

a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been existing for such a long period. When I say this is that book, I perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that "this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the past, whereas "this book" refers to the book which is before my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove permanence is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived at the present moment by the senses¹. This is true not only of all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But since memory points to an object of past perception, and the perception to another object of the present moment, identity cannot be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed. Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been persisting through all the passing moments². Just as the flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.

¹ See *pratyabhijñānirāsa* of the Buddhists, *Nyāyamañjarī*, V.S. Series, pp. 449, etc.

² See *Tāṅkarahasyadīpikā* of Guṇaratna, p. 30, and also *Nyāyamañjarī*, V.S. edition, p. 450.

The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal Efficiency (*Arthakriyākāritva*).

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse characteristics¹. What we call a thing is but a conglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic, the conglomeration is to be called a new one². Existence or being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in Sanskrit is called *arthakriyākāritva* which literally translated means—the power of performing actions and purposes of some kind³. The criterion of existence or being is the performance of certain specific actions, or rather existence means that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency). That which has produced such an effect is then called existent or *sat*. Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect

¹ Compare *Milindapañha*, II. 1. 1.—The Chariot Simile.

² Compare *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* of Guṇaratna, A. S.'s edition, pp. 24, 28 and *Nyāyamañjarī*, V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the paper on *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi* by Ratnakīrti in *Six Buddhist Nyāya tracts*.

³ This meaning of the word “*arthakriyākāritva*” is different from the meaning of the word as we found in the section “*sautrāntika* theory of perception.” But we find the development of this meaning both in Ratnakīrti as well as in Nyāya writers who referred to this doctrine. With Vinitadeva (seventh century A.D.) the word “*arthakriyā-siddhi*” meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire (*arthasādhena prayojanamucyate puruṣasya prayojanaṃ dāruṣpākādi tasya siddhiḥ nispattiḥ*—the word *artha* means need; the need of man such as cooking by logs, etc.; *siddhi* of that, means accomplishment). With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later *arthasiddhi* means action (*anuṣṭhiti*) with reference to undesirable and desirable objects (*heyopādeyārthaviṣayā*). But with Ratnakīrti (950 A.D.) the word *arthakriyākāritva* has an entirely different sense. It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as such it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence (*sattva*). Thus he says in his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, pp. 20, 21, that though in different philosophies there are different definitions of existence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted definition of existence as *arthakriyākāritva* (efficiency of causing any action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnakīrti refer to the Buddhist doctrine of *arthakriyākāritva* they usually refer to this doctrine in Ratnakīrti's sense.

which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there would be no reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time. Any difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should hold that beyond such powers as are associated with the production of impressions or effects there should be some other permanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be different units of power at different moments, there should also be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power. This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of momentariness shown by Ratnakīrti.

Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged.

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophical circles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation of cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (*avayavī*) and the part (*avayava*), (3) the relation of generality (*sāmānya*) to the specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the

relation of power (*śakti*) to the power-possessor (*śaktimān*). Thus on the relation of cause and effect, Śaṅkara held that cause alone was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent illusions due to ignorance, Sāṃkhya held that there was no difference between cause and effect, except that the former was only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects. Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary existence has been determined by the destruction of its momentary antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by another and this determination is nothing more than "that happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole, Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and thus there is no such thing as "whole". The Buddhists hold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone which come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there is no such thing as fingeriness (*aṅgulitva*) as the abstract universal of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we know that the Sautrāntika Buddhists did not believe in the existence of any substance apart from its attributes; what we call a substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation. In the external world there are as many individual simple units (atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the assemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relation as that of inherence (*samavāya*) in which relation the attributes are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not

¹ See *Avayavīnirākaraṇa, Six Buddhist Nyāya tracts, Bibliotheca Indica*, Calcutta, 1910.

believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the power.

Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought.

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation of sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of *paṭiccasamuppāda* was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathāgata existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on *śīla*, *śamādhi* and *paññā* and the doctrine that there was no soul. The *Abhidhammas* hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in the *Suttas*. They only elaborated the materials of the *suttas* with enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of *Mahāyāna* scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the non-essentialness and voidness of all *dhammas* began to be preached. This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Kumārajīva and Candrakīrti, is more or less a corollary from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathāgata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was no permanent soul and all the *dhammas* were changing, the only legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality. The Tathatā doctrine which was preached by Aśvaghōṣa oscillated between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all *dhammas* and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the background of all these non-essential *dhammas*. This he called *tathatā*, but he could not consistently say that any such permanent entity could exist. The *Vijñānavāda* doctrine which also took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the Śūnyavāda doctrine and the Tathatā doctrine; but when carefully examined it seems to be nothing but Śūnyavāda, with an attempt at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was

non-essential how did it originate? Vijñānavāda proposes to give an answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind generated by the beginningless *vāsanā* (desire) of the mind. The difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathatā doctrine that there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijñānavāda doctrine. The Vijñānavādins could not admit the existence of such a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of heresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make the doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality assumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijñānavāda literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we are not in a position to judge what answers Vijñānavāda could give on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the same time and the difficulty of conceiving *śūnya* (void), *tathatā*, (thatness) and the *ālayavijñāna* of Vijñānavāda is more or less the same.

The Tathatā doctrine of Aśvaghōṣa practically ceased with him. But the *Śūnyavāda* and the *Vijñānavāda* doctrines which originated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably till the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with *Śūnyavāda* doctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu philosophy, after Kumārila and Śaṅkara. From the third or the fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of systematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu logicians. Dīnnāga the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably started these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines of the great Hindu logician Vātsyāyana, in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. In association with this logical activity we find the activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the *Sarvāstivādins* (known also as *Vaibhāṣikas*) and the *Sautrāntikas*. Both the *Vaibhāṣikas* and the *Sautrāntikas* accepted the existence of the external world, and they were generally in conflict with the Hindu schools of thought *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and *Sāṃkhya* which also admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu (420–500 A.D.) was one of the most illustrious names of this school. We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist thinkers such as Yaśomitra (commentator of Vasubandhu's work),

Dharmmakīrti (writer of Nyāyabindu 635 A.D.), Vinītadeva and Śāntabhadra (commentators of Nyāyabindu), Dharmmottara (commentator of Nyāyabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnakīrti (950 A.D.), Paṇḍita Aśoka, and Ratnākara Śānti, some of whose contributious have been published in the *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, published in Calcutta in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series. These Buddhist writers were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and the doctrine of causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) as demonstrating the nature of existence. On the negative side they were interested in denying the ontological theories of Nyāya and Sāṃkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation, relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrāntika and non-Vaibhāṣika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between Hindu thought up to Śaṅkara (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought till the time of Śaṅkara consisted mainly in the denial by the Buddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world. For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the Vedānta of Śaṅkara admitted the existence of the permanent external world in some sense. With Śaṅkara the forms of the external world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a permanent background in the Brahman, which was the only reality behind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrāntikas admitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel with Nyāya and Sāṃkhya was with regard to their doctrine of momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the different ontological problems were in accordance with their doctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not hear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this time the disputes were mainly between the different systems of Hindu philosophers, viz. Nyāya, the Vedānta of the school of Śaṅkara and the Theistic Vedānta of Rāmānuja, Madhva, etc.

CHAPTER VI

THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

The Origin of Jainism.

NOTWITHSTANDING the radical differences in their philosophical notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, and some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their old name Nigantha and their leader Nātaputta Varddhamāna Mahāvira, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahāvira the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career.

Thus Mahāvira was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tirthaṅkara) of Jainism¹. His predecessor Pārśva, the last Tirthaṅkara but one, is said to have died 250 years before Mahāvira, while Pārśva's predecessor Ariṣṭanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before Mahāvira's Nirvāṇa. The story in *Uttarādhyaṇasūtra* that a disciple of Pārśva met a disciple of Mahāvira and brought about the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahāvira seems to suggest that this Pārśva was probably a historical person.

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable Tirthaṅkaras. In the present period the first Tirthaṅkara was Rṣabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamāna Mahāvira. All

¹ See Jacobi's article on Jainism, *E. R. E.*

Tirthaṅkaras have reached mokṣa at their death, and they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped¹

Two Sects of Jainism².

There are two main sects of Jains, Śvetāmbaras (wearers of white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as the Tirthaṅkaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of Mahāvira was not removed from the womb of Devanandā to that of Trīśalā as the Śvetāmbaras contend, thirdly that a monk who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Mokṣa, fourthly that no woman can reach Mokṣa³. The Digambaras deny the canonical works of the Śvetāmbaras and assert that these had been lost immediately after Mahāvira. The origin of the Digambaras is attributed to Śivabhūti (A.D. 83) by the Śvetāmbaras as due to a schism in the old Śvetāmbara church, of which there had already been previous to that seven other schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and that under Bhadrabāhu, the eighth sage after Mahāvira, the last Tirthaṅkara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphālakas with laxer principles, from which developed the present sect of Śvetāmbaras (A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times from the Śvetāmbaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history, though there is practically no difference about the main creed. It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than those of the Śvetāmbaras, if we except the canonical books of the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called *gacchas*, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha, which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have

¹ See "*Digumbara Jain Iconography* (1. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459" of J. Burgess, and Bühler's "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathurā," in *Epigraphica Indica*, II. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on Jainism, *E. R. E.*

² See Jacobi's article on Jainism, *E. R. E.*

³ See Guṇaratna's commentary on Jainism in *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*.

preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahāvīra (*sthavirāvali*, *paṭṭāvali*, *gurvāvali*) and also many legends about them such as those in the *Kalpasūtra*, the *Parīṣiṣṭa-parvan* of Hemacandra, etc.

The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains.

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen Pūrvas and the eleven Aṅgas. The Pūrvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were gradually lost. The works known as the eleven Aṅgas are now the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these are *Ācāra*, *Sūtrakṛta*, *Sthāna*, *Samavāya Bhagavatī*, *Jñātadharma-kathās*, *Upāsakadaśās*, *Antakṛtadaśās Anuttaraupapātikadaśās*, *Prāśnavyākaraṇa*, *Vipāka*. In addition to these there are the twelve *Upāṅgas*¹, the ten *Prakīrṇas*², six *Chedasūtras*³, *Nāndī* and *Anuyogadvāra* and four *Mūlasūtras* (*Uttarādhyayana*, *Āvaśyaka*, *Daśavaikālika*, and *Pinḍaniryukti*). The Digambaras however assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhamāgadhī, but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prākṛit and that of the later works Jaina Mahārāṣṭrī. A large literature of glosses and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain systematic expositions of their faith in Prākṛit and Sanskrit. Many commentaries have also been written upon these independent treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umāsvatī's *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* (1-85 A.D.). Some of the most important later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are *Vīṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, Jaina *Tarkavārttika*, with the commentary of Śāntiācāryya, *Dravyasaṃgraha* of Nemicaṇḍa (1150 A.D.), *Syādvādamāñjarī* of Malliṣeṇa (1292 A.D.), *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara (533 A.D.), *Parīkṣāmukhasūtralaghuvṛtti* of Anantavīryya (1039 A.D.), *Prameyakamalāmārtanḍa* of Prabhā-

¹ *Aupapātika*, *Rājaprasāna*, *Jīvābhigama*, *Prajñāpanā*, *Jambudvīpaprājñapti*, *Candraprajñapti*, *Sūryaprajñapti*, *Nirayāvali*, *Kalpāvatamsikā*, *Puṣpikā*, *Puṣpacūlikā*, *Vṛṣṇidaśās*.

² *Caṭuṣṣaraṇa*, *Samstāra*, *Āturaṇapratyākhyāna*, *Bhaktāparijñā*, *Taṇḍulavaiyālī*, *Caṇḍāvīja*, *Devendrastava*, *Gaṇivīja*, *Mahāpratyākhyāna*, *Vīrastava*.

³ *Niśītha*, *Mahāniśītha*, *Vyavahāra*, *Daśasrutaskandha*, *Bṛhatkalpa*, *Pañcakalpa*.

candra (825 A.D.), *Yogaśāstra* of Hemacandra (1088–1172 A.D.), and *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṃkāra* of Deva Sūri (1086–1169 A.D.). I am indebted for these dates to Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *Indian Logic*.

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and Prākṛit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. *Samarāicca-kahā*, *Upamītabhavaṇaprapaṇca-kathā* in Prākṛit, and the *Yaśastilaka* of Somadeva and Dhanapāla's *Tīlakamañjarī*); Jaina Sanskrit poems both in the Purāṇa and Kāvya style and hymns in Prākṛit and Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works, original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature of India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics, poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic deserve special notice¹.

Some General Characteristics of the Jains.

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces, Eastern Rājputāna and the Punjab. The head-quarters of the Śvetāmbaras are in Gujarat and Western Rājputāna, but they are to be found also all over Northern and Central India.

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to bare necessities, and these he must beg—clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it². The outfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms of peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (*cāmara*)³. The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out. The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The laymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks

¹ See Jacobi's article on Jainism, *E. R. E.*

² See Jacobi, *loc. cit.*

³ See *Śaddarśanasamuccaya*, chapter IV.

by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in the upāśrayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist vihāras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture, etc., and has thrust them into commerce¹.

Life of Mahāvīra.

Mahāvīra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a Kṣattriya of the Jñāta clan and a native of Vaiśālī (modern Besarh, 27 miles north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhārtha and Trīśālā. The Śvetāmbaras maintain that the embryo of the Tirthāṅkara which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanandā was then transferred to the womb of Trīśālā. This story the Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents were the worshippers of Pārśva and gave him the name Varddhamaṇā (Vīra or Mahāvīra). He married Yaśodā and had a daughter by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained omniscience (*kevala*, cf. *bodhi* of the Buddhists). He lived to preach for forty-two years more, and attained mokṣa (emancipation) some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C.²

The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chāndogya Upaniṣad held that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent, that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally

¹ See Jacobi's article on Jainism, *E. R. E.*

² See Hoernlé's translation of *Uvāsagadasāo*, Jacobi, *loc. cit.*, and Hoernlé's article on the Ājivakas, *E. R. E.* The Śvetāmbaras, however, say that this date was 527 B.C., and the Digambaras place it eighteen years later.

demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g. the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (*nāma-rūpa*)¹. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities, have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere phantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason.

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind them. What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upaniṣads regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance, as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere, for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of quality as a new existence.

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and possibly of some of the Upaniṣads too, and they had also a solution to offer. They held that it was not true that substance alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances. Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that there was no permanent substance but merely the change of passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are three elements: (1) that some collocations of qualities appear to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated; (3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in it which is permanent. The clay has become lost in some form, has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still

¹ See Chāndogya, VI. 1.

another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold" are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed, and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (*sat*) then is neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit, which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent (*dhruva*) accession of some new qualities (*utpāda*) and loss of some old qualities (*vyaya*)¹. The solution of Jainism is thus a reconciliation of the two extremes of Vedāntism and Buddhism on grounds of common-sense experience.

The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (*anekāntavāda*).

This conception of being as the union of the permanent and change brings us naturally to the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* or what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme absolutism of the Upaniṣads and the pluralism of the Buddhists. The Jains regarded all things as *anekānta* (*na-ekānta*), or in other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely, as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existence as a substance (*dravya*) is of the nature of a collocation of atoms and not as any other substance such as space (*ākāśa*), i.e. a gold jug is a *dravya* only in one sense of the term and not in every sense; so it is a *dravya* in the sense that it is a collocation of atoms and not a *dravya* in the sense of space or time (*kāla*). It is thus both a *dravya* and not a *dravya* at one and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is

¹ See *Tattvārthadhigamaśūtra*, and Guṇaratna's treatment of Jainism in *Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya*.

not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone. Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsullied gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajñadatta. Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a certain limited sense. All things (*vastu*) thus possess an infinite number of qualities (*anantadharmātmakam vastu*), each of which can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted senses and not absolutely¹. Thus in the positive relation riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations) can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing in relation to this or that, are technically called *naya*².

The Doctrine of Nayas.

In framing judgments about things there are two ways open to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from

¹ See Guṇaratna on Jainamata in *Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, pp. 211, etc., and also *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*.

² See *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, and *Viśeṣāvaśya bhāṣya*, pp. 895-923.

the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptible and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two points of view are respectively called *dravyanaya* and *paryāyanaya*¹. The *dravyanaya* again shows itself in three forms, and *paryāyanaya* in four forms, of which the first form only is important for our purposes, the other three being important rather from the point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted here. The three *nayas* under *dravyanaya* are called *naigama-naya*, *saṃgraha-naya* and *vyavahāra-naya*.

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say, I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy, whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view, in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technically called the *naigama* standpoint. This empirical view probably proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other ones. This is the point of view from which according to the Jains the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* schools interpret experience.

Saṃgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being." This according to the Jains is the *Vedānta* way of looking at things.

¹ *Syādvādamāñjarī*, pp. 171-173.

The vyavahāra-naya standpoint holds that the real essence of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practical experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics, go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday experience, and none of these can be separated and held up as being the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the Sāṃkhya way of looking at things.

The first view of paryāya-naya called *ṛjusūtra* is the Buddhist view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at any given moment. At each new moment there are new collocations of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as the true essence of our notion of things¹.

The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number. The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The Jains hold that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Vēdānta, the Sāṃkhya, and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize experience from one of the above four points of view, and each regards the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error (*naṣābhāsa*), for each standpoint represents only one of the many points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirmations from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame

¹ The other standpoints of paryāya-naya, which represent grammatical and linguistic points of view, are *śabda-naya*, *samabhīrūḍha-naya*, and *evambhūta-naya*. See *Vīṣeṣāvātyaka bhāṣya*, pp. 895-923.

things may be held to be true from other points of view. The truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase *syāt* (may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another. This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syādvāda¹.

The Doctrine of Syādvāda.

The doctrine of Syādvāda holds that since the most contrary characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, affirmation made from whatever standpoint (*naya*) cannot be regarded as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some *syādsti* or "may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense; all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense (*syādavaktavya*); all affirmations are true as well as false in some sense (*syādsti syānnāsti*); all affirmations are true as well as indefinite (*syādsti cāvaktavyaśca*); all affirmations are false as well as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite in some sense (*syādsti syānnāsti syādavaktavyaśca*). Thus we may say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to say explicitly that "may be (*syāt*) that the jug is," otherwise if "being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being, it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence "the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the negation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic (such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue, golden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all

¹ See *Vīṣeṣavākyaka bhāṣya*, pp. 895, etc., and *Syādvādamāñjarī*, pp. 170, etc.

the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined. What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being (of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may say, may be it is an affirmation of being (*syādaṣṭi*), may be it is a negation of being (*syānnāṣṭi*); or I may proceed in quite another way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judgment "the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is," and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable—*avaktavya*, for how can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet such is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus all affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four again we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable. Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called *saptabhaṅgī*) holds good¹. The Jains say that other Indian systems each from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only

¹ See *Syādvādamāñjarī*, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166, etc.

point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or senses (*upādhi*). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation, which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of the *naya* doctrine with the *syādvāda* doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every *naya* there are as many alternatives as are indicated by *syādvāda*. The validity of such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne in mind when making any judgment according to any *naya*, the *naya* is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely according to any particular *naya* without any reference to other *nayas* as required by the *syādvāda* doctrine the *nayas* are wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such judgments are false and should therefore be called false *nayas* (*nayābhāsa*)¹.

Knowledge, its value for us.

The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on *Nyāyabindu* says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the task of examining the nature of true knowledge (*samyagjñāna* or *pramāṇa*). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with the above view of knowledge of the Buddhists². They also

¹ The earliest mention of the doctrine of *syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* probably occurs in Bhadrabāhu's (433-357 B.C.) commentary *Sūtrakṛtāṅganīryukti*.

² See *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokaṇkāra* (Benares), p. 26; also *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra-vṛtti* (Asiatic Society), ch. 1.

say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The validity (*prāmāṇya*) of anything consists in this, that it directly helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what is good for us and avoid what is bad¹. The conditions that lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection. For we are not concerned with how a cognition is produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes. It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain conditions assume such a special fitness (*yogyatā*) that we can have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions we do not know it². The enquiry as to the nature of the special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate, and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual experience, but are derived only by imagination (*utprekṣā*), and that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (*nirvikalpa jñāna*). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.

¹ *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokaṇkāra*, p. 26.

² See *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra*, II. 9, and its *vṛtti*, and also the concluding *vṛtti* of ch. II.

Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted it should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents things in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that¹. The error thus consists in this, that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a snake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing is what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True knowledge, therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful representation of its object as is never afterwards found to be contradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and distinct, and is called perceptual (*pratyakṣa*); when attained otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then called non-perceptual (*parokṣa*²).

Theory of Perception.

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the Jains think that perception (*pratyakṣa*) reveals to us the external objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul

¹ Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its relation with the "this" as "this is a snake" does not exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called *satkhyāti* or misrelationing of existents (*sat*).

² See *Jaina-tarka-vārttika* of Siddhasena, ch. 1., and *vṛtti* by Śāntiācārya, *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṃkāra*, ch. 1., *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra-vṛtti*, ch. 1.

from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vi-jñānavādin Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge of external objects by perception is gained through the senses. The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself before. The process of external perception does not thus involve the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this happens in association with the eye; I say that I see through the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas (mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve its purpose¹. Perception of an object means

¹ *Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu ātmā ca indriyam...anupahatacakṣurādideśeṣu eva ātmanah karmakṣayopasaṁstenaṣṭhagitagavākṣatulyāni cakṣurādini upakaraṇāni. Jaina-Vārttika-Vṛtti*, II. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number of senses they possess. (See *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*. See also *Tattvārthā-dhigamasūtra*, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial

that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence of any *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate) stage preceding the final *savikalpa* (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials were necessary for the development of determinate perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of indeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. The determinate stage with them is the result of the application of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence does not truly represent the presentative part¹.

Non-Perceptual Knowledge.

Non-perceptual knowledge (*parokṣa*) differs from *pratyakṣa* in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. *Parokṣa* thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called respectively *pratiṣṭhā*, *hetu*, *drṣṭānta*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*, except for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process (*Prameyakamalamārtanda*, pp. 108, 109). When we make an

of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that the veil which was observing it is removed.

¹ *Prameyakamalamārtanda*, pp. 8-11.

inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (*sahabhāva*) or as invariable antecedence (*kramabhāva*) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference¹.

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance².

Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

¹ As regards concomitance (*vyāpti*) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists prefer *antarvyāpti* (between smoke and fire) to *bahirvyāpti* (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, *svārthānumāna* for one's own self and *parārthānumāna* for convincing others. It may not be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabāhu in his *Daśavaikālikaniryukti* was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (1) *Pratijñā* (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) *Pratijñāvibhakti* (non-injury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) *Hetu* (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) *Hetu vibhakti* (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) *Vipakṣa* (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) *Vipakṣa pratiṣedha* (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) *Drṣṭānta* (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) *Āśāṅkū* (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) *Āśāṅkāpratiṣedha* (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) *Naigamana* (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (*Vidyābhūṣaṇa's Indian Logic*). These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāya-sūtrabhāṣya*, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this Jaina view in his mind.

² See *Jainatarkavārttika*, and *Parikṣāmukhasūtravṛtti*, and *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* with Guṇaratna on Jainism.

which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect, they supposed that there was a succession of different units of effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary. The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding experience. When we have a unit of experience we suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so, the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes every moment and that new things are being renewed at each succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence associated with change—*pariyāya* (acquirement of new qualities and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one particular standpoint (*naya*) whereas they alone carefully weigh experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and limitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of *arthakriyākāritva* the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable abstract speculations which went directly against experience. Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge

in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it. The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment. Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious and an unconscious element in knowledge as Sāṃkhya does. Nor should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it reveals, as the Sautrāntikas think, for then by copying the materiality of the object, knowledge would itself become material. Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mīmāṃsā view that the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence (*saṃvāda*) with facts. But in those cases where by previous knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without reference to objective facts (*prāmāṇyamutpattau parata eva jñaptau svakārye ca svataḥ parataśca abhyāsānabhyāsāpekṣayā*)¹. The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics.

The Jīvas.

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be divided into the living (*jīva*) and the non-living (*ajīva*). The principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property of the body². It is on account of this life-principle that the body appears to be living. This principle is the soul. The soul is directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or

¹ *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, pp. 38-43.

² See *Jaina Vārttika*, p. 60.

a description. This is directly against the view of the great Mīmāṃsā authority Prabhākara¹. The soul in its pure state is possessed of infinite perception (*ananta-darśana*), infinite knowledge (*ananta-jñāna*), infinite bliss (*ananta-sukha*) and infinite power (*ananta-vīrya*)². It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with the exception of a few released pure souls (*mukta-jīva*), all the other jīvas (*saṃsārīn*) have all their purity and power covered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating in them from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number. They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable space-points in our mundane world (*lokākāśa*), have a limited size (*madhyama-parimāṇa*) and are neither all-pervasive (*vibhu*) nor atomic (*aṇu*); it is on account of this that *jīva* is called *Jīvāstikāya*. The word *astikāya* means anything that occupies space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The Jains divide the jīvas according to the number of sense-organs they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste. Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell. The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these an inner sense-organ namely *manas* by virtue of which they are

¹ See *Prameyakamalamārtanda*, p. 33.

² The Jains distinguish between *darśana* and *jñāna*. *Darśana* is the knowledge of things without their details, e.g. I see a cloth. *Jñāna* means the knowledge of details, e.g. I not only see the cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where it was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first *darśana* and then *jñāna*. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all things as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details.

called rational (*saṃjñin*) while the lower animals have no reason and are called *asaṃjñin*.

Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being animated by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives; they live and die and are born again in another elementary body. These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case they are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants. Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common. Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants of which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. The whole universe is full of minute beings called *nigodas*; they are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters, having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extreme pains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with them like a box filled with powder. The *nigodas* furnish the supply of souls in place of those that have reached Mokṣa. But an infinitesimally small fraction of one single *nigoda* has sufficed to replace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvāṇa of all the souls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to the present. Thus it is evident the saṃsāra will never be empty of living beings. Those of the *nigodas* who long for development come out and continue their course of progress through successive stages¹.

Karma Theory.

It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jīvas are born as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already noticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soul is the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of the pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter. Those which obscure right knowledge of details (*jñāna*) are called *jñānāvaraṇīya*, those which obscure right perception (*darśana*) as in sleep are called *darśanāvaraṇīya*, those which

¹ See Jacobi's article on Jainism, *E. R. E.*, and *Lokaprakāśa*, vi. pp. 31 ff.

obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and pain are *vedanīya*, and those which obscure the right attitude of the soul towards faith and right conduct *mohanīya*¹. In addition to these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma which determine (1) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body with its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nationality, caste, family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the soul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good action when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called (1) *āyuska karma*, (2) *nāma karma*, (3) *gotra karma*, (4) *antarāya karma*. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are continually producing certain subtle karma matter which in the first instance is called *bhāva karma*, which transforms itself into *dravya karma* and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming into contact with the passions (*kaṣāya*) of the soul. These act like viscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. This matter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided into eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the cause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as golden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are called the *leśyās*. The feelings generated by the accumulation of the karma-matter are called *bhāva-leśyā* and the actual coloration of the soul by it is called *dravya-leśyā*. According as any karma matter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it gives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the knowledge that we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc., is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which the particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind of knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge of a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our knowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that kind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. All knowledge, feeling, etc., are thus in one sense generated from within, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be generating them all being but mere coexistent external conditions.

¹ The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge : (1) *matijñāna* (ordinary cognition), (2) *śrutī* (testimony), (3) *avadhi* (supernatural cognition), (4) *manahparyāya* (thought-reading), (5) *kevala-jñāna* (omniscience).

After the effect of a particular karma matter (*karma-vargaṇā*) is once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul. This process of purging off the karmas is called *nirjarā*. If no new karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purging off of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but as it is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karma matter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging and binding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul to continue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and re-birth. After the death of each individual his soul, together with its karmic body (*kārmaṇaśarīra*), goes in a few moments to the place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.

In the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces its proper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the *audayika* state. By proper efforts karma may however be prevented from taking effect, though it still continues to exist, and this is said to be the *aupaśamika* state of the soul. When karma is not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soul is said to be in the *kṣāyika* state, and it is from this state that Mokṣa is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinary good men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized, and some active (*kṣāyopāśamika*)¹.

Karma, Āsrava and Nirjarā.

It is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer all the experiences of this world process, including births and re-births in diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects. The karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter (*karma-vargaṇā*). The influx of these karma particles into the soul is called āsrava in Jainism. These karmas are produced by body, mind, and speech. The āsravas represent the channels or modes through which the karmas enter the soul, just like the channels through which water enters into a pond. But the Jains distinguish between the channels and the karmas which actually

¹ The stages through which a developing soul passes are technically called *guṇa-sthānas* which are fourteen in number. The first three stages represent the growth of faith in Jainism, the next five stages are those in which all the passions are controlled, in the next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all his karmas, at the thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas but he still practises yoga and at the fourteenth stage he attains liberation (see Dravyasaṃgrahavṛtti, 13th verse).

enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds of āsravas, bhāvāsrava and karmāsrava. Bhāvāsrava means the thought activities of the soul through which or on account of which the karma particles enter the soul¹. Thus Nemicandra says that bhāvāsrava is that kind of change in the soul (which is the contrary to what can destroy the karmāsrava), by which the karmas enter the soul². Karmāsrava, however, means the actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These bhāvāsravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion (*mithyātva*), want of control (*avirati*), inadvertence (*pramāda*), the activities of body, mind and speech (*yoga*) and the passions (*kaṣāyas*). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely *ekānta* (a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed), *viparīta* (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), *vinaya* (retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit), *saṁśaya* (doubt as to right or wrong) and *ajñāna* (want of any belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers). Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (*himsā*), falsehood (*anṛta*), stealing (*caurya*), incontinence (*abrahma*), and desire to have things which one does not already possess (*parigrahākāṅkṣā*). Pramāda or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation (*vikathā*), passions (*kaṣāya*), bad use of the five senses (*indriya*), sleep (*nidrā*), attachment (*rāga*)³.

Coming to dravyāsrava we find that it means that actual influx of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight different kinds, namely jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya, vedanīya, mohaniya, āyu, nāma, gotra and antarāya. These actual influxes take place only as a result of the bhāvāsrava or the reprehensible thought activities, or changes (*pariṇāma*) of the soul. The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas is called bhāvabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called dravyabandha. It is on account of bhāvabandha that the actual connection between the karmas and the soul can take place⁴. The actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking

¹ *Dravyasaṃgraha*, Śl. 29.

² Nemicandra's commentary on *Dravyasaṃgraha*, Śl. 29, edited by S. C. Ghoshal, Arrah, 1917.

³ See Nemicandra's commentary on Śl. 30.

⁴ Nemicandra on 31, and *Vardhamānapurāṇa* xvi. 44, quoted by Ghoshal.

of dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over with oil. Thus Guṇaratna says: "The influx of karma means the contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the particular kind of karma, with the soul, just like the sticking of dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked at from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as a material body during its saṃsāra stage¹." From one point of view the bondage of karma is only of *puṇya* and *pāpa* (good and bad karmas)². From another this bondage is of four kinds, according to the nature of karma (*prakṛti*), duration of bondage (*sthiti*), intensity (*anubhāga*) and extension (*pradeśa*). The nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma already mentioned, namely the jñānāvaraṇīya karma which obscures the infinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail, darśanāvaraṇīya karma which obscures the infinite general knowledge of the soul, vedanīya karma which produces the feelings of pleasure and pain in the soul, mohaniya karma, which so infatuates souls that they fail to distinguish what is right from what is wrong, āyu karma, which determines the tenure of any particular life, nāma karma which gives them personalities, gotra karma which brings about a particular kind of social surrounding for the soul and antarāya karma which tends to oppose the performance of right actions by the soul. The duration of the stay of any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may be intense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principle of division, anubhāga. Pradeśa refers to the different parts of the soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. The duration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are due to the nature of the kaṣāyas or passions of the soul, whereas the different classification of karmas as jñānāvaraṇīya, etc., are due to the nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter³.

Corresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bhāvāsrava and dravyāsrava) are two kinds of control opposing this inrush, by actual thought modification of a contrary nature and by the actual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and these are respectively called bhāvasaṃvara and dravyasaṃvara⁴.

¹ See Guṇaratna, p. 181.

² *Ibid.*

³ Nemicandra, 33.

⁴ *Varddhamānaphurāṇa*, XVI. 67-68, and *Dravyasaṃgrahaṇṭī*, Śl. 35.

The bhāvaśamvaras are (1) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness, abstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objects of desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in order to avoid injury to insects (*īryā*), gentle and holy talk (*bhāṣā*), receiving proper alms (*eṣaṇā*), etc., (3) *guptis* or restraints of body, speech and mind, (4) *dharma*s consisting of habits of forgiveness, humility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint, penance, abandonment, indifference to any kind of gain or loss, and supreme sex-control¹, (5) *anuprekṣā* consisting of meditation about the transient character of the world, about our helplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence, about our own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about the difference between the soul and the non-soul, about the uncleanness of our body and all that is associated with it, about the influx of karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those karmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matter and the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining true knowledge, faith, and conduct, and about the essential principles of the world², (6) the *pariśahajaya* consisting of the conquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc., and of feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) *cāritra* or right conduct.

Next to this we come to nirjarā or the purging off of the karmas or rather their destruction. This nirjarā also is of two kinds, bhāvanirjarā and dravyanirjarā. Bhāvanirjarā means that change in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles are destroyed. Dravyanirjarā means the actual destruction of these karma particles either by the reaping of their effects or by penances before their time of fruition, called savipāka and avipāka nirjarās respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed mokṣa or liberation is effected.

Pudgala.

The *aḥi*va (non-living) is divided into *pudgalāstikāya*, *dharma stikāya*, *adharmāstikāya*, *ākāśāstikāya*, *kāla*, *puṇya*, *pāpa*. The word *pudgala* means matter³, and it is called *astikāya* in the sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms

¹ *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*.

² *Ibid*.

³ This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the Buddhists *pudgala* means an individual or a person.

which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (*anu*). The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell, and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combination of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangement and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic space (*ghanapratarabhedena*). Some combinations take place by simple mutual contact at two points (*yugmapradeśa*) whereas in others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractive force (*ojalpradeśa*) (*Prajñāpanopāṅgasūtra*, pp. 10–12). Two atoms form a compound (*skandha*), when the one is viscous and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce the gross things of the world. They are, however, liable to constant change (*pariṇāma*) by which they lose some of their old qualities (*guṇas*) and acquire new ones. There are four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these are alike in character. The perception of grossness however is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the perception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise (as the Sāṃkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combined atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the darśanavaraṇīya and jñānavaraṇīya veil, there arises in the soul the perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness (*samāna-rūpatā*) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow) is technically called *tiryaksāmānya*. This sāmānya or generality is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity

(as maintained by the Naiyāyikas) but represents only the accession of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and to continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This sameness of qualities in time is technically called *ūrdhvasāmānya*¹. If the atoms are looked at from the point of view of the change and accession of new qualities, they may be regarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at from the point of view of substance (*dravya*) they are eternal.

Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa.

The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is absolutely different from what they mean in other systems of Indian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell, sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe (*lokākāśa*) and pervades every part of it. The term *astikāya* is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanying circumstance or cause which makes motion possible, like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition or circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent or passive (*udāsīna*) and not an active or solicitous (*preraka*) cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but if the fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its motion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move; but if they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of dharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (*loka*) in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the liberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there because there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma². Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which

¹ See *Prameyacakalamārtanḍa*, pp. 136-143; *Jainatarkavārttika*, p. 106.

² *Dravyasaṃgrahavṛtti*, 17-20.

helps jīvas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance could move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if there were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on account of their notion that the inner activity of the jīva or the atoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other extraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformed into actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jīvas were regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be found to be moving even at the time of liberation (mokṣa), which was undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required for its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent in the region of the liberated souls.

The category of ākāśa is that subtle entity which pervades the mundane universe (*loka*) and the transcendent region of liberated souls (*aloka*) which allows the subsistence of all other substances such as dharma, adharma, jīva, pudgala. It is not a mere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere emptiness, but a positive entity which helps other things to interpenetrate it. On account of its pervasive character it is called *ākāśāstikāya*¹.

Kāla and Samaya.

Time (*kāla*) in reality consists of those innumerable particles which never mix with one another, but which help the happening of the modification or accession of new qualities and the change of qualities of the atoms. Kāla does not bring about the changes of qualities, in things, but just as ākāśa helps interpenetration and dharma motion, so also kāla helps the action of the transformation of new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments, hours, days, etc., is called *samaya*. This is the appearance of the unchangeable kāla in so many forms. Kāla thus not only aids the modifications of other things, but also allows its own modifications as moments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), and the moments, hours, etc., are its paryāyas. The unit of samaya is the time required by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a slow movement.

¹ *Dravyasaṃgrahavṛtti*, 19.

Jaina Cosmography.

According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning or end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are experienced as results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts, *ūrdhva* (where the gods reside), *madhya* (this world of ours), and *adho* (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe (*lokākāśa*) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movement possible. Beyond the *lokākāśa* there is no dharma and therefore no movement, but only space (*ākāśa*). Surrounding this *lokākāśa* are three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight over the *ūrdhvaloka* goes to the top of this *lokākāśa* and (there being no dharma) remains motionless there.

Jaina Yoga.

Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of mokṣa (salvation). This yoga consists of jñāna (knowledge of reality as it is), śraddhā (faith in the teachings of the Jinās), and cāritra (cessation from doing all that is evil). This cāritra consists of *ahiṃsā* (not taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), *sūnṛta* (speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), *asteya* (not taking anything which has not been given), *brahmacaryya* (abandoning lust for all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and body), and *aparigraha* (abandoning attachment for all things)¹. These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent on attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary householders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra, that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should follow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from a good family, should follow the customs of the country and so forth. These are just what we should expect from any good and

¹ Certain external rules of conduct are also called cāritra. These are: *Īryyā* (to go by the path already trodden by others and illuminated by the sun's rays, so that proper precaution may be taken while walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc., which may be lying on the way), *bhāṣā* (to speak well and pleasantly to all beings), *iṣaṇa* (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner), *dānasamiti* (to inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions when taking or giving anything), *utsargasamiti* (to take care that bodily refuse may not be thrown in such a way as to injure any being), *manogupti* (to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within oneself, and hold all people to be the same in mind), *vāggupti* (absolute silence), and *kāyagupti* (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds of cāritra are counted in *Dravyasaṃgrahavṛtti* 35.

honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon the virtues of *ahiṃsā*, *sūnṛta*, *asteya* and *brahmacaryya*, but the root of all these is *ahiṃsā*. The virtues of *sūnṛta*, *asteya* and *brahmacaryya* are made to follow directly as secondary corollaries of *ahiṃsā*. *Ahiṃsā* may thus be generalized as the fundamental ethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may be passed in accordance with the standard of *ahiṃsā*; *sūnṛta*, *asteya* and *brahmacaryya* are regarded as virtues as their transgression leads to *hiṃsā* (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice of these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this is called *anubrata* (small vows). But those who are struggling for the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues according to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called *mahābrata* (great vows). Thus for example *brahmacaryya* for a householder according to the *anubrata* standard would be mere cessation from adultery, whereas according to *mahābrata* it would be absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-acts. *Ahiṃsā* according to a householder, according to *anubrata*, would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according to *mahāvratā* it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to any living being in any way.

Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all of which are based upon the cardinal virtue of *ahiṃsā*. These are (1) *digvirati* (to carry out activities within a restricted area and thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places), (2) *bhogopabhogamāna* (to desist from drinking liquors, taking flesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and vegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding time and place of taking meals), (3) *anarthadaṇḍa* consisting of (a) *apadhyāna* (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries, killing of one's enemies, etc.), (b) *pāpopadeśa* (desisting from advising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing of so many insects), (c) *hiṃsopakāridāna* (desisting from giving implements of agriculture to people which will lead to the injury of insects), (d) *pramādācaraṇa* (to desist from attending musical parties, theatres, or reading sex-literature, gambling, etc.), (4) *śikṣā-padabrata* consisting of (a) *sāmayikabrata* (to try to treat all beings equally), (b) *deśāvakaśikabrata* (gradually to practise the *digviratibrata* more and more extensively), (c) *poṣadhabrata*

(certain other kinds of restriction), (d) *atithisaṃvibhāgabhrata* (to make gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called *aticāra*, should be carefully avoided.

All perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and to know the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of the soul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge can be removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself is pure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only on account of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas are burnt (*dhyānāgnidagdhakarma*) the self becomes purified. The soul is itself the saṃsāra (the cycle of rebirths) when it is overpowered by the four kaṣāyas (passions) and the senses. The four kaṣāyas are *krodha* (anger), *māna* (vanity and pride), *māyā* (insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and *lobha* (greed). These kaṣāyas cannot be removed except by a control of the senses; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind (*manahśuddhi*). Without the control of the mind no one can proceed in the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled when the mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation should make every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism (*tapas*) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attachment and antipathy (*rāga-dveṣa*) can be removed only by the purification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy that man loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin (sage) that he should be free from them and become independent in the real sense of the term. When a man learns to look upon all beings with equality (*saṃatva*) he can effect such a conquest over rāga and dveṣa as one could never do even by the strictest asceticism through millions of years. In order to effect this saṃatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds of meditation (*bhāvanā*):

We should think of the transitoriness (*anityatā*) of all things, that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day, what it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things are transitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure, wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles in a whirlwind.

All, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives will by their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full of misery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in

whatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, we find that it fails us. This is called *aśaraṇabhāvanā* (the meditation of helplessness).

Some are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruits of the karma done in another life. We are all different from one another by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies and by all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditate on these aspects is called *ekatvabhāvanā* and *anyatvabhāvanā*.

To think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh, blood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called *aśucibhāvanā* (meditation of the impurity of the body).

To think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of universal friendship and compassion and the passions are removed, then only will good (*śubha*) accrue to me, but if on the contrary I commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evil will befall me, is called *āsravabhāvanā* (meditation of the befalling of evil). By the control of the *āsrava* (inrush of karma) comes the *saṃvara* (cessation of the influx of karma) and the destruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to *nirjarā* (decay and destruction of karma matter).

Again one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas (virtues) of self control (*saṃyama*), truthfulness (*sūnṛta*), purity (*śauca*), chastity (*brahma*), absolute want of greed (*akiñcanatā*), asceticism (*tapas*), forbearance, patience (*kṣānti*), mildness (*mārdava*), sincerity (*rjūtā*), and freedom or emancipation from all sins (*mukti*) can alone help us in the achievement of the highest goal. These are the only supports to which we can look. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is called *dharmasvākhyātātābhāvanā*.

Again one should think of the Jaina cosmology and also of the nature of the influence of karma in producing all the diverse conditions of men. These two are called *lokabhāvanā* and *bodhibhāvanā*.

When by the continual practice of the above thoughts man becomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings, and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a mind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he should take to the performance of *dhyāna* or meditation by deep concentration. The *śamatva* or perfect equality of the mind and *dhyāna* are interdependent, so that without *dhyāna* there is no *śamatva*

and without samatva there is no dhyāna. In order to make the mind steady by dhyāna one should think of *maitrī* (universal friendship), *pramoda* (the habit of emphasizing the good sides of men), *karuṇā* (universal compassion) and *mādhyastha* (indifference to the wickedness of people, i.e. the habit of not taking any note of sinners). The Jaina dhyāna consists in concentrating the mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. The dhyāna however as we have seen is only practised as an aid to making the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbed towards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of the final extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a complete course of moral discipline which leads to the purification of the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hindu yoga of Patañjali or even of the Buddhists¹.

Jaina Atheism².

The Naiyāyikas assert that as the world is of the nature of an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and this agent is Īśvara (God). To this the Jain replies, "What does the Naiyāyika mean when he says that the world is of the nature of an effect"? Does he mean by "effect," (1) that which is made up of parts (*sāvayava*), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a non-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as having been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (*vikāritvam*). Again, what is meant by being "made up of parts"? If it means existence in parts, then the class-concepts (*sāmānya*) existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence destructible, but these the Naiyāyikas regard as being partless and eternal. If it means "that which has parts," then even "space" (*ākāśa*) has to be regarded as "effect," but the Naiyāyika regards it as eternal.

Again "effect" cannot mean "coinherence of the causes of a thing which were previously non-existent," for in that case one could not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the elements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal.

Again if "effect" means "that which is regarded by anyone as

¹ *Yogaśāstra*, by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft*, Leipzig, 1874, and *Dravyasaṃgraha*, edited by Ghoshal, 1917.

² See Guṇaratna's *Tarkarāhasyaḍīpikā*.

having been made," then it would apply even to space, for when a man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in the hollow which he dug.

If it means "that which is liable to change," then one could suppose that God was also liable to change and he would require another creator to create him and he another, and so on *ad infinitum*. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to change with reference to his creative activity.

Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some time and do not happen at other times are regarded as "effects." But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are "effects," then that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these are contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue of that. And even atoms would be "effects," for they also undergo changes of colour by heat.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a whole is an "effect." And every effect has a cause, and so the world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke. If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced by intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects, and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have a vicious circle (*anyonyāśraya*).

Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by an agent, then such an agent should have a body, for we have never seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held that we should consider the general condition of agency only, namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind of body. If you take the instances of other kinds of effects such as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it is said that these are also made by God, then you have an argument in a circle (*cakraka*), for this was the very matter which you sought to prove.

Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists. Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does he produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible, for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that he can be all-creator.

Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such a blind destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*) might take the place of God. If He took to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of

admitting him at all? You may rather say that the world came into being out of its own nature.

It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create this world. This is against all experience.

Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists, you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will. But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction. Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whichever way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense with the supposition altogether¹.

¹ See *Śaṅḍarśanasamuccaya*, Guṇaratna on Jainism, pp. 115-124.

Mokṣa (emancipation).

The motive which leads a man to strive for release (*mokṣa*) is the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (*anantajñāna*) and infinite perception (*anantadarśana*). In the saṃsāra state on account of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and that time as ordinary knowledge (*matī*), testimony (*śruta*), supernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (*avadhī*), and direct knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (*manah-paryāya*). In the state of release however there is omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*) and all things are simultaneously known to the perfect (*kevalin*) as they are. In the saṃsāra stage the soul always acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.

It may not be out of place to mention here that though the karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action (*anantavīrya*), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated. If man had not this anantavīrya in him he might have been eternally under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured his bondage (*bandha*). But since man is the repository of this indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his highest good.

CHAPTER VII

THE KAPILA AND THE PĀTAÑJALA SĀM̐KHYA (YOGA)¹.

A Review.

THE examination of the two ancient Nāstika schools of Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in circles other than those of the Upaniṣad sages. That certain practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the wise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some of the Upaniṣads but were accepted by the two nāstika schools of Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from the point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nāstika schools appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial disciplines of the Brāhmaṇas. Both these systems originated with the Kṣattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals at the sacrifices.

The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable combination of rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical power of producing the desired effect—a shower of rain, the birth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices were enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as for the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas were the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate a detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a certain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses in such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired by the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic culture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with which we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth of Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our

¹ This chapter is based on my *Study of Patanjali*, published by the Calcutta University, and my *Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of thought*, awaiting publication with the same authority. The system has been treated in detail in those two works.

objects. Truth cannot be determined *a priori* but depends upon the test of experience¹.

It is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism though probably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificial creed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamental principles which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were at least tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we see that Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being due to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that which could produce any effect. But to such a logical extreme did the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in formulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness². Turning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of knowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what is good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an account of things that on proceeding according to its directions we may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct estimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good and avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not carry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in the world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so far that they had even denied the existence of any permanent soul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute view of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening of events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true only in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense, which we acknowledge as superior to mere *a priori* abstractions, which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new qualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this common-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary experience, could not satisfy our inner *a priori* demands for finding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but absolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism

¹ The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mīmāṃsā of Kumāṛila and Prabhākara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them is determined *a priori* while error is determined by experience.

² Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior to the doctrine of *arthakriyākāritva*. But the later Buddhists sought to prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of *arthakriyākāritva*.

would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, but untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such a point of view and untrue from another." But such an answer cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement, an absolute judgment.

The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to formulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of sentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances of sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions were here considered bad or good according as they brought about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the other world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken, was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial creed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followed only if it was so dictated in the Vedas. Karma and the fruit of karma (*karmaphala*) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its fruits—temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit of sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however, karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happiness or destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions performed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.

Such an advance had however already begun in the Upa-

niṣads which had anticipated the new systems in all these directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the Upaniṣads, and built their systems independently by their own rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upaniṣads were thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas, it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to harmonize the suggestions of the Upaniṣads and of the sacrificial creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are indeed fulfilled in the Sāṃkhya philosophy, germs of which may be discovered in the Upaniṣads.

The Germs of Sāṃkhya in the Upaniṣads.

It is indeed true that in the Upaniṣads there is a large number of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the earliest Vedic literature, *mantra*, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result¹. In many passages of the Upaniṣads this Brahman appears as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored, and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the monistic Vedānta as explained by Śaṅkara. But there was another line of thought which was developing alongside of it, which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in Śvetāśvatara and particularly in Maitrāyaṇī from which it appears that the Sāṃkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and many of its technical terms were already in use². But the date of Maitrāyaṇī has not yet been definitely settled, and the details

¹ See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (*E. R. E.*).

² Kāṭha III. 10, v. 7. Śvetā. v. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, 1. 3. This has been dealt with in detail in my *Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought*, in the first chapter.

found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion of the Sāṃkhya thought as it developed in the Upaniṣads. It is not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upaniṣads with the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of relativism of the Jains.

Sāṃkhya and Yoga Literature.

The main exposition of the system of Sāṃkhya and Yoga in this section has been based on the *Sāṃkhya kārīkā*, the *Sāṃkhya sūtras*, and the *Yoga sūtras* of Patañjali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. The *Sāṃkhya kārīkā* (about 200 A.D.) was written by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The account of Sāṃkhya given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and this has been treated separately. Vācaspati Miśra (ninth century A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as *Tattvakaumudī*. But before him Gauḍapāda and Rājā wrote commentaries on the *Sāṃkhya kārīkā*¹. Narāyaṇatīrtha wrote his *Candrikā* on Gauḍapāda's commentary. The *Sāṃkhya sūtras* which have been commented on by Vijñāna Bhikṣu (called *Pravacanabhāṣya*) of the sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the *Sāṃkhya sūtras*. Vijñāna Bhikṣu wrote also another elementary work on Sāṃkhya known as *Sāṃkhyasāra*. Another short work of late origin is *Tattvasamāsa* (probably fourteenth century). Two other works on Sāṃkhya, viz. Sīmānanda's *Sāṃkhyatattvavivēcana* and Bhāvāgaṇeśa's *Sāṃkhyatattvayāthārthyadīpana* (both later than Vijñānabhikṣu) of real philosophical value have also been freely consulted. Patañjali's *Yoga sūtra* (not earlier than 147 B.C.) was commented on by Vyāsa (400 A.D.) and Vyāsa's bhāṣya commented on by Vācaspati Miśra is called *Tattvavaiśārādī*, by Vijñāna Bhikṣu *Yogavārttika*, by Bhoja in the tenth century *Bhojavṛtti*, and by Nāgeśa (seventeenth century) *Chāyāvṛtyākhyā*.

¹ I suppose that Rājā's commentary on the *Kārīkā* was the same as *Rājāvārttika* quoted by Vācaspati. Rājā's commentary on the *Kārīkā* has been referred to by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 109. This book is probably now lost.

Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may mention the two treatises *Mechanical, physical and chemical theories of the Ancient Hindus* and the *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* by Dr B. N. Seal and my two works on *Yoga Study of Patanjali* published by the Calcutta University, and *Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought* which is shortly to be published, and my *Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus*, awaiting publication with the Calcutta University.

Guṇaratna mentions two other authoritative Sāṃkhya works, viz. *Mātharabhāṣya* and *Ātreyantra*. Of these the second is probably the same as Caraka's treatment of Sāṃkhya, for we know that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it was called *Ātreyaśaṃhitā* or *Ātreyantra*. Nothing is known of the *Mātharabhāṣya*¹.

An Early School of Sāṃkhya.

It is important for the history of Sāṃkhya philosophy that Caraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sāṃkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. According to Caraka there are six elements (*dhātus*), viz. the five elements such as ākāśa, vāyu etc. and cetanā, called also puruṣa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold prakṛti (prakṛti, mahat, ahaṃkāra and the five elements)². The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate sensing (*ūha*) and conceiving (*vicāra*) before definite understanding (*buddhi*) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with a preponderance of ākāśa, the sense of touch with a preponderance

¹ Readers unacquainted with Sāṃkhya-Yoga may omit the following three sections at the time of first reading.

² Puruṣa is here excluded from the list. Cakrapāṇi, the commentator, says that the prakṛti and puruṣa both being unmanifested, the two together have been counted as one. *Prakṛtivyatiriktāñcodāśīnam puruṣamaṃyaktatvasādharmyāt avyaktāyām prakṛtāveva prakṣīpya avyaktaśabdenaiva gṛhṇāti*. Harinātha Viśārada's edition of Caraka, *Sārira*, p. 4.

of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmātras at all¹. The conglomeration of the sense-objects (*indriyārtha*) or gross matter, the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhūtas and prakṛti, mahat and ahaṃkāra taking place through rajas make up what we call man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases. All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance, life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also the puruṣa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death, bondage, or salvation. If the ātman were not regarded as cause, all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one others would be responsible. This puruṣa, called also *paramātmān*, is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puruṣa and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action, cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the avyakta part of prakṛti with puruṣa as forming one category. The vikāra or evolutionary products of prakṛti are called kṣetra, whereas the avyakta part of prakṛti is regarded as the kṣetrājña (*avyaktamasya kṣetrasya kṣetrājñamṛṣayo viduḥ*). This avyakta and cetanā are one and the same entity. From this unmanifest prakṛti or cetanā is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is derived the ego (*ahaṃkāra*) and from the ahaṃkāra the five elements and the senses are produced, and when this production is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return back to prakṛti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the time of a new creation from the puruṣa the unmanifest (*avyakta*), all the manifested forms—the evolutes of buddhi, ahaṃkāra, etc.—

¹ But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter, is referred to as forming part of *prakṛti* which is regarded as having eight elements in it (*prakṛtiṣṭāṣṭadhātuki*), viz. avyakta, mahat, ahaṃkāra, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming part of the prakṛti we hear of indriyārthā, the five sense objects which have evolved out of the prakṛti.

appear¹. This cycle of births or rebirths or of dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish, undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive, yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains are felt by the conglomeration (*rāśi*), and not by the ātman presiding over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and pain comes desire (*trṣṇā*) consisting of wish and antipathy, and from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Mokṣa means complete cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves, but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived². It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sāṃkhyas as their goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,

¹ This passage has been differently explained in a commentary previous to Cakrapāṇi as meaning that at the time of death these resolve back into the prakṛti—the puruṣa—and at the time of rebirth they become manifest again. See Cakrapāṇi on Śārīra, 1. 46.

² Though this state is called brahmabhūta, it is not in any sense like the Brahman of Vedānta which is of the nature of pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (*alaksanami*), resembling Nāgārjuna's Nirvāṇa. Thus Caraka writes:—*tasmimścarama-sannyāse samūlāhsaravedanāḥ asaṃjñājnānavijñānā nivṛttim yāntyāśetaḥ. atah-paraṃ brahmabhūto bhūtātmā nopalabhyate niḥśṛtaḥ sarvabhāvebhyah cihnam yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmadevāṇi brahma taccākṣaramalakṣaṇam. Caraka, Śārīra 1. 98-100.*

the state of mokṣa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours in the shape of association with good people, abandoning of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (*tattva*) thus discovered should be recalled again and again¹ and this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the self is *avyakta* (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation (*mokṣe nīvṛttirniḥśeṣā*).

The main features of the Sāṃkhya doctrine as given by Caraka are thus: 1. *Puruṣa* is the state of *avyakta*. 2. By a conglomeration of this *avyakta* with its later products a conglomeration is formed which generates the so-called living being. 3. The *tanmātras* are not mentioned. 4. *Rajas* and *tamas* represent the bad states of the mind and *sattva* the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* etc. 6. The senses are formed of matter (*bhautika*).

This account of Sāṃkhya agrees with the system of Sāṃkhya propounded by *Pañcaśikha* (who is said to be the direct pupil of Āsuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the *Mahābhārata* XII. 219. *Pañcaśikha* of course does not describe the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sāṃkhya he sketches is the same as that of Caraka². *Pañcaśikha* speaks of the ultimate truth as being *avyakta* (a term applied in all Sāṃkhya literature to *prakṛti*) in the state of *puruṣa* (*puruṣa-vasthamavyaktam*). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility. The same discussion occurs in *Pañcaśikha* also, and the proofs

¹ Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory: (1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect, (2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to remember.

² Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty in accepting *Pañcaśikha*'s doctrine as a genuine Sāṃkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the fact that the Sāṃkhya doctrines sketched in *Caraka* did not attract their notice.

for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again Pañcaśikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,—and the element of “cetas.” They are mutually independent, and by such independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mokṣa is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these phenomena. The guṇas described by Pañcaśikha are the different kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it. The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the kṣetra, as Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose themselves in the ocean and it is called aliṅga (without any characteristic)—a term reserved for prakṛti in later Sāṃkhya. This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction (*samyagbadha*).

Guṇaratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, mentions two schools of Sāṃkhya, the Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later)¹. Of these the doctrine of the Maulikya Sāṃkhya is said to be that which believed that there was a separate pradhāna for each ātman (*maulikyasāṃkhyā hyātmānamātmānam prati pṛthak pradhānam vadanti*). This seems to be a reference to the Sāṃkhya doctrine I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sāṃkhya.

In *Mahābhārata* XII. 318 three schools of Sāṃkhya are mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five (the well-known orthodox Sāṃkhya system) and those who admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a supreme being in addition to puruṣa and this was the twenty-sixth principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the form of Sāṃkhya advocated in the *Mahābhārata*. The schools of Sāṃkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of Sāṃkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the

¹ Guṇaratna's *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, p. 99.

other chapters of the *Mahābhārata* (XII. 203, 204). The self apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon day; it is said that as Rāhu (the shadow on the sun during an eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be seen apart from the body. The selfs (*śarīrinah*) are spoken of as manifesting from prakṛti.

We do not know anything about Āsuri the direct disciple of Kapila¹. But it seems probable that the system of Sāṃkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same form in the *Mahābhārata* and has been attributed there to Pañcaśikha is probably the earliest form of Sāṃkhya available to us in a systematic form. Not only does Guṇaratna's reference to the school of Maulikya Sāṃkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka (78 A.D.) does not refer to the Sāṃkhya as described by Īśvarakṛṣṇa and referred to in other parts of *Mahābhārata* is a definite proof that Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya is a later modification, which was either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as an authoritative old Sāṃkhya view.

Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavāsin altered the Sāṃkhya according to his own views². Takakusu thinks that Vindhyavāsin was a title of Īśvarakṛṣṇa³ and Garbe holds that the date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a very plausible view that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was indebted for his kārīkās to another work, which was probably written in a style different from what he employs. The seventh verse of his *Kārīkā* seems to be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the

¹ A verse attributed to Āsuri is quoted by Guṇaratna (*Tarkarāhasyaḍīpikā*, p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puruṣa) has experience. It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.

² Vassilief's *Buddhismus*, p. 240.

³ Takakusu's "A study of Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu," *J. R. A. S.*, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be extremely doubtful, for Guṇaratna mentions Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsin as two different authorities (*Tarkarāhasyaḍīpikā*, pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavāsin (p. 104) in anuṣṭubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Īśvarakṛṣṇa. It appears that Īśvarakṛṣṇa wrote two books; one is the *Sāṃkhya kārīkā* and another an independent work on Sāṃkhya, a line from which, quoted by Guṇaratna, stands as follows:

"*Pratiniṣyatādhyavasāyāḥ śrotṛādīsamuttha adhyakṣam*" (p. 108).

If Vācaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumāna in his *Tattvakaumudī* be considered to be a correct explanation of *Sāṃkhya kārīkā* then Īśvarakṛṣṇa must be a different person from Vindhyavāsin whose views on anumāna as referred to in *Ślokaṣārttika*, p. 393, are altogether different. But Vācaspati's own statement in the *Tātparyyaṭīkā* (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not faithful.

Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali the grammarian (147 B.C.)¹. The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned with the strictly technical part of Sāṃkhya, and it is just possible that the book from which Patañjali quoted the passage, and which was probably paraphrased in the Āryā metre by Īśvarakṛṣṇa was not a Sāṃkhya book at all. But though the subject of the verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sāṃkhya, yet since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard against certain objections against the Sāṃkhya doctrine of prakṛti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the verse of a Sāṃkhya book which was paraphrased by Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

The earliest descriptions of a Sāṃkhya which agrees with Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya (but with an addition of Īśvara) are to be found in Patañjali's *Yoga sūtras* and in the *Mahābhārata*; but we are pretty certain that the Sāṃkhya of *Caraka* we have sketched here was known to Patañjali, for in *Yoga sūtra* I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Sāṃkhya similar to this.

From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sāṃkhya of Caraka and Pañcaśikha is very important; for it shows a transitional stage of thought between the Upaniṣad ideas and the orthodox Sāṃkhya doctrine as represented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that the puruṣa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyāya, and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer than the orthodox Sāṃkhya.

We hear of a *Ṣaṣṭitantraśāstra* as being one of the oldest Sāṃkhya works. This is described in the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā* as containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters². A quotation from *Rājavārttika* (a work about which there is no definite information) in Vācaspati Miśra's commentary on the *Sāṃkhya kārika*(72) says that it was called the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* because it dealt with the existence of prakṛti, its oneness, its difference from puruṣas, its purposefulness for puruṣas, the multiplicity of puruṣas, connection and separation from puruṣas, the evolution of

¹ Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, IV. 1. 3. *Atisannikarṣādativiprakarṣāt mūrttyantara-vyavadhānāt tamasāvṛtatvāt indriyadaurvālyādatipramādāt*, etc. (Benares edition.)

² *Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā*, pp. 108, 110.

the categories, the inactivity of the puruṣas and the five *viparyyayas*, nine *tuṣṭis*, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the eight *siddhis*¹.

But the content of the *Śaṣṭitantra* as given in *Ahīrbudhnyā Saṃhitā* is different from it, and it appears from it that the Sāṃkhya of the *Śaṣṭitantra* referred to in the *Ahīrbudhnyā Saṃhitā* was of a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pāñcarātra Vaiṣṇavas and the *Ahīrbudhnyā Saṃhitā* says that Kapila's theory of Sāṃkhya was a Vaiṣṇava one. Vijnāna Bhikṣu, the greatest expounder of Sāṃkhya, says in many places of his work *Vijñānāmṛta Bhāṣya* that Sāṃkhya was originally theistic, and that the atheistic Sāṃkhya is only a *prauḍhivāda* (an exaggerated attempt to show that no supposition of Īśvara is necessary to explain the world process) though the *Mahābhārata* points out that the difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga is this, that the former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy between the two accounts of *Śaṣṭitantra* suggests that the original *Śaṣṭitantra* as referred to in the *Ahīrbudhnyā Saṃhitā* was subsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is corroborated by the fact that Guṇaratna does not mention among the important Sāṃkhya works *Śaṣṭitantra* but *Śaṣṭitantroddhāra*

¹ The doctrine of the *viparyyaya*, *tuṣṭi*, defects of organs, and the *siddhi* are mentioned in the *Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, but I have omitted them in my account of Sāṃkhya as these have little philosophical importance. The *viparyyaya* (false knowledge) are five, viz. *avidyā* (ignorance), *asmitā* (egoism), *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (anti-pathy), *abhiniveśa* (self-love), which are also called *tamo*, *moha*, *mahāmoha*, *tamīrā*, and *andhatāmīra*. These are of nine kinds of *tuṣṭi*, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since *prakṛti* will herself bring our salvation (*ambhas*), that it is not necessary to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's life (*salīla*), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time (*megha*), that salvation will be worked out by fate (*bhāgya*), and the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (*para*), the troubles of protecting the earned money (*supara*), the natural waste of things earned by enjoyment (*parāpara*), increase of desires leading to greater disappointments (*anuttamāmbhas*), all gain leads to the injury of others (*uttamāmbhas*). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations with those who consider *prakṛti* and its evolutes as the self. The *siddhis* or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of scriptures (*tāra*), (2) enquiry into their meaning (*sutāra*), (3) proper reasoning (*tāratāra*), (4) corroborating one's own ideas with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field (*ramyaka*), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice (*sadāmudita*). The three other *siddhis* called *pramoda*, *mudita*, and *modamāna* lead directly to the separation of the *prakṛti* from the puruṣa. The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the absence of *siddhis* and the presence of *tuṣṭis*. The *viparyyayas*, *tuṣṭis* and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the achievement of the Sāṃkhya goal.

(revised edition of *Ṣaṣṭitantra*)¹. Probably the earlier *Ṣaṣṭitantra* was lost even before Vācaspati's time.

✱ If we believe the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* referred to in the *Ahīrbudhnya Samhitā* to be in all essential parts the same work which was composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it has to be assumed that Kapila's Sāṃkhya was theistic². It seems probable that his disciple Āsuri tried to popularise it. But it seems that a great change occurred when Pañcaśikha the disciple of Āsuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It is said in *Sāṃkhya kārīkā* (70) that the literature was divided by him into many parts (*tena bahudhākṛtam tantram*). The exact meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that the original *Ṣaṣṭitantra* was rewritten by him in various treatises. It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vaiṣṇavas accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential parts as the Sāṃkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption that Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there are a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the Pātañjala Sāṃkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may be ventured is that Pañcaśikha probably modified Kapila's work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If this supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of Sāṃkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but which is kept in a modified form by the Pātañjala school of Sāṃkhya, second an atheistic one as represented by Pañcaśikha, and a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sāṃkhya system. An important change in the Sāṃkhya doctrine seems to have been introduced by Vijñāna Bhikṣu (sixteenth century A.D.) by his treatment of guṇas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this interpretation of Sāṃkhya as the most rational and philosophical one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system of the accepted Kapila and the Pātañjala school of Sāṃkhya. But it must be pointed out that originally the notion of guṇas was applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the

¹ *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, p. 109.

² *evam śaḍvimsakam prāhuḥ śarīramiḥ mānavāḥ sāmṅkhyam sāmṅkhyātmakatvācca kapilādibhirucyate. Matsyapurāṇa*, iv. 28.

totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanation of the guṇas was attempted in two different lines by Vijñāna Bhikṣu and the Vaiṣṇava writer Veṅkaṭa¹. As the Yoga philosophy compiled by Patañjali and commented on by Vyāsa, Vācaspati and Vijñāna Bhikṣu, agree with the Sāṃkhya doctrine as explained by Vācaspati and Vijñāna Bhikṣu in most points I have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Pātañjala schools of Sāṃkhya and have treated them together—a principle which was followed by Haribhadra in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*.

The other important Sāṃkhya teachers mentioned by Gauḍapāda are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana and Voḍhu. Nothing is known about their historicity or doctrines.

Sāṃkhya kārīkā, Sāṃkhya sūtra, Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñāna Bhikṣu.

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system. The *Sāṃkhya kārīkā* is the oldest Sāṃkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. The *Sāṃkhya sūtra* was not referred to by any writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth century A.D.). Even Guṇaratna of the fourteenth century A.D. who made allusions to a number of Sāṃkhya works, did not make any reference to the *Sāṃkhya sūtra*, and no other writer who is known to have flourished before Guṇaratna seems to have made any reference to the *Sāṃkhya sūtra*. The natural conclusion therefore is that these sūtras were probably written some time after the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is said at the end of the *Sāṃkhya kārīkā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa that the kārīkās give an exposition of the Sāṃkhya doctrine excluding the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the parables attached to the original Sāṃkhya works—the *Ṣaṣṭitantraśāstra*. The *Sāṃkhya sūtras* contain refutations of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable that these were collected from some earlier Sāṃkhya work which is now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition of the *Ṣaṣṭitantraśāstra* (*Ṣaṣṭitantrōddhāra* as mentioned by

¹ Veṅkaṭa's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume of the present work.

Guṇaratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to suppose that the Sāṃkhya doctrine found in the sūtras differs in any important way from the Sāṃkhya doctrine as found in the *Sāṃkhya kārīkā*. The only point of importance is this, that the *Sāṃkhya sūtras* hold that when the Upaniṣads spoke of one absolute pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved in the class of intelligent puruṣas as distinct from the class of the guṇas. As all puruṣas were of the nature of pure intelligence, they were spoken of in the Upaniṣads as one, for they all form the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in the *Sāṃkhya kārīkā*. This is, however, a case of omission and not of difference. Vijñāna Bhikṣu, the commentator of the *Sāṃkhya sūtra*, was more inclined to theistic Sāṃkhya or Yoga than to atheistic Sāṃkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in his *Sāṃkhyaprabhāṣya*, *Yogavārttika*, and *Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya* (an independent commentary on the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa on theistic Sāṃkhya lines). Vijñāna Bhikṣu's own view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he agreed more with the views of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the Purāṇas, where both the diverse puruṣas and the prakṛti are said to be merged in the end in Īśvara, by whose will the creative process again began in the prakṛti at the end of each pralaya. He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the *Sāṃkhya sūtras*, but he remarked that these were used only with a view to showing that the Sāṃkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even without the intervention of an Īśvara it could explain all facts. Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his interpretation of Sāṃkhya differed on many points from those of Vācaspati, and it is difficult to say who is right. Vijñāna Bhikṣu has this advantage that he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points on which Vācaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the nature of the conception of the guṇas, which I believe is the most important thing in Sāṃkhya. Vijñāna Bhikṣu described the guṇas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vācaspati and Gauḍapāda (the other commentator of the *Sāṃkhya kārīkā*) remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of Vijñāna Bhikṣu, but yet while they were silent as to any definite explanations regarding the nature of the guṇas, Bhikṣu definitely

came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation of their nature.

Since no definite explanation of the *guṇas* is found in any other work before Bhikṣu, it is quite probable that this matter may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka nor the *Mahābhārata* explains the nature of the *guṇas*. But Bhikṣu's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known of the manifestations and the workings of the *guṇas* in all early documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhikṣu in giving my account of the nature of the *guṇas*. The *Kārikā* speaks of the *guṇas* as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*). It also describes *sattva* as being light and illuminating, *rajas* as of the nature of energy and causing motion, and *tamas* as heavy and obstructing. Vācaspati merely paraphrases this statement of the *Kārikā* but does not enter into any further explanations. Bhikṣu's interpretation fits in well with all that is known of the *guṇas*, though it is quite possible that this view might not have been known before, and when the original Sāṃkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness as to the conception of the *guṇas*.

There are some other points in which Bhikṣu's interpretation differs from that of Vācaspati. The most important of these may be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of the buddhi states with the *puruṣa*. Vācaspati holds that there is no contact (*saṃyoga*) of any buddhi state with the *puruṣa* but that a reflection of the *puruṣa* is caught in the state of buddhi by virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection that it does not explain how the *puruṣa* can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience (*bhoga*) on the basis of that image alone without any actual connection of the *puruṣa* with the buddhi. The answer of Vācaspati Miśra is that there is no contact of the two in space and time, but that their proximity (*sannidhi*) means only a specific kind of fitness (*yogyatā*) by virtue of which the *puruṣa*, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed to a person. Vijñāna Bhikṣu differs from Vācaspati and says that if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no

reason why puruṣa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all, for the fitness being in the puruṣa, he could not be divested of it, and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in the buddhi for ever. Vijñāna Bhikṣu thus holds that there is a real contact of the puruṣa with the buddhi state in any cognitive state. Such a contact of the puruṣa and the buddhi does not necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers changes, and when these changes are reflected in the puruṣa, there is the notion of a person or experiencer in the puruṣa, and when the puruṣa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between Vācaspati and Bhikṣu as regards the nature of the perceptual process. Bhikṣu thinks that the senses can directly perceive the determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas, whereas Vācaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified by the activity of manas called saṃkalpa which coordinates the indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics. Bhikṣu who supposes that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate position to manas as being only the faculty of desire, doubt, and imagination.

It may not be out of place to mention here that there are one or two passages in Vācaspati's commentary on the *Sāṃkhya kārīkā* which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (*ahaṃkāra*) as producing the subjective series of the senses and the objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will, but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view with regard to the evolution of the tanmātras from the mahat; for contrary to the view of *Vyāsabhāṣya* and Vijñāna Bhikṣu etc. Vācaspati holds that from the mahat there was ahaṃkāra and

from ahaṃkāra the tanmātras¹. Vijñāna Bhikṣu however holds that both the separation of ahaṃkāra and the evolution of the tanmātras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between Vācaspati and Bhikṣu which are not of much philosophical importance.

Yoga and Patañjali.

The word yoga occurs in the Rg-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was used in this sense in Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad². The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature³.

With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacharya (the holy vow of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues and considered as being productive of the highest power⁴.

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control of the senses⁵.

In Pāṇini's time the word yoga had attained its technical meaning, and he distinguished this root "*yuj samādhan*" (*yuj* in the sense of concentration) from "*yujir yoge*" (root *yujir* in the sense of connecting). *Yuj* in the first sense is seldom used as a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological derivation of the word yoga⁶.

¹ See my *Study of Patanjali*, p. 60 ff.

² Compare R.V. 1. 34. 9/vii. 67. 8/iii. 27. 11/x. 30. 11/x. 114. 9/iv. 24. 4/i. 5. 3/i. 30. 7; Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 14. 7. 1. 11.

³ It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German Joch, A.S. geoc, Latin jugum.

⁴ See Chāndogya III. 17. 4; Bṛh. I. 2. 6; Bṛh. III. 8. 10; Taitt. I. 9. 1/III. 2. 1/III. 3. 1; Taitt. Brāh. II. 2. 3. 3; R.V. x. 129; Śatap. Brāh. XI. 5. 8. 1.

⁵ Kaṭha III. 4, *indriyāṇi hayānāhuḥ viśayāteṣugocarān*. The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects. Maitr. 2. 6. *Kārmendriyāṇyasya hayāḥ* the conative senses are its horses.

⁶ *Yugya* is used from the root of *yujir yoge* and not from *yuja samādhan*. A consideration of Pāṇini's rule "*Tudasya brahmacharyam*," v. i. 94 shows that not only

In the *Bhagavadgītā*, we find that the word yoga has been used not only in conformity with the root “*yuj-samādhau*” but also with “*yujir yoge*.” This has been the source of some confusion to the readers of the *Bhagavadgītā*. “Yogin” in the sense of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of this word lies in this that the *Bhagavadgītā* tried to mark out a middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently from *yujir yoge*) on the other, who should combine in himself the best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.

Kauṭilya in his *Arthaśāstra* when enumerating the philosophic sciences of study names Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata. The oldest Buddhist sūtras (e.g. the *Satipatṭhāna sutta*) are fully familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.

As regards the connection of Yoga with Sāṃkhya, as we find it in the *Yoga sūtras* of Patañjali, it is indeed difficult to come to any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted notice in many of the earlier Upaniṣads, though there had not probably developed any systematic form of prāṇāyāma (a system of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we come to Maitrāyaṇī that we find that the Yoga method had attained a systematic development. The other two Upaniṣads in which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the Śvetāśvatara and the Kaṭha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three Upaniṣads of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to the Sāṃkhya tenets, though the Sāṃkhya and Yoga ideas do not appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the Maitrāyaṇī in the conversation between Śākyāyana and Bṛhad ratha where we find that the Sāṃkhya metaphysics was offered

different kinds of asceticism and rigour which passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time (Pāṇini as Goldstücker has proved is pre-buddhist), but associated with these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by the name of Yoga.

in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes, and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the Sāṃkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently systematized by Patañjali. Thus Śākyāyana says: "Here some say it is the guṇa which through the differences of nature goes into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave, but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man stand free from will, imagination and belief—this is the sign of liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state¹.'"

An examination of such Yoga Upaniṣads as Śāṇḍilya, Yogatattva, Dhyānabindu, Haṃsa, Amṛtanāda, Varāha, Maṇḍala Brāhmaṇa, Nāḍabindu, and Yogakuṇḍali, shows that the Yoga practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but none of these show any predilection for the Sāṃkhya. Thus the Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the

¹ Vātsyāyana, however, in his bhāṣya on *Nyāya sūtra*, 1. i. 29, distinguishes Sāṃkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sāṃkhya holds that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any change in the pure intelligence (*nīratīśayāḥ cetanāḥ*). All changes are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects. Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puruṣa. Doṣas (passions) and the pravṛtti (action) are the cause of karma. The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non-being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of *Vyāsabhāṣya*. It is closer to Nyāya in its doctrines. If Vātsyāyana's statement is correct, it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in creation was borrowed by Sāṃkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the same sūtra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sāṃkhya and Yoga on the doctrine of the *indriyas* being "*abhautika*." Curiously enough Vātsyāyana quotes a passage from *Vyāsabhāṣya*, III. 13, in his bhāṣya, 1. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (*viruddha*).

Śaivas and Śāktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantra-yoga; they grew in another direction as the Haṭhayoga which was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The Yogatattva Upaniṣad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Haṭhayoga and Rājayoga¹. In some cases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedāntism with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also very great, but we have to leave out these from our present consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as they are not connected with our present endeavour.

Of the Pātañjala school of Sāṃkhya, which forms the subject of the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patañjali was probably the most notable person for he not only collected the different forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all on the Sāṃkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which they have been handed down to us. Vācaspati and Vijñāna Bhikṣu, the two great commentators on the *Vyāsabhāṣya*, agree with us in holding that Patañjali was not the founder of the Yoga, but an editor. Analytic study of the sūtras also brings the conviction that the sūtras do not show any original attempt, but a masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented by fitting contributions. The systematic manner also in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition and classification shows that the materials were already in existence and that Patañjali only systematized them. There was no missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of other systems, except as far as they might come in, by way of explaining the system. Patañjali is not even anxious to establish the system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts as he had them. Most of the criticisms against the Buddhists occur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are described in the first three chapters, and this part is separated from the last chapter where the views of the Buddhists are

¹ The Yoga writer Jaigīṣavya wrote "*Dhāranāsāstra*" which dealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra than that given by Patañjali. He mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory where concentration is to be made. See Vācaspati's *Tātparyatikā* or Vātsyāyana's bhāṣya on *Nyāya sūtra*, III. ii. 43.

criticized; the putting of an “*iti*” (the word to denote the conclusion of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course another “*iti*” at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a hand other than that of Patañjali who was anxious to supply some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a marked change (due either to its supplementary character or to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last chapter as compared with the style of the other three.

The sūtras, 30–34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what has already been said in the second chapter and some of the topics introduced are such that they could well have been dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sūtras, whereas the average number of sūtras in other chapters is between 51 to 55.

We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date of this famous Yoga author Patañjali. Weber had tried to connect him with Kāpya Paṭamchala of Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa¹; in Kātyāyana’s *Vārttika* we get the name Patañjali which is explained by later commentators as *patantaḥ aṅjalayah yasmāi* (for whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of names. There is however another theory which identifies the writer of the great commentary on Pāṇini called the *Mahā-bhāṣya* with the Patañjali of the *Yoga sūtra*. This theory has been accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of some Indian commentators who identified the two Patañjalis. Of these one is the writer of the *Patañjalīcarita* (Rāmabhadra Dikṣita) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth century. The other is that cited in Śivarāma’s commentary on *Vāsavadattā* which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century. The other two are king Bhoja of Dhār and Cakrapāṇidatta,

¹ Weber’s *History of Indian Literature*, p. 223 n.

the commentator of *Caraka*, who belonged to the eleventh century A.D. Thus Cakrapāṇi says that he adores the Ahipati (mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech and body by his *Pātañjala mahābhāṣya* and the revision of *Caraka*. Bhoja says: "Victory be to the luminous words of that illustrious sovereign Raṇaraṅgamalla who by composing his grammar, by writing his commentary on the Pātañjala and by producing a treatise on medicine called *Rājamṛgāṅka* has like the lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech, mind and body." The adoration hymn of Vyāsa (which is considered to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion between the three Patañjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor, and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as *Pātañjalatantra*, and who has been quoted by Śivadāsa in his commentary on *Cakradatta* in connection with the heating of metals.

Professor J. H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great commentators of the grammar school such as Bhartṛhari, Kaiyaṭa, Vāmana, Jayāditya, Nāgeśa, etc. are silent on this point. This is indeed a point against the identification of the two Patañjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later age. And if other proofs are available which go against such an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the Yoga writer to be the same person.

Let us now see if Patañjali's grammatical work contains anything which may lead us to think that he was not the same person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the philosophic concept of substance (*dravya*) of the two Patañjalis differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that *dravya* is described in *Vyāsaśāstra* in one place as being the unity of species and qualities (*sāmānyaviśeṣātma*), whereas the *Mahābhāṣya* holds that a *dravya* denotes a genus and also specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally antagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by

Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana (Vyāḍi holding that words denoted qualities or dravya and Vājapyāyana holding that words denoted species¹). Even Pāṇini had these two different ideas in “*jātyākhyā-yāmekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyām*,” and “*sarūpānamekaśeṣamekavibhaktau*,” and Patañjali the writer of the *Mahābhāṣya* only combined these two views. This does not show that he opposes the view of *Vyāsabhāṣya*, though we must remember that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard to the writer of the sūtras. Moreover, when we read that dravya is spoken of in the *Mahābhāṣya* as that object which is the specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.—“*yat sāsñālāṅgulakakudakhuraviśāṇyartharūpam*,” we are reminded of its similarity with “*ayutasiddhāvayavabhedānugataḥ samūhaḥ dravyam*” (a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the *Vyāsabhāṣya*. So far as I have examined the *Mahābhāṣya* I have not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us in holding that the two Patañjalis cannot be identified. There are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable for us to judge anything about the personal views of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the writer of the *Mahābhāṣya* knew most of the important points of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer to the guṇa theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Sāṃkhya dictum of ex nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the idea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of change *vikāra* as production of new qualities *guṇāntarādhāna* (5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133). We may add to it that the *Mahābhāṣya* agrees with the Yoga view as regards the Sphoṭavāda, which is not held in common by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin their works in a similar manner (*atha yogānuśāsanam* and *atha śābdānuśāsanam*)—“now begins the compilation of the instructions on Yoga” (*Yoga sūtra*)—and “now begins the compilation of the instructions of words” (*Mahābhāṣya*).

It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments

¹ Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, 1. 2. 64.

which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the *Yoga sūtra* between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive, as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patañjalis cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the *Yoga* should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed Buddhist¹ reference is found in the fourth chapter which, as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they were written by Patañjali it cannot be inferred that because Vācaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijñāna-vādi type, we are to infer that the sūtras refer to Vasubandhu or even to Nāgārjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sūtras had been developing long before the time of Nāgārjuna.

Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two Patañjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative critical study of the *Yoga sūtras* and the text of the *Mahābhāṣya*, which can lead us to say that the writer of the *Yoga sūtras* flourished at a later date than the other Patañjali.

Postponing our views about the time of Patañjali the *Yoga* editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing the other work *Kitāb Pātanjali*, of which Alberuni speaks, for our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous one and he translates it along with another book called *Sāṅka* (Sāṃkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that this book was not the present *Yoga sūtra* of Patañjali, though it had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation and for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation. The book was called by Alberuni *Kitāb Pātanjali*, which is to be translated as the book of Pātañjala, because in another place, speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when translated stands as "the author of the book of Pātanjali." It had also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes many extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. It treats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in the *Yoga sūtra*, but the manner in which these are described (so

¹ It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist reference *naiika-cittatantram vastu tadapramāṇakam tadā kim syāt* (iv. 16) was probably a line of the *Vyāsabhāṣya*, as Bhoja, who had consulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count it as a sūtra.

far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change from what we find in the *Yoga sūtra*. Following the idea of God in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identical with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption with him and beatitude is obtained¹.

The idea of soul is the same as we find in the *Yoga sūtra*. The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditation corresponding to the four stages we have as in the *Yoga sūtra*. He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation, of which the first is the *abhyāsa* (habit) of Patañjali, and the object of this *abhyāsa* is unity with God². The second stands for *vairāgya*; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. *Yoga sūtra*, I. 23 and I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of *rasāyana* or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the same as in the *Yoga sūtra*, II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an *ūrddhvamūla avākśākhā aśvattha* (a tree with roots upwards and branches below), after the Upaniṣad fashion, the upper root is pure Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of interpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the

¹ Cf. *Yoga sūtra* I. 23–29 and II. 1, 45. The *Yoga sūtras* speak of Īśvara (God) as an eternally emancipated puruṣa, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of concentration. The commentator Vyāsa notes that he is the best object, for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration He so wills that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No argument is given in the *Yoga sūtras* of the existence of God.

² Cf. *Yoga* II. 1.

object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the roots.

The difference of this system from that of the *Yoga sūtra* is : (1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption in him is the goal ; (2) the importance of the yama¹ and the niyama has been reduced to the minimum ; (3) the value of the Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any connection with God as we find in the *Yoga sūtra* has been lost sight of ; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in God ; (5) the introduction of Brahman ; (6) the very significance of Yoga as control of mental states (*cittavṛttinirodha*) is lost sight of, and (7) rasāyana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the means of salvation.

From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patañjali's *Yoga sūtra* in the direction of Vedānta and Tantra, and as such it probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga doctrine of the sūtras entered into a new channel in such a way that it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments of Vedānta, Tantra and Śaiva doctrines². As the author mentions rasāyana as a means of salvation, it is very probable that he flourished after Nāgārjuna and was probably the same person who wrote *Pātañjala tantra*, who has been quoted by Śivadāsa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of by Nāgeśa as "*Carake Patañjaliḥ*." We can also assume with some degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that Cakrapāṇi and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with the writer of the *Mahābhāṣya*. It is also very probable that Cakrapāṇi by his line "*pātañjalamahābhāṣyacarakapratisaṃskṛtaiḥ*" refers to this work which was called "*Pātañjala*." The commentator of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvīpas and the sāgaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the *Vyāsabhāṣya*, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably written at a time when the *Vyāsabhāṣya* was not written or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni

¹ Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sāṃkhya, gives a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.

² Cf. the account of *Pāṣupatadarśana* in *Sarvadārśanasamgraha*.

also described the book as being very famous at the time, and Bhoja and Cakrapāṇi also probably confused him with Patañjali the grammarian ; from this we can fairly assume that this book of Patañjali was probably written by some other Patañjali within the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not be improbable that when *Vyāsabhāṣya* quotes in III. 44 as “*iti Patañjaliḥ*,” he refers to this Patañjali.

The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad consisted of six aṅgas or accessories, namely prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhyāna, dhāraṇā, tarka and samādhi¹. Comparing this list with that of the list in the *Yoga sūtras* we find that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been replaced by āsana. Now from the account of the sixty-two heresies given in the *Brahmajāla sūtra* we know that there were people who either from meditation of three degrees or through logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samādhi or Dhyāna school as belonging to one class of thinkers called śāśvatavāda, and from the inclusion of tarka as an aṅga in samādhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the aṅgas given in Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine, when the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being grafted on each other, and when the Sāṃkhya method of discussion did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The substitution of āsana for tarka in the list of Patañjali shows that the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Sāṃkhya. The introduction of ahiṃsā (non-injury), satya (truthfulness), asteya (want of stealing), brahmacarya (sex-control), aparigraha (want of greed) as yama and śauca (purity), santoṣa (contentment) as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is deemed impossible (for the first time in the sūtras), probably marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrī, karuṇā, muditā, upekṣā is also equally significant, as we do not find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation. Beginning from the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*,

¹ *prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāraḥ dhyānam dhāraṇā tarkaḥ samādhiḥ ṣaḍaṅga ityucyate yogah* (Maitr. 6. 8).

the *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra*, etc., and passing through Umāsvāti's *Tat-tvārthādhigamasūtra* to Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra* we find that the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the opinion expressed in Alberuni's *Pātanjal* that these cannot give salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the path to the removal of suffering¹. Again, the metaphysics of the saṃsāra (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination, decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism. Avidyā is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidyā should not be confused with the Vedānta avidyā of Śaṅkara, as it is an avidyā of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidyā is the ignorance of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sūtra "*anityāśuciduḥkḥānātmasu nityaśuciduḥkḥātmakhyātiravidyā*" (II. 5).

The ground of our existing is our will to live (*abhiniveśa*). "This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts off being for us at least²." This is true as much of Buddhism as of the Yoga *abhiniveśa*, which is a term coined and used in the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things in this section is to show that the *Yoga sūtras* proper (first three chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such

¹ *Yoga sūtra*, II. 15, 16, 17. *Yathācikitsāsāstraṃ caturvyūhaṃ rogo rogahetuḥ ārogyaṃ bhaiṣajyamiti evamidamāpi sāstraṃ caturvyūhameva; tadyathā saṃsārah, saṃsārahetuḥ mokṣaḥ mokṣopāyah; duḥkhabahulaḥ saṃsāro heyah, pradhānapuruṣayoḥ saṃyogo heyahetuḥ, saṃyogasyātyantikī nirvṛttirhānam, hanopāyah samyagdarśanam, Vyāsabhāṣya*, II. 15

² Oldenberg's *Buddhism*¹.

a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another. As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed to think that the date of the first three chapters of the *Yoga sūtras* must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the grammarian Patañjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may take them as being identical¹.

The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Puruṣa.

The Sāṃkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles, souls and *prakṛti*, the root principle of matter. Souls are many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are many, and had it not been so (the Sāṃkhya argues) with the birth of one all would have been born and with the death of one all would have died².

The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension, and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly grasp in order to understand the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Unlike the Jaina soul possessing *anantajñāna*, *anantadarśana*, *ananta-sukha*, and *anantavīrya*, the Sāṃkhya soul is described as being devoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolute pure consciousness (*cit*). The Sāṃkhya view differs from the Vedānta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (*ānanda*)³. Bliss with Sāṃkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it belongs to *prakṛti* and does not constitute the nature of soul; secondly, according to Vedānta the individual souls (*jīva*) are

¹ See S. N. Das Gupta, *Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought*, ch. II. The most important point in favour of this identification seems to be that both the Patañjalis as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of *sphoṭa* which was denied even by Sāṃkhya. On the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* see my *Study of Patañjali*, Appendix I.

² *Kārikā*, 18.

³ See Citsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā*, IV.

but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the Brahman, but according to Sāṃkhya they are all real and many.

The most interesting feature of Sāṃkhya as of Vedānta is the analysis of knowledge. Sāṃkhya holds that our knowledge of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind, the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go, they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things, and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material, but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest. These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious, if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connection with which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted as the experience of a person¹. We know that the Upaniṣads consider the soul or ātman as pure and infinite consciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas, and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not detect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle which has no change, no form, but which is like a light which illumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes. The self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our "self" but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other things, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. The Jains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, and every act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the veil. Sāṃkhya says that the self cannot be found as an image of knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendent principle, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle matter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere forms or images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance, and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed in darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves, the pictures appear one by one before the light and are illuminated. So it is with our knowledge. The special characteristic of self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would be blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and

¹ *Tattakauṃudī*, 5; *Yogavārttika*, IV. 22; *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya*, p. 74; *Yogavārttika* and *Tattvavaiśārādī*, I. 4, II. 6, 18, 20; *Vyāsaśāṅkhya*, I. 6, 7.

so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the same as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens these knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious. This principle of consciousness (*cit*) cannot indeed be separately perceived *per se*, but the presence of this principle in all our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference. This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality, no impurity¹. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes place in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it, and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes of knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each item of knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is but a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by the principle of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledge carries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness, it is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness. Knowledge-revelation is not the unveiling or revelation of a particular part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelation of the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening, pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image is concerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blind knowledge-stuff.

The Buddhists had analysed knowledge into its diverse constituent parts, and had held that the coming together of these brought about the conscious states. This coming together was to them the point of the illusory notion of self, since this unity or coming together was not a permanent thing but a momentary collocation. With Sāṃkhya however the self, the pure *cit*, is neither illusory nor an abstraction; it is concrete but transcendent. Coming into touch with it gives unity to all the movements of the knowledge-composites of subtle stuff, which would otherwise have remained aimless and unintelligent. It is by coming into connection with this principle of intelligence that they are interpreted as the systematic and coherent experience of a person, and may thus be said to be intelligized. Intelligizing means the expression and interpretation of the events or the happenings of

¹ It is important to note that Sāṃkhya has two terms to denote the two aspects involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of awareness as such (*cit*), and the content (*buddhi*) which is the form of the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognition takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter.

knowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them a system of experience. This principle of intelligence is called *puruṣa*. There is a separate *puruṣa* in Sāṃkhya for each individual, and it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Vedānta *ātman* however is different from the Sāṃkhya *puruṣa* in this that it is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory *māyā* it appears as many.

Thought and Matter.

A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter are, why then should the *puruṣa* illuminate it and not external material objects. The answer that Sāṃkhya gives is that the knowledge-complexes are certainly different from external objects in this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderance of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (*sattva*), which resembles the light of *puruṣa*, and is thus fit for reflecting and absorbing the light of the *puruṣa*. The two principal characteristics of external gross matter are mass and energy. But it has also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photographed by our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has again the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able to catch the reflection of the *cit*—the super-translucent transcendent principle of intelligence. The fundamental characteristic of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is at its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity of translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the gross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of thought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour, and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its object. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter did not possess some of the essential substances of which the copy was made up. But this plastic entity (*sattva*) which is so predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination in matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some such notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in

thought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, have movement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The images do not extend in space, but they can represent space. The translucent and plastic element of thought (*sattva*) in association with movement (*rajas*) would have resulted in a simultaneous revelation of all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction (*tamas*) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and discloses things in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff) holds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter darkness, and actual knowledge comes before our view as though by the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of the light of the puruṣa. This characteristic of knowledge, that all its stores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one picture or idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstrates that in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifests itself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus both thought and gross matter are made up of three elements, a plasticity of intelligence-stuff (*sattva*), energy-stuff (*rajas*), and mass-stuff (*tamas*), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the last two are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought.

Feelings, the Ultimate Substances¹.

Another question that arises in this connection is the position of feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. Sāṃkhya holds that the three characteristic constituents that we have analyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the most interesting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings that we think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves. If we should analyze any percept into the crude and undeveloped sensations of which it is composed at the first moment of its appearance, it comes more as a shock than as an image, and we find that it is felt more as a feeling mass than as an image. Even in our ordinary life the elements which precede an act of knowledge are probably mere feelings. As we go lower down the scale of evolution the automatic actions and relations of matter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feeling which never rise to the level of knowledge. The lower the scale of evolution the less is the keenness of feeling, till at last there comes a stage where matter-complexes do not give rise to feeling

¹ *Kārikā*, 12, with Gauḍpāda and Nārāyaṇatīrtha.

reactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus mark the earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in ordinary life. What we call matter complexes become at a certain stage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes at a certain stage of descent sink into mere matter-complexes with matter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves, the ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross matter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt in taking feelings to be the ultimate substances of which gross matter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomed to take feelings as being merely subjective, but if we remember the Sāṃkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought and matter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substances which are in essence but three types of feeling entities. The three principal characteristics of thought and matter that we have noticed in the preceding section are but the manifestations of three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelings that we call the sorrowful, there is another class of feelings that we call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neither sorrowful nor pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression (*viśāda*) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types of manifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially as shining (*prakāśa*), energy (*pravṛtti*), obstruction (*niyama*), there are three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded as the ultimate things which make up all the diverse kinds of gross matter and thought by their varying modifications.

The Guṇas¹.

These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically called *guṇa* in Sāṃkhya philosophy. Guṇa in Sanskrit has three meanings, namely (1) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. These entities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But it may be mentioned in this connection that in Sāṃkhya philosophy there is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that each and every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. What we call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearance of a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality

¹ *Yogavārttika*, II. 18; Bhāvāgaṇeśa's *Tattvayāthārthyadīpana*, pp. 1-3; *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya*, p. 100; *Tattvakaumudī*, 13; also Gauḍapāda and Nārāyaṇatīrtha, 13.

signifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts ; any object we see seems to possess many qualities, but the Sāṃkhya holds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality, however fine and subtle it may be, there is a corresponding subtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as a quality. This is true not only of qualities of external objects but also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entities were thus called *guṇas* probably to suggest that they are the entities which by their various modifications manifest themselves as *guṇas* or qualities. These subtle entities may also be called *guṇas* in the sense of ropes because they are like ropes by which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought and matter. These may also be called *guṇas* as things of secondary importance, because though permanent and indestructible, they continually suffer modifications and changes by their mutual groupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalterably constant like the souls (*puruṣa*). Moreover the object of the world process being the enjoyment and salvation of the *puruṣas*, the matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being of primary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclined to justify the name *guṇa* as applied to these subtle entities, it should be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or subtle substances and not abstract qualities. These *guṇas* are infinite in number, but in accordance with their three main characteristics as described above they have been arranged in three classes or types called *sattva* (intelligence-stuff), *rajas* (energy-stuff) and *tamas* (mass-stuff). An infinite number of subtle substances which agree in certain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called the *sattva-guṇas* and those which behave as units of activity are called the *rajo-guṇas* and those which behave as factors of obstruction, mass or materiality are called *tamo-guṇas*. These subtle *guṇa* substances are united in different proportions (e.g. a larger number of *sattva* substances with a lesser number of *rajas* or *tamas*, or a larger number of *tamas* substances with a smaller number of *rajas* and *sattva* substances and so on in varying proportions), and as a result of this, different substances with different qualities come into being. Though attached to one another when united in different proportions, they mutually act and react upon one another, and thus by their combined resultant produce new characters, qualities and substances. There is how-

ever one and only one stage in which the guṇas are not compounded in varying proportions. In this state each of the guṇa substances is opposed by each of the other guṇa substances, and thus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, in which none of the characters of the guṇas manifest themselves. This is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristics that it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It is a qualityless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which is as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium of the guṇas is called prakṛti¹. This is a state which cannot be said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose, but it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the earliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modifications take place.

Prakṛti and its Evolution.

Sāṃkhya believes that before this world came into being there was such a state of dissolution—a state in which the guṇa compounds had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakṛti. Then later on disturbance arose in the prakṛti, and as a result of that a process of unequal aggregation of the guṇas in varying proportions took place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold. Prakṛti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of the guṇas, thus gradually evolved and became more and more determinate, differentiated, heterogeneous, and coherent. The guṇas are always uniting, separating, and uniting again². Varying qualities of essence, energy, and mass in varied groupings act on one another and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolve from the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate the definite or qualitatively determinate. And though co-operating to produce the world of effects, these diverse moments with diverse tendencies never coalesce. Thus in the phenomenal product whatever energy there is is due to the element of rajas and rajas alone; all matter, resistance, stability, is due to tamas, and all conscious manifestation to sattva. The particular guṇa which happens to be predominant in any phenomenon becomes manifest in that phenomenon and others become latent, though their presence is inferred by their

¹ *Yogavārttika*, II. 19, and *Pravacanabhāṣya*, I. 61.

² *Kaumudī*, 13-16; *Tattvavaiśārādī*, II. 20, IV. 13, 14; also *Yogavārttika*, IV. 13, 14.

effect. Thus, for example, in a body at rest mass is patent, energy latent and potentiality of conscious manifestation sublatent. In a moving body, the rajas is predominant (kinetic) and the mass is partially overcome. All these transformations of the groupings of the guṇas in different proportions presuppose the state of prakṛti as the starting point. It is at this stage that the tendencies to conscious manifestation, as well as the powers of doing work, are exactly counterbalanced by the resistance of inertia or mass, and the process of cosmic evolution is at rest. When this equilibrium is once destroyed, it is supposed that out of a natural affinity of all the sattva reals for themselves, of rajas reals for other reals of their type, of tamas reals for others of their type, there arises an unequal aggregation of sattva, rajas, or tamas at different moments. When one guṇa is preponderant in any particular collocation, the others are co-operant. This evolutionary series beginning from the first disturbance of the prakṛti to the final transformation as the world-order, is subject to "a definite law which it cannot overstep." In the words of Dr B. N. Seal¹, "the process of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated (*vaiśaṃya*) within the undifferentiated (*sāmyāvasthā*) of the determinate (*viśeṣa*) within the indeterminate (*aviśeṣa*) of the coherent (*yutasiddha*) within the incoherent (*ayutasiddha*). The order of succession is neither from parts to whole nor from whole to the parts, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole." The meaning of such an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in the shape of the evolving collocations of guṇa reals take place within the body of the prakṛti. Prakṛti consisting of the infinite reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or that the totality of the guṇas in the prakṛti has been unhinged from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast number of guṇas constituting the worlds of thought and matter has been upset. These guṇas once thrown out of balance begin to group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of aggregates should not be thought to take place in such a way that the later aggregates appear in supersession of the former ones, so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist.

¹ Dr B. N. Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, 1915, p. 7.

For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this second stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of the reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the second stage is made good by a refilling from the prakṛti. So also, as the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the reals of the second stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the first stage from the prakṛti. Thus by a succession of refillings the process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where there is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical and physical changes of qualities in things which had already evolved. Evolution (*tattvāntara-pariṇāma*) in Sāṃkhya means the development of categories of existence and not mere changes of qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental). Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent category of being, and offers scope to the more and more differentiated and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differentiation of new stages as integrated in previous stages (*saṃsṛṣṭa-viveka*).

Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prakṛti Equilibrium.

But how or rather why prakṛti should be disturbed is the most knotty point in Sāṃkhya. It is postulated that the prakṛti or the sum-total of the guṇas is so connected with the puruṣas, and there is such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prakṛti, that all its evolution and transformations take place for the sake of the diverse puruṣas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and sufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them to absolute freedom or mukti. A return of this manifold world into the quiescent state (*pralaya*) of prakṛti takes place when the karmas of all puruṣas collectively require that there should be such a temporary cessation of all experience. At such a moment the guṇa compounds are gradually broken, and there is a backward movement (*pratisañcara*) till everything is reduced to the guṇas in their elementary disintegrated state when their mutual opposition brings about their equilibrium. This equilibrium however is not a mere passive state, but one of utmost tension; there is intense activity, but the activity here does not lead to the generation of new things and qualities (*visadrśa-pariṇāma*); this course of new

production being suspended, the activity here repeats the same state (*sadrśa-pariṇāma*) of equilibrium, so that there is no change or new production. The state of pralaya thus is not a suspension of the teleology or purpose of the guṇas, or an absolute break of the course of guṇa evolution; for the state of pralaya, since it has been generated to fulfil the demands of the accumulated karmas of puruṣas, and since there is still the activity of the guṇas in keeping themselves in a state of suspended production, is also a stage of the saṃsāra cycle. The state of mukti (liberation) is of course quite different, for in that stage the movement of the guṇas ceases for ever with reference to the liberated soul. But still the question remains, what breaks the state of equilibrium? The Sāṃkhya answer is that it is due to the transcendental (non-mechanical) influence of the puruṣa¹. This influence of the puruṣa again, if it means anything, means that there is inherent in the guṇas a teleology that all their movements or modifications should take place in such a way that these may serve the purposes of the puruṣas. Thus when the karmas of the puruṣas had demanded that there should be a suspension of all experience, for a period there was a pralaya. At the end of it, it is the same inherent purpose of the prakṛti that wakes it up for the formation of a suitable world for the experiences of the puruṣas by which its quiescent state is disturbed. This is but another way of looking at the inherent teleology of the prakṛti, which demands that a state of pralaya should cease and a state of world-framing activity should begin. Since there is a purpose in the guṇas which brought them to a state of equilibrium, the state of equilibrium also presupposes that it also may be broken up again when the purpose so demands. Thus the inherent purpose of the prakṛti brought about the state of pralaya and then broke it up for the creative work again, and it is this natural change in the prakṛti that may be regarded from another point of view as the transcendental influence of the puruṣas.

Mahat and Ahaṃkāra.

The first evolute of the prakṛti is generated by a preponderance of the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest state from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is a state in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds

¹ The Yoga answer is of course different. It believes that the disturbance of the equilibrium of the prakṛti for new creation takes place by the will of Īśvara (God).

within it the minds (*buddhi*) of all puruṣas which were lost in the prakṛti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolution of prakṛti to serve the puruṣas is thus manifested by the separating out of the old buddhis or minds (of the puruṣas) which hold within themselves the old specific ignorance (*avidyā*) inherent in them with reference to each puruṣa with which any particular buddhi is associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. This state of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi) of all the puruṣas is therefore called *buddhitattva*. It is a state which holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all individuals. The individual buddhis of individual puruṣas are on one hand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associated with their specific puruṣas. When some buddhis once begin to be separated from the prakṛti, other buddhi evolutions take place. In other words, we are to understand that once the transformation of buddhis is effected for the service of the puruṣas, all the other direct transformations that take place from the prakṛti take the same line, i.e. a preponderance of sattva being once created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other transformations of prakṛti that follow them have also the sattva preponderance, which thus have exactly the same composition as the first buddhis. Thus the first transformation from prakṛti becomes buddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be regarded as the most universal stage, which comprehends within it all the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter of which the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of view it has the widest and most universal existence comprising all creation, and is thus called *mahat* (the great one). It is called *liṅga* (sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us the ground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distinguished from the prakṛti which is called *aliṅga*, i.e. of which no liṅga or characteristic may be affirmed.

This mahat-tattva being once produced, further modifications begin to take place in three lines by three different kinds of undulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas preponderance and tamas preponderance. This state when the mahat is disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance of tamas, rajas and sattva is called *ahaṁkāra*, and the above three tendencies are respectively called *tāmasika ahaṁkāra* or *bhūtādi*, *rājasika* or *taijasa ahaṁkāra*, and *vaikārika ahaṁkāra*. The rajasika ahaṁkāra cannot mark a new preponderance by itself; it only

helps (*sahakāri*) the transformations of the sattva preponderance and the tamas preponderance. The development of the former preponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a more and more determinate character of the buddhi, for we remember that buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva preponderance. Further development with the help of rajas on the line of sattva development could only take place when the buddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first development of the buddhi on this line is called *sāttvika* or *var-kārika ahaṃkāra*. This ahaṃkāra represents the development in buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather "mine," and must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi, the function of which is a mere understanding and general datum as thisness.

The ego or ahaṃkāra (*abhimāna-dravya*) is the specific expression of the general consciousness which takes experience as mine. The function of the ego is therefore called *abhimāna* (self-assertion). From this again come the five cognitive senses of vision, touch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five conative senses of speech, handling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generative sense; the *prāṇas* (bio-motor force) which help both conation and cognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The individual ahaṃkāras and senses are related to the individual buddhis by the developing sattva determinations from which they had come into being. Each buddhi with its own group of ahaṃkāra (ego) and sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similar other buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore as knowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is different for each individual, but so far as a general mind (*kāraṇa buddhi*) apart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community of all buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhi is separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associated ignorance (*avidyā*). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of ahaṃkāra and the senses are so related that though they are different from buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the buddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. We must again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling, for as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to ahaṃkāra, the deficiency of buddhi is made good by prakṛti; again as ahaṃkāra partially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the defi-

ciency is made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus the change and wastage of each of the stadia are always made good and kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher state and finally from prakṛti.

The Tanmātras and the Paramāṇus¹.

The other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helped by the liberated rajas of ahaṁkāra, in order to make itself preponderant, and this state in which the tamas succeeds in overcoming the sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi, is called *bhūtādi*. From this *bhūtādi* with the help of rajas are generated the *tanmātras*, the immediately preceding causes of the gross elements. The *bhūtādi* thus represents only the intermediate stage through which the differentiations and regroupings of tamas reals in the mahat proceed for the generation of the *tanmātras*. There has been some controversy between Sāṃkhya and Yoga as to whether the *tanmātras* are generated from the mahat or from ahaṁkāra. The situation becomes intelligible if we remember that evolution here does not mean coming out or emanation, but increasing differentiation in integration within the evolving whole. Thus the regroupings of tamas reals marks the differentiation which takes place within the mahat but through its stage as *bhūtādi*. *Bhūtādi* is absolutely homogeneous and inert, devoid of all physical and chemical characters except quantum or mass. The second stadium *tanmātra* represents subtle matter, vibratory, impingent, radiant, instinct with potential energy. These "potentials" arise from the unequal aggregation of the original mass-units in different proportions and collocations with an unequal distribution of the original energy (*rajas*). The *tanmātras* possess something more than quantum of mass and energy; they possess physical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers of impact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability of viscous and cohesive attraction².

In intimate relation with those physical characters they also possess the potentials of the energies represented by sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell; but, being subtle matter, they are devoid

¹ I have accepted in this section and in the next many of the translations of Sanskrit terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largely indebted to him for his illuminating exposition of this subject as given in Ray's *Hindu Chemistry*. The credit of explaining Sāṃkhya physics in the light of the text belongs entirely to him.

² Dr Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*.

of the peculiar forms which these "potentials" assume in particles of gross matter like the atoms and their aggregates. In other words, the potentials lodged in subtle matter must undergo peculiar transformations by new groupings or collocations before they can act as sensory stimuli as gross matter, though in the minutest particles thereof the sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible (*atīndriya* but not *anudbhūta*)¹.

Of the *tanmātras* the *śabda* or *ākāśa tanmātra* (the sound-potential) is first generated directly from the *bhūtādi*. Next comes the *spārśa* or the *vāyu tanmātra* (touch-potential) which is generated by the union of a unit of *tamas* from *bhūtādi* with the *ākāśa tanmātra*. The *rūpa tanmātra* (colour-potential) is generated similarly by the accretion of a unit of *tamas* from *bhūtādi*; the *rasa tanmātra* (taste-potential) or the *ap tanmātra* is also similarly formed. This *ap tanmātra* again by its union with a unit of *tamas* from *bhūtādi* produces the *gandha tanmātra* (smell-potential) or the *kṣiti tanmātra*². The difference of *tanmātras* or infra-atomic units and atoms (*paramāṇu*) is this, that the *tanmātras* have only the potential power of affecting our senses, which must be grouped and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existence as atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses. It is important in this connection to point out that the classification of all gross objects as *kṣiti*, *ap*, *tejas*, *marut* and *vyoman* is not based upon a chemical analysis, but from the points of view of the five senses through which knowledge of them could be brought home to us. Each of our senses can only apprehend a particular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are said to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be grasped by the five senses. In accordance with the existence of these five elements, the existence of the five potential states or *tanmātras* was also conceived to exist as the ground of the five gross forms.

The five classes of atoms are generated from the *tanmātras* as follows: the sound-potential, with accretion of rudiment matter from *bhūtādi* generates the *ākāśa*-atom. The touch-potentials combine with the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the

¹ Dr Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*.

² There were various ways in which the genesis of *tanmātras* and atoms were explained in literatures other than Sāṃkhya; for some account of it see Dr Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*.

vāyu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentials and sound-potentials to produce the tejas-atom. The taste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch-potentials and sound-potentials to generate the ap-atom and the smell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generate the earth-atom. The ākāśa-atom possesses penetrability, the vāyu-atom impact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heat and light, the ap-atom viscous attraction and the earth-atom cohesive attraction. The ākāśa we have seen forms the transition link from the bhūtādi to the tanmātra and from the tanmātra to the atomic production; it therefore deserves a special notice at this stage. Sāṃkhya distinguishes between a kāraṇa-ākāśa and kāryākāśa. The kāraṇa-ākāśa (non-atomic and all-pervasive) is the formless tamas—the mass in prakṛti or bhūtādi; it is indeed all-pervasive, and is not a mere negation, a mere unoccupiedness (*āvaraṇābhāva*) or vacuum¹. When energy is first associated with this tamas element it gives rise to the sound-potential; the atomic ākāśa is the result of the integration of the original mass-units from bhūtādi with this sound-potential (*śabda tanmātra*). Such an ākāśa-atom is called the kāryākāśa; it is formed everywhere and held up in the original kāraṇa ākāśa as the medium for the development of vāyu atoms. Being atomic it occupies limited space.

The ahaṃkāra and the five tanmātras are technically called *aviśeṣa* or indeterminate, for further determinations or differentiations of them for the formation of newer categories of existence are possible. The eleven senses and the five atoms are called *viśeṣa*, i.e. determinate, for they cannot further be so determined as to form a new category of existence. It is thus that the course of evolution which started in the prakṛti reaches its furthest limit in the production of the senses on the one side and the atoms on the other. Changes no doubt take place in bodies having atomic constitution, but these changes are changes of quality due to spatial changes in the position of the atoms or to the introduction of new atoms and their re-arrangement. But these are not such that a newer category of existence could be formed by them which was substantially different from the combined atoms.

¹ Dr B. N. Seal in describing this ākāśa says "Ākāśa corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and in others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle)." Ray's *History of Hindu Chemistry*, p. 88.

The changes that take place in the atomic constitution of things certainly deserve to be noticed. But before we go on to this, it will be better to enquire about the principle of causation according to which the Sāṃkhya-Yoga evolution should be comprehended or interpreted.

Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy¹.

The question is raised, how can the prakṛti supply the deficiencies made in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutes from them? When from mahat some tanmātras have evolved, or when from the tanmātras some atoms have evolved, how can the deficiency in mahat and the tanmātras be made good by the prakṛti?

Or again, what is the principle that guides the transformations that take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk, changes into curd, and so on? Sāṃkhya says that "as the total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same ultimate Energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes in a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes, and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the guṇas, but without creation of anything new. What is called the (material) cause is only the power which is efficient in the production or rather the vehicle of the power. This power is the unmanifested (or potential) form of the Energy set free (*udbhūta-vṛtti*) in the effect. But the concomitant conditions are necessary to call forth the so-called material cause into activity²." The appearance of an effect (such as the manifestation of the figure of the statue in the marble block by the causal efficiency of the sculptor's art) is only its passage from potentiality to actuality and the concomitant conditions (*sahakāri-śakti*) or efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*, such as the sculptor's art) is a sort of mechanical help or instrumental help to this passage or the transition³. The refilling from prakṛti thus means nothing more than this, that by the inherent teleology of the prakṛti, the reals there are so collocated as to be transformed into mahat as those of the mahat have been collocated to form the bhūtādi or the tanmātras.

¹ *Vyāsabhāṣya* and *Yogavārttika*, IV. 3; *Tattvavaiśārādī*, IV. 3.

² Ray, *History of Hindu Chemistry*, p. 72.

³ *Ibid.* p. 73.

Yoga however explains this more vividly on the basis of transformation of the liberated potential energy. The sum of material causes potentially contains the energy manifested in the sum of effects. When the effectuating condition is added to the sum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens is that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs the relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of energy together with a fresh collocation (*guṇasanniveśaviśeṣa*). As the owner of an adjacent field in transferring water from one field to another of the same or lower level has only to remove the obstructing mud barriers, whereupon the water flows of itself to the other field, so when the efficient or instrumental causes (such as the sculptor's art) remove the barrier inherent in any collocation against its transformation into any other collocation, the energy from that collocation flows out in a corresponding manner and determines the collocation. Thus for example the energy which collocated the milk-atoms to form milk was in a state of arrest in the milk state. If by heat or other causes this barrier is removed, the energy naturally changes direction in a corresponding manner and collocates the atoms accordingly for the formation of curd. So also as soon as the barriers are removed from the prakṛti, guided by the constant will of Īśvara, the reals in equilibrium in the state of prakṛti leave their state of arrest and evolve themselves into mahat, etc.

Change as the formation of new collocations.

It is easy to see from what we have already said that any collocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form, unless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of the present collocation could be removed by some other extraneous instrumental cause. All gross things are formed by the collocation of the five atoms of kṣiti, ap, tejas, marut, and vyoman. The difference between one thing and another is simply this, that its collocation of atoms or the arrangement or grouping of atoms is different from that in another. The formation of a collocation has an inherent barrier against any change, which keeps that collocation in a state of equilibrium, and it is easy to see that these barriers exist in infinite directions in which all the other infinite objects of the world exist. From whichever side the barrier is removed, the energy flows in that direction and helps the

formation of a corresponding object. Provided the suitable barriers could be removed, anything could be changed into any other thing. And it is believed that the Yogins can acquire the powers by which they can remove any barriers, and thus make anything out of any other thing. But generally in the normal course of events the line of evolution follows "a definite law which cannot be overstepped" (*pariṇāmakramanīyama*) or in other words there are some natural barriers which cannot be removed, and thus the evolutionary course has to take a path to the exclusion of those lines where the barriers could not be removed. Thus saffron grows in countries like Kashmere and not in Bengal, this is limitation of countries (*deśāpabandha*); certain kinds of paddy grow in the rainy season only, this is limitation of season or time (*kālāpabandha*); deer cannot beget men, this is limitation by form (*ākārāpabandha*); curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes (*nimit-tāpabandha*). The evolutionary course can thus follow only that path which is not barricaded by any of these limitations or natural obstructions¹.

Change is taking place everywhere, from the smallest and least to the highest. Atoms and reals are continually vibrating and changing places in any and every object. At each moment the whole universe is undergoing change, and the collocation of atoms at any moment is different from what it was at the previous moment. When these changes are perceivable, they are perceived as *dharmapariṇāma* or changes of *dharma* or quality; but perceived or unperceived the changes are continually going on. This change of appearance may be viewed from another aspect by virtue of which we may call it present or past, and old or new, and these are respectively called the *lakṣaṇapariṇāma* and *avasthā-pariṇāma*. At every moment every object of the world is undergoing evolution or change, change as past, present and future, as new, old or unborn. When any change is in a potential state we call it future, when manifested present, when it becomes sub-latent again it is said to be past. Thus it is that the potential, manifest, and sub-latent changes of a thing are called future, present and past².

¹ *Vyāsabhāṣya*, *Tattvavaiśārādī* and *Yogavārttika*, III. 14.

² It is well to note in this connection that Sāṃkhya-yoga does not admit the existence of time as an independent entity like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Time represents the order of moments in which the mind grasps the phenomenal changes. It is hence a construction of the mind (*buddhi-nirmāṇa*). The time required by an atom to move

Causation as Satkāryavāda (the theory that the effect potentially exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause).

The above consideration brings us to an important aspect of the Sāṃkhya view of causation as *satkāryavāda*. Sāṃkhya holds that there can be no production of a thing previously non-existent; causation means the appearance or manifestation of a quality due to certain changes of collocations in the causes which were already held in them in a potential form. Production of effect only means an internal change of the arrangement of atoms in the cause, and this exists in it in a potential form, and just a little loosening of the barrier which was standing in the way of the happening of such a change of arrangement will produce the desired new collocation—the effect. This doctrine is called *satkāryavāda*, i.e. that the kārya or effect is *sat* or existent even before the causal operation to produce the effect was launched. The oil exists in the sesamum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk. The causal operation (*kāraṇakavyāpāra*) only renders that manifest (*āvīrbhūta*) which was formerly in an unmanifested condition (*tirohita*)¹.

The Buddhists also believed in change, as much as Sāṃkhya did, but with them there was no background to the change; every change was thus absolutely a new one, and when it was past, the next moment the change was lost absolutely. There were only the passing dharmas or manifestations of forms and qualities, but there was no permanent underlying dharma or substance. Sāṃkhya also holds in the continual change of dharmas, but it also holds that these dharmas represent only the conditions of the permanent reals. The conditions and collocations of the reals change constantly, but the reals themselves are unchangeable. The effect according to the Buddhists was non-existent, it came into being for a moment and was lost. On account of this theory of causation and also on account of their doctrine of śūnya, they were called *vaināśīkas* (nihilists) by the Vedāntins. This doctrine is therefore contrasted to Sāṃkhya doctrine as *asatkāryavāda*.

its own measure of space is called a moment (*kṣaṇa*) or one unit of time. Vijñāna Bhikṣu regards one unit movement of the guṇas or reals as a moment. When by true wisdom the guṇas are perceived as they are both the illusory notions of time and space vanish. *Vyāsabhāṣya*, *Tattvavaiśārādī*, and *Yogavārttika*, III. 52 and III. 13.

¹ *Tattvakaumudī*, 9.

The Jain view holds that both these views are relatively true and that from one point of view satkāryavāda is true and from another asatkāryavāda. The Sāṃkhya view that the cause is continually transforming itself into its effects is technically called *pariṇāmavāda* as against the Vedānta view called the *vivarttavāda*: that cause remains ever the same, and what we call effects are but illusory impositions of mere unreal appearance of name and form—mere Māyā¹.

Sāṃkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism.

Granted that the interchange of the positions of the infinite number of reals produce all the world and its transformations; whence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order of cause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers which prevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or the first disturbance of the equilibrium of the prakṛti? Sāṃkhya denies the existence of Īśvara (God) or any other exterior influence, and holds that there is an inherent tendency in these reals which guides all their movements. This tendency or teleology demands that the movements of the reals should be in such a manner that they may render some service to the souls either in the direction of enjoyment or salvation. It is by the natural course of such a tendency that prakṛti is disturbed, and the guṇas develop on two lines—on the mental plane, *citta* or mind comprising the sense faculties, and on the objective plane as material objects; and it is in fulfilment of the demands of this tendency that on the one hand take place subjective experiences as the changes of the buddhi and on the other the infinite modes of the changes of objective things. It is this tendency to be of service to the puruṣas (*puruṣārthatā*) that guides all the movements of the reals, restrains all disorder, renders the world a fit object of experience, and finally rouses them to turn back from the world and seek to attain liberation from the association of prakṛti and its gratuitous service, which causes us all this trouble of saṃsāra.

Yoga here asks, how the blind tendency of the non-intelligent

¹ Both the Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya theories of causation are sometimes loosely called *satkāryavāda*. But correctly speaking as some discerning commentators have pointed out, the Vedānta theory of causation should be called satkāraṇavāda for according to it the *kāraṇa* (cause) alone exists (*sat*) and all *kāryas* (effects) are illusory appearances of the *kāraṇa*; but according to Sāṃkhya the *kārya* exists in a potential state in the *kāraṇa* and is hence always existing and real.

prakṛti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe, how can it determine what course of evolution will be of the best service to the puruṣas, how can it remove its own barriers and lend itself to the evolutionary process from the state of prakṛti equilibrium? How too can this blind tendency so regulate the evolutionary order that all men must suffer pains according to their bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones? There must be some intelligent Being who should help the course of evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony may be attained. This Being is Īśvara. Īśvara is a puruṣa who had never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions. His body is of pure sattva quality which can never be touched by ignorance. He is all knowledge and all powerful. He has a permanent wish that those barriers in the course of the evolution of the reals by which the evolution of the guṇas may best serve the double interest of the puruṣa's experience (*bhoga*) and liberation (*apavarga*) should be removed. It is according to this permanent will of Īśvara that the proper barriers are removed and the guṇas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for the service of the best interests of the puruṣas. Īśvara has not created the prakṛti; he only disturbs the equilibrium of the prakṛti in its quiescent state, and later on helps it to follow an intelligent order by which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order of the world is brought about. This acknowledgement of Īśvara in Yoga and its denial by Sāṃkhya marks the main theoretic difference between the two according to which the Yoga and Sāṃkhya are distinguished as Seśvara Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhya with Īśvara) and Nirīśvara Sāṃkhya (Atheistic Sāṃkhya)¹.

Buddhi and Puruṣa.

The question again arises that though puruṣa is pure intelligence, the guṇas are non-intelligent subtle substances, how can the latter come into touch with the former? Moreover, the puruṣa is pure inactive intelligence without any touch of impurity and what service or need can such a puruṣa have of the guṇas? This difficulty is anticipated by Sāṃkhya, which has already made room for its answer by assuming that one class of the guṇas called sattva is such that it resembles the purity and the intelligence of the puruṣa to a very high degree, so much so

¹ *Tattvavaiśārādī*, IV. 3; *Yogavārttika*, I. 24; and *Pravacanabhāṣya*, V. 1-12.

that it can reflect the intelligence of the puruṣa, and thus render its non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were intelligent. Thus all our thoughts and other emotional or volitional operations are really the non-intelligent transformations of the buddhi or citta having a large sattva preponderance; but by virtue of the reflection of the puruṣa in the buddhi, these appear as if they are intelligent. The self (puruṣa) according to Sāṃkhya-Yoga is not directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. Its existence is a matter of inference on teleological grounds and grounds of moral responsibility. The self cannot be directly noticed as being separate from the buddhi modifications. Through beginningless ignorance there is a confusion and the changing states of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These buddhi changes are further so associated with the reflection of the puruṣa in the buddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the puruṣa. This association of the buddhi with the reflection of the puruṣa in the buddhi has such a special fitness (*yogyatā*) that it is interpreted as the experience of the puruṣa. This explanation of Vācaspati of the situation is objected to by Vijñāna Bhikṣu. Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that the association of the buddhi with the image of the puruṣa cannot give us the notion of a real person who undergoes the experiences. It is to be supposed therefore that when the buddhi is intelligized by the reflection of the puruṣa, it is then superimposed upon the puruṣa, and we have the notion of an abiding person who experiences¹. Whatever may be the explanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the puruṣa is somewhat mystical. As a result of this reflection of *cit* on buddhi and the superimposition of the buddhi the puruṣa cannot realize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own. Buddhi resembles puruṣa in transparency, and the puruṣa fails to differentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and as a result of this non-distinction the puruṣa becomes bound down to the buddhi, always failing to recognize the truth that the buddhi and its transformations are wholly alien to it. This non-distinction of puruṣa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi is what is meant by *avidyā* (non-knowledge) in Sāṃkhya, and is the root of all experience and all misery².

¹ *Tattvavaiśārādī* and *Yogavārttika*, 1. 4.

² This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion with Sāṃkhya. It is the non-apprehension of the distinction of two things (e.g. the snake and the rope) that

Yoga holds a slightly different view and supposes that the puruṣa not only fails to distinguish the difference between itself and the buddhi but positively takes the transformations of buddhi as its own. It is no non-perception of the difference but positively false knowledge, that we take the puruṣa to be that which it is not (*anyathākhyāti*). It takes the changing, impure, sorrowful, and objective prakṛti or buddhi to be the changeless, pure, happiness-begetting subject. It wrongly thinks buddhi to be the self and regards it as pure, permanent and capable of giving us happiness. This is the avidyā of Yoga. A buddhi associated with a puruṣa is dominated by such an avidyā, and when birth after birth the same buddhi is associated with the same puruṣa, it cannot easily get rid of this avidyā. If in the meantime pralaya takes place, the buddhi is submerged in the prakṛti, and the avidyā also sleeps with it. When at the beginning of the next creation the individual buddhis associated with the puruṣas emerge, the old avidyās also become manifest by virtue of it and the buddhis associate themselves with the puruṣas to which they were attached before the pralaya. Thus proceeds the course of saṃsāra. When the avidyā of a person is rooted out by the rise of true knowledge, the buddhi fails to attach itself to the puruṣa and is forever dissociated from it, and this is the state of mukti.

The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta.

It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the puruṣa. What is the process of this experience? Sāṃkhya (as explained by Vācaspati) holds that through the senses the buddhi comes into touch with external objects. At the first moment of this touch there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particulars of the thing cannot be noticed. This is called *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* (indeterminate perception). At the next moment by the function of the *saṃkalpa* (synthesis) and *vikalpa* (abstraction or imagination) of manas (mind-organ) the thing is perceived in all its determinate character; the manas differentiates, integrates, and associates the sense-data received through the senses, and is the cause of illusion; it is therefore called the *akhyāti* (non-apprehension) theory of illusion which must be distinguished from the *anyathākhyāti* (misapprehension) theory of illusion of Yoga which consists in positively misapprehending one (e.g. the rope) for the other (e.g. snake). *Yogavārttika*, 1. 8.

thus generates the determinate perception, which when intelligized by the puruṣa and associated with it becomes interpreted as the experience of the person. The action of the senses, ahaṃkāra, and buddhi, may take place sometimes successively and at other times as in cases of sudden fear simultaneously. Vijñāna Bhikṣu differs from this view of Vācaspati, and denies the synthetic activity of the mind-organ (manas), and says that the buddhi directly comes into touch with the objects through the senses. At the first moment of touch the perception is indeterminate, but at the second moment it becomes clear and determinate¹. It is evident that on this view the importance of manas is reduced to a minimum and it is regarded as being only the faculty of desire, doubt and imagination.

Buddhi, including ahaṃkāra and the senses, often called *citta* in Yoga, is always incessantly suffering changes like the flame of a lamp; it is made up of a large preponderance of the pure sattva substances, and is constantly moulding itself from one content to another. These images by the dual reflection of buddhi and puruṣa are constantly becoming conscious, and are being interpreted as the experiences of a person. The existence of the puruṣa is to be postulated for explaining the illumination of consciousness and for explaining experience and moral endeavour. The buddhi is spread all over the body, as it were, for it is by its functions that the life of the body is kept up; for the Sāṃkhya does not admit any separate prāṇa vāyu (vital breath) to keep the body living. What are called *vāyus* (bio-motor force) in Vedānta are but the different modes of operation of this category of buddhi, which acts all through the body and by its diverse movements performs the life-functions and sense-functions of the body.

¹ As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes place through the senses, the sense-data of colours, etc., are modified by the senses if they are defective. The spatial qualities of things are however perceived by the senses directly, but the time-order is a scheme of the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds that the external objects are faithfully copied by the buddhi in which they are reflected, like trees in a lake :

“*tasmimśca darpaṇe sphāre samastā vastudṛṣṭayah
imāstāḥ pratibimbanti sarasīva taḍadrumāḥ.*” *Yogavārttika*, 1. 4.

The buddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it by the senses, or rather the mind flows out through the senses to the external objects and assumes their forms: “*indriyāṇyeva prañālikā cittasañcāraṇamārgaḥ taiḥ samyujya tadgola-kadvārā bāhyavastuśūparaktasya cittasyendriyasāhityenatvārthākāraḥ pariṇāmo bhavati.*” *Yogavārttika*, 1. vi. 7. Contrast *Tattvakaumudī*, 27 and 30.

Apart from the perceptions and the life-functions, buddhi, or rather citta as Yoga describes it, contains within it the root impressions (*saṃskāras*) and the tastes and instincts or tendencies of all past lives (*vāsanā*)¹. These *saṃskāras* are revived under suitable associations. Every man had had infinite numbers of births in their past lives as man and as some animal. In all these lives the same citta was always following him. The citta has thus collected within itself the instincts and tendencies of all those different animal lives. It is knotted with these *vāsanās* like a net. If a man passes into a dog life by rebirth, the *vāsanās* of a dog life, which the man must have had in some of his previous infinite number of births, are revived, and the man's tendencies become like those of a dog. He forgets the experiences of his previous life and becomes attached to enjoyment in the manner of a dog. It is by the revival of the *vāsanā* suitable to each particular birth that there cannot be any collision such as might have occurred if the instincts and tendencies of a previous dog-life were active when any one was born as man.

The *saṃskāras* represent the root impressions by which any habit of life that man has lived through, or any pleasure in which he took delight for some time, or any passions which were

¹ The word *saṃskāra* is used by Pāṇini who probably preceded Buddha in three different senses: (1) improving a thing as distinguished from generating a new quality (*Sata utkarṣādānam saṃskārah*, Kāśikā on Pāṇini, vi. ii. 16), (2) conglomeration or aggregation, and (3) adornment (Pāṇini, vi. i. 137, 138). In the Pīṭakas the word *saṃkhāra* is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing, perfecting, embellishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas (collected by Childers). In fact *saṃkhāra* stands for almost anything of which impermanence could be predicated. But in spite of so many diversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning of aggregation (*samavāya* of Pāṇini) is prominent. The word *saṃskaroti* is used in Kauṣītaki, II. 6, Chāndogya, iv. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and Bṛhadāraṇyaka, vi. iii. 1, in the sense of improving. I have not yet come across any literary use of the second meaning in Sanskrit. The meaning of *saṃskāra* in Hindu philosophy is altogether different. It means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in sub-conscious states and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (*smṛti*). The word *vāsanā* (*Yoga sūtra*, iv. 24) seems to be a later word. The earlier Upaniṣads do not mention it and so far as I know it is not mentioned in the Pāli pīṭakas. *Abhidhānapadīpikā* of Moggallāna mentions it, and it occurs in the Muktika Upaniṣad. It comes from the root "*vas*" to stay. It is often loosely used in the sense of *saṃskāra*, and in *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* they are identified in iv. 9. But *vāsanā* generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But *saṃskāras* are the sub-conscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. *Vāsanās* are innate *saṃskāras* not acquired in this life. See *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, *Tattvavaiśārādī* and *Yogavārttika*, II. 13.

engrossing to him, tend to be revived, for though these might not now be experienced, yet the fact that they were experienced before has so moulded and given shape to the citta that the citta will try to reproduce them by its own nature even without any such effort on our part. To safeguard against the revival of any undesirable idea or tendency it is therefore necessary that its roots as already left in the citta in the form of saṃskāras should be eradicated completely by the formation of the habit of a contrary tendency, which if made sufficiently strong will by its own saṃskāra naturally stop the revival of the previous undesirable saṃskāras.

Apart from these the citta possesses volitional activity (*ceṣṭā*) by which the conative senses are brought into relation to their objects. There is also the reserved potent power (*śakti*) of citta, by which it can restrain itself and change its courses or continue to persist in any one direction. These characteristics are involved in the very essence of citta, and form the groundwork of the Yoga method of practice, which consists in steadying a particular state of mind to the exclusion of others.

Merit or demerit (*puṇya, pāpa*) also is imbedded in the citta as its tendencies, regulating the mode of its movements, and giving pleasures and pains in accordance with it.

Sorrow and its Dissolution¹.

Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, like the Buddhists, hold that all experience is sorrowful. Tamas, we know, represents the pain substance. As tamas must be present in some degree in all combinations, all intellectual operations are fraught with some degree of painful feeling. Moreover even in states of temporary pleasure, we had sorrow at the previous moment when we had solicited it, and we have sorrow even when we enjoy it, for we have the fear that we may lose it. The sum total of sorrows is thus much greater than the pleasures, and the pleasures only strengthen the keenness of the sorrow. The wiser the man the greater is his capacity of realizing that the world and our experiences are all full of sorrow. For unless a man is convinced of this great truth that all is sorrow, and that temporary pleasures, whether generated by ordinary worldly experience or by enjoying heavenly experiences through the performance of Vedic sacrifices, are quite unable to

¹ *Tattvavaiśārādī* and *Yogavārttika*, II. 15, and *Tattvakaumudī*, 1.

eradicate the roots of sorrow, he will not be anxious for mukti or the final uprooting of pains. A man must feel that all pleasures lead to sorrow, and that the ordinary ways of removing sorrows by seeking enjoyment cannot remove them ultimately; he must turn his back on the pleasures of the world and on the pleasures of paradise. The performances of sacrifices according to the Vedic rites may indeed give happiness, but as these involve the sacrifice of animals they must involve some sins and hence also some pains. Thus the performance of these cannot be regarded as desirable. It is when a man ceases from seeking pleasures that he thinks how best he can eradicate the roots of sorrow. Philosophy shows how extensive is sorrow, why sorrow comes, what is the way to uproot it, and what is the state when it is uprooted. The man who has resolved to uproot sorrow turns to philosophy to find out the means of doing it.

The way of eradicating the root of sorrow is thus the practical enquiry of the Sāṃkhya philosophy¹. All experiences are sorrow. Therefore some means must be discovered by which all experiences may be shut out for ever. Death cannot bring it, for after death we shall have rebirth. So long as citta (mind) and puruṣa are associated with each other, the sufferings will continue. Citta must be dissociated from puruṣa. Citta or buddhi, Sāṃkhya says, is associated with puruṣa because of the non-distinction of itself from buddhi². It is necessary therefore that in buddhi we should be able to generate the true conception of the nature of puruṣa; when this true conception of puruṣa arises in the buddhi it feels itself to be different, and distinct, from and quite unrelated to puruṣa, and thus ignorance is destroyed. As a result of that, buddhi turns its back on puruṣa and can no longer bind it to its experiences, which are all irrevocably connected with sorrow, and thus the puruṣa remains in its true form. This according to Sāṃkhya philosophy is alone adequate to bring about the liberation of the puruṣa. Prakṛti which was leading us through cycles of experiences from birth to birth, fulfils its final purpose when this true knowledge arises differentiating

¹ Yoga puts it in a slightly modified form. Its object is the cessation of the rebirth-process which is so much associated with sorrow (*duḥkhabahulaḥ saṃsāraḥ heyah*).

² The word *citta* is a Yoga term. It is so called because it is the repository of all sub-conscious states. Sāṃkhya generally uses the word buddhi. Both the words mean the same substance, the mind, but they emphasize its two different functions. Buddhi means intellection.

puruṣa from prakṛti. This final purpose being attained the prakṛti can never again bind the puruṣa with reference to whom this right knowledge was generated ; for other puruṣas however the bondage remains as before, and they continue their experiences from one birth to another in an endless cycle.

Yoga, however, thinks that mere philosophy is not sufficient. In order to bring about liberation it is not enough that a true knowledge differentiating puruṣa and buddhi should arise, but it is necessary that all the old habits of experience of buddhi, all its saṃskāras should be once for all destroyed never to be revived again. At this stage the buddhi is transformed into its purest state, reflecting steadily the true nature of the puruṣa. This is the *kevala* (oneness) state of existence after which (all saṃskāras, all avidyā being altogether uprooted) the citta is impotent any longer to hold on to the puruṣa, and like a stone hurled from a mountain top, gravitates back into the prakṛti¹. To destroy the old saṃskāras, knowledge alone not being sufficient, a graduated course of practice is necessary. This graduated practice should be so arranged that by generating the practice of living higher and better modes of life, and steadying the mind on its subtler states, the habits of ordinary life may be removed. As the yogin advances he has to give up what he had adopted as good and try for that which is still better. Continuing thus he reaches the state when the buddhi is in its ultimate perfection and purity. At this stage the buddhi assumes the form of the puruṣa, and final liberation takes place.

Karmas in Yoga are divided into four classes: (1) *śukla* or white (*puṇya*, those that produce happiness), (2) *kṛṣṇa* or black (*pāpa*, those that produce sorrow), (3) *śukla-kṛṣṇa* (*puṇya-pāpa*, most of our ordinary actions are partly virtuous and partly vicious as they involve, if not anything else, at least the death of many insects), (4) *aśuklākṛṣṇa* (those inner acts of self-abnegation, and meditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures or pains). All external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work in the world and avoid taking the lives of insects². All karmas

¹ Both Sāṃkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state as *kaivalya* (alone-ness), the former because all sorrows have been absolutely uprooted, never to grow up again and the latter because at this state puruṣa remains for ever alone without any association with buddhi, see *Sāṃkhya kārikā*, 68 and *Yoga sūtras*, IV. 34.

² *Vyāsabhāṣya* and *Tattvavaiśārādī*, IV. 7.

proceed from the five-fold afflictions (*kleśas*), namely *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhiniveśa*.

We have already noticed what was meant by *avidyā*. It consists generally in ascribing intelligence to buddhi, in thinking it as permanent and leading to happiness. This false knowledge while remaining in this form further manifests itself in the other four forms of *asmitā*, etc. *Asmitā* means the thinking of worldly objects and our experiences as really belonging to us—the sense of “mine” or “I” to things that really are the qualities or transformations of the *guṇas*. *Rāga* means the consequent attachment to pleasures and things. *Dveṣa* means aversion or antipathy to unpleasant things. *Abhiniveśa* is the desire for life or love of life—the will to be. We proceed to work because we think our experiences to be our own, our body to be our own, our family to be our own, our possessions to be our own; because we are attached to these; because we feel great antipathy against any mischief that might befall them, and also because we love our life and always try to preserve it against any mischief. These all proceed, as is easy to see, from their root *avidyā*, which consists in the false identification of buddhi with *puruṣa*. These five, *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhiniveśa*, permeate our buddhi, and lead us to perform karma and to suffer. These together with the performed karmas which lie inherent in the buddhi as a particular mode of it transmigrate with the buddhi from birth to birth, and it is hard to get rid of them¹. The karma in the aspect in which it lies in the buddhi as a mode or modification of it is called *karmāśaya* (the bed of karma for the *puruṣa* to lie in). We perform a karma actuated by the vicious tendencies (*kleśa*) of the buddhi. The karma when thus performed leaves its stain or modification on the buddhi, and it is so ordained according to the teleology of the *prakṛti* and the removal of obstacles in the course of its evolution in accordance with it by the permanent will of *Īśvara* that each vicious action brings sufferance and a virtuous one pleasure.

The karmas performed in the present life will generally accumulate, and when the time for giving their fruits comes, such a life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready for him according to the evolution of *prakṛti* as shall make it possible for him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereof. The karma of the

¹ *Vyāsabhāṣya* and *Tattvavaiśārādī*, II. 3-9.

present life thus determines the particular kind of future birth (as this or that animal or man), the period of life (*āyus*) and the painful or pleasurable experiences (*bhoga*) destined for that life. Exceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often produce their effects in this life. It may also happen that a man has done certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of which he requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of which he requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remain in abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life first and then be born again as a man to enjoy the fruits of his good actions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions, all his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannot again be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of those karmas which have already ripened. This is the *jīvanmukti* stage, when the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet suffering mundane life in order to experience the karmas that have already ripened (*tiṣṭhati saṃskāravaśāt cakrabhramivaddhṛtaśarīrah*).

Citta.

The word *Yoga* which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patañjali in his *Yoga sūtra* in the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of *citta*. Some sort of concentration may be brought about by violent passions, as when fighting against a mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct. The *citta* which has the concentration of the former type is called *kṣipta* (wild) and of the latter type *pramūḍha* (ignorant). There is another kind of *citta*, as with all ordinary people, in which concentration is only possible for a time, the mind remaining steady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings to another thing and so on. This is called the *vikṣipta* (unsteady) stage of mind (*cittabhūmi*). As distinguished from these there is an advanced stage of *citta* in which it can concentrate steadily on an object for a long time. This is the *ekāgra* (one-pointed) stage. There is a still further advanced stage in which the *citta* processes are absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before *mukti*, and is called the *nirodha* (cessation) state of *citta*. The purpose of *Yoga* is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of *citta*.

The *cittas* have five processes (*vṛtti*), (1) *pramāṇa*¹ (valid

¹ Sāṃkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any cognition depend upon the cognitive state itself and not on correspondence with external facts or objects (*svataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ svataḥ aprāmāṇyaṃ*). The contribution of Sāṃkhya to the doc-

cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference and scriptural testimony), (2) *viparyaya* (false knowledge, illusion, etc.), (3) *vikalpa* (abstraction, construction and different kinds of imagination), (4) *nidrā* (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which *tamas* tends to predominate), (5) *smṛti* (memory).

These states of mind (*vṛtti*) comprise our inner experience. When they lead us towards *saṃsāra* into the course of passions and their satisfactions, they are said to be *kliṣṭa* (afflicted or leading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation, they are called *akliṣṭa* (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards *saṃsāra* or towards *mukti*, we have to make use of our states of mind; the states which are bad often alternate with good states, and whichever state should tend towards our final good (liberation) must be regarded as good.

This draws attention to that important characteristic of *citta*, that it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and sometimes towards bad (*saṃsāra*). It is like a river, as the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* says, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the good. The teleology of *prakṛti* requires that it should produce in man the *saṃsāra* as well as the liberation tendency.

Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts and bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts, and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad thoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore never lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is as strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather remarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows that our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic attraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an innate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation¹. Removal of pains

trine of inference is not definitely known. What little Vācaspati says on the subject has been borrowed from Vātsyāyana such as the *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* types of inference, and these may better be consulted in our chapter on Nyāya or in the *Tātparyāṭīkā* of Vācaspati. Sāṃkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the ground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds of inference “*mātrānīmīttasamyogivirodhisahacārībhīḥ*. *Svasvāmibadhyaghātādyaṭṭh sām-khyānām saptadhānumā*” (*Tātparyāṭīkā*, p. 109). Sāṃkhya definition of inference as given by Udyotakara (I. I. v) is “*sambandhādekasmāt pratyakṣāccheṣasiddhiranumānam*.”

¹ Sāṃkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction of three kinds of sorrows, *ādhyātmika* (generated internally by the illness of the body or the unsatisfied passions of the mind), *ādhibhautika* (generated externally by the injuries inflicted by other men, beasts, etc.) and *ādhidaiivika* (generated by the injuries inflicted by demons and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours (*puruṣārtha*).

is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but still the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible tendency of the mind. Man has power (*śakti*) stored up in his citta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may gradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot the other. He must succeed in this, since prakṛti wants liberation for her final realization¹.

Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).

The purpose of Yoga meditation is to steady the mind on the gradually advancing stages of thoughts towards liberation, so that vicious tendencies may gradually be more and more weakened and at last disappear altogether. But before the mind can be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should be purged of ordinary impurities. Thus the intending yogin should practise absolute non-injury to all living beings (*ahimsā*), absolute and strict truthfulness (*satya*), non-stealing (*asteya*), absolute sexual restraint (*brahmacarya*) and the acceptance of nothing but that which is absolutely necessary (*aparigraha*). These are collectively called *yama*. Again side by side with these abstinences one must also practise external cleanliness by ablutions and inner cleanliness of the mind, contentment of mind, the habit of bearing all privations of heat and cold, or keeping the body unmoved and remaining silent in speech (*tapas*), the study of philosophy (*svādhyāya*) and meditation on Īśvara (*Īśvara-praṇidhāna*). These are collectively called *niyamas*. To these are also to be added certain other moral disciplines such as *pratipakṣa-bhāvanā*, *maitrī*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekṣā*. *Pratipakṣa-bhāvanā* means that whenever a bad thought (e.g. selfish motive) may come one should practise the opposite good thought (self-sacrifice); so that the bad thoughts may not find any scope. Most of our vices are originated by our unfriendly relations with our fellow-beings. To remove these the practice of mere abstinence may not be sufficient, and therefore one should habituate the mind to keep itself in positive good relations with our fellow-beings. The practice of *maitrī* means to think of all beings as friends. If we continually habituate ourselves to think this, we can never be displeased with them. So too one should practise *karuṇā* or kindly feeling for sufferers, *muditā*

¹ See my "Yoga Psychology," *Quest*, October, 1921.

or a feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, and upekṣā or a feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others. The last one indicates that the yogin should not take any note of the vices of vicious men.

When the mind becomes disinclined to all worldly pleasures (*vairāgya*) and to all such as are promised in heaven by the performances of Vedic sacrifices, and the mind purged of its dross and made fit for the practice of Yoga meditation, the yogin may attain liberation by a constant practice (*abhyāsa*) attended with faith, confidence (*śraddhā*), strength of purpose and execution (*vīrya*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) attained at each advance.

The Yoga Meditation.

When the mind has become pure the chances of its being ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (*āsana*) and fixes his mind on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should fix it on Īśvara, for in that case Īśvara being pleased removes many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for him to attain success. But of course he makes his own choice, and can choose anything he likes for the unifying concentration (*samādhi*) of his mind. There are four states of this unifying concentration namely *vitarka*, *vicāra*, *ānanda* and *asmitā*. Of these *vitarka* and *vicāra* have each two varieties, *savitarka*, *nirvitarka*, *savicāra*, *nirvicāra*¹. When the mind concentrates on objects, remembering their names and qualities, it is called the *savitarka* stage; when on the five tanmātras with a remembrance of their qualities it is called *savicāra*, and when it is one with the tanmātras without any notion of their qualities it is called *nirvicāra*. Higher than these are the *ānanda* and the *asmitā* states. In the *ānanda* state the mind concentrates on the buddhi with its functions of the senses causing pleasure. In the *asmitā* stage buddhi concentrates on pure substance as divested of all modifications. In all these stages there are objects on which the mind consciously concentrates, these are therefore called the *samprajñāta* (with knowledge of objects) types of *samādhi*. Next to this comes the last stage of *samādhi* called the *asamprajñāta* or *nirodha samādhi*, in which the mind is without any object. By remaining

¹ Vācaspati, however, thinks that *ānanda* and *asmitā* have also two other varieties, which is denied by Bhikṣu.

long in this stage the old potencies (saṃskāras) or impressions due to the continued experience of worldly events tending towards the objective world or towards any process of experiencing inner thinking are destroyed by the production of a strong habit of the nirodha state. At this stage dawns the true knowledge, when the buddhi becomes as pure as the puruṣa, and after that the citta not being able to bind the puruṣa any longer returns back to prakṛti.

In order to practise this concentration one has to see that there may be no disturbance, and the yogin should select a quiet place on a hill or in a forest. One of the main obstacles is, however, to be found in our constant respiratory action. This has to be stopped by the practice of *prāṇāyāma*. Prāṇāyāma consists in taking in breath, keeping it for a while and then giving it up. With practice one may retain breath steadily for hours, days, months and even years. When there is no need of taking in breath or giving it out, and it can be retained steady for a long time, one of the main obstacles is removed.

The process of practising concentration is begun by sitting in a steady posture, holding the breath by prāṇāyāma, excluding all other thoughts, and fixing the mind on any object (*dhāraṇā*). At first it is difficult to fix steadily on any object, and the same thought has to be repeated constantly in the mind, this is called *dhyāna*. After sufficient practice in dhyāna the mind attains the power of making itself steady; at this stage it becomes one with its object and there is no change or repetition. There is no consciousness of subject, object or thinking, but the mind becomes steady and one with the object of thought. This is called *samādhi*¹. We have already described the six stages of samādhi. As the yogin acquires strength in one stage of samādhi, he passes on to a still higher stage and so on. As he progresses onwards he attains miraculous powers (*vibhūti*) and his faith and hope in the practice increase. Miraculous powers bring with them many temptations, but the yogin is firm of purpose and even though the position of Indra is offered to him he does not relax. His wisdom (*prajñā*) also increases at each step. Prajñā knowledge is as clear as perception, but while perception is limited to

¹ It should be noted that the word *samādhi* cannot properly be translated either by "concentration" or by "meditation." It means that peculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes one with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passing states.

certain gross things and certain gross qualities¹ prajñā has no such limitations, penetrating into the subtlest things, the tanmātras, the guṇas, and perceiving clearly and vividly all their subtle conditions and qualities². As the potencies (*saṃskāra*) of the prajñā wisdom grow in strength the potencies of ordinary knowledge are rooted out, and the yogin continues to remain always in his prajñā wisdom. It is a peculiarity of this prajñā that it leads a man towards liberation and cannot bind him to saṃsāra. The final prajñās which lead to liberation are of seven kinds, namely, (1) I have known the world, the object of suffering and misery, I have nothing more to know of it. (2) The grounds and roots of saṃsāra have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more of it remains to be uprooted. (3) Removal has become a fact of direct cognition by inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledge in the shape of a discrimination of puruṣa from prakṛti has been understood. The other three are not psychological but are rather metaphysical processes associated with the situation. They are as follows: (5) The double purpose of buddhi experience and emancipation (*bhoga* and *apavarga*) has been realized. (6) The strong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated guṇas drives them into prakṛti like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops. (7) The buddhi disintegrated into its constituents the guṇas become merged in the prakṛti and remain there for ever. The puruṣa having passed beyond the bondage of the guṇas shines forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss or happiness in this Sāṃkhya-Yoga mukti, for all feeling belongs to prakṛti. It is thus a state of pure intelligence. What the Sāṃkhya tries to achieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfected discipline of the will and psychological control of the mental states.

¹ The limitations which baffle perception are counted in the *Kārikā* as follows: Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky), extreme proximity (e.g. collyrium inside the eye), loss of sense-organ (e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme smallness of the object (e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by walls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight), being mixed up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown into a lake).

² Though all things are but the modifications of guṇas yet the real nature of the guṇas is never revealed by the sense-knowledge. What appears to the senses are but illusory characteristics like those of magic (*māyā*):

“*Guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛṣṭīpathamṛcchati
Yattu dṛṣṭīpatham prāptam tanmāyeva sutucchakam.*”

Vyāsaśāstra, IV. 13.

The real nature of the guṇas is thus revealed only by *prajñā*.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

Criticism of Buddhism and Sāṃkhya from the Nyāya standpoint.

THE Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary; each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to another group and that to another and so on. But if a collocation representing milk generates the collocation of curd it is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming the cause-collocation and the *modus operandi* is unintelligible; the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately generate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on such a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine of momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influence on the part of the cause-elements and their coordination and manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment. The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the result of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is against our universal uncontradicted experience that specific elements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are the cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the whiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness, blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump state should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in the iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience. Moreover there would be no difference between material (*upādāna*, e.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (*nimitta* and *sahakāri*, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in forming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and there was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumental causes, as such.

Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is brought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its

effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the cause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence to produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the moment after it is born produce any effect? The truth is that causal elements remain and when they are properly collocated the effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we perceive things as existing from a past time. The past time is perceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as future and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards.

The Sāṃkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized states of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds within it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is already existent even before the causal movement for the production of the effect, is also baseless. Sāṃkhya says that the oil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and that it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the stone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists only in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in a potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of clay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is it to say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never carry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug. What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was in a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest or actual? What does potential state mean? The potential state of the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state of the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it is meant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of which the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does not mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump of clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it can expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the potter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the effect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said that the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Sāṃkhya that the substance and attribute have the same reality is also against all experience, for we all perceive that movement and attribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again Sāṃkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different

from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi non-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss that the qualities of buddhi are reflected on puruṣa and then again on buddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul (*ātman*) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why Sāṃkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge, feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in order to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double reflection. Again Sāṃkhya prakṛti is non-intelligent, and where is the guarantee that she (prakṛti) will not bind the wise again and will emancipate him once for all? Why did the puruṣa become bound down? Prakṛti is being utilized for enjoyment by the infinite number of puruṣas, and she is no delicate girl (as Sāṃkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the puruṣa ashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure (*sukha*), sorrow (*duḥkha*) and a blinding feeling through ignorance (*moha*) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what impudence could Sāṃkhya think of these as material substances? Again their cosmology of a mahat, ahaṃkāra, the tanmātras, is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor by reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders. The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstruction in the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in other systems. (See *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 452-466 and 490-496.)

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sūtras.

It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyāya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in the days of the Upaniṣads, and the art of disputation was regarded even then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by the name of *vākovākya*. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Āpastamba who according to Bühler lived before the third century B.C. used the word Nyāya in the sense of Mimāṃsā¹. The word Nyāya derived

¹ *Āpastamba*, trans. by Bühler, Introduction, p. xxvii., and Bodas's article on the *Historical Survey of Indian Logic* in the Bombay Branch of J.R.A.S., vol. xix.

from the root *nī* is sometimes explained as that by which sentences and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered into combination) were called Nyāya¹. Prof. Jacobi on the strength of Kauṭilya's enumeration of the *vidyā* (sciences) as Ānvikṣikī (the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge by further scrutiny), *trayī* (the three Vedas), *vārttā* (the sciences of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and *daṇḍanīti* (polity), and the enumeration of the philosophies as Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Lokāyata and Ānvikṣikī, supposes that the *Nyāya sūtra* was not in existence in Kauṭilya's time 300 B.C.)². Kauṭilya's reference to Nyāya as Ānvikṣikī only suggests that the word Nyāya was not a familiar name for Ānvikṣikī in Kauṭilya's time. He seems to misunderstand Vātsyāyana in thinking that Vātsyāyana distinguishes Nyāya from the Ānvikṣikī in holding that while the latter only means the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics. What appears from Vātsyāyana's statement in *Nyāya sūtra* I. i. 1 is this that he points out that the science which was known in his time as Nyāya was the same as was referred to as Ānvikṣikī by Kauṭilya. He distinctly identifies Nyāyavidyā with Ānvikṣikī, but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories such as *saṃśaya* (doubt) etc., though these were already contained within the first two terms *pramāṇa* (means of cognition) and *prameya* (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its special and separate branches (*prthakprasthāna*) were treated, Nyāyavidyā would simply become metaphysics (*adhyātmavidyā*) like the Upaniṣads. The old meaning of Nyāya as the means of determining the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon by Vātsyāyana and is sanctioned by Vācaspati in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā* I. i. 1). He compares the meaning of the word Nyāya (*pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam*—to scrutinize an object by means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word ānvikṣikī (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception and scriptures). Vātsyāyana of course points out that so far as this logical side of Nyāya is concerned it has the widest scope for

¹ Kālidāsa's *Kumārasambhava* "Udghāto praṇavo yāsām nyāyaistribhirudīraṇam," also Mallinātha's gloss on it.

² Prof. Jacobi's "The early history of Indian Philosophy," *Indian Antiquary*, 1918.

itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences¹. He quotes Kauṭilya to show that in this capacity Nyāya is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vātsyāyana himself designates the logical portion as a *prthakprasthāna* (separate branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vātsyāyana or Kauṭilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made after Kauṭilya. Vātsyāyana has no doubt put more stress on the importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or *adhyātmavidyā* was acknowledged by all. But the importance of the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of the *dharmaśāstras* (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend any support to it, and Vātsyāyana had to seek the support of Kauṭilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kauṭilya was not satisfied by counting Ānvīkṣikī as one of the four *vidyās* but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side with Sāṃkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably even in Kauṭilya's time Nyāya was composed of two branches, one as *adhyātmavidyā* and another as a science of logic or rather of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external, and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might not attract sufficient attention. Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda Śāstrī in an article in the *Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society* 1905 says that as Vācaspati made two attempts to collect the *Nyāya sūtras*, one as *Nyāyasūci* and the other as *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, it seems that even in Vācaspati's time he was not certain as to the authenticity of many of the *Nyāya sūtras*. He further points out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the *sūtras* were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyāya and Yoga. He also

¹ *Yena prayuktāḥ pravarttate tat prayojanam* (that by which one is led to act is called *prayojanam*); *yamartham abhīpsan jihāsan vā karma ārabhate tenānena sarve prāṇināḥ sarvāṇi karmāṇi sarvāśca vidyāḥ vyāptāḥ tadāśrayāśca nyāyāḥ pravarttate* (all those which one tries to have or to fly from are called *prayojana*, therefore all beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within *prayojana*, and all these depend on Nyāya). *Vātsyāyana bhāṣya*, 1. i. 1.

thinks that the *sūtras* underwent two additions, one at the hands of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs of the interpolation of many of the *sūtras* makes the fixing of the date of the original part of the *Nyāya sūtras* still more difficult, for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and Prof. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the *Nyāya sūtras* on the basis of references to Śūnyavāda naturally loses its value; except on the supposition that all references to Śūnyavāda must be later than Nāgārjuna, which is not correct, since the *Mahāyāna sūtras* written before Nāgārjuna also held the Śūnyavāda doctrine.

The late Dr S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in *J.R.A.S.* 1918 thinks that the earlier part of *Nyāya* was written by Gautama about 550 B.C. whereas the *Nyāya sūtras* of Akṣapāda were written about 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word *Nyāya* in the sense of logic in *Mahābhārata* I. I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment of the subject that the fixing of the date of Akṣapāda was made to fit in somehow with his idea that Akṣapāda wrote his *Nyāya sūtras* under the influence of Aristotle—a supposition which does not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part of the *Nyāya*. Goldstücker says that both Patañjali (140 B.C.) and Kātyāyana (fourth century B.C.) knew the *Nyāya sūtras*¹. We know that Kauṭilya knew the *Nyāya* in some form as Ānvikṣikī in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say that the *Nyāya* existed in some form as early as the fourth century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think that at least some of the present *sūtras* were written some time in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Bādarāyaṇa's *sūtras* make allusions to the Vaiśeṣika doctrines and not to *Nyāya*. On this ground he thinks that *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* were written before Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtras*, whereas the *Nyāya sūtras* were written later. Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra also contends in his

¹ Goldstücker's *Pāṇini*, p. 157.

edition of Vaiśeṣika that the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* were earlier than the Nyāya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes one of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, but the whole foundation of his medical physics is based on the Vaiśeṣika physics¹. The *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* (which as it was quoted by Aśvaghōṣa is earlier than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing that the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* are probably pre-Buddhistic².

It is certain that even the logical part of the present *Nyāya sūtras* was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I. i. 32 in which the sūtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (*avayava*) Vātsyāyana says that this sūtra was written to refute the views of those who held that there should be ten premisses³. The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* also give us some of the earliest types of inference, which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyāya doctrine of inference⁴.

Does Vaiśeṣika represent an Old School of Mīmāṃsā ?

The Vaiśeṣika is so much associated with Nyāya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mīmāṃsā, older than that represented in the *Mīmāṃsā sūtras*. But a closer inspection of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*. An examination of Caraka's *Sūtrasthāna* (I. 35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of Vaiśeṣika such as that of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* before him. *Caraka sūtra* or *kārikā* (I. i. 36) says that the guṇas are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc., cognition, and those which begin with the guṇa "*para*" (universality) and end with "*prayatna*" (effort) together with the sense-qualities (*sārthā*). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (I. i. 6) which leaves out the six guṇas,

¹ Caraka, *Śūrīra*, 39.

² See the next section.

³ Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya sūtras*, I. i. 32. This is undoubtedly a reference to the Jain view as found in *Daśavaikālikaniryukti* as noted before.

⁴ *Nyāya sūtra* I. i. 5, and *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5, and III. i. 8-17.

heaviness (*gurutva*), liquidity (*dravatva*), oiliness (*sneha*), elasticity (*saṃskāra*), merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*); in one part of the *sūtra* the enumeration begins with “para” (universality) and ends in “prayatna,” but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka’s *sūtra* was written at a time when the six guṇas left out in the *Vaiśeṣika* enumeration had come to be counted as guṇas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* (a later *Vaiśeṣika* compendium), is a compilation from some very old *kārikās* which are referred to by Viśvanātha as being collected from “*atisaṃkṣiptacirantanoktibhiḥ*”—(from very ancient aphorisms¹); Caraka’s definition of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later Nyāya-*Vaiśeṣika* doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* that *sāmānya* (generality) and *viśeṣa* are relative to each other². Caraka’s *sūtras* were therefore probably written at a time when the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.

The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of “I.” There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some *Mīmāṃsā* doctrines and occasionally to *Sāṃkhya*. There is no reason to suppose that the *Mīmāṃsā* doctrines referred to allude to the *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* of Jaimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyāya phraseology of “*pūrvavat*” and “*śeṣavat*” was not known. *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate cause³. We know that the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* refers to those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the

¹ Professor Vanamāli Vedāntatīrtha’s article in *J. A. S. B.*, 1908.

² Caraka (I. 1. 33) says that *sāmānya* is that which produces unity and *viśeṣa* is that which separates. V. S. II. ii. 7. *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).

³ *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).

systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient view¹. These considerations as well as the general style of the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these sūtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability are pre-Buddhistic.

The *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* begins with the statement that its object is to explain virtue, "dharma." This is we know the manifest duty of Mimāṃsā and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini begins his *Mimāṃsā sūtras* by defining "dharma." This at first seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vaiśeṣika, viz., the description of the nature of padārtha². He then defines dharma as that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (*nirṣreyasa*) and says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions (of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts³. The fact that the Vaiśeṣika begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also the *adṛṣṭa* (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce any direct effect, will produce prosperity through *adṛṣṭa*, shows that Kaṇāda's method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption of *adṛṣṭa* (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The

¹ Śvetāśvatara 1. i. 2.

² I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the *Kalāpa Vyākaraṇa*, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Kaṇāda in his *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himālaya). "*Dharmaṇi vyākhyātukāmasya śaṭpadārthopavarṇanam Himavadgantukāmasya sāgaraganopamam.*"

³ The sūtra "*Tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmānyam* (1. i. 3 and x. ii. 9) has been explained by *Upaskāra* as meaning "The Veda being the word of Īśvara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of "Īśvara" anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyāya ideas into the Vaiśeṣika. Sūtra x. ii. 8 is only a repetition of vi. ii. 1.

description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of *adrṣṭa* proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In v. i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in v. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, v. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to *adrṣṭa*. In v. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in *Upaskāra*) are said to be due to *adrṣṭa*. Salvation (*mokṣa*) is said to be produced by the annihilation of *adrṣṭa* leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non-production of rebirths. Vaiṣeṣika marks the distinction between the *drṣṭa* (experienced) and the *adrṣṭa*. All the categories that he describes are founded on *drṣṭa* (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to *adrṣṭa*. These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. Kaṇāda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to *adrṣṭa*. But what leads to *adrṣṭa*? In answer to this, Kaṇāda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (*snāna*), fasting, holy student life (*brahmacarya*), remaining at the house of the teacher (*gurukulavāsa*), retired forest life (*vānaprastha*), sacrifice (*yağña*), gifts (*dāna*), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (*mantras*) (VI. ii. 2).

He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure; and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through *adrṣṭa*. He also described how

feelings of attachment to things are also generated by adṛṣṭa. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Kaṇāda is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on Mīmāṃsā will show that the later Mīmāṃsā writers agreed with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mīmāṃsā differs from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are (1) self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (śabda), (5) (according to Kumārila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vaiśeṣika. But as no Īśvara is mentioned, and as all adṛṣṭa depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vaiśeṣika had no dispute with Mīmāṃsā. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*. It is probable that Kaṇāda believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mīmāṃsā suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, the view was probably what is represented in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*. As there is no reference to Īśvara and as adṛṣṭa proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vaiśeṣika was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mīmāṃsā philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Kaṇāda gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mīmāṃsā view as we know from the later Mīmāṃsā writers¹. Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyāya view is

¹ The last two concluding sūtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by Śaṅkara Miśra in his *Upaskāra* (II. ii. 36 by adding an “*api*” to the sūtra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination “saṃkhyābhāva” as saṃkhyā and bhāva instead of saṃkhyā and abhāva, which in my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.

that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally this is regarded as the Vaiśeṣika view as well. But in Vaiśeṣika III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6–7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (*āgama*). To this the final Vaiśeṣika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as “I” (*aḥam*), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as “I” (*aḥam*) (III. ii. 10–18, also IX. i. 11).

These considerations lead me to think that the Vaiśeṣika represented a school of Mimāṃsā thought which supplemented a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.

Philosophy in the Vaiśeṣika sūtras.

The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (*dharma*) (I. i. 1) and *dharma* according to it is that by which prosperity (*abhyudaya*) and salvation (*nirīśreyasa*) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sūtra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of *dharma*, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), class concept (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*)¹. The *dravyas* are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The *guṇas* are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure, separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to species². Action (*karma*) means upward move-

¹ *Upaskāra* notes that *viśeṣa* here refers to the ultimate differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same element has specific features of difference.

² Here the well known qualities of heaviness (*gurutva*), liquidity (*dravatva*), oiliness (*sneha*), elasticity (*saṃskāra*), merit (*dharma*), and demerit (*adharma*) have been altogether omitted. These are all counted in later Vaiśeṣika commentaries and com-

ment, downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal movement. The three common qualities of dravya, guṇa and karma are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause, and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other dravyas and the guṇas other guṇas. But karma is not necessarily produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or its effect, but the guṇas are destroyed both by the cause and by the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses karma and guṇa and is regarded as the material (*samavāyi*) cause. Guṇas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further guṇas, and are not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is devoid of guṇa, cannot remain at one time in more than one object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (*samavāyi*) of (derivative) dravyas, guṇa, and karma; guṇa is also the non-material cause (*asamavāyi*) of dravya, guṇa and karma. Karma is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion (*vega*). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be produced even without karma¹. Dravya is the general effect of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to guṇa in this that it does not produce karma. The numbers two, three, etc., separateness, contact and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma not being connected with more than one thing is not produced by more than one thing². A dravya is the result of many contacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the cause of dravya and karma³.

In the second chapter of the first book Kaṇāda first says that if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause even though there may not be the effect. He next says that genus (*sāmānya*) and species (*viśeṣa*) are relative to the under-

pendiums. It must be noted that “*guṇa*” in Vaiśeṣika means qualities and not subtle reals or substances as in Sāṃkhya-Yoga. Guṇa in Vaiśeṣika would be akin to what Yoga would call *dharma*.

¹ It is only when the kārya ceases that dravya is produced. See *Upaskāra* 1. i. 22.

² If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.

³ It must be noted that “karma” in this sense is quite different from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action which is the cause of rebirth.

standing; being (*bhāva*) indicates continuity only and is hence only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action may be both genus and species, but *viśeṣa* as constituting the ultimate differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient). In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being (*sattā*) in virtue of which things appear as existent; all other genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it is different from *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*, and yet exists in them, and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that something is and must be regarded as a category existing as one identical entity in all *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *karma*, for in its universal nature as being it has no special characteristics in the different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of thingness (*dravyatva*), qualitiveness (*guṇatva*) or actionness (*karmatva*) are also categories which are separate from universal being (*bhāva* or *sattā*) for they also have no separate genus or species and yet may be distinguished from one another, but *bhāva* or being was the same in all.

In the first chapter of the second book Kaṇāda deals with substances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch; water, colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (*snigdha*); fire, colour and touch; air, touch; but none of these qualities can be found in ether (*ākāśa*). Liquidity is a special quality of water because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself¹. Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferred from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (*dravya*) and is eternal². The inference of air is of the type of inference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics called *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*. The name of air "*vāyu*" is derived from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us has (*asmadvīṣiṣṭānām*) to be admitted for accounting for the

¹ It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is important for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.

² Substance is that which possesses quality and action. It should be noted that the word "*adravyatvena*" in II. i. 13 has been interpreted by me as "*adravyavattvena*."

giving of names to things (*saṃjñākarma*). Because we find that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented by us)¹. On account of the fact that movements rest only in one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied space, would not lead us to infer the existence of ākāśa (ether). Ākāśa has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched, there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this substance is ākāśa. It is a substance and eternal like air. As being is one so ākāśa is one².

In the second chapter of the second book Kaṇāda tries to prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire, and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered, or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the question whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.

The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact of the senses and their object inheres.

The knowledge of sense-objects (*indriyārtha*) is the reason by

¹ I have differed from *Upaskāra* in interpreting "*saṃjñākarma*" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while *Upaskāra* makes it a *dvandva* compound. *Upaskāra*'s interpretation seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of God.

² This interpretation is according to Śaṅkara Miśra's *Upaskāra*.

which we can infer the existence of something different from the senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The types of inferences referred to are (1) inference of non-existence of some things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence of some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the existence of some things from the existence of others. In all these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to be connected with each other (*prasiddhipūrvakatvāt apadeśasya*)¹. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have *anapadeśa* (fallacious middle) and *sandigdha* (doubtful middle); thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way in which the existence of one's own soul is inferred², i.e. by virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In the second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).

The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance and eternal can be proved after the manner of vāyu. An objector is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But the Vaiśeṣika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But

¹ In connection with this there is a short reference to the methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear. There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference are only pointed out as the basis.

² The forms of inference used show that Kaṇāda was probably not aware of Gautama's terminology.

then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences as "I am Yajñadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction. When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajñadatta goes, there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajñadatta the body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else. As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure, pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on the strength of the scriptures¹.

In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered eternal (*nitya*). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can only take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal is ignorance (*avidyā*)². Colour is visible in a thing which is great (*mahat*) and compounded. Air (*vāyu*) is not perceived to have colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not the actuality of colour (*rūpasamskāra*—i.e. in air there is only colour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible only when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions³. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also explained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, the quality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (*guṇatva*)

¹ I have differed here from the meaning given in *Upaskāra*. I think the three sūtras "*Sukhaduḥkhaññānaṣṭipattyaṣiṣṭādekātmyam*," "*vyavasthāto nānā*," and "*śas-trasāmarthyāt ca*" originally meant that the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures, they are regarded as many.

² I have differed here also in my meaning from the *Upaskāra*, which regards this sūtra "*avidyā*" to mean that we do not know of any reasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.

³ This is what is meant in the later distinctions of *udbhūtarūpavattva* and *anudbhūtarūpavattva*. The word *samskāra* in Vaiśeṣika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection (*samavāya*), production (*udbhava*) and not being overcome (*anubhībhava*). For the last three senses see *Upaskāra* IV. i. 7.

are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch, and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. by the *manas* and number etc. by the visual and the tactile sense)¹.

In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one of them acts as the central radicle (*upaṣṭambhaka*). Bodies are of two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance with special kinds of *dharma*. All combinations of atoms are due to special kinds of *dharma*s. Such super-mundane bodies are to be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and also on account of the authority of the *Vedas*.

In the first chapter of the fifth book action (*karma*) is discussed. Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of heaviness (*gurutva*) the flail will fall when not held by the hand. Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed motions (*nodanaviśeṣa*) which are generated by special kinds of efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep. The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown cause (*adr̥ṣṭakāraṇaka*). The arrow first acquires motion by specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia (*vegasam̐skāra*) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls down through heaviness.

The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explana-

¹ This portion has been taken from the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra on the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* of Kaṇāda. It must be noted here that the notion of number according to Vaiśeṣika is due to mental relativity or oscillation (*apekṣābuddhijanya*). But this mental relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or touched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend on the visual or the tactual sense.

tions of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained as being due to unknown cause (*adṛṣṭakāritam*) and no explanation is given as to the nature of this unknown (*adṛṣṭa*). It is however said that with the absence of *adṛṣṭa* there is no contact of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore mokṣa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, ākāśa are regarded as inactive.

The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain Vedic performances, which brings in *adṛṣṭa*, purification and impurities of things, how passions are often generated by *adṛṣṭa*, how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mokṣa takes place as a result of the work of the soul.

In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many causes¹, but the atom is therefore different from those that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small relatively at the same time. In accordance with *aṇutva* (atomic) and *mahattva* (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The eternal size of *parimaṇḍala* (round) belongs to the atoms. Ākāśa and ātman are called *mahān* or *paramamahān* (the supremely great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being of the measure "supremely great" (*paramamahat*). Atomic size (*parimaṇḍala*) belonging to the atoms and the mind (*manas*) and the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether (*ākāśa*) are regarded as eternal.

In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality; the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are

¹ I have differed from the *Upaskāra* in the interpretation of this sūtra.

neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (*ekaprthaktva*). The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc. Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist independently (*yutasiddhyabhāvāt*). In the eighth book it is said that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension of qualities, action, generality, and particularity perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the cause of taste, colour and touch¹. In the ninth book negation is described; non-existence (*asat*) is defined as that to which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things may become non-existent and that which is existent in one way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of existence and non-existence². All negation can be directly perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).

In the second chapter the nature of *hetu* (reason) or the middle term is described. It is said that anything connected with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary or as inseparably connected, will serve as *liṅga* (reason). The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or "these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (*avidyā*) is due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite of this is true knowledge (*vidyā*). In the tenth it is said that pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to doubt and certainty.

¹ *Upaskāra* here explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the sūtras.

² In the previous three kinds of non-existence, *prāgabhāva* (negation before production), *dhvaṃsābhāva* (negation after destruction), and *anyonyābhāva* (mutual negation of each other in each other), have been described. The fourth one is *sāmānyābhāva* (general negation).

A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced. Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contact is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of fire is also a cause.

Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the Vedas direct them, they have validity.

Philosophy in the Nyāya sūtras¹.

The *Nyāya sūtras* begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), object of right knowledge (*prameya*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), illustrative instances (*dṛṣṭānta*), accepted conclusions (*siddhānta*), premisses (*avayava*), argumentation (*tarka*), ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), debates (*vāda*), disputations (*jalpa*), destructive criticisms (*vitaṇḍā*), fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*), quibble (*chala*), refutations (*jāti*), points of opponent's defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (*nirṇāya*), is attained. In the second sūtra it is said that salvation (*apavarga*) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*), defects (*doṣa*), endeavours (*pravṛtti*), birth (*janma*), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said to be of four kinds, perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), and testimony (*śabda*). Perception is defined as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three kinds, from cause to effect (*pūrvavat*), effect to cause (*śeṣavat*), and inference from common characteristics (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*). Upamāna is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known thing.

Śabda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (*āpta*)².

¹ This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in *Nyāya sūtras*, supplemented here and there with the views of Vātsyāyana, the commentator. This follows the order of the sūtras, and tries to present their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyāya as possible. The general treatment of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika expounds the two systems in the light of later writers and commentators.

² It is curious to notice that Vātsyāyana says that an ārya, a ṛṣi or a nīleccha (foreigner), may be an āpta (reliable authority).

Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced and which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge are said to be self (*ātman*), body, senses, sense-objects, understanding (*buddhi*), mind (*manas*), endeavour (*pravṛtti*), rebirths, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (*prayatna*), pleasure, pain, and knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects¹; the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as pṛthivī, ap, tejas, vāyu and ākāśa; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (*manas*). Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and body. Doṣas (attachment, antipathy, etc.) are those which lead men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering². Ultimate cessation from pain is called *apavarga*³. Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting opinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That for attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work is called *prayojana*.

Illustrative example (*drṣṭānta*) is that on which both the common man and the expert (*parīkṣaka*) hold the same opinion. Established texts or conclusions (*siddhānta*) are of four kinds, viz. (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called the *sarvatantrasiddhānta*; (2) those which are held by one school or similar schools but opposed by others called the *pratitantra-siddhānta*; (3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally follow called *adhikaraṇasiddhānta*; (4) those of the opponent's views which are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute the consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and bring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (*abhyupagamāsiddhānta*)⁴. The premisses are five:

¹ Here I have followed Vātsyāyana's meaning.

² Vātsyāyana comments here that when one finds all things full of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.

³ Vātsyāyana wants to emphasize that there is no bliss in salvation, but only cessation from pain.

⁴ I have followed Vātsyāyana's interpretation here.

(1) *pratijñā* (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved); (2) *hetu* (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples or negative instances); (3) *udāharaṇa* (positive or negative illustrative instances); (4) *ūpanaya* (corroboration by the instance); (5) *nigamana* (to reach the conclusion which has been proved). Then come the definitions of tarka, nirṇaya, vāda, jalpa, vitanḍā, the fallacies (hetvābhāsa), chala, jāti, and nigrahasthāna, which have been enumerated in the first sūtra.

The second book deals with the refutations of objections against the means of right knowledge (pramāṇa). In refutation of certain objections against the possibility of the happening of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there was always a difference between the two things regarding which doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating characteristics between the two things are not noted. Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object to the validity of the pramāṇa in general and particularly of perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter, and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two happened together then there would be no notion of succession in our cognitions. To this the Nyāya reply is that if there were no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous existence of those different kinds of musical instruments, so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence of those objects of knowledge¹.

The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition of other things may themselves be the objects of right

¹ *Yathāpaścātsiddhena śabdena pūrvāsiddham ātodyamanumīyate sādhyam ca ātodyam sādhanam ca śabdaḥ antarkhite hyātodye svanataḥ anumānam bhavati, vīṇā vādyate venuh pūrvyyate iti svanaviśeṣeṇa ātodyaviśeṣam pratipadyate tathā pūrvāsiddham upalabdhiṇṣayam paścātsiddhena upalabdkhetunā pratipadyate. Vātsyāyana bhāṣya, II. i. 15.*

knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge. The means of right knowledge (pramāṇa) do not require other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves as well.

Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact of the soul with the mind¹. Then it is said that though we perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms². Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this the Nyāya answer is that there is always such a difference in the specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular cause³. In refuting those who object to the existence of time on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time did not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible. The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have perceived things as being done in the past or as going to be done in the future. The validity of analogy (*upamāna*) as a means of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved. The four pramāṇas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture

¹ Here the sūtras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later interpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyāya doctrine of perception, but against the wording of the definition of perception as given in the *Nyāya sūtra*, II. i. 4.

² This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who rejected the existence of wholes (*avayavi*). On this subject a later Buddhist monograph by Paṇḍita Aśoka (9th century A.D.), *Avayavinirākaraṇa* in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, may be referred to.

³ *Pūrvodakaviśiṣṭam khalu varṣodakan śighrataram srotasā bahutaraphenaphalaparṇakāśṭhādīvahanāncopalabhamānaḥ pūrnatvena, nadyā upari vr̥ṣto deva ityanuminioti nodakabṛddhimātrena. Vātsyāyana bhāṣya*, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics, associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river.

are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthāpatti (implication), aitihiya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is also understood—if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere we understand that the same contains eight gallons of corn as well) and abhāva (non-existence) as separate pramāṇas for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthāpatti, sambhava and abhāva are included within inference.

The validity of these as pramāṇas is recognized, but they are said to be included in the four pramāṇas mentioned before. The theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to refer to class-notions (*jāti*), individuals (*vyakti*), and the specific position of the limbs (*ākṛti*), by which the class notion is manifested. Class (*jāti*) is defined as that which produces the notion of sameness (*samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ*).

The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of the self or ātman. It is said that each of the senses is associated with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men; again if there were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize things as having seen them before; the two images produced by the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united together as one visual perception of the things¹; moreover if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition, for the experience of one could not be recognized by another. If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this entity the knower would require some instrument by which it would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the

¹ According to Vātsyāyana, in the two eyes we have two different senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which works in both eyes.

senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained. Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires, and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in previous existences.

The body is made up of the kṣiti element. The visual sense is material and so also are all other senses¹. Incidentally the view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three, fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye, and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive quality of earth, viz. smell.

Against the Sāṃkhya distinction of *buddhi* (cognition) and *cit* (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between the *buddhi* and *cit*. We do not find in our consciousness two elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness, but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Sāṃkhya epistemology that the antaḥkaraṇa assumes diverse forms in cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition of contacts of manas with the senses, ātman and external objects. The Buddhist objection against the Sāṃkhya explanation that the antaḥkaraṇas catch reflection from the external world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at different times is refuted by Nyāya; for it says that it cannot be said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced. In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no coming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but

¹ It is well to remember that Sāṃkhya did not believe that the senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view represented in *Ātreya-saṃhitā* (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika or constituted of the gross elements.

the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The contact of manas with soul (*ātman*) takes place within the body and not in that part of *ātman* which is outside the body; knowledge belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous. Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas). Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given as follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign, (5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor and the possessed or master and servant, or things which are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition, (11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection, (19) merit and demerit¹. It is said that knowledge does not belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body as due to *adr̥ṣṭa* is described. Salvation (*apavarga*) is effected by the manas being permanently separated from the soul (*ātman*) through the destruction of karma.

In the fourth book in course of the examination of *doṣa* (defects), it is said that *moha* (ignorance), is at the root of all other defects such as *rāga* (attachment) and *dveṣa* (antipathy). As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the process of origination. *Īśvara* is regarded as the cause of the production of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, for man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts. A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all things have come into being by no-cause (*animitta*), for then no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.

The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed.

¹ *Nyāya sūtra* 111. ii. 44.

The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (śūnyavādin Bauddhas) that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen. Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless sleep, so there is no affliction (*kleśa*) in the man who attains apavarga (salvation)¹. When once this state is attained all efforts (*pravṛtti*) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism (*aḥaṃkāra*) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects (*doṣa*); about the nature of whole and parts and about the nature of atoms (*aṇus*) which cannot further be divided. A discussion is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijñānavādins that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as leading to right knowledge.

The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations (*nigrahasthāna*) and futilities (*jāti*).

Caraka, Nyāya sūtras and Vaiśeṣika sūtras.

When we compare the *Nyāya sūtras* with the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* we find that in the former two or three different streams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their opponents². This assumption is justified when

¹ Vātsyāyana notes that this is the salvation of him who has known Brahman, IV. i. 63.

² A reference to the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa sūtra* shows that the Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to the worship of Sarasvatī (goddess of learning), who they supposed would help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.

we compare the futilities (jāti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to disputations as found in the *Nyāya sūtra* with those that are found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the *Nyāya sūtra* and *Caraka-saṃhitā* which have treated of these matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g. *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *prayojana*, *pratijñā* and *vitaṇḍā*) follows very closely the definitions given of those in the *Nyāya sūtras*. There are others such as the definitions of *jalpa*, *chala*, *nigrahassthāna*, etc., where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. *pratiṣṭhāpanā*, *jijñāsā*, *vyavasāya*, *vākyadoṣa*, *vākyapraśaṃsā*, *upalambha*, *parihāra*, *abhyamujñā*, etc.) which are not found in the *Nyāya sūtra*¹. Again, the various types of futilities (jāti) and points of opponent's refutation (*nigrahassthāna*) mentioned in the *Nyāya sūtra* are not found in *Caraka*. There are some terms which are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. *aupamyā* in *Caraka*, *upamāna* in *Nyāya sūtra*, *arthāpatti* in *Nyāya sūtra* and *arthaprāpti* in *Caraka*. Caraka does not seem to know anything about the Nyāya work on this subject, and it is plain that the treatment of these terms of disputations in the *Caraka* is much simpler and less technical than what we find in the *Nyāya sūtras*. If we leave out the varieties of jāti and nigrahassthāna of the fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the treatment of Caraka and that of the *Nyāya sūtras*. It seems therefore in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the *Nyāya sūtras* were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation was earlier, whereas the compilation of the *Nyāya sūtras* represents a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work. It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing through the *Nyāya sūtras* is that of a polemic against the doctrines which could be attributed to the Sautrāntika Buddhists, the Vijñānavāda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Sāṃkhya, the Cārvāka, and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no

¹ Like Vaiśeṣika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (*anumāna*) as *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.

further allusion elsewhere. The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* as we have already seen had argued only against the Mimāṃsā, and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with Mimāṃsā in the *Nyāya sūtras* is the same as in the *Vaiśeṣika* over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*) and the akhyāti doctrine of illusion of the Mimāṃsists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later Mimāṃsā and later Nyāya, are never alluded to in the *Nyāya sūtras*. The advocacy of Yoga methods (*Nyāya sūtras*, IV. ii. 38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in *Vaiśeṣika* and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the *Nyāya sūtras*, and the Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda Śāstrī has pointed out¹ is not improbable.

The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, III. i. 18 and III. ii. 1, describe perceptual knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (ātman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of *saṃskāra* (conglomeration etc.). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity (*ayaugapadya*) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with *Vaiśeṣika* as with *Nyāya*. The *Nyāya sūtras* give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of *saṃskāra* or *udbhūtarūpavattva* which *Vaiśeṣika* does. On the question of inference *Nyāya* gives three classifications as *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, but no definition. The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V. S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of *vyāpti* (concomitance of *hetu* (reason) and *sādhya* (probandum)) which became so important in later *Nyāya* has never been properly formulated either in the *Nyāya sūtras* or in the *Vaiśeṣika*. *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya* (*prasiddhipūrvakatvāt apadeśasya*),

¹ J. A. S. B. 1905.

but the technical vyāpti is not known, and the connotation of the term *prasiddhipūrvakatva* of Vaiśeṣika seems to be more loose than the term *vyāpti* as we know it in the later Nyāya. The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* do not count scriptures (*śabda*) as a separate pramāṇa, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. With *Nyāya sūtras* *śabda* as a pramāṇa applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vātsyāyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds *ṛṣi*, *ārya* and *mleccha* (foreigners). Upamāna which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyāya is not even referred to in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*. The *Nyāya sūtras* know of other pramāṇas, such as *arthāpatti*, *sambhava* and *aitihya*, but include them within the pramāṇas admitted by them, but the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* do not seem to know them at all¹. The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* believe in the perception of negation (*abhāva*) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10). The *Nyāya sūtras* (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that *abhāva* as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived². Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyāya and the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* about the acceptance of *abhāva* as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The *Nyāya sūtras* say nothing about the categories of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* which form the main subjects of Vaiśeṣika discussions³. The *Nyāya sūtras* take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with Vaiśeṣika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* do not mention the name of "Īśvara," whereas the *Nyāya sūtras* try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the *Nyāya sūtras* are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the

¹ The only old authority which knows these pramāṇas is Caraka. But he also gives an interpretation of *sambhava* which is different from Nyāya and calls *arthāpatti* *arthaprāpti* (Caraka III. viii.).

² The details of this example are taken from Vātsyāyana's commentary.

³ The *Nyāya sūtra* no doubt incidentally gives a definition of *jāti* as "*samānaprasavātmikā jātih*" (II. ii. 71).

Vaiśeṣika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact of knowledge. Both the Nyāya and the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* admit the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of atomic structure in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are absent there. The Vaiśeṣika calls salvation *nihśreyasa* or *mokṣa* and the Nyāya *apavarga*. Mokṣa with Vaiśeṣika is the permanent cessation of connection with body; the apavarga with Nyāya is cessation of pain¹. In later times the main points of difference between the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya are said to lie with regard to theory of the notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc. Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of relativeness—apekṣābuddhi—notion of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two things); again, the doctrine of pilupāka (changes of qualities by heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyāya held) was held by Vaiśeṣika, which the Naiyāyikas did not admit². But as the *Nyāya sūtras* are silent on these points, it is not possible to say that such were really the differences between early Nyāya and early Vaiśeṣika. These differences may be said to hold between the later interpreters of Vaiśeṣika and the later interpreters of Nyāya. The Vaiśeṣika as we find it in the commentary of Praśastapāda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyāya from the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found from the sixth century onwards.

The Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* by Kaṇāda, also called Aulūkyā the son of Ulūka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It

¹ Professor Vanamāli Vedāntatīrtha quotes a passage from *Samkṣepasānikarajaya*, xvi. 68-69 in *J. A. S. B.*, 1905, and another passage from a Nyāya writer Bhāsarvajña, pp. 39-41, in *J. A. S. B.*, 1914, to show that the old Naiyāyikas considered that there was an element of happiness (*sukha*) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vaiśeṣikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyāya or the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, unless the cessation of pain with Nyāya is interpreted as meaning the presence of some sort of bliss or happiness.

² See Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha-Aulūkyadarśana*.

appears from the *Vāyu purāṇa* that he was born in Prabhāsa near Dvārakā, and was the disciple of Somaśarmā. The time of Praśastapāda who wrote a bhāṣya (commentary) of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity of Praśastapāda's bhāṣya is this that unlike other bhāṣyas (which first give brief explanations of the text of the sūtras and then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining the first brief comments), it does not follow the sūtras but is an independent dissertation based on their main contents¹. There were two other bhāṣyas on the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, namely *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* and *Bharādvāja-vṛtti*, but these are now probably lost. References to the former are found in *Kiraṇāvalībhāskara* of Padmanābha Miśra and also in *Ratnaprabhā* 2. 2. 11. Four commentaries were written on this bhāṣya, namely *Vyomavatī* by Vyomaśekharācārya, *Nyāyakandalī* by Śrīdhara, *Kiraṇāvalī* by Udayana (984 A.D.) and *Līlāvatī* by Śrīvatsācārya. In addition to these Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya of Navadvīpa and Śaṅkara Miśra wrote two other commentaries on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, namely *Bhāṣyasūkti* and *Kaṇāda-rahasya*. Śaṅkara Miśra (1425 A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* called the *Upaskāra*. Of these *Nyāya-kandalī* of Śrīdhara on account of its simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably the best for a modern student of Vaiśeṣika. Its author was a native of the village of Bhūrisṛṣṭi in Bengal (Rāḍha). His father's name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchokā and he wrote his work in 913 Śaka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes at the end of his work.

The *Nyāya sūtra* was written by Akṣapāda or Gautama, and the earliest commentary on it written by Vātsyāyana is known as the *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya*. The date of Vātsyāyana has not

¹ The bhāṣya of Praśastapāda can hardly be called a bhāṣya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories (*Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*). He takes the categories of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* in order and without raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupāka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the first time as the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vaiśeṣika available to us after Kaṇāda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th century A.D.

been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a *Vārttika* on Vātsyāyana's bhāṣya to establish the Nyāya views and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Dinnāga (about 500 A.D.) in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Vācaspatimiśra (840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the *Nyāyavārttika* of Udyotakara called *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* in order to make clear the right meanings of Udyotakara's *Vārttika* which was sinking in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings (*dustarakunibandhapaṅkamagnānām*). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the *Tātparyāṭikā* called *Tātparyāṭikā-parīśuddhi*. Varddhamāna (1225 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*. Padmanābha wrote a sub-commentary on that called *Varddhamānendu* and Śaṅkara Miśra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the *Nyāyatātparyamaṇḍana*. In the seventeenth century Viśvanātha wrote an independent short commentary known as *Viśvanāthavṛtti*, on the *Nyāya sūtra*, and Rādhāmohana wrote a separate commentary on the *Nyāya sūtras* known as *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa*. In addition to these works on the *Nyāya sūtras* many other independent works of great philosophical value have been written on the Nyāya system. The most important of these in medieval times is the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished shortly after Vācaspatimiśra. Jayanta chooses some of the *Nyāya sūtras* for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyāya views quite independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vācaspati's *Tātparyāṭikā*, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another important work is Udayana's *Kusumāñjalī* in which he tries to prove the existence of Īśvara (God). This work ought to be read with its commentary *Prakāśa* by Varddhamāna (1225 A.D.) and its sub-commentary *Makaranda* by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka* is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in which he tries to establish the Nyāya doctrine of soul. In addition to these we have a number of useful works on Nyāya in later times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection with the present work. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* by Viśvanātha with its commentaries *Muktāvalī*, *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī*, *Tarkasamgraha* with *Nyāyanirṇaya*, *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra with

the commentary *Nyāyapradīpa*, *Saptapadārthī* of Śivāditya, *Tārīkarakṣā* of Varadarāja with the commentary *Niṣkaṇṭaka* of Mallinātha, *Nyāyasāra* of Mādhava Deva of the city of Dhāra and *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* of Jānakīnātha Bhaṭṭācārya with the *Nyāyamañjarīsāra* by Yādavācārya, and *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara with *Prabhā* by Śeṣānantācārya.

The new school of Nyāya philosophy known as Navya-Nyāya began with Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya of Mithilā, about 1200 A.D. Gaṅgeśa wrote only on the four pramāṇas admitted by the Nyāya, viz. pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, and śabda, and not on any of the topics of Nyāya metaphysics. But it so happened that his discussion on anumāna (inference) attracted unusually great attention in Navadvīpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumāna portion of his work *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, and many independent treatises on śabda and anumāna were also written by the scholars of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home of Nyāya studies. The commentaries of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi (1500 A.D.), Mathurā Bhaṭṭācārya (1580 A.D.), Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (1650 A.D.) and Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya (1590 A.D.), commentaries on Śīromaṇi's commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, had been very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyāya became the most important study in Navadvīpa and there appeared a series of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject¹. The contribution was not in the direction of metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts².

Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic thinking and the development of a system of highly technical

¹ From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyāya was started in Mithilā (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyāya studies. See Mr Cakravartī's paper, *J. A. S. B.* 1915. I am indebted to it for some of the dates mentioned in this section.

² *Īśvarānumāna* of Raghunātha as well as his *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* are, however, notable exceptions.

expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that so far as the logical portion of the Nyāya system is concerned, though Akṣapāda was the first to write a comprehensive account of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyāya account of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic *Daśavaikālikaniryukti* of Bhadrabāhu (357 B.C.), Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama sūtra*, *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara (533 A.D.) Māṇikyā Nandī's (800 A.D.) *Parikṣāmukha sūtra*, and *Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṇkāra* of Deva Sūri (1159 A.D.) and *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa* of Prabhācandra deserve special notice. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Nyāyapraveśa* of Diṇnāga (500 A.D.), *Pramāṇavārttika kārīkā* and *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti (650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic¹. The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the present volume.

It is interesting to notice that between the *Vātsyāyana bhāṣya* and the Udyotakara's *Vārttika* no Hindu work on logic of importance seems to have been written : it appears that the science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and the Buddhists ; and it was Diṇnāga's criticism of Hindu Nyāya that roused Udyotakara to write the *Vārttika*. The Buddhist and the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we come to Gaṅgeśa, and there is probably only one Hindu work of importance on Nyāya in the Buddhist style namely *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña. Other older Hindu works generally treated of

¹ See *Indian Logic Medieval School*, by Dr S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.

inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyāya interest¹.

The main doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy².

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing.

As the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas depended solely on experience and on valid reasons, they dismissed the Sāṃkhya cosmology, but accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (*bhūtas*), earth (*kṣiti*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), and air (*marut*). These atoms are eternal; the fifth substance (*ākāśa*) is all pervasive and eternal. It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf man though he has the *ākāśa* as his sense of hearing, cannot hear on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense organ³. In addition to these they admitted the existence of time (*kāla*) as extending from the past through the present to the

¹ Almost all the books on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika referred to have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyāya in Bengal," by Mr Cakravartti in *J. A. S. B.* 1915.

² I have treated Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as the same system. Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those of the other. The original character of the two systems has already been treated.

³ See *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 59-64.

endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sāṃkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit of *kāla* is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of *kāla* as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi (*buddhinirmāṇa*) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But *kāla* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is regarded as a substance existing by itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself as past, present, and future. Sāṃkhya regarded it as past, present, and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution (*adhrvan*). The astronomers regarded it as being due to the motion of the planets. These must all be contrasted with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of *kāla* which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless substance which appears as many in association with the changes related to it¹.

The seventh substance is relative space (*dik*). It is that substance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; *kāla* like *dik* is also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight directions and in the upper and lower². The eighth substance is the soul (*ātman*) which is all-pervading. There are separate *ātman*s for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to *ātman*. Manas (mind) is the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory; all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Īśvara. The definition

¹ See *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 64-66, and *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 136-139. The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* regarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.

² See *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 66-69, and *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 140.

of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas the other things such as quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), sameness or generality (*sāmānya*), speciality or specific individuality (*viśeṣa*) and the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) cannot show themselves without the help of substance (*dravya*). *Dravya* is thus the place of rest (*āśraya*) on which all the others depend (*āśṛta*). *Dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, and *samavāya* are the six original entities of which all things in the world are made up¹. When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated². The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types or categories (*padārtha*), and held that the notion of each type was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in number—*dravya*, *guṇa*, etc. If we take a percept “I see a red book,” the book appears to be an independent entity on which rests the concept of “redness” and “oneness,” and we thus call the book a substance (*dravya*); *dravya* is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a *dravya* (*dravyatva*). So also *guṇa* and *karma*. In the subdivision of different kinds of *dravya* also the same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with Sāṃkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say

¹ *Abhāva* (negation) as dependent on *bhāva* (position) is mentioned in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*. Later Nyāya writers such as Udayana include *abhāva* as a separate category, but Śrīdhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that *abhāva* was not counted by Praśastapāda as it was dependent on *bhāva*—“*abhāvasya prthagānupadeśaḥ bhāvoparatantryāt na tvabhāvāt*.” *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 6, and *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, p. 2.

² “*Tattvato jñāteṣu bāhyādhyātmikeṣu viśeṣeṣu doṣadarśanāt viraktasya samīhā-nivṛttau ātmajñāsyā tadarthāni karmānyakurvataḥ tatparityāgasāadhanāni śrutismṛtyudītāni asaṅkalpītapahalanī upādadanāsya ātmajñānamabhyasataḥ prakṛṣṭanivartakadharmopacaye sati paripakvātmaññānasyātyantikaśaṇīravāyogasya bhāvāt*.” *Ibid.* p. 7.

whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would collect "all whiteness" under the name of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed¹. They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate entities or categories.

**The six Padārthas : Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya,
Viśeṣa, Samavāya.**

Of the six classes of entities or categories (*padārtha*) we have already given some account of dravya². Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (*guṇa*) the first one called *rūpa* (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (*citra*). Colours are found only in kṣiti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (*nitya*), but the colour of kṣiti changes when heat is applied, and this, Śridhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of kṣiti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. *Rūpa* is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus *rūpatva* (colourness), and the *rūpa guṇa* (quality) is that on which rests this genus; *rūpa* is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye.

The second is *rasa* (taste), that quality of things which can be apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent (*kaṭu*), astringent (*kaṣāya*) and bitter (*tikta*). Only kṣiti and ap have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. *Rasa* like *rūpa* also denotes the genus *rasatva*, and *rasa* as quality must be distinguished from *rasa* as genus, though both of them are apprehended by the tongue.

The third is *gandha* (odour), that quality which can be apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to kṣiti alone. Water

¹ The reference is to Sautrāntika Buddhism, "yo yo viruddhādhyāsavān nāsāvekaḥ." See Paṇḍitaśoka's *Avayavinirākaraṇa*, *Six Buddhist Nyāya tracts*.

² The word "*padārtha*" literally means denotations of words.

or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence of earth materials.

The fourth is *sparsa* (touch), that quality which can be apprehended only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold, hot, neither hot nor cold. *Sparsa* belongs to *kṣiti*; *ap*, *tejas*, and *vāyu*. The fifth *śabda* (sound) is an attribute of *ākāśa*. Had there been no *ākāśa* there would have been no sound.

The sixth is *saṃkhyā* (number), that entity of quality belonging to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three, etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative oscillatory state of the mind (*apekṣābuddhi*); thus when there are two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion—This is one jug and that is another jug. This is called *apekṣābuddhi*; then in the two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (*dvitva*) and then an indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa-dvitva-guṇa*) of *dvitva* in us and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs. The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a similar manner¹.

The seventh is *parimīti* (measure), that entity of quality in things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is called *parimaṇḍala parimāṇa*; it is eternal, and it cannot generate the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely; when two atoms generate a dyad (*dvaṇuka*) it is not the measure of the atom that generates the *aṇu* (atomic) and the *hrasva* (small) measure of the dyad molecule (*dvaṇuka*), for then the size (*parimāṇa*) of it would have been still smaller than the measure of the atom (*parimaṇḍala*), whereas the measure of the *dvaṇuka* is of a different kind, namely the small (*hrasva*)². Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but then the number (*saṃkhyā*) of the atom should be regarded as bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (*hrasva*) measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (*dvaṇuka*) compose a *tryaṇuka* the number and not the measure “small”

¹ This is distinctively a Vaiśeṣika view introduced by *Prāśastapāda*. *Nyāya* seems to be silent on this matter. See *Śaṅkara Miśra's Upaskāra*, VII. ii. 8.

² It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms as eternal as in “*paramāṇus*” and non-eternal as in the *dvaṇuka*. The *parimaṇḍala parimāṇa* is thus a variety of *aṇuparimāṇa*. The *aṇuparimāṇa* and the *hrasvaparimāṇa* represent the two dimensions of the measure of *dvaṇukas* as *mahat* and *dirgha* are with reference to *tryaṇukas*. See *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 133.

(*hrasva*) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (*mahat*) of the tryaṇuka. But when we come to the region of these gross tryaṇukas we find that the "great" measure of the tryaṇukas is the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by them. For as many tryaṇukas constitute a gross body, so much bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the tryaṇukas of mahat parimāṇa makes things of still more mahat parimāṇa. The measure of tryaṇukas is not only regarded as mahat but also as dīrgha (long) and this dīrgha parimāṇa has to be admitted as coexisting with mahat parimāṇa but not identical, for things not only appear as great but also as long (*dīrgha*). Here we find that the accumulation of tryaṇukas means the accumulation of "great" (*mahat*) and "long" (*dīrgha*) parimāṇa, and hence the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater and longer than the individual atoms which composed them. Now the hrasva parimāṇa of the dyads is not regarded as having a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct type of measure which is called small (*hrasva*). As accumulation of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness, grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the hrasva (small) parimāṇa ought to generate still more hrasva parimāṇa, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of the dyads was the cause of the measure of the tryaṇukas, the tryaṇukas should be even smaller than the dyaṇukas. So also if the atomic and circular (*parimaṇḍala*) size of the atoms is regarded as generating by their measure the measure of the dyaṇukas, then the measure of the dyaṇukas ought to be more atomic than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness and the parimaṇḍala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect. But since the dyads and the tryaṇuka molecules are seen to be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the measure of their effects, but it is their *number* which is the cause

of the measure of the latter. This explains *aṇuparimāṇa*, *hrasva parimāṇa*, *mahat parimāṇa*, and *dirgha parimāṇa*. The *parimāṇa* of *ākāśa*, *kāla*, *dik* and *ātman* which are regarded as all-pervasive, is said to be *paramamahat* (absolutely large). The *parimāṇas* of the atoms, *ākāśa*, *kāla*, *dik*, *manas*, and *ātman* are regarded as eternal (*nitya*). All other kinds of *parimāṇas* as belonging to non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.

The eighth is *prthaktva* (mutual difference or separateness of things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation such as this jug is not this pot.

The ninth is *saṃyoga* (connection), that entity of *guṇa* by virtue of which things appear to us as connected.

The tenth is *vibhāga* (separation), that entity of *guṇa* which destroys the connection or contact of things.

The eleventh and twelfth *guṇas*, *paratva* and *aparatva*, give rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote and near.

The other *guṇas* such as *buddhi* (knowledge), *sukha* (happiness), *duḥkha* (sorrow), *icchā* (will), *d-veṣa* (antipathy or hatred) and *yatna* (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.

The characteristic of *gurutva* (heaviness) is that by virtue of which things fall to the ground. The *guṇa* of *sneha* (oiliness) belongs to water. The *guṇa* of *saṃskāra* is of three kinds, (1) *vega* (velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions, (2) *sthiti-sthāpaka* (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) *bhāvanā* is that quality of *ātman* by which things are constantly practised or by which things experienced are remembered and recognized¹. *Dharma* is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation². *Adharma* is

¹ Praśastapāda says that *bhāvanā* is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the *saṃskāra* becomes particularly strong. See *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 267. Kaṇāda however is silent on these points. He only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the *saṃskāra*, memory (*smṛti*) is produced (IX. 2. 6).

² Praśastapāda speaks of *dharma* (merit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon Śrīdhara points out that this view does not admit that *dharma* is a power of karma (*na karmasāmarthyam*). Sacrifice etc. cannot be *dharma* for these actions being momentary

the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a man to suffer. *Adṛṣṭa* or destiny is that unknown quality of things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with their merits or demerits.

Karma means movement ; it is the third thing which must be held to be as irreducible a reality as *dravya* or *guṇa*. There are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction, (4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of karmas rest on substances just as the *guṇas* do, and cause the things to which they belong to move.

Sāmānya is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as *sat* or existing. This *sat* or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *karma*. This sameness is called *sāmānya* or *jāti*, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on *dravya*, *guṇa*, or *karma*. This highest genus *sattā* (being) is called *para-jāti* (highest universal), the other intermediate *jātis* are called *aparajāti* (lower universals), such as the genus of *dravya*, of *karma*, or of *guṇa*, or still more intermediate *jātis* such as *gotvajāti* (the genus cow), *nīlatvajāti* (the genus blue). The intermediate *jātis* or genera sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as *paśutva* (animal *jāti*) and *gotva* (the cow *jāti*); here however *gotva* appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a *jāti*. The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is *jāti* which from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.

they cannot generate the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action is destroyed its power (*sāmarthyā*) cannot last. So *dharma* is to be admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions of time, place, etc. Faith (*śraddhā*), non-injury, doing good to all beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods, fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by *Prāśastapāda* as producing *dharma*. The person who strictly adheres to these duties and the *yamas* and *niyamas* (cf. *Patañjali's Yoga*) and attains *Yoga* by a meditation on the six *padārthas* attains a *dharma* which brings liberation (*mokṣa*). Śrīdhara refers to the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* account of the method of attaining salvation (*Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 272-280). See also Vallabha's *Nyāyatīlāvati*, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)

This jāti or *sāmānya* thus must be regarded as having a separate independent reality though it is existent in dravya, guṇa and karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent reality of *sāmānya*, but said that the sameness as cow was really but the negation of all non-cows (*apoha*). The perception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns on his own head¹. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika said that negation of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. *Sāmānya* has thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that object¹. This jāti is eternal or non-destructible; for even with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jāti, the latter is not destroyed².

Through *viśeṣa* things are perceived as diverse. No single sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves. The specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it

¹ The Buddhist Paṇḍitāśoka says that there is no single thing running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the *sāmānya* could be established. For if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish jāti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum. Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent (*yadyadupalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat*). *Sāmānya* is such, therefore *sāmānya* is non-existent. No *sāmānya* can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no *sāmānya* can be pointed out as being externally perceptible—*Sāmānyadūṣaṇadikprasāritā*—in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*. The Vedānta also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jāti as a separate substance. So it discards jāti. See *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, *Sikhāmaṇi* and *Maṇi-prabhā*, pp. 69–71. See also Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāṇḍya*, pp. 1079–1086.

² Similarity (*sādrśya*) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as identity in difference (*tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhūyodharmavattvam*).

is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the yogins who can perceive them.

Samavāya, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation by virtue of which two different things such as substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and sāmānya, kāraṇa (cause) and kārya (effect), atoms and viśeṣa, appear so unified that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality. This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jāti in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing. Saṃyoga or contact may take place between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected and may later on be connected (*yutasiddha*), such as when I put my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances and were disconnected; the saṃyoga relation is the guṇa by virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavāya however makes absolutely different things such as dravya and guṇa and karma or kāraṇa and kārya (clay and jug) appear as one inseparable whole (*ayutasiddha*). This relation is thus a separate and independent category. This is not regarded as many like saṃyogas (contact) but as one and eternal because it has no cause. This or that object (e.g. jug) may be destroyed but the samavāya relation which was never brought into being by anybody always remains¹.

These six things are called the six padārthas or independent realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.

The Theory of Causation.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus

¹ The Vedānta does not admit the existence of the relation of samavāya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus Śāṅkara says (*Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya* II. ii. 13) that if a samavāya relation is to be admitted to connect two different things, then another samavāya would be necessary to connect it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). Nyāya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of anavasthā—*prāmāṇikī* (valid infinite, as in case of the question of the seed and the tree, or of the avidyā and the passions), and another *aprāmāṇikī anavasthā* (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything involves an infinite chain before it can be completed.

they admitted *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma* and *sāmānya*. Viśeṣa they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent before but was newly produced. This is what is called the doctrine of *asatkāryavāda*. This is just the opposite of the Sāṃkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed (*nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*) and that the non-existent could never be produced (*nāsato vidyate bhāvaḥ*). The objection to this view is that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika answer is that the view is not that anything that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced was non-existent¹.

It is held by Mīmāṃsā that an unseen power resides in the cause which produces the effect. To this Nyāya objects that this is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained by molecular movement (*parispanda*). There is nothing except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence) between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (*anyathāsiddhiśūnyasya niyatāpūrvavarttitā*). Unconditionality and invariability are indispensable for *kāryakāraṇa-bhāva* or cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional upon something else (*na svātantryeṇa*). The potter's stick is an unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour

¹ *Nyāyamāñjuri*, p. 494.

of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable antecedents or what enters into the production of their co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and ākāśa (ether) as the substrate and vāyu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar), the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded as causal conditions. Thus Dr Seal in describing it rightly remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral, secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of energy. This test the Nyāya would accept only in the sense of an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (*parispanda eva bhautiko vyāpāraḥ karotyārthaḥ atīndriyastu vyāparo nāsti*. Jayanta's Mañjarī Āhnika I), but would emphatically reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious causal power or efficiency (*śakti*)¹." With Nyāya all energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyāya—its insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations of the different causal conditions—that these operations are of the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely repudiates the Sāṃkhya conception of power or productive

¹ Dr P. C. Ray's *Hindu Chemistry*, 1909, pp. 249-250.

efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (*atīndriya*) and finds nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements of operative conditions (*kāraṇa-sāmagrī*), and nothing in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions¹. Certain general conditions such as relative space (*dik*), time (*kāla*), the will of Īśvara, destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*) are regarded as the common cause of all effects (*kāryatva-prayojaka*). Those are called *sādhkāraṇa-kāraṇa* (common cause) as distinguished from the specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called *asādhkāraṇa kāraṇa*. It may not be out of place here to notice that Nyāya while repudiating transcendental power (*śakti*) in the mechanism of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of metaphysical conditions like merit (*dharma*), which constitutes a system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical systems and order of nature.

The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species, is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from a certain *a priori* principle like that of causality or identity of essence².

The material cause such as the clay is technically called the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the jug. *Samavāya* means as we have seen an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A *kāraṇa* is called *samavāyi* when its materials are found inseparably connected with the materials of the effect. *Asamavāyi-kāraṇa* is that which produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of the *samavāyi* or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This colour of the clay is thus called the *asamavāyi* cause of the jug. Any quality (*guṇa*) or movement which existing in the *samavāya* cause in the *samavāya* relation determines the characteristics of the effect is called the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*. The instrumental

¹ Dr P. C. Ray's *Hindu Chemistry*, 1909, pp. 249-250.

² See for this portion Dr B. N. Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, pp. 263-266. *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* on Buddhism. *Nyāyamāñjarī*, *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, with *Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī*, and *Tarkasamgraha*. The doctrine of Anyathāsiddhi was systematically developed from the time of Gaṅgeśa.

nimitta and accessory (*sahakāri*) causes are those which help the material cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel and the stick may be regarded as the *nimitta* and the *sahakāri* causes of the effect.

We know that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards the effect as non-existent, before the operation of the cause in producing it, but it holds that the *guṇas* in the cause are the causes of the *guṇas* in the effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the black colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an extraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clay jug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the colour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another important exception is to be found in the case of the production of the *parimāṇas* of *dvyāṇukas* and *trasareṇus* which are not produced by the *parimāṇas* of an *aṇu* or a *dyaṇuka*, but by their number as we have already seen.

Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (Sṛṣṭi).

The doctrine of *pralaya* is accepted by all the Hindu systems except the Mīmāṃsā¹. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view Īśvara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings desires to bring about dissolution (*saṃhāreccho bhavati*). Simultaneously with it the *adṛṣṭa* force residing in all the souls and forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act (*śakti-pratibandha*). As a result of this no further bodies, senses, or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about of the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of Īśvara) the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations as bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to the disintegrated atomic state, then all *ap*, then all *tejas* and then all *vāyu*. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated with *dharma*, *adharma* and past impressions (*saṃskāra*) remain suspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that souls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless, non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected with bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of *manas*. In the state of *pralaya* owing to the *adṛṣṭa* of souls the

¹ The doctrine of *pralaya* and *sṛṣṭi* is found only in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, but the *sūtras* of both the systems seem to be silent on the matter.

atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the part of Īśvara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.

At the time of creation, Īśvara wishes to create and this desire of Īśvara works in all the souls as *adrṣṭa*. This one eternal desire of Īśvara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of *pralaya*) as accessory causes (*sahakāri*) helps the disintegration of atoms and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation. When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called *adrṣṭa*. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this *adrṣṭa* is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play. At the time of creation action first begins in the *vāyu* atoms by the kinetic function of this *adrṣṭa*, by the contact of the souls with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact with one another and the *dvyanukas* are formed and then in a similar way the *tryanukas* are formed, and thus *vāyu* originates. After *vāyu*, the *ap* is formed by the conglomeration of water atoms, and then the *tejas* atoms conglomerate and then the earth atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the gross form, the god *Brahmā* and all the worlds are created by Īśvara and *Brahmā* is directed by Īśvara to do the rest of the work. *Brahmā* thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Īśvara brings about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for the attainment of the highest good, *mukti*. Moreover Īśvara arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes or punishments according to good or bad deeds¹. Many Nyāya books do not speak of the appointment of a *Brahmā* as deputy for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma according to merit or demerit. It is also held that *pralaya* and creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of men, or that it may be due to a mere play (*līlā*) of Īśvara. Īśvara is one, for if there were many Īśvaras they might quarrel. The will of Īśvara not only brings about dissolution and creation,

¹ See *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 48-54.

but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen. The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions. Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire (*icchā*) of Īśvara may thus be compared with the *icchā* of Īśvara as we find it in the Yoga system.

Proof of the Existence of Īśvara.

Sāṃkhya asserts that the teleology of the prakṛti is sufficient to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The Mīmāṃsakas, the Cārvākas, the Buddhists and the Jains all deny the existence of Īśvara (God). Nyāya believes that Īśvara has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is Īśvara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose, but is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is a collocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other individual objects (e.g. jug, etc.), which we call effects. The world being an effect like any other effect must have a cause like any other effect. The objection made against this view is that such effects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agents as their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers, oceans etc. is so utterly different in form from ordinary effects that we notice every day, that the law that every effect must have a cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. The answer that Nyāya gives is that the concomitance between two things must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specific peculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I had seen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and had thence formed the notion that "wherever there is smoke there is fire"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and small fires, could I say that only small quantities of smoke could lead us to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore large volumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not be sufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest?

Thus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effects are preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariably and unconditionally preceded by causes. This world therefore being an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is Īśvara. This cause we cannot see, because Īśvara has no visible body, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said that we see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they are not produced by any agent. To such an objection the Nyāya answer is that even they are created by God, for they are also effects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is not because there is no maker of them, but because the creator cannot be seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there was no invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he point to it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not done it is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legitimate for us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots as well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause. This cause is Īśvara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful. At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our father who is always engaged in doing us good¹.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Physics.

The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms. These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity (or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour, taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of heat. Ākāśa (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being only as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel wave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combination is only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot exist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmospheric air however consists of atoms in an uncombined state.

Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule (*dvyaṇuka*). Two, three, four, or five *dvyaṇukas* form themselves into grosser molecules of *tryaṇuka*, *caturaṇuka*, etc.² Though this was the generally current view, there was also another view as has been pointed out by Dr B. N. Seal in his *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, that the "atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite," and that

¹ See Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 190-204, and Udayana's *Kusumāñjali* with *Prakāśa* and *Īśvarānumāna* of Raghunātha.

² *Kadūcit tribhīrārabhyate iti tryaṇukamityucyate, kadūcit caturbhīrārabhyate kadūcit pañcabhīriti yatheṣṭam kalpanā. Nyāyakandalī*, p. 32.

they do so in twos, threes, or fours, "either by the atoms falling into groups of threes, fours, etc. directly, or by the successive addition of one atom to each preceding aggregate¹." Of course the atoms are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. It must however be noted in this connection that behind this physical explanation of the union of atoms there is the *adṛṣṭa*, the will of *Īśvara*, which gives the direction of all such unions in harmony with the principle of a "moral government of the universe," so that only such things are produced as can be arranged for the due disposal of the effects of karma. "An elementary substance thus produced by primary atomic combination may however suffer qualitative changes under the influence of heat (*pākajotpatti*)."² The impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a *dvyaṇuka* into the atoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determining them all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to impinge reunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or other molecules in different orders or arrangements, which account for the specific characters or qualities finally produced. The *Vaiśeṣika* holds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, then change of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination, under the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrine of *pīlupāka* (heating of atoms). *Nyāya* on the other hand thinks that no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of qualities, but it is the molecules which assume new characters under the influence of heat. Heat thus according to *Nyāya* directly affects the characters of the molecules and changes their qualities without effecting a change in the atoms. *Nyāya* holds that the heat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object and thereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole is not disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, for such a procedure is never experienced by observation. This is called the doctrine of *piṭharapāka* (heating of molecules). This is one of the few points of difference between the later *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems³.

Chemical compounds of atoms may take place between the

¹ Utpala's commentary on *Brhatsamhitā* 1. 7.

² See Dr B. N. Seal in P. C. Ray's *Hindu Chemistry*, pp. 190-191, *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 438, and Udyotakara's *Vārttika*. There is very little indication in the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* that they had any of those differences indicated here. Though there are slight indications of these matters in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* (vii. 1), the *Nyāya sūtras* are almost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory of creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after *Vātsyāyana*.

atoms of the same bhūta or of many bhūtas. According to the Nyāya view there are no differences in the atoms of the same bhūta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of the compound of the same bhūta are due only to diverse collocations of those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (III. i. 4) that there is no difference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed, since these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impact of heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat and heat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastes etc. in the original bhūta atoms. The change of these physical characters depends on the colours etc. of the constituent substances in contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on the species of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaks bodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and forms separate bodies with them.

Praśastapāda (the commentator of Vaiśeṣika) holds that in the higher compounds of the same bhūta the transformation takes place (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the compound molecules, atoms specially determined as the compound and not in the original atoms of the bhūta entering into the composition of the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd, the transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determined as milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that the milk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of the original bhūta of which the milk is a modification. The change as curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk molecule has not to be disintegrated into kṣiti or ap atoms. So again in the fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which in the Vaiśeṣika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accompaniments of other bhūtas) are broken up into homogeneous earth atoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animal heat and biomotor force vāyu to form the germ (*kalala*). But when the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from the blood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules of the germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i.e. atoms specifically determined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm. These germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms of the food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues¹. This atomic contact is called *ārambhaka-samyoga*.

¹ See Dr B. N. Seal's *Positive Sciences*, pp. 104-108, and *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 33-34, "Śarīrārambhe paramāṇava eva kāraṇam na śukra-sonitasannipātaḥ kriyāvibhāga-

In the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there is another kind of contact called *upaṣṭambha*. Thus in the case of such compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atoms cannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded by the water atoms which congregate round the former, and by the infra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiar qualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compounds are also possible where the ap, tejas, or the vāyu atoms form the inner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e.g. gold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the surrounding upaṣṭambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap) are regarded as physical mixtures.

Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the stores of heat required for chemical change. But there are differences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind of contact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical action which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what transforms flavour or taste.

Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely small particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions rectilinearly with inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through the interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, as when water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency light rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with *pari-spanda* of the nature of deflection or refraction (*tiryag-gamana*). In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound back—which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform the physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recombine them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable velocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical combination¹. Govardhana a later Nyāya writer says that pāka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that

dīnyāyena tayorvināṣe sati utpannapākajaiḥ paramāṇubhīrārambhāt, na ca sukraśonita-paramāṇūnām kaścidviśeṣaḥ pāthivātvaṁviśeṣāt....Pituh sukraṁ mātuh śonitaṁ tayos sannipātānantaram jatharānālasambandhāt sukra-śonitārambhakeṣu paramāṇuṣu pūrvarūpādivināṣe samāṇaguṇāntarotpattau dṛyaṇukādikrameṇa kalalāśarīropattiḥ tatrāntahkaraṇapraveśo...tatra māturāhāraro mātṛayā saṁkrāmāte, adṛṣṭavaśāttatra punarjatharānālasambandhāt kalalārambhakaparamāṇuṣu kriyāvibhāgādīnyāyena kalalāśarīre naṣṭe samutpannapākajaiḥ kalalārambhakaparamāṇubhīradṛṣṭavaśād upajātakriyairāhāraparamāṇubhīḥ saha sambhūya śarīrāntaramārabhyate."

¹ See Dr Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Hindus*.

changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the same a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When grass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into such forms as those that belong to milk¹.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system all action of matter on matter is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (*prayatna*) is distinguished from all forms of motion as against the Sāṃkhya doctrine which considered everything other than puruṣa (intelligence) to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore to be subject to vibratory motion.

The Origin of Knowledge (Pramāṇa).

The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We have already seen that Sāṃkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or puruṣa. The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence of the self.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (*sāmagrī*) which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus called *pramāṇa* or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge². None of the separate elements composing

¹ Govardhana's *Nyāyabodhinī* on *Tarkasaṃgraha*, pp. 9, 10.

² "Avyabhičārīnimasandīgdhārthopalabdhīm vidadhatī bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam." *Nyāyamaijārī*, p. 12. Udyotakara however defined "*pramāṇa*" as *upalabdhihetu* (cause of knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have followed, but it emphasizes the side of *vyāpāra* or movement of the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge is produced. In *Vācaspati* says: "*siddhamindriyādi, asiddhañca tatsannikarṣādi vyāpārayannutpādayan karaṇa eva caritārthaḥ karaṇaṁ tvindriyādi tatsannikarṣādi vā nānyatra caritārthamiti sākṣādupalabdhāveva phale vyāpriyate.*" *Tātparyatikā*, p. 15. Thus it is the action of the senses as *pramāṇa* which is the direct cause of the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the

the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly. These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate cognition as qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) in determinate perceptions, the knowledge of *liṅga* in inference, the seeing of similar things in *upamāna*, the hearing of sound in *śabda*) but also the assemblage of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception, capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations that is called *pramāṇa*.

Nyāya argues that in the Sāṃkhya view knowledge originates by the transcendent influence of *puruṣa* on a particular state of *buddhi*; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does not belong to *buddhi* as it is non-intelligent, though it contains within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept (knowledge). The *puruṣa* to whom the knowledge belongs, however, neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental contact of the *puruṣa* with *buddhi* is but a mere semblance or appearance or illusion, then the Sāṃkhya has to admit that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge is false. And since all knowledge is false, the Sāṃkhyists have precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.

There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should

subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense. “*Pramātṛ-prameyayoh pramāṇe caritārthatvamacaritārthatvaṃ pramāṇasya tasmāt tadeva phalahetuḥ. Pramātṛprameye tu phaloddeśena pravṛtṭe iti tuddhetū kathaṃcit.*” *Ibid.* p. 16.

express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the object. The doctrine of the Vijñāna vādins, that it is knowledge alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object in such a manner that knowledge as object should require the knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on *ad infinitum*. Again if pramāṇa be defined as *prāpana* (capacity of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called pramāṇa. These views moreover do not explain the origin of knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes intellectual and physical¹. There is no transcendent element involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena are produced².

The four Pramāṇas of Nyāya.

We know that the Cārvākas admitted perception (*pratyakṣa*) alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika admitted two sources, *pratyakṣa* and inference (*anumāna*)³. Sāṃkhya added *śabda* (testimony) as the third source;

¹ See *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 12-26.

² Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Gaṅgeśa, a later naiyāyika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be successful, I call it valid knowledge. *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, K. Tarkavāgīśa's edition, *Prāmāṇyavāda*.

³ The *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramāṇa. The view that Vaiśeṣika only admitted two pramāṇas, perception and inference, is traditionally accepted, "*pratyakṣamekaṃcārvākāḥ kaṇādasugataiḥ punaḥ anumānaṃ taccāpi*, etc." *Prāśastapāda* divides all cognition (*buddhi*) as *vidyā* (right knowledge) and *avidyā* (ignorance). Under *avidyā* he counts *saṃśaya* (doubt or uncertainty), *viparyaya* (illusion or error), *anadhyavasāya* (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and *svapna* (dream). Right knowledge (*vidyā*) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages (*ārṣa*). Interpreting the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* 1. i. 3,

Nyāya adds a fourth, *upamāna* (analogy). The principle on which the four-fold division of *pramāṇas* depends is that the causal collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of our perception, may become the object of inference or *śabda* (testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be admitted that inference and *śabda* are different *pramāṇas*, though they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyāya thus objects to the incorporation of *śabda* (testimony) or *upamāna* within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different *pramāṇas*¹.

Perception (Pratyakṣa).

The *naiyāyikas* admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of *ākāśa*, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The conative senses (*vāk*, *pāṇi*, *pāda*, *pāyu*, and *upastha*) recognized in *Sāṃkhya* as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body.

Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such

VI. i. 1, and VI. i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. *Arthāpatti* (implication) and *anupalabdhi* (non-perception) are also classed as inference and *upamāna* (analogy) and *aitihya* (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.

¹

Sāmagribhedāt phalabhedācca pramāṇabhedaḥ

Anye eva hi sāmagrīphale pratyakṣalingayoh

Anye eva ca sāmagrīphale śabdopamāṇayoh. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 33.

as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate¹. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow, the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (*śabda-pramāṇa*). That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact of the senses with the object is said to be the product of the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and (*savikalpa*) determinate. Indeterminate perception is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of perception in which it appears without any association with name. Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate perception of a thing called *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*. If at the time of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that product is said to constitute *nirvikalpa* perception which results from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with the object. Of this *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate) perception it is held by the later *naiyāyikas* that we are not conscious of it directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first stage without which the determinate consciousness could not arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception. The contact of the sense with the object is regarded as being of six kinds: (1) contact with the *dravya* (thing) called *saṃyoga*, (2) contact with the *guṇas* (qualities) through the thing (*saṃyukta-samavāya*) in which they inhere in *samavāya* (inseparable) relation, (3) contact with the *guṇas* (such as colour etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness (*rūpatva*), which inhere in the *guṇas* in the *samavāya* relation.

¹ Gaṅgeśa, a later *naiyāyika* of great reputation, describes perception as immediate awareness (*pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvam lakṣaṇam*).

This species of contact is called *saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*, for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour is in *samavāya* relation, and in the specific colour there is the colour universal or the generic character of colour in *samavāya* relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called *samavāya* by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory sense is *ākāśa* and the sound exists in *ākāśa* in the *samavāya* relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar kind of contact called *samaveta-samavāya*. (5) The generic character of sound as the universal of sound (*śabdatva*) is perceived by the kind of contact known as *samaveta-samavāya*. (6) There is another kind of contact by which negation (*abhāva*) is perceived, namely *saṃyukta viśeṣaṇa* (as qualifying contact). This is so called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation. Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen that Nyāya admits not only the substances and qualities but all kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).

The most important thing about the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge is indeed *arthaprakāśa*, revelation of objects, and it is called perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well. The senses according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are material and we have seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental (*atīndriya*) power (*śakti*) than that of actual vibratory

movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition¹. The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced by the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called *ālocana-jñāna* (sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character (*sukhasāadhanatvasmṛti*) and as a result of that I perceive the orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character². It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant cause (*sahakāri*). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind, yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact, it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process. Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals associated with them but also with negation. A perception is erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does not possess (*atasmiṃstaditi*) and right knowledge (*pramā*) is that which presents an object with a character which it really has

¹ *Na khatvatindriyā śaktirasmābhirupagamyate
yayā saha na kāryasya sambandhajñānasambhavaḥ.*

Nyāyamañjarī, p. 69.

² *Sukhādi manasā buddhvā kapīthādi ca cakṣuṣā
tasya karaṇatā tatra manasaivāvagamyate...
...Sambandhagrahanakāle yattatkapīthādīviṣayamaḥṣajam
jñānam tadupādeyādījñānaphalamiti bhāṣyakṛtaścetasi sthitam
sukhasāadhanatvajñānamupādeyajñānam.*

Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.

(*tadvati tatprakārakānubhava*)¹. In all cases of perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object, but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions that it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream that it is misapprehended as a stream². Jayanta observes that on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by illusion³. In the case of mental delusions however there is no sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions⁴. This doctrine of illusion is known as *viparītakhyāti* or *anyathākhyāti*. What existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (*hrdaye parisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhāsanam*)⁵. Later Vaiśeṣika as interpreted by Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara is in full agreement with Nyāya in this doctrine of illusion (*bhrama* or as Vaiśeṣika calls it *viparyaya*) that the object of illusion is always the right thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics⁶.

I have pointed out above that Nyāya divided perception into two classes as *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate) and *savikalpa* (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vācaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this *avikalpika* or *nirvikalpika* stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal

¹ See Udyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 37, and Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 401, *Bibliotheca Indica*.

² "Indriyenāloca maricīn uccāvacamuccalato nirvikalpena gṛhītvā paścāttatropaghātadoṣāt viparyyati, savikalpakō'sya pratyayo bhrānto jāyate tasmādvijñānasya vabhidhāro nārthasya, Vācaspati's *Tātparyatikā*," p. 87.

³ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 88.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 89 and 184.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 184.

⁶ *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 177-181, "Śuktisaṃyuktenendriyeṇa doṣasahakāriṇā rajata-saṃskārasaciveṇa sādṛśyamanurundhatā śuktikāviśayo rajatādhyavasāyah kṛtaḥ."

it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange." The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage, the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and attribute (*jātyādisvarūpāvagāhi na tu jātyādinām mitho viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāvāvagāhīti yāvat*)¹. He thinks that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary persons, for the association of the names and relations could be distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage². Śrīdhara, in explaining the Vaiśeṣika view, seems to be largely in agreement with the above view of Vācaspati. Thus Śrīdhara says that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not consciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this," which can only take place at the savikalpa stage³. Vācaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others, but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite subject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyāya writers however, following Gaṅgeśa, hold an altogether different opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge means the knowledge of mere predication without any association with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers. But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual cognition and not a psychological stage. They would

¹ *Tātparyatīkā*, p. 82, also *ibid.* p. 91, "prathamamālocito'rthaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣavān."

² *Ibid.* p. 84, "tasmādvutpannasyāpi nāmadheyasmarāṇāya pūrvameṣitatavo vinaiva nāmadheyamarthapratyayaḥ."

³ *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 189 ff., "ataḥ savikalpakāmicchatā nirvikalpakamapyeṣitavyam, tacca na sāmānyamātram grhṇāti bhedasyāpi pratibhāsanāt nāpi svalakṣaṇamātram sāmānyākāraṣyāpi samvedanāt vyaktyantaradarśane pratisandhānēcā, kintu sāmānyam viśeṣaṇobhayamāpi grhṇāti yadi paramidaṁ sāmānyamayam viśeṣaḥ ityevam vivicya na pratyeti vasīvantarānusandhānavirahāt, pīndāntarānuvṛttigrahaṇāddhi sāmānyam vivicyate, vyāvṛttigrahaṇādvīśeṣoyamiti vivekaḥ."

not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñānam prati hi viśeṣaṇatāvaccchedakaparakāram jñānam kāraṇam*)¹. So, before any determinate knowledge such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected with universality or any other relations (*jātyādiyojanārahitaṁ vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi niṣprakāraṇam nirvikalpakaṁ*)². But this stage is never psychologically experienced (*atīndriya*) and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate with a subject. Thus Viśvanātha says in his *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, "the cognition which does not involve relationing cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower, the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the predicative quality (*viśeṣaṇatāvaccchedaka*) of the predicate 'jug' which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative quality, the content³." But in order that the knowledge of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at which the universal or the pure predication should be known and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be related to the particular with which it is associated.

But both the old and the new schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception consists in the attribution of jāti (universal), guṇa (quality),

¹ *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 812.

² *Ibid.* p. 809.

³ *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on *Bhāṣāpariccheda kārīkā*, 58.

kriyā (action), nāma (name), and dravya (substance) to things¹. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different from that which moves. But name is completely different from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference of the Nyāya ontological position with that of the Buddhists, for we know that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika believe jāti, guṇa and kriyā to be different from substance and therefore the predicating of them of substance as different categories related to it at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vācaspati replies that the memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated until the second stage through the joint action of memory is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual perception. To this Vācaspati says that through the help of memory or past impressions (*samskāra*) this can be considered as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is

¹ *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 93-100, "Pañca caite kalpanā bhavanti jātikalpanā, guṇakalpanā, kriyākalpanā, nāmakalpanā dravyakalpanā ceti, tāśca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanāt kvaccca bhede'pyabhedakalpanāt kalpanā ucyante." See Dharmakīrti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book.

present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an object of past experience refers to a past time and place and is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with an object which is experienced at the present moment. It has to be admitted that Vācaspati's answer is not very satisfactory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception which was challenged by the Buddhists¹. It is easy to see that early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual development of perception as the progressive effects of causal operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the self and the object under the influence of various intellectual (e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vedānta, require that right perception should only give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon the variety of causal collocations.

Mind according to Nyāya is regarded as a separate sense and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy and will. The later Nyāya writers speak of three other kinds of contact of a transcendental nature called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *jñānalakṣaṇa* and *yogaśa* (miraculous). The contact *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a particular we are transcendently (*alaukika*) in contact with all the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all smoke in general. *Jñānalakṣaṇa* contact is that by virtue of which we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*) by virtue of which this is rendered

¹ *Tātparyaṭīkā*, pp. 88-95.

possible is called jñānalakṣaṇa. But the knowledge acquired by these two contacts is not counted as perception¹.

Pleasures and pains (*sukha* and *duḥkha*) are held by Nyāya to be different from knowledge (jñāna). For knowledge interprets, conceives or illumines things, but *sukha* etc. are never found to appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then that experience which generates *sukha* in one should have generated the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should have manifested its nature as *sukha* to all; and this does not happen, for the same thing which generates *sukha* in one might not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain, it is evident that there must be some differences between the pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different, and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case was associated with *sukha* and in another case with *duḥkha*. This shows that *sukha* and *duḥkha* are not themselves knowledge. Such is the course of things that *sukha* and *duḥkha* are generated by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through or in association with other objects either in direct perception or in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes in their production.

The yogins are believed to have the *pratyakṣa* of the most distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"

¹ *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on *Kārikā* 63 and 64. We must remember that Gaṅgeśa discarded the definition of perception as given in the *Nyāya sūtra* which we have discussed above, and held that perception should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle (*Tattvacintāmaṇi*, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by Udyotakara as mentioned above.

and this may happen to be true. This is called *pratibhāna-jñāna*, which is also to be regarded as a *pratyakṣa* directly by the mind. This is of course different from the other form of perception called *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, by which memories of past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the eye, but the *manas* perceives it directly and associates the visual percept with it. According to Vedānta this acquired perception is only a case of inference. The *prātibha-pratyakṣa* however is that which is with reference to the happening of a future event. When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by the mind again coming in contact for re-perception of the cognition which had already been generated in the soul. This second re-perception is called *anuvyavasāya*, and all practical work can proceed as a result of this *anuvyavasāya*¹.

Inference.

Inference (*anumāna*) is the second means of proof (*pramāṇa*) and the most valuable contribution that Nyāya has made has been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or *liṅga* which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called *liṅga*, or *hetu*. That about which the assertion has been made (the hill in this example) is called *pakṣa*, and the term "fire" is called *sādhya*. To make a correct inference it is necessary that the *hetu* or *liṅga* must be present in the *pakṣa*,

¹ This later Nyāya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be contrasted with the *tripuṭipratyakṣa* doctrine of Prabhākara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously in knowledge. *Vyavasāya* (determinate cognition), according to Gaṅgeśa, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called *anu* (after) *vyavasāya* (cognition), "*idam ahaṃ jānāmi ity vyavasāye na bhāsate tad-bodhahendriyasannikarṣābhāvāt kintu vidanṛvīṣayakajñānatvaviśiṣṭasya jñānasya vaiśiṣṭyamātmani bhāsate; na ca svaprakāṣe vyavasāye tādṛśaṃ svasya vaiśiṣṭyaṃ bhāsitumarhati, pūrvam viśeṣaṇasya tasyājñānāt, tasmā didam ahaṃ jānāmi na vyavasāyah kintu anuvyavasāyah.*" *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 795.

and in all other known objects similar to the pakṣa in having the sādhyā in it (sapakṣa-sattā), i.e., which are known to possess the sādhyā (possessing fire in the present example). The liṅga must not be present in any such object as does not possess the sādhyā (*vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*) absent from vipakṣa or that which does not possess the sādhyā). The inferred assertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or the testimony of the śāstra (*abādhitā-viśayatva*). The liṅga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible (*asat-pratipakṣa*). The violation of any one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu as determining the inference, and thus would only make the hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvābhāsa or seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the pakṣa) does not possess¹. This hetvābhāsa is technically called *asiddha-hetu*. Again, hetvābhāsa of the second type, technically called *viruddha-hetu*, may be exemplified in the case that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being created" is present in the opposite of sādhyā (*vipakṣa*), namely non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, technically called *anaikāntika-hetu*, is found in the case that sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being an object of knowledge" (*prameyatva*) is here the hetu, but it is present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sādhyā), as well as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the sādhyā), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the sādhyā is not absolute (*anaikāntika*). A fallacy of the fourth type, technically called *kālītyayāpadiṣṭa*, may be found in the example—fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc. Here pratyakṣa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called *prakaraṇasama*, is to be found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-

¹ It should be borne in mind that Nyāya did not believe in the doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mīmāṃsā did. Eternality of sound meant with Mīmāṃsā the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of movement of the vocal muscles.

eternal, since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like ākāśa is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against inference by the Cārvākas, that inferential arguments are valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz. *tādātmya* (essential identity) and *tadutpatti* (succession in a relation of cause and effect). *Tādātmya* is a relation of genus and species and not of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*). The relation of *tadutpatti* is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.

Nyāya holds that inference is made because of the invariable association (*niyama*) of the *liṅga* or *hetu* (the concomitance of which with the *sādhya* has been safeguarded by the five conditions noted above) with the *sādhya*, and not because of such specific relations as *tādātmya* or *tadutpatti*. If it is held that the inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential identity, but to the invariable association of the *liṅga* (mark) with the *liṅgin* (the possessor of *liṅga*), otherwise called *niyama*. The argument from *tadutpatti* (association as cause and effect) is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference, where the association as cause and effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the *liṅga* with the *liṅgin*, as safeguarded by the conditions noted above, is what leads us to make a valid inference¹.

We perceived in many cases that a *liṅga* (e.g. smoke) was associated with a *liṅgin* (fire), and had thence formed the notion

¹ See *Nyāyamaijārī* on anumāna.

that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered the concomitance (*vyāpti*) of smoke and fire which we had observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the *liṅga* (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its concomitance with fire (*tr̥tīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*) is thus the cause (*anumitikaṇa* or *anumāna*) of the inference (*anumiti*). The concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called *vyāpti*. When this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with those having fire, it is called *bahirvyāpti*; and when it refers to the conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was observed, it is called *antarvyāpti*. The Buddhists since they did not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred *antarvyāpti* view of concomitance to *bahirvyāpti* as a means of inference¹.

Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign (*hetu*) with the signate (*sādhya*), how are we to assure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (*vyāptigraha*) had been correct, and the observation of concomitance had been valid. The Mīmāṃsā school held, as we shall see in the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire. But Nyāya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically called *anvayavyāpti* and the latter *vyatirekavyāpti*. But even this is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomi-

¹ See *Antarvyāptisamarthana*, by Ratnākaraśānti in the *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, 1910.

tance, or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately followed by the disappearance of smoke (*yasmin sati bhavanam yato vinā na bhavanam iti bhūyodarsanam*, *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the ass and the smoke¹. But of course it might be that what we concluded to be the *hetu* by the above observations of *anvaya-vyatireka* might not be a real *hetu*, and there might be some other condition (*upādhi*) associated with the *hetu* which was the real *hetu*. Thus we know that fire in green wood (*ārdrendhana*) produced smoke, but one might doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it. But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would have to be dispensed with (*vyāghāta*). Thus such doubts as lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or unsettle the notion of *vyāpti* or concomitance at which we had arrived by careful observation and consideration². The Buddhists and the *naiyāyikas* generally agreed as to the method of forming the notion of concomitance or *vyāpti* (*vyāptigraha*), but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance always depended on a relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence, whereas *Nyāya* held that neither the relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was quite a number of other types of inference which could not be brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening other things would happen could certainly exist, even without the supposition of an identity of essence.

But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to

¹ See *Tātparyaṭīkā* on *anumāna* and *vyāptigraha*.

² *Tātparyaṭīkā* on *vyāptigraha*, and *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa on *vyāptigraha*.

infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyāya holds however that though different causes are often found to produce the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances, the special manner in which the water flows by small rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we see that Nyāya relied on empirical induction based on uniform and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists assumed *a priori* principles of causality or identity of essence. It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyāya works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves assured that there was no such upādhi (condition) associated with the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sādhyā in a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition (*upādhi*) without which no smoke could be produced. It is on account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the validity of vyāpti, it is necessary that we must be assured that there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide experience (*bhūyodarśana*).

Praśastapāda in defining inference as the "knowledge of that (e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of the reason" described a valid reason (*liṅga*) as that which is connected with the object of inference (*anumeya*) and which exists wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases

where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyāya qualifications of *pakṣasattva*, *sapakṣasattva* and *vipakṣasattva* of a valid reason (hetu). Praśastapāda further quotes a verse to say that this is the same as what Kāśyapa (believed to be the family name of Kaṇāda) said. Kaṇāda says that we can infer a cause from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We can infer by a reason because it is duly associated (*prasiddhipūrvakatva*) with the object of inference. What this association was according to Kaṇāda can also be understood for he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association, the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred or it has no concomitance with it (*aprasiddha*) or it has a doubtful existence (*sandigdha*). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns. Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The first fallacy is a combination of *pakṣasattva* and *sapakṣasattva*, for not only the present *pakṣa* (the ass) had no horns, but no horses had any horns, and the second is a case of *vipakṣasattva*, for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus, it seems that when Praśastapāda says that he is giving us the view of Kaṇāda he is faithful to it. Praśastapāda says that wherever there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke. When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that there is fire. But with regard to Kaṇāda's enumeration of types of inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect from the cause," etc., Praśastapāda holds that these are not the only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides inference into two classes, *drṣṭa* (from the experienced characteristics of one member of a class to another member of the same class), and *sāmānyato drṣṭa*. *Drṣṭa* (perceived resemblance) is that where the previously known case and the inferred case is exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of flesh on its neck (*sāsnā*), I can whenever I see the same hanging

mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended to a different class of objects, it is called *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa*. Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of heaven). When the conclusion to which one has arrived (*svanīścitārtha*) is expressed in five premisses for convincing others who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then the inference is called *parārthānumāna*. We know that the distinction of *svārthānumāna* (inference for oneself) and *parārthānumāna* (inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists. Praśastapāda does not make a sharp distinction of two classes of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is called *parārthānumāna*. But this need not be considered as an entirely new innovation of Praśastapāda, for in IX. 2, Kaṇāda himself definitely alludes to this distinction (*asyedaṃ kāryyakāraṇasambandhaścāyavāvādbhavati*). The five premisses which are called in Nyāya *pratijñā*, *hetu dr̥ṣṭānta*, *ūpanaya*, and *nigamana* are called in Vaiśeṣika *pratijñā*, *apadeśa*, *nidarśana*, *anusandhāna*, and *pratyāmnyā*. Kaṇāda however does not mention the name of any of these premisses excepting the second “apadeśa.” *Pratijñā* is of course the same as we have in Nyāya, and the term *nidarśana* is very similar to Nyāya *dr̥ṣṭānta*, but the last two are entirely different. *Nidarśana* may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence (e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being¹). He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example

¹ Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa says that “An example before the time of Dignāga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery ; because it has smoke ; like a kitchen (example). Asaṅga made the example more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignāga converted it into a universal proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery ; because it has smoke ; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen” (*Indian Logic*, pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vatsyāyana had an imperfect example as “like a kitchen” (*śabdaḥ utpattidharmakatvādanityaḥ sthālyādīval*, I. i. 36), but Praśastapāda has it in the proper form. Whether Praśastapāda borrowed it from Dīnnāga or Dīnnāga from Praśastapāda cannot be easily settled.

(*nidarśanābhāsa*). Praśastapāda's contribution thus seems to consist of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of the *nidarśana*, but the names of the last two premisses are so different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional Vaiśeṣika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being pursued in Vaiśeṣika circles independently of Nyāya. There is no reason however to suppose that Praśastapāda borrowed anything from Diñnāga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes, for, as I have shown above, most of Praśastapāda's apparent innovations are all definitely alluded to by Kaṇāda himself, and Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the question of the fallacies of *nidarśana*, unless it is definitely proved that Diñnāga preceded Praśastapāda, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former¹.

The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most important part of inference. Vātsyāyana says that an inference can be made by the sight of the *līnga* (reason or middle) through the memory of the connection between the middle and the major previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is *līnga-parāmarśa*, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection, but the present perception of the middle associated with the memory of the connection (*smṛtyanugrहितo līngaparāmarśo*). But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance. Udyotakara's criticisms of Diñnāga as shown by Vācaspati have no reference to this point. The doctrine of *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti* was therefore in all probability a new contribution to Buddhist logic by Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti's contention was that the root principle of the connection between the middle and the major was that the former was either identical in essence with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us

¹ Praśastapāda's bhāṣya with *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 200-255.

the desired connection¹. Vācaspati in his refutation of this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence such that there being fire there is smoke and there being no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated, it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of identity of essence (*tādātmya* as in the case of the pine and the tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when such is the case, though we may not know any further about the nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate the validity of inference. To this Vācaspati's answer is that if even after observing a large number of cases and careful search such conditions (*upādhi*) cannot be discovered, we have to take it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural connection between the middle and the major. The later Buddhists introduced the method of *Pañcakāraṇī* in order to determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions determining the causal relation are (1) neither the cause nor the effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in

¹ *Kūṛyākāraṇabhāvādvā svabhāvādvā niyamakāt avinābhāvanīyamo' darśanānna na darśanāt. Tūtparyāṭikā*, p. 105.

immediate succession the effect disappears. But this method cannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause and effect relation ; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect relation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better to accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect relation¹.

In early Nyāya books three kinds of inference are described, namely pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa. Pūrvavat is the inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from heavy dark clouds ; śeṣavat is the inference of causes from effects, e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river ; sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa refers to the inference in all cases other than those of cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the tamarind from its form and colour. *Nyāyamañjarī* mentions another form of anumāna, namely pariśeṣamāna (*reductio ad absurdum*), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness) of any other thing (e.g. ātman), because it was already definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely that of the inference of the probandum (*sādhya*) by virtue of the unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called the vyāpti-niyama. In the new school of Nyāya (Navya-Nyāya) a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalānvayi, and kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the vyāpti has been observed by a combination of a large number of instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever there is smoke there is fire (*anvaya*), and where there is no fire, there is no smoke (*vyatireka*)). An inference could be for one's own self (*svārthānumāna*) or for the sake of convincing others (*parārthānumāna*). In the latter case, when it was necessary that an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner, five propositions (*avayavas*) were regarded as necessary, namely pratijñā (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), udāharaṇa (where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen), upanaya (this hill has smoke), nigamana (therefore it has got

¹ Vātsyāyana's bhāṣya, Udyotakara's *Vārttika* and *Tūtparyyaṭīkā*, I. i. 5.

fire). Kevalānvayi is that type of inference, the vyāpti of which could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case “this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge (*īdaṃ, vācyaṃ prameyatvāt*).” Now no such case is known which is not an object of knowledge ; we cannot therefore know of any case where there was no object of knowledge (*prameyatva*) and no name (*vācyatva*); the vyāpti here has therefore to be based necessarily on cases of agreement—wherever there is prameyatva or an object of knowledge, there is vācyatva or name. The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our inference—earth differs from other elements, since it has the special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.

Upamāna and Śabda.

The third pramāṇa, which is admitted by Nyāya and not by Vaiśeṣika, is *upamāna*, and consists in associating a thing unknown before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never seen a wild ox (*gavaya*) goes to the forest, asks a forester—“what is gavaya?” and the forester replies—“oh, you do not know it, it is just like a cow”; after hearing this from the forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya. This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its similarity to a known thing is called *upamāna*. If some forester had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would have been due to testimony (*śabda-pramāṇa*). The knowledge is said to be generated by the upamāna process when the association of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer

on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown animal to a known one. The naiyāyikas are thorough realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind. Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the association of the name in accordance with the perception of similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is called *upamāna*¹.

Śabda-pramāṇa or testimony is the right knowledge which we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the Vedas were uttered by Īśvara himself. The Vedas give us right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the utterances of the infallible Īśvara. The Vaiśeṣikas did not admit śabda as a separate pramāṇa, but they sought to establish the validity of testimony (*śabda*) on the strength of inference (*anumiti*) on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly corroborated by the Vaiśeṣika sūtras, which tacitly admit the validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this was how Vaiśeṣika was interpreted in later times.

Negation in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The problem of negation or non-existence (*abhāva*) is of great interest in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumārila²

¹ See *Nyāyamañjarī* on upamāna. The oldest Nyāya view was that the instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association of the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself "upamāna." When Praśastapāda held that upamāna should be treated as a case of testimony (*āptavacana*), he had probably this interpretation in view. But Udyotakara and Vācaspati hold that it was not by the instruction alone of the forester that the association of the name "wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and the memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories that lead us to this association called upamāna. What Vātsyāyaṇa meant is not very clear, but Dinnāga supposes that according to him the result of upamāna was the knowledge of similarity or the knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vācaspati of course holds that he has correctly interpreted Vātsyāyaṇa's intention. It is however definite that upamāna means the associating of a name to a new object (*samākhya-sambandhapratipattirupamānārthaḥ*, Vātsyāyaṇa). Jayanta points out that it is the preception of similarity which directly leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of the forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently it cannot be classed under testimony (*śabda*). See Praśastapāda and *Nyāyakandālī*, pp. 220-22, Vātsyāyaṇa, Udyotakara, Vācaspati and Jayanta on *Upamāna*.

² See Kumārila's treatment of *abhāva* in the *Ślokavārttika*, pp. 473-492.

and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the next chapter, hold that negation (*abhāva*) appears as an intuition (*mānam*) with reference to the object negated where there are no means of ordinary cognition (*pramāṇa*) leading to prove the existence (*satparicchedakam*) of that thing. They held that the notion "it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non-existence of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact, which is absent in the other case, we could never say that both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even without perceiving the place and without any operation of the memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence, for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind, and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could be regarded as a reason (*liṅga*), for the non-perception of the jug is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficulty about the notion of non-existence (*abhāva*) which was sought to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process of knowledge. Nyāya however says that the perception of non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g.

there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance, and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact. It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation or non-existence of other places which are far away from him. To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existence but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence (e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (*abhāva*) can thus, according to Nyāya, generate its cognition just as any positive existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not," as position (*bhāva*) is what generates the cognition "it is."

The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now); but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think that negation could thus be associated with them in any relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its *pratiyogi* (thing negated—e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the relation of opposition (*virodha*), for we could have admitted it, if

the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug, for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception, e.g. (1) *svabhāvānupalabdhi* (natural non-perception—there is no jug because none is perceived); (2) *kāraṇānupalabdhi* (non-perception of cause—there is no smoke here, since there is no fire); (3) *vyāpakānupalabdhi* (non-perception of the species—there is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) *kāryānupalabdhi* (non-perception of effects—there are not the causes of smoke here, since there is no smoke); (5) *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi* (perception of contradictory natures—there is no cold touch here because of fire); (6) *viruddhakāryopalabdhi* (perception of contradictory effects—there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7) *viruddhavyāptopalabdhi* (opposite concomitance—past is not of necessity destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) *kāryaviruddhopalabdhi* (opposition of effects—there is not here the causes which can give cold since there is fire); (9) *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* (opposite concomitants—there is no touch of snow here, because of fire); (10) *kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi* (opposite causes—there is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire); (11) *kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi* (effects of opposite causes—this place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it is full of smoke¹).

There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation, but that does not prove that there is any reason for the cognition of negation (*hetuṇābhāvasamvidah*). All that we can say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use (*yogyatā*) of negative appellations. But this situation or *yogyatā* is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort. Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that

¹ See *Nyāyabindu*, p. 11, and *Nyāyamāñjarī*, pp. 53-7.

leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug (*anupalambhaḥ abhāvaḥ vyavahārayati*)¹.

The Nyāya reply against this is that the perception of positive existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception of the ground without the jug. But is this being without the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground, without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation is apprehended by perception as much as any positive existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different; just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of negation with space and time with which it appears associated is the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality (*viśeṣya viśeṣaṇa*). The relation between the negation and its pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is the other is not. The *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (IX. i. 6) seems to take *abhāva* in a similar way as Kumārila the Mīmāṃsist does, though the commentators have tried to explain it away². In *Vaiśeṣika* the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) *prāgabhāva* (the negation preceding the production of an object—e.g. of the jug before it is made by the potter); (2) *dhvaṃsābhāva* (the negation following the destruction of an object—as of the jug after it is destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) *anyonyābhāva* (mutual negation—e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and

¹ See *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 34 ff., and also *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 48-63.

² Prāsaṣṭapāda says that as the production of an effect is the sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign of its non-existence. Śrīdhara in commenting upon it says that the non-perception of a sensible object is the sign (*liṅga*) of its non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses (*bhāvavad abhāvo'pindriyagrahaṇayogyah*) and that there is an actual sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the perception of non-existence (*abhāvendriyasannikarṣo'pi abhāvagrahaṇasāmagrī*), *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 225-30.

in the horse that of the cow); (4) *atyantābhāva* (a negation which always exists—e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in other places is not destroyed)¹.

The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker of Salvation.

It is probable that the Nyāya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are *tarka*, *nirṇaya*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitandā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*.

Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right conclusion. When there is doubt (*saṁśaya*) about the specific nature of anything we have to take to *tarka*. *Nirṇaya* means the conclusion to which we arrive as a result of *tarka*. When two opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the doctrines that there is or is not an ātman, in which each of them tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is called a *vāda*. *Jalpa* means a dispute in which the disputants give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents. A *jalpa* is called a *vitandā* when it is only a destructive criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. *Hetvābhāsa*s are those which appear as *hetus* but are really not so. *Nyāya sūtras* enumerate five fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*s) of the middle (*hetu*): *savyabhicāra* (erratic), *viruddha* (contradictory), *prakaraṇasama* (tautology), *sādhyasama* (unproved reason) and *kālātīta* (inopportune). *Savyabhicāra* is that where the same reason may prove opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); *viruddha* is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a jug is eternal, because it is produced); *prakaraṇasama* is that

¹ The doctrine of negation, its function and value with reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.

where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form (e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of eternality); *sādhyaśama* is that where the reason itself requires to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion, but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not); *kālātita* is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal. The later Nyāya works divide *savyabhicāra* into three classes, (1) *sādhāraṇa* or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire is also an object of knowledge), (2) *asādhāraṇa* or too restricted (e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the sound and nowhere else), and (3) *anupasaṃhārin* or unsubsuming (e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion may also be drawn). The fallacy *satpratipakṣa* is that in which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy *asiddha* (unreal) is of three kinds (1) *āśrayāsiddha* (the lotus of the sky is fragrant because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in the sky), (2) *svaṛūpāsiddha* (sound is a quality because it is visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) *vyāpyatvāsiddha* is that where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated with smoke. The fallacy *bādhita* is that which pretends to prove a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the fallacies counted by Vaiśeṣika. Contrary to Nyāya practice

Praśastapāda counts the fallacies of the example. Dinnāga also counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms ; but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakīrti counted also the fallacies of the pakṣa (minor) ; but Nyāya rightly considers that the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the purpose of defeating him. Jāti consists in the drawing of contradictory conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthāna means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī* that these had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils. If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow, and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding onward for the attainment of mokṣa should acquire these devices for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge of these has therefore been enjoined in the *Nyāya sūtra* as being necessary for the attainment of salvation¹.

The doctrine of Soul.

Dhūrtta Cārvākas denied the existence of soul and regarded consciousness and life as products of bodily changes ; there were other Cārvākas called Suśikṣita Cārvākas who admitted the existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death. The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self. The naiyāyikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience. They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing, etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be

¹ See *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 586-659, and *Tārikikarakṣā* of Varadarāja and *Niṣkaṇṭaku* of Mallinātha, pp. 185 ff.

some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self is not proved according to Nyāya merely by the notion of our self-consciousness, as in the case of Mīmāṃsā, for Nyāya holds that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced as a result of collocations. Never has the production of ātman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at the same time in all places (*vibhu*), and does not travel with the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though ātman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness as a result of suitable collocations¹.

Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.

Īśvara and Salvation.

Nyāya seeks to establish the existence of Īśvara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Sāṃkhya and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Īśvara and offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyāya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of Īśvara by an inference of the *sāmānyato-drṣṭa* type.

¹ *Jñānasamavāyanibandhanamevātmanaścetayitṛtvam*, &c. See *Nyāyamahājārī*, pp. 432 ff.

The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyāya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and land-slips occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in nature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a difference between the order and arrangement of human productions (e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe; and therefore from the order and arrangement (*sanniveśa-viśiṣṭatā*) of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was produced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyāya answers that the concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement" in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with specific cases of "order and arrangement," for each specific case may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar other specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general. So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and arrangement" in general with "the existence of a creator," and thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be different from the order and arrangement of things produced by man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold, for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator. Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes,

so Īśvara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without any intervention of any internal sense such as *manas*, etc. He is always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in the external world, so Īśvara also can by his will create the universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any association of body with Īśvara is indispensable for our conception of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body, so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements are produced in the atoms¹.

The *naiyāyikas* in common with most other systems of Indian philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (*sarvaṃ duḥkhaṃ vivekināḥ*); the wise therefore is never attached to the so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.

The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*) which consists in thinking as my own self that which is not my self, namely body, senses, *manas*, feelings and knowledge; when once the true knowledge of the six *padārthas* and as *Nyāya* says, of the proofs (*pramāṇa*), the objects of knowledge (*prameya*), and of the other logical categories of inference is attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can be removed by constant thinking of its opposite (*pratipakṣa-bhāvanā*), namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and ignorance about them (collectively called *doṣa*, cf. the *kleśa* of *Patañjali*) are also destroyed.

With the destruction of attachment actions (*pravṛtti*) for the

¹ See *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 190-204, *Īśvarānumāna* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Udayana's *Kusumāñjali*.

fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment, actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of sorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute happiness (*ānanda*), though really speaking the state of mukti can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc.¹

¹ *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 499-533.

CHAPTER IX

MĪMĀMSĀ PHILOSOPHY¹

A Comparative Review.

THE Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy looked at experience from a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our common sense experience should be considered as coming out of an original universal (e.g. prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya). Space, time, the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many entities which have distinct and separate existence but which manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also karma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even the class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in substances. Knowledge (*jñāna*) which illuminates all things is regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other physical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical circumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and the objects of sense, knowledge (*jñāna*) is produced. Soul with Nyāya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc. inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action, class notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as without it the different entities being without any principle of relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction.

Sāṃkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances, qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist between substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived

¹ On the meaning of the word Mīmāṃsā see Chapter IV.

that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three types of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within them the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge, willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly and new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collocations did not bring about any new thing but brought about a phenomenon which was already there in its causes in another form. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them merely a form of subtle illuminating matter-stuff. Sāṃkhya holds however that there is a transcendent entity as pure consciousness and that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact this pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-matter into conscious thought or experience of a person.

But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly be demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has been pointed out by the Nyāya school in a very strong and emphatic manner. Even Sāṃkhya did not try to prove that the existence of its transcendent puruṣa could be demonstrated in experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of a permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle towards virtue and emancipation. Sāṃkhya had first supposed knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as puruṣa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by the inadequate analysis of consciousness (*buddhi*) as being non-intelligent and incessantly changing.

Nyāya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality, and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis is again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-

conscious thought. Of course it is true that Sāṃkhya had approached nearer to this view than Nyāya, but it had separated the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this could not be done except by what may be regarded as a make-shift—a transcendent illusion running on from beginningless time. These difficulties occurred because Sāṃkhya soared to a region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common sense experience. The Nyāya position is of course much worse as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything, but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common sense experience that substances are different from qualities and actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is, to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and an account of experience should be given according to its verdict. No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction is ushered in by the Mīmāṃsā system. The *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* were written by Jaimini and the commentary (*bhāṣya*) on it was written by Śabara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made by Kumārila, who preceded the great Śaṅkarācārya, and a disciple of Kumārila, Prabhākara.

The Mīmāṃsā Literature.

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in India in the Brāhmaṇas. This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition

had it, and this it seems gave rise to the smṛti literature. Discussions and doubts became more common about the many intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and priests. These represent the beginnings of Mīmāṃsā (lit. attempts at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* (which are with us the foundations of Mīmāṃsā) are only a comprehensive and systematic compilation of one school is evident from the references he gives to the views in different matters of other preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other attempts that were made before him. Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work of the Mīmāṃsā system. Commentaries were written on it by various persons such as Bhartṛmītra (alluded to in *Nyāyaratnākara* verse 10 of *Ślokavārttika*), Bhavadāsa (*Pratijñāsūtra* 63), Hari and Upavarṣa (mentioned in *Śāstradīpikā*). It is probable that at least some of these preceded Śabara, the writer of the famous commentary known as the *Śabara-bhāṣya*. It is difficult to say anything about the time in which he flourished. Dr Gaṅgānātha Jhā would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current verse which speaks of King Vikramāditya as being the son of Śabarasvāmin by a Kṣātrīya wife. This bhāṣya of Śabara is the basis of the later Mīmāṃsā works. It was commented upon by an unknown person alluded to as Vārttikakāra by Prabhākara and merely referred to as "yathāhuḥ" (as they say) by Kumārila. Dr Gaṅgānātha Jhā says that Prabhākara's commentary *Bṛhatī* on the *Śabara-bhāṣya* was based upon the work of this Vārttikakāra. This *Bṛhatī* of Prabhākara had another commentary on it—*Rjuvimālā* by Śālikanātha Miśra, who also wrote a compendium on the Prabhākara interpretation of Mīmāṃsā called *Prakaraṇapañcikā*. Tradition says that Prabhākara (often referred to as Nibandhakāra), whose views are often alluded to as "gurumata," was a pupil of Kumārila. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary of Śaṅkara (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent

exposition of Śabara's bhāṣya in three parts known as *Śloka-vārttika* (dealing only with the philosophical portion of Śabara's work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as Tarkapāda), *Tantravārttika* (dealing with the remaining three chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and *Tuṭṭikā* (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books)¹. Kumārila is referred to by his later followers as Bhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭa-pāda, and Vārttikakāra. The next great Mīmāṃsā scholar and follower of Kumārila was Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of *Vidhi-viveka*, *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇī* and the commentator of *Tantravārttika*, who became later on converted by Śaṅkara to Vedantism. Pārthasārathi Miśra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his *Śāstradīpikā*, *Tantrarātna*, and *Nyāyaratnamālā* following the footprints of Kumārila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumārila, the names of Sucarita Miśra the author of *Kāśikā* and Someśvara the author of *Nyāyasudhā* deserve special notice. Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa wrote an excellent commentary on the *Tarkapāda* of *Śāstradīpikā* called the *Yuktisnehapūraṇī-siddhānta-candrikā* and Somanātha wrote his *Mayūkhamālikā* on the remaining chapters of *Śāstradīpikā*. Other important current Mīmāṃsā works which deserve notice are such as *Nyāyamālāvistara* of Mādhava, *Subodhinī*, *Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa* of Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāyakaṇikā* of Vācaspati Miśra, *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣa* by Kṛṣṇayajvan, *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* by Anantadeva, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa's *Bhaṭṭacintāmaṇi*, etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of the Mīmāṃsā literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all Vedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even the smṛti literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals of Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained by them. The legal side of the smṛtis consisting of inheritance, proprietary rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil life even under the British administration is explained according to the Mīmāṃsā maxims. Its relations to the Vedānta philosophy will be briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika have also been pointed out in various places of this chapter. The views of the two schools of Mīmāṃsā as propounded by Prabhākara and Kumārila on all the important topics have

¹ Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda Śāstri says, in his introduction to *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, that "Kumārila preceded Śaṅkara by two generations."

also been pointed out. Prabhākara's views however could not win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that he was regarded by Kumārila as a very strong rival¹. Hardly any new contribution has been made to the Mīmāṃsā philosophy after Kumārila and Prabhākara. The *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* deal mostly with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be gleaned out of them. Śabara's contributions are also slight and vague. Vārttikakāra's views also can only be gathered from the references to them by Kumārila and Prabhākara. What we know of Mīmāṃsā philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone. It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do not know of any work on Mīmāṃsā written in English except the excellent one by Dr Gaṅgānātha Jhā on the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā to which I have frequently referred.

The Parataḥ-prāmāṇya doctrine of Nyāya and the Svataḥ-prāmāṇya doctrine of Mīmāṃsā.

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude of truth. The Mīmāṃsā philosophy asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering (*smṛti*) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. But Nyāya holds that this self-validity of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation. It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge

¹ There is a story that Kumārila, not being able to convert Prabhākara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhākara whether his burial rites should be performed according to Kumārila's views or Prabhākara's. Prabhākara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by him only to rouse up Kumārila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumārila's views were the right ones. Kumārila then rose up and said that Prabhākara was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But this has of course no historic value.

it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and how can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In other words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guarantee that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively as well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge, and following our perception of even a mirage we should never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions, and this proves that when we practically follow the directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity, which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception with what we find later on in practical experience. Again, every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations, and as such depends upon them for its production, and hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else. It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with our perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (*arthakriyājñāna* or *phalajñāna*) just as perception or knowledge represented them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmānya*), but validity is ascertained by *saṃvāda* or agreement with the objective facts of experience¹.

It is easy to see that this Nyāya objection is based on the supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can

¹ See *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 160-173.

only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations; we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted by experience; knowledge only photographs the objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective facts never come to us directly, they are always taken on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is what is said to be the self-validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) of knowledge in its production (*utpatti*). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent

of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well (*svakāryakaraṇe svataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ jñānasya*). Whenever there is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work (*pravṛtti*) according to its direction. There is no indecision in our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness of knowledge ; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper of mind. This is what Mīmāṃsā means when it says that the validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other data (*jñānasya prāmāṇyam svataḥ aprāmāṇyaṃ parataḥ*). Knowledge attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory experience (*bādhakajñāna*) comes in or when our organs etc. are known to be faulty and defective (*karaṇadoṣajñāna*). It is from these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself.

The place of sense organs in perception.

We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in

face of the Nyāya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mīmāṃsā probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. It therefore accepted the Nyāya view of sense-contact as a condition of knowledge with slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*. It does not appear to have been conscious of a conflict between these two different principles of the production of knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it looked at it was that the fact that there were the senses and contacts of them with the objects, or such special capacities in them by virtue of which the things could be perceived, was with us a matter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledge are never experienced at the time of the rise of knowledge, but when the knowledge arises we argue that such and such senses must have acted. The only case where knowledge is found to be dependent on anything else seems to be the case where one knowledge is found to depend on a previous experience or knowledge as in the case of memory. In other cases the dependence of the rise of knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for the physical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to be operating before the rise of knowledge, and these are only inferred later on in accordance with the nature and characteristic of knowledge. We always have our first start in knowledge which is directly experienced from which we may proceed later on to the operation and nature of objective facts in relation to it. Thus it is that though contact of the senses with the objects may later on be imagined to be the conditioning factor, yet the rise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes us as original, underived, immediate, and first-hand.

Prabhākara gives us a sketch as to how the existence of the senses may be inferred. Thus our cognitions of objects are phenomena which are not all the same, and do not happen always in the same manner, for these vary differently at different moments; the cognitions of course take place in the soul which may thus be regarded as the material cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*); but there must be some such movements or other specific associations (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) which render the production of this or that specific cognition possible. The immaterial causes subsist either in the cause of the material cause (e.g. in the case of the colouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns which

is the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns which form the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause itself (e.g. in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a substance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial cause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put in the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul is eternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed that the immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition must inhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then again accepting the Nyāya conclusions we know that the rise of qualities in an eternal thing can only take place by contact with some other substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soul acquires would naturally require the contact of such substances. Since there is nothing to show that such substances inhere in other substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There are three eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time and space being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them. Contact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional rise of different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kind of atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul. This atom may be called *manas* (mind). This *manas* alone by itself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, etc. The *manas* however by itself is found to be devoid of any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot lead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; hence it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized by these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind will need the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic quality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous characteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know that the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must be one composed of *tejas* or light, as colour is a feature of light, and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye—for the cognition of colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly organ (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the *ākāśic* organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of touch) may be demonstrated. But without *manas* none of these organs is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have to be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the sense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the *manas*

with the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. The objects of perception are of three kinds, (1) substances, (2) qualities, (3) jāti or class. The material substances are tangible objects of earth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomic states they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort¹.

It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was rather undecided as to the nature of the senses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that the senses may be conceived either as certain functions or activities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things without coming into actual contact with them, or that they might be entities which actually come in contact with their objects², and he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory.

Indeterminate and determinate perception.

There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first stage is called *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate) and the second *savikalpa* (determinate). The *nirvikalpa* perception of a thing is its perception at the first moment of the association of the senses and their objects. Thus Kumārila says that the cognition that appears first is a mere *ālocana* or simple perception, called non-determinate pertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling the cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around himself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the individual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminate perception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhist view which defines it as being merely the specific individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*) and regards it as being the only valid element in perception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary

¹ See *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 52 etc., and Dr Gaṅgānātha Jhā's *Prabhākaramīmāṃsā*, pp. 35 etc.

² *Ślokaśārttika*, see *Pratyakṣasūtra*, 40 etc., and *Nyāyaratnākara* on it. It may be noted in this connection that Sāṃkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyāya that the senses actually went out to meet the objects (*prāpyakāritva*) but held that there was a special kind of functioning (*vṛtti*) by virtue of which the senses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars. It is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The nature of this *vṛtti* is not further clearly explained and Pārthasārathi objects to it as being almost a different category (*tattvāntara*).

impositions. But both Kumāṛila and Prabhākara think that both the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in contrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or differentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only in comparison with other things from which it differs in certain well-defined characters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a class only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features in common with some other things; so we see that as other things are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceived at the indeterminate stage¹. So long as other things are not remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first stage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past impressions brings the present perception in relation to past ones and realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of memory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as a valid cognition. Kumāṛila also agrees with Prabhākara in holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception valid².

Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Perception.

The perception of the class (*jāti*) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of *jāti* and *avayavāvayavī* (part and whole notion) were

¹ Compare this with the Vaiśeṣika view as interpreted by Śrīdhara.

² See *Prakaraṇapañcikā* and *Śāstradīpikā*.

the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jāti, Prabhākara first introduced the problem of *avayava* (part) and *avayavī* (whole). He argues as an exponent of svataḥ-prāmānyavāda that the proof of the true existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness, and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness must be admitted to have its existence established. Following this canon Prabhākara says that gross objects as a whole exist, since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material cause and their connection (*saṃyoga*) is the immaterial cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*), and it is the latter which renders the whole altogether different from the parts of which it is composed; and it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the whole is perceived. Kumārila holds that it is due to the point of view from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate whole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are identical, but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see *Ślokavārttika, Vanavāda*)¹.

Jāti, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its entirety in each individual constituting that jāti (*vyāsajya-*

¹ According to Sāṃkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity of the universal and the particular (*sāmānyaviśeṣasamudāyo dravyam, Vyāsbhāṣya*, III. 44); for there is no other separate entity which is different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyāya holds. Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which they exist close together (*nirantarā hi tadavayavāḥ*), and it is this latter combination (*ayutasiḍdhāvayava*) which is called a dravya, but here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space between them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as Paṇḍitaśoka has shown did not believe in any whole (*avayavī*); it is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole occupying space (*paramāṇava eva hi pararūpadēśaparihāreṇotpannāḥ parasparasahitā avabhāsamānā deśavitānavanto bhavanti*). The whole is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see *Avayavinirākaraṇa, Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*). Nyāya however held that the atoms were partless (*niravayava*) and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an object we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from the parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid reason against it:

“aduṣṭakaraṇodbhūta-manāvīrbhūtābādhakam
asandigdhaṇa vijñānam katham mithyeti kathyate.”

Nyūyamañjarī, pp. 550 ff.

vṛtti), but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the argument that jāti should be denied, because it involves the conception of a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals). The class character or jāti exists because it is distinctly perceived by us in the individuals included in any particular class. It is eternal in the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even when one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new individual of that class (e.g. cow class) comes into being, a new relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is brought into relation with the class-character existing in other individuals; for inherence (*samavāya*) according to Prabhākara is not an eternal entity but an entity which is both produced and not produced according as the thing in which it exists is non-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Nyāya holds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number of things in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, the class-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that individual, nor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence of class-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With the destruction of an individual or its production it is a new relation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But the class-character or jāti has no separate existence apart from the individuals as Nyāya supposes. Apprehension of jāti is essentially the apprehension of the class-character of a thing in relation to other similar things of that class by the perception of the common characteristics. But Prabhākara would not admit the existence of a highest genus *sattā* (being) as acknowledged by Nyāya. He argues that the existence of class-character is apprehended because we find that the individuals of a class possess some common characteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparate things of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separate jāti as *sattā*, as demanded by the *naiyāyikas*. That all things are said to be *sat* (existing) is more or less a word or a name without the corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our experience always gives us concrete existing individuals, but we can never experience such a highest genus as pure existence or being, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. When we speak of a thing as *sat*, we do not mean that it is possessed of any such class-characters as *sattā* (being); what we mean is simply that the individual has its specific existence or *svarū-*

pasattā. Thus the Nyāya view of perception as taking only the thing in its pure being apart from qualities, etc. (*sanmātra-viṣayam pratyakṣam*) is made untenable by Prabhākara, as according to him the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. According to Kumārila however *jāti* is not something different from the individuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived. Kumārila's view of *jāti* is thus similar to that held by Sāṃkhya, namely that when we look at an individual from one point of view (*jāti* as identical with the individual), it is the individual that lays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of *jāti* becomes latent, but when we look at it from another point of view (the individual as identical with *jāti*) it is the *jāti* which presents itself to consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent. The apprehension as *jāti* or as individual is thus only a matter of different points of view or angles of vision from which we look at a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of *jāti*, Kumārila holds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is distinct from the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist, but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves (*Śloka-vārttika*, *Pratyakṣasūtra*, 149, 150, *abhedāt samavāyo'stu svarūpam dharmadharmīṇoḥ*), Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara that *jāti* is perceived by the senses (*tatraikabuddhinirgrāhyā jātirindriyagocarā*).

It is not out of place to mention that on the evidence of Prabhākara we find that the category of *viśeṣa* admitted by the Kaṇāda school is not accepted as a separate category by the Mīmāṃsā on the ground that the differentiation of eternal things from one another, for which the category of *viśeṣa* is admitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinary qualities of these things. The quality of *prthaktva* or specific differences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things they constitute, can very well serve the purposes of *viśeṣa*.

The nature of knowledge.

All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded as perception from the point of view of self. The division

of the *pramāṇas* as *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with reference to the varying modes in which they are brought within the purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining or revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have knowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the remembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (*saṃvid*) that reveals by its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects. It is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of knowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they are said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rather say that they have the same identical reality too. The *Mīmāṃsā* answer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the cognized were not different from one another, they could not have been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is by cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The cognition (*saṃvedana*) of a person simply means that such a special kind of quality (*dharma*) has been manifested in the self by virtue of which his active operation with reference to a certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cognition is that with reference to which the active operation of the self has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely formless, for they have the cognitional character by which things are illumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than this, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are believed to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal to us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to objects that were perceived previously, and of which the impressions were left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency (*adr̥ṣṭa*). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembrance of that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressions of cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just that amount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with the operation of *adr̥ṣṭa*, as the person deserves to have in accordance with his previous merit or demerit.

The *Prabhākara* *Mīmāṃsā*, in refuting the arguments of those who hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized by some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we do not experience any such double cognition and also because it would lead us to a *regressus ad infinitum*, for if a second cognition

is necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a third and so on. If a cognition could be the object of another cognition, then it could not be self-valid. The cognition is not of course unknown to us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, and reveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects. From the illumination of objects also we can infer the presence of this self-cognizing knowledge. But it is only its presence that is inferred and not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate the presence of an object and not in the form in which it can be apprehended by perception (*pratyakṣa*). Prabhākara draws a subtle distinction between perceptuality (*saṃvedyatva*) and being object of knowledge (*prameyatva*). A thing can only be apprehended (*saṃvedyate*) by perception, whereas inference can only indicate the presence of an object without apprehending the object itself. Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any other cognition. Inference can only indicate the presence or existence of knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself¹.

Kumārila also agrees with Prabhākara in holding that perception is never the object of another perception and that it ends in the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But he says that every perception involves a relationship between the perceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as the agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cognition. This is indeed different from the Prabhākara view, that in one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, and the knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of *tripuṭipratyakṣa*)².

The Psychology of Illusion.

The question however arises that if all apprehensions are valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot be regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception and its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian philosophy. Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called *satkhyāti* which we have described before, and of the Vedāntists, which we shall describe in the next chapter, there are three different theories of illusion, viz. (1) *ātmakhyāti*, (2) *viparītakhyāti* or *anyathākhyāti*, and (3) *akhyāti* of the Mīmāṃsā school. The

¹ See *Prabhākaramīmāṃsā*, by Dr Gaṅgānātha Jhā.

² *loc. cit.* pp. 26-28.

viparitākhyāti or anyathākhyāti theory of illusion is accepted by the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and the Yoga, the ākhyāti theory by Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya and the ātmakhyāti by the Buddhists.

The commonest example of illusion in Indian philosophy is the illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-shell as a piece of silver. That such an illusion occurs is a fact which is experienced by all and agreed to by all. The differences of view are with regard to its cause or its psychology. The idealistic Buddhists who deny the existence of the external world and think that there are only the forms of knowledge, generated by the accumulated karma of past lives, hold that just as in the case of a correct perception, so also in the case of illusory perception it is the flow of knowledge which must be held responsible. The flow of knowledge on account of the peculiarities of its own collocating conditions generates sometimes what we call right perception and sometimes wrong perception or illusion. On this view nothing depends upon the so-called external data. For they do not exist, and even if they did exist, why should the same data sometimes bring about the right perception and sometimes the illusion? The flow of knowledge creates both the percept and the perceiver and unites them. This is true both in the case of correct perception and illusory perception. Nyāya objects to the above view, and says that if knowledge irrespective of any external condition imposes upon itself the knower and the illusory percept, then the perception ought to be of the form "I am silver" and not "this is silver." Moreover this theory stands refuted, as it is based upon a false hypothesis that it is the inner knowledge which appears as coming from outside and that the external as such does not exist.

The viparitākhyāti or the anyathākhyāti theory supposes that the illusion takes place because on account of malobservation we do not note the peculiar traits of the conch-shell as distinguished from the silver, and at the same time by the glow etc. of the conch-shell unconsciously the silver which I had seen elsewhere is remembered and the object before me is taken as silver. In illusion the object before us with which our eye is associated is not conch-shell, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, it is merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for it exists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced before that creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-shell as silver. This school agrees with the ākhyāti school that the fact

that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of illusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough to account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite positive aspect associated with it, viz. the false identification of silver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us.

The akhyāti theory of Mīmāṃsā holds that since the special peculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneous to say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell as the silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cognized at all. What happens here is simply this, that only the features common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the perceiver fails to apprehend the difference between these two things, and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain weakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the common features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended, and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past time that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is as a result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the silver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusion takes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a dual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is different from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a matter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the difference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of the present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception appears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real valid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on the part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver would be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case of a real perception. Kumārila agrees with this view as expounded by Prabhākara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as valid to the cognizer at the time that he has the cognition as any real judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, that does not matter, for it is admitted in Mīmāṃsā that when later experience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidate the original perception which was self-valid at the time of its production¹. It is easy to see that the Mīmāṃsā had to adopt this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognition at the moment of its production is valid. The akhyāti theory

¹ See *Prakaranapañcikā*, *Śāstradīpikā*, and *Ślokovārttika*, sūtra 2.

tries to establish the view that the illusion is not due to any positive wrong knowledge, but to a mere negative factor of non-apprehension due to certain weakness of mind. So it is that though illusion is the result, yet the cognition so far as it is cognition, is made up of two elements, the present perception and memory, both of which are true so far as they are individually present to us, and the cognition itself has all the characteristics of any other valid knowledge, for the mark of the validity of a cognition is its power to prompt us to action. In doubtful cognitions also, as in the case "Is this a post or a man?" what is actually perceived is some tall object and thus far it is valid too. But when this perception gives rise to two different kinds of remembrance (of the pillar and the man), doubt comes in. So the element of apprehension involved in doubtful cognitions should be regarded as self-valid as any other cognition.

Inference.

Śabara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind of knowledge is called inference. Kumārila on the basis of this tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire) subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend upon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also necessary that the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a third thing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of one thing should also be cases involving the existence of the other, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire), though including all the cases of the existence of the other (smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter (smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whether it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of the constellation of Kṛttikā with Rohiṇī, where, by the rise of the former the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case of identity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of cases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming

one whole, and as a result of that when the existence of the one (e.g. smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer the existence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In all such cases the thing (e.g. fire) which has a sphere extending beyond that in which the other (e.g. smoke) can exist is called *gamyā* or *vyāpaka* and the other (e.g. smoke) *vyāpya* or *gamaka* and it is only by the presence of *gamaka* in a thing (e.g. hill, the pakṣa) that the other counterpart the *gamyā* (fire) may be inferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of the *gamaka* with the *gamyā* (e.g. wherever there is smoke there is fire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a case of inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanent relation subsisting between two things (e.g. smoke and fire) in a third thing (e.g. kitchen); but the third thing is remembered only in a general way that the coexisting things must have a place where they are found associated. It is by virtue of such a memory that the direct perception of a basis (e.g. hill) with the *gamaka* thing (e.g. smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind that the same basis (hill) must contain the *gamyā* (i.e. fire) also. Every case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perception and not from any universal general proposition. Kumārila holds that the inference gives us the minor as associated with the major and not of the major alone, i.e. of the fiery mountain and not of fire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was known in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the possessor of fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipated and the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new knowledge (*deśakālādhikeyadyuktamagr̥hītagr̥hītvam anumānasya, Nyāyaratnākara*, p. 363)¹. It should also be noted that in forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things, a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough that in the large number of cases where the concomitance was noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitance failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances in which the absence of the *gamyā* or *vyāpaka* was marked by an

¹ It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumārila was indebted to Dinnāga for this; for Dinnāga's main contention is that "it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise inference would give us no new knowledge (see Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *Indian Logic*, p. 87 and *Tūtparyāṭikā*, p. 120.

absence of the gamaka or vyāpya, should also be noted, for a knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for the forming of the notion of the permanent relation¹. The experience of a large number of particular cases in which any two things were found to coexist together in another thing in some relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist in exactly the same relation². In those cases where the circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the existence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other. It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of coexistence as well.

The question arises that if no inference is possible without a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded as self-valid. To this Kumārila's answer is that memory is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramāṇa, as it does not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence of two things in another was known in a number of cases, yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.

As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit statement of the process of inference for convincing others (*pārārthānumāna*) both Kumārila and Prabhākara hold that three premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three premisses pratijñā, hetu and dṛṣṭānta may quite serve the purpose of an anumāna.

There are two kinds of anumāna according to Kumārila viz. pratyakṣatodṛṣṭasambandha and sāmānyatodṛṣṭasambandha. The former is that kind of inference where the permanent

¹ Kumārila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance (*vyāpti*) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the positive ones.

² "tasmādanavagatē'pi sarvatrānvaye sarvataśca vyatireke bahusah sähityāvagama-mātrādeva vyabhicārādarśanasanāthādanumānotpattiraṅgikartavyaḥ." *Nyāyaratnākara*, p. 288.

relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete things but between two general notions, as in the case of movement and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals¹.

Prabhākara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke) is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation between two things is the main point, whereas in all other associations of time and place the things in which these two subsist together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things (e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute². When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any smoke is seen. Prabhākara counts separately the fallacies of the minor (*pakṣābhāsa*), of the enunciation (*pratijñābhāsa*) and of the example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) along with the fallacies of the middle and this seems to indicate that the Mīmāṃsā logic was not altogether free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhākara, for he does not admit that a *pramāṇa* should necessarily bring us any new knowledge, for *pramāṇa* is simply defined as "apprehension." So though the inferential cognition always pertains to things already known it is yet regarded by him as a *pramāṇa*, since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.

¹ See *Ślokavārttika*, *Nyāyaratnākara*, *Śāstradīpikā*, *Yuktisnehaṭpuraṇī*, *Siddhāntacandrikā* on anumāna.

² On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is no condition (*upādhi*) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhākara has nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in a large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say that it does not exist (*prayatnenānvīṣyamāṇe aupādhikatva-navagamūt*, see *Prakaranapañcikā*, p. 71).

Upamāna, Arthāpatti.

Analogy (*upamāna*) is accepted by Mimāṃsā in a sense which is different from that in which Nyāya took it. The man who has seen a cow (*go*) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox (*gavaya*), and apprehends the similarity of the *gavaya* with the *go*, and then cognizes the similarity of the *go* (which is not within the limits of his perception then) with the *gavaya*. The cognition of this similarity of the *gavaya* in the *go*, as it follows directly from the perception of the similarity of the *go* in the *gavaya*, is called *upamāna* (analogy). It is regarded as a separate *pramāṇa*, because by it we can apprehend the similarity existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is not mere remembrance, for at the time the *go* was seen the *gavaya* was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen, and what was not seen could not be remembered. The difference of Prabhākara and Kumārila on this point is that while the latter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the fact of more than one object having the same set of qualities, the former regards it as a distinct category.

Arthāpatti (implication) is a new *pramāṇa* which is admitted by the Mimāṃsā. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcile these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being in the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside the house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Devadatta outside the house is called *arthāpatti* (presumption or implication).

The exact psychological analysis of the mind in this *arthāpatti* cognition is a matter on which Prabhākara and Kumārila disagree. Prabhākara holds that when a man knows that Devadatta habitually resides in his house but yet does not find him there, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired previously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and the cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his house. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause of implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Devadatta, and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain somewhere outside. That can only be found by implication, without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed. The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for

making the presumption that he is outside the house, for he might also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living and also that he was not at home; this perception of his absence from home creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he is living, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there creeps in the presumption that he must be living somewhere else. The perception of the absence of Devadatta through the intermediate link of a doubt passes into the notion of a presumption that he must then remain somewhere else. In inference there is no element of doubt, for it is only when the smoke is perceived to exist beyond the least element of doubt that the inference of the fire is possible, but in presumption the perceived non-existence in the house leads to the presumption of an external existence only when it has thrown the fact of the man's being alive into doubt and uncertainty¹.

Kumārila however objects to this explanation of Prabhākara, and says that if the fact that Devadatta is living is made doubtful by the absence of Devadatta at his house, then the doubt may as well be removed by the supposition that Devadatta is dead, for it does not follow that the doubt with regard to the life of Devadatta should necessarily be resolved by the supposition of his being outside the house. Doubt can only be removed when the cause or the root of doubt is removed, and it does not follow that because Devadatta is not in the house therefore he is living. If it was already known that Devadatta was living and his absence from the house creates the doubt, how then can the very fact which created the doubt remove the doubt? The cause of doubt cannot be the cause of its removal too. The real procedure of the presumption is quite the other way. The doubt about the life of Devadatta being removed by previous knowledge or by some other means, we may presume that he must be outside the house when he is found absent from the house. So there cannot be any doubt about the life of Devadatta. It is the certainty of his life associated with the perception of his absence from the house that leads us to the presumption of his external existence. There is an opposition between the life of Devadatta and his absence from the house, and the mind cannot come to rest without the presumption of his external existence. The mind oscillates between two contradictory poles both of which it accepts but

¹ See *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 113-115.

cannot reconcile, and as a result of that finds an outlet and a reconciliation in the presumption that the existence of Devadatta must be found outside the house.

Well then, if that be so, inference may as well be interpreted as presumption. For if we say that we know that wherever there is smoke there is fire, and then perceive that there is smoke in the hill, but no fire, then the existence of the smoke becomes irreconcilable, or the universal proposition of the concomitance of smoke with fire becomes false, and hence the presumption that there is fire in the hill. This would have been all right if the universal concomitance of smoke with fire could be known otherwise than by inference. But this is not so, for the concomitance was seen only in individual cases, and from that came the inference that wherever there is smoke there is fire. It cannot be said that the concomitance perceived in individual cases suffered any contradiction without the presumption of the universal proposition (wherever there is smoke there is fire); thus *arthāpatti* is of no avail here and inference has to be accepted. Now when it is proved that there are cases where the purpose of inference cannot be served by *arthāpatti*, the validity of inference as a means of proof becomes established. That being done we admit that the knowledge of the fire in the hill may come to us either by inference or by *arthāpatti*.

So inference also cannot serve the purpose of *arthāpatti*, for in inference also it is the *hetu* (reason) which is known first, and later on from that the *sādhya* (what is to be proved); both of them however cannot be apprehended at the same moment, and it is exactly this that distinguishes *arthāpatti* from *anumāna*. For *arthāpatti* takes place where, without the presumption of Devadatta's external existence, the absence from the house of Devadatta who is living cannot be comprehended. If Devadatta is living he must exist inside or outside the house. The mind cannot swallow a contradiction, and hence without presuming the external existence of Devadatta even the perceived non-existence cannot be comprehended. It is thus that the contradiction is resolved by presuming his existence outside the house. *Arthāpatti* is thus the result of *arthānupapatti* or the contradiction of the present perception with a previously acquired certain knowledge.

It is by this *arthāpattipramāṇa* that we have to admit that there is a special potency in seeds by which they produce the

shoots, and that a special potency is believed to exist in sacrifices by which these can lead the sacrificer to Heaven or some such beneficent state of existence.

Śabda pramāṇa.

Śabda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Cārvāka and Vaiśeṣika. A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyāya, and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied it. Some sought to establish this authority on the supposition that they were the word of God, while others, particularly the Mīmāṃsists strove to prove that they were not written by anyone, and had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal. Their authority was not derived from the authority of any trustworthy person or God. Their words are valid in themselves. Evidently a discussion on these matters has but little value with us, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the old days of India. It was in fact the most important subject for Mīmāṃsā, for the *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* were written for the purpose of laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas. The slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemological doctrines has been due solely to their laying the foundation of its structure of interpretative maxims, and not to writing philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so much upon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as a rational compendium of maxims with the help of which the Vedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed. But a brief examination of the doctrine of word (*śabda*) as a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection with Mīmāṃsā as it is its very soul.

Śabda (word) as a pramāṇa means the knowledge that we get about things (not within the purview of our perception) from relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of which they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds, viz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas. The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not

uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in itself. The meanings of words are of course known to us before, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof; but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged means of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept śabda as a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the validity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its being uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not explain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when even the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known, we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any sentence.

Prabhākara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters, or are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituent letters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are thus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which serve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The reason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be found in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the denotation of the word may be comprehended. The perception of each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing about the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the purpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is the direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabhākara and Kumārila agree on this point.

Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning, but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning and it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact that helps him to

understand the meaning of a word. Mīmāṃsā does not think that the association of a particular meaning with a word is due to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings to the words¹. Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention is admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic commandments, by the performance of which such results would arise as could not have been predicted by any other person. Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by which they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consists of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the word. Nyāya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause that produces the word while Mīmāṃsā thinks that it only manifests to the hearer the ever-existing word.

The process by which according to Prabhākara the meanings of words are acquired may be exemplified thus: a senior commands a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the senior's commands comes to understand the meaning of "cow" and "horse." Thus according to him the meanings of words can only be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; he deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things only as related to the other factors of the injunction (*anvitābhidhāna vāda*), and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence, thus the word *gām* accusative case of *go* (cow) means that it is intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of action, viz. bringing in the sentence *gām ānaya*—bring the cow. Kumārila however thinks that words independently express separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea (*abhikhitānvayavāda*). Thus in *gām ānaya*, according to Kumārila, *gām* means the bovine class in the accusative character and *ānaya* independently means

¹ According to Nyāya God created all words and associated them with their meanings.

bring; these two are then combined into the meaning "bring the cow." But on the former theory the word *gām* means that it is connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above sentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kumārila which is also the Nyāya theory is called *abhihitānvayavāda*¹.

Lastly according to Prabhākara it is only the Veda that can be called *śabda-pramāṇa*, and only those sentences of it which contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the speaker. But Kumārila considers the words of all trustworthy persons as *śabda-pramāṇa*.

The Pramāṇa of Non-perception (*anupalabdhi*).

In addition to the above *pramāṇas* Kumārila admits a fifth kind of *pramāṇa*, viz. *anupalabdhi* for the perception of the non-existence of a thing. Kumārila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of *anumāna*. They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped? It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of *pramāṇa* namely *anupalabdhi*.

All things exist in places either in a positive (*sadrūpa*) or in a negative relation (*asadrūpa*), and it is only in the former case

¹ See *Prabhākaramīmāṃsā* by Dr Gaṅgānātha Jhā and S. N. Dasgupta's *Study of Patañjali*, appendix. It may be noted in this connection that Mīmāṃsā did not favour the Sphoṭa doctrine of sound which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was manifested (sphoṭa) but not created by the passing sounds of the syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this word-manifestation. See Vācaspati's *Tattva-bindu*, *Śloka-vārttika* and *Prakaraṇapañcika*. For the doctrine of *anvitābhidhāna* see Śālikanātha's *Vākyārthamātrkāvyūtti*.

that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we designate as a separate *pramāṇa* as *anupalabdhi*. Prabhākara holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need of admitting a separate *pramāṇa* as *anupalabdhi*. For what is meant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty space before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the place is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as that which is not associated with the jug, then the category of negation is practically admitted as a separate entity. If the perception of empty space is defined as the perception of space at the moment which we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then also want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted, which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best be an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge, or in other words to substitute for the place of the external absence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about the thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation or *abhāva* as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted. It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without any knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next moment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug. But this also means that the moment of the perception of the ground is associated with the want of knowledge of the jug or its negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission of negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can there be in the perception of "only the ground" if it is not meant that it (the perception of the ground) is associated with or qualified by the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of the ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of the jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived. The qualifying phrase that "only the ground is perceived" be-

comes meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not specified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the ground. And this would require that we had already the notion of negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special manner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also be noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the notion of negation immediately and not through other negations, and this is true not only of things of the present moment but also of the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we remember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a separate *pramāṇa* by which the absence or want of a sensible object—the negation of a thing—can be comprehended.

Self, Salvation, God.

Mīmāṃsā has to accept the existence of soul, for without it who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the sense organs, and *buddhi*; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhākara thinks that it is manifested to us in all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our cognitions—even in those where there is no perception of the body? Kumārila however differs from Prabhākara about this analysis of the consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that even though we may not have any notion of the parts of our body or their specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodied beings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in our cognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of the self as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is different from the body on the ground that the consciousness of self is present in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized in many of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting that the self is different from the body is this, that movement or willing, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be attributed to the body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then be found. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to some other entity owing to the association with which the body ap-

pears to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge, feeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceived by others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc., are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation that the qualities of the constituent elements (in the cause) impart themselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body is made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and this also corroborates the inference of a separate entity as the vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a mover? But Mīmāṃsā does not admit that movement means atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul. It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of the body. The self must also be understood as being different from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all through.

The question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabhākara holds that the self as cognizer is never cognized apart from the cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizer entering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in what we have already described as *tripuṭi-pratyakṣa* (perception as three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illuminated but knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and the object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet it appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum, and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparable from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is cognized the self also is not cognized.

Kumārila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) as the substratum of the notion of "I," or in other words the self perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its

own nature shines forth in consciousness as the "I." The objection that the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhākara's theory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet considers it as the subject of the operation. The analogy of linguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yet he is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge, for the usage of language is not philosophical analysis. Though at the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it does not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but reveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which is distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubt known as the substratum of "I," but the knowledge of this self does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects, nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of objects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition which we represent as the "I." The self does not reveal itself as the knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the mind. This is indeed different from Prabhākara's analysis, who regarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition, both being the result of the illumination of knowledge. Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara however in holding that soul is not self-illuminating (*svayamprakāśa*), for then even in deep sleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no such manifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as an unconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for had it been so people would not have regretted that they had missed sensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that "I slept in bliss" signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreover the opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also found when a man on rising from sleep says "I slept so long without knowing anything not even my own self." The self is not atomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the head as well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size of the body which contracts and expands according to the body it occupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul should be regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. This self must also be different in different persons for otherwise their individual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannot be explained¹.

¹ See *Ślokavārttika*, ātmavāda *Śāstra-dīpikā*, ātmavāda and mokṣavāda.

Kumārila considered the self to be merely the potency of knowledge (*jñānaśakti*)¹. Cognitions of things were generated by the activity of the manas and the other senses. This self itself can only be cognized by mental perception. Or at the time of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manas the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge without any actual expression or manifestation. So the state of salvation is the state in which the self remains devoid of any of its characteristic qualities such as pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc., for the self itself is not knowledge nor is it bliss or ānanda as Vedānta supposes; but these are generated in it by its energy and the operation of the senses. The self being divested of all its senses at that time, remains as a mere potency of the energy of knowledge, a mere existence. This view of salvation is accepted in the main by Prabhākara also.

Salvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffers the fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts them and stops the further generation of new effects by refraining from the performance of kāmya-karmas (sacrifices etc. performed for the attainment of certain beneficent results) and guarantees himself against the evil effects of sin by assiduously performing the nitya-karmas (such as the sandhyā prayers etc., by the performance of which there is no benefit but the non-performance of which produces sins). This state is characterized by the dissolution of the body and the non-production of any further body or rebirth.

Mīmāṃsā does not admit the existence of any God as the creator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe is made up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that the universe had ever any beginning in time, or that any God created it. Every day animals and men are coming into being by the action of the parents without the operation of any God. Neither is it necessary as Nyāya supposes that dharma and adharma should have a supervisor, for these belong to the performer and

¹ It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike Nyāya Mīmāṃsā did not consider all activity as being only of the nature of molecular vibration (*pariṣpanda*). It admitted the existence of energy (*śakti*) as a separate category which manifested itself in actual movements. The self being considered as a śakti can move the body and yet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the relationing of the energy with a thing. Nyāya strongly opposes this doctrine of a non-sensible (atindriya) energy and seeks to explain all action by actual molecular motion.

no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot be any contact (*saṃyoga*) or inherence (*saṃavāya*) of dharma and adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the world either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself require a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator, no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, *sṛṣṭi* or *pralaya*.

Mīmāṃsā as philosophy and Mīmāṃsā as ritualism.

From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mīmāṃsā agrees in the main with Vaiśeṣika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, *rūpa*, *rasa*, etc. Kumārila's differences on the points of *jāti*, *saṃavāya*, etc. and Prabhākara's peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumārila was influenced by Sāṃkhya thought rather than by Nyāya. Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhākara and Kumārila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vaiśeṣika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika about the world was most suitable.

The main difference of Mīmāṃsā with Nyāya consists of the theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions

invalid. The other *pramāṇas* such as perception, inference, etc. were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us how *dharma* could be acquired, for *dharma* was not an existing thing which could be perceived by the other *pramāṇas*, but a thing which could only be produced by acting according to the injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of *dharma* and *adharma* therefore the *śabdapramāṇa* of the Veda was our only source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a knowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them it would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable Vedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution which is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be acknowledged by the Mīmāṃsā as it would have endangered the eternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with on that account.

The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas (also called the *vidhis* or injunctive sentences). There are three classes of injunctions (1) *apūrva-vidhi*, (2) *niyama-vidhi*, and (3) *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi*. *Apūrva-vidhi* is an order which enjoins something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed (we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the sacrifice except by the above injunction). *Niyama-vidhi* is that where when a thing could have been done in a number of ways, an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following some definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn could be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn should be threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the only course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the *niyama-vidhi* that which is ordered is already known as possible but only as an alternative, and the *vidhi* insists upon one of these methods as the only one. In *apūrva-vidhi* the thing to be done would have remained undone and unknown had it not been for the *vidhi*. In *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi* all that is enjoined is already known but not necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra "I take up the rein" (*imām agrbhuṇām raśanām*) which could be used in a number of cases should not however be used at the time of holding the reins of an ass.

There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic sentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively they yield a meaning but not individually, then they should be

taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences can however yield meanings separately by themselves they should not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain sentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context of immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.

• The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma. The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities or powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the deity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered that as dharma can only be acquired by following the injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as giving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas which cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming part of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive. Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which describe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction (called the *arthavādas*) should be interpreted as forming part of a vidhi-vākya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even those expressions which give reasons for the performance of certain actions are to be treated as mere arthavādas and interpreted as praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as mandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.

When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of the Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated either in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive force called *apūrva* produces in time the beneficent results of the sacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven). This *apūrva* is like a potency or faculty in the agent which abides in him until the desired results follow¹.

It is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous works of Śabara and Kumārila make an elaborate research into the nature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in great detail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a student of philosophy.

¹ See Dr Gaṅgānātha Jhā's *Prabhākaramīmāṃsā* and Mādhava's *Nyāyamālā-vistara*.

CHAPTER X

THE ŚAṆKARA SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA

**Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential
than the Dialectic of controversy.**

PRAMĀṆA in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement by which knowledge is acquired, *pramātā* means the subject or the knower who cognizes, *pramā* the result of *pramāṇa*—right knowledge, *prameya* the object of knowledge, and *prāmāṇya* the validity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is sometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to its object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of validity in the mind of the subject—the knower (that his perceptions are true), which moves him to work in accordance with his perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the attainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things. The question wherein consists the *prāmāṇya* of knowledge has not only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a metaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledge based on an analysis of psychological experience, and on the other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the theory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify a theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretation of experience which the others sometimes ignored or sometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different schools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one another in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequently very important in determining the prestige of any school of thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyāya or Mīmāṃsā thinker in a great public debate attended by many learned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at once spread all over the country and he could probably secure a large number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputation were often undertaken by great masters all over the country for the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools and of securing adherents to their own. These debates were therefore not generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical

mood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order to inflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendancy of some particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personal victory and of the victory of the school of thought to which the debater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. Advanced Sanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitude of mind of these debaters and we find that most of these debates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers by exposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by close dialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent, asking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving that his theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposed to the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work on Indian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through an interminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms (to thwart opponents) sometimes called *vitandā*, before he can come to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical divergence. All the resources of the arts of controversy find full play for silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answer is given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs to no party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victory of either side, the most important thing is the comprehension of the different aspects from which the problem of the theory of knowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked at by the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the deficiency of each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the speculations on the experience of each school, their analysis, and their net contribution to philosophy. With Vedānta we come to an end of the present volume, and it may not be out of place here to make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate the position of the Vedānta of the Śāṅkara school in the field of Indian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall therefore now try to lay before my readers the solution of the theory of knowledge (*pramāṇavāda*) reached by some of the main schools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered by the Śāṅkara Vedānta will also be dealt with, as we shall attempt to sketch the views of the Vedānta later on in this chapter.

The philosophical situation. A Review.

Before dealing with the Vedānta system it seems advisable to review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to the main philosophical and epistemological questions which determine the position of the Vedānta as taught by Śāṅkara and his school.

The Sautrāntika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (*puruṣārtha*). This however cannot be done without right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them. So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned, it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get in our practical experience (*arthaprāpakatva*). The perception is right (*abhrānta* non-illusory) when following its representation we can get in the external world such things as were represented by it (*samvādakatva*). That perception alone can be right which is generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination. When I say "this is the cow I had seen," what I see is the object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that this is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this or that permanent name. This association of name and permanence to objects perceived is called *kalpanā* or *abhilāpa*. Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the *abhilāpa* association (*kalpanāpōdha*), for though this is taken as a part of our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and hence its association with the object is an evident error. The object as unassociated with name—the *nirvikalpa*—is thus what is perceived. As a result of the *pratyakṣa* the *manovijñāna* or thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an

object of knowledge (*grāhya*), and by the fact of the rise of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing realizable or attainable in the external world. The special features of the object undefinable in themselves as being what they are in themselves (*svalakṣaṇa*) are what is actually perceived (*pratyakṣaviśaya*)¹. The *pramāṇaphala* (result of perception) is the

¹ There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word “*svalakṣaṇa*” of Dharmakīrti between my esteemed friend Professor Stcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakīrti held that the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception was almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, “According to your interpretation *svalakṣaṇa* means—the object (or idea with *Vijñānavādin*) from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated, this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and future has been taken away, what remains? *The present* and the present is a *kṣaṇa* i.e. nothing...The reverse of *kṣaṇa* is a *kṣaṇasamāna* or simply *samāna* and in every *samāna* there is a synthesis *ekibhāva* of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (*buddhi* = *nīścaya* = *kalpanā* = *adhyavasāya*)...There is in the perception of a jug something (a *kṣaṇa* of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the *idea* of a jug (which is always a *samāna*, always *vikalpita*), and if you take the idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains : *kṣaṇasya jñānena prāpayitumaśakyatvāt*. This is absolutely the Kantian teaching about *Synthesis of Apprehension*. Accordingly *pratyakṣa* is a *transcendental* source of knowledge, because practically speaking it gives no knowledge at all. This *pramāṇa* is *asatkālpa*. Kant says that without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = *pratyakṣa* = *kalpanāpodha*) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of intellect (*kalpanā* = *buddhi* = *synthesis* = *ekibhāva*) they would be blind. Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of Dharmakīrti. He is a *Vijñānavādi* as I understand, because he maintains the cognizability of ideas (*vijñāna*) alone, but the reality is an incognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is *bāhya*, it is *artha*, it is *arthakriyākṣaṇa* = *svalakṣaṇa*; that is the reason for which he sometimes is called *Sautrāntika* and this school is sometimes called *Sautrānta-vijñānavāda*, as opposed to the *Vijñānavāda* of *Aśvaghoṣa* and *Āryaśaṅga*, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug as it exists in our representation were the *svalakṣaṇa* and *paramārthasat*, what would remain of *Vijñānavāda*? But there is the perception of the jug as opposed to the *pure idea* of a jug (*śuddhā kalpanā*), an element of reality, the sensational *kṣaṇa*, which is communicated to us by sense knowledge. Kant's ‘thing in itself’ is also a *kṣaṇa* and also an element of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to *pure reason*, Dharmakīrti has also *śuddhā kalpanā* and *śuddham pratyakṣam*...And very interesting is the opposition between *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, the first moves from *kṣaṇa* to *samāna* and the second from *samāna* to *kṣaṇa*, that is the reason that although *bhṛānta* the *anumāna* is nevertheless *pramāṇa* because through it we indirectly also reach *kṣaṇa*, the *arthakriyākṣaṇa*. It is *bhṛānta* directly and *pramāṇa* indirectly; *pratyakṣa* is *pramāṇa* directly and *bhṛānta* (*asatkālpa*) indirectly....” So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are concerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes the interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive “this is blue,” the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative element of sense-knowledge (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the affirmation (*nīścaya*). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a *kṣaṇa* (moment) and is nothing. I also hold that it is a *kṣaṇa*, but it is nothing only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving affirmation such as “this is blue.” The affirmative process occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative element of the

ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing the means which being followed the thing can be got (*yena kṛtena arthaḥ prāpito bhavati*). Pramāṇa then is the similarity of the knowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is perceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience. Yet this later stage is pramāṇaphala and not pramāṇa which consists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations), and which determines the attitude of the perceiver towards the perceived object. The pramāṇa therefore only refers to the newly-acquired knowledge (*anadhigatādhiḡantr*) as this is of use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the objective world. This account of perception leaves out the real epistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated by the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks to the correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object and its value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The question of the relation of the external world with knowledge as determining the latter is regarded as unimportant.

first moment (*pratyaḥśabaloṭpanna* N. T., p. 20) but this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative process of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form a part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its own specific nature (*svalakṣaṇa*). But what is this specific nature? Dharmakīrti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (*yasyārthasya sannidhānsannidhānābhyām jñānapratibhāsabhedastat svalakṣaṇam* N., p. 1 and N. T., p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the object itself; it is the appearance of the "blue" in its specific character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea "this is blue" (*nilasarūpaṃ pratyaḥśamanubhūyamānaṃ nilabodharūpamavasthāpyate ... nilasarūpyamasya pramāṇam nilavikalpanarūpaṃ tvasya pramāṇaphalam*, N. T. p. 22). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue (*nilanirbhāsaṃ hi vijñānam*, N. T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance (*yatkīñcit arthasya sāḥśātkārījñānam tatpratyaḥśamucyate*, N. T. 7) and this is real (*paramārthasat*) and valid. This blue sensation is different from the idea "this is blue" (*nilabodha*, N. T. 22) which is the result of the former (pramāṇaphala) through the association of the affirmative process (*adhyavasāya*) and is regarded as invalid for it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense, and is a *vikalpa-pratyaya*. In my opinion *svalakṣaṇa* therefore means pure sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object and with Dharmakīrti this is the only thing which is valid in perception and *vikalpa-pratyaya* or *pramāṇaphala* is the idea or concept which follows it. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage of the first moment of sensation-presentation (*lakṣaṇasya prāpayitumaśakyatvāt*, N. T. 16). N. T. = *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, N = *Nyāyabindu* (Peterson's edition).

The Yogācāras or idealistic Buddhists take their cue from the above-mentioned Sautrāntika Buddhists, and say that since we can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone, what is the use of admitting an external world of objects as the data of sensation determining our knowledge? You say that sensations are copies of the external world, but why should you say that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never come into touch with objects in themselves; these can only be grasped by us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must therefore be the same as knowledge (*sahopalambhaniyamāt abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ*); for it is in and through knowledge that external objects can appear to us, and without knowledge we are not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it is knowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself in such a manner as to appear as referring to other external objects. We all acknowledge that in dreams there are no external objects, but even there we have knowledge. The question why then if there are no external objects, there should be so much diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solved by the assumption of an external world; for in such an assumption, the external objects have to be admitted as possessing the infinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determining our knowledge; that being so, it may rather be said that in the beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding knowledge-moments by virtue of their inherent specific qualities determine the succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledge alone exists; the projection of an external world is an illusion of knowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire (*vāsanā*) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determines the succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc. are not qualities requiring a permanent entity as soul in which they may inhere, but are the various forms in which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, "I perceive a blue thing," is but a form of knowledge, and this is often erroneously interpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Though the cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long as the series continues to be the same, as in the case of one person, say Devadatta, the phenomena of memory, recognition, etc. can happen in the succeeding moments, for these are evidently illusory cognitions, so far as they refer to the permanence of the objects

believed to have been perceived before, for things or knowledge-moments, whatever they may be, are destroyed the next moment after their birth. There is no permanent entity as perceiver or knower, but the knowledge-moments are at once the knowledge, the knower and the known. This thoroughgoing idealism brushes off all references to an objective field of experience, interprets the verdict of knowledge as involving a knower and the known as mere illusory appearance, and considers the flow of knowledge as a self-determining series in successive objective forms as the only truth. The Hindu schools of thought, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, and the Mīmāṃsā, accept the duality of soul and matter, and attempt to explain the relation between the two. With the Hindu writers it was not the practical utility of knowledge that was the only important thing, but the nature of knowledge and the manner in which it came into being were also enquired after and considered important.

Pramāṇa is defined by Nyāya as the collocation of instruments by which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes into being. The collocation of instruments which brings about definite knowledge consists partly of consciousness (*bodha*) and partly of material factors (*bodhābodhasvabhāva*). Thus in perception the proper contact of the visual sense with the object (e.g. jug) first brings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminate consciousness (*nirvikalpa*) as the jugness (*ghaṭatva*) and this later on combining with the remaining other collocations of sense-contact etc. produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug. The existence of this indeterminate state of consciousness as a factor in bringing about the determinate consciousness, cannot of course be perceived, but its existence can be inferred from the fact that if the perceiver were not already in possession of the qualifying factor (*viśeṣanajñāna* as jugness) he could not have comprehended the qualified object (*viśiṣṭabuddhi*) the jug (i.e. the object which possesses jugness). In inference (*anumāna*) knowledge of the līṅga takes part, and in upamāna the sight of similarity with other material conglomerations. In the case of the Buddhists knowledge itself was regarded as pramāṇa; even by those who admitted the existence of the objective world, right knowledge was called pramāṇa, because it was of the same form as the external objects it represented, and it was by the form of the knowledge (e.g. blue) that we could apprehend that the

external object was also blue. Knowledge does not determine the external world but simply enforces our convictions about the external world. So far as knowledge leads us to form our convictions of the external world it is *pramāṇa*, and so far as it determines our attitude towards the external world it is *pramāṇaphala*. The question how knowledge is generated had little importance with them, but how with knowledge we could form convictions of the external world was the most important thing. Knowledge was called *pramāṇa*, because it was the means by which we could form convictions (*adhyavasāya*) about the external world. Nyāya sought to answer the question how knowledge was generated in us, but could not understand that knowledge was not a mere phenomenon like any other objective phenomenon, but thought that though as a *guṇa* (quality) it was external like other *guṇas*, yet it was associated with our self as a result of collocations like any other happening in the material world. *Pramāṇa* does not necessarily bring to us new knowledge (*anadhigatādhi-gantṛ*) as the Buddhists demanded, but whenever there were collocations of *pramāṇa*, knowledge was produced, no matter whether the object was previously unknown or known. Even the knowledge of known things may be repeated if there be suitable collocations. Knowledge like any other physical effect is produced whenever the cause of it namely the *pramāṇa* collocation is present. Categories which are merely mental such as class (*sāmānya*), inherence (*samavāya*), etc., were considered as having as much independent existence as the atoms of the four elements. The phenomenon of the rise of knowledge in the soul was thus conceived to be as much a phenomenon as the turning of the colour of the jug by fire from black to red. The element of indeterminate consciousness was believed to be combining with the sense contact, the object, etc. to produce the determinate consciousness. There was no other subtler form of movement than the molecular. Such a movement brought about by a certain collocation of things ended in a certain result (*phala*). *Jñāna* (knowledge) was thus the result of certain united collocations (*sāmagrī*) and their movements (e.g. contact of *manas* with soul, of *manas* with the senses, of the senses with the object, etc.). This confusion renders it impossible to understand the real philosophical distinction between knowledge and an external event of the objective world. Nyāya thus fails to explain the cause

of the origin of knowledge, and its true relations with the objective world. Pleasure, pain, willing, etc. were regarded as qualities which belonged to the soul, and the soul itself was regarded as a qualitless entity which could not be apprehended directly but was inferred as that in which the qualities of *jñāna*, *sukha* (pleasure), etc. inhered. Qualities had independent existence as much as substances, but when any new substances were produced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them. It is very probable that in *Nyāya* the cultivation of the art of inference was originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deduced later by an application of the inferential method which gave the introspective method but little scope for its application, so that inference came in to explain even perception (e.g. this is a jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psychological experience was taken only as a supplement to corroborate the results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it¹.

Sāṃkhya understood the difference between knowledge and material events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being the copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from the objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucent sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external objects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objects makes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substances though in a subtler form as that of which the objects were made. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the form of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably thus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances of which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element, viz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly different from material combinations. This element of intelligence is indeed different from the substances or content of the knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a stationary light, "the self," which illuminates the crowding, bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in accordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. This light of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in consciousness as the "I," the changeless entity amidst all the fluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How this element of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge

¹ See *Nyāyamañjarī* on *pramāṇa*.

relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up into itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point of the Sāṃkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substance of knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of knowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (*puruṣa*) when it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shape of knowledge is thus the *pramāṇa* (instrument and process of knowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes is criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the external objects (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya* and *svataḥ-apramāṇya*). The *pramāṇa* however can lead to a *pramā* or right knowledge only when it is intelligized by the *puruṣa*. The *puruṣa* comes in touch with buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact but by what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact. It is the transcendental influence of *puruṣa* that sets in motion the original *prakṛti* in Sāṃkhya metaphysics, and it is the same transcendent touch (call it *yogyatā* according to Vācaspati or *saṃyoga* according to Bhikṣu) of the transcendent entity of *puruṣa* that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi into consciousness. The Vijñānavādin Buddhist did not make any distinction between the pure consciousness and its forms (*ākāra*) and did not therefore agree that the *ākāra* of knowledge was due to its copying the objects. Sāṃkhya was however a realist who admitted the external world and regarded the forms as all due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent substance (*śūtra*) which could assume the shape of the objects. But Sāṃkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did not think like Nyāya that the *ākāra* of knowledge was all that knowledge had to show; it held that there was a transcendent element which shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. With Nyāya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi and the intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost like a physical event. With Sāṃkhya however so far as the content and the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it was indeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing element of consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendent affair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise of consciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical.

The Mīmāṃsist Prabhākara agreed with Nyāya in general as regards the way in which the objective world and sense con-

tact induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations, for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals things—the direct apprehension that should be called the *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇa* in this sense is the same as *pramiti* or *pramā*, the phenomenon of apprehension. *Pramāṇa* may also indeed mean the collocations so far as they induce the *pramā*. For *pramā* or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists, but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances. The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific attitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge, and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the objective field (*saṃvādin*). Knowledge as *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate) means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as *Nyāya* holds. The *saṃvikalpa* (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as represented by memory¹.

Prabhākara rejected the *Sāṃkhya* conception of a dual element in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (*cit*) and a material part, the *buddhi*; but it regarded consciousness as an unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (*pradarśakatva*) external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension (*anubhūti*) has of prompting us to action in the external world; knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart from its self-revealing character Prabhākara did not enquire.

Kumārila declared that *jñāna* (knowledge) was a movement brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing consciousness (*jñātātā*) of objective things. *Jñāna* itself cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement necessary for producing the *jñātātā* or consciousness of things. Movement with Kumārila was not a mere atomic vibration, but was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration

¹ *Sāṃkhya* considered *nirvikalpa* as the dim knowledge of the first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next moment, was called *saṃvikalpa*.

was sometimes the result. Jñāna was a movement and not the result of causal operation as Nyāya supposed. Nyāya would not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment of a physical movement. Kumārila accords the same self-validity to knowledge that Prabhākara gives. Later knowledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the previous movement. For what is called saṃvādi or later testimony of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more¹. The self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstances leading to cognition of things that is called jñāna². Here Kumārila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.

The idealistic tendency of Vijñānavāda Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, and Mīmāṃsā was manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in touch. But Vijñānavāda denied the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Sāṃkhya admitted the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge and pure intelligence; Prabhākara ignored this difference, and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and the known; Kumārila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative, either referring to one's being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later

¹ See *Nyāyaratnamālā*, svataḥ-prāmānya-nirṇaya.

² See *Nyāyamahjarī* on Pramāṇa, *Ślokaṭvārtika* on Pratyakṣa, and Gāgā Bhaṭṭa's *Bhaṭṭacintāmaṇi* on Pratyakṣa.

uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded as the real. But the question was not asked, whether there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth, the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable reality. This philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the Hindu mind.

Vedānta Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain the time when the *Brahma-sūtras* were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the Śūnyavāda Buddhism (of course according to Śāṅkara's interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gauḍapāda revived the monistic teaching of the Upaniṣads by his commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad in verse called *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*. His disciple Govinda was the teacher of Śāṅkara (788—820 A.D.). Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* is the root from which sprang forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedāntism of great originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Ānandagiri, a disciple of Śāṅkara, wrote a commentary called *Nyāyanirnaya*, and Govindānanda wrote another commentary named *Ratnaprabhā*. Vācaspati Miśra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote another commentary on it called the *Bhāmātī*. Amalānanda (1247—1260 A.D.) wrote his *Kalpataru* on it, and Apyayadīkṣita (1550 A.D.) son of Raṅgarājādharīndra of Kāñcī wrote his *Kalpataruparimāla* on the *Kalpataru*. Another disciple of Śāṅkara, Padmapāda, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it known as *Pañcapādīkā*. From the manner in which the book is begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary on the whole of Śāṅkara's bhāṣya, but it ends abruptly at the end of the fourth sūtra. Mādhava (1350), in his *Śāṅkaravijaya*, recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sureśvara received Śāṅkara's permission to write a *vārttika* on the bhāṣya. But other pupils objected to Śāṅkara that since Sureśvara was formerly a great Mimāṃsist (Maṇḍana Miśra was called Sureśvara after his conversion to Vedāntism) he was not competent to write

a good *vārttika* on the bhāṣya. Sureśvara, disappointed, wrote a treatise called *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. Padmapāda wrote a *ṭikā* but this was burnt in his uncle's house. Śaṅkara, who had once seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapāda wrote it down. Prakāśātman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā* known as *Pañcapādikāvivarana*. Akhaṇḍānanda wrote his *Tattvadīpana*, and the famous Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni (1500) wrote his *Vivaraṇabhāvaṇaprakāśikā* on it. Amalānanda and Vidyāsāgara also wrote commentaries on *Pañcapādikā*, named *Pañcapādikādarpaṇa* and *Pañcapādikāṭikā* respectively, but the *Pañcapādikāvivarana* had by far the greatest reputation. Vidyāraṇya who is generally identified by some with Mād-hava (1350) wrote his famous work *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*¹, elaborating the ideas of *Pañcapādikāvivarana*; Vidyāraṇya wrote also another excellent work named *Jīvanmuktiviveka* on the Vedānta doctrine of emancipation. Sureśvara's (800 A.D.) excellent work *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* is probably the earliest independent treatise on Śaṅkara's philosophy as expressed in his bhāṣya. It has been commented upon by Jñānottama Miśra. Vidyāraṇya also wrote another work of great merit known as *Pañcadaśī*, which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in verse on Vedānta. Another important work written in verse on the main teachings of Śaṅkara's bhāṣya is *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, written by Sarvajñātma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been commented upon by Rāmatīrtha. Śrīharṣa (1190 A.D.) wrote his *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*, the most celebrated work on the Vedānta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly after Śrīharṣa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an independent work on Vedānta dialectic known as *Tattvadīpikā* which has also a commentary called *Nayanaprasādinī* written by Pratyagrūpa. Śaṅkara Miśra and Raghunātha also wrote commentaries on *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*. A work on Vedānta epistemology and the principal topics of Vedānta of great originality and merit known as *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* was written by Dharmarājādharīndra (about 1550 A.D.). His son Rāmakṛṣṇādharīn wrote his *Śikhāmaṇi* on it and Amaradāsa his *Maṇiprabhā*. The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* with these two commentaries forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental principles of Vedānta. Another work of supreme importance

¹ See Narasiṃhācārya's article in the *Indian Antiquary*, 1916.

(though probably the last great work on Vedānta) is the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who followed Dharmarājādhvarīndra. This has three commentaries known as *Gauḍa-brahmānandī*, *Viṭṭhaleśopadhyāyī* and *Siddhivivākyā*. Sadānanda Vyāsa wrote also a summary of it known as *Advaitasiddhisiddhāntasāra*. Sadānanda wrote also an excellent elementary work named *Vedāntasāra* which has also two commentaries *Subodhinī* and *Vidvanmanoranjinī*. The *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* of Sadānanda Yati though much inferior to *Advaitasiddhi* is important, as it touches on many points of Vedānta interest which are not dealt with in other Vedānta works. The *Nyāyamakaranda* of Ānanda-bodha Bhaṭṭārakācāryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very well, as also some other important points of Vedānta interest. *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī* of Prakāśānanda discusses many of the subtle points regarding the nature of ajñāna and its relations to cit, the doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda*, etc., with great clearness. *Siddhāntaleśa* by Apyayadikṣita is very important as a summary of the divergent views of different writers on many points of interest. *Vedāntatattvādīpikā* and *Siddhāntatattva* are also good as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedānta system. *Bhedadhikkāra* of Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni also is to be regarded as an important work on the Vedānta dialectic.

The above is only a list of some of the most important Vedānta works on which the present chapter has been based.

Vedānta in Gauḍapāda.

It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of the Vedānta thought as contained in the *Brahma-sūtras* without making any reference to the commentary of Śaṅkara or any other commentator. There is reason to believe that the *Brahma-sūtras* were first commented upon by some Vaiṣṇava writers who held some form of modified dualism¹. There have been more than a half dozen Vaiṣṇava commentators of the *Brahma-sūtras* who not only differed from Śaṅkara's interpretation, but also differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation was the only one that was faithful to the sūtras and to

¹ This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall deal with the systems expounded by the Vaiṣṇava commentators of the *Brahma-sūtras*.

the Upaniṣads. Should I attempt to give an interpretation myself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only just one additional view. But however that may be, I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the *Brahma-sūtras* were probably more faithful to the sūtras than the interpretations of Śaṅkara.

The *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*, which itself was a work of the Ekānti (singularistic) Vaiṣṇavas, mentions the *Brahma-sūtras* as having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons¹. Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical sūtras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism found in the *Brahma-sūtras* are not with regard to the Vijñāna-vāda of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the Śūnyavāda, but he regards the composition of the *Brahma-sūtras* to be later than Nāgārjuna. I agree with the late Dr S. C. Vidyābhūṣhana in holding that both the Yogācāra system and the system of Nāgārjuna evolved from the *Prajñāpāramitā*². Nāgārjuna's merit consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support of Śūnyavāda; but so far as the essentials of Śūnyavāda are concerned I believe that the Tathatā philosophy of Aśvaghoṣa and the philosophy of the *Prajñāpāramitā* contained no less. There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nāgārjuna were better known to the Hindu writers than the *Mahāyāna sūtras*. Even in such later times as that of Vācaspati Miśra, we find him quoting a passage of the *Śālistambha sūtra* to give an account of the Buddhist doctrine of pratitya-samutpāda³. We could interpret any reference to Śūnyavāda as pointing to Nāgārjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods were referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in the *Bhagavadgītā* to the *Brahma-sūtras* clearly points out a date prior to that of Nāgārjuna; though we may be slow to believe such an early date as has been assigned to the *Bhagavadgītā* by Telang, yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century B.C. The *Brahma-sūtras* could thus be placed slightly earlier than the date of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

¹ “Brahmasūtrapadaśaiṣaiva hetumadbhirviniścitaḥ” *Bhagavadgītā*. The proofs in support of the view that the *Bhagavadgītā* is a Vaiṣṇava work will be discussed in the 2nd volume of the present work in the section on *Bhagavadgītā* and its philosophy.

² *Indian Antiquary*, 1915.

³ See Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmātī* on Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on *Brahma-sūtra*, II. ii.

I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with this supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hindu writer who held such monistic views as Gauḍapāda or Śaṅkara, and who interpreted the *Brahma-sūtras* in accordance with those monistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists had been writing commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras*, goes to show that the *Brahma-sūtras* were originally regarded as an authoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact that the *Bhagavadgītā*, the canonical work of the Ekānti Vaiṣṇavas, should refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gauḍapāda who attempted to give an exposition of the monistic doctrine (apart from the Upaniṣads), either by writing a commentary as did Śaṅkara, or by writing an independent work as did Gauḍapāda. I am inclined to think therefore that as the pure monism of the Upaniṣads was not worked out in a coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form of dualism which was already developing in the later days of the Upaniṣads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such Upaniṣads as the Śvetāśvatara, and the like. The epic Sāṃkhya was also the result of this dualistic development.

It seems that Bādarāyaṇa, the writer of the *Brahma-sūtras*, was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentator Śaṅkara. Gauḍapāda seems to be the most important man, after the Upaniṣad sages, who revived the monistic tendencies of the Upaniṣads in a bold and clear form and tried to formulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significant that no other kārikās on the Upaniṣads were interpreted, except the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* by Gauḍapāda, who did not himself make any reference to any other writer of the monistic school, not even Bādarāyaṇa. Śaṅkara himself makes the confession that the absolutist (*advaita*) creed was recovered from the Vedas by Gauḍapāda. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary on Gauḍapāda's kārikā, he says that "he adores by falling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of his adored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean made dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for all people, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart of the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal

gods¹." It seems particularly significant that Śaṅkara should credit Gauḍapāda and not Bādarāyaṇa with recovering the Upaniṣad creed. Gauḍapāda was the teacher of Govinda, the teacher of Śaṅkara ; but he was probably living when Śaṅkara was a student, for Śaṅkara says that he was directly influenced by his great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-control and modesty of the other pupils of Gauḍapāda². There is some dispute about the date of Śaṅkara, but accepting the date proposed by Bhaṇḍarkar, Paṭhak and Deussen, we may consider it to be 788 A.D.³, and suppose that in order to be able to teach Śaṅkara, Gauḍapāda must have been living till at least 800 A.D.

Gauḍapāda thus flourished after all the great Buddhist teachers Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu ; and I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his kārikās for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upaniṣads tallied with those of Buddha. Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his kārikās he says that he adores that great man (*dvīpadām varam*) who by knowledge as wide as the sky realized (*sambuddha*) that all appearances (*dharma*) were like the vacuous sky (*gaganopamam*⁴). He then goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (*deśita*) that the touch of untouch (*asparśayoga*—probably referring to Nirvāṇa) was the good that produced happiness to all beings, and that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine nor found any contradiction in it (*avivādaḥ aviruddhaśca*). Some disputants hold that coming into being is of existents, whereas others quarrelling with them hold that being (*jāta*) is of non-existents (*abhūtaśya*); there are others who quarrel with them and say that neither the existents nor non-existents are liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being (*advayamajātīm*). He agrees with those who hold that there is no coming into being⁵. In IV. 19 of his kārikā he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there was no coming into being in any way (*sarvathā Buddhairajātiḥ paridīpitaḥ*).

¹ Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda's kārikā, Ānandāśrama edition, p. 214.

² Ānandāśrama edition of Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda's kārikā, p. 21.

³ Telang wishes to put Śaṅkara's date somewhere in the 8th century, and Veṅkaṭeśvara would have him in 805 A.D.—897 A.D., as he did not believe that Śaṅkara could have lived only for 32 years. *J. R. A. S.* 1916.

⁴ Compare *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 29, *Kathaṃ ca gaganopamam*.

⁵ Gauḍapāda's kārikā, IV. 2, 4.

Again, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (*vastuvādi*), who since they found things and could deal with them and were afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken of origination (*jāti*). In IV. 90 he refers to *agrayāna* which we know to be a name of *Mahāyāna*. Again, in IV. 98 and 99 he says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature. These the Buddhas, the emancipated one (*mukta*) and the leaders know first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances (*dharma*) were knowledge. He then closes the *kārikās* with an adoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha¹.

Gauḍapāda's work is divided into four chapters: (1) Āgama (scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4) Alā-taśānti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter is more in the way of explaining the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad by virtue of which the entire work is known as *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*. The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts of Gauḍapāda's work, not particularly connected with the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.

In the first chapter Gauḍapāda begins with the three apparent manifestations of the self: (1) as the experiencer of the external world while we are awake (*viśva* or *vaiśvānara ātmā*), (2) as the experiencer in the dream state (*taijasa ātmā*), (3) as the experiencer in deep sleep (*susupti*), called the *prājña* when there is no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and pure bliss (*ānanda*). He who knows these three as one is never attached to his experiences. Gauḍapāda then enumerates some theories of creation: some think that the world has proceeded as a creation from the *prāṇa* (vital activity), others consider creation as an expansion (*vibhūti*) of that cause from which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is like dream (*svapna*) and magic (*māyā*); others, that creation proceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceeds from time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord (*bhogārtham*) or for his play only (*krīḍārtham*), for such is the nature (*svabhāva*) of the Lord, that he creates, but he cannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment.

¹ Gauḍapāda's *kārikā*, IV. 100. In my translation I have not followed Śāṅkara, for he has I think tried his level best to explain away even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism in Gauḍapāda's *kārikā*. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly as Gauḍapāda's *kārikās* seemed to indicate. I have followed the same principle in giving the short exposition of Gauḍapāda's philosophy below.

Gauḍapāda does not indicate his preference one way or the other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*), unrelationable (*avyavahāryam*), ungraspable (*agrāhyam*), indefinable (*alākṣaṇa*), unthinkable (*acintyam*), unspeakable (*avya-padeśya*), the essence as oneness with the self (*ekātmapratya-yasāra*), as the extinction of the appearance (*prapañcōpaśama*), the quiescent (*śāntam*), the good (*śivam*), the one (*advaita*)¹. The world-appearance (*prapañca*) would have ceased if it had existed, but all this duality is mere māyā (magic or illusion), the one is the ultimately real (*paramārthataḥ*). In the second chapter Gauḍapāda says that what is meant by calling the world a dream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the present. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside, but both of them are but illusory creations of the self. What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the moment of perception only; external objects are supposed to have two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived, and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary productions in association with the sense faculties. There is first the imagination of a perceiver or soul (*jīva*) and then along with it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake, so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms. There is neither any production nor any destruction (*na nirodho, na utpattiḥ*), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is striving, no one who wants to be released². Imagination finds itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the sense

¹ Compare in Nāgārjuna's first kārikā the idea of *prapañcōpaśamam śivam. Anirodhamanutpādamanuchedamaśāśvatam anekārthamanānārthamanūgamamanir-gamam yaḥ pratityasanutpādam prapañcōpaśamam śivam deśayāmāsa sambuddhastam vande vadatām̐varam*. Compare also Nāgārjuna's Chapter on *Nirvāṇaparīkṣā, Pūrvo-palambhōpaśamaḥ prapañcōpaśamaḥ śivah na kvacit kasyacit kaścit dharmmo bud-dhenadeśitaḥ*. So far as I know the Buddhists were the first to use the words *prapañcōpaśamam śivam*.

² Compare Nāgārjuna's kārikā, "anirodhamanutpādam" in *Mādhyamikavṛtti*, B. T. S., p. 3.

of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (*advaya*) is false; it is only the oneness (*advayatā*) that is good. There is no many, nor are things different or non-different (*na nānedam ... na prthag nāprthag*)¹. The sages who have transcended attachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all appearance (*nirvikalpaḥ prapañcōpaśamaḥ*), the one².

In the third chapter Gauḍapāda says that truth is like the void (*ākāśa*) which is falsely conceived as taking part in birth and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from *ākāśa*. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams (*svapna*) and *māyā* (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed upon the one (*advaita*) by *māyā*. The truth is immortal, it cannot therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition of *māyā* upon it³. One mind appears as many in the dream, so also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the mind activity of the *Togins* (sages) is stopped arises this fearless state, the extinction of all sorrow, final cessation. Thinking everything to be misery (*duḥkham sarvam anusmṛtya*) one should stop all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken the mind (*citta*) into its final dissolution (*laya*) and pacify it when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (*sukham*) and by wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction; when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into being, the unproduced is then called the omniscient (*sarvajña*).

In the fourth chapter, called the *Alātaśānti*, Gauḍapāda further

¹ Compare *Mādhyamikakārikā*, B. T. S., p. 3, *anekārtham anānārtham*, etc.

² Compare *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 78, *Advayāsamsāraṇirvāṇavatsarvadharmāḥ tasmāt tarhi mahāmāte Śūnyatānutpādādvayanirvabhāvalakṣaṇe yogaḥ karaniyah*; also 8, 46, *Yaduta svacittaviśayavikalpadṛṣṭyānavabodhanāt vijñānānām svacittadṛśyamātrānavatāreṇa mahāmāte vālaprthagjanāḥ bhāvābhāvasvabhāvaparāmārthadṛṣṭidvayavādinō bhavanti*.

³ Compare Nāgārjuna's *kārikā*, B. T. S., p. 196, *Ākāśam śaśaśṛṅgaṇca bandhyāyāḥ putra eva ca asantaścābhivyajyante tathābhāvaṇa kalpanā*, with Gauḍapāda's *kārikā*, III. 28, *Asato māyayā janma tatvato naiva jāyate bandhyāputro na tattvena māyāya vāpi jāyate*.

describes this final state¹. All the dharmas (appearances) are without death or decay². Gauḍapāda then follows a dialectical form of argument which reminds us of Nāgārjuna. Gauḍapāda continues thus: Those who regard kāraṇa (cause) as the kāryya (effect in a potential form) cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (*aja*), for it suffers production ; how can it be called eternal and yet changing? If it is said that things come into being from that which has no production, there is no example with which such a case may be illustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that which has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a right conclusion about the *regressus ad infinitum* of cause and effect (*hetu* and *phala*)? Without reference to the effect there is no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect. Nothing is born either by itself or through others ; call it either being, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth, neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature (*svabhāvataḥ*), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot be said to have a production. All experience (*prajñapti*) is dependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there would be none of the afflictions (*samkleśa*) that we suffer. When we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be dependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (*citta*) does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest them, for since things do not exist they are not different from their manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular case that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while they do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in present, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with objects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations. Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are really traversing the reason of vacuity (*khe*), for all production is but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is perceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of

¹ The very name Alātaśānti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare Nāgārjuna's kārikā, *B. T. S.*, p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the *Śataka*.

² The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance or entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini, "Codanālakṣaṇaḥ arthah, dharmah." Dharma is determined by the injunctions of the Vedas.

production, for it being of the nature of absence of production it could never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like a magical or illusory elephant (*māyāhastī*) and exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus the appearance of production, movement and things, but the one knowledge (*viññāna*) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness (*avastutva*), the cessation (*śāntam*). As the movement of burning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is the movement (*spandita*) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving and the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or curved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it does not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposed upon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess them. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation between the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore to be demonstrated as unthinkable (*acintya*). A thing (*dravya*) is the cause of a thing (*dravya*), and that which is not a thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all the appearances are neither things nor those which are not things, so neither are appearances produced from the mind (*citta*), nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as one thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of existence (*saṃsāra*), but when that notion ceases there is no saṃsāra. All things are regarded as being produced from a relative point of view only (*saṃvṛti*), there is therefore nothing permanent (*śāśvata*). Again, no existent things are produced, hence there cannot be any destruction (*uccheda*). Appearances (*dharma*) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their coming into being is like māyā, and that māyā again does not exist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of seeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible. As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all appearances. That which appears as existing from an imaginary relative point of view (*kalpita saṃvṛti*) is not so in reality (*paramārtha*), for the existence depending on others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not a real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or steady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.

It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the Mādhyaṃika doctrines, as found in the Nāgārjuna's kārikās and the Vijñānavāda doctrines, as found in *Laṅkāvatāra*, that it is needless to attempt to prove it. Gauḍapāda assimilated all the Buddhist Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda teachings, and thought that these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upaniṣads. It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the teachings which he believed to be his. Gauḍapāda took the smallest Upaniṣads to comment upon, probably because he wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable vijñāna or vacuity would hold good of the highest ātman of the Upaniṣads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the Upaniṣad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upaniṣads guaranteed in detail the truth of Gauḍapāda's views it was left for his disciple, the great Śaṅkara, to examine and explain.

Vedānta and Śaṅkara (788–820 A.D.).

Vedānta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upaniṣads and summarized in the *Brahma-sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. The Upaniṣads form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mimāṃsā or the Mimāṃsā (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished from the Mimāṃsā of the previous part of the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas as incorporated in the *Pūrvanīmāṃsā sūtras* of Jaimini. Though these *Brahma-sūtras* were differently interpreted by different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentary on them now available, written by Śaṅkarācārya, have attained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle and deep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of the illustrious personality of Śaṅkara. So great is the influence of the philosophy propounded by Śaṅkara and elaborated by his illustrious followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedānta philosophy we mean the philosophy that was propounded by Śaṅkara. If other expositions are intended the names of the exponents have to be mentioned (e.g. Rāmānuja-mata, Vallabha-mata, etc.). In this

chapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Vedānta philosophy as elaborated by Śaṅkara and his followers. In Śaṅkara's work (the commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtra* and the ten Upaniṣads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which as found in Śaṅkara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but are more intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is therefore better to take up the Vedānta system, not as we find it in Śaṅkara, but as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declare that they are true to their master's philosophy.

For the other Hindu systems of thought, the sūtras (*Jaimini sūtra*, *Nyāya sūtra*, etc.) are the only original treatises, and no foundation other than these is available. In the case of the Vedānta however the original source is the Upaniṣads, and the sūtras are but an extremely condensed summary in a systematic form. Śaṅkara did not claim to be the inventor or expounder of an original system, but interpreted the sūtras and the Upaniṣads in order to show that there existed a connected and systematic philosophy in the Upaniṣads which was also enunciated in the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. The Upaniṣads were a part of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the Hindus. If Śaṅkara could only show that his exposition of them was the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the highest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The most formidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task were the Mīmāṃsists, who held that the Vedas did not preach any philosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to be interpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this or that action. They held that if the Upaniṣads spoke of Brahman and demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mere exaggerations intended to put the commandment of performing some kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form. Śaṅkara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as found in the Brāhmaṇas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declared by the Mīmāṃsā, but he sought to prove that such could not be the purport of the Upaniṣads, which spoke of the truest and the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wise could attain salvation. He said that in the karmakāṇḍa—the (sacrificial injunctions) Brāhmaṇas of the Vedas—the purport of the Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intended for ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure,

and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute truth, but the Upaniṣads, which were intended for the wise who had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly joys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas were intended for two classes of persons. Śaṅkara thus did not begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and psychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show by textual comparison of the different Upaniṣads, and by reference to the content of passages in the Upaniṣads, that they were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upaniṣads was in favour of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and apparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prakṛti, etc. of the Sāṃkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the Upaniṣads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order to show that the philosophy of the Upaniṣads as he expounded it was a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the Upaniṣads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and wrong. This he did not only in his bhāṣya on the *Brahma-sūtras* but also in his commentaries on the Upaniṣads. Logic with him had a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the Upaniṣad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted testimony of the Upaniṣads as the absolute truth. His disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in great detail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted either in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that all the realistic categories which Nyāya and other systems had put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also supplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vedānta epistemology, and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the māyā, the Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevant topics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which

had been left out or slightly touched by Śaṅkara were discussed fully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that philosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken as but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our faith in the truth revealed in the Upaniṣads. The true work of logic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting the instructions of the Upaniṣads is logic gone astray. Many lives of Śaṅkarācārya were written in Sanskrit such as the *Śaṅkara-digvijaya*, *Śaṅkara-vijaya-vilāsa*, *Śaṅkara-jaya*, etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700 and 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father Śivaguru was a Yajurvedi Brāhmin of the Taittirīya branch. Many miracles are related of Śaṅkara, and he is believed to have been the incarnation of Śiva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and became the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in a mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over to Benares and thence went to Badarikāśrama. It is said that he wrote his illustrious bhāṣya on the *Brahma-sūtra* in his twelfth year. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upaniṣads. He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to travel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other schools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to meet Kumārila, but Kumārila was then at the point of death, and he advised him to meet Kumārila's disciple. He defeated Maṇḍana and converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then travelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere he established his Vedānta philosophy, which from that time forth acquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of India.

Śaṅkara carried on the work of his teacher Gauḍapāda and by writing commentaries on the ten Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras* tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which was intended to be preached in the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras*¹. Throughout his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, there is ample evidence that he was contending against some other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held that the Upaniṣads partly favoured the Sāṃkhya cosmology

¹ The main works of Śaṅkara are his commentaries (bhāṣya) on the ten Upaniṣads (Īśa, Kena, Katha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya, Aitareya, Taittirīya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, and Chāndogya), and on the *Brahma-sūtra*.

of the existence of prakṛti. That these were actual textual interpretations of the *Brahma-sūtras* is proved by the fact that Śaṅkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions were faulty¹. In one place he says that others (referring according to Vācaspati to the Mīmāṃsā) and some of us (referring probably to those who interpreted the sūtras and the Upaniṣads from the Vedānta point of view) think that the soul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed to the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity of the self (*ātmaikatva*) that this Śārīraka commentary of mine is being attempted². Rāmānuja, in the introductory portion of his bhāṣya on the *Brahma-sūtra*, says that the views of Bodhāyana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* were summarized by previous teachers, and that he was following this Bodhāyana bhāṣya in writing his commentary. In the *Vedārthasaṃgraha* of Rāmānuja mention is made of Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bhāruci as Vedāntic authorities, and Draviḍācāryya is referred to as the “bhāṣyakāra” commentator. In Chāndogya III. x. 4, where the Upaniṣad cosmology appeared to be different from the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* cosmology, Śaṅkara refers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom he calls “ācāryya” (*atroktaḥ parihāraḥ ācāryyaiḥ*) and Ānandagiri says that “ācāryya” there refers to Draviḍācāryya. This Draviḍācāryya is known to us from Rāmānuja’s statement as being a commentator of the dualistic school, and we have evidence here that he had written a commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

A study of the extant commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa by the adherents of different schools of thought leaves us convinced that these sūtras were regarded by all as condensations of the teachings of the Upaniṣads. The differences of opinion were with regard to the meaning of these sūtras and the Upaniṣad texts to which references were made by them in each particular case. The *Brahma-sūtra* is divided into four adhyāyas or books, and each of these is divided into four chapters or pādas. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion (*adhikaraṇa*) which are composed of a number of sūtras, which raise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt and uncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour

¹ See note on p. 432.

² Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya on the *Brahma-sūtras*, I. iii. 19.

a particular conclusion. As explained by Śāṅkara, most of these sūtras except the first four and the first two chapters of the second book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the Upaniṣad passages. Śāṅkara's method of explaining the absolutist Vedānta creed does not consist in proving the Vedānta to be a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but in so interpreting the Upaniṣad texts as to show that they all agree in holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the only truth. In Chapter I of Book II Śāṅkara tries to answer some of the objections that may be made from the Sāṃkhya point of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some apparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present any real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist, Jaina, Bhāgavata and Śaiva systems of thought. These two chapters and his commentaries on the first four sūtras contain the main points of his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing that the conclusion of the sūtras was always in strict agreement with the Upaniṣad doctrines. Reason with Śāṅkara never occupied the premier position; its value was considered only secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding of the revealed scriptures, the Upaniṣads. The ultimate truth cannot be known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be reasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he shows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater. So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic and argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found in the Upaniṣads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to be used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport of the Upaniṣads. From his own position Śāṅkara was not thus bound to vindicate the position of the Vedānta as a thoroughly rational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on its rationality but on the authority of the Upaniṣads. But what was true could not contradict experience. If therefore Śāṅkara's interpretation of the Upaniṣads was true, then it would not contradict experience. Śāṅkara was therefore bound to show that his interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience. If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretation that was faithful to the Upaniṣads, and that its apparent contradictions with experience could in some way be explained,

he considered that he had nothing more to do. He was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upaniṣads and not simply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneously appear to be quite reasonable. Ultimate validity does not belong to reason but to the scriptures.

He started with the premise that whatever may be the reason it is a fact that all experience starts and moves in an error which identifies the self with the body, the senses, or the objects of the senses. All cognitive acts presuppose this illusory identification, for without it the pure self can never behave as a phenomenal knower or perceiver, and without such a perceiver there would be no cognitive act. Śaṅkara does not try to prove philosophically the existence of the pure self as distinct from all other things, for he is satisfied in showing that the Upaniṣads describe the pure self unattached to any kind of impurity as the ultimate truth. This with him is a matter to which no exception can be taken, for it is so revealed in the Upaniṣads. This point being granted, the next point is that our experience is always based upon an identification of the self with the body, the senses, etc. and the imposition of all phenomenal qualities of pleasure, pain, etc. upon the self; and this with Śaṅkara is a beginningless illusion. All this had been said by Gauḍapāda. Śaṅkara accepted Gauḍapāda's conclusions, but did not develop his dialectic for a positive proof of his thesis. He made use of the dialectic only for the refutation of other systems of thought. This being done he thought that he had nothing more to do than to show that his idea was in agreement with the teachings of the Upaniṣads. He showed that the Upaniṣads held that the pure self as pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss was the ultimate truth. This being accepted the world as it appears could not be real. It must be a mere magic show of illusion or māyā. Śaṅkara never tries to prove that the world is māyā, but accepts it as indisputable. For, if the self is what is ultimately real, the necessary conclusion is that all else is mere illusion or māyā. He had thus to quarrel on one side with the Mīmāṃsā realists and on the other with the Sāṃkhya realists, both of whom accepted the validity of the scriptures, but interpreted them in their own way. The Mīmāṃsists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action,

or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that the Upaniṣads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of actions. The description of Brahman in the Upaniṣads does not therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman, but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman should be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates. Śaṅkara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was that the Upaniṣads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman. No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required; but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas, the karmakāṇḍa (those dealing with the injunctions relating to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior types of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upaniṣads, the jñānakāṇḍa (those which declare the nature of ultimate truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly joy. Throughout his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* Śaṅkara tried to demonstrate that those who should follow the injunctions of the Veda and perform Vedic deeds, such as sacrifices, etc., belonged to a lower order. So long as they remained in that order they had no right to follow the higher teachings of the Upaniṣads. They were but karmins (performers of scriptural duties). When they succeeded in purging their minds of all desires which led them to the performance of the Vedic injunctions, the field of karmamārga (the path of duties), and wanted to know the truth alone, they entered the jñānamārga (the way of wisdom) and had no duties to perform. The study of Vedānta was thus reserved for advanced persons who were no longer inclined to the ordinary joys of life but wanted complete emancipation. The qualifications necessary for a man intending to study the Vedānta are (1) discerning knowledge about what is eternal and what is transitory (*nityānityavastuviveka*), (2) disinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world or of

the after world (*ihāmutraphalabhogavirāga*), (3) attainment of peace, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentration and faith (*śamadamādisādhanaśampat*) and desire for salvation (*mumukṣutva*). The person who had these qualifications should study the Upaniṣads, and as soon as he became convinced of the truth about the identity of the self and the Brahman he attained emancipation. When once a man realized that the self alone was the reality and all else was *māyā*, all injunctions ceased to have any force with him. Thus, the path of duties (*karma*) and the path of wisdom (*jñāna*) were intended for different classes of persons or *adhikāriṇs*. There could be no joint performance of Vedic duties and the seeking of the highest truth as taught in the Upaniṣads (*jñāna-karma-samuccayābhāvaḥ*). As against the dualists he tried to show that the Upaniṣads never favoured any kind of dualistic interpretations. The main difference between the Vedānta as expounded by Gauḍapāda and as explained by Śaṅkara consists in this, that Śaṅkara tried as best he could to dissociate the distinctive Buddhist traits found in the exposition of the former and to formulate the philosophy as a direct interpretation of the older Upaniṣad texts. In this he achieved remarkable success. He was no doubt regarded by some as a hidden Buddhist (*pracchanna Bauddha*), but his influence on Hindu thought and religion became so great that he was regarded in later times as being almost a divine person or an incarnation. His immediate disciples, the disciples of his disciples, and those who adhered to his doctrine in the succeeding generations, tried to build a rational basis for his system in a much stronger way than Śaṅkara did. Our treatment of Śaṅkara's philosophy has been based on the interpretations of Vedānta thought, as offered by these followers of Śaṅkara. These interpretations are nowhere in conflict with Śaṅkara's doctrines, but the questions and problems which Śaṅkara did not raise have been raised and discussed by his followers, and without these one could not treat Vedānta as a complete and coherent system of metaphysics. As these will be discussed in the later sections, we may close this with a short description of some of the main features of the Vedānta thought as explained by Śaṅkara.

Brahman according to Śaṅkara is "the cause from which (proceeds) the origin or subsistence and dissolution of this world which is extended in names and forms, which includes many

agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works specially determined according to space, time, and cause, a world which is formed after an arrangement inconceivable even by the (imagination of the) mind¹." The reasons that Śaṅkara adduces for the existence of Brahman may be considered to be threefold: (1) The world must have been produced as the modification of something, but in the Upaniṣads all other things have been spoken of as having been originated from something other than Brahman, so Brahman is the cause from which the world has sprung into being, but we could not think that Brahman itself originated from something else, for then we should have a *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). (2) The world is so orderly that it could not have come forth from a non-intelligent source. The intelligent source then from which this world has come into being is Brahman. (3) This Brahman is the immediate consciousness (*sākṣi*) which shines as the self, as well as through the objects of cognition which the self knows. It is thus the essence of us all, the self, and hence it remains undenied even when one tries to deny it, for even in the denial it shows itself forth. It is the self of us all and is hence ever present to us in all our cognitions.

Brahman according to Śaṅkara is the identity of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness. Brahman is the self of us all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life, we are identifying the self with thousands of illusory things, with all that we call "I" or mine, but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutely without any touch of these phenomenal notions the nature of our true state as pure blessedness is partially realized. The individual self as it appears is but an appearance only, while the real truth is the true self which is one for all, as pure intelligence, pure blessedness, and pure being.

All creation is illusory māyā. But accepting it as māyā, it may be conceived that God (Īśvara) created the world as a mere sport; from the true point of view there is no Īśvara who creates the world, but in the sense in which the world exists, and we all exist as separate individuals, we can affirm the existence of Īśvara, as engaged in creating and maintaining the world. In reality all creation is illusory and so the creator also is illusory. Brahman, the self, is at once the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) as well as the efficient cause (*niṁitta-kāraṇa*) of the world.

¹ Śaṅkara's commentary, 1. i. 2. See also Deussen's *System of the Vedānta*.

There is no difference between the cause and the effect, and the effect is but an illusory imposition on the cause—a mere illusion of name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs and call them by so many different names, but it cannot be admitted that they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformations as plates and jugs are only appearances of name and form (*nāmarūpa*). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect imposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent (*vyavahārika*) as mere objects of name and form (*nāmarūpa*), but the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality (*pāramārthika*)¹.

The main idea of the Vedānta philosophy.

The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedānta philosophy as taught by the Śāṅkara school is this, that the ultimate and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as many in different individuals. The world also as apart from us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical, are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable truth underlying them all is the self. While other systems investigated the *pramāṇas* only to examine how far they could determine the objective truth of things or our attitude in practical life towards them, Vedānta sought to reach beneath the surface of appearances, and enquired after the final and ultimate truth underlying the microcosm and the macrocosm, the subject and the object. The famous instruction of Śvetaketu, the most important Vedānta text (*mahāvākya*) says, "That art thou, O Śvetaketu." This comprehension of my self as the ultimate truth is the highest knowledge, for when this knowledge is once produced, our cognition of world-appearances will automatically cease. Unless the mind is chastened and purged of all passions and desires, the soul cannot comprehend this truth; but when this is once done, and the soul is anxious for salvation by a knowledge of the highest truth, the preceptor instructs him, "That art thou." At once he becomes the truth itself, which is at once identical with pure bliss and pure intelligence; all ordinary notions and cognitions of diversity and of the

¹ All that is important in Śāṅkara's commentary of the *Brahma-sūtras* has been excellently systematised by Deussen in his *System of the Vedānta*; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give any long account of this part. Most of what follows has been taken from the writings of his followers.

many cease; there is no duality, no notion of mine and thine; the vast illusion of this world process is extinct in him, and he shines forth as the one, the truth, the Brahman. All Hindu systems believed that when man attained salvation, he became divested of all world-consciousness, or of all consciousness of himself and his interests, and was thus reduced to his own original purity untouched by all sensations, perceptions, feelings and willing, but there the idea was this that when man had no bonds of karma and no desire and attachment with the world and had known the nature of his self as absolutely free and unattached to the world and his own psychosis, he became emancipated from the world and all his connections with the world ceased, though the world continued as ever the same with others. The external world was a reality with them; the unreality or illusion consisted in want of true knowledge about the real nature of the self, on account of which the self foolishly identified itself with world-experiences, worldly joys and world-events, and performed good and bad works accordingly. The force of accumulated karmas led him to undergo the experiences brought about by them. While reaping the fruits of past karmas he, as ignorant as ever of his own self, worked again under the delusion of a false relationship between himself and the world, and so the world process ran on. Mukti (salvation) meant the dissociation of the self from the subjective psychosis and the world. This condition of the pure state of self was regarded as an unconscious one by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, and as a state of pure intelligence by Sāṃkhya and Yoga. But with Vedānta the case is different, for it held that the world as such has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imagination which lasts till the moment when true knowledge is acquired. As soon as we come to know that the one truth is the self, the Brahman, all our illusory perceptions representing the world as a field of experience cease. This happens not because the connections of the self with the world cease, but because the appearance of the world process does not represent the ultimate and highest truth about it. All our notions about the abiding diversified world (lasting though they may be from beginningless time) are false in the sense that they do not represent the real truth about it. We not only do not know what we ourselves really are, but do not also know what the world about us is. We take our ordinary experiences of the world as representing

it correctly, and proceed on our career of daily activity. It is no doubt true that these experiences show us an established order having its own laws, but this does not represent the real truth. They are true only in a relative sense, so long as they appear to be so; for the moment the real truth about them and the self is comprehended all world-appearances become unreal, and that one truth, the Brahman, pure being, bliss, intelligence, shines forth as the absolute—the only truth in world and man. The world-appearance as experienced by us is thus often likened to the illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; for the moment the perception appears to be true and the man runs to pick it up, as if the conch-shell were a real piece of silver; but as soon as he finds out the truth that this is only a piece of conch-shell, he turns his back on it and is no longer deluded by the appearance or again attracted towards it. The illusion of silver is inexplicable in itself, for it was true for all purposes so long as it persisted, but when true knowledge was acquired, it forthwith vanished. This world-appearance will also vanish when the true knowledge of reality dawns. When false knowledge is once found to be false it cannot return again. The Upaniṣads tell us that he who sees the many here is doomed. The one, the Brahman, alone is true; all else is but delusion of name and form. Other systems believed that even after emancipation, the world would continue as it is, that there was nothing illusory in it, but I could not have any knowledge of it because of the absence of the instruments by the processes of which knowledge was generated. The Sāṃkhya puruṣa cannot know the world when the buddhi-stuff is dissociated from it and merged in the prakṛti, the Mimāṃsā and the Nyāya soul is also incapable of knowing the world after emancipation, as it is then dissociated from manas. But the Vedānta position is quite distinct here. We cannot know the world, for when the right knowledge dawns, the perception of this world-appearance proves itself to be false to the person who has witnessed the truth, the Brahman. An illusion cannot last when the truth is known; what is truth is known to us, but what is illusion is undemonstrable, unspeakable, and indefinite. The illusion runs on from beginningless time; we do not know how it is related to truth, the Brahman, but we know that when the truth is once known the false knowledge of this

world-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate link is necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi or manas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch-shell the illusory perception of silver is destroyed, so this illusory perception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a true knowledge of the reality, the Brahman. The Upaniṣads held that reality or truth was one, and there was "no many" anywhere, and Śāṅkara explained it by adding that the "many" was merely an illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was bound to disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearance is māyā (illusion). This is what Śāṅkara emphasizes in expounding his constructive system of the Upaniṣad doctrine. The question is sometimes asked, how the māyā becomes associated with Brahman. But Vedānta thinks this question illegitimate, for this association did not begin in time either with reference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons. In fact there is no real association, for the creation of illusion does not affect the unchangeable truth. Māyā or illusion is no real entity, it is only false knowledge (*avidyā*) that makes the appearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found. Māyā or *avidyā* has an apparent existence only so long as it lasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It is not a real entity in association with which a real world-appearance has been brought into permanent existence, for it only has existence so long as we are deluded by it (*prātītika-sattā*). Māyā therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logical division of existence and non-existence and the principle of excluded middle. For the māyā can neither be said to be "is" nor "is not" (*tattvānyatvābhyām anīrvacanīyā*). It cannot be said that such a logical category does not exist, for all our dream and illusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they are perceived, but they do not exist since they have no other independent existence than the fact of their perception. If it has any creative function, that function is as illusive as its own nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts. Brahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by association with māyā, for there can be no association of the real with the empty, the māyā, the illusory. It is no real association but a mere appearance.

In what sense is the world-appearance false?

The world is said to be false—a mere product of *māyā*. The falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved in the category of the indefinite which is neither *sat* “is” nor *asat* “is not.” Here the opposition of the “is” and “is not” is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is “is not,” since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and has its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge dawns. It is not therefore “is not” in the sense that a “castle in the air” or a hare’s horn is “is not,” for these are called *tuccha*, the absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said to be “is” or existing, since it appears to be so for the time the state of ignorance persists in us. Since it exists for a time it is *sat* (is), but since it does not exist for all times it is *asat* (is not). This is the appearance, the falsehood of the world-appearance (*jagat-prapañca*) that it is neither *sat* nor *asat* in an absolute sense. Or rather it may also be said in another way that the falsehood of the world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears to be the reality or an expression or manifestation of the reality, the being, *sat*, yet when the reality is once rightly comprehended, it will be manifest that the world never existed, does not exist, and will never exist again. This is just what we find in an illusory perception; when once the truth is found out that it is a conch-shell, we say that the silver, though it appeared at the time of illusory perception to be what we saw before us as “this” (this is silver), yet it never existed before, does not now exist, and will never exist again. In the case of the illusory perception of silver, the “this” (pointing to a thing before me) appeared as silver; in the case of the world-appearance, it is the being (*sat*), the Brahman, that appears as the world; but as in the case when the “this” before us is found to be a piece of conch-shell, the silver is at once dismissed as having had no existence in the “this” before us, so when the Brahman, the being, the reality, is once directly realized, the conviction comes that the world never existed. The negation of the world-appearance however has no separate existence other than the comprehension of the identity of the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as that the world-appearance is negated. The negation here involved refers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the

negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the conviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false (for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity different from Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then this reinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of the world-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself, and hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis, that the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negation also as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the only thing left is the realized identity of the truth, the being. The peculiarity of this illusion of world-appearance is this, that it appears as consistent with or inlaid in the being (*sat*) though it is not there. This of course is dissolved when right knowledge dawns. This indeed brings home to us the truth that the world-appearance is an appearance which is different from what we know as real (*sadvilakṣaṇa*); for the real is known to us as that which is proved by the *pramāṇas*, and which will never again be falsified by later experience or other means of proof. A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted; but since at the dawn of right knowledge this world-appearance will be found to be false and non-existing, it cannot be regarded as real¹. Thus Brahman alone is true, and the world-appearance is false; falsehood and truth are not contrary entities such that the negation or the falsehood of falsehood will mean truth. The world-appearance is a whole and in referring to it the negation refers also to itself as a part of the world-appearance and hence not only is the positive world-appearance false, but the falsehood itself is also false; when the world-appearance is contradicted at the dawn of right knowledge, the falsehood itself is also contradicted.

Brahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) and has no form; it cannot therefore be the object of any other consciousness that grasps it. All other things, ideas, emotions, etc., in contrast to it are called *dṛśya* (objects of consciousness), while it is the *draṣṭā* (the pure consciousness comprehending all objects). As soon as anything is comprehended as an expression of a mental state (*vṛtti*), it is said to have a form and it becomes *dṛśya*, and this is the characteristic of all objects of consciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from being manifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state.

¹ See *Advaitasiddhi*, *Mithyātvānirukti*.

Brahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of the Upaniṣad text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it shines forth as apart from the associations of any form that it is svaprakāśa and draṣṭā. The knowledge of the pure Brahman is devoid of any form or mode. The notion of *dr̥śyatva* (objectivity) carries with it also the notion of *jaḍatva* (materiality) or its nature as non-consciousness (*ajñānatva*) and non-selfness (*anātmatva*) which consists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness. The relation of consciousness (*jñāna*) to its objects cannot be regarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shall see later, it is not possible to determine the relation between knowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of the conch-shell is not its own natural appearance, so the forms in which consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence. In the state of emancipation when supreme bliss (*ānanda*) shines forth, the ānanda is not an object or form of the illuminating consciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever there is a form associated with consciousness, it is an extraneous illusory imposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are different from the essence of consciousness, not only in this that they depend on consciousness for their expression and are themselves but objects of consciousness, but also in this that they are all finite determinations (*paricchinna*), whereas consciousness, the abiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever. The forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. are limited in themselves in what they are, but through them all the pure being runs by virtue of which we say that the cow is, the jug is, the pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all the individual appearances, there is no other class (*jāti*) such as cowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that different individual forms are illusorily imposed (*ghaṭādikam sadarthekalpitam, pratyekam tadanubiddhatvena pratīyamānatvāt*). So this world-appearance which is essentially different from the Brahman, the being which forms the material cause on which it is imposed, is false (*upādānaniṣṭhātvyantābhāvapratiyogitvalakṣaṇamithyātvāsiddhiḥ*—as Citsukha has it).

The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena.

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly illusions is called *prātibhāsika*, as they are contradicted by other

later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called *vyavahārika* (from *vyavahāra*, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our practical movements). So long as the right knowledge of the Brahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearance runs on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the accumulated experience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true. It is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearance ceases to manifest itself that we have to say that from the ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance is false and unreal. As against this doctrine of the Vedānta it is sometimes asked how, as we see the reality (*sattva*) before us, we can deny that it has truth. To this the Vedānta answers that the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, nor can it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge, for we cannot have any conception of right knowledge without a conception of reality, and no conception of reality without a conception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehends within it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, and independence, which cannot be had directly from experience, as this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth. Judged from this point of view it will be evident that the true reality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash of consciousness which is all through identical with itself in all its manifestations of appearance. Our present experience of the world-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will not be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all experience is the being (*sat*) and not its forms. This being that is associated with all our experience is not a universal genus nor merely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is the being, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective events and appearances (*ekenaiva sarvānugatena sarvatra satpratītiḥ*). Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being (*sat*) as Nyāya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves but appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis and ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on which the illusions appear. This being is not different with different things but one in all appearances. Our perceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a guarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them

could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and śruti (scriptures) did not point the other way. Perception can of course invalidate inference, but it can do so only when its own validity has been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner. But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance, for our present perceptions cannot prove that these will never be contradicted in future, and inference and śruti are also against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted by inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception in this case is contradicted by inference and we have hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend (*upajīvyā*) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely valid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by proper examination and enquiry (*parīkṣā*), which may convince us that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universal testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality. But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never be contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedānta also admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to exist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of the objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will never be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedānta inference that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as one dawns in us. The testimony of the Upaniṣads also contradicts the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold aspect.

Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation between the consciousness (*dṛk*) and the objects of consciousness (*dṛśya*). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of

connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for it can neither be contact (*saṃyoga*) nor inherence (*samavāya*); and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness, but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect like the *jñātātā* of Mīmāṃsā is produced upon the object, for such an effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor can objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us) associated with the object as Prabhākara thinks, for there are many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (*jñāna-kāraṇa*) involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement? Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all nothing but illusory.

Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted even by Vedānta that this can only take place through specific sense-contact and particular mental states (*vṛtti*) or modes; but if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place even on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold external world without? The answer that the Vedānta gives to such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one

flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness; so it is not possible that the external reality should have to pass through any process before consciousness could arise; what happens is simply this, that the reality (*sat*) which subsists in all things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its veil is removed by association with the *vr̥tti* (mental mould or state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates everything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous if there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the reality is hidden by the veil of *ajñāna* (nescience). This veil is removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a mental mould or *vr̥tti*, and as soon as it is removed the thing shines forth. Even before the formation of the *vr̥tti* the illusory impositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively, but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by *ajñāna* which is removed by the action of the corresponding *vr̥tti*; and as soon as the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The action of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the *vr̥tti* of the mind, and the *vr̥tti* of the mind once formed, the corresponding *ajñāna* veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of the world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the object which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows itself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could not be manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the veil is removed by the action of the *vr̥tti* the light of reality shows the corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself is the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but ever exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-shell) take place not because the *doṣa* consisting of the defect of the eye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed to the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it generated a wrong *vr̥tti*. It is because of the generation of the wrong *vr̥tti* that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion "this is silver" as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver, it is the *cit*, consciousness or reality as underlying the object represented to us by "this" or "*idam*" that is the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience or non-cognition (*ajñāna*) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereas the right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The

basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my mental state (*vr̥tti*), so that the illusion is not of the form that the "knowledge is silver" but of "this is silver." Objective phenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression of illumination of them as states of knowledge is made through the *cit* being manifested through the mental mould or states. Without the *vr̥tti* there is no illuminating knowledge. Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one *cit* or reality, but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification (*vr̥tti*). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of knowledge must be through the mental states there is no other entity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested through the states. This Vedānta does not admit, for it holds that it is necessary that before the operation of the mental states can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be there and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Had there been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge, the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to be admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality untouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are material and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous consciousness that seems to assume diverse forms in connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations (*upādhi*). It manifests *ajñāna* (nescience) and hence does not by itself remove the *ajñāna*, except when it is reflected through any specific kind of *vr̥tti*. There is of course no difference, no inner and outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness which is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal appearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that manifests itself through the mental states. There is only one identical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis of the phenomena as well as their interpreter by a reflection through the mental states or *vr̥ttis*.

The phenomena or objects called the *dṛśya* can only be determined in their various forms and manifestations but not as to their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity of any relation such as *saṃyoga* (contact) or *saṃavāya* (inherence)

between them and the pure consciousness called the *dr̥k*; for the truth is this, that the *dr̥k* (perceiver) and the *dr̥śya* (perceived) have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but illusory creations on it.

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological illusion such as "this is silver," the knowledge of "this" as a thing is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are not noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure consciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any illusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere "this" can be. The answer of Vedānta is that when the Brahman stands as the ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the world-appearance its characteristic as *sat* or real only is manifested, whereas its special character as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it may be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible because the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed to us in our objective consciousness; when I say "the jug is," the "isness," or "being," does not shine in its purity, but only as a characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion. In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines forth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore the Brahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made possible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance can serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and not illusory. But the Vedānta points out that even by illusory perceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory perception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake could do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams may be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical functions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressions imbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient to account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced in actual waking life account for the dream creations. According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in previous lives and according to the impressions or potencies (*saṃskāra*) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of world-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot affect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But

the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective creation for each individual, for even before his cognition the phenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable state of existence (*svena adhyastasya saṁskārasya viyadādyadyāsajanakatvopapattē tatpratītyabhlāvepi tadadhyāsasya pūrvam sattvāt kṛtsnasyāpi vyavahārikapadārthasya ajñātasattvābhyupagamāt*). It is again sometimes objected that illusion is produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the illusory notion as silver in "this is silver," but no such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance. To this Vedānta says that similarity is not an indispensable factor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a white conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye through the influence of bile or *pitta*). Similarity helps the production of illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions or memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be done by *adrṣṭa*—the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds. In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of this world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no other doṣa (defect) than the avidyā (nescience) which constitutes the appearance. Here avidyā is the only doṣa and Brahman is the only adhiṣṭhāna or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the self-luminous as the adhiṣṭhāna, the illusory creations could not have been manifested at all. The cause of the direct perception of illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhiṣṭhāna. Hence where the adhiṣṭhāna is hidden by the veil of avidyā, the association with mental states becomes necessary for removing the veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhiṣṭhāna. As soon as the adhiṣṭhāna, the ground, the reality, the blissful self-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear. The disappearance of the phenomena means nothing more than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.

The Definition of Ajñāna (nescience).

Ajñāna the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (*anādi-bhāvarūpatve sati jñānanivartiyatvam*). Though it manifests itself in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no beginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which

is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive (*bhāvarūpa*) it can very well constitute the essence of negation (*abhāva*) too, for the positivity (*bhāvatva*) does not mean here the opposite of *abhāva* (negation) but notes merely its difference from *abhāva* (*abhāva-vilakṣaṇatvamātram vivakṣitam*). Ajñāna is not a positive entity (*bhāva*) like any other positive entity, but it is called positive simply because it is not a mere negation (*abhāva*). It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the ordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different both from position as well as from negation. It is sometimes objected that ajñāna is a mere illusory imagination of the moment caused by defect (*doṣa*) and hence it cannot be beginningless (*anādi*); but Vedānta holds that the fact that it is an imagination or rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merely a temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could have been said to be a temporary product of the moment if the ground as well as the illusory creation associated with it came into being for the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, the ground of illusion, is ever-present and the ajñāna therefore being ever associated with it is also beginningless. The ajñāna is the indefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is different from the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it is beginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have a beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine whether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolution of a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which can cause it; and it is a fact that when knowledge comes the illusion is destroyed; it does not matter whether the cause which produced the illusion was beginningless or not. Some Vedāntists however define ajñāna as the substance constituting illusion, and say that though it is not a positive entity yet it may be regarded as forming the substance of the illusion; it is not necessary that only a positive entity should be the matter of any thing, for what is necessary for the notion of a material cause (*upādāna*) is this, that it should continue or persist as the same in all changes of effects. It is not true that only what is positive can persist in and through the effects which are produced in the time process. Illusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the ajñāna which also is unreal should be the cause of it.

Ajñāna established by Perception and Inference.

Ajñāna defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions as "I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else," or "I do not know what you say," or more particularly "I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything." Such perceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics, and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative. It may be objected that the perception "I do not know" is not the perception of the indefinite, the ajñāna, but merely the negation of knowledge. To this Vedānta says that had it been the perception of a negation merely, then the negation must have been associated with the specific object to which it applied. A negation must imply the thing negated; in fact negation generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation. But the perception "I do not know or I had no knowledge" does not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any specific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless ignorance. Such an indefinite ajñāna is positive in the sense that it is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positive in the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive, for it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itself in our experience. If negation meant only a general negation, and if the perception of negation meant in each case the perception of a general negation, then even where there is a jug on the ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there. Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the negation of all specific things; similarly a general negation without any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception "I do not know" can persist, even though many individual objects be known to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of "I do not know" is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category namely the indefinite, the ajñāna. It is our common experience

that after experiencing the indefinite (*ajñāna*) of a specific type we launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be admitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the perception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving consciousness (*sākṣi*) is such that both the root *ajñāna* as well as its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented in mental states (*vr̥tti-jñāna*), are comprehended by it. Of course when the *vr̥ttijñāna* about a thing as in ordinary perceptions of objects comes in, the *ajñāna* with regard to it is temporarily removed, for the *vr̥ttijñāna* is opposed to the *ajñāna*. But so far as our own perceiving consciousness (*sākṣi-caitanya*) is conceived it can comprehend both the *ajñāna* and the *jñāna* (knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show themselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or as unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all positives either as indefinite *ajñāna* or as states of knowledge or as specific kinds of *ajñāna* or ignorance, but it is unable to comprehend a negation, for negation (*abhāva*) is not a perception, but merely the absence of perception (*anupalabdhi*). Thus when I say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness with reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a negation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from the Nyāya point of view that since without the knowledge of a qualification (*viśeṣana*) the qualified thing (*viśiṣṭa*) cannot be known, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness without the object being known first. To this Vedānta replies that the maxim that the qualification must be known before the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can as well perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is not out of place here to say that negation is not a separate entity, but is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive. Even the naiyāyikas would agree that in the expression "there is no negation of a jug here," no separate negation can be accepted, for the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctions and differences in positive entities by illusory impositions, so negations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositions and appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc.; so all distinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may be accepted that negation like position is one which appears as many on account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the

content of negation being itself positive, there is no reason to object that such perceptions as "I do not know" refer to the perception of an indefinite ajñāna in consciousness. So also the perception "I do not know what you say" is not the perception of negation, for this would require that the hearer should know first what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it is impossible to say "I do not know what you say."

So also the cognition "I was sleeping long and did not know anything" has to be admitted as referring to the perception of the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say that during sleep there is no perception, but what appears to the awakened man as "I did not know anything so long" is only an inference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant and active state of the senses in the awakened state that the activity had ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object of knowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is no invariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state of the senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediately preceding state. During sleep there is a mental state of the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it is by the impression (*samskāra*) of the aforesaid mental state of ajñāna that one remembers that state and says that "I did not perceive anything so long." The indefinite (*ajñāna*) perceived in consciousness is more fundamental and general than the mere negation of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) and the two are so connected that though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred from the perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definite is thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived as such in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakened state as well as in the sleeping state.

The presence of this ajñāna may also be inferred from the manner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness, as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness which was not known or rather known as indefinite before we say "I did not know it before, but I know it now." My present knowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinite which was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just as the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself by removing the darkness¹. Apart from such an inference its exist-

¹ See *Pañcapādikūvivaraṇa*, *Tattvadīpana*, and *Advaitasiddhi*.

ence is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman does not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there was no ajñāna to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself in its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajñāna there would have been no illusion. It is the ajñāna that constitutes the substance of the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded as constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it is unchangeable. This ajñāna is manifested by the perceiving consciousness (*sākṣi*) and not by the pure consciousness. The perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which reflects itself in the states of avidyā (ignorance).

Locus and Object of Ajñāna, Ahaṁkāra, and Antaḥkaraṇa.

This ajñāna rests on the pure *cit* or intelligence. This *cit* or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajñāna or the indefinite. The *cit* becomes opposed to the ajñāna and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states (*vṛtti*). The ajñāna thus rests on the pure *cit* and not on the *cit* as associated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego "*aham*" or the individual soul. Vācaspati Miśra however holds that the ajñāna does not rest on the pure *cit* but on the *jīva* (individual soul). Mādhava reconciles this view of Vācaspati with the above view, and says that the ajñāna may be regarded as resting on the *jīva* or individual soul from this point of view that the obstruction of the pure *cit* is with reference to the *jīva* (*Cinmātrāśritam ajñānam jīvapakṣapātivāt jīvāśritam ucyate Vivaraṇaprameya*, p. 48). The feeling "I do not know" seems however to indicate that the ajñāna is with reference to the perceiving self in association with its feeling as ego or "I"; but this is not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of the close association of ajñāna with antaḥkaraṇa (mind) both of which are in essence the same (see *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, p. 48).

The ajñāna however does not only rest on the *cit*, but it has the *cit* as its *viśaya* or object too, i.e. its manifestations are with reference to the self-luminous *cit*. The self-luminous *cit* is thus the entity on which the veiling action of the ajñāna is noticed; the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous character, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on the part of the *cit*, nor by stopping its relations with the *viśaya*,

but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does not shine (*nāsti na prakāśate iti vyavahārah*) or rather there is no appearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman is hidden by the ajñāna means nothing more than this, that it is such (*tadyogyatā*) that the ajñāna can so relate itself with it that it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other states of ajñāna-consciousness in experience. Ajñāna is thus considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It is opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel it. The action of this ajñāna is thus on the light of the reality which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness but also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss; so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the essence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal experiences of pleasure. The ajñāna is one, but it seems to obstruct the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it may be said that the ajñāna has many states as constituting the individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the diverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajñāna are technically called *tulājñāna* or *avasthājñāna*. Any state of consciousness (*vyṭtījñāna*) removes a manifestation of the ajñāna as *tulājñāna* and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.

The most important action of this ajñāna as obstructing the pure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated in the notion of the ego or *ahaṁkāra*. This notion of *ahaṁkāra* is a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other associations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.; it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand limitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation of the notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set of previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of impositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associations held up in the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) with the real, the false with

the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the antaḥkaraṇa taken as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns, there are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one, so here also when I say "I perceive" there are two distinct elements of the self as consciousness and the mind or antaḥkaraṇa fused into one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality, and changefulness represents the antaḥkaraṇa, whereas that which appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self. Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and the other unreal.

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhākara sought to repudiate. Prabhākara did not consider the self to be self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought (*tripuṭī*), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the self. He further said that the analogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the antaḥkaraṇa are never separately experienced, and we can never say that these two are really different and only have an illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (*anubhava*) is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and like it does not require the assistance of anything else for the fulfilling of its purpose. But the Vedānta objects to this saying that according to Prabhākara's supposition it is impossible to discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge are indeed one and the same. Kumārila thinks this thought (*anubhava*) to be a movement, Nyāya and Prabhākara as a quality of the self¹. But if it were a movement like other movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of a thing, if all-pervasive then it would illuminate everything, if of medium size it would depend on its parts for its own

¹ According to Nyāya the *ātman* is conscious only through association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness (*cit*). Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus *Nyāyamañjarī* in refuting the doctrine of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśa*) says (p. 432)

*sacetanaścītā yogāttadyogena vinā jadaḥ
nārthābhāsādanyadādhī caitanyaṃ nāma manmahe.*

constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the self, the ātman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else. The self is thus the same as vijñāna, the pure consciousness, which is always of itself self-luminous¹.

Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages, waking or sleeping, yet ahaṁkāra is absent during deep sleep. It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels "I slept happily and did not know anything": yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the antaḥkaraṇa and the ahaṁkāra are altogether submerged in the ajñāna, and there are only the ajñāna and the self; on waking, this ahaṁkāra as a state of antaḥkaraṇa is again generated, and then it associates the perception of the ajñāna in the sleep and originates the perception "I did not know anything." This ahaṁkāra which is a mode (*vṛtti*) of the antaḥkaraṇa is thus constituted by avidyā, and is manifested as jñānaśakti (power of knowledge) and kriyāśakti (power of work). This kriyāśakti of the ahaṁkāra is illusorily imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to be an active agent in knowing and willing. The ahaṁkāra itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or *vṛtti* of the antaḥkaraṇa, and as such the ahaṁkāra of a past period can now be associated; but even then the *vṛtti* of antaḥkaraṇa, ahaṁkāra, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of the antaḥkaraṇa. The same antaḥkaraṇa is called manas in its capacity as doubt, buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering². When the pure cit shines forth in association with this antaḥkaraṇa, it is called a jīva. It is clear from the above account that the ajñāna is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (*āśraya*); its own nature as the ajñāna or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as under-

¹ See *Nyūyamakaranda*, pp. 130-140, *Citsukha* and *Vivaraṇaḥrameyasamgraha*, pp. 53-58.

² See *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 88, Bombay edition.

lying these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the antaḥkaraṇa, and the light of the real shines forth through these states. The antaḥkaraṇa of which ahaṁkāra is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajñāna-phenomena containing within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the jīva or individual soul began his career.

Anirvācyavāda and the Vedānta Dialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajñāna could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedānta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is different from the category of the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidyā, ajñāna or māyā is indeed hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason. It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

examined, and one cannot make any such assertion about them as that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by Śrīharṣa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible within the limits of this chapter to give a complete account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality. I shall give here only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference (*bheda*) from *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. Four explanations are possible of the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience (*svarūpa-bheda*) as Prabhākara thinks; (2) the difference between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other (*anyonyābhāva*), as some Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭas think; (3) difference means divergence of characteristics (*vaidharmya*) as the Vaiśeṣikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality in itself like the *prthaktva* quality of Nyāya. Taking the first alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth represent in themselves by their very form and existence their mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the cloth we perceive only its difference from the jug as the characteristic of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug? i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference from something else, it is expected that something else such as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived must also be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if the perception of difference between two things has penetrated together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from something else, and if that thing from which the difference is perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an entity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug, then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference from the cloth be the very nature of the jug, then the cloth itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that

the jug only indicates that it is a term from which difference is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent of any association of its difference from other things, and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other, but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere everything might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation between these two, then that relation would require another relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference. But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely different from the perception of difference. It should also be noted that the notion of difference is also different from the notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth. The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different from the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is the same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the difference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and not merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This shows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the thing perceived.

Again, in the second alternative where difference of two

things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we find that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not in the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same difficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation of jug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the residence of the absence of jug in the cloth would require that the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce difference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the cloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth itself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be explained. If this mutual negation (*anyonyabhāva*) is explained as the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in the jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality in jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded; and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as identical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth we might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for clothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence of jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness in the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third alternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics (*vaidharmya*), then the question arises whether the *vaidharmya* or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence as can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if the answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless *vaidharmyas* progressing *ad infinitum*. If the answer is in the negative then there being no divergence between the two divergences they become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics as such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of things are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the other, then apart from the differences—the natural forms—the things are reduced to formlessness (*niḥsvarūpatā*). If natural forms (*svārūpa*) mean special natural forms (*svārūpa-viśeṣa*) then as the special natural forms or characteristics only represent difference, the natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones would appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there is no such quality as *pṛthaktva* (separateness) which can explain differences of things, for there also the questions would arise as to whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones or whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it exists or not, and so forth.

The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters of *Kathāvatthu*. In the great *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini by Patañjali also we find some traces of it. But Nāgārjuna was the man who took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all its subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was non-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was only the void (*śūnya*). Śaṅkara partially utilized this method in his refutations of Nyāya and the Buddhist systems; but Śrīharṣa again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after having criticized the most important notions and concepts of our everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyāya system, sought to prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of all possible definitions that the Nyāya could give necessarily led to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not exist though they appeared to do so; the Vedāntic contention was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajñāna produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show that no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other words the world-appearance, the phenomena of māyā or ajñāna, are indefinable or anirvacanīya. This great work of Śrīharṣa was followed by *Tattvadīpikā* of Citsukha, in which he generally followed Śrīharṣa and sometimes supplemented him with the addition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of Vedānta thus followed on one side the method of Śūnyavāda in annulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other Vijñānavāda Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character of knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous ultimate reality.

The Theory of Causation.

The Vedānta philosophy looked at the constantly changing phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects. The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents, as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved

and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedānta had before it. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set. In fact the concept of causation and production had in it something quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry after the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and primary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the present moment when we wished to know what was the cause of the jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect was only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the ground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If apart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation of the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably present at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs forth into being, we find that we are just where we were before, and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The Nyāya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a general way in associating certain groups of things of a particular kind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding moment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the other also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing more than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature of cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable condition for the cause. But time, according to Nyāya, is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived as antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these again involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time and of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually dependent upon each other (*anyonyāśraya*) neither of these can be conceived independently. Another important condition is invariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable antecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as an antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman's house, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke¹. If it means such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect, it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contri-

¹ Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.

buting to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it is said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated with its accessory factors, then also the question remains the same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause. Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a plurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which happening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot also be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular cause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that from a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special kind of effect (cf. Vātsyāyana and *Nyāyamañjarī*), for out of the same clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate, etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then the question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does it mean the factors themselves or something else above them? On the former supposition the scattered factors being always present in the universe there should always be the effect; if it means something else above the specific factors, then that something always existing, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation (*sāmagrī*) be defined as the last movement of the causes immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible. Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces the effect, the very conception of causation which was required to be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically inconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable series of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics of the effects are indescribable and undefinable *ajñāna* of *māyā*, and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and some day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon

which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon it of ajñāna or avidyā. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates, etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere appearances, unreal, indefinable, and so illusory. The one truth is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what is called the *satkāryavāda* or more properly the *satkāraṇavāda* of the Vedānta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing, and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called the *vivarttavāda* as distinguished from the *sāṃkhyayogapariṇāma-vāda*, in which the effect is regarded as the real development of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a different kind of being from the cause it is called *vivartta* but when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called *pariṇāma* (*kāraṇasvalakṣaṇānyathābhāvah pariṇāmaḥ tadvilakṣaṇo vivarttaḥ* or *vastunastatsamattāko'nyathābhāvah pariṇāmaḥ tadviśamasattākaḥ vivarttaḥ*). Vedānta has as much to object against the Nyāya as against the pariṇāma theory of causation of the Sāṃkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality, and actuality—all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality however though phenomena are not identical with the cause, they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (*Tadabhedam vinaiva tadvyatirekeṇa durvacam kāryyam vivarttaḥ*).

This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the world, the different followers of Śāṅkara Vedānta in explaining the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the māyā, ajñāna or avidyā, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes on them both. Thus Sarvajñātman, the writer of *Śaṅkṣepa-śārīraka* and his followers think that the pure Brahman should be regarded as the causal substance (*upādāna*) of the world-appearance, whereas Prakāśātman Akhaṇḍānanda, and

Mādhava hold that Brahman in association with māyā, i.e. the māyā-reflected form of Brahman as Īśvara should be regarded as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance is an evolution or pariṇāma of the māyā as located in Īśvara, whereas Īśvara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others however make a distinction between māyā as the cosmical factor of illusion and avidyā as the manifestation of the same entity in the individual or jīva. They hold that though the world-appearance may be said to be produced by the māyā yet the mind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the avidyā with the jīva or the individual as the causal matter (*upādāna*). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom both Īśvara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better rather to think that these are all manifestations of the jīva in association with his avidyā or ajñāna. Others however hold that since in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being and in another materiality etc., both Brahman and māyā are to be regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal matter, upādāna and māyā as the entity evolving in pariṇāma. Vācaspati Miśra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of the world-appearance through māyā as associated with jīva. Māyā is thus only a sahakāri or instrument as it were, by which the one Brahman appears in the eye of the jīva as the manifold world of appearance. Prakāśānanda holds however in his *Siddhānta Muktaṭvālī* that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected even as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal matter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the phenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the product of māyā, which is both the instrumental and the upādāna (causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences of view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect the principal Vedānta text that the only unchangeable cause is the Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only a temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word māyā was used in the Ṛg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and wonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying it was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began to be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Praśna, and Svetāśvatara Upaniṣads the word means magic. It is not out of place here to mention that in the older Upaniṣads

the word *māyā* occurs only once in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and once only in the *Praśna*. In early Pāli Buddhist writings it occurs only in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhaghōṣa uses it in the sense of magical power. In Nāgārjuna and the *Laṅkāvatāra* it has acquired the sense of illusion. In Śaṅkara the word *māyā* is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle of creation as a śakti (power) or accessory cause, and as the phenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.

It may also be mentioned here that Gauḍapāda the teacher of Śaṅkara's teacher Govinda worked out a system with the help of the *māyā* doctrine. The Upaniṣads are permeated with the spirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do not pay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance or enquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gauḍapāda asserts clearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, that the world does not exist in reality, that it is *māyā*, and not reality. When the highest truth is realized *māyā* is not removed, for it is not a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its own airy nothing never to recur again. It was Gauḍapāda who compared the world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objects seen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capable of being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false and unreal. The ātman says Gauḍapāda is at once the cognizer and the cognized, the world subsists in the ātman through *māyā*. As ātman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarily follows that all experience is also illusory. Śaṅkara expounded this doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra*, but he seems to me to have done little more than making explicit the doctrine of *māyā*. Some of his followers however examined and thought over the concept of *māyā* and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinable thereby substantially contributing to the development of the Vedānta philosophy.

Vedānta theory of Perception and Inference¹.

Pramāṇa is the means that leads to right knowledge. If memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then

¹ Dharmarājādīhvarindra and his son Rāmakṛṣṇa worked out a complete scheme of the theory of Vedantic perception and inference. This is in complete agreement with the general Vedānta metaphysics. The early Vedantists were more interested in

pramāṇa is to be defined as the means that leads to such right knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge (*pramā*) in Vedānta is the knowledge of an object which has not been found contradicted (*abādhitārthaviśayajñānatva*). Except when specially expressed otherwise, *pramā* is generally considered as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired (*anadhigata*) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedānta considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise, any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a series of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge of the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental state has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as having remained unchanged all through the series of moments. There is of course this difference between the same percept of a previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed. When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state representing the book is not changed every second, and hence there can be no *such supposition* that I am having separate mental states in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous one, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains the same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any change in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the same so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains the same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous

demonstrating the illusory nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory. It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as worked out by Dharmarājadhvarīndra he was largely indebted to the Mīmāṃsā school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamāna śabda and anupalabdhi also Dharmarājadhvarīndra accepted the Mīmāṃsā view. The Vedantins, previous to Dharmarājadhvarīndra, had also tacitly followed the Mīmāṃsā in these matters.

addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the external world should be regarded as right knowledge until the absolute is realized.

When the antaḥkaraṇa (mind) comes in contact with the external objects through the senses and becomes transformed as it were into their forms, it is said that the antaḥkaraṇa has been transformed into a state (*vṛtti*)¹. As soon as the antaḥkaraṇa has assumed the shape or form of the object of its knowledge, the ignorance (*ajñāna*) with reference to that object is removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness (*cit*) shows the object which was so long hidden by ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object is thus the self-shining of the cit through a *vṛtti* of a form resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposes that by the action of *ajñāna*, pure consciousness or being is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is but the transformation of ignorance (*ajñāna*), the former cannot manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance they are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The diversified objects of the world are but transformations of the principle of *ajñāna* which is neither real nor unreal. It is the nature of *ajñāna* that it veils its own creations. Thus on each of the objects created by the *ajñāna* by its creating (*vikṣepa*) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (*āvaraṇa*) capacity. But when any object comes in direct touch with antaḥkaraṇa through the senses the antaḥkaraṇa becomes transformed into the form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil on that particular *ajñāna* form—the object, and as the self-shining cit is shining through the particular *ajñāna* state, we have what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is in reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the *ajñāna* has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls and the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,

¹ Vedānta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The same antaḥkaraṇa, according to its diverse functions, is called manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called manas, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness ahaṁkāra, and as producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications or states (*vṛtti*) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special kind of modification of *ajñāna* as antaḥkaraṇa).

etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajñāna forms so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation (*abheda*) of the subjective consciousness with the objective consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the specific mental states (*tattadindriyayogyaviṣayāvacchinnacaitanyā-bhinnatvam tattadākāraviṣayāvacchinnañjñānasya tattadamśe pratyakṣatvam*). This union in perception means that the objective has at that moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the antaḥkaraṇa is called jīvasākṣi.

Inference (*anumāna*), according to Vedānta, is made by our notion of concomitance (*vyāptijñāna*) between two things, acting through specific past impressions (*saṁskāra*). Thus when I see smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is generated by the perception of two things together, when no case of the failure of concomitance is known (*vyabhicārājñāna*) regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether subjective, the Vedantist does not emphasize the necessity of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (*bhūyodarśanam sakṛddarśanam veti viśeṣo nādarāṇīyah*). Vedānta is not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference, but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedānta whether this concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases. The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance (*anvayavyāpti*) that the Vedānta allows. So the Vedānta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyāya supported, viz. *anvayavyatireki* (by joining agreement in presence with agreement in absence), *kevalānvayi* (by universal agreement where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and

kevalavyatireki (by universal agreement in absence). Vedānta advocates three premisses, viz. (1) *pratijñā* (the hill is fiery); (2) *hetu* (because it has smoke) and (3) *drṣṭānta* (as in the kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyāya maintained¹. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedānta as being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false, we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (*Brahmabhinnam sarvām mithyā Brahmabhinnatvāt yadevam tadevam yathā śūktirūpyam*). First premiss (*pratijñā*) all else excepting Brahman is false; second premiss (*hetu*) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss (*drṣṭānta*) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch².

Ātman, Jīva, Īśvara, Ekajīvavāda and Dṛṣṭiṣṭivāda.

We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous (*svayaṁprakāśa*). But what does this mean? Vedānta defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but is yet immediate and direct with us (*avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam*). Self-luminosity thus means the capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another. This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for its manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug, the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness to manifest it, then that might again require another, and that another, and so on *ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). If consciousness did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation, then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness (*anubhūti*) manifests itself and thereby maintains the ap-

¹ Vedānta would have either *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *udāharaṇa*, or *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*, and not all the five of Nyāya, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*.

² Vedantic notions of the *pramāṇa* of *upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, *śabda* and *anupalabdhi*, being similar to the *mīmāṃsā* view, do not require to be treated here separately.

pearance of all our world experience. This goes directly against the jñātātā theory of Kumārila that consciousness was not immediate but was only inferable from the manifesting quality (*jñātātā*) of objects when they are known in consciousness.

Now Vedānta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association comprehended under the term ahaṁkāra (ego). The real self is identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness. This real self called the ātman is not the same as the jīva or individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences of worldly life. Īśvara also must be distinguished from this highest ātman or Brahman. We have already seen that many Vedāntists draw a distinction between māyā and avidyā. Māyā is that aspect of ajñāna by which only the best attributes are projected, whereas avidyā is that aspect by which impure qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are more of a creative, generative (*viksepa*) type, whereas in the latter veiling (*āvaraṇa*) characteristics are most prominent. The relation of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with māyā and avidyā (also called ajñāna) was believed respectively to explain the phenomenal Īśvara and the phenomenal jīva or individual. This relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upādhi or pratibimba, and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image, though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of water and yield different kinds of images possessing different characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally have all the appearance of reality. The other conception of the relation is that when we speak of ākāśa (space) in the jug or of ākāśa in the room. The ākāśa in reality does not suffer

any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (*avachinna*) within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the ākāśa limited within it will remain as separate from the ākāśa limited within the room.

Of the Vedantists who accept the reflection analogy the followers of Nṛsiṃhāśrama think that when the pure cit is reflected in the māyā, Īśvara is phenomenally produced, and when in the avidyā the individual or jīva. Sarvajñātmā however does not distinguish between the māyā and the avidyā, and thinks that when the cit is reflected in the avidyā in its total aspect as cause, we get Īśvara, and when reflected in the antaḥkaraṇa—a product of the avidyā—we have jīva or individual soul.

Jīva or individual means the self in association with the ego and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels, suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jīva also three stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the antaḥkaraṇa is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajñāna and the jīva in this state is called prājña or ānandamaya. In the dream-state the self is in association with a subtle body and is called taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a subtle and gross body is called viśva. So also the self in its pure state is called Brahman, when associated with māyā it is called Īśvara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as controlling them, it is called hiranyagarbha; when with the gross elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virāṭ puruṣa.

The jīva in itself as limited by its avidyā is often spoken of as pāramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and the ego in the waking states as vyavahārika (phenomenal), and when in the dream states as dream-self, prātibhāṣika (illusory).

Prakāśātmā and his followers think that since ajñāna is one there cannot be two separate reflections such as jīva and Īśvara; but it is better to admit that jīva is the image of Īśvara in the ajñāna. The totality of Brahman-cit in association with māyā is Īśvara, and this when again reflected through the ajñāna gives us the jīva. The manifestation of the jīva is in the antaḥkaraṇa as states of knowledge. The jīva thus in reality is Īśvara and apart from jīva and Īśvara there is no other separate existence of

Brahma-caitanya. Jīva being the image of Īśvara is thus dependent on him, but when the limitations of jīva are removed by right knowledge, the jīva is the same Brahman it always was.

Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible of things which have colour, and therefore jīva is cit limited (avacchinna) by the antaḥkaraṇa (mind). Īśvara is that which is beyond it; the diversity of antaḥkaraṇas accounts for the diversity of the jīvas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining or comprehending the relation of Īśvara and jīva. In the Vedānta system Īśvara has but little importance, for he is but a phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and both jīva and Īśvara are but illusory impositions on it. Some Vedantists hold that there is but one jīva and one body, and that all the world as well as all the jīvas in it are merely his imaginings. These dream jīvas and the dream world will continue so long as that super-jīva continues to undergo his experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of the imaginary jīvas. The cosmic jīva is alone the awakened jīva and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the doctrine of ekajīva (one-soul).

The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some Vedantists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must be distinguished from the normal Vedānta view which holds that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these

are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance. According to the other view phenomena are not objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion, and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore called the theory of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda*, i.e. the theory that the subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions. In the normal Vedānta view however the objects of the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of *ajñāna*, but still these phenomena of the *ajñāna* are there as the common ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective epistemology whereas the *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda* has no proper epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined by his own subjective *avidyā* and previous impressions as modifications of the *avidyā*. The *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda* theory approaches nearest to the *Vijñānavāda* Buddhism, only with this difference that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being Vedānta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary perceptions are but impositions on it.

The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that both are modifications of *ajñāna*. It is indeed difficult to comprehend the nature of *ajñāna*, though its presence in consciousness can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedānta explains the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse

that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms and names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable, incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under certain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real, and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a positive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms and names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being apart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have being in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributing the characteristics of the unreal forms—the modes of ajñāna and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajñāna. Moreover such is the nature of ajñānas that they are knowable only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous Brahman or ātman. Being as such is the highest truth, the Brahman. The ajñāna states are not non-being in the sense of nothing of pure negation (*abhāva*), but in the sense that they are not being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being, the ajñāna, and this illumination means nothing more than a false identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajñāna if they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness, and this association means an illusion, superimposition, and mutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these cannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone that is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajñāna states in themselves as apart from the ātman we fall in a dilemma, for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and when it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus apart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other kind of its existence is known to us. If ajñāna had been a non-entity altogether it could never come at all, if it were a positive entity then it would never cease to be; the ajñāna thus is a mysterious category midway between being and non-being and indefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it is called *tattvānyatvābhyām anirvācya* or undefinable and undeterminable either as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is

a necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unreal in its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousness it is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while they are manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and incomprehensible as to their real nature or mutual relation, and comprehensible only so far as they are manifested in consciousness, but apart from these no rational conception of them can be formed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the ajñāna (for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested in consciousness and depending on this the Dṛṣṭiṣṭivādins asserted that our experience was inexplicably produced under the influence of avidyā and that beyond that no objective common ground could be admitted. But though this has the general assent of Vedānta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explaining our common sense view (*pratīkarmavyavasathā*) we may think that we have an objective world before us as the common field of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things and operations by which the phenomenon of our experience may be interpreted in the light of the Vedānta metaphysics.

The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the ātman, the one highest reality, secondly as jīva or the ātman as limited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated from the ātman, but ātman is regarded as identical with the psychosis thus appearing as a living and knowing being, as *jīvasākṣi* or perceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jīva comprehends, knows, or experiences; thirdly the antaḥkaraṇa psychosis or mind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidyā manifestations, just as the outer world objects are exterior centres of avidyā phenomena or objective entities. The antaḥkaraṇa is not only the avidyā capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences, but it also contains all the tendencies and modes of past impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The antaḥkaraṇa is always turning the various avidyā modes of it into the jīvasākṣi (jīva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and these are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformed into experience. These avidyā states of the antaḥkaraṇa are called its *vṛttis* or states. The specific peculiarity of the *vṛtti-ajñāna*s is this that only in these forms can they be superimposed upon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of consciousness and have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The

forms of ajñāna remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only so long as they do not come into relation to these vṛttis of antaḥkaraṇa, for the ajñāna can be destroyed by the cit only in the form of a vṛtti, while in all other forms the ajñāna veils the cit from manifestation. The removal of ajñāna-vṛttis of the antaḥkaraṇa or the manifestation of vṛtti-jñāna is nothing but this, that the antaḥkaraṇa states of avidyā are the only states of ajñāna which can be superimposed upon the self-luminous ātman (*adhyāsa*, false attribution). The objective world consists of the avidyā phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity consists in this that avidyā in this form cannot be superimposed on the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These avidyā phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but in all these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyond consciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidyā phenomena as antaḥkaraṇa states that they coalesce with the avidyā states and render themselves objects of consciousness or have their veil of āvaraṇa removed. It is thus assumed that in ordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. the antaḥkaraṇa goes out of the man's body (*śarīramadhyāt*) and coming in touch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form, and as soon as this transformation takes place the cit which is always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug. The jug phenomena in the objective world could not be manifested (though these were taking place on the background of the same self-luminous Brahman or ātman as forms of the highest truth of my subjective consciousness) because the ajñāna phenomena in these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-luminous. It was only by coming into contact with these phenomena that the antaḥkaraṇa could be transformed into corresponding states and that the illumination dawned which at once revealed the antaḥkaraṇa states and the objects with which these states or vṛttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through the vṛttis alone has the power of removing the ajñāna veiling the cit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer, or the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only of appearance and due to avidyā. And it is only from the point of view of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objects can only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite together through the antaḥkaraṇavṛtti, which makes the external objects

translucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the ajñāna which was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals the object phenomena by the very union of the cit as 'reflected through it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. The pratyakṣa-pramā or right knowledge by perception is the cit, the pure consciousness, reflected through the vṛtti and identical with the cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed by it. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish three consciousnesses: (1) consciousness as the background of objective phenomena, (2) consciousness as the background of the jīva or pramātā, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the vṛtti of the antaḥkaraṇa; when these three unite perception is effected.

Pramā or right knowledge means in Vedānta the acquirement of such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by experience (*abādhita*). There is thus no absolute definition of truth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though it is very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradicted by right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true absolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness which is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The truth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out whether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience or not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to be regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be contradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated by a false identification of antaḥkaraṇa transformations as pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated the perceptions, "I am happy," or "I am sorry." In continuous perception of anything for a certain time as an object or as pleasure, etc. the mental state or vṛtti is said to last in the same way all the while so long as any other new form is not taken up by the antaḥkaraṇa for the acquirement of any new knowledge. In such cases when I infer that there is fire on the hill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter of inference, for the antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti cannot be in touch with the fire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of

mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it to be odoriferous. Vedānta does not admit the existence of the relation called *samavāya* (inherence) or *jāti* (class notion); and so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the other class called inference, and holds that both perception and inference are but different modes of the transformations of the antaḥkaraṇa reflecting the cit in the corresponding vṛttis. The perception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is in contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of the cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in the subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjective cit with the objective cit. This identity of course means that through the vṛtti the same reality subsisting in the object and the subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be inferred, being away from contact with antaḥkaraṇa, has apparently a different reality from that manifested in the states of consciousness. Thus perception is regarded as the mental state representing the same identical reality in the object and the subject by antaḥkaraṇa contact, and it is held that the knowledge produced by words (e.g. this is the same Devadatta) referring identically to the same thing which is seen (e.g. when I see Devadatta before me another man says this is Devadatta, and the knowledge produced by "this is Devadatta" though a verbal (*śābda*) knowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyakṣa. The content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the same as the perception, and there being no new relationing knowledge as represented in the proposition "this is Devadatta" involving the unity of two terms "this" and "Devadatta" with a copula, but only the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual perception already experienced, the knowledge proceeding from "this is Devadatta" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpa knowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-consciousness when the preceptor instructs "thou art Brahman" the knowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for

though grammatically there are two ideas and a copula, yet from the point of view of intrinsic significance (*tātparyā*) one identical reality only is indicated. Vedānta does not distinguish nirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual perception, but only in śābda perception as in cases referred to above. In all such cases the condition for nirvikalpa is that the notion conveyed by the sentence should be one whole or one identical reality, whereas in savikalpa perception we have a combination of different ideas as in the sentence, "the king's man is coming" (*rājapuruṣa āgacchati*). Here no identical reality is signified, but what is signified is the combination of two or three different concepts¹.

It is not out of place to mention in this connection that Vedānta admits all the six *pramāṇas* of Kumārila and considers like Mīmāṃsā that all knowledge is self-valid (*svataḥpramāṇa*). But *pramā* has not the same meaning in Vedānta as in Mīmāṃsā. There as we remember *pramā* meant the knowledge which goaded one to practical action and as such all knowledge was *pramā*, until practical experience showed the course of action in accordance with which it was found to be contradicted. In Vedānta however there is no reference to action, but *pramā* means only uncontradicted cognition. To the definition of self-validity as given by Mīmāṃsā Vedānta adds another objective qualification, that such knowledge can have *svataḥprāmāṇya* as is not vitiated by the presence of any *doṣa* (cause of error, such as defect of senses or the like). Vedānta of course does not think like Nyāya that positive conditions (e.g. correspondence, etc.) are necessary for the validity of knowledge, nor does it divest knowledge of all qualifications like the Mīmāṃsists, for whom all knowledge is self-valid as such. It adopts a middle course and holds that absence of *doṣa* is a necessary condition for the self-validity of knowledge. It is clear that this is a compromise, for whenever an external condition has to be admitted, the knowledge cannot be regarded as self-valid, but Vedānta says that as it requires only a negative condition for the absence of *doṣa*, the objection does not apply to it, and it holds that if it depended on the presence of any positive condition for proving the validity of knowledge like the Nyāya, then only its theory of self-validity would have been damaged. But since it wants only a negative condition, no blame can be

¹ See *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* and *Śikhāmaṇi*.

attributed to its theory of self-validity. Vedānta was bound to follow this slippery middle course, for it could not say that the pure cit reflected in consciousness could require anything else for establishing its validity, nor could it say that all phenomenal forms of knowledge were also all valid, for then the world-appearance would come to be valid; so it held that knowledge could be regarded as valid only when there was no doṣa present; thus from the absolute point of view all world-knowledge was false and had no validity, because there was the avidyā-doṣa, and in the ordinary sphere also that knowledge was valid in which there was no doṣa. Validity (prāmānya) with Mīmāṃsā meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to practical action in accordance with it, but with Vedānta it meant correctness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence of doṣa being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the correctness of knowledge¹.

Vedānta Theory of Illusion.

We have already seen that the Mīmāṃsists had asserted that all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (*yath-ārthāḥ sarve vivādaśpadibhūtāḥ pratyayāḥ pratyayatvāt*). Even illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and the thing remembered (e.g. silver). But Vedānta objects to this, and asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing which is clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it is said that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i.e. non-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver), then also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation, and negation with Mīmāṃsā is nothing but the bare presence of the locus of negation (e.g. negation of jug on the ground is nothing but the bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perception of the non-association of "silver" and "this" means barely and merely the "silver" and "this." Even admitting for argument's sake that the distinction between two things or two ideas is not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no one could be tempted to move forward to action (such as stooping down to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positive

¹ See *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, *Śikhāmaṇi*, *Maṇiprabhā* and Citsukha on svataḥprāmānya.

conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical movement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated and comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the movement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us to behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite this similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mīmāṃsā position may be defined it fails¹. Vedānta thinks that the illusion is not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenon of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects; the difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusion is generated by the doṣa or defect of the senses etc., whereas the phenomena of external objects are not due to such specific doṣas. The process of illusory perception in Vedānta may be described thus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by doṣas a mental state as “thisness” with reference to the thing before me is generated; then in the thing as “this” and in the mental state of the form of that “this” the cit is reflected. Then the avidyā (nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence of the doṣa, and this disturbance along with the impression of silver remembered through similarity is transformed into the appearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silver appearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state generated by its contact with the illusory silver. These two transformations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenal illusory silver state, are manifested by the perceiving consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya*). There are thus here two phenomenal transformations, one in the avidyā states forming the illusory objective silver phenomenon, and another in the antahkaraṇa-vṛtti or mind state. But in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena, their object being the same as the “this” in perception, we have one knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory of illusion is that an indefinable (*anirvacanīya-khyāti*) illusory silver is created in every case where an illusory perception of silver occurs. There are three orders of reality in Vedānta, namely the

¹ See *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* and *Nyāyamakaranda* on akhyāti refutation.

pāramārthika or absolute, *vyavahārika* or practical ordinary experience, and *prātibhāsika*, illusory. The first one represents the absolute truth; the other two are false impressions due to doṣa. The difference between *vyavahārika* and *prātibhāsika* is that the doṣa of the *vyavahārika* perception is neither discovered nor removed until salvation, whereas the doṣa of the *prātibhāsika* reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (such as defect of the senses, sleep, etc.) is perceived in the world of our ordinary experience, and thus the *prātibhāsika* experience lasts for a much shorter period than the *vyavahārika*. But just as the *vyavahārika* world is regarded as phenomenal modifications of the ajñāna, as apart from our subjective experience and even before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is also regarded as a modification of avidyā, an undefinable creation of the object of illusion, by the agency of the doṣa. Thus in the case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver is created by the doṣa in association with the senses, which is called the creation of an indefinable (*anirvacanīya*) silver of illusion. Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same but the avidyā of antaḥkaraṇa suffers modifications (*pariṇāma*) on account of doṣa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation. The illusory silver is thus *vivartta* (appearance) from the point of view of the cit and *pariṇāma* from the point of view of avidyā, for the difference between *vivartta* and *pariṇāma* is, that in the former the transformations have a different reality from the cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it), while in the latter case the transformations have the same reality as the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same stuff as the avidyā whose transformations it is). But now a difficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to a coalescing of the cit underlying the antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti as modified by doṣa and the object—cit as underlying the “this” before me (in the illusion of “this is silver”), then I ought to have the experience that “I am silver” like “I am happy” and not that “this is silver”; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place in connection with my previous notion as “this,” the form of the knowledge also is “this is silver,” whereas in the notion “I am happy,” the notion of happiness takes place in connection with a previous vṛtti of “I.” Thus though the coalescing of the two “cits” is the same in both cases, yet in one case the

knowledge takes the form of "I am," and in another as "this is" according as the previous impression is "I" or "this." In dreams also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations are generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are imposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regarded merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the form that "I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc." and not that "I remember the chariots." In the dream state all the senses are inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there, but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space, time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought to continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the waking stages the antaḥkaraṇa is being constantly transformed into different states on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc., which were causing the dream cognitions. This is called *nivṛtti* (negation) as distinguished from *bādha* (cessation). The illusory creation of dream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but these cannot be experienced any longer, for there being no doṣa of sleep the antaḥkaraṇa is active and suffering modifications in accordance with the objects presented before us. This is what is called *nivṛtti*, for though the illusion is there I cannot experience it, whereas *bādha* or cessation occurs when the illusory creation ceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shell the illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, this was not and will not be silver. When the conch-shell is perceived as silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of reality was not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objective illusory creation; for the reality in the śukti (conch-shell) is transferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed upon it. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kinds of illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an indefinable silver (*anirvacanīya-rajatotpatti*) and the other is the attribution of the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusory silver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illusion that it is a reality. This is no doubt the *anyathākhyāti* form of illusion as advocated by Nyāya. Vedānta admits that when two things (e.g. red flower and crystal) are both present

before my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the other by illusion (e.g. the illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusion is of the form of *anyathākhyāti*; but if one of the things is not present before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is not of the *anyathākhyāti* type, but of the *anirvacanīyakhyāti* type. Vedānta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it believed that all appearance of reality in the world-appearance was really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-luminous in all our experiences. The world appearance is an illusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with it is a misattribution (*anyathākhyāti*) of the characteristic of the Brahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, which manifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience, just as it is the reality of śukti that gives to the appearance of silver its reality.

Vedānta Ethics and Vedānta Emancipation.

Vedānta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the study of Vedānta and is instructed by the preceptor—"Thou art that (Brahman)," he attains the emancipating knowledge, and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory. The qualifications necessary for the study of Vedānta are (1) that the person having studied all the Vedas with the proper accessories, such as grammar, lexicon etc. is in full possession of the knowledge of the Vedas, (2) that either in this life or in another, he must have performed only the obligatory Vedic duties (such as daily prayer, etc. called *nitya-karma*) and occasionally obligatory duty (such as the birth ceremony at the birth of a son, called *naimittika-karma*) and must have avoided all actions for the fulfilment of selfish desires (*kāmya-karmas*, such as the performance of sacrifices for going to Heaven) and all prohibited actions (e.g. murder, etc. *niṣiddha-karma*) in such a way that his mind is purged of all good and bad actions (no karma is generated by the *nitya* and *naimittika-karma*, and as he has not performed the *kāmya* and prohibited karmas, he has acquired no new karma). When he has thus properly purified his mind and is in possession of the four virtues or means of fitting the mind for Vedānta instruction (called *sādhana*) he can regard himself as properly qualified for the Vedānta instruction. These virtues are (1) knowledge of what is eternal

and what is transient, (2) disinclination to enjoyments of this life and of the heavenly life after death, (3) extreme distaste for all enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right knowledge, (4) control over the senses by which these are restrained from everything but that which aids the attainment of right knowledge (*dama*), (*a*) having restrained them, the attainment of such power that these senses may not again be tempted towards worldly enjoyments (*uparati*), (*b*) power of bearing extremes of heat, cold, etc., (*c*) employment of mind towards the attainment of right knowledge, (*d*) faith in the instructor and Upaniṣads; (5) strong desire to attain salvation. A man possessing the above qualities should try to understand correctly the true purport of the Upaniṣads (called *śravaṇa*), and by arguments in favour of the purport of the Upaniṣads to strengthen his conviction as stated in the Upaniṣads (called *manana*) and then by *nididhyāsana* (meditation) which includes all the Yoga processes of concentration, try to realize the truth as one. Vedānta therefore in ethics covers the ground of Yoga; but while for Yoga emancipation proceeds from understanding the difference between puruṣa and prakṛti, with Vedānta salvation comes by the dawn of right knowledge that Brahman alone is the true reality, his own self¹. Mimāṃsā asserts that the Vedas do not declare the knowledge of one Brahman to be the supreme goal, but holds that all persons should act in accordance with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of good and the removal of evil. But Vedānta holds that though the purport of the earlier Vedas is as Mimāṃsā has it, yet this is meant only for ordinary people, whereas for the elect the goal is clearly as the Upaniṣads indicate it, namely the attainment of the highest knowledge. The performance of Vedic duties is intended only for ordinary men, but yet it was believed by many (e.g. Vācaspati Miśra and his followers) that due performance of Vedic duties helped a man to acquire a great keenness for the attainment of right knowledge; others believed (e.g. Prakāśātmā and his followers) that it served to bring about suitable opportunities by securing good preceptors, etc. and to remove many obstacles from the way so that it became easier for a person to attain the desired right knowledge.

In the acquirement of ordinary knowledge the ajñānas re-

¹ See *Vedāntasāra* and *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*.

moved are only smaller states of ajñāna, whereas when the Brahma-knowledge dawns the ajñāna as a whole is removed. Brahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a state of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when this knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge which at first reflects it (and which being a state is itself ajñāna modification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed, only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its own true light. Thus it is said that just as fire riding on a piece of wood would burn the whole city and after that would burn the very same wood, so in the last state of mind the Brahma-knowledge would destroy all the illusory world-appearance and at last destroy even that final state¹.

The mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahman as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as illusory nothing. As all being of the world-appearance is but limited manifestations of that one being, so all pleasures also are but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a taste of which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep. The being of Brahman however is not an abstraction from all existent beings as the *sattā* (being as class notion) of the naiyāyika, but the concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness and pure bliss is always identical with itself. Being (*sat*) is pure bliss and pure consciousness. What becomes of the avidyā during mukti (emancipation) is as difficult for one to answer as the question, how the avidyā came forth and stayed during the world-appearance. It is best to remember that the category of the indefinite avidyā is indefinite as regards its origin, manifestation and destruction. Vedānta however believes that even when the true knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a while, if the individual's previously ripened karmas demand it. Thus the emancipated person may walk about and behave like an ordinary sage, but yet he is emancipated and can no longer acquire any new karma. As soon as the fruits due to his ripe karmas are enjoyed and exhausted, the sage loses his body and there will never be any other birth for him, for the dawn of perfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas of beginningless previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any

¹ *Siddhāntaleśa*.

of the illusions subjective or objective which could make any knowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man is called *jīvanmukta*, i.e. emancipated while living. For him all world-appearance has ceased. He is the one light burning alone in himself where everything else has vanished for ever from the stage¹.

Vedānta and other Indian Systems.

Vedānta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyāya, and most of its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it. Śāṅkara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and inconsistencies in many of the Nyāya conceptions, such as the theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of *samavāya*, the conception of *jāti*, etc.² His followers carried it to still greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours of Śrīhaṛṣa, Citsukha, Madhusūdana, etc. It was opposed to Mīmāṃsā so far as this admitted the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories, but agreed with it generally as regards the *pramāṇas* of *anumāna*, *upamiti*, *arthāpatti*, *śabda*, and *anupalabdhi*. It also found a great supporter in Mīmāṃsā with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifesting power of knowledge. But it differed from Mīmāṃsā in the field of practical duties and entered into many elaborate discussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only to ordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic duties to perform but were to rise above them and attain the highest knowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic duties only so long as he was not fit for Vedānta instruction and studies.

With Sāṃkhya and Yoga the relation of Vedānta seems to be very close. We have already seen that Vedānta had accepted all the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc., that were advocated by Yoga. The main difference between Vedānta and Sāṃkhya was this that Sāṃkhya believed that the stuff of which the world consisted was a reality side by side with the *puruṣas*. In later times Vedānta had compromised so far with Sāṃkhya that it also sometimes described *māyā* as being made up of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. Vedānta also held that according to these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications

¹ See *Pañcadaśī*.

² See Śāṅkara's refutation of Nyāya, *Śāṅkara-bhāṣya*, II. ii.

of the māyā. Thus Īśvara is believed to possess a mind of pure sattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted in Vedānta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as Sāṃkhya held it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that māyā was believed to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it was indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different from what we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial nothing, a magic entity which had its being only so long as it appeared. Prakṛti also was indefinable or rather undemonstrable as regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation, but even then it was believed to be a combination of positive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the reals composing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged to it with which it could be defined. Māyā however was undemonstrable, indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a separate category of the indefinite. Sāṃkhya believed in the personal individuality of souls, while for Vedānta there was only one soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the māyā transformations. There was an adhyāsa or illusion in Sāṃkhya as well as in Vedānta; but in the former the illusion was due to a mere non-distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa or mere misattribution of characters or identities, but in Vedānta there was not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable creation. Causation with Sāṃkhya meant real transformation, but with Vedānta all transformation was mere appearance. Though there were so many differences, it is however easy to see that probably at the time of the origin of the two systems during the Upaniṣad period each was built up from very similar ideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifested themselves into the present divergences of the two systems. Though Śaṅkara laboured hard to prove that the Sāṃkhya view could not be found in the Upaniṣads, we can hardly be convinced by his interpretations and arguments. The more he argues, the more we are led to suspect that the Sāṃkhya thought had its origin in the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara and his followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the śūnya of Nāgārjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between pure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of Śaṅkara to the self-luminosity of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism

can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth in the accusations against Śaṅkara by Vijñāna Bhikṣu and others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to think that Śaṅkara's philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhism with the Upaniṣad notion of the permanence of self superadded.

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¹ The words are arranged in the order of the English alphabet. Sanskrit and Pāli technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books are in italics with a capital. English words and other names are in Roman with a capital. Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones. But throughout the body of the book the names of Vedic works are in Roman with a capital, as a mark of respect for their supposed revealed character.

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A HISTORY
OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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PREFACE

NINE years have passed away since the first volume of this work was published, and the present volume has been in the press for more than two years. During the last seven years bad health has been responsible for many interruptions. In the first volume manuscripts were sparingly used, but in the present work numerous unpublished and almost unknown manuscripts have been referred to. These could not be collected easily, and it took time to read them; many of them were old and moth-eaten and it was not often easy to decipher the handwriting. It has not always been possible, however, to give an elaborate account of the content of all these manuscripts, for in many cases they contained no new matter and had therefore only been mentioned by name, a fact which could be ascertained only after long and patient study, since records of them were previously unknown. A considerable delay was also caused in the writing of this volume by the fact that large portions of what will appear in the third volume had to be compiled before the manuscripts had left the author's hands. In any event, the author offers his sincere apologies for the delay.

The manuscript of the third volume has made good progress and, barring illness and other accidents, will soon be sent to press. This volume will contain a fairly elaborate account of the principal dualistic and pluralistic systems, such as the philosophy of the *Pañca-rātra*, Bhāskara, Yāmuna, Rāmānuja and his followers, Madhva and his followers, the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and the Gaudīya school of Vaiṣṇavism. The fourth and the fifth volumes will deal with the philosophy of Vallabha and some other lesser known schools of Vaiṣṇavism, the philosophy of the Purāṇas, Tantras, the different schools of Śaivas, Śāktas, Indian Aesthetics, the philosophy of right and law and the religious systems that have found their expression in some of the leading vernaculars of India.

A new impression of the first volume is now in the press. The present volume contains four chapters on Śāṅkara Vedānta, the Medical Speculations of the Ancient Hindus, and the Philosophy of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* and the *Bhagavad-gītā*. A good deal of the Śāṅkara Vedānta, especially in regard to its controversy with

Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and their followers, still remains to be treated in the third volume.

A word of explanation may be needed with regard to the inclusion in a work on Indian philosophy of the speculations of the Indian medical schools. Biology has recently played a great part in liberating philosophy from its old-world ideas. In ancient India, Biology had not grown into a separate science; whatever biological ideas were current in India were mixed up with medical, osteological and physiological speculations, the only branches of study in ancient India which may be regarded as constituting an experimental science. It was therefore thought that a comprehensive work on the history of Indian philosophy would be sadly defective without a chapter on these speculations, which introduce also some distinctly new ethical and eschatological concepts and a view of life which is wholly original. The biological notions of growth, development and heredity of these schools are no less interesting, and their relations to the logical categories of Nyāya are very instructive.

No attempt has been made to draw any comparisons or contrasts with Western philosophy, since in a work of this type it would most likely have been misleading and would have obscured the real philosophical issues. The study here presented is strictly faithful to the original Sanskrit texts within the limits of the present writer's capacities. Often the ground covered has been wholly new and the materials have been obtained by a direct and first-hand study of all available texts and manuscripts. Nevertheless some sources, containing, possibly, valuable materials, inevitably remain unconsulted, for many new manuscripts will be discovered in future, and our knowledge of Indian philosophy must advance but slowly. In spite of the greatest care, errors of interpretation, exposition and expression may have crept in and for these the author craves the indulgence of sympathetic readers.

Since the publication of the first volume of the present work, many treatises on Indian philosophy have appeared in India and elsewhere. But it has not been possible to refer to many of these. The present attempt is mainly intended to give an exposition of Indian thought strictly on the basis of the original texts and commentaries, and not to eradicate false views by indulging in controversy; and, since the author takes upon himself the responsibility of all the interpretations of the texts that he has used, and since

he has drawn his materials mostly from them, it has seldom been possible to refer to the efforts of his fellow-workers in the field. Occasionally, however, he has had to discuss and sometimes to borrow the views of other writers in the assessment of chronological facts, and he also expresses his indebtedness to such other writers who have worked upon some of the special problems of Indian thought. It has been suggested to him that it would have been better if the views of other writers had been fully criticized, but however that may be, such criticism has been considered as beyond the scope of this work, which, as at present planned, will cover some 3000 pages when completed.

The chronological views regarding the antiquity of the *Gītā* may appear heretical, but it is hoped that they may be deemed excusable, for this is an age of toleration, and they are not more heretical than the views of many distinguished writers on Indian chronology. In the chapter on the *Gītā*, some repetition of the same views in different contexts was inevitable on account of the looseness of the structure of the *Gītā*, which is an ethico-religious treatise and not a system of philosophy. This, however, has been studiously avoided in the other chapters. Neither the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* nor the *Gītā* are systematic works on philosophy, and yet no treatment of Indian philosophy can legitimately ignore their claims. For in a country where philosophy and religion have been inseparably associated, the value of such writings as breathe the spirit of philosophy cannot be over-estimated, and no history of Indian philosophy worth the name can do without them.

I have no words sufficient to express my gratitude to my esteemed friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford, who went through the proofs in two of their stages and thus co-operated with me in the trouble of correcting them. I fear that in spite of our joint efforts many errors have escaped our eyes, but had it not been for his kind help the imperfections of the book would have been greater. I must similarly thank my friend, Mr Douglas Ainstie, for help with the proofs. My thanks are also due to my pupils, Dr M. Eleade (Bucharest), Mr Janakiballabh Bhattacharyya, M.A., and my other friends, Messrs Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Durgacharan Chatterjee, M.A., Srish Chandra Das Gupta, M.A., and my daughter, Miss Maitreyi Devi, for the assistance they rendered me in getting the manuscript

ready for the press, inserting diacritical marks, comparing the references and the like, and also in arranging the index cards. But as none of them had the whole charge of any of these tasks, and as their help was only of an occasional nature, the responsibility for imperfections belongs to the author and not to them.

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

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CHAPTER XI

THE ŚAṆKARA SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA (*continued*)

THE treatment of the school of Śaṅkara Vedānta in the preceding chapter may be considered fairly sufficient for all ordinary purposes. But the reputation of this school of thought stands so high, and so many people are interested in it, that it was pointed out to me that it would be desirable to go into a little more detailed study of it. An additional justification for such a suggestion is to be found in the regrettable fact that, though numerous elementary and half-informed treatises have been published both in this country and in Europe, I do not know of any systematic study of the system in any of the modern languages of Europe or Asia which has been based on a first-hand study of the works of the great thinkers of this school who followed Śaṅkara and developed his system in a remarkably recondite manner. The comparatively small compass of this chapter in a History of Indian Philosophy cannot be expected to fulfil adequately such a demand; but still it may be expected that an attempt to bring out some of these materials by some amount of detailed study will be excusable, though it may seem slightly to disturb the general plan of this work.

The World-Appearance.

The Upaniṣads, called also the Vedānta, contain passages which indicate very different lines of thought, theistic, pantheistic, of self as the only ultimate reality, creationism, etc. The works of those commentators who wrote commentaries on the Upaniṣads before Śaṅkara and tried to interpret them on the supposition that there was one uniform, systematic, dogmatic philosophy in them are now practically all lost, and all that we can know of them is contained in the meagre references that are found in Śaṅkara's commentaries or the works of other, later, commentators. As an example I may refer to Bhartṛprapañca, who tried to give a realistic interpretation of the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* by treating the world and souls as real emanations from God or Brahman¹.

¹ Fragments of Bhartṛprapañca from the writings of Śaṅkara and his commentator Ānandajñāna and from Sureśvara's *Vārttika* have been collected by Prof. Hiriyanṇa, Mysore, in a short paper read at the Third Oriental Conference in Madras in 1924, published in Madras in 1925.

Śaṅkara inherited from his predecessors the opinion that the Upaniṣads teach us one consistent systematic philosophy, but, being under the influence of Gauḍapāda, differed from them on the nature of this philosophy, which he propounded so elaborately in all his commentaries on the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras*.

The main thesis of Śaṅkara, as has already been pointed out in the preceding chapter, consists of the view that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality, while everything else is false. He was interested in proving that this philosophy was preached in the Upaniṣads; but in the Upaniṣads there are many passages which are clearly of a theistic and dualistic purport, and no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that these could yield a meaning which would support Śaṅkara's thesis. Śaṅkara therefore introduces the distinction of a common-sense view (*vyāvahārika*) and a philosophic view (*pāramārthika*), and explains the Upaniṣads on the supposition that, while there are some passages in them which describe things from a purely philosophic point of view, there are many others which speak of things only from a common-sense dualistic view of a real world, real souls and a real God as creator. Śaṅkara has applied this method of interpretation not only in his commentary on the Upaniṣads, but also in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Judging by the *sūtras* alone, it does not seem to me that the *Brahma-sūtra* supports the philosophical doctrine of Śaṅkara, and there are some *sūtras* which Śaṅkara himself interpreted in a dualistic manner. He was never afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations; for he could easily get out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions found in the *sūtras* or in the Upaniṣad passages were merely an estimate of things from the common-sense point of view. Though on the basis of Śaṅkara's own statements, as well as those of his later commentators and other adherents of his school, there is hardly any room for doubt regarding the meaning and force of Śaṅkara's philosophy, yet at least one Indian scholar has sought to prove that Śaṅkara's philosophy was realistic¹. That there was some amount of realism in Śaṅkara is proved by his own confession, when he criticizes the uncompromising Buddhist idealists (*vijñāna-vādins*) or the so-called Buddhist nihilists (*śūnya-vādins*).

¹ *Advaita Philosophy* by K. Vidyāratna, published by the Calcutta University Press, 1924.

I have already discussed in a general way in what sense according to the Vedānta, from the point of view of the Śāṅkara school of Vedānta as interpreted by his later adherents, the world is an illusion. But in the present section I propose to discuss Śāṅkara's own statements, as well as the statements of some of his important followers, on the subject of the nature of world-illusion. This is one of the most important points of the Śāṅkara school of philosophy and needs a discussion in some detail.

But before I take it up, I am naturally reminded of the views of Buddhist idealism and the so-called Buddhistic nihilism, and it seems desirable that Śāṅkara's doctrine of illusion should be treated in connection with the doctrines of illusion in those systems of Buddhistic thought which preceded Śāṅkara. Taking the *Sūnyavāda* theory of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, we see that they also introduced the distinction between limited truth and absolute truth. Thus Nāgārjuna says in his *Mādhyamika-sūtras* that the Buddhas preach their philosophy on the basis of two kinds of truth, truth as veiled by ignorance and depending on common-sense presuppositions and judgments (*saṃvṛti-satya*) and truth as unqualified and ultimate (*paramārtha-satya*)¹. The word *saṃvṛti* literally means "closed." Candrakīrti explains *saṃvṛti* as meaning "closing on all sides" and says that it is ignorance (*ajñāna*) which is denoted by the term *saṃvṛti* here, because it covers the truth of all things². In this sense the whole of the world of our experience of causes and effects, which we perceive and of which we speak, presents an appearance which is hidden by ignorance. This world is not contradicted in our world-experience; but, as each and every entity of this world is produced by other things or entities, and they again by others, and as we cannot specify the nature of each one of them without referring to others which produced them or from which they originated, and tracing those again to other causes and

¹ *dve satye samuṣṭāśrītya buddhānām dharma-deśanā
loka-saṃvṛti-satyam ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ.*

Mādhyamika-sūtra, xxiv. 8, p. 492, B.B. edition.

² *Ajñānam hi samantāt sarva-padārtha-tattvāvacchādanāt saṃvṛtir ity ucyate.* *Ibid.* Candrakīrti however gives two other meanings of the word *saṃvṛti*, which do not seem to be so closely connected with the etymology. In the first of the two meanings *saṃvṛti* means interdependent origination or *pratītya-samutpāda*, and in the second it means the conventional world of common-sense, which can be expressed or indicated by speech and language and which we are supposed to know and refer to in all our experiences involving the knower and the known—*saṃvṛtiḥ saṃketo loka-vyavahārah, sa ca abhīdhanābhīdheya-jñāna-jñeyādīlak-ṣaṇaḥ.*

so on, it is not possible to assert anything as to the nature or characteristic (*svabhāva*) of anything as it is. Things are known to us only as being the result of the combination of many entities or as product complexes. Nothing is produced of itself, and so the products are never by themselves self-existent, but exist only through the coming together of different entities. That which has any nature of its own cannot owe its origination to other complexes, and so there is nothing in our world-experience which has a nature of its own. The apparent reality of the world has therefore the mysterious veil of ignorance over it, and it is this veil of ignorance which is referred to by the term *loka-saṃvṛta*. This is spoken of also as *tathya-saṃvṛti* (real ignorance), as distinguished from *mithyā-saṃvṛti* (false ignorance), properly used of the ordinary illusions and hallucinations of magic, mirage reflections, etc.¹ Those appearances which are due to sense-defects or other causes and are therefore contradicted in experience are called *mithyā-saṃvṛta*, because their falsehood is discovered in experience. The falsehood of the world-appearances, however, can be realized only when their real nature (*paramārtharūpa*) as a succession of essenceless products of causal complexes is properly understood. The world holds good and remains uncontradicted and has all the appearance of reality in all our practical experiences, and it is only when it is understood that these phenomena have no nature of their own that they are considered false. All teachings in philosophy take for granted the world-appearances, subjective and objective, and try to give a rational analysis and estimate of them; and it is only through an experience of these world-phenomena and a rational understanding of them that one realizes their truth as being a mere flow of causes and effects devoid of essence. The appearance of the world as reality is therefore true only in a limited manner during the period when the veil of ignorance is not removed from our eyes; and this is signified by designating the truth (*satya*) of the world as only *loka-saṃvṛta*. This world-appearance is however relatively true when compared with the ordinary illusions of perception (when, e.g., a piece of rope is perceived as a snake, or when one sees a mirage in a desert).

But a question arises—if the world-appearance has no essence of its own, how is it that it appears to have one, or how is it that the world-phenomena appear at all? To such a question Nāgārjuna's answer is that the appearance of the world is like the

¹ *Bodhi-caryāvatāra-ṭīkā*, p. 353, Bibliotheca Indica Series, 1902.

appearance of mirages or dreams, which have no reality of their own, but still present an objective appearance of reality¹. The world is not a mere nothing, like a lotus of the sky or the hare's horn, which are simply non-existent (*avidyamāna*). Thus there is not only the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*); there is also the relative truth of the phenomenal world (*loka-saṃvṛti-satya*); there are, further, the sense-illusions, hallucinations and the like which are contradicted in ordinary experience (*aloka-saṃvṛta* or *mithyā-saṃvṛta*), and also that which is merely non-existent, like the hare's horn. The error (*viparyāsa*) of world-appearance is considered as being of four kinds, viz. the consideration of the momentary as eternal, the consideration of the painful as being pleasurable, the consideration of the unholy as holy, and of that which has no soul as having a soul². And this error is due to ignorance (*avidyā*). Candrakīrti quotes a passage from the *Ārya-dṛḍhāsaya-paripṛcchā*, in which it is said that, just as a man may see in a dream that he is spending the night with the wife of the king, and, suddenly realizing that he is discovered, tries to fly for fear of his life (thus perceiving the presence of a woman, where there is none), so we are always falling into the error of asserting that we have perceived the manifold world-appearance where there is none³.

Such analogies of error naturally suggest the supposition that there must be some reality which is mistaken as some other thing; but, as has already been explained, the Buddhists emphasized the fact that, in dreams, the illusory appearances were no doubt objectively known as objective presentations of which we had previously become aware—experiences through which we pass, though there is no reality on which these appearances rest or are imposed. It was here that Śāṅkara differed. Thus, in his introduction to the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* he says that the essence of all illusory perception is that one thing is mistaken for another, that the qualities, characteristics or attributes of one thing are taken for the qualities, characteristics or attributes of another. Illusion is defined as the false appearance in some object of something

¹ *Mādhyamika-sūtra*, XXIII. 8.

² *Iha catvāro viparyāsā ucyante: tadyathā pratikṣaṇa-vināśini skandha-pañcake yo nityam iti grāhaḥ sa viparyāsaḥ... duḥkhātmake skandha-pañcake yaḥ sukham iti viparīto grāhaḥ so 'paro viparyāsaḥ... śarīram aśuci-svabhāvaṃ tatra yo śucitvena grāhaḥ sa viparyāsaḥ... pañca-skandhaṃ nirātmakam tasmin ya ātma-grāhaḥ anātmāni ātmābluniveśaḥ sa viparyāsaḥ.* Candrakīrti's commentary on *ibid.* XXIII. 13. Compare it with the *Yoga-sūtra*, II. 5, *Ānandāśrama* Series.

³ Candrakīrti's commentary on the *Mādhyamika-sūtra*, XXIII. 13.

experienced before, resembling a memory image. It is explained by some as being the false affirmation of the characteristics of one thing in regard to another; others explain it as an error due to the non-apprehension of the difference between that which is wrongly apprehended and the misapprehended object which the former is wrongly supposed to be; others think that, when one thing is misapprehended as another, the illusion consists in the fancying of the former entity as being endowed with strange characteristics (*viparīta-dharmatva*); but in all these different ways of analysis illusion fundamentally is nothing but the false appearance of one thing with the characteristics of another. So also it may be that a conch-shell appears as silver or that one moon appears as two moons¹. Śāṅkara then suggests that, since the universal self (*pratyag-ātman*) is felt through our feeling of "I" and since it is immediate in all experience (*aparokṣa*), it is not absolutely unrelated and unindicated (*aviśaya*) in experience, and consequently it is quite possible that the non-self (*anātman*) and its characteristics may be illusorily imposed upon the universal self. This illusory imposition of the non-self and its characteristics on the universal self is called nescience (*avidyā*).

In his commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*, 1. 17, Śāṅkara says that, when a piece of rope falsely appears as a snake, this is merely false imposition or appearance, not existence. The illusory appearance of the snake did not really bring into existence a snake, which later on became non-existent when right knowledge supervened. It was a mere illusion, and the rope-snake had no existence at all². Śāṅkara in commenting on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* explains with approval Gauḍapāda's view that the world of common experience is as illusory as a dream. Dreams are false; for in a dream a man may have the experience of going to distant places, and yet, when he wakes up, he finds that he has been asleep for a few seconds only, and has not moved a foot from his bed. The dream experiences are therefore false, because they are contradicted by the waking experiences. But the waking experiences, being similar to dream experiences, are equally false. For both sets of experiences involve the duality of subject and object, and are therefore

¹ Śāṅkara's *Adhyāśa-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1904.

² *Rajjvām sarpa iva kalpitatvāt na tu sa vidyate... na hi rajjvām bhrānti-buddhyā kalpitah sarpo vidyamānaḥ san vivekato nirvṛtṭah; tathedaṃ prapañcākhyam māyā-mātram*. Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*, 1. 17, Ānandāśrama Series.

fundamentally more or less the same: so that, if one of them is false, the other also is false. The world-experience is like other well-known instances of illusion—the mirage, for example. Since it had no existence in the beginning, and will not have any existence in the end, neither can it have existence in the intervening period of appearance. The objection that our waking experiences fulfil practical purposes and have thus associated with them the pragmatic test of truth, which is absent in the case of dream experiences, is invalid; for the pragmatic tests of the waking experiences may well be contradicted by dream experiences; a man who goes to sleep after a sumptuous feast may well dream that he has been starving for days together. Both our inner world of mind and its experiences and the outer objective world are thus false creations¹. But Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara differ from the Śūnyavādin Buddhists in this—that they think that even false creations must have some basis in truth. If a rope appears as a snake, the false creation of the snake has some basis in the truth of the rope: there could not be false creations and false appearances without any firm basis of truth (*āspada*) underlying them². Nāgārjuna, it will be remembered, tried to prove the falsity of all appearances on the ground of their being interdependent and not having anything which could be pointed out as their own nature. The dialectic being applicable to all appearances, there was nothing left which was not relative and interdependent, nothing which was self-evident by nature and which was intelligible by itself without reference to anything else. It is this interdependence and relativity of all appearances that was called “nothingness” or *śūnyātā* by Nāgārjuna. There was nothing which could be affirmed of anything independently by itself without reference to something else; nothing therefore could be conceived as having any essence by itself. All appearances were therefore only interdependent phantom creations; and it was precisely this interdependence that proved the essencelessness of their natures. There was no basis of truth anywhere. There was nothing which had any essence. But neither Śaṅkara nor Gauḍapāda appears to have tried to show why the inner world of thoughts, ideas, emotions, volitions and the outer world of objects should be considered as being illusory appearances.

¹ Śaṅkara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*, II. 1-12.

² *Na hi nirāspadā rajju-sarpa-mṛgaṭṛṣṇikādayaḥ kvacit upalabhyante. Ibid.* 1. 6.

Their main point seems to consist in a dogmatic statement that all appearances or experiences are false just as dream experiences are false. The imperfect analogy of waking experiences is made into an argument, and the entire manifold of appearances is declared to be false. But it is urged at the same time that these false creations must have some basis of truth; the changing appearances must have some unchanging basis on which they are imposed—and this basis is the self (*ātman*), or Brahman, which is the only thing that is permanent, unchanging and real. This self is the being of pure intelligence, which is one identical unit, negating all differences and duality (*viśuddha-vijñapti-mātra-sattā-dvaya-rūpeṇa*)¹. Just as the false creation of “snake” appears in the case of the “rope,” so all such judgments as “I am happy,” “I am unhappy,” “I am ignorant,” “I am born,” “I am old,” “I am with a body,” “I perceive,” etc., are all merely false predications associated with the self; they are all false, changing and illusory predications, and it is only the self which remains permanent through all such judgments. The self is entirely different from all such predications; it is self-luminous and self-manifesting, shining independently by itself.

By applying the dialectic of mutual interdependence, *pratītya-samutpāda*, Nāgārjuna tried to prove that there was nothing which could be pointed out as the essence of anything as it is; but he did not explain how the appearances which were nothing more than phantom creations came to be what they were. How did the world-appearance of essenceless interdependent phenomena show itself? Śaṅkara did not try to prove with a keen logical dialectic that the world-appearance was false: he simply took it for granted, since the Upaniṣads proclaimed Brahman as the ultimate reality. But how did the world-appearance manifest itself? Śaṅkara does not seem to go deeply into this question and simply passes it over in asserting that this world-appearance is all due to ignorance (*avidyā*); it could not be spoken of as either existing or non-existing; it was merely illusory, like the conch-shell silver. But Padmapāda, who wrote the commentary known as *Pañca-pādikā* on the first four *sūtras* of Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, says that the precise meaning of the term “false conception” (*mithyā-jñāna*) in Śaṅkara’s introduction to his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* is that there is a force or power or potency (*śakti*) of

¹ Gaudapāda’s *Kārikā*, II. 17.

nescience which constitutes materiality (*jaḍātmikā avidyā-śaktiḥ*), and that it is this potency which transforms itself into the stuff (*upādāna*) of the world-appearance¹. It is well to remember in this connection that, according to Śaṅkara's philosophy, it is not only the objective world that constitutes the world of appearance, but also the subjective world of all experiences and predicates that may be associated with the self. Thus, when one says "I," this ego-hood is analysed as involving two parts—the one, pure intelligence or pure consciousness; and the other, the concept of subjectivity, which is illuminated, expressed or manifested by the underlying pure intelligence with which it is falsely associated. The concept of subjectivity stands here as materiality, or objectivity, which is made to float up by the power of pure intelligence, thus causing the judgment "I am" or "I am a man"². This *avidyā-śakti*, or power of *avidyā*, subsists in the pure self and, on the one hand, arrests the revelation of its true nature as Brahman, and, on the other hand, transforms itself into the various concepts associated with the psychological self of our ordinary experience³. The illusion consists in the association of the psychological qualities of thinking, feeling, willing, etc. with the transcendent or universal self (*pratyak-citi*). These psychological determinations are all mutually connected with one another. Thus, to be able to enjoy pleasures, one must first act; one can only act when one has attachments, antipathies and desires, and one can have attachments and desires only when one has experienced joys and sorrows—so these psychological determinations in a beginningless cycle are always naturally associated with the transcendent self-luminous self⁴.

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that, as Padmapāda or Prakāśātman explains, *ajñāna* or nescience is some kind of indefinable stuff out of the transformations of which subjective psychological experiences and the world of objects have come into being. This *ajñāna* is not the *ajñāna* of the Buddhists, i.e. a wrong notion or misconception, and this *adhyāsa*, or illusion,

¹ *Pañca-pādikā*, p. 4, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1891.

² *asmat-pratyaye yo 'nidam-amśaś cid-eka-rasaḥ tasmīms tad-bala-nirbhāsita-tayā lakṣaṇato yusmad-arthasya manuṣyābhimānasya sambhedaivāvabhāsaḥ sa eva adhyāsaḥ*. *Ibid.* p. 3.

³ *ataḥ sā pratyak-citi brahma-svarūpāvabhāsaṃ pratibadhnāti ahaṃkārad-yatad-rūpa-pratibhāsa-nimittam ca bhavati*. *Ibid.* p. 5.

⁴ Prakāśātman's *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 10, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1892.

is not the *viparyaya* of Nāgārjuna; for here it is a positive power or stuff. Thus Prakāśātman argues that all effects have at their back some cause, which forms their stuff or material; the world-appearance, being also an effect, must have some stuff out of which it has evolved or was made up; and *ajñāna*, lying in the transcendent self as a separate power, is such a material cause¹. This *avidyā*-potency in the transcendent self is positive in its nature. This positive *ajñāna* is directly perceived in such immediate perceptions as "I do not know myself or others," and can also be inferred or comprehended by implication². The fact that *ajñāna* or *avidyā* is spoken of as a power inherent in the transcendent self shows that it is dependent thereon; *avidyā* is not, however, a power, but a substance or entity which has certain powers by which it transforms itself into the cosmic appearances, subjective and objective; yet it is called a power, or *śakti*, because of its dependence (*para-tantratā*) on the transcendent self, and it is in consideration of the entire dependence of *avidyā* and its transformations on the self that the self is regarded as the material cause of all effects—the cosmic appearances of the world and the mind³. The self thus not only holds the *ajñāna* within it as a dependent function, but in spite of its self-luminosity it can be reacted upon by the *ajñāna* with its manifold powers in such a way that it can be veiled by this *ajñāna* and made the underlying basis of all world-appearances of *ajñāna*-transformations⁴.

Appaya Dikṣita, referring in his *Siddhānta-leśa* to the view of the writer of the *Padārtha-tattva*, summarizes the matter thus: Brahman and Māyā form together the material cause (*ubhayam upādānam*), and hence it is that in the world-appearance there are two distinct characteristics, "being" (*sattā*) from Brahman and materiality (*jāḍya*) from Māyā. Brahman is the cause, as the unchanging basis of the Māyā, which is the cause as being the

¹ *sarvaṃ ca kāryam sopādānam bhāva-kāryatvāt ghaṭādivad ity amumānāt ... tasmān mīthyārtha-taj-jñānātmakam mīthyā-bhūtam adhyāsam upādāna-kāraṇa-sāpekṣam ... mīthyā-jñānam eva adhyāśopādānam. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, pp. 11-12.

² *Ibid.* p. 13.

³ *śaktir ity ātma-para-tantratayā ātmanah sarva-kāryopādānasya nirvodh-rtvam. Ibid.* p. 13. *Ātma-kāraṇatva-nirvodhṛtvād ātma-para-tantratvā ca śakti-matyām api śakti-śabda upacāritah. Akhaṇḍānanda Muni's Tattva-dīpana*, p. 65, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1902.

⁴ *ataḥ svaprakāśe 'pi ātmani vicitra-śakti-bhāva-rūpāvidyā-prayuktam āvaraṇam durapahñavam. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī's Vivaraṇopanyāsa*, p. 16, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.

stuff that actually undergoes transformation¹. Vācaspati Miśra also conceives Brahman, jointly with its *avidyā*, to be the material cause of the world (*avidyā-sahita-brahmopādānam*)². In his adoration hymn at the beginning of his *Bhāmātī* he describes Brahman as being in association with its companion, the indefinable *avidyā*, the unchanging cause of the entire objective universe³. Sarva-jñātma Muni, however, does not wish to give *māyā* the same degree of co-operation in the production of the world-appearance as Brahman, and considers the latter to be the real material cause of the world through the instrumentality of *Māyā*; for Brahman, being absolutely changeless, cannot by itself be considered as cause, so that, when Brahman is spoken of as cause, this can only be in a remote and modified sense (*upalakṣaṇa*), through the instrumentality of *māyā*⁴. The author of the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* is referred to by Appaya Dīkṣita as holding that it is the *māyā* and *māyā* alone that forms the stuff of the world-appearance; and that Brahman is not in any way the material cause of the universe, but that it is only the basis of the subsistence of *māyā* and is only from that point of view spoken of as being the material cause⁵.

It is clear that the above differences of view regarding the nature of the relation between *māyā* and the self or Brahman in the production of the world-appearance are mere scholastic disputes over words or modes of expression, and have but little philosophical significance. As has already been said, these questions do not seem to have arisen in Śaṅkara's mind. He did not think it worth while to explain anything definitely regarding the nature of *avidyā* and its relation with Brahman, and the part that it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe. The world was an illusion, and Brahman was the basis of truth on which these illusions appeared; for even illusions required something on which they could appear. He never faced squarely the difficulties that are naturally connected with the theory, and was not therefore concerned to explain the definite relation of *māyā* to Brahman in connection with the production of the phantom show of the universe. The natural objection against such views is that the term

¹ *Siddhānta-leśa*, p. 12, V.S. Series, 1890.

² *Bhāmātī* on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*, I. 1. 2, Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, 1904.

³ *Anirvācya-vidyā-dvīṭaya-sacivasya prabhavato vivartā yasyaite vityad-amīlātejob-avanayaḥ*, *ibid.* p. 1.

⁴ *Samkṣepa-śāstraka*, I. 333, 334, Bhāu Śāstrī's edition.

⁵ *Siddhānta-leśa*, p. 13, V.S. Series, 1890.

avidyā (formed by compounding the negative particle *a* and *vidyā* “knowledge”) may mean either absence of knowledge (*vidyā-bhāvaḥ*) or false knowledge (*mithyā-jñānam*); and in neither of these meanings can it be supposed to behave as the material cause or substance-stuff of anything; for a false knowledge cannot be a substance out of which other things are made¹. The answer given by Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka to such an objection is that this *avidyā* is not a psychological ignorance, but a special technical category, which is beginningless and indefinable (*anādy-anirvācyāvidyāśra-yaṇāt*). The acceptance of such a category is a hypothesis which one is justified in holding as valid, since it explains the facts. Effects must have some cause behind them, and a mere instrumental cause cannot explain the origination of the substratum of the effect; again, effects which are not true cannot have for their material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) that which is true, nor can they have for their material cause that which is absolutely non-existent. So, since the material cause of the world can neither be true nor be anything which is absolutely non-existent, the hypothesis is naturally forced upon the Vedāntists that the material cause of this false world-appearance is an entity which is neither existent nor non-existent². Ānandabodha in his *Pramāṇa-mālā* quotes approvingly from the *Brahma-tattva-samikṣā* of Vācaspati to show that *avidyā* is called *avidyā* or nescience because it is a hypothetic category which is neither “is” nor “is not,” and is therefore unintelligible; *avidyā* signifies particularly the unintelligibility of this category³. Ānandabodha points out that the acceptance of *avidyā* is merely the logical consequence of indicating some possible cause of the world-appearance—considering the nature of the world-appearance as it is, its cause can only be something which neither is nor is not; but what we understand by such a category, we cannot say; it is plainly unintelligible; the logical requirements of such a category merely indicate that that which is the material cause of this false world-appearance cannot be regarded either as existing or as non-existing; but this does not

¹ *avidyā hi vidyābhavo mithyā-jñānam vā na cobhayaṃ kasya cit samavāyīkāraṇam adravatyatvāt*. Ānandabodha's *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 122, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.

² *Ibid.* pp. 122-124.

³ *sad-asad-ubhayānubhayādi-prakāraiḥ anirvacanīyatvam eva hy avidyānām avidyātvam*. *Brahma-tattva-samikṣā* as quoted in *Pramāṇa-mālā*, p. 10, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1907.

make this concept either intelligible or consistent¹. The concept of *avidyā* is thus plainly unintelligible and inconsistent.

Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedānta.

The Vedānta takes a twofold view of things ; the first view refers to ultimate reality and the second to appearance. This ultimate reality is pure intelligence, as identical with pure bliss and pure being. This is called ultimately real in the sense that it is regarded as changeless. By pure intelligence the Vedānta does not mean the ordinary cognitional states ; for these have a subjective and an objective content which are extraneous to them. This pure intelligence is pure immediacy, identical with the fact of revelation found in all our conscious states. Our apprehensions of objects are in some sense events involving both a subjective and an objective content ; but their special feature in every case is a revelatory inwardness or immediacy which is non-temporal and changeless. The fact that we see, hear, feel, touch, think, remember is equivalent to saying that there are various kinds of cognizings. But what is the nature of this cognizing? Is it an act or a fact? When I see a blue colour, there is a blue object, there is a peculiar revelation of an appearance as blue and a revelation of the "I" as perceiver. The revelation is such that it is both a revelation of a certain character as blue and of a certain thing called the blue object. When a revelation occurs in perception, it is one and it reveals both the object and its appearance in a certain character as blue. The revelation is not the product of a certain relation which happens to subsist at any time between the character-appearance and the object ; for both the character-appearance as blue and the object are given in revelation. The revelation is self-evident and stands unique by itself. Whether I see, or hear, or feel, or change, the fact remains that there is some sort of an awareness which does not change. Awareness is ever present by itself and does not undergo the changes that its contents undergo. I may remember that I had seen a blue object five minutes previously ; but, when I do this, what I perceive is the image of a blue object, with certain temporal and spatial relations, which arises or

¹ *Vailakṣaṇya-vāco-yuktir hi pratiyogi-nirūpaṇād yauktikatva-prakaṣaṇa-phalā na tv evaṃ-rūpatāyāḥ sāmāṇyasya-sampādanāya ity avocāma. Pramāṇa-mālā*, p. 10.

becomes revealed; but the revelation itself cannot be revealed again. I may be conscious, but I cannot be conscious of consciousness. For consciousness as such, though ever present in its immediacy, cannot become an object of any other consciousness. There cannot be any such thing as the awareness of an awareness or the awareness of the awareness of an awareness, though we may multiply such phrases in language at our pleasure. When I remember that I have been to Trinity College this morning, that only means that I have an image of the way across the commons, through Church Street and Trinity Street; my movements through them are temporally pushed backward, but all this is a revelation as image at the present moment and not a revelation of a past revelation. I cannot say that this present image in any way reveals that particular image as the object of the present revelation. But the former revelation could not be held to be distinct from the present one; for distinction is always based on content and not on revelation. Revelation as such is identical and, since this is so, one revelation cannot be the object of another. It is incorrect to say that "*A* is *A*" means that one *A* becomes itself over again. It is owing to the limitations of grammatical terminology that identity is thus described. Identity thus understood is different from what we understand by identity as a relation. Identity understood as a relation presupposes some difference or otherness and thus is not self-contained. And it is because it is not self-contained that it can be called a relation. When it is said that *A* is identical with *A*, it means that on all the various occasions or contents in which *A* appeared it always signified the same thing, or that it had the same shape or that it was the same first letter of the English alphabet. Identity in this sense is a function of thought not existing by itself, but in relation to a sense of opponency or otherness. But revelation has no otherness in it; it is absolutely ubiquitous and homogeneous. But the identity of revelation of which we are speaking does not mean that the revelation signifies the same thing amidst a diversity of contents: it is simply the one essence identical in itself and devoid of any numerical or other kinds of difference. It is absolutely free from "now" and "then," "here" and "there," "such" or "not such" and "this" or "that." Consciousness of the self-shining self taken in this way cannot be regarded as the relation of an appearance to an object, but it is the fact of the revelation or the entity of the self. If we conceive

of revelation in this way, it is an error to make any distinction in revelation as the revelation of the past or the revelation of the present moment. For moments are revealed as objects are revealed; they do not constitute revelation or form any part of it. This revelation is identical with the self-shining self to which everything else has to be related in order to be known.

“Is cognizing an act or a fact?” Before this can be answered the point to be made clear is what is meant by cognizing. If we ignore the aspect of revelation and speak of mental states which can be looked at from the point of view of temporal or qualitative change of character, we must speak of them as acts or events. If we look at any mental state as possessing certain characters and relations to its objects, we have to speak of these aspects. But, if we look at cognizing from the point of view of its ultimate truth and reality as revelation, we cannot call it either an act or a fact; for, as revelation, it is unique and unchangeable in itself. All relations and characters are revealed in it, it is self-evident and is at once in and beyond them all. Whether we dream or wake, whether we experience an illusion or a truth, revelation is always there. When we look at our mental states, we find that they are always changing, but this is so only with reference to the contents. Apart from this there is a continuity in our conscious life. By this continuity the Vedānta apprehends not any sort of coherence in our ideas, but the fact of the permanence of revelation. It may be asked what remains of revelation, if the mental states are taken away. This question is not admissible; for the mental states do not form part of revelation; they are rendered conscious by coming into relation with revelation. This category is the ultimate reality. It is not self or subject in the sense in which self or ego is ordinarily understood. For what is ordinarily understood as the ego or the “I” is as much a content of the perception of the moment as any other objective content. It is not impossible that any particular objective content may be revealed at any time without the corresponding “I perceive” being explicitly revealed at the same time. The notion of ego or “I” does not refer to an everlasting abiding independent self or person; for this notion is as changing as any other objective content. The “I” has no definite real content as referring to an existing entity, but is only a particular mode of mind which is often associated, as a relatively abiding content, with other changing contents of the

mind. As such, it is as changeable as is any other object. "I know this" only means that there is a revelation which at one sweep reveals both the "this" and the "I." So far as the revelation appears as revealing the "this" and the "I," it is manifested in a subjective mental state having a particular conscious centre different from other similar centres. But, since revelation cannot in reality be individuated, all that we may say about "I" or "mine," "thou" or "thine," falls outside it. They are all contents, having some indefinite existence of their own and revealed by this principle of revelation under certain conditions. This principle of revelation thus has a reality in quite a different sense from that which is used to designate the existence of any other object. All other objects are dependent upon this principle of revelation for their manifestation, and their nature or essence, out of connection with it, cannot be defined or described. They are not self-evident, but are only expressed by coming into some sort of relation with this principle. We have already seen that this principle cannot be either subjective or objective. For all considerations of subject or object fall outside it and do not in any way qualify it, but are only revealed by it. There are thus two principles, the principle of revelation and all that which is revealed by it. The principle of revelation is one; for there is nothing else like it; it alone is real in the highest and truest sense. It is absolute in the sense that there is no growth, decay, evolution or change in it, and it is perfectly complete in itself. It is infinite in the sense that no finitude can form part of it, though through it all finitude is being constantly revealed. It is all-pervading in the sense that no spatial or temporal limits can be said to affect it in any way, though all these are being constantly revealed by it. It is neither in my head nor in my body nor in the space before me; but yet there is nowhere that it is not. It has sometimes been designated as the "Self" or *ātman*, but only in the sense of denoting its nature as the supreme essence and transcendent reality of all—the Brahman.

Apart from this principle of revelation, all else is constituted of a substanceless indefinable stuff called *māyā*. In some schools of Śaṅkara Vedānta it is said that all is pure and simple illusion, that things exist only when they are perceived and dissolve into nothingness as soon as we cease to perceive them; this school has been designated the *Dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* school, a doctrine which has been

briefly explained in the tenth chapter of the present work¹. One of the most important texts of this school is the *Siddhānta-muktāvali* by Prakāśānanda². Prakāśānanda seems to have taken his inspiration from the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, and he denied the existence of things when they are not perceived (*ajñāta-sattvānabhyupagama*). He tried to show that there were no grounds for holding that external objects existed even when they were not perceived or that external objects had a reality independent of their perceptions. Examining the capacity of perception as a proof to establish this difference between perception and its object, he argued that, since the difference between the awareness and its object was a quality of the awareness, the awareness itself was not competent to grasp this quality in the object, as it was one of the constituents of the complex quality involving a difference of the awareness and its object; to assert the contrary would be a fallacy of self-dependence (*ātmaśrayatva*). If the apprehended difference is a complex, such as "difference-between-awareness-and-its-object," and if this complex is a quality which is apprehended as existing in the object, it has to be assumed that, in order that the nature of awareness may be realized, vindicated or established, it must depend upon itself involved as a constituent in the complex "difference-between-awareness-and-its-object" directly and immediately—which comes to the same thing as saying that awareness becomes aware of itself by being aware of itself; this is impossible and is called the logical fallacy of self-

¹ *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I. pp. 477-478, by S. N. Dasgupta, published by the Cambridge University Press, 1922.

² Prakāśānanda refers to the arguments of Prakāśātman's (A.D. 1200) *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa* and Sarvajñātma Muni's (A.D. 900) *Samkṣepa-sātraka* and refers approvingly to Sureśvara, the author of the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*. Appaya Dikṣita (A.D. 1620) refers to Prakāśānanda in his *Siddhānta-leśa* (pp. 13, 72). Nānā Dikṣita, a follower of the school of Prakāśānanda and author of the *Siddhānta-dīpikā*, in a commentary on the *Siddhānta-muktāvali*, gives a list of Vedānta teachers. In this list he mentions the names of Prakāśānubhavananda, Nṛsiṃha and Rāghavendra Yati. Venis thinks (see *The Pandit*, 1890, pp. 487-490) that Prakāśānubhava is the same as Prakāśātman and Nṛsiṃha the same as Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni, who is said to have converted Appaya Dikṣita to Śāṅkara Vedānta, and thinks that Prakāśānanda lived in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, being wedged in between Nṛsiṃha and Appaya. Though it would be difficult to settle his time so precisely and definitely, yet it would not be wrong to suppose that he lived some time towards the latter half of the sixteenth century. Prakāśānanda's doctrine of *Dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* is apparently unknown to the earlier Vedantic works and even the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, a work of the early sixteenth century, does not seem to be aware of him, and it appears that the earliest mention of his name can be traced only to Appaya, who lived in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Prakāśānanda may thus be believed to have lived in the latter half of the sixteenth century.

dependence¹. If it is held that the complex quality ("difference-of-awareness-from-the-object") is directly perceived in the object through the senses, then it has to be assumed that the said complex quality existed in the object even before the production of the awareness, and this would involve the impossible supposition that the complex quality of which the awareness was a constituent was already present even before such an awareness had already come into being. If perception or direct awareness cannot be said to prove the difference between the awareness and its object, there can be no inference which may be supposed to do it. For such an inference has to take form thus—"the object is different from its own awareness, because it is associated with entirely different kinds of qualities or characteristics²." But how could it be known that the object has qualities of an entirely different character from its awareness, since a difference between an awareness and its object was contested and could not be proved by perception or any other means? Prakāśānanda further says that the argument by implication (*arthāpatti*), that awareness involves the acceptance of something different from the awareness of which the awareness is affirmed, because there cannot be any knowledge without a corresponding object, is invalid. In proving the invalidity of the supposition that knowledge necessarily implies an object, Prakāśānanda raises the question whether such an implication of an object as conditioning knowledge refers to the production (*utpatti*) of knowledge, its persistence (*sthiti*) or its secondary cognition. As regards the first alternative Prakāśānanda says that according to the Vedānta consciousness is ever-existent and is never a product; and, even if it is regarded as a product, the process of cognition can itself be regarded as a sufficient cause for its production. It can by no means be urged that the presence of an external object is in all cases necessary for the production of knowledge; for, though it is arguable that in perception an object is necessary, no one will suggest that an external object is to be considered necessary in the production of inferential knowledge—a fact which shows that the presence of an external object is not indispensable for the production of knowledge as such. As regards the persistence of knowledge it is said

¹ *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, as printed in the Pandit, 1889, pp. 247-249.

² *vimato viṣayaḥ sva-viṣaya-jñānād bhidyate tad-viruddha-dharmāśrayatvāt. Ibid.* p. 252.

that awareness has not the object that it knows for its locus or substance (*āśraya*), in such a way that the absence of the object, as apart from the awareness, would make it impossible for the awareness to persist; and, if knowledge is supposed to be persisting in anything, that something would not be a cognized object, but the cognizer itself—as in the Nyāya view, where knowledge is regarded as an attribute of the self and the self is then regarded as the substance or locus (*āśraya*) of knowledge. Since again cognition and its object do not exist in the same space or in the same time (this is proved by the possibility of our knowing a past or a future object), there cannot be any such concomitance between the two that it would be right for any one to infer the external presence of an object because of there being a subjective cognition or awareness. So he argues that there is no proof that cognition and cognized objects are different.

In the above account of Prakāśānanda's views it is clear that he does not attempt to give any positive proof in support of his thesis that the world-appearance and all objects contained in it have no existence while they are not perceived or that the being of all objects cognized is their *percipi*. He only tries to show that it cannot be logically established that awareness of blue and blue are two different objects; or, in other words, that it cannot be proved that the cognized object is different from its cognition. It could not legitimately be held that awareness (*pratīti*) was different from its object (*pratyetaṃ*). The whole universe, as we perceive it, is nothing but cognition without there being any object corresponding to it. As dreams are nothing but mere awareness, without there being any real objects behind them which manifest themselves in different ways of awareness and their objects, so also is the world of awaking consciousness¹. The world has thus no independent substratum, but is mere cognition or mere awareness (*viññāna-mātra* or *bhāva-mātra*).

This scheme of Vedānta philosophy is surprisingly similar to the idealism of Vasubandhu (A.D. 280–360), as taught in his *Viṃśatikā* with a short commentary of his own and in his *Triṃśikā* with a commentary by Sthiramati². According to this idealism

¹ *pratyetaṃ-pratītyoś ca bhedaḥ prāmāṇikāḥ kutah
pratīti-mātram evaitad bhāti viśvaṃ carācaram
jñāna-jñeya-prabhedenā yathā svāpnaṃ pratīyate
viññāna-mātram evaitat tathā jāgrac carācaram.*

Siddhānta-muktāvalī, p. 258.

² *Viññapti-mātratā-siddhi*, containing two treatises, *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā*,

(*viññāna-vāda*) of Vasubandhu all appearances are but transformations of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement, and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects at different places and countries without there being any objective existence of them, or as in dreams many people may come together and perform various actions, so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may well be explained as a mere creation of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all. All that we know as subjective or objective is mere ideation (*viññapti*) and there is no substantive reality, or entity corresponding to it; but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual (*anabhilāpyenātmanā*) thought, which the saints realize, is also false¹. It is possible that the awareness of anything may become the object of a further awareness, and that of another; but in all such cases where the awarenesses are significant (*arthavati*) there is no entity or reality represented by them; this, however, should not be interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence or pure knowledge as such. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world cannot be trusted. He says that, taking visual perception as an example, we may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception are one as a whole or many as atoms. They cannot be mere wholes, since wholes would imply parts; they cannot be of the nature of atoms, since such atoms are not separately perceived; they cannot be of the nature of combinations of atoms, since the existence of atoms cannot be proved². For, if six atoms combine from six sides, that implies that the atoms have parts; if however six atoms combine with one another at one identical point, that would mean that the combined group would not have a size larger than that of one atom and would therefore be invisible. Again, if the objects of awareness and perception were only wholes, then succession and sequence would be inexplicable, and our perception of separate and distinct things would remain unaccountable. So they have

Paris, 1925. It seems probable that Vasubandhu flourished in A.D. 280–360 rather than in A.D. 420–500 as held by me in the first volume of the present work. See B. Bhattacharya's foreword to the *Tattva-saṃgraha*.

¹ *yo bālair dhārmāṇāṃ svabhāvo grāhya-grāhakādīḥ parikalpitaḥ tena kalpiten-ātmanā teṣāṃ nairātmyaṃ na tv anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhāṇāṃ viśaya iti.* Commentary on *Vīṃśatikā*, p. 6.

² *Nāpi te saṃhatā viśayī-bhavanti, yasmāt paramāṇur ekaṃ draṇyaṃ na sidhyati.* *Ibid.* p. 7.

no real objective existence, though perception leads us to believe that they have. People are dreaming of the world of objects in the sleep of the sub-conscious habit of false imaginative construction (*vitatha-vikalpābhyāsa-vāsanā-nidrayā*), and in their dreams they construct the objective world; it is only when they become awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (*lokottara-nirvikalpa-jñāna-lābhāt prabuddho bhavati*) that they find the world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction of diverse appearances. In such a view there is no objective material world, and our cognitions are not influenced by external objects; how then are our minds influenced by good instructions and associations? and, since none of us have any real physical bodies, how can one kill another? Vasubandhu explains this by the theory that the thought-currents of one person can sometimes determine the thought-currents of another. Thus the idea of killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity of the thought-processes, which is called death¹. So also the good ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good.

In the *Trīṃśikā* of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthiramati this idealism is more clearly explained. It is said that both the soul (or the knower) and all that it knows as subjective ideas or as external objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure intelligence (*viññāna-pariṇāma*). The transformation (*pariṇāma*) of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different from that of the causal moment simultaneously with the cessation of the causal moment². There is neither externality nor subjectivity in pure intelligence, but these are imposed upon it (*viññāna-svarūpe parikalpita eva ātmā dharmāś ca*). All erroneous impositions imply that there must be some entity which is mistaken for something else; there cannot be erroneous impositions on mere vacuity; so it has to be admitted that these erroneous impositions of various kinds of external characteristics, self, etc. have been made upon the transformations of pure intelligence³. Both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists who

¹ *para-viññapti-viśeṣādhipatyāt paresām jīvitendriya-virodhiṃ kācit vikriyā utpadyate yayā sabhāga-santati-vicchedākhyam maraṇam bhavati*. Commentary on *Vīṃśatikā*, p. 10.

² *kāraṇa-kṣaṇa-nirodha-sama-kālaḥ kāraṇa-kṣaṇa-vilakṣaṇa-kāryasya ātmā-lābhaḥ pariṇāmah*. Sthiramati's commentary on *Trīṃśikā*, p. 16.

³ *upacārasya ca nirādhārasyāsambhavād avaśyaṃ viññāna-pariṇāmo vastuto 'sty upagantavyo yatra ātma-dharmopacāraḥ pravartate*. *Ibid.* Compare Śaṅkara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*, "na hi nirāśpadā mṛgatṛṣṇikādayaḥ."

deny also the reality of pure intelligence on grounds of interdependence or relativity (*saṃvṛti*)¹. Vasubandhu holds that pure consciousness (*viññapti-mātratā*) is the ultimate reality. This ultimate consciousness is a permanent entity, which by its inherent power (*śakti*) undergoes threefold transformations as the inherent indeterminate inner change (*vipāka*), which again produces the two other kinds of transformations as the inner psychoses of mental operations (*manana*) and as the perception of the so-called external sensibles (*viśaya-viññapti*). The apprehension of all appearances or characterized entities (*dharma*) as cognized objects and that of selves as cognizers, the duality of perceivers and the perceived, are due to the threefold transformations of *vipāka*, *manana* and *viśaya-viññapti*. The ultimate consciousness (*viññapti-mātra*) which suffers all these modifications is called *ālaya-vijñāna* in its modified transformations, because it is the repository of all experiences. The ultimate principle of consciousness is regarded as absolutely permanent in itself and is consequently also of the nature of pure happiness (*sukha*); for what is not eternal is painful, and this, being eternal, is happy². When a saint's mind becomes fixed (*pratiṣṭhita*) in this pure consciousness (*viññapti-mātra*), the tendency to dual thought of the subjective and the objective (*grāhya-grāhakānuśaya*) ceases and there dawns the pure indeterminate (*nir-vikalpa*) and transcendent (*lokottara*) consciousness. It is a state in which the ultimate pure consciousness returns from its transformations and rests in itself. It is divested of all afflictions (*kleśa*) or touch of vicious tendencies and is therefore called *anāsrava*. It is unthinkable and undemonstrable, because it is, on the one hand, pure self-consciousness (*pratyātma-vedya*) and omniscience (*sarvajñatā*), as it is divested of all limitations (*āvaraṇa*), and, on the other hand, it is unique in itself³. This pure consciousness is called the container of the seed of all (*sarva-bīja*), and, when its first indeterminate and indefinable transformations rouse the psychosis-transformations and

¹ Thus *Laṅkāvatāra*, one of the most important works on Buddhist idealism, denies the real transformation of the pure intelligence or *ālaya-vijñāna*. See *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 46, published by the Otani University Press, Kyoto, 1923.

² *dhrūvo nityatvād akṣayatayā; sukho nityatvād eva yad anityam tad duḥkham ayaṃ ca nitya iti asmāt sukhaḥ*. Sthiramati's commentary on *Triṃśikā*, p. 44.

³ *Ālaya-vijñāna* in this ultimate state of pure consciousness (*viññapti-mātratā*) is called the cause (*dhātu*) of all virtues, and, being the ultimate state in which the dharmas or characterized appearances have lost all their limitations it is called the *dharma-kāya* of the Buddha (*mahā-muṇiḥ bhūmi-pāramitādi-bhāvanayā kleśa-jñeyāvaraṇa-prahānāt... sarva-dharma-vibhūta-lābhataḥ ca dharma-kāya ity ucyate*). *Ibid*.

also the transformations as sense-perceptions, these mutually act and react against one another, and thus the different series rise again and again and mutually determine one another. These transformations are like waves and ripples on the ocean, where each is as much the product of others as well as the generator of others¹.

In this view thought (*vijñāna*) is regarded as a real substance, and its transformations are also regarded as real; and it is these transformations that are manifested as the selves and the characterized appearances². The first type of transformations, called *vipāka*, is in a way the ground of the other two transformations, which contain the indeterminate materials out of which the manifestations of the other two transformations appear. But, as has already been pointed out, these three different types of transformations again mutually determine one another. The *vipāka* transformations contain within them the seeds of the constructive instincts (*vikalpa-vāsanā*) of the selves as cognizers, the constructive instincts of colours, sounds, etc., the substantive basis (*āśraya*) of the attribution of these twofold constructive instincts, as well as the sense-faculties and the localization of space-determinations (*sthāna-vijñapti* or *bhājana-loka-sanniveśa-vijñapti*). They are also associated in another mode with sense-modifications involving the triune of the sense (*indriya*), sense-object (*viśaya*) and cognition (and each of these triunes is again associated with a characteristic affective tone corresponding to the effective tones of the other two members of the triune in a one-to-one relation), attention (*manaskāra*), discrimination (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*) and feeling (*vedanā*)³. The *vipāka* transformations have no determinate or limited forms (*aparicchināmbanākāra*), and there are here no

¹ *tac ca varitāte srotasauḥavāt. Ibid. p. 21.*

² *avaśyaṃ vijñāna-pariṇāmo vastuto 'sty upagantavyo yatrātmadharmopacārah pravarttate. Ibid. p. 16.*

³ Feeling (*vedanā*) is distinguished here as painful, pleasurable and as the basic entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable, which is feeling *per se* (*vedanā anubhava-svabhāva sā punar viśayasya āhlādaka-paritāpaka-tadubhaya-kara-vivikta-svarūpa-sākṣātkaraṇa-bhedāt*). This feeling *per se* must be distinguished again from the non-pleasurable-painful feeling existing along with the two other varieties, the painful and the pleasurable. Here the *vipāka* transformations are regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling, and it is therefore undifferentiated in it as pleasure or pain and is hence called "feeling as indifference (*upekṣā*)" and undifferentiated (*avyākṛta*). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling evolved in the *vipāka* transformations of good and bad deeds (*śubhāśubha-karma-vipāka*). Good and bad (*śubhāśubha*) are to be distinguished from moral and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious actions.

actualized emotional states of attachment, antipathy or the like, which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings. The *vipāka* transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind and its principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate subject-object consciousness and its processes. There are here the constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers, the objective constructive tendencies of colours, sounds, etc., the sense-faculties, etc., attention, feeling, discrimination, volition and sense-functioning. But none of these have any determinate and actualized forms. The second grade of transformations, called *manana*, represents the actual evolution of moral and immoral emotions; it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references to the mental elements as the self, and from this ignorance about the self is engendered self-love (*ātma-sneha*) and egoism (*ātma-māna*). These references are again associated with the fivefold universal categories of sense-functioning, feeling, attention, volition and discrimination. Then comes the third grade of transformations, which is associated with the fivefold universal categories together with the special manifestations of concrete sense-perceptions and the various kinds of intellectual states and moral and immoral mental states, such as desire (*chandaḥ*) for different kinds of sense-experiences, decisions (*adhimokṣa*) in conclusions firmly established by perceptions, reasoning, etc., memory, attentive reflection (*samādhi*), wisdom (*prajñā*), faith and firm will for the good (*śraddhā*), shamefulness (*hrī*) for the bad, etc. The term *ālaya-vijñāna* is given to all these three types of transformations, but there is underneath it, as the permanent passive ground, the eternal and unchangeable pure thought (*vijñapti-mātratā*).

It may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy the eternal and unchangeable thought-substance undergoes by virtue of its inner dynamic three different orders of superficial changes, which are compared to constantly changing streams and waves. The first of these represents the basic change which later determines all subjective and objective possibilities; the second starts the process of the psychosis by the original ignorance and false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements, self-love and egoism; and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental and extra-mental facts. The fundamental categories which make the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental relations, are evolved in the first stage of transformations; and these

abide through the other two stages of transformations and become more and more complex and concrete in course of their association with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the knowledge situation Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness of blue is only a modification of the "awareness," but he thinks that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the subject or the knower (*grāhaka-graha*) and a relation with the object which is known (*grāhya-graha*). Blue as an object is essential for making an awareness of blue possible; for the awareness is not blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought, and it does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external objects existing outside of it and generating the awareness as external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply ontological objectivity. It is argued that, if the agency of objective entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there could not be any case where sense-knowledge could be admitted to be produced without the operation of the objective entities; but, since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such objective entities, no causal operation can be conceded to the objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge.

Śaṅkara, in attempting to refute the Buddhist idealism in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, II. ii. 28, seems to refer to a school of idealism which is the same as that described by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattva-saṃgraha* (commented upon by Kama-lāśīla), but largely different from that described in Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*. The positive arguments against the impossibility of an external world constituted by partless atoms are the same¹. But

¹ Vācaspati, however, in his *Bhāmāṭī* commentary, II. ii. 28, introduces some new points. He says that spatial extension, as perceived in visual perception, cannot be due to the perception of partless atoms. Nor can it be said that the colour particles produced in uninterrupted succession generate the notion of spatial extension, though there is no spatial extension in the individual atom; for it is not possible that the groups of colour particles are not interrupted by taste, smell and the tactual particles. So it has to be admitted that the colour particles are at some distance from one another and are interrupted by other particles, and that the continuous appearance of colour in spatial distribution is a false appearance, like the appearance of continuous trees from a distance constituting a forest (*gandha-rasa-sparśa-paramāṇv-antaritā hi te rūpa-paramāṇavo na nīrantarāḥ; tasmād ārāt sāntareṣu vṛkṣeṣu eka-ghana-pratyayavad eṣa sthūla-pratyayaḥ paramāṇuṣu sāntareṣu bhrānta eva*).

it is further argued on behalf of the Buddhist idealists that the awareness of a pillar, the awareness of a wall or of a jug or of a piece of cloth, implies that these individual awarenesses are mutually different in nature among themselves; and that consequently the apparent differences among objects are but differences among the ideas; and that therefore the objects are of the same nature as the particular ideas by which we are supposed to know them; and, if that be so, the hypothesis of an external world of objects becomes unnecessary. Moreover the fact that both the idea of the object and the object are taken at one and the same moment proves that both the object and the idea are identical, just as the illusory second moon perceived simultaneously with the moon is identical with it¹. When one of them is not perceived the other also is not perceived. If they were by nature separate and different, there would be no reason why there should be such a uniform and invariable relation between them. The reason for the diversity of our ideas is to be sought not in the diversity of external objects which are ordinarily supposed to produce them, but in the beginningless diversity of the instinctive sub-conscious roots (*vāsanā*) which produce all our ideas in the waking state, just as they produce dreams during sleep; as dreams are admitted by all to be produced without any external objects, so are all ideas produced without any external real objects; for as ideas the dream ideas are just the same as the waking ideas. But in both cases there are the instinctive sub-conscious roots (*vāsanā*), without which no ideas, whether in the dream state or in the waking state, can be produced; so these, being invariably present in all cases of production of ideas, are the cause of all ideas².

¹ This simile is adduced by Vācaspati probably from a quotation from Dīnāga—*sahopalambha-niyamād abhedo nīla-tad-dhīyoḥ bhedaś ca bhrānti-vijñānair dṛsyetendāv ivādṛṣṭvaye*.

Since both the blue and the idea of the blue are taken at the same moment, they are one and the same; for any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical. As one moon appears as two in an illusory manner, so the difference between the idea and the object is also perceived only illusorily. This argument of *sahopalambha-niyama* is absent in Vasubandhu's *Vimśatikā* and *Trimśikā*.

² Vācaspati summarizes in this connection the inference of the Sautrāntikas for the existence of an external world of objects as the causes of the corresponding ideas. The argument of the Sautrāntikas runs thus: When, the old causes remaining the same, there is a new effect, that new effect must be due to a new cause. Now, though it should be admitted that in the passing series of inner consciousness each particular moment generates the succeeding one, and that this power of productivity is called *vāsanā* (*tat-pravṛtti-vijñāna-janana-śak-*

Śaṅkara in refuting the above position says that such a view is untenable because it contradicts our experience, which always distinguishes the subject and the object from the awareness. We are directly aware of our sense-contact with external objects which we perceive, and the object of awareness and the awareness are not one and the same. Our awareness itself shows that it is different from its object. The awareness of a pillar is not the same as a pillar, but a pillar is only an object of the awareness of a pillar. Even in denying external objects, the Buddhist idealists have to say that what is knowable only within appears as if it was existing outside¹. Śaṅkara argues thus: if externality is absolutely non-existent, how can any sense-cognition appear as external? Viṣṇumitra cannot appear as the son of a barren woman. Again, the fact that an idea has the same form as its object does not imply that there are no objects; on the other hand, if there were no objects, how could any idea have the same form as its corresponding object? Again, the maxim that any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical is false; for, if the object and its awareness are comprehended at the same moment, the very fact that one is taken along with the other shows that they cannot be identical. Moreover, we find that in all our awarenesses of blue or yellow, a jug or a wall, it is the qualifying or predicative factors of objects of knowledge that differ; awareness as such remains just the same. The objects of knowledge are like so many extraneous qualities attributed to knowledge, just as whiteness or blackness may be attributed to a cow; so whether one perceives blue or red or yellow, that signifies that the difference of perception involves a difference in objects and not in the awareness itself. So the awareness, being one, is naturally different from the objects, which are many; and, since the objects are many,

tir vāsanā), and that its tendency to effectuate itself is called its power of fruition (*paripāka*), even then it would be difficult to understand how each particular moment should have a power altogether different from other moments; for, since there is nothing else to change the character of the moments, each moment is just as much a moment as any other. So it has to be admitted that there are other things which make one moment different in its power of effectuation from any other; and these are the external objects.

¹ Śaṅkara says *yad antar-jñeya-rūpaṃ tad bahirvad avabhāsate*. This seems to be a quotation from Diṇnāga. Diṇnāga's verse, as quoted by Kamalaśīla in his commentary on the *Tattva-saṃgraha*, verses 2082-2084, runs as follows:

*yad antar-jñeya-rūpaṃ tu bahirvad avabhāsate
so 'rtho vijñāna-rūpatvāt tat-pratyayatayāpi ca.*

This shows that Śaṅkara had Diṇnāga in his mind when he attempted to refute the Buddhist idealists.

they are different from the one, the awareness. The awareness is one and it is different from the objects, which are many¹. Moreover, the argument that the appearance of world objects may be explained on the analogy of dreams is also invalid; for there is a great difference between our knowledge of dreams and of worldly objects—dreams are contradicted by the waking experience, but the waking experiences are never found contradicted.

It is curious to note here the contradictions in Śāṅkara's own statements. It has been already pointed out that he himself in his commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* built a powerful argument for the non-existence of all objects of waking experience on the analogy of the non-existence of the objects of dream experience. Śāntarakṣita (A.D. 705) and Kamalaśīla (A.D. 728) in refuting a position similar to that of the view of Śāṅkara—that consciousness is one and unchangeable and that all objects are changing, but that the change of objects does not imply any change of the consciousness itself—argue that, had this been so, then that would imply that all sensibles of different kinds of colours, sounds, etc. were known at one and the same time, since the consciousness that would reveal those objects is constant and unchangeable². Kamalaśīla therefore holds that consciousness is not unchangeable and one, but that there are only the changeable ideas of the sensibles and each idea is different from the other which follows it in time. Śāṅkara's view that consciousness is only one and that it is only the objects that are many seems to be based on a separation due to an arbitrary abstraction. If the commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* be admitted to be a work of Śāṅkara, then it may be urged that Śāṅkara's views had undergone a change when he was writing the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*; for in the commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* he seems again and again to emphasize the view that the objects perceived in waking experience are as false and as non-existent as objects of dream experience. His only realism there consisted in the assertion that the world was but the result of a false illusory imposition on the real Brahman, since

¹ *dvābhyāṃ ca bheda ekasya siddho bhavati ekasmāc ca dvayoh; tasmād artha-jñānayoḥ bhedaḥ*. Śāṅkara's *Bhāṣya*, II. ii. 28, Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1904.

² *tad yadi nityaika-jñāna-pratibhāsātmakā amī śabdādayaḥ syus tadā vicitrā-taraṇa-pratibhāsavat sakṛd eva pratibhāseran; tat-pratibhāsātmakasya jñānasya sarvadā vaśhitatvāt*. Kamalaśīla's commentary on the *Tattva-saṃgraha*, sl. 331. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1926.

Neither Śāntarakṣita nor Kamalaśīla seems to be familiar with Śāṅkara.

illusions such as mirage, etc. must have some underlying basis upon which they are imposed. But in the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* the world of objects and sensibles is seen to have an existence of some sort outside individual thought. Vācaspati in his *Bhāmatī* commentary distinguishes the position of Śaṅkara from that of Buddhist idealism by saying that the Vedānta holds that the “blue” is not an idea of the form of blue, but “the blue” is merely the inexplicable and indefinable object¹.

In discussing the views of Vasubandhu in the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* it has been pointed out that Vasubandhu did not try to repudiate the objectivity of the objects of awareness, but he repudiated the idea that objects of awareness existed outside of thought and produced the different kinds of awareness. His idea seems to have been that the sensibles are made up of thought-stuff and, though they are the psychological objects of awareness, they do not exist outside of thought and determine the different ideas that we have of them. But both the sensibles and their ideas are determined by some inner law of thought, which determines the nature and methods of the whole process of the growth and development of the psychosis, and which determines not only its cognitional character, but also its moral and emotional character. All the arguments of Śaṅkara in which he emphasizes the psychological duality of awareness and its object would have no force against Vasubandhu, as Vasubandhu admits it himself and holds that “blue” (*nīla*) is different from the idea of blue; the blue is an object (*ālambana*) and the idea of the blue is an awareness. According to him thought splits itself into subject and object; the idea therefore expresses itself as a subject-object awareness. The subject and the object are as much products of thought as the idea itself; the fact that he considers the blue to be thought does not mean that he denies the objectivity of the blue or that the only existence of the blue is the blue-idea. The blue is objectively present before the idea of blue as a presentation, just as there is the subject to perceive it, but this objectivity does not imply that the blue is somewhere outside thought in the space outside; for even space-locations are thought-products, and so there is no sense in attributing the sensibles of presentation to the outside world. The sensibles are objects of awareness, but they are not the excitants

¹ *na hi brahma-vādinō nīlādyākārāṃ vīttim abhyupagacchanti, kintu anirvacanīyaṃ nīlādīti. Bhāmatī, II. ii. 28.*

of the corresponding awareness. It does not seem that Śaṅkara says anything to refute such a view. Śaṅkara's position in the commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* seems to have been the same sort of view as that of Dīnnāga, which he takes so much pains to refute in the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, and as such it was opposed to the view of Nāgārjuna that there must be some essence or reality on which the illusory impositions are made. But in the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* he maintains the view that the objective world, as it appears to our consciousness, is present before it objectively and independently—only its ultimate nature is inexplicable. The difference of the objects from the awareness and their independent existence and activity have been accepted by most of the later Vedānta teachers of the Śaṅkara school; and it is well known that in sense-perception the need of the mind-contact with the object of perception through the specific sense is considered indispensable¹.

Prakāśātman (A.D. 1200) in his *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa* raises this point and says that the great difference between the Mahāyānists and the Vedāntins consists in the fact that the former hold that the objects (*viśaya*) have neither any separate existence nor any independent purpose or action to fulfil as distinguished from the momentary ideas, while the latter hold that, though the objects are in essence identical with the one pure consciousness, yet they can fulfil independent purposes or functions and have separate, abiding and uncontradicted existences². Both Padmapāda and Prakāśātman argue that, since the awareness remains the same while there is a constant variation of its objects, and therefore that which remains constant (*anuvṛtta*) and that which changes (*vyāvṛtta*) cannot be considered identical, the object cannot be regarded as being only a modification of the idea³. It is suggested that the Buddhist idealist urges that, if the object (e.g. blue) is different from the awareness, it cannot be revealed in it, and, if the blue can be revealed in the awareness, at that moment all the other things of the world might as well be revealed; for there is no such

¹ See *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, ch. 1, Śrīvenkateśvar Press, Bombay, 1911.

² *tattva-darśinas tu advitīyāt samvedanāt abhede 'pi viśayasya bhedenāpi artha-kriyā-sāmarthyā-sattvaṃ sthāyitvaṃ cābādhitam astīti vadanti. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 73. In addition to this work Prakāśātman also wrote two independent commentaries on *Brahma-sūtra* called *Sāriraka-mīmāṃsā-nyāya-saṃgraha* and *Laukika-nyāya-muktāvali*.

³ *anuvṛttasya vyāvṛttān na bhedo 'nuvṛttatvād ākāśa-ghaṭādivat. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 73.

specific relation with the blue that the blue alone should appear in consciousness at that moment. If it is urged that the blue produces the awareness of the blue, then what would be the function of the visual organ? It is better, therefore, the Buddhist suggests, to admit a natural and unique relation of identity of the idea and the object¹. The Vedāntist objects to this and says that such a supposition cannot be true, since we perceive that the subject, object and the idea are not one and the same. To such an objection the Buddhist is supposed to reply that these three do not form a complex unity, but arise at three successive moments of time, and then by virtue of their potency or root-impression a complex of the three appears; and this complex should not therefore be interpreted as being due to a relationing of three distinct entities². Thus the fact that "I perceive blue" is not to be interpreted as a conscious relationing of "I," "the blue" and the awareness, but as an ideation arising at one particular point of time, involving all the three constituents in it. Such a supposition is necessary, because all appearances are momentary, and because the relationing of the three as three independent entities would necessarily be impossible without the lapse of some time for their operation of relationing. The theory of momentariness naturally leads us to the above supposition, that what appears as relationing is nothing but one momentary flash, which has the above three as its constituent elements; so the Buddhist is supposed to admit that, psychologic-

¹ *tasmāt svābhāvikāsādharaṇābhēdasambandhād eva vijñāne nīlam avabhāsate. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 74.

Arguing from a similar point of view, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla urge that, if the object was not identical with the awareness, there must be some immutable law why they should appear simultaneously. This law according to the Buddhists could only be either of identity (*tādātmya*) or of causality as invariability of production (*tad-utpatti*). The first alternative is what the Buddhists here are contending for as against the Vedāntists. There cannot be the law of causality here; for there cannot be any operation of the law of causality as production between two entities which are simultaneous. *Tattva-saṃgraha* and *Pañjikā*, 2030, 2031.

² *tad vāsanā-sameta-samanantera-pratyaya-samuttham saṅkalanātmakam pratyayāntaram etan neha sambandhāgamah*. Padmapāda's (A.D. 820) *Pañca-pādikā*, p. 25. This work exerted the greatest influence on the development of Vedāntic thought for about six or seven centuries, and several commentaries were written on it. Most important of these are Prakāśātman's *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, *Pañca-pādikādhāyāsa-bhāṣya-vyākhyā*, *Pañca-pādikā-śāstra-darpaṇa* by Amṛtānanda, *Tattva-dīpana* by Amṛtānandanātha, and also a commentary by Ānandapūrṇa Yati. Prakāśātman's commentary on it, called *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, was commented upon by Akhaṇḍānanda Muni in his *Tattva-dīpana*, by Rāmānanda Sarasvatī in his *Vivaraṇopanyāsa*, and by Nṛsiṃhāśrama in his *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa-bhāva-prakāśikā*.

ally, the awareness and its object seem to be different, but such a psychological appearance can at best be considered as a mental illusion or fiction; for logically the Buddhist cannot admit that a momentary appearance could subsist long enough to have the possibility of being related to the self and the awareness, as in "I know the blue"; and, if the blue was not considered to be identical with awareness, there would remain no way to explain the possibility of the appearance of the blue in the awareness¹.

Padmapāda points out that the main point with the Buddhists is the doctrine of causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*), or the maxim that that alone exists which can prove its existence by effecting some purpose or action. They hold further that this criterion of existence can be satisfied only if all existents are momentary and if all things are momentary; the only epistemological view that can consistently be accepted is the identity of the awareness and the object. The main reason why only momentary existents can satisfy the criterion of causal efficiency is that, if the existents were not assumed to be momentary, they could not effect any purpose or action². Padmapāda urges in refutation of this that, if causal efficiency means the productivity of its own awareness (*sva-viśaya-jñāna-jananam*), then an awareness or idea has no existence; for it does not produce any other knowledge of itself (*saṃvidāṃsva-viśaya-jñānā-jananād asallakṣaṇatvam*), and the awareness of one cannot be known by others except by inference, which again would not be direct cognition³. If causal efficiency means the production of another moment, then the last moment, having no other moment to produce, would itself be non-existent; and, if the last moment is proved to be non-existent, then by turns all the other moments would be non-existent. Existence is a nature of things; and even when a thing remains silent after an operation it does not on that account cease to exist⁴. On such a basis Prakāśātman points out

¹ *nānubhavam āsṛitya saṃvedanād abhimanā nīlaṃ brūmaḥ kintu vijñānena nīlasya pratibhāsānyathānupapattiyā; kṣaṇikasya tv āgantuka-sambandhābhāve . . . pratibhāsa eva na syāt. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 74.*

² See the first volume of this work, pp. 163-164, where the reasons in justification of the doctrine are briefly stated.

³ Padmapāda derives the possibility of one's being aware of an awareness, which however hardly appears to be convincing. He thinks that an awareness, being of the nature of light, does not stand in need of any other light to illuminate it. *na ca saṃvit saṃvido viśayaḥ saṃvid-ātmanā bhedābhāvāt pradīpasyeva pradīpāntaram. Pañca-pādikā, p. 27.*

⁴ *nārtha-kriyā-kāritva-lakṣaṇam sattvaṃ kintu svābhāvikaṃ iti sakṛt kāryyaṃ kṛtvā tu śūnmbhūtaśāpi sthāyinaḥ sattvaṃ na virudhyate. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 80.*

that the supposed three notions of “I,” “awareness” and the object are really not three distinct notions appearing as one on account of their similarity, but all the three are joined together in one identical subject-object-awareness which does not involve the three successive stages which the Buddhists suppose. This identity is proved by the fact that they are recognized (*pratyabhijñā*) to be so. We are, again, all conscious of our own identity, that we persist in all our changing states of consciousness, and that, though our ideas are continually changing with the changing objects, we remain unchanged all the same; and this shows that in knowing ourselves as pure awareness we are successively connected with the changing objects. But the question arises who is to be convinced of this identity, a notion of which can be produced only by a relationing of the previous existence (through sub-conscious impressions of memory) to the existence of the present moment; and this cannot be done by the Vedāntic self, which is pure self-revealing consciousness that cannot further be made an object of any other conscious state; for it is unchangeable, indestructible, and there cannot be in it a consciousness of relationing between a past state and a present state through the sub-conscious impressions of memory¹. The mere persistence of the same consciousness is not the recognition of identity; for the recognition of identity would be a relation uniting the past as past with the present as present; and, since there is no one to perceive the relation of identity, the appearance of identity is false. The Vedāntic answer to such an objection is that, though the pure consciousness cannot behave as an individual, yet the same consciousness associated with mind (*antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭa*) may behave as an individual who can recognize his own identity as well as that of others. The mind is associated with the sub-conscious impressions of a felt ego (*ahamvṛtti-saṃskāra-sahitam*), due to the experience of the self as associated with a past time; being responsible for the experience of the self as associated with the present time, it produces the notion of the identity of the self as persisting both in the past and in the present. A natural objection against such an explanation is that, since the Vedānta does not admit that one awareness can be the object of another awareness, the revival of a past awareness is

¹ *pūrvānubhava-saṃskāra-sahitād idānīmtana-vastu-pramiti-kāraṇāj jātam ekasya kāla-dvaya-saṃbandha-viśayakaṃ pratyakṣa-jñānaṃ pratyabhijñā iti cet, na tarhi ātmani sā sambhavati. . . vijñāna-svabhāvasya hy ātmanaḥ. . . jñānānta-rāganyatvāt. . . Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 75.*

impossible, without which recognition of identity would be impossible. The answer of the Vedāntist is that, just as an idea is remembered through its sub-conscious impressions, so, though recognition of identity was absent in the preceding moment, yet it could arise through the operation of the sub-conscious impressions at a later moment¹. According to the Vedānta the pure consciousness is the only unchanging substance underlying; it is this consciousness associated with mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) that behaves as the knower or the subject, and it is the same consciousness associated with the previous and later time that appears as the objective self with which the identity is felt and which is known to be identical with the knower—the mind-associated consciousness. We all have notions of self-identity and we feel it as “I am the same”; and the only way in which this can be explained is on the basis of the fact that consciousness, though one and universal, can yet be supposed to perform diverse functions by virtue of the diverse nature of its associations, by which it seems to transform itself as the knower and the thousand varieties of relations and objects which it knows. The main point which is to be noted in connection with this realization of the identity of the self is that the previous experience and its memory prove that the self existed in the past; but how are we to prove that what existed is also existing at the present moment? Knowledge of identity of the self is something different from the experience of self in the past and in the present. But the process consists in this, that the two experiences manifest the self as one identical entity which persisted through both the experiences, and this new experience makes the self known in the aforesaid relation of identity. Again, when I remember a past experience, it is the self as associated with that experience that is remembered; so it is the self as associated with the different time relations that is apprehended in an experience of the identity of self.

From all these discussions one thing that comes out clearly is that according to the Śāṅkara Vedānta, as explained by the *Vivaraṇa* school of Padmapāda and his followers, the sense-data and the objects have an existence independent of their being perceived; and there is also the mind called *antaḥkaraṇa*, which operates in its own way for the apprehension of this or that object. Are objects already there and presented to the pure consciousness through the

¹ *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 76.

mind? But what then are the objects? and the Śāṅkarite's answer is that they in themselves are unspeakable and indescribable. It is easy to notice the difference of such a view from that of the Buddhist idealism of Dīnnāga or the *Laṅkāvatāra* on the one hand and that of Vasubandhu in his *Trīṃśikā* on the other. For in the case of the former there were no objects independent of their being perceived, and in the case of the latter the objects are transformations of a thought-principle and are as such objective to the subject which apprehends them. Both the subject and the object are grounded in the higher and superior principle, the principle of thought. This grounding implies that this principle of thought and its transformations are responsible for both the subject and the object, as regards material and also as regards form. According to the Śāṅkara Vedānta, however, the stuff of world-objects, mind, the senses and all their activities, functionings and the like are but modifications of *māyā*, which is indescribable (*anirvācya*) in itself, but which is always related to pure consciousness as its underlying principle, and which in its forms as material objects hides from the view and is made self-conscious by the illuminating flash of the underlying principle of pure consciousness in its forms as intellectual states or ideas. As already described, the Śūnyavādins also admitted the objective existence of all things and appearances; but, as these did not stand the test of criticism, considered them as being essenceless (*niḥsvabhāva*). The only difference that one can make out between this doctrine of essencelessness and the doctrine of indescribability of the Śāṅkara school is that this "indescribable" is yet regarded as an indescribable something, as some stuff which undergoes changes and which has transformed itself into all the objects of the world. The idealism of the Śāṅkara Vedānta does not believe in the *sahopalambha-niyama* of the Buddhist idealists, that to exist is to be perceived. The world is there even if it be not perceived by the individual; it has an objective existence quite independent of my ideas and sensations; but, though independent of my sensations or ideas, it is not independent of consciousness, with which it is associated and on which it is dependent. This consciousness is not ordinary psychological thought, but it is the principle that underlies all conscious thought. This pure thought is independent and self-revealing, because in all conscious thought the consciousness shines by itself; all else is manifested by this consciousness and

when considered apart from it, is inconceivable and unmeaning. This independent and uncontradicted self-shiningness constitutes being (*abādhita-svayaṃ-prakāśataiva asya sattā*)¹. All being is pure consciousness, and all appearance hangs on it as something which is expressed by a reference to it and apart from which it has no conceivable status or meaning. This is so not only epistemologically or logically, but also ontologically. The object-forms of the world are there as transformations of the indescribable stuff of *māyā*, which is not "being," but dependent on "being"; but they can only be expressed when they are reflected in mental states and presented as ideas. Analogies of world objects with dream objects or illusions can therefore be taken only as popular examples to make the conception of *māyā* popularly intelligible; and this gives the Vedāntic idealism its unique position.

Śāṅkara's Defence of Vedānta; Philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa and Bhartṛprapañca.

Śāṅkara's defensive arguments consisted in the refutation of the objections that may be made against the Vedāntic conception of the world. The first objection anticipated is that from the followers of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Thus it is urged that the effect must be largely of the same nature as the cause. Brahman, which is believed to be intelligent (*cetana*) and pure (*śuddha*), could not be the cause of a world which is unintelligent (*jaḍa* and *acetana*) and impure (*aśuddha*). And it is only because the world is so different in nature from the intelligent spirits that it can be useful to them. Two things which are identical in their nature can hardly be of any use to each other—two lamps cannot be illuminating to each other. So it is only by being different from the intelligent spirits that the world can best serve them and exist for them. Śāṅkara's answer to this objection is that it is not true that the effect should in every way be similar to the cause—there are instances of inanimate hair and nails growing from living beings, and of living insects growing out of inanimate objects like cow-dung. Nor can it be denied that there is at least some similarity between Brahman and the world in this, that both have being. It cannot be urged that, because Brahman is intelligent, the world also should be intelligent; for there is no reason for such

¹ Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmati*, p. 13, Nirṇaya-Sāgara edition, 1904.

an expectation. The converse of it also has not been found to be true—it has not been found that what is unintelligent has been known to have been derived from a source other than Brahman¹. The whole point of this argument seems to lie in the fact that, since the Upaniṣads assert that Brahman is the cause of the world, the apparent incompatibility of the production of an impure and unintelligent world from the intelligent and pure Brahman has to be explained away; for such ultimate truths can be discovered not by reason, but by the testimony of the Upaniṣads. Another objection supposed to be raised by Sāṃkhya against Vedānta is that at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*), when the world of effects will dissolve back into Brahman the cause, the impurities of the worldly state might also make the causal state of Brahmanhood impure. Śaṅkara refutes it by pointing out two sets of instances in which the effects do not affect the causal state when they return to it. Of these, one set of instances is to be found in those cases where articles of gold, silver, etc. are melted back into their original material states as unformed gold and silver, and are not seen to affect them with their specific peculiarities as formed articles. The other instance is to be found in the manifestation of magic by a magician. The magical creations of a magician are controlled by him and, when they vanish in this way, they cannot in any way affect the magician himself; for the magical creations have no reality. So also a dreamer is not affected by his dreams when he is awake. So the reality is one which remains altogether untouched by the changing states. The appearance of this reality as all the changing states is mere false show (*māyā-mātram*), like the appearance of a rope as a snake. Again, as a man may in deep sleep pass into a state where there is no trace of his mundane experiences and may yet, when he becomes awake, resume his normal vocation in life, so after the dissolution of the world into its causal state there may again be the same kind of creation as there was before the dissolution. So there can be no objection that the world of impure effects will affect the pure state of Brahman at the time of dissolution or that there could be no creation after dissolution.

These arguments of Śaṅkara in answer to a supposed objection

¹ *kiṃ hi yac caitanyenānarvitaṃ tad abrahma-prakṛtikaṃ dr̥ṣṭam iti brahma-vādināṃ praty udāhriyeta samastasya vastu-jātasya brahma-prakṛtikatvābhīyupagamāt. Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya, II, i. 6.*

that the world of effects, impure and unintelligent as it is, could not have been the product of pure and intelligent Brahman are not only weak but rather uncalled for. If the world of effects is mere *māyā* and magic and has no essence (*vastutva*), the best course for him was to rush straight to his own view of effects as having no substantiality or essence and not to adopt the *pariṇāma* view of real transformations of causes into effects to show that the effects could be largely dissimilar from their causes. Had he started with the reply that the effects had no real existence and that they were merely magical creations and a false show, the objection that the impure world could not come out of pure Brahman would have at once fallen to the ground; for such an objection would have validity only with those who believed in the real transformations of effects from causes, and not with a philosopher like Śaṅkara, who did not believe in the reality of effects at all. Instead of doing that he proceeded to give examples of the realistic return of golden articles into gold in order to show that the peculiar defects or other characteristics of the effect cannot affect the purity of the cause. Side by side with this he gives another instance, how magical creations may vanish without affecting the nature of the magician. This example, however, does not at all fit in with the context, and it is surprising how Śaṅkara failed to see that, if his examples of realistic transformations were to hold good, his example of the magic and the magician would be quite out of place. If the *pariṇāma* view of causation is to be adopted, the *vivarta* view is to be given up. It seems however that Śaṅkara here was obliged to take refuge in such a confusion of issues by introducing stealthily an example of the *vivarta* view of unreality of effects in the commentary on *sūtras* which could only yield a realistic interpretation. The *sūtras* here seem to be so convincingly realistic that the ultimate reply to the suggested incompatibility of the production of effects dissimilar from their causes is found in the fact that the Upaniṣads hold that this impure and unintelligent world had come out of Brahman; and that, since the Upaniṣads assert it, no objection can be raised against it on grounds of reason.

In the next section the theory of realistic transformation of causes is further supported by the *sūtra* which asserts that in spite of the identity of effects with their cause their plurality or diversity may also be explained on the analogy of many popular illustrations. Thus, though the waves are identical with the sea, yet they have

an existence in their plurality and diversity as well. Here also Śaṅkara has to follow the implication of the *sūtra* in his interpretation. He, however, in concluding his commentary on this *sūtra*, says that the world is not a result of any real transformation of Brahman as effect; Brahman alone exists, but yet, when Brahman is under the conditioning phenomena of a world-creation, there is room for apparent diversity and plurality. It may be pointed out, however, that such a supplementary explanation is wholly incompatible with the general meaning of the rule, which is decidedly in favour of a realistic transformation. It is unfortunate that here also Śaṅkara does not give any reason for his supplementary remark, which is not in keeping with the general spirit of the *sūtra* and the interpretation which he himself gave of it.

In the next section the *sūtras* seem plainly to assert the identity of cause and effect, "because of the possibility of the effect, because the cause exists, because the effect exists in the cause and is due to an elaboration of the cause and also for other reasons and the testimony of the Upaniṣads." Such a meaning is quite in keeping with the general meaning of the previous sections. Śaṅkara, however, interprets the *sūtra* as meaning that it is Brahman, the cause, which alone is true. There cannot therefore be any real transformation of causes into effects. The omniscience of Brahman and His being the creator of the world have thus only a limited validity; for they depend upon the relative reality of the world. From the absolute point of view therefore there is no Īśvara who is the omniscient creator of the world¹. Śaṅkara supports this generally on the ground of the testimony of some Upaniṣad texts (e.g. *mṛttiketyeva satyam*, etc.). He however introduces an argument in support of the *sat-kārya-vāda* theory, or the theory that the effect is already existent in the cause. This theory is indeed common both to the *pariṇāma* view of real transformation and the *vivarta* view, in two different ways. It is curious however that he should support the *sat-kārya-vāda* theory on *pariṇāma* lines, as against the generative view of *a-sat-kārya-vāda* of the Nyāya, but not on *vivarta* lines, where effects are treated as non-existent and false. Thus he

¹ *kūṭa-stha-brahmātma-vādinah ekatvaikāntyāt īśitṛīśitavyabhāvaḥ īśvara-kāraṇa-pratijñā-virodha iti cet; na; avidyātmaka-nāma-rūpa-bija-vyākaraṇāpekṣavāt sarvajñatvasya. Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra. 11. 1. 14.*

na tattvikaṁ aiśvaryaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ ca brahmaṇaḥ kintu avidyopādḥikam iti tadāśrayaṁ pratijñā-sūtram, tattvāśrayaṁ tu tad ananyatva-sūtram. Bhāmati on the above Bhāṣya.

says that the fact that curd is produced from milk and not from mud shows that there is some such intimate relation of curd with milk which it has not with anything else. This intimate relation consists in the special power or capacity (*śakti*) in the cause (e.g. the milk), which can produce the special effect (e.g. the curd). This power is the very essence of the cause, and the very essence of this power is the effect itself. If a power determines the nature of the effect, it must be already existent in the cause as the essence of the effect. Arguing against the Nyāya view that the cause is different from the effect, though they are mutually connected in an inseparable relation of inherence (*samavāya*), he says that, if such a *samavāya* is deemed necessary to connect the cause with the effect, then this also may require a further something to connect the *samavāya* with the cause or the effect and that another and that another *ad infinitum*. If it is urged that *samavāya*, being a relation, does not require any further relation to connect it with anything else, it may well be asked in reply how "conjunction" (*saṃyoga*), which is also regarded as a relation, should require the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) to connect it with the objects which are in conjunction (*saṃyogin*). The conception of *samavāya* connecting substances with their qualities is unnecessary; for the latter always appear identified with the former (*tādātmya-pratīti*). If the effect, say a whole, is supposed to be existing in the cause, the parts, it must exist in them all taken together or in each of the separate parts. If the whole exist only in the totality of the parts, then, since all the parts cannot be assembled together, the whole as such would be invisible. If the whole exist in the parts in parts, then one has to conceive other parts of the whole different from its constituent parts; and, if the same questions be again repeated, these parts should have other parts and these others; and thus there would be a vicious infinite. If the whole exists wholly in each of the parts at the same time, then there would be many wholes. If it exists successively in each of the parts, then the whole would at one time be existent only in one part, and so at that time the functions of the whole would be absent in the other parts. If it is said that, just as a class-concept (e.g. cow) exists wholly in each of the individuals and yet is not many, so a whole may also be wholly existent in each of the parts, it may well be replied that the experience of wholes is not like the experience of class-concepts. The class-concept of cow is realized in each and every cow; but

a whole is not realized in each and every part. Again, if the effect is non-existent before its production, then, production being an action, such an action would have nothing as its agent, which is impossible—for, since the effect is non-existent before its production, it could not be the agent of its production; and, since being non-existent, it cannot be the agent of its production, such a production would be either itself non-existent or would be without any agent. If, however, production is not defined as an action, but as a relationing of an effect with its cause (*svakāraṇa-sattā-samavāya*), then also it may be objected that a relation is only possible when there are two terms which are related, and, since the effect is as yet non-existent, it cannot be related to its cause.

But, if the effect is already existent, what then is the necessity of the causal operation (*kāraṇa-vyāpāra*)? The answer to such a question is to be found in the view that the effect is but an elaboration of the cause into its effect. Just as a man may sit with his limbs collected together or stretched out and yet would be considered the same man, so an effect also is to be regarded as an expansion of the cause and as such identical with it. The effect is thus only a transformed state of the cause; and hence the causal operation is necessary for bringing about this transformation; but in spite of such a transformation the effect is not already existing in the cause as its potency or power.

There are seven other smaller sections. In the first of these the objection that, if the world is a direct product of the intelligent Brahman, there is no reason why such an intelligent being should create a world which is full of misery and is a prison-house to himself, is easily answered by pointing out that the transcendent creator is far above the mundane spirits that suffer misery in the prison-house of the world. Here also Sāṅkara adds as a supplementary note the remark that, since there is no real creation and the whole world is but a magical appearance, no such objection that the creator should not have created an undesirable world for its own suffering is valid. But the *sūtras* gave him no occasion for such a remark; so that indeed, as was the case with the previous sections, here also his *māyā* theory is not in keeping even with his general interpretation of the *sūtras*, and his remarks have to be appended as a note which hangs loosely and which does not appear to have any relevancy to the general meaning and purport of the *sūtras*.

In the next section an objection is raised that Brahman cannot without the help of any other accessory agents create the world; the reply to such an objection is found in the fact that Brahman has all powers in Himself and can as such create the world out of Himself without the help of anything else.

In the next section an objection is raised that, if the world is a transformation of Brahman, then, since Brahman is partless, the transformation must apply to the whole of Brahman; for a partial transformation is possible only when the substance which is undergoing the transformation has parts. A reply to such an objection is to be found in the analogy of the human self, which is in itself formless and, though transforming itself into various kinds of dream experiences, yet remains unchanged and unaffected as a whole by such transformations. Moreover, such objections may be levelled against the objectors themselves; for Sāṃkhya also admits the transformation of the formless *prakṛti*.

In another section it is urged that, since Brahman is complete in Himself, there is no reason why He should create this great world, when He has nothing to gain by it. The reply is based on the analogy of play, where one has nothing to gain and yet one is pleased to indulge in it. So Brahman also creates the world by His *līlā* or play. Śaṅkara, however, never forgets to sing his old song of the *māyā* theory, however irrelevant it may be, with regard to the purpose of the *sūtras*, which he himself could not avoid following. Thus in this section, after interpreting the *sūtra* as attributing the world-creation to God's playful activity, he remarks that it ought not to be forgotten that all the world-creation is but a fanciful appearance due to nescience and that the ultimate reality is the identity of the self and Brahman.

The above discussion seems to prove convincingly that Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy was some kind of *bhedābheda-vāda* or a theory of transcendence and immanence of God (Brahman)—even in the light of Śaṅkara's own commentary. He believed that the world was the product of a real transformation of Brahman, or rather of His powers and energies (*śakti*). God Himself was not exhausted by such a transformation and always remained as the master creator who by His play created the world and who could by His own powers create the world without any extraneous assistance. The world was thus a real transformation of God's powers, while He Himself, though remaining immanent in the

world through His powers, transcended it at the same time, and remained as its controller, and punished or rewarded the created mundane souls in accordance with their bad and good deeds.

The doctrine of *bhedābheda-vāda* is certainly prior to Śaṅkara, as it is the dominant view of most of the *purāṇas*. It seems probable also that Bhartṛprapañca refers to Bodhāyana, who is referred to as *ṛttikāra* by Rāmānuja, and as *ṛttikāra* and *Upavarṣa* by Śaṅkara, and to Dramiḍācārya, referred to by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja; all held some form of *bhedābheda* doctrine¹. Bhartṛprapañca has been referred to by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*; and Ānandajñāna, in his commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary, gives a number of extracts from Bhartṛprapañca's *Bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*. Prof. M. Hiriyanna collected these fragments in a paper read before the Third Oriental Congress in Madras, 1924, and there he describes Bhartṛprapañca's philosophy as follows. The doctrine of Bhartṛprapañca is monism, and it is of the *bhedābheda* type. The relation between Brahman and the *jīva*, as that between Brahman and the world, is one of identity in difference. An implication of this view is that both the *jīva* and the physical world evolve out of Brahman, so that the doctrine may be described as *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*. On the spiritual side Brahman is transformed into the *antaryāmin* and the *jīva*; on the physical side into *avyakta*, *sūtra*, *virāj* and *devatā*, which are all cosmic; and *jāti* and *piṇḍa*, which are not

¹ Prof. S. Kuppusvāmī Śāstrī, in an article read before the Third Oriental Conference, quotes a passage from Veṅkata's *Tattva-ṭīkā* on Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, in which he says that Upavarṣa is a name of Bodhāyana—*ṛttikārasya Bodhāyanasyaiva hi Upavarṣa iti syān nāma—Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference*, Madras, 1924. The commentators on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* say that, when he refers to *Ṛttikāra* in I. i. 9, I. i. 23, I. ii. 23 and III. iii. 53, he refers to Upavarṣa by name. From the views of Upavarṣa referred to in these *sūtras* it appears that Upavarṣa believed in the theory of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya*, held also by Bhāskara (an adherent of the *bhedābheda* theory), Rāmānuja and others, but vehemently opposed by Śaṅkara, who wanted to repudiate the idea of his opponents that the performance of sacrificial and Vedic duties could be conceived as a preliminary preparation for making oneself fit for Brahma-knowledge.

References to Dramiḍācārya's commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* are made by Ānandagiri in his commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. In the commentary of Sarvajñātma Muni's *Samkṣepa-śāriraka*, III. 217-227, by Nṛsiṃhāśrama, the Vākyakāra referred to by Sarvajñātma Muni as Ātreya has been identified with Brahmanandin or Ṭaṅka and the bhāṣyakāra (a quotation from whose *Bhāṣya* appears in *Samkṣepa-śāriraka*, III. 221, "*antar-guṇā bhagavatī paradevateti*," is referred to as a quotation from Dramiḍācārya in Rāmānuja's *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, p. 138, Pandit edition) is identified with Dramiḍācārya, who wrote a commentary on Brahmanandin's *Chāndogyo-paniṣad-vārttika*.

cosmic. These are the *avasthās* or modes of Brahman, and represent the eight classes into which the variety of the universe may be divided. They are again classified into three *rāśis*, *para-mātma-rāśi*, *jīva-rāśi* and *mūrttāmūrtta-rāśi*, which correspond to the triple subject-matter of Religion and Philosophy, viz. God, soul and matter. Bhartṛprapañca recognized what is known as *pramāṇa-samuccaya*, by which it follows that the testimony of common experience is quite as valid as that of the Veda. The former vouches for the reality of variety and the latter for that of unity (as taught in the Upaniṣads). Hence the ultimate truth is *dvaitādvaita*. *Mokṣa*, or life's end, is conceived as being achieved in two stages—the first leading to *apavarga*, where *saṃsāra* is overcome through the overcoming of *āsaṅga*; and the second leading to Brahmahood through the dispelling of *avidyā*. This means of reaching either stage is *jñāna-karma-samuccaya*, which is a corollary on the practical side to *pramāṇa-samuccaya* on the theoretical side.

It is indeed difficult to say what were the exact characteristics of Bādarāyaṇa's *bhedābheda* doctrine of Vedānta; but there is very little doubt that it was some special type of *bhedābheda* doctrine, and, as has already been repeatedly pointed out, even Śāṅkara's own commentary (if we exclude only his parenthetic remarks, which are often inconsistent with the general drift of his own commentary and the context of the *sūtras*, as well as with their purpose and meaning, so far as it can be made out from such a context) shows that it was so. If, however, it is contended that this view of real transformation is only from a relative point of view (*vyavahārika*), then there must at least be one *sūtra* where the absolute (*pāramārthika*) point of view is given; but no such *sūtra* has been discovered even by Śāṅkara himself. If experience always shows the causal transformation to be real, then how is one to know that in the ultimate point of view all effects are false and unreal? If, however, it is contended that there is a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the *māyā* stuff, whereas Brahman remains always unchanged, and if *māyā* is regarded as the power (*śakti*) of Brahman, how then can the *śakti* of Brahman as well as its transformations be regarded as unreal and false, while the possessor of the *śakti* (or the *śaktimat*, Brahman) is regarded as real and absolute? There is a great diversity of opinion on this point among the Vedāntic writers of the Śāṅkara school. Thus Appaya Dikṣita in his *Siddhānta-leśa* refers to the author of *Padārtha-nirṇaya* as saying that

Brahman and *māyā* are both material causes of the world-appearance—Brahman the *vivarta* cause, and *māyā* the *pariṇāma* cause. Others are said to find a definition of causation intermediate between *vivarta* and *pariṇāma* by defining material cause as that which can produce effects which are not different from itself (*svābhinnā-kārya janakatvam upādānatvam*). The world is identical with Brahman inasmuch as it has being, and it is identical with nescience inasmuch as it has its characteristics of materiality and change. So from two different points of view both Brahman and *māyā* are the cause of the world. Vācaspati Miśra holds that *māyā* is only an accessory cause (*śahakārī*), whereas Brahman is the real *vivarta* cause¹. The author of the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, Prakāśānanda, however, thinks that it is the *māyā* energy (*māyā-śakti*) which is the material cause of the world and not Brahman. Brahman is unchangeable and is the support of *māyā*; and is thus the cause of the world in a remote sense. Sarvajñātma Muni, however, believes Brahman alone to be the *vivarta* cause, and *māyā* to be only an instrument for the purpose². The difficulty that many of the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa give us a *pariṇāma* view of causation was realized by Sarvajñātma Muni, who tried to explain it away by suggesting that the *pariṇāma* theory was discussed approvingly in the *sūtras* only because this theory was nearest to the *vivarta*, and by initiating people to the *pariṇāma* theory it would be easier to lead them to the *vivarta* theory, as hinted in *sūtra* II. i. 14³. This explanation could have some probability, if the arrangement of the *sūtras* was

¹ Vācaspati Miśra flourished in about A.D. 840. In addition to his *Bhāmātī* commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* he wrote many other works and commentaries on other systems of philosophy. His important works are: *Tattva-bindu*, *Tattva-vaiśārādī* (yoga), *Tattva-samākṣā*, *Brahma-siddhi-ṭīkā*, *Nyāya-kaṇikā* on *Vidhi-viveka*, *Nyāya-tattvāloka*, *Nyāya-ratna-ṭīkā*, *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, *Brahma-tattva-saṃhitōddīpanī*, *Yukti-dīpikā* (*Sāṃkhya*), *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, *Vedānta-tattva-kaumudī*.

² He lived about A.D. 900 during the reign of King Manukulāditya and was a pupil of Devesvara.

³

*vivarta-vādasya hi pūrva-bhūmīr
vedānta-vāde pariṇāma-vādaḥ
vyavasthite 'smīn pariṇāma-vāde
svayaṃ samāyāti vivarta-vādaḥ.*

Saṃkṣepa-sātraka, II. 61.

*upāyam ātiṣṭhati pūrvam uccair
upeyam āptum janatā yathaiṃ
śrutir munīndraḥ ca vivarta-siddhyai
vikāra-vādaṃ vadatas tathaiṃ.*

Ibid. II. 62.

*vikāra-vādaṃ Kapilādi-pakṣam
upetya vādena tu sūtra-kāraḥ
śrutīś ca saṃjalpatī pūrvabhūmau
sthitvā vivarta-pratipādanāya.*

Ibid. II. 64.

such as to support the view that the *pariṇāma* view was introduced only to prepare the reader's mind for the *vivarta* view, which was ultimately definitely approved as the true view; but it has been shown that the content of almost all the *sūtras* of II. i. consistently support the *pariṇāma* view, and that even the *sūtra* II. i. 14 cannot be explained as holding the *vivarta* view of causation as the right one, since the other *sūtras* of the same section have been explained by Śaṅkara himself on the *pariṇāma* view; and, if the content be taken into consideration, this *sūtra* also has to be explained on the *pariṇāma* view of *bhedābheda* type.

Teachers and Pupils in Vedānta.

The central emphasis of Śaṅkara's philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra* is on Brahman, the self-revealed identity of pure consciousness, bliss and being, which does not await the performance of any of the obligatory Vedic duties for its realization. A right realization of such Upaniṣad texts as "That art thou," instilled by the right teacher, is by itself sufficient to dispel all the false illusions of world-appearance. This, however, was directly against the Mīmāṃsā view of the obligatoriness of certain duties, and Śaṅkara and his followers had to fight hard on this point with the Mīmāṃsakas. Different Mīmāṃsā writers emphasized in different ways the necessity of the association of duties with Brahma-wisdom; and a brief reference to some of these has been made in the section on Sureśvara. Another question arose regarding the nature of the obligation of listening to the unity texts (e.g. "that art thou") of the Vedānta; and later Vedānta writers have understood it differently. Thus the author of the *Prakāṭārtha*, who probably flourished in the twelfth century, holds that it is only by virtue of the mandate of the Upaniṣads (such as "thou shouldst listen to these texts, understand the meaning and meditate") that one learns for the first time that one ought to listen to the Vedānta texts—a view which is technically called *apūrvavidhi*. Others, however, think that people might themselves engage in reading all kinds of texts in their attempts to attain salvation and that they might go on the wrong track; and it is just to draw them on to the right path, viz. that of listening to the unity texts of the Upaniṣads, that the Upaniṣads direct men to listen to the unity texts—this view is technically called *nīyama-vidhi*.

The followers of Sarvajñātma Muni, however, maintain that there can in no sense be a duty in regard to the attainment of wisdom of Brahma-knowledge, and the force of the duty lies in enjoining the holding of discussions for the clarification of one's understanding; and the meaning of the obligatory sentence "thou shouldst listen to" means that one should hold proper discussions for the clarification of his intellect. Other followers of Sureśvara, however, think that the force of the obligation lies in directing the student of Vedānta steadily to realize the truth of the Vedānta texts without any interruption; and this view is technically called *parisaṃkhyā-vidhi*. Vācaspati Miśra and his followers, however, think that no obligation of duties is implied in these commands; they are simply put in the form of commands in order to show the great importance of listening to Vedānta texts and holding discussions on them, as a means of advancement in the Vedāntic course of progress.

But the central philosophical problem of the Vedānta is the conception of Brahman—the nature of its causality, its relation with *māyā* and the phenomenal world of world-appearance, and with individual persons. Śaṅkara's own writings do not always manifest the same uniform and clear answer; and many passages in different parts of his work show tendencies which could be more or less diversely interpreted, though of course the general scheme was always more or less well-defined. Appaya Dīkṣita notes in the beginning of his *Siddhānta-leśa* that the ancients were more concerned with the fundamental problem of the identity of the self and the Brahman, and neglected to explain clearly the order of phenomenal appearance; and that therefore many divergent views have sprung up on the subject. Thus shortly after Śaṅkara's death we have four important teachers, Sureśvara and his pupil Sarvajñātma Muni, Padmapāda and Vācaspati Miśra, who represent three distinct tendencies in the monistic interpretation of the Vedānta. Sureśvara and his pupil Sarvajñātma Muni held that *māyā* was only an instrument (*dvāra*), through which the one Brahman appeared as many, and had its real nature hidden from the gaze of its individual appearances as individual persons. In this view *māyā* was hardly recognized as a substance, though it was regarded as positive; and it was held that *māyā* had, both for its object and its support, the Brahman. It is the pure Brahman that is the real cause underlying all appearances, and the *māyā* only hangs on it like a veil of illusion which makes this one thing

appear as many unreal appearances. It is easy to see that this view ignores altogether the importance of giving philosophical explanations of phenomenal appearance, and is only concerned to emphasize the reality of Brahman as the only truth. Vācaspati's view gives a little more substantiality to *māyā* in the sense that he holds that *māyā* is coexistent with Brahman, as an accessory through the operation of which the creation of world-appearance is possible; *māyā* hides the Brahman as its object, but it rests on individual persons, who are again dependent on *māyā*, and *māyā* on them, in a beginningless cycle. The world-appearance is not mere subjective ideas or sensations, but it has an objective existence, though the nature of its existence is inexplicable and indescribable; and at the time of dissolution of the world (or *pralaya*) its constitutive stuff, psychical and physical, will remain hidden in *avidyā*, to be revived again at the time of the next world-appearance, otherwise called creation. But the third view, namely that of Padmapāda, gives *māyā* a little more substantiality, regarding it as the stuff which contains the double activity or power of cognitive activity and vibratory activity, one determining the psychical process and the other the physical process, and regarding Brahman in association with *māyā*, with these two powers as *Īśvara*, as the root cause of the world. But the roots of a very thoroughgoing subjective idealism also may be traced even in the writings of Śaṅkara himself. Thus in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya* he says that, leaving aside theories of limitation (*avaccheda*) or reflection (*pratibimba*), it may be pointed out that, as the son of Kuntī is the same as Rādheya, so it is the Brahman that appears as individual persons through beginningless *avidyā*; the individual persons so formed again delusively create the world-appearance through their own *avidyā*. It will be pointed out in a later section that Maṇḍana also elaborated the same tendency shortly after Śaṅkara in the ninth century. Thus in the same century we have four distinct lines of Vedāntic development, which began to expand through the later centuries in the writers that followed one or the other of these schools; and some additional tendencies also developed. The tenth century seems to have been very barren in the field of the Vedānta, and, excepting probably Jñānottama Miśra, who wrote a commentary on Sureśvara's *Vārttika*, no writer of great reputation is known to us to have lived in this period. In other fields of philosophical development also this century was more or

less barren, and, excepting Udayana and Śrīdhara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Utpala in Astronomy and Abhinavagupta in Śaivism, probably no other persons of great reputation can be mentioned. There were, however, a few Buddhistic writers of repute in this period, such as Candragomin (junior) of Rajshahi, the author of *Nyāya-loka-siddhi*, Prajñākara Gupta of Vikramaśilā, author of *Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra* and *Sahopalambha-miścaya*, Ācārya Jetāri of Rajshahi, the author of *Hetu-tattvopadeśa*, *Dharma-dharmiviniścaya* and *Bālāvatāra-tarka*, Jina, the author of *Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭīkā*, Ratnakīrti, the author of the *Apoha-siddhi*, *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi* and *Sthira-siddhi-dūṣaṇa*, and Ratna Vajra, the author of the *Yukti-prayoga*. The eleventh century also does not seem to have been very fruitful for Vedānta philosophy. The only author of great reputation seems to have been Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭarakācārya, who appears to have lived probably in the latter half of the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth century. The *mahāvīdyā* syllogisms of Kulārka Paṇḍita, however, probably began from some time in the eleventh century, and these were often referred to for refutation by Vedāntic writers till the fourteenth century, as will be pointed out in a later section. But it is certain that quite a large number of Vedāntic writers must have worked on the Vedānta before Ānandabodha, although we cannot properly trace them now. Ānandabodha says in his *Nyāya-makaranda* that his work was a compilation (*saṃgraha*) from a large number of Vedāntic monographs (*nibandha-puṣpāñjali*). Citsukha in his commentary on the *Nyāya-makaranda* points out (p. 346) that Ānandabodha was refuting a view of the author of the *Brahma-prakāśikā*. According to Govindānanda's statement in his *Ratna-prabhā*, p. 311, Amalānanda of the thirteenth century refuted a view of the author of the *Prakaṭārtha*. The author of the *Prakaṭārtha* may thus be believed to have lived either in the eleventh or in the twelfth century. It was a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*, and its full name was *Śārīraka-bhāṣya-prakaṭārtha*; and Ānandajñāna (called also Janārdana) wrote his *Tattvāloka* on the lines of Vedāntic interpretation of this work. Mr Tripathi says in his introduction to the *Tarka-saṃgraha* that a copy of this work is available in Tekka Maṭha; but the present writer had the good fortune of going through it from a manuscript in the Adyar Library, and a short account of its philosophical views is given below in a separate section. In the *Siddhānta-leśa* of Appaya Dikṣita we

hear of a commentary on it called *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa*. But, though Ānandajñāna wrote his *Tattvāloka* on the lines of the *Prakaṭārtha*, yet the general views of Ānandajñāna were not the same as those of the author thereof; Ānandajñāna's position was very much like that of Sarvajñātma Muni, and he did not admit many *ajñānas*, nor did he admit any difference between *māyā* and *avidyā*. But the author of the *Prakaṭārtha*, so far as can be judged from references to him in the *Siddhānta-leśa*, gave a separate place to the *antaḥkaraṇas* of individual persons and thought that, just as the *jīvas* could be cognizers through the reflection of pure intelligence in the *antaḥkaraṇa* states, so Īśvara is omniscient by knowing everything through *māyā* modifications. The views of the author of the *Prakaṭārtha* regarding the nature of *vidhi* have already been noted. But the way in which Ānandajñāna refers to the *Prakaṭārtha* in *Muṇḍaka*, p. 32, and *Kena*, p. 23, shows that he was either the author of the *Prakaṭārtha* or had written some commentary to it. But he could not have been the author of this work, since he refers to it as the model on which his *Tattvāloka* was written; so it seems very probable that he had written a commentary to it. But it is surprising that Ānandajñāna, who wrote commentaries on most of the important commentaries of Śaṅkara, should also trouble himself to write another commentary on the *Prakaṭārtha*, which is itself a commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary. It may be surmised, therefore, that he had some special reasons for respecting it, and it may have been the work of some eminent teacher of his or of someone in his parental line. However it may be, it is quite unlikely that the work should have been written later than the middle of the twelfth century¹.

It is probable that Gaṅgāpurī Bhaṭṭāraka also lived earlier than Ānandabodha, as Citsukha points out. Gaṅgāpurī must then have lived either towards the latter part of the tenth century or the first half of the eleventh century. It is not improbable that he may have been a senior contemporary of Ānandabodha. His work, *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya*, was commented on by Ānandajñāna. According to him both *māyā* and Brahman are to be regarded as the cause of the world. All kinds of world-phenomena exist, and being may therefore be attributed to them; and being is the same whatever may be the nature of things that exist. Brahman is thus the changeless cause in the world or the *vivarta-kāraṇa*; but all the

¹ See Tripathi's introduction to the *Tarka-saṃgraha*.

changing contents or individual existents must also be regarded as products of the transformation of some substance, and in this sense *māyā* is to be regarded as the *pariṇāmi-kāraṇa* of the world. Thus the world has Brahman as its *vivarta-kāraṇa* and *māyā* as its *pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*. The world manifests both aspects, the aspect of changeless being and that of changing materiality; so both *māyā* and Brahman form the material cause of the world in two different ways (*Brahma māyā caityubhayopādānam; sattva-jādyā-rūpobhaya-dharmānugaty-upapattis ca*). *Tarka-viveka* and *Siddhānta-viveka* are the names of two chapters of this book, giving a summary of Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta philosophy respectively. The view of Gaṅgapurī in the *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya* just referred to seems to have been definitely rejected by Ānandabodha in his *Pramāṇa-mālā*, p. 16.

When Kulārka had started the *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms, and great Nyāya authors such as Jayanta and Udayana in the ninth and tenth centuries had been vigorously introducing logical methods in philosophy and were trying to define all that is knowable, the Vedāntic doctrine that all that is knowable is indefinable was probably losing its hold; and it is probable that works like Ānandabodha's *Pramāṇa-mālā* and *Nyāya-dīpāvalī* in the eleventh century or in the early part of the twelfth century were weakly attempting to hold fast to the Vedāntic position on logical grounds. It was Śrīharṣa who in the third quarter of the twelfth century for the first time attempted to refute the entire logical apparatus of the Naiyāyikas. Śrīharṣa's work was carried on in Citsukha's *Tattva-pradīpikā* in the early part of the thirteenth century, by Ānandajñāna in the latter part of the same century in his *Tarka-saṃgraha* and by Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni in his *Bheda-dhikkāra* in the sixteenth century. On the last-named a pupil, Nārāyaṇāśrama, wrote his *Bheda-dhikkāra-satkriyā*, and this had a sub-commentary, called *Bheda-dhikkāra-satkriyājvalā*. The beginnings of the dialectical arguments can be traced to Śaṅkara and further back to the great Buddhist writers, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, etc. Interest in these dialectical arguments was continuously kept up by commentaries written on these works all through the later centuries. The names of these commentators have been mentioned in the sections on Śrīharṣa, Citsukha and Ānandajñāna.

Moreover, the lines of Vedānta interpretation which started with Sureśvara, Padmapāda and Vācaspati were vigorously

continued in commentaries and in independent works throughout the later centuries. Thus in the middle of the thirteenth century Vācaspati's *Bhāmātī* was commented on by Amalānanda in his *Kalpa-taru*; and this *Kalpa-taru* was again commented on by Appaya Dīkṣita in the latter part of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth century, and by Lakṣmīnṛsiṃha in his *Ābhoga* towards the end of the seventeenth century or the beginning of the eighteenth¹.

Padmapāda's *Pañca-pādikā* was commented on by Prakāśātman in the thirteenth century in his *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, by Akhaṇḍānanda in the fourteenth century in his *Tattva-dīpana*, by Vidyāraṇya in the same century in his *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*, by Ānandapūrṇa and Nṛsiṃha in the sixteenth century and by Rāma Tīrtha in the seventeenth century². The line of Sureśvara also continued in the summary of his great *Vārttika* (called *Vārttika-sāra*) by Vidyāraṇya and its commentaries, and also in the commentaries on the *Samkṣepa-sātraka* from the sixteenth century onwards. Many independent works were also written by persons holding more or less the same kinds of views as Sarvajñātma Muni³. The philosophy of *dyṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* Vedānta, which was probably started by Maṇḍana, had doubtless some adherents too; but we do not meet with any notable writer on this line, except Prakāśānanda in the sixteenth century and his pupil Nānā Dīkṣita. The *Vedānta-kaumudī* is an important work which is

¹ Allāla Sūri, son of Trivikramācārya, wrote a commentary on the *Bhāmātī*, called the *Bhāmātī-tilaka*.

² Samyagbodhendra Saṃnyamin, pupil of Girvāṇendra (A.D. 1450), wrote a summary of the main contents of the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa* in six chapters (*varṇaka*), and this work is called by two names, *Advaita-bhūṣaṇa* and *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*. There are again two other commentaries on Prakāśātman's *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*: the *Riju-vivaraṇa* by Viṣṇubhaṭṭa, son of Janārdana Sarvajña and pupil of Svāmīndrapūrṇa, and the *Ṭikā-ratna* by Ānandapūrṇa. The *Riju-vivaraṇa* had again another commentary on it, called the *Trayyanta-bhāva-pradīpikā*, by Rāmānanda, pupil of Bhārati Tīrtha.

There are, however, two other commentaries on the *Pañca-pādikā* called *Pañca-pādikā-vyākhyā* (by an author whose name is not definitely known) and the *Prabandha-parīśodhinī* by Ātmasvarūpa, pupil of Nṛsiṃhasvarūpa. Dharmarāyadhvarindra also wrote a commentary on *Pañca-pādikā*, called the *Pañca-pādikā-ṭikā*.

³ Apart from the two published commentaries on the *Samkṣepa-sātraka*, there is another work called the *Samkṣepa-sātraka-sambandhokti* by Vedānanda, pupil of Vedādhyakṣa-bhagavat-pūjyapāda, in which the author tries to show the mutual relation of the verses of it as yielding a consistent meaning. Nṛsiṃhāśrama also wrote a commentary on the *Samkṣepa-sātraka*, called the *Tattva-bodhinī*. One Sarvajñātma Bhagavat wrote a small Vedāntic work, called *Pañca-prakriyā*; but it is not probable that he is the same as Sarvajñātma Muni.

referred to by Appaya Dikṣita in his *Siddhānta-leśa*. In this work the omniscience of Brahman consists in the fact that the pure consciousness as Brahman manifests all that exists either as actually transformed or as potentially transformed, as future, or as latently transformed, as the past in the *māyā*; and it is the Parameśvara who manifests Himself as the underlying consciousness (*sākṣin*) in individual persons, manifesting the *ajñāna* transformations in them, and also their potential *ajñāna* in dreamless sleep. Many other important Vedānta views of an original character are expressed in this book. This work of Ramādvaya has been found by the present writer in the Govt. Oriental MSS. Library, Madras, and a separate section has been devoted to its philosophy. From references in it to followers of Madhva it may be assumed that the *Vedānta-kaumudī* was written probably in the fourteenth century.

From the fourteenth century, however, we have a large number of Vedānta writers in all the succeeding centuries; but with the notable exception of Prakāśānanda, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaita-siddhi* (in which he tried to refute the objections of Vyāsa Tīrtha against the monistic Vedānta in the sixteenth century) and probably Vidyāraṇya's *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* and Dharmarājadhvarindra's *Paribhāṣā*, and its *Śikhāmaṇi* commentary by Rāmakṛṣṇa, there are few writers who can be said to reveal any great originality in Vedāntic interpretations. Most of the writers of this later period were good compilers, who revered all sorts of past Vedāntic ideas and collected them in well-arranged forms in their works. The influence of the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, however, is very strong in most of these writers, and the *Vivaraṇa* school of thought probably played the most important part in Vedāntic thought throughout all this period.

These Vedāntic writers grew up in particular circles inspired by particular teachers, whose works were carried on either in their own families or among their pupils; a few examples may make this clear. Thus Jagannāthāśrama was a great teacher of south India in the latter half of the fifteenth century; he had a pupil in Nṛsiṃhāśrama, one of the most reputed teachers of Vedānta in the early half of the sixteenth century. He was generally inspired on the one hand by the *Vivaraṇa* and on the other by Śrīharṣa and Citsukha and Sarvajñātma Muni: he wrote a number of Vedānta works, such as *Advaita-dīpikā* (his pupil, Nārāyaṇāśrama, wrote a commentary called *Advaita-dīpikā-vivaraṇa* on it), *Advaita-pañca-*

ratna, *Advaita-bodha-dīpikā*, *Advaita-ratna-koṣa*, *Tattva-bodhinī*, a commentary on the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, *Tattva-viveka* (which had two commentaries, *Tattva-viveka-dīpana* of Nārāyaṇāśrama and *Tattva-vivecana* of Agnihotra, pupil of Jñānendra Sarasvatī), *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa-prakāśikā*, *Bheda-dhikkāra*, *Advaita-ratna-vyākhyāna* (a commentary on Mallanārodiya's *Advaita-ratna*), and *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*. The fact that he could write commentaries both on Sarvajñātma Muni's work and also on the *Vivaraṇa*, and also write a *Bheda-dhikkāra* (a work on dialectic Vedānta on the lines of Śrīharṣa's dialectical work) shows the syncretistic tendencies of the age, in which the individual differences within the school were all accepted as different views of one Vedānta, and in which people were more interested in Vedānta as a whole and felt no hesitation in accepting all the Vedāntic ideas in their works. Nṛsiṃhāśrama had a pupil Dharmarājādharīndra, who wrote a *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, a commentary called *Tarka-cūḍāmaṇi* on the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa, and also on the *Nyaya-siddhānta-dīpa* of Śaśadhara Ācārya, and a commentary on the *Pañca-pādikā* of Padmapāda. His son and pupil Rāmakṛṣṇa Dikṣita wrote a commentary on the first, called *Vedānta-sikhāmaṇi*; and Amaradāsa, the pupil of Brahmapijñāna, wrote another commentary on this *Sikhāmaṇi* of Rāmakṛṣṇa¹. Rāmakṛṣṇa had also written a commentary on Rucidatta's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa*, called *Nyāya-sikhāmaṇi*, and a commentary on the *Vedānta-sāra*. Other authors, such as Kāśinātha Śāstrin and Brahmendra Sarasvatī, had also written separate works bearing the name *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* after the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* of Dharmarāja in the seventeenth century. Under the sphere of Nṛsiṃha's influence, but in the Śaiva and Mīmāṃsaka family of Raṅgarāja Adhvarin, was born Appaya Dikṣita, who became one of the most reputed teachers of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. His works have all been noted in the section devoted to him. He again was a teacher of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, who in addition to many works on grammar, law and ritual (*smṛti*) wrote two important works on Vedānta, called *Tattva-kaustubha* and *Vedānta-tattva-dīpana-vyākhyā*, the latter a commentary on the commentary, *Tattva-viveka-dīpana*, of Nārāyaṇāśrama (a pupil of Nṛsiṃhāśrama) on the latter's work, *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*. This Nārāyaṇāśrama had also written another commentary on

¹ Pettā Dikṣita, son of Nārāyaṇa Dikṣita, also wrote a commentary on the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, called *Vedānta-paribhāṣā-prakāśikā*.

Nṛsiṃhāśrama's *Bheda-dhikkāra*, called *Bheda-dhikkāra-satkriyā*; and later on in the eighteenth century another commentary was written on Nṛsiṃha's *Bheda-dhikkāra*, called *Advaita-candrikā*, by Narasiṃha Bhaṭṭa, pupil of Rāmahadrāśrama and Nāgeśvara in the eighteenth century. Bhaṭṭojī Dikṣita's son Bhānujī Dikṣita was a commentator on the *Amara-koṣa* (*Vyākhyā-sudhā* or *Subodhinī*). Bhaṭṭojī was, however, a pupil not only of Appaya, but also of Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni. Bhaṭṭojī's younger brother and pupil, Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa, wrote two works, the *Advaita-cintāmaṇi* and the *Advaita-śāstra-sāroddhāra*, more or less on the same lines, containing a refutation of Vaiśeṣika categories, a determination of the nature of the self, a determination of the nature of *aṅgāna* and the nature of the doctrine of reflection, proofs of the falsity of world-appearance and an exposition of the nature of Brahman and how Brahmanhood is to be attained. His son Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa was mainly a grammarian, who wrote also on Vaiśeṣika. Again Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who was a pupil of Viśveśvara Sarasvatī (pupil of Sarvajña Viśveśa and pupil's pupil of Govinda Sarasvatī), lived in the early half of the sixteenth century and was probably under the influence of Nṛsiṃhāśrama, who is reputed to have defeated Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's teacher, Mādhava Sarasvatī. Madhusūdana had at least three pupils, Puruṣottama, who wrote on Madhusūdana's commentary the *Siddhānta-tattva-bindu* a commentary called *Siddhānta-tattva-bindu-ṭīkā*¹; the others were Bālabhadra and Śeṣagovinda (the latter of whom wrote a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, called *Sarva-siddhānta-rahasya-ṭīkā*). Again Sadānanda, the author of the *Vedānta-sāra*, one of the most popular and well-read syncretistic works on Vedānta, was a contemporary of Nṛsiṃhāśrama; Nṛsiṃha Sarasvatī wrote in 1588 a commentary thereon, called *Subodhinī*. Devendra, the author of the *Svānubhūti-prakāśa*, was also a contemporary of Nṛsiṃhāśrama. It has already been pointed out that Prakāśānanda was probably a contemporary of Nṛsiṃhāśrama, though he does not seem to have been under his influence. This shows how some of the foremost Vedānta writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries grew up together in a Vedāntic circle, many of whom were directly or indirectly under the influence of Nṛsiṃhāśrama and Appaya Dikṣita.

¹ Brahmānanda wrote on the *Siddhānta-bindu* another commentary, called *Siddhānta-bindu-ṭīkā*.

Passing to another circle of writers, we see that Bhāskara Dīkṣita, who lived in the latter half of the seventeenth century, wrote a commentary, *Ratna-tūlikā*, on the *Siddhānta-siddhāñjana* of his teacher Kṛṣṇānanda. The *Siddhānta-siddhāñjana* is an excellent syncretistic work on Vedānta, which contains most of the important Vedānta doctrines regarding the difference of *dharma-vicāra* and *brahma-vicāra*, the relation of Mīmāṃsā theories of commands, and the need of Brahma-knowledge; it introduces many Mīmāṃsā subjects and treats of their relations to many relevant Vedānta topics. It also introduces elaborate discussions on the nature of knowledge and ignorance. It seems, however, to be largely free from the influence of the *Vivaraṇa*, and it does not enter into theories of perception or the nature of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and its *ṛtti*. It is thus very different from most of the works produced in the sixteenth century in the circles of Nṛsiṃha or Appaya. Kṛṣṇānanda lived probably in the middle of the seventeenth century. He had for teacher Rāmabhadraṇanda; and Rāmabhadraṇanda was taught by Svayaṃprakāśānanda, the author of the *Vedānta-naya-bhūṣaṇa*, a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* on the lines of Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmati*. This Svayaṃprakāśa must be distinguished from the other Svayaṃprakāśa, probably of the same century, who was a pupil of Kaivalyānanda Yogīndra and the author of the *Rasābhivyāñjikā*, a commentary of *Advaita-makaranda* of Lakṣmīdhara Kavi. Rāmabhadraṇanda had as his teacher Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, the author of the *Vedānta-siddhānta-candrikā*, on which a commentary was written by Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī (A.D. 1826), pupil of Rāmacandra Sarasvatī and pupil's pupil of Sarvajña Sarasvatī, and author of the *Sāṃvājya-siddhi* with its commentary, the *Kaivalya-kalpadruma*. Prakāśānanda was a pupil of Advaitānanda, author of the *Brahma-vidyābharaṇa*, a commentary on Śāṅkara's *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*—Advaitānanda was a disciple of Rāmatīrtha, author of the *Anvaya-prakāśikā* (a commentary on the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* of Sarvajñātma Muni) and a disciple of Kṛṣṇatīrtha, a contemporary of Jagannāthāśrama, the teacher of Nṛsiṃhāśrama. Rāmatīrtha's *Anvaya-prakāśikā* shows an acquaintance with Madhusūdana's *Advaita-siddhi*; and he may thus be considered to have lived in the middle of the seventeenth century. Svayaṃprakāśānanda, again, had for pupil Mahādevānanda, or Vedāntin Mahādeva, the author of the *Advaita-cintā-kaustubha* or *Tattvānusandhāna*. It seems very clear that these writers of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth

centuries flourished in a different circle of Vedāntic ideas, where the views of Vācaspati, Sureśvara and Sarvajñātma Muni had greater influence than the authors of the *Vivaraṇa* school of Vedānta. Another important syncretistic Vedānta writer is Sadānanda Kāśmīraka, author of the *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, who lived in the early part of the eighteenth century. The *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* is an excellent summary of all the most important Vedānta doctrines, written in an easy style and explaining the chief features of the Vedāntic doctrines in the different schools of Advaita teachers. Narahari's *Bodha-sāra* may be mentioned as one of the important products of the late eighteenth century¹.

The sort of relationship of teachers and students in particular circles that has been pointed out holds good of the earlier authors also, though it is difficult to trace them as well as can be done in the later years, since many of the earlier books are now missing and the footprints of older traditions are becoming more and more faint. Thus it may be pointed out that Vidyāranya was a contemporary of Amalānanda in the fourteenth century, as both of them

¹ A number of other important Vedānta works, written mostly during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, may also be mentioned. Thus Lokanātha, son of Sarvajñanārāyaṇa and grandson of Nṛsiṃhāśrama, wrote a metrical work in three chapters refuting the views of the dualists, called *Advaita-muktā-sāra* with a commentary on it called *Kānti*; Brahmānanda Sarasvatī wrote the *Advaita-siddhānta-vidyotana*; Gopālānanda Sarasvatī, pupil of Yogānanda, wrote the *Akhaṇḍātma-prakāśikā*; Harihara Paramahansa, pupil of Śivarāma, pupil of Viśveśvarāśrama, wrote the *Anubhava-vilāsa*, and early in the nineteenth century Sāmin, a pupil of Brahmānanda, wrote a big work in twelve chapters, called *Brahmānanda-vilāsa*. In this connection it may not be out of place to mention the names of some important works of Vedānta dialectics in refutation of other systems of philosophical views more or less on the lines of those dialectical writings which have been noticed in the present volume. Thus Ānandapūṇa (A.D. 1600), who commented on Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, wrote the *Nyāya-candrikā* in four chapters, refuting the views of the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika; Ānandānubhava, pupil of Nārāyaṇa Jyotiṣa, who lived probably in the same century, wrote a similar work, called *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya*; Jñānaghana, who probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote an elaborate dialectical work in thirty-three chapters (*prakaraṇa*), called *Tattva-śuddhi*; Śrīnivāsa Yajvan, who probably lived in the sixteenth century, wrote the *Vādāvali* in twenty-six chapters in refutation of Viśiṣṭadvaita and Dvaita views; Bhavanīsaṅkara also wrote a similar dialectical work, called *Siddhānta-dīpikā*. As examples of semi-popular Vedānta works of a syncretistic type, such works as the *Tattva-bodha* of Vāsudevendra, the *Guna-traya-viveka* of Svayamprakāśa Yogindra, the *Jagan-mithyātva-dīpikā* of Rāmendra Yogin, the *Ānanda-dīpa* of Śivananda Yati (which had a commentary called *Ānanda-dīpa-ṭīkā* by Rāmanātha), the *Svātma-yoga-pradīpa* by Yogīśvara (which had a commentary by Amaraṇanda) and the *Vedānta-hṛdaya* (on the lines of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* and *Gauḍāpīda*) by Varada Paṇḍita may be mentioned. This latter work was probably later than Prakāśananda's *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali*, which followed the same line of thought.

were pupils of Śaṅkarānanda and Anubhavānanda respectively; these in turn were both pupils of Ānandātman. Śaṅkarānanda was the author of the *Gītā-tātparya-bodhinī* and of a number of commentaries on the various Upaniṣads, and also of a summary of the Upaniṣads, called *Upaniṣad-ratna*. Amalānanda, however, had as teacher not only Anubhavānanda, but also Sukhaprakāśa Muni, who again was a disciple of Citsukha, himself a disciple of Gauḍeśvara Ācārya (called also Jñānottama).

Vedānta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness.

One of the most important points of Śaṅkara's criticism of Buddhism is directed against its denial of a permanent soul which could unite the different psychological constituents or could behave as the enjoyer of experiences and the controller of all thoughts and actions.

The Buddhists argue that for the production of sense-cognition, as the awareness of a colour or sound, what is required in addition to the sense-data of colours, etc. is the corresponding sense-faculties, while the existence of a soul cannot be deemed indispensable for the purpose¹. Vasubandhu argues that what is experienced is the sense-data and the psychological elements in groups called *skandhas*. What one calls self (*ātman*) cannot be anything more than a mere apparent cognitional existence (*prajñapti-sat*) of what in reality is but a conglomeration of psychological elements. Had the apparent self been something as different from the psychological elements as colours are from sounds, it would then be regarded as an individual (*pudgala*); but, if its difference from these psychological elements be of the same nature as the difference of the constituents of milk from the appearance of milk, then the self could be admitted only to have a cognitional existence (*prajñapti-sat*)². The self has, in fact, only a cognitional appearance of separateness from the psychological elements; just as, though

¹ The arguments here followed are those of Vasubandhu, as found in his *Abhidharma-kośa*, and are based on Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of the appendix to ch. viii of that work, called the *Pudgala-viniścaya*, and Yaśomitra's commentary in manuscript from Nepal, borrowed from Viśvabhāratī, Santiniketan, Bengal.

² *yadi yathā rūpādīḥ śabdāder bhāvāntaram abhipreyate pudgala iti abhyupagato bhavati bhūma-lakṣaṇam hi rūpam śabdād ityādi kṣīrādīvat samudāyaś cet prajñaptitah. Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā*, Viśvabhāratī MS. p. 337.

milk appears to have a separate existence from the proper combination of its constituent elements, yet it is in reality nothing more than a definite kind of combination of its constituent elements, so the self is nothing more than a certain conglomeration of the psychological elements (*skandha*), though it may appear to have a separate and independent existence. The Vātsīputriyas, however, think that the individual is something different from the *skandhas* or psychological entities, as its nature is different from the nature of them. The Vātsīputriyas deny the existence of a permanent soul, but believe in momentary individuals (*pudgala*) as a category separate and distinct from the *skandhas*. Just as fire is something different from the fuel that conditioned it, so the name "individual" (*pudgala*) is given to something conditioned by the *skandhas* at a given moment in a personal life¹. Vasubandhu, however, argues against the acceptance of such an individual and says that there is no meaning in accepting such an individual. Rain and sun have no effects on mere vacuous space, they are of use only to the skin; if the individual is, like the skin, a determiner of the value of experiences, then it must be accepted as external; if it is like vacuous space, then no purpose is fulfilled by accepting it². The Vātsīputriyas, however, thought that, just as the fuel conditioned the fire, so the personal elements conditioned the individual. By this conditioning the Vātsīputriyas meant that the personal elements were some sort of a coexisting support³. What is meant by saying that the *pudgala* is conditioned by the personal elements is that, when the *skandhas* or psychological elements are present, the *pudgala* is also present there⁴. But Vasubandhu urges that a mere conditioning of this kind is not sufficient to establish the cognitional existence of an individual; for even colour is conditioned by the visual sense, light and attention in such a way that, these being present, there is the perception of light; but can anybody on that ground consider the

¹ Stcherbatsky's translation of the *Pudgala-viniścaya*, *Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie*, p. 830.

The exact text of Vasubandhu, as translated from Tibetan in a note, runs thus: *grhīta-pratyutpanmābhyantara-skandham upādāya pudgala-prajñaptiḥ*. *Ibid.* p. 953.

² *Vātsīputrīyānām tīrthika-dṛṣṭiḥ prasajyate nīsprayojanatvaṃ ca varṣāta-pābhyaṃ kiṃ vyomnaś carmaṇy-asti tayoh phalam carmoṇamaś cet sa nityaḥ khatulyaś ced asatphalaḥ*.

MS. of Yaśomitra's commentary, p. 338.

³ *āśraya-bhūtaḥ saha-bhūtaś ca*. *Ibid.*

⁴ *rūpaśyāpi prajñaptir vaktavyā cakṣur-ādiṣu satsu tasyopālambhāt, tāni cakṣur-ādīny upādāya rūpam prajñāpyate*. *Ibid.*

existence of colour to be a cognitional one? And would cognitional entities deserve to be enumerated as separate categories? Again it may be asked, if such an individual exists, how is it experienced? For, if it be experienced by any of the senses, it must be a sense-datum: for the senses can grasp only their appropriate sense-data, and the individual is no sense-datum. Therefore, just as milk is nothing but the collected sense-data of colour, taste, etc., so also the so-called individual is nothing more than the conglomerated psychological elements¹. The Vātsīputriyas argue that, since the psychological elements, the sense-data, etc., are the causes of our experience of the individual, the individual cannot be regarded as being identical with these causal elements which are responsible for their experience; if it were so, then even light, eye, attention, etc., which are causes of the experience of the sense-data, would have to be regarded as being identical in nature with the individual². But it is not so maintained; the sense-datum of sounds and colours is always regarded as being different from the individual, and one always distinguishes an individual from a sense-datum and says "this is sound," "this is colour" and "this is individual"³. But the individual is not felt to be as distinct from the psychological elements as colour is from sound. The principle of difference or distinctness consists in nothing but a difference of moments; a colour is different from a sound because it is experienced at a different moment, while the psychological elements and the individual are not experienced at different moments⁴. But it is argued in reply that, as the sense-data and the individual are neither different nor identical (*ratio essendi*), so their cognition also is neither different nor identical in experience (*ratio cognoscendi*)⁵. But Vasubandhu says that, if such a view is taken in this case, then it might as well be taken in all cases wherever there is any conglomeration⁶. Moreover, the separate senses are all limited to their special fields, and the mind which acts with them is also limited

¹ *yathā rūpādīnyeva samastāni samuditāni kṣīram iti udakam iti vā prajñāpyate, tathā skandhāś ca samastā pudgalaḥ pudgalaḥ prajñāpyate, iti siddham.* MS. of Yaśo-mitra's commentary, p. 339 A.

² *yathā rūpam pudgalopalabdheḥ kāraṇam bhavati sa ca tebhyo 'nyo na vaktavyaḥ āloka-cakṣur-manaskārā api rūpopalabdheḥ kāraṇam bhavati tad api tad-abhinna-svabhāvaḥ pudgalaḥ prāpnoti.* *Ibid.* ³ *Ibid.* p. 339 B.

⁴ *svalakṣaṇād api kṣaṇāntaram anyad ity udāhāryam.* *Ibid.*

⁵ *yathā rūpa-pudgalayor anyānanyatvam avaktavyam evaṃ tadupalabdhayor api anyānanyatvam avaktavyam.* *Ibid.*

⁶ *yo 'yam siddhāntaḥ pudgala eva vaktavyaḥ so 'yam bhidyate saṃskṛtam api avaktavyam iti kṛtvā.* *Ibid.*

to the data supplied by them; there is, therefore, no way in which the so-called individual can be experienced. In the Ajita sermon Buddha is supposed to say: "A visual consciousness depends upon the organ of sight and a visible object. When these three (object, sense organ and consciousness) combine, a sensation is produced. It is accompanied by a feeling, a representation and a volition. Only so much is meant, when we are speaking of a human being. To these (five sets of elements) different names are given, such as a sentient being, a man, Manu's progeny, a son of Manu, a child, an individual, a life, a soul. If with respect to them the expression is used 'he sees the object with his own eyes,' it is false imputation (there being in reality nobody possessing eyes of his own). In common life such expressions with respect to them are current as 'that is the name of this venerable man, he belongs to such a caste and such a family, he eats such food, this pleases him, he has reached such an age, he has lived so many years, he has died at such an age.' These O brethren! accordingly are mere words, mere conventional designations.

'Expressions are they, (but not truth)!
Real elements have no duration:
Vitality makes them combine
In mutually dependent apparitions¹.'

The Vātsīputrīyas however refer to the *Bhāra-hāra-sūtra*, in which Buddha is supposed to say: "O brethren, I shall explain unto you the burden (of life), and moreover I shall explain the taking up of the burden, the laying aside of it and who the carrier is.... What is the burden? All the five aggregates of elements—the substrates of personal life. What is meant by the taking up of the burden? The force of craving for a continuous life, accompanied by passionate desires, the rejoicing at many an object. What is the laying aside of the burden? It is the wholesale rejection of this craving for a continuation of life, accompanied as it is by passionate desires and rejoicings at many an object, the getting rid of it in every circumstance, its extinction, its end, its suppression, an aversion to it, its restraint, its disappearance. Who is the carrier? We must answer: it is the individual, i.e. 'this venerable man having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure at such things, of such an age, who after a

¹ Stcherbatsky's translation in *Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie*.

life of such length will pass away having reached such an age¹.” But Vasubandhu points out that the carrier of the burden is not to be supposed to be some eternal soul or real individual. It is the momentary group of elements of the preceding moment that is designated as the burden, and the immediately succeeding one the carrier of the burden (*bhāra-hāra*)².

The Vātsīputrīyas again argue that activity implies an active agent, and, since knowing is an action, it also implies the knower who knows, just as the walking of Devadatta implies a Devadatta who walks. But Vasubandhu's reply to such a contention is that there is nowhere such a unity. There is no individual like Devadatta: what we call Devadatta is but a conglomeration of elements. “The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved. Similarly consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of conscious moments. When it changes its place (i.e. appears in co-ordination with another objective element), we say that it apprehends that object. And in the same way we speak about the existence of material elements. We say matter ‘is produced,’ ‘it exists’; but there is no difference between existence and the element which does exist. The same applies to consciousness (there is nothing that cognizes, apart from the evanescent flashing of consciousness itself)³.”

It is easy to see that the analysis of consciousness offered by the Vedānta philosophy of the Śāṅkara school is entirely different from this. The Vedānta holds that the fact of consciousness is entirely different from everything else. So long as the assemblage of the physical or physiological conditions antecedent to the rise of any cognition, as for instance, the presence of illumination, sense-object contact, etc., is being prepared, there is no knowledge, and it is only at a particular moment that the cognition of an object arises. This cognition is in its nature so much different from each and all the elements constituting the so-called assemblage of conditions, that it cannot in any sense be regarded as the product of

¹ Stcherbatsky's translation.

² Yaśomitra points out that there is no carrier of the burden different from the collection of the skandhas—*bhārādānavan na skandhebhyo 'rthāntara-bhūtaḥ pudgala ity arthaḥ. Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā*, Viśvabhāratī MS.

³ Stcherbatsky's translation in *Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie*, pp. 938-939.

any collocation of conditions. Consciousness thus, not being a product of anything and not being further analysable into any constituents, cannot also be regarded as a momentary flashing. Uncaused and unproduced, it is eternal, infinite and unlimited. The main point in which consciousness differs from everything else is the fact of its self-revelation. There is no complexity in consciousness. It is extremely simple, and its only essence or characteristic is pure self-revelation. The so-called momentary flashing of consciousness is not due to the fact that it is momentary, that it rises into being and is then destroyed the next moment, but to the fact that the objects that are revealed by it are reflected through it from time to time. But the consciousness is always steady and unchangeable in itself. The immediacy (*aparokṣatva*) of this consciousness is proved by the fact that, though everything else is manifested by coming in touch with it, it itself is never expressed, indicated or manifested by inference or by any other process, but is always self-manifested and self-revealed. All objects become directly revealed to us as soon as they come in touch with it. Consciousness (*saṃvid*) is one. It is neither identical with its objects nor on the same plane with them as a constituent element in a collocation of them and consciousness. The objects of consciousness or all that is manifested in consciousness come in touch with consciousness and themselves appear as consciousness. This appearance is such that, when they come in touch with consciousness, they themselves flash forth as consciousness, though that operation is nothing but a false appearance of the non-conscious objects and mental states in the light of consciousness, as being identical with it. But the intrinsic difference between consciousness and its objects is that the former is universal (*pratyak*) and constant (*anuvṛtta*), while the latter are particular (*apratyak*) and alternating (*vyāvṛtta*). The awarenences of a book, a table, etc. appear to be different not because these are different flashings of knowledge, but because of the changing association of consciousness with these objects. The objects do not come into being with the flashings of their awareness, but they have their separate existence and spheres of operation¹. Consciousness is one and unchanging; it is only when the objects get associated with it that

¹ *tattva-darśi tu nityam advītiyaṃ vijñānaṃ viśayaś ca tatrādhyastāḥ prthag-
artha-kriyā-samarthāś teṣāṃ cābādhitāṃ sthāyitvaṃ astīti vadati. Vivaraṇa-
prameya-saṃgraha*, p. 74, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1893.

they appear in consciousness and as identical with it in such a way that the flashing of an object in consciousness appears as the flashing of the consciousness itself. It is through an illusion that the object of consciousness and consciousness appear to be welded together into such an integrated whole, that their mutual difference escapes our notice, and that the object of consciousness, which is only like an extraneous colour applied to consciousness, does not appear different or extraneous to it, but as a specific mode of the consciousness itself. Thus what appear as but different awarenesses, as book-cognition, table-cognition, are not in reality different awarenesses, but one unchangeable consciousness successively associated with ever-changing objects which falsely appear to be integrated with it and give rise to the appearance that qualitatively different kinds of consciousness are flashing forth from moment to moment. Consciousness cannot be regarded as momentary. For, had it been so, it would have appeared different at every different moment. If it is urged that, though different consciousnesses are arising at each different moment, yet on account of extreme similarity this is not noticed; then it may be replied that, if there is difference between the two consciousnesses of two successive moments, then such difference must be grasped either by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness. In the first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case, if another awareness be required to comprehend their difference and that requires another and so on, there would be a vicious infinite. If the difference be itself said to be identical with the nature of the consciousness (*saṃvit-svarūpa-bhūto bhedaḥ*), and if there is nothing to apprehend this difference, then the non-appearance of the difference implies the non-appearance of the consciousness itself; for by hypothesis the difference has been held to be identical with the consciousness itself. The non-appearance of difference, implying the non-appearance of consciousness, would mean utter blindness. The difference between the awareness of one moment and another cannot thus either be logically proved, or realized in experience, which always testifies to the unity of awareness through all moments of its appearance. It may be held that the appearance of unity is erroneous, and that, as such, it

presumes that the awarenesses are similar; for without such a similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of unity. But, unless the difference of the awarenesses and their similarity be previously proved, there is nothing which can even suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous¹. It cannot be urged that, if the existence of difference and similarity between the awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false, then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true; for the appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience. Its evidence can be challenged only if the existence of difference between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved. The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the awarenesses (*pratyabhijñā*), which is self-evident.

It has also been pointed out that the Buddhists give a different analysis of the fact of recognition. They hold that perception reveals the existence of things at the moment of perception, whereas recognition involves the supposition of their existence through a period of past time, and this cannot be apprehended by perception, which is limited to the present moment only. If it is suggested that recognition is due to present perception as associated with the impressions (*saṃskāra*) of previous experience, then such a recognition of identity would not prove the identity of the self as "I am he"—for in the self-luminous self there cannot be any impressions. The mere consciousness as the flash cannot prove any identity; for that is limited to the present moment and cannot refer to past experience and unite it with the experience of the present moment. The Buddhists on their side deny the existence of recognition as the perception of identity, and think that it is in reality not one but two concepts—"I" and "that"—and not a separate experience of the identity of the self as persisting through time. To this the Vedāntic reply is that, though there cannot be any impressions in the self as pure consciousness, yet the self as associated with the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) can well have impressions (*saṃskāra*), and so recognition is possible². But it may be objected that the complex of the self and mind would then be playing the double rôle of knower and the known; for it is the mind containing the impressions and the self that together

¹ *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*, p. 76.

² *kevale cidātmani janya-jñāna-tat-saṃskārayor asambhave 'py antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭe tat-sambhavād ukta-pratyabhijñā kim na syāt. Ibid.* p. 76.

play the part of the recognizer, and it is exactly those impressions together with the self that form the content of recognition also—and hence in this view the agent and the object have to be regarded as one. But in reply to this Vidyāraṇya Muni urges that all systems of philosophy infer the existence of soul as different from the body; and, as such an inference is made by the self, the self is thus both the agent and the object of such inferences. Vidyāraṇya says that it may further be urged that the recognizer is constituted of the self in association with the mind, whereas the recognized entity is constituted of the self as qualified by past and present time¹. Thus the recognition of self-identity does not strictly involve the fact of the oneness of the agent and its object. If it is urged that, since recognition of identity of self involves two concepts, it also involves two moments, then the assertion that all knowledge is momentary also involves two concepts, for momentariness cannot be regarded as being identical with knowledge. The complexity of a concept does not mean that it is not one but two different concepts occurring at two different moments. If such a maxim is accepted, then the theory that all knowledge is momentary cannot be admitted as one concept, but two concepts occurring at two moments; and hence momentariness cannot be ascribed to knowledge, as is done by the Buddhists. Nor can it be supposed, in accordance with the Prabhākara view, that the existence of the permanent “this self” is admitted merely on the strength of the recognizing notion of “self-identity”; for the self which abides through the past and exists in the present cannot be said to depend on a momentary concept of recognition of self-identity. The notion of self-identity is only a momentary notion, which lasts only at the present time; and hence the real and abiding self cannot owe its reality or existence merely to a psychological notion of the moment.

Again, if it is argued that memory, such as “I had an awareness of a book,” shows that the self was existing at the past time when the book was perceived, it may be replied that such memory and previous experience may prove the past existence of the self, but it cannot prove that the self that was existing in the past is identical with the self that is now experiencing. The mere existence of self at two moments of time does not prove that the self had persisted through the intervening times. Two notions of

¹ *antahkaraṇa-viśiṣṭatayaivātmanaḥ pratyabhijñāṭṛtvaṃ pūrvāpara-kāla-viśiṣṭatayā ca pratyabhijñēyatvam. Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha, p. 77.*

two different times cannot serve to explain the idea of recognition, which presupposes the notion of persistence. If it were held that the two notions produce the notion of self-persistence through the notion of recognition, then that would mean that the Buddhist admits that one can recognize himself as "I am he." It cannot be said that, since the self itself cannot be perceived, there is no possibility of the perception of the identity of the self through recognition; for, when one remembers "I had an experience," that very remembrance proves that the self was perceived. Though at the time when one remembers it the self at the time of such memory is felt as the perceiver and not as the object of that self-perception, yet at the time of the previous experience which is now being remembered the self must have been itself the object of the perception. If it is argued that it is only the past awareness that is the object of memory and this awareness, when remembered, expresses the self as its cognizer, then to this it may be replied that since at the time of remembering there is no longer the past awareness, the cognizer on whom this awareness had to rest itself is also absent. It is only when an awareness reveals itself that it also reveals the cognizer on whom it rests; but, if an awareness is remembered, then the awareness which is remembered is only made an object of present awareness which is self-revealed. But the past awareness which is supposed to be remembered is past and lost and, as such, it neither requires a cognizer on which it has to rest nor actually reveals such a cognizer. It is only the self-revealed cognition that also immediately reveals the cognizer with its own revelation. But, when a cognition is mediated through memory, its cognizer is not manifested with its remembrance¹. So the self which experienced an awareness in the past can be referred to only through the mediation of memory. So, when the Prabhākaras hold that the existence of the self is realized through such a complex notion as "I am he," it has to be admitted that it is only through the process of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) that the persistence of the self is established. The main point that Vidyāranya Muni urges in his *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* is that the fact of recognition or the experience of self-identity cannot be explained by any assumption of two separate concepts, such as the memory of a past cognition or cognizer and the present awareness.

¹ *svayaṃprakāśamānaṃ hi saṃvedanam āśrayaṃ sādhayati na tu smṛti-viśayatayā para-prakāśyam. Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha, p. 78.*

We all feel that our selves are persisting through time and that I who experienced pleasure yesterday and I who am experiencing new pleasures to-day are identical; and the only theory by which this notion of self-persistence or self-identity can be explained is by supposing that the self exists and persists through time. The Buddhist attempts at explaining this notion of self-identity by the supposition of the operation of two separate concepts are wholly inadequate, as has already been shown. The perception of self-identity can therefore be explained only on the basis of a permanently existing self.

Again, the existence of self is not to be argued merely through the inference that cognition, will and feeling presuppose some entity to which they belong and that it is this entity that is called self; for, if that were the case, then no one would be able to distinguish his own self from that of others. For, if the self is only an entity which has to be presupposed as the possessor of cognition, will, etc., then how does one recognize one's own cognition of things as differing from that of others? What is it that distinguishes my experience from that of others? My self must be immediately perceived by me in order that I may relate any experience to myself. So the self must be admitted as being self-manifested in all experience; without admitting the self to be self-luminous in all experience the difference between an experience as being my own and as belonging to others could not be explained. It may be objected by some that the self is not self-luminous by itself, but only because, in self-consciousness, the self is an object of the cognizing operation (*saṃvit-karma*). But this is hardly valid; for the self is not only cognized as an object of self-consciousness, but also in itself in all cognitional operations. The self cannot be also regarded as being manifested by ideas or percepts. It is not true that the cognition of the self occurs after the cognition of the book or at any different time from it. For it is true that the cognition of the self and that of the book take place at the same point of time; for the same awareness cannot comprehend two different kinds of objects at the same time. If this was done at different points of time, then that would not explain our experience—"I have known this." For such a notion implies a relation between the knower and the known; and, if the knower and the known were grasped in knowledge at two different points of time, there is nothing which could unite them together in the

same act of knowledge. It is also wrong to maintain that the self is manifested only as the upholder of ideas; for the self is manifested in the knowing operation itself. So, since the self cannot be regarded as being either the upholder or cognizer of ideas or their object, there is but one way in which it can be considered as self-manifesting or self-revealing (*sva-prakāśa*). The immediacy of the self is thus its self-revealing and self-manifesting nature. The existence of self is thus proved by the self-luminous nature of the self. The self is the cognizer of the objects only in the sense that under certain conditions of the operation of the mind there is the mind-object contact through a particular sense, and, as the result thereof, these objects appear in consciousness by a strange illusion; so also ideas of the mind, concepts, volitions and emotions appear in consciousness and themselves appear as conscious states, as if consciousness was their natural and normal character, though in reality they are only illusorily imposed upon the consciousness—the self-luminous self.

Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭācakācārya, from whom Vidyāraṇya often borrows his arguments, says that the self-luminosity of the self has to be admitted, because it cannot be determined as being manifested by anything else. The self cannot be regarded as being perceived by a mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*); for that would involve the supposition that the self is the object of its own operation; for cognition is at any rate a function of the self. The functions of cognition belonging to the self cannot affect the self itself¹. The Vedānta has also to fight against the Prabhākara view which regards cognition as manifesting the object and the self along with itself, as against its own view that it is the self which is identical with knowledge and which is self-manifesting. Ānandabodha thus objects to the Prabhākara view, that it is the object-cognition which expresses both the self and the not-self, and holds that the self cannot be regarded as an object of awareness. Ānandabodha points out that it may be enunciated as a universal proposition that what is manifested by cognition must necessarily be an object of cognition, and that therefore, if the self is not an object of cognition, it is not manifested by cognition². Therefore the self or the cognizer is not manifested by cognition; for, like

¹ *tathā sati svādhāra-vijñāna-vṛtti-vyāpyatvād ātmanah karmatve svātmani vṛtti-virodhād iti brūmah. Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 131.

² *Ibid.* pp. 134-135.

cognition, it is self-manifested and immediate without being an object of cognition¹.

The self-luminosity of cognition is argued by Ānandabodha. He says that, if it is held that cognition does not manifest itself, though it manifests its objects, it may be replied that, if it were so, then at the time when an object is cognized the cognizer would have doubted if he had any cognition at the time or not. If anyone is asked whether he has seen a certain person or not, he is sure about his own knowledge that he has seen him and never doubts it. It is therefore certain that, when an object is revealed by any cognition, the cognition is itself revealed as well. If it is argued that such a cognition is revealed by some other cognition, then it might require some other cognition and that another and so on *ad infinitum*; and thus there is a vicious infinite. Nor can it be held that there is some other mental cognition (occurring either simultaneously with the awareness of the object or at a later moment) by which the awareness of the awareness of the object is further cognized. For from the same mind-contact there cannot be two different awarenesses of the type discussed. If at a later moment, then, there is mind-activity, cessation of one mind-contact, and again another mind-activity and the rise of another mind-contact, that would imply many intervening moments, and thus the cognition which is supposed to cognize an awareness of an object would take place at a much later moment, when the awareness which it has to reveal is already passed. It has therefore to be admitted that cognition is itself self-luminous and that, while manifesting other objects, it manifests itself also. The objection raised is that the self or the cognition cannot affect itself by its own functioning (*vytti*); the reply is that cognition is like light and has no intervening operation by which it affects itself or its objects. Just as light removes darkness, helps the operation of the eye and illuminates the object and manifests itself all in one moment without any intervening operation of any other light, so cognition also in one flash manifests itself and its objects, and there is no functioning of it by which it has to affect itself. This cognition cannot be described as being mere momentary flashes, on the ground that, when there is the blue awareness, there is not the yellow awareness; for apart from the blue awareness, the

¹ *saṃveditā na saṃvid-adhāna-prakāśaḥ saṃvit-karmatām antareṇa aparokṣatvāt saṃvedanavat. Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 135. This argument is borrowed verbatim by Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*, p. 85.

yellow awareness or the white awareness there is also the natural basic awareness or consciousness, which cannot be denied. It would be wrong to say that there are only the particular awarenesses which appear and vanish from moment to moment; for, had there been only a series of particular awarenesses, then there would be nothing by which their differences could be realized. Each awareness in the series would be of a particular and definite character, and, as it passed away, would give place to another, and that again to another, so that there would be no way of distinguishing one awareness from another; for according to the theory under discussion there is no consciousness except the passing awarenesses, and thus there would be no way by which their differences could be noticed; for, even though the object of awareness, such as blue and yellow, differed amongst themselves, that would fail to explain how the difference of a blue awareness and a yellow awareness could be apprehended. So the best would be to admit the self to be of the nature of pure consciousness.

It will appear from the above discussion that the Vedānta had to refute three opponents in establishing its doctrine that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness and that it is permanent and not momentary. The first opponent was the Buddhist, who believed neither in the existence of the self nor in the nature of any pure permanent consciousness. The Buddhist objection that there was no permanent self could be well warded off by the Vedānta by appealing to the verdict of our notion of self-identity—which could not be explained on the Buddhist method by the supposition of two separate notions of a past “that self” and the present “I am.” Nor can consciousness be regarded as being nothing more than a series of passing ideas or particular awarenesses; for on such a theory it would be impossible to explain how we can react upon our mental states and note their differences. Consciousness has thus to be admitted as permanent. Against the second opponent, the Naiyāyika, the Vedānta urges that the self is not the inferred object to which awarenesses, volitions or feelings belong, but is directly and immediately intuited. For, had it not been so, how could one distinguish his own experiences as his own and as different from those of others? The internalness of my own experiences shows that they are directly intuited as my own, and not merely supposed as belonging to some self who was the possessor of his experiences. For inference cannot reveal the

internalness of any cognition or feeling. Against the third opponent, the Mīmāṃsaka, the Vedānta urges that the self-revealing character belongs to the self which is identical with thought—as against the Mīmāṃsā view, that thought as a self-revealing entity revealed the self and the objects as different from it. The identity of the self and thought and the self-revealing character of it are also urged; and it is shown by a variety of dialectical reasoning that such a supposition is the only reasonable alternative that is left to us.

This self as pure consciousness is absolutely impersonal, unlimited and infinite. In order to make it possible that this one self should appear as many individuals and as God, it is supposed that it manifests itself differently through the veil of *māyā*. Thus, according to the *Siddhānta-leśa*, it is said in the *Prakāṭārthavivaraṇa* that, when this pure consciousness is reflected through the beginningless, indescribable *māyā*, it is called Īśvara or God. But, when it is reflected through the limited parts of *māyā* containing powers of veiling and of diverse creation (called *avidyā*), there are the manifestations of individual souls or *jīvas*. It is again said in the *Tattva-viveka* of Nṛsiṃhāśrama that, when this pure consciousness is reflected through the pure *sattva* qualities, as dominating over other impure parts of *prakṛti*, there is the manifestation of God. Whereas, when the pure consciousness is reflected through the impure parts of *rajas* and *tamas*, as dominating over the *sattva* part of *prakṛti* (called also *avidyā*), there are the manifestations of the individual selves or *jīvas*. The same *prakṛti* in its two aspects, as predominating in *sattva* and as predominating in *rajas* and *tamas*, goes by the name of *māyā* and *avidyā* and forms the conditioning factors (*upādhi*) of the pure consciousness, which on account of the different characters of the conditioning factors of *māyā* and *avidyā* appear as the omniscient God and the ignorant individual souls. Sarvajñātma Muni thinks that, when the pure consciousness is reflected through *avidyā*, it is called Īśvara, and, when it is reflected through mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), it is called *jīva*.

These various methods of accounting for the origin of individual selves and God have but little philosophical significance. But they go to show that the principal interest of the Vedānta lies in establishing the supreme reality of a transcendental principle of pure consciousness, which, though always untouched and unattached in its own nature, is yet the underlying principle which

can explain all the facts of the enlivening and enlightening of all our conscious experiences. All that is limited, be it an individual self or an individual object of awareness, is in some sense or other an illusory imposition of the modification of a non-conscious principle on the principle of consciousness. The Vedānta is both unwilling and incapable of explaining the nature of the world-process in all its details, in which philosophy and science are equally interested. Its only interest is to prove that the world-process presupposes the existence of a principle of pure consciousness which is absolutely and ultimately real, as it is immediate and intuitive. Reality means what is not determined by anything else; and in this sense pure consciousness is the only reality—and all else is indescribable—neither real nor unreal; and the Vedānta is not interested to discover what may be its nature.

Vedāntic Cosmology.

From what has been said above it is evident that *māyā* (also called *avidyā* or *ajñāna*) is in itself an indefinable mysterious stuff, which has not merely a psychological existence, but also an ontological existence as well. It is this *ajñāna* which on the one hand forms on the subjective plane the mind and the senses (the self alone being Brahman and ultimately real), and on the other hand, on the objective plane, the whole of the objective universe. This *ajñāna* has two powers, the power of veiling or covering (*āvaraṇa*) and the power of creation (*vikṣepa*). The power of veiling, though small, like a little cloud veiling the sun with a diameter of millions of miles, may, in spite of its limited nature, cover up the infinite, unchangeable self by veiling its self-luminosity as cognizer. The veiling of the self means veiling the shining unchangeable self-perception of the self, as infinite, eternal and limitless, pure consciousness, which as an effect of such veiling appears as limited, bound to sense-cognitions and sense-enjoyments and functioning as individual selves¹. It is through this covering power of *ajñāna* that the self appears as an agent and an enjoyer of pleasures and pains and subject to ignorant fears of rebirth, like the illusory perception of a piece of rope in darkness as a snake. Just as through the creative power of ignorance a piece of

¹ *vastuto 'jñānasyātmāchādakatvābhāve 'pi pramāṭy-buddhīmātrāchādakatvena ajñānasyātmāchādakatvam upacārād ucyate. Subodhīnti on Vedānta-sāra, p. 13, Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1916.*

rope, the real nature of which is hidden from view, appears as a snake, so does ignorance by its creative power create on the hidden self the manifold world-appearance. As the *ajñāna* is supposed to veil by its veiling power (*āvaraṇa-śakti*) only the self-cognizing and self-revealing aspect of the self, the other aspect of the self as pure being is left open as the basis on which the entire world-appearance is created by the creative power thereof. The pure consciousness, veiled as it is by *ajñāna* with its two powers, can be regarded as an important causal agent (*nimitta*), when its nature as pure consciousness forming the basis of the creation of the world-appearance is emphasized; it can be regarded as the material cause, when the emphasis is put on its covering part, the *ajñāna*. It is like a spider, which, so far as it weaves its web, can be regarded as a causal agent, and, so far as it supplies from its own body the materials of the web, can be regarded as the material cause of the web, when its body aspect is emphasized. The creative powers (*vikṣepa-śakti*) of *ajñāna* are characterized as being threefold, after the manner of Sāṃkhya *prakṛti*, as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. With the pure consciousness as the basis and with the associated creative power of *ajñāna* predominating in *tamas*, space (*ākāśa*) is first produced; from *ākāśa* comes air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth. It is these elements in their fine and uncompounded state that in the Sāṃkhya and the Purāṇas are called *tan-mātras*. It is out of these that the grosser materials are evolved as also the subtle bodies¹. The subtle bodies are made up of seventeen parts,

¹ As to how the subtle elements are combined for the production of grosser elements there are two different theories, viz. the *trivṛt-karaṇa* and the *pañci-karaṇa*. The *trivṛt-karaṇa* means that fire, water and earth (as subtle elements) are each divided into two halves, thus producing two equal parts of each; then the three half parts of the three subtle elements are again each divided into two halves, thus producing two quarter parts of each. Then the original first half of each element is combined with the two quarters of other two elements. Thus each element has half of itself with two quarter parts of other two elements. Vācaspati and Amalananda prefer *trivṛt-karaṇa* to *pañci-karaṇa*; for they think that there is no point in admitting that air and *ākāśa* have also parts of other elements integrated in them, and the Vedic texts speak of *trivṛt-karaṇa* and not of *pañci-karaṇa*. The *pañci-karaṇa* theory holds that the five subtle elements are divided firstly into two halves, and then one of the two halves of these five elements is divided again into four parts, and then the first half of each subtle element is combined with the one-fourth of each half of all the other elements excepting the element of which there is the full half as a constituent. Thus each element is made up of one-half of itself, and the other half of it is constituted of the one-fourth of each of the other elements (i.e. one-eighth of each of the other four elements), and thus each element has at least some part of other elements integrated into it. This view is supported by the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* and its *Sikhāmaṇi* commentary, p. 363.

excluding the subtle elements, and are called *sūkṣma-śarīra* or *līṅga-śarīra*. This subtle body is composed of the five cognitive senses, the five conative senses, the five *vāyus* or biomotor activities, *buddhi* (intellect) and *manas*, together with the five subtle elements in tanmātrīc forms. The five cognitive senses, the auditory, tactile, visual, gustatory and olfactory senses, are derived from the *sattva* parts of the five elements, *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, *agni*, *ap* and *prthivī* respectively. *Buddhi*, or intellect, means the mental state of determination or affirmation (*niścayātmikā antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*). *Manas* means the two mental functions of *vikalpa* and *saṅkalpa* or of *saṅkalpa* alone resulting in doubt¹. The function of mind (*citta*) and the function of egoism (*ahaṁkāra*) are included in *buddhi* and *manas*². They are all produced from the *sattva* parts of the five elements and are therefore elemental. Though they are elemental, yet, since they are produced from the compounded *sattva* parts of all the elements, they have the revealing function displayed in their cognitive operations. *Buddhi* with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of knowledge (*viññānamaya-koṣa*). *Manas* with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of *manas* (*manomaya-koṣa*). It is the self as associated with the *viññānamaya-koṣa* that feels itself as the agent, enjoyer, happy or unhappy, the individual self (*jīva*) that passes through worldly experience and rebirth. The conative senses are produced from the *rajas* parts of the five elements. The five *vāyus* or biomotor activities are called *Prāṇa* or the breathing activity, *Udāna* or the upward activity and *Samāna* or the digestive activity. There are some who add another five *vāyus* such as the *Nāga*, the vomiting *Apāna troyāṇes* activity, *Kūrma*, the reflex activity of opening the eyelids, *Kṛkala*, the activity of coughing, *Devadatta*, the activity of yawning, and *Dhanañjaya*, the nourishing activity. These *prāṇas*

¹ The *Vedānta-sāra* speaks of *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa*, and this is explained by the *Subodhinī* as meaning doubt. See *Vedānta-sāra* and *Subodhinī*, p. 17. The *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* and its commentators speak of *saṅkalpa* as being the only function of *manas*, but it means "doubt." See pp. 88-89 and 358.

² *smaraṇākāra-vṛttimad antaḥkaraṇaṁ cittam* (*Vedānta-paribhāṣā-Maṇi-prabhā*, p. 89). *anayor eva cittāhaṁkārayor antarbhāvau* (*Vedānta-sāra*, p. 17). But the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* says that *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and *citta*, all four, constitute the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). See *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 88. The *Vedānta-sāra* however does not count four functions *buddhi*, *manas*, *citta*, *ahaṁkāra*; *citta* and *ahaṁkāra* are regarded as the same as *buddhi* and *manas*. Thus according to the *Vedānta-sāra* there are only two categories. But since the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* only mentions *buddhi* and *manas* as constituents of the subtle body, one need not think that there is ultimately any difference between it and the *Vedānta-sāra*.

together with the cognitive senses form the active sheath of *prāṇa* (*prāṇamaya-koṣa*). Of these three sheaths, the *vijñānamaya*, *manomaya* and *prāṇamaya*, the *vijñānamaya* sheath plays the part of the active agent (*kartṛ-rūpaḥ*); the *manomaya* is the source of all desires and volition, and is therefore regarded as having an instrumental function; the *prāṇamaya* sheath represents the motor functions. These three sheaths make up together the subtle body or the *sūkṣma-śarīra*. Hiranyagarbha (also called *Sūtrātmā* or *prāṇa*) is the god who presides over the combined subtle bodies of all living beings. Individually each subtle body is supposed to belong to every being. These three sheaths, involving as they do all the sub-conscious impressions from which our conscious experience is derived, are therefore called a dream (*jāgrad-vāsanāmayatvāt svapna*).

The process of the formation of the gross elements from the subtle parts of the elements is technically called *pañcikaraṇa*. It consists in a compounding of the elements in which one half of each rudimentary element is mixed with the eighth part of each other rudimentary element. It is through such a process of compounding that each element possesses some of the properties of the other elements. The entire universe consists of seven upper worlds (*Bhuh, Bhuvah, Svar, Mahar, Janah, Tapaḥ* and *Satyam*), seven lower worlds (*Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasātala, Talātala, Mahātala* and *Pātāla*) and all the gross bodies of all living beings. There is a cosmic deity who presides over the combined physical bodies of all beings, and this deity is called Virāṭ. There is also the person, the individual who presides over each one of the bodies, and, in this aspect, the individual is called Viśva.

The *ajñāna* as constituting *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind, involving the operative functions of *buddhi* and *manas*, is always associated with the self; it is by the difference of these *antaḥkaraṇas* that one self appears as many individual selves, and it is through the states of these *antaḥkaraṇas* that the veil over the self and the objects are removed, and as a result of this there is the cognition of objects. The *antaḥkaraṇa* is situated within the body, which it thoroughly pervades. It is made up of the *sattva* parts of the five rudimentary elements, and, being extremely transparent, comes into touch with the sense objects through the specific senses and assumes their forms. It being a material stuff, there is one part inside the body, another part in touch with the sense-objects, and a third part between the two and connected with them both as one whole.

The interior part of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is the ego or the agent. The intervening part has the action of knowledge, called also *vytti-jñāna*. The third part, which at the time of cognition is transformed into the form of the sense-objects, has the function of making them manifested in knowledge as its objects. The *antaḥkaraṇa* of three parts being transparent, pure consciousness can well be manifested in it. Though pure consciousness is one, yet it manifests the three different parts of the *antaḥkaraṇa* in three different ways, as the cognizer (*pramātṛ*), cognitive operation (*pramāṇa*) and the cognition, or the percept (*pramiti*). In each of the three cases the reality is the part of the pure consciousness, as it expresses itself through the three different modifications of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The sense-objects in themselves are but the veiled pure consciousness, *brahman*, as forming their substance. The difference between the individual consciousness (*jīva-caitanya*) and the *brahman*-consciousness (*brahma-caitanya*) is that the former represents pure consciousness, as conditioned by or as reflected through the *antaḥkaraṇa*, while the latter is the unentangled infinite consciousness, on the basis of which all the cosmic creations of *māyā* are made. The covering of *avidyā*, for the breaking of which the operation of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is deemed necessary, is of two kinds, viz. subjective ignorance and objective ignorance. When I say that I do not know a book, that implies subjective ignorance as signified by "I do not know," and objective ignorance as referring to the book. The removal of the first is a precondition of all kinds of knowledge, perceptual or inferential, while the second is removed only in perceptual knowledge. It is diverse in kind according to the form and content of the sense-objects; and each perceptual cognition removes only one specific ignorance, through which the particular cognition arises¹.

Śaṅkara and his School.

It is difficult to say exactly how many books were written by Śaṅkara himself. There is little doubt that quite a number of books attributed to Śaṅkara were not written by him. I give here a list of those books that seem to me to be his genuine works, though it is extremely difficult to be absolutely certain.

¹ See Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Siddhānta-bindu*, pp. 132-150; and Brahmanānda Sarasvatī's *Nyāya-ratnāvalī*, pp. 132-150, Śrividya Press, Kumbakonam, 1893.

I have chosen only those works which have been commented on by other writers, since this shows that these have the strength of tradition behind them to support their authenticity. The most important works of Śaṅkara are his commentaries on the ten Upaniṣads, *Īśā*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Aitareya*, *Taittirīya*, *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* and the *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya*. The main reasons why a number of works which probably were not written by him were attributed to him seem to be twofold; first, because there was another writer of the same name, i.e. Śaṅkarācārya, and second, the tendency of Indian writers to increase the dignity of later works by attributing them to great writers of the past. The attribution of all the Purāṇas to Vyāsa illustrates this very clearly. Śaṅkara's *Īśopaniṣad-bhāṣya* has one commentary by Ānandajñāna and another, *Dīpikā*, by the other Śaṅkara Ācārya. His *Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya* has two commentaries, *Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa* and a commentary by Ānandajñāna. The *Kāṭhakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* has two commentaries, by Ānandajñāna and by Bālagopāla Yogindra. The *Praśnopaniṣad-bhāṣya* has two commentaries, by Ānandajñāna and Nārāyaṇendra Sarasvatī. The *Muṇḍakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* has two commentaries, by Ānandajñāna and Abhinavanārāyaṇendra Sarasvatī. The *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-bhāṣya* has two commentaries, by Ānandajñāna and Mathurānātha Śukla, and a summary, called *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-bhāṣyārtha-saṃgraha*, by Rāghavānanda. The *Aitareyopaniṣad-bhāṣya* has six commentaries, by Ānandajñāna, Abhinavanārāyaṇa, Nṛsimha Ācārya, Bālakṛṣṇadāsa, Jñānāmṛta Yati, and Viśveśvara Tīrtha. The *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya* seems to have only one commentary on it, by Ānandajñāna. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* has two commentaries, called *Bhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*, and a commentary by Ānandajñāna. The *Bṛhad-āraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* has a commentary by Ānandajñāna and a big independent work on it by Sureśvara, called *Bṛhad-āraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika*, or simply *Vārttika*, which has also a number of commentaries; these have been noticed in the section on Sureśvara. His *Aparokṣānubhava* has four commentaries, by Śaṅkara Ācārya, by Bālagopāla, by Caṇḍeśvara Varman (*Anubhava-dīpikā*), and by Vidyāranya. His commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, called *Gauḍapādiya-bhāṣya* or *Āgamaśāstra-vivaraṇa*, has two commentaries, one by Śuddhānanda and one by Ānandajñāna. His *Ātma-jñānopadeśa* has two commentaries, by Ānandajñāna and by Pūrṇānanda Tīrtha; the *Eka-śloka* has a

commentary called *Tattva-dīpana*, by Svayaṃprakāśa Yati; no commentary however is attributed to the *Viveka-cūdāmaṇi*, which seems to be genuinely attributed to Śaṅkara; the *Ātma-bodha* has at least five commentaries, by Advayānanda, Bhāsurānanda, Bodhendra (*Bhāva-prakāśika*), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Rāmānanda Tīrtha; The *Ātmānātma-viveka* has at least four commentaries, by Padmapāda, Pūrṇānanda Tīrtha, Sāyaṇa and Svayaṃprakāśa Yati. The *Ātmopadeśa-vidhi* is said to have a commentary by Ānandajñāna; the *Ānanda-lahari* has about twenty-four commentaries, by Appaya Dīkṣita, Kavirāja, Kṛṣṇa Ācārya (*Mañju-bhāṣiṇī*), Keśava-bhaṭṭa, Kaivalyāśrama (*Saubhāgya-varḍhinī*), Gaṅgāhari (*Tattva-dīpikā*), Gaṅgādhara, Gopīrāma, Gopikānta Sārvabhauma (*Ānanda-lahari-tarī*), Jagadīśa?, Jagannātha Pañcānana, Narasiṃha, Brahmānanda (*Bhāvārtha-dīpikā*), Malla Bhaṭṭa, Mahādeva Vidyāvagīśa, Mahādeva Vaidya, Rāmacandra, Rāmabhadra, Rāmānanda Tīrtha, Lakṣmīdhara Deśika and Viśvambhara and Śrīkaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa and another called *Vidvan-manoramā*. The *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* has at least four commentaries, by Ānandajñāna, by Rāmā Tīrtha (*Padayojanikā*), *Bodha-vidhi* by a pupil of Vidyādhāman, and by Śaṅkarācārya. His *Cid-ānanda-stava-rāja*, called also *Cid-ānanda-daśaśloki* or simply *Daśa-śloki*, has also a number of commentaries and sub-commentaries, such as the *Siddhānta-tattva-bindu* by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī; Madhusūdana's commentary was commented on by a number of persons, such as Nārāyaṇa Yati (*Laghu-ṭikā*), Puruṣottama Sarasvatī (*Siddhānta-bindu-sandīpana*), Pūrṇānanda Sarasvatī (*Tattva-viveka*), Gauḍa Brahmānanda Sarasvatī (*Siddhānta-bindu-nyāya-ratnāvalī*), by Saccidānanda and Śivalāla Śarmaṇ. Gauḍa Brahmānanda's commentary, *Siddhānta-bindu-nyāya-ratnāvalī*, was further commented on by Kṛṣṇakānta (*Siddhānta-nyāya-ratna-pradīpikā*). Śaṅkara's *Drṣṭya-prakaraṇa* was commented on by Rāmacandra Tīrtha; his *Pañcikaraṇa-prakriyā* has again a number of commentaries—that by Sureśvara is *Pañcikaraṇa-vārttika*, and this has a further commentary, called *Pañcikaraṇa-vārttikābharaṇa*, by Abhinavanārāyaṇendra Sarasvatī, pupil of Jñānendra Sarasvatī. Other commentaries on the *Pañcikaraṇa-prakriyā* are *Pañcikaraṇa-bhāva-prakāśikā*, *Pañcikaraṇa-ṭikā-tattva-candrikā*, *Pañcikaraṇa-tātparya-candrikā* and *Pañcikaraṇa-vivaraṇa* by Ānandajñāna, *Pañcikaraṇa-vivaraṇa* by Svayaṃprakāśa Yati and by Prajñānānanda, and a sub-commentary called *Tattva-candrikā*. Śaṅkara also commented on the *Bhagavad-*

gītā; this commentary has been examined in the chapter on the *Bhagavad-gītā* in the present volume. His *Laghu-vākya-vṛtti* has a commentary called *Puṣpāñjali*, and another, called *Laghu-vākya-vṛtti-prakāśikā*, by Rāmānanda Sarasvatī; his *Vākya-vṛtti* has a commentary by Ānandajñāna, and another commentary, called *Vākya-vṛtti-prakāśikā*, by Viśveśvara Paṇḍita. He starts his *Vākya-vṛtti* in the same manner as Īśvarakṛṣṇa starts his *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, namely by stating that, suffering from the threefold sorrows of life, the pupil approaches a good teacher for instruction regarding the ways in which he may be liberated from them. Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* also starts in the same manner and thus gives a practical turn to the study of philosophy, a procedure which one does not find in his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*. The answer, of course, is the same as that given in so many other places, that one is liberated only by the proper realization of the Upaniṣad texts that declare the unity of the self with Brahman. He then goes on to show that all external things and all that is called mind or mental or psychical is extraneous to self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness; he also declares here that the effects of one's deeds are disposed by God (Īśvara), the superior illusory form of Brahman, and not by the mysterious power of *apūrva* admitted by the Mimāṃsists. He concludes this short work of fifty-three verses by insisting on the fact that, though the unity texts (*advaita-śruti*) of the Upaniṣads, such as "that (Brahman) art thou," may have a verbal construction that implies some kind of duality, yet their main force is in the direct and immediate apperception of the pure self without any intellectual process as implied by relations of identity. The *Vākya-vṛtti* is thus conceived differently from the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, where *yoga* processes of posture and breath-regulations are described, as being helpful for the realization of the true nature of self. This may, of course, give rise to some doubts regarding the true authorship of the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, though it may be explained as being due to the different stages of the development of Śāṅkara's own mind; divergences of attitude are also noticeable in his thoroughgoing idealism in his commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*, where the waking life is regarded as being exactly the same as dream life, and external objects are deemed to have no existence whatsoever, being absolutely like dream-perceptions—as contrasted with his *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya*, where external objects are considered to have an indescribable existence, very different from dream-

creations. The *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, which in its nineteen chapters contains only six hundred and seventy-five stanzas, is more in a line with the *Vākya-vṛtti*, and, though the well-known Vedānta topics are all slightly touched upon, greater emphasis is laid on the proper realization of the Vedāntic unity texts, such as “that art thou,” as means to the attainment of Brahmahood. There are also a number of short poems and hymns attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, such as the *Advaitānubhūti*, *Ātma-bodha*, *Tattvopadeśa*, *Praudhānubhūti*, etc., some of which are undoubtedly his, while there are many others which may not be so; but in the absence of further evidence it is difficult to come to any decisive conclusion¹. These hymns do not contain any additional philosophical materials, but are intended to stir up a religious fervour and emotion in favour of the monistic faith. In some cases, however, the commentators have found an excuse for extracting from them Vedāntic doctrines which cannot be said to follow directly from them. As an illustration of this, it may be pointed out that out of the ten ślokaś of Śaṅkara Madhusūdana made a big commentary, and Brahmānanda Sarasvatī wrote another big commentary on that of Madhusūdana and elaborated many of the complex doctrines of the Vedānta which have but little direct bearing upon the verses themselves. But Śaṅkara’s most important work is the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, which was commented on by Vācaspati Miśra in the ninth century, Ānandajñāna in the thirteenth, and Govindānanda in the fourteenth century. Commentaries on Vācaspati’s commentary will be noticed in the section on Vācaspati Miśra. Subrahmaṇya wrote a verse summary of Śaṅkara’s commentary which he calls *Bhāṣyārthan-nyāya-mālā*; and Bhārati Tīrtha wrote also the *Vaiyāsika-nyāya-mālā*, in which he tried to deal with the general arguments of the *Brahma-sūtra* on the lines of Śaṅkara’s commentary. Many other persons, such as Vaidyanātha Dikṣita, Devarāma Bhaṭṭa, etc., also wrote topical summaries of the main lines of the general arguments of the *Brahma-sūtra* on the lines of Śaṅkara’s commentary, called *Nyāya-mālā* or *Adhikaraṇa-mālā*. But many other persons were inspired by Śaṅkara’s commentary (or by the commentaries of Vācaspati Miśra and other great writers of the Śaṅkara school) and under the name of independent commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtra* merely repeated what was contained in these. Thus

¹ The *Ātma-bodha* was commented upon by Padmapāda in his commentary *Ātma-bodha-vyākhyāna*, called also *Vedānta-sāra*.

Amalānanda wrote his *Śāstra-darpaṇa* imitating the main lines of Vācaspati's commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary; and Svayaṃprakāśa also wrote his *Vedānta-naya-bhūṣaṇa*, in which for the most part he summarized the views of Vācaspati's *Bhāmātī* commentary. Hari Dikṣita wrote his *Brahma-sūtra-vṛtti*, Śaṅkarānanda his *Brahma-sūtra-dīpikā* and Brahmānanda his *Vedānta-sūtra-muktāvalī* as independent interpretations of the *Brahma-sūtra*, but these were all written mainly on the lines of Śaṅkara's own commentary, supplementing it with additional Vedāntic ideas that had been developed after Śaṅkara by the philosophers of his school of thought or explaining Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*¹.

Maṇḍana, Sureśvara and Viśvarūpa.

General tradition has always identified Maṇḍana with Sureśvara and Viśvarūpa; and Col. G. A. Jacob in his introduction to the second edition of the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* seems willing to believe this tradition. The tradition probably started from Vidyāraṇya's *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya*, where Maṇḍana is spoken of as being named not only Umbeka, but also Viśvarūpa (VIII. 63). He further says in x. 4 of the same work that, when Maṇḍana became a follower of Śaṅkara, he received from him the name Sureśvara. But the *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya* is a mythical biography, and it is certainly very risky to believe any of its statements, unless corroborated by other reliable evidences. There is little doubt that Sureśvara was

¹ Some of these commentaries are: *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣyārtha-saṃgraha* by Brahmānanda Yati, pupil of Viśveśvarānanda, *Brahma-sūtrārtha-dīpikā* by Veṅkaṭa, son of Gauri and Śiva, *Brahma-sūtra-vṛtti* (called also *Mitākṣarā*) by Annam Bhaṭṭa, and *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā* (called also *Vidyā-śrī*) by Jñānottama Bhaṭṭāraka, pupil of Jñānaghana. The peculiarity of this last work is that it is the only commentary on the *eka-jīva-vāda* line that the present writer could trace. In addition to these some more commentaries may be mentioned, such as *Brahma-sūtra-vṛtti* by Dharma Bhaṭṭa, pupil of Rāmacandrārya and pupil's pupil of Mukundaśrama, *Sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyāna* (called also *Brahma-vidyā-bharaṇa*) by Advaitānanda, pupil of Rāmānanda and pupil's pupil of Brahmānanda, *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā* (called also *Nyāya-rakṣa-maṇi*) by Appaya Dikṣita, *Brahma-tattva-prakāśikā* (which is different from an earlier treatise called *Brahma-prakāśikā*) by Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī, *Brahma-sūtro-paṇyāsa* by Rāmeśvara Bhāratī, by a pupil of Rāmānanda, *Śāriraka-mīmāṃsā-sūtra-siddhānta-kaumudī* by Subrahmaṇya Agnicin Makhindra, *Vedānta-kaustubha* by Sitārāma; none of which seem to be earlier than the sixteenth century. But Ananyānubhava, the teacher of Prakāśātman (A.D. 1200), seems to have written another commentary, called *Śāriraka-nyāya-maṇimālā*. Prakāśātman himself also wrote a metrical summary of the main contents of Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* called *Śāriraka-mīmāṃsā-nyāya-saṃgraha*, and Kṛṣṇānubhūti, in much later times, wrote a similar metrical summary, called *Śāriraka-mīmāṃsā-saṃgraha*.

the author of a *Vārttika*, or commentary in verse, on Śaṅkara's *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* Upaniṣad (which was also summarized by Vidyāraṇya in a work called *Vārttika-sāra*, which latter was further commented on by Maheśvara Tīrtha in his commentary, called the *Laghu-saṃgraha*). The *Vārttika* of Sureśvara was commented on by at least two commentators, Ānandagiri in his *Śāstra-prakāśikā* and Ānandapūrṇa in his *Nyāya-kalpa-latikā*. In a commentary on the *Parāśara-smṛti* published in the Bib. Ind. series (p. 51) a quotation from this *Vārttika* is attributed to Viśvarūpa; but this commentary is a late work, and in all probability it relied on Vidyāraṇya's testimony that Viśvarūpa and Sureśvara were identically the same person. Vidyāraṇya also, in his *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*, p. 92, quotes a passage from Sureśvara's *Vārttika* (IV. 8), attributing it to Viśvarūpa. But in another passage of the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* (p. 224) he refers to a Vedānta doctrine, attributing it to the author of the *Brahma-siddhi*. But the work has not yet been published, and its manuscripts are very scarce: the present writer had the good fortune to obtain one. A fairly detailed examination of the philosophy of this work will be given in a separate section. The *Brahma-siddhi* is an important work, and it was commented on by Vācaspati in his *Tattva-samikṣā*, by Ānandapūrṇa in his *Brahma-siddhi-vyākhyā-ratna*, by Śaṅkhaṇi in his *Brahma-siddhi-ṭīkā*, and by Citsukha in his *Abhiprāya-prakāśikā*. But only the latter two works are available in manuscripts. Many important works however refer to the *Brahma-siddhi* and its views generally as coming from the author of *Brahma-siddhi* (*Brahma-siddhi-kāra*). But in none of these references, so far as it is known to the present writer, has the author of *Brahma-siddhi* been referred to as Sureśvara. The *Brahma-siddhi* was written in verse and prose, since two quotations from it in Citsukha's *Tattva-pradīpikā* (p. 381, Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press) and *Nyāya-kaṇikā* (p. 80) are in verse, while there are other references, such as *Tattva-pradīpikā* (p. 140) and elsewhere, which are in prose. There is, however, little doubt that the *Brahma-siddhi* was written by Maṇḍana or Maṇḍana Miśra; for both Śrīdhara in his *Nyāya-kandalī* (p. 218) and Citsukha in his *Tattva-pradīpikā* (p. 140) refer to Maṇḍana as the author of the *Brahma-siddhi*. Of these the evidence of Śrīdhara, who belonged to the middle of the tenth century, ought to be considered very reliable, as he lived within a hundred years of the death of Maṇḍana; whoever Maṇḍana may have been,

since he lived after Śaṅkara (A.D. 820), he could not have flourished very much earlier than the middle of the ninth century. It is, therefore, definitely known that the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* and the *Vārttika* were written by Sureśvara, and the *Brahma-siddhi* by Maṇḍana. The question regarding the identity of these two persons may be settled, if the views or opinions of the *Brahma-siddhi* can be compared or contrasted with the views of the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* or the *Vārttika*. From the few quotations that can be traced in the writings of the various writers who refer to it it is possible to come to some fairly decisive conclusions¹.

Of all passages the most important is that quoted from the *Brahma-siddhi* in the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* (p. 224). It is said there that according to the author of the *Brahma-siddhi* it is the individual persons (*jīvāḥ*, in the plural) who by their own individual ignorance (*svāvidyayā*) create for themselves on the changeless Brahman the false world-appearance. Neither in itself, nor with the *māyā*, or as reflection in *māyā*, is Brahman the cause of the world (*Brahma na jagat-kāraṇam*). The appearances then are but creations of individual ignorance, and individual false experiences of the world have therefore no objective basis. The agreement of individual experiences is due to similarity of illusions in different persons who are suffering under the delusive effects of the same kinds of ignorance; this may thus be compared with the delusive experience of two moons by a number of persons. Not all persons experience the same world; their delusive experiences are similar, but the objective basis of their experience is not the same (*saṃvādas tu bahu-puruṣāvagata-dvitiya-candravat sādṛśyād upapadyate*). If this account is correct, as may well be supposed, then Maṇḍana Miśra may be regarded as the originator of the Vedāntic doctrine of *drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*, which was in later times so forcefully formulated by Prakāśānanda. Again, in Prakāśātman's *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa* (p. 32), it is held that according to the author of the *Brahma-siddhi* both *māyā* and *avidyā* are nothing but false experiences (*avidyā māyā mithyā-pratyaya iti*). About the function

¹ A copy of the manuscript of the *Brahma-siddhi* and its commentary was consulted by me in the Adyar and the Govt. Sanskrit MSS. Libraries after the above section had been written, and a thorough examination of its contents, I am happy to say, corroborates the above surmises. The *Brahma-siddhi* is expected to be shortly published by Prof. Kuppusvāmi Śāstri, and I consulted the tarka-pāda of it in proof by the kind courtesy of Prof. Śāstri in Madras in December 1928. A separate section has been devoted to the philosophy of Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi*.

of knowledge as removing doubts he is said to hold the view (as reported in the *Nyāya-kandalī*, p. 218) that doubt regarding the validity of what is known is removed by knowledge itself. In the *Nyāya-kaṇikā* (p. 80) it is said that Maṇḍana held that reality manifests itself in unlimited conceptions of unity or universality, whereas differences appear only as a result of limited experience. Again, in the *Laghu-candrikā* (p. 112, Kumbakonam edition) Maṇḍana is introduced in the course of a discussion regarding the nature of the dispersion of ignorance and its relation to Brahma-knowledge or Brahmahood. According to Śaṅkara, as interpreted by many of his followers, including Sureśvara, the dissolution of ignorance (*avidyā-nivṛtti*) is not a negation, since negation as a separate category has no existence. So dissolution of ignorance means only Brahman. But according to Maṇḍana there is no harm in admitting the existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance; for the monism of Brahman means that there is only one positive entity. It has no reference to negations, i.e. the negation of duality only means the negation of all positive entities other than Brahman (*bhāvādvaita*). The existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance does not hurt the monistic creed. Again, Sarvajñātma Muni in his *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* (II. 174) says that ignorance (*avidyā*) is supported (*āśraya*) in pure consciousness (*cin-mātrāśrita-viśayam ajñānam*), and that, even where from the context of Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* it may appear as if he was speaking of the individual person (*jīva*) as being the support of *ajñāna*, it has to be interpreted in this sense. Objections of Maṇḍana, therefore, to such a view, viz. that ignorance rests with the individuals, are not to be given any consideration; for Maṇḍana's views lead to quite different conclusions (*parihṛtya Maṇḍana-vācāḥ tad dhy anyathā prasthitam*)¹. The commentator of the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, Rāmatīrtha Svāmin, also, in commenting on the passage referred to, contrasts the above view of Maṇḍana with that of Sureśvara, who according to him is referred to by an adjective *bahu-śruta* in the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* text, and who is reported to have been in agreement with the views of Sarvajñātma Muni, as against the views of Maṇḍana. Now many of these views which have been attributed to Maṇḍana are not shared by Sureśvara, as will appear from what will be said below concerning him. It does not therefore appear that Maṇḍana Miśra and Sureśvara were the same

¹ Mr Hiriyanṇa, in *J.R.A.S.* 1923, mentions this point as well as the point concerning *avidyā-nivṛtti* in Maṇḍana's view as admission of negation.

person. But, if Vidyāraṇya, who knows so much about the views of Maṇḍana, had identified them in the *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya*, that might lead one to pause. Now Mr Hiriyantha seems to have removed this difficulty for us by his short note in *J.R.A.S.* 1924, where he points out that Vidyāraṇya in his *Vārttika-sāra* refers to the author of the *Brahma-siddhi* as a different authority from the author of the *Vārttika*, viz. Sureśvara. Now, if Vidyāraṇya, the author of the *Vārttika-sāra*, knew that Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahma-siddhi*, was not the same person as Sureśvara, he could not have identified them in his *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya*. This naturally leads one to suspect that the Vidyāraṇya who was the author of the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* and the *Vārttika-sāra* was not the same Vidyāraṇya as the author of *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya*. Another consideration also leads one to think that Vidyāraṇya (the author of the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*) could not have written the *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya*. Ānandātman had two disciples, Anubhavānanda and Śaṅkarānanda. Anubhavānanda had as his disciple Amalānanda, and Śaṅkarānanda had Vidyāraṇya as his disciple. So Amalānanda may be taken as a contemporary of Vidyāraṇya. Now Amalānanda had another teacher in Sukhaprakāśa, who had Citsukha as his teacher. Thus Citsukha may be taken to be a contemporary of the grand teacher (*parama-guru*), Ānandātman, of Vidyāraṇya. If this was the case, he could not have written in his *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya* (XIII. 5) that Citsukha, who lived several centuries after Padmapāda, was a disciple of Padmapāda. It may therefore be safely asserted that the author of the *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya* was not the author of the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*. Now, if this is so, our reliance on the author of the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* cannot be considered to be risky and unsafe. But on p. 92 of the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* a passage from the *Vārttika* of Sureśvara (iv. 8) is attributed to Viśvarūpa Ācārya. It may therefore be concluded that Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahma-siddhi*, was not the same person as Sureśvara, unless we suppose that Maṇḍana was not only a Mīmāṃsā writer, but also a Vedānta writer of great repute and that his conversion by Śaṅkara meant only that he changed some of his Vedāntic views and accepted those of Śaṅkara, and it was at this stage that he was called Sureśvara. On this theory his *Brahma-siddhi* was probably written before his conversion to Śaṅkara's views. It seems likely that this theory may be correct, and that the author of the *Vidhi-viveka* was also the author of the

Brahma-siddhi; for the passage of the *Brahma-siddhi* quoted by Vācaspati in his *Nyāya-kaṇikā* is quoted in a manner which suggests that in all probability the author of the *Vidhi-viveka* was also the author of the *Brahma-siddhi*. It may also be concluded that in all probability Viśvarūpa was the same person as Sureśvara, though on this subject no references of value are known to the present writer other than by the author of the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*.

Maṇḍana (A.D. 800).

Maṇḍana Miśra's *Brahma-siddhi* with the commentary of Śaṅkha-pāṇi is available in manuscript, and Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppasvāmi Śāstrī of Madras is expected soon to bring out a critical edition of this important work. Through the courtesy of Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppasvāmi Śāstrī the present writer had an opportunity of going through the proofs of the *Brahma-siddhi* and through the courtesy of Mr C. Kunhan Raja, the Honorary Director of the Adyar Library, he was able also to utilize the manuscript of Śaṅkha-pāṇi's commentary¹. The *Brahma-siddhi* is in four chapters, *Brahma-kāṇḍa*, *Tarka-kāṇḍa*, *Niyoga-kāṇḍa*, and *Siddhi-kāṇḍa*, in the form of verses (*kārikā*) and long annotations (*vr̥tti*). That Maṇḍana must have been a contemporary of Śaṅkara is evident from the fact that, though he quotes some writers who flourished before Śaṅkara, such as Śabara, Kumārila or Vyāsa, the author of the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya*, and makes profuse references to the Upaniṣad texts, he never refers to any writer who flourished after Śaṅkara². Vācaspati also wrote a commentary, called *Tattva-samīkṣā*, on Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi*; but unfortunately this text, so far as is known to the present writer, has not yet been

¹ Citsukha, the pupil of Jñānottama, also wrote a commentary on it, called *Abhiprāya-prakāśikā*, almost the whole of which, except some portions at the beginning, is available in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, R. No. 3853. Ānandapūrṇa also wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-siddhi*, called *Bhāva-siddhi*.

² Maṇḍana's other works are *Bhāvanā-viveka*, *Vidhi-viveka*, *Vibhrama-viveka* and *Sphoṭa-siddhi*. Of these the *Vidhi-viveka* was commented upon by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya-kaṇikā*, and the *Sphoṭa-siddhi* was commented upon by the son of Bhavadāsa, who had also written a commentary, called *Tattva-vibhāvanā*, on Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattva-bindu*. The commentary on the *Sphoṭa-siddhi* is called *Gopālika*. Maṇḍana's *Vibhrama-viveka* is a small work devoted to the discussion of the four theories of illusion (*khyāti*), *ātma-khyāti*, *asat-khyāti*, *anyathā-khyāti* and *akhyāti*. Up till now only his *Bhāvanā-viveka* and *Vidhi-viveka* have been published.

discovered. In the *Brahma-kāṇḍa* chapter Maṇḍana discusses the nature of Brahman; in the *Tarka-kāṇḍa* he tries to prove that we cannot perceive "difference" through perception and that therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upaniṣad texts on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference. In the third chapter, the *Niyoga-kāṇḍa*, he tries to refute the Mīmāṃsā view that the Upaniṣad texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā principle of interpretation, that all Vedic texts command us to engage in some kind of action or to restrain ourselves from certain other kinds of action. This is by far the longest chapter of the book. The fourth chapter, the *Siddhi-kāṇḍa*, is the shortest: Maṇḍana says here that the Upaniṣad texts show that the manifold world of appearance does not exist at all and that its apparent existence is due to the *avidyā* of *jīva*.

In the *Brahma-kāṇḍa* the most important Vedāntic concepts are explained by Maṇḍana according to his own view. He first introduces the problem of the subject (*draṣṭṛ*) and the object (*drśya*) and says that it is only by abolishing the apparent duality of subject and object that the fact of experience can be explained. For, if there was any real duality of subject and object, that duality could not be bridged over and no relation between the two could be established; if, on the other hand, there is only the subject, then all things that are perceived can best be explained as being illusory creations imposed on self, the only reality¹. Proceeding further with the same argument, he says that attempts have been made to bring about this subject-object relation through the theory of the operation of an intermediary mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*); but whatever may be the nature of this intermediary, the pure unchangeable intelligence, the self or the subject, could not change with its varying changes in accordance with its connection with different objects; if it is held that the self does not undergo any transformation or change, but there is only the appearance of a transformation through its reflection in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, then it is plainly admitted that objects are not in reality perceived and that there is only an appearance of perception. If objects are not perceived in reality, it is wrong to think that they have a separate

¹ *ekatva evāyam draṣṭṛ-dṛśya-bhāvo 'vakalpate, draṣṭur eva cid-ātmanah tathā tathā vipariṇāmād vivartanād vā; nānāṭve tu vivikta-svabhāvayor asaṃśṛṣṭa-paraspara-svarūpayor asambaddhayoḥ kidyāśo draṣṭṛ-dṛśya-bhāvaḥ*. Kuppusvāmi Śāstri's edition of *Brahma-siddhi*, p. 7. (In the press.)

and independent existence from the self¹. Just as the very same man sees his own image in the mirror to be different from him and to exist outside of him as an object, so the same self appears as all the diverse objects outside of it. It is difficult to conceive how one could admit the existence of external objects outside the pure intelligence (*cit*); for in that case it would be impossible to relate the two².

According to Maṇḍana *avidyā* is called *māyā*, or false appearance, because it is neither a characteristic (*sva-bhāva*) of Brahman nor different from it, neither existent nor non-existent. If it was the characteristic of anything, then, whether one with that or different from it, it would be real and could not therefore be called *avidyā*; if it was absolutely non-existent, it would be like the lotus of the sky and would have no practical bearing in experience (*na vyavahāra-bijam*) such as *avidyā* has; it has thus to be admitted that *avidyā* is indescribable or unspeakable (*anirvacanīyā*)³.

According to Maṇḍana *avidyā* belongs to the individual souls (*jīva*). He admits that there is an inconsistency in such a view; but he thinks that, *avidyā* being itself an inconsistent category, there is no wonder that its relation with *jīva* should also be incon-

¹ *ekāntaḥkaraṇa-saṃkrāntāu asty eva sambandha iti cet, na, citeḥ śuddhatvād aparināmād aprati-saṃkramāc ca; dr̥ṣyā buddhiḥ citi-sannidheṣ chāyaya vivartata iti ced atha keyaṃ tac chāyatā? a-tad-ātmanah tad-avabhāsaḥ; na tarhi paramārthato dr̥ṣyaṃ dr̥ṣyate, paramārthataś ca dr̥ṣyamānaṃ draṣṭṛ-vyatiriktam asti iti durbhaṇam. Ibid.* Śaṅkhaṇi in commenting on this discards the view that objects pass through the sense-channels and become superimposed on the *antaḥkaraṇa* or *durbhaṇam* and thereby become related to the pure intelligence of the self and objectified: *na tu sphatikopame cetasi indriya-praṇālī-saṃkrāntānām arthānām tatraiva saṃkrāntena ātma-caitanya sambaddhānām tad-dr̥ṣyatvaṃ ghaṭiṣyate*. Adyar MS. p. 75.

It may not be out of place to point out in this connection that the theory of Padmapāda, Prakāśātman, as developed later on by Dharmarājadhvarindra, which held that the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) becomes superimposed on external objects in perception, was in all probability borrowed from the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *cic-chāyāpatti* in perception, which was somehow forced into Śaṅkara's loose epistemological doctrines and worked out as a systematic epistemological theory. The fact that Maṇḍana discards this epistemological doctrine shows, on the one hand, that he did not admit it to be a right interpretation of Śaṅkara and may, on the other hand, be regarded as a criticism of the contemporary interpretation of Padmapāda. But probably the reply of that school would be that, though they admitted extra-individual reality of objects, they did not admit the reality of objects outside of pure intelligence (*cit*).

² *tathā hi darpaṇa-tala-stham ātmānaṃ vibhaktam ivātmanah pratyeti; cites tu vibhaktam asaṃśṛṣṭaṃ tayā cetyata iti dur-avagamyam. Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 9. It may not be out of place here to point out that Ānandabodha's argument in his *Nyāya-makaranda* regarding the unspeakable nature of *avidyā*, which has been treated in a later section of this chapter, is based on this argument of Maṇḍana.

sistent and unexplainable. The inconsistency of the relationship of *avidyā* with the *jīvas* arises as follows: the *jīvas* are essentially identical with Brahman, and the diversity of *jīvas* is due to imagination (*kalpanā*); but this imagination cannot be of Brahman, since Brahman is devoid of all imagination (*tasyā vidyātmanah kalpanā-sūnyatvāt*); it cannot be the imagination of the *jīvas*, since the *jīvas* themselves are regarded as being the product of imagination¹. Two solutions may be proposed regarding this difficulty, firstly, that the word *māyā* implies what is inconsistent; had it been a consistent and explainable concept, it would be reality and not *māyā*². Secondly, it may be said that from *avidyā* come the *jīvas* and from the *jīvas* comes the *avidyā*, and that this cycle is beginningless and therefore there is no ultimate beginning either of the *jīvas* or of the *avidyā*³. This view is held by those who think that *avidyā* is not the material cause of the world: these are technically called *avidyopādāna-bheda-vādins*. It is through this *avidyā* that the *jīvas* suffer the cycle of births and rebirths, and this *avidyā* is natural to the *jīvas*, since the *jīvas* themselves are the products of *avidyā*⁴. And it is through listening to the Vedāntic texts, right thinking, meditation, etc. that true knowledge dawns and the *avidyā* is destroyed; it was through this *avidyā* that the *jīvas* were separated from Brahman; with its destruction they attain Brahmanhood⁵.

In defining the nature of Brahman as pure bliss Śaṅkhaṇḍīyāni the commentator raises some very interesting discussions. He starts by criticizing the negative definition of happiness as cessation of pain or as a positive mental state qualified by such a negative condition⁶. He says that there are indeed negative pleasures which are enjoyed as negation of pain (e.g. a plunge into cold water is an escape from the painful heat); but he holds that there are cases where pleasures and pains are experienced simultaneously

¹ itaretarāśraya prasaṅgāt kalpanādhīno hi
jīva vibhāgaḥ, jīvāśrayā kalpanā.

Ibid. p. 10.

² anupapadyamānārthaiva hi māyā; upapadyamānārthatve yathārtha-bhāvān na māyā syāt. *Ibid.*

³ anāditvān netaretarāśrayatva-doṣah. *Ibid.*

⁴ na hi jīveṣu nisarga-jā vidyāsti, avidyayaiva hi naisargikī, āgantukyā vidyāyāḥ pravilayaḥ. *Ibid.* pp. 11-12.

⁵ avidyayaiva tu brahmaṇo jīvo vibhaktah, tan-nivṛttau brahma-svarūpam eva bhavati, yathā ghaṭādi-bhede tad-ākāśam pariśuddham paramākaśam eva bhavati. *Ibid.*

⁶ duḥkha nivṛttir vā tad-viśiṣṭātmopalabdhir vā sukham astu, sarvathā sukham nāma na dharmāntaram asti. Adyar MS. of the Śaṅkhaṇḍīyāni commentary, p. 18.

and not as negation of each other. A man may feel painful heat in the upper part of his body and yet feel the lower part of his body delightfully cool and thus experience pleasure and pain simultaneously (*sukha-duḥkhe yugapaj janyete*). Again, according to the scriptures there is unmixed pain in Hell, and this shows that pain need not necessarily be relative. Again, there are many cases (e.g. in the smelling of a delightful odour of camphor) where it cannot be denied that we have an experience of positive pleasure¹. Śāṅkhaṇḍinī then refutes the theory of pain as unsatisfied desire and happiness as satisfaction or annulment of desires (*viśaya-prāptim vinā kāma eva duḥkham ataḥ tan-nivṛttir eva sukham bhaviṣyati*) by holding that positive experiences of happiness are possible even when one has not desired them². An objection to this is that experience of pleasures satisfies the natural, but temporarily inactive, desires in a sub-conscious or potential condition³. Again, certain experiences produce more pleasures in some than in others, and this is obviously due to the fact that one had more latent desires to be fulfilled than the other. In reply to these objections Śāṅkhaṇḍinī points out that, even if a thing is much desired, yet, if it is secured after much trouble, it does not satisfy one so much as a pleasure which comes easily. If pleasure is defined as removal of desires, then one should feel happy before the pleasurable experience or after the pleasurable experience, when all traces of the desires are wiped out, but not at the time of enjoying the pleasurable experience; for the desires are not wholly extinct at that time. Even at the time of enjoying the satisfaction of most earnest desires one may feel pain. So it is to be admitted that pleasure is not a relative concept which owes its origin to the sublation of desires, but that it is a positive concept which has its existence even before the desires are sublated⁴. If negation of desires be defined as happiness, then even disinclination to food through bilious attacks is to be called happiness⁵. So it is to be admitted that positive pleasures are in the first instance experienced and then are desired. The theory that pains and pleasures are relative and that without pain there can be no experience of pleasure and that there can be no experience of pain without an

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 20, 21.

² *Ibid.* p. 22.

³ *sahajo hi rāgaḥ sarva-puṃsām asti sa tu viśaya-viśeṣeṇa āvir-bhavati. Ibid.* p. 23.

⁴ *ataḥ kāma-nivṛtteḥ prāg-bhāvi sukha-vastu-bhūtam eṣṭavyam. Ibid.* p. 27.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 25.

experience of pleasure is false and consequently the Vedāntic view is that the state of emancipation as Brahmahood may well be described as an experience of positive pure bliss¹.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and in his commentaries on some of the Upaniṣads and the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* had employed some elements of dialectical criticism, the principles of which had long been introduced in well-developed forms by the Buddhists. The names of the three great dialecticians, Śrīharṣa, Ānandajñāna and Citsukha, of the Śaṅkara school, are well known, and proper notice has been taken of them in this chapter. But among the disciples of Śaṅkara the man who really started the dialectical forms of argument, who was second to none in his dialectical powers and who influenced all other dialecticians of the Śaṅkaraschool, Ānandabodha, Śrīharṣa, Ānandajñāna, Citsukha, Nṛsiṃhāśrama and others, was Maṇḍana. Maṇḍana's great dialectical achievement is found in his refutation of the perception of difference (*bheda*) in the *Tarka-kāṇḍa* chapter of his *Brahma-siddhi*.

The argument arose as follows: the category of difference (*bheda*) is revealed in perception, and, if this is so, the reality of difference cannot be denied, and therefore the Upaniṣad texts should not be interpreted in such a way as to annul the reality of "difference." Against such a view-point Maṇḍana undertakes to prove that "difference," whether as a quality or characteristic of things or as an independent entity, is never experienced by perception (*pratyakṣa*)². He starts by saying that perception yields three possible alternatives, viz. (1) that it manifests a positive object, (2) that it presents differences from other objects, (3) that it both manifests a positive object and distinguishes it from other objects³. In the third alternative there may again be three other alternatives, viz. (i) simultaneous presentation of the positive object and its distinction from others, (ii) first the presentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference, (iii) first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object⁴. If by perception differences

¹ *yadi duḥkhā-bhāvah sukham syāt tataḥ syād evam bhāvāntare tu sukhe duḥkhābhāve ca tathā syād eva. Ibid. p. 161.*

² This discussion runs from page 44 of the *Brahma-siddhi* (in the press) to the end of the second chapter.

³ *tatra pratyakṣe trayāḥ kalpāḥ, vastu-svarūpa-siddhiḥ vastu-antarasya vya-
vacchedaḥ ubhayaṃ vā. Brahma-siddhi, 11.*

⁴ *ubhayaśminn api traividhyam, yaugapadyam, vyavaccheda-pūrvako vidhiḥ,
vidhi-pūrvako vyavacchedaḥ. Ibid.*

from other objects are experienced, or if it manifests both the object and its differences, then it has to be admitted that "difference" is presented in perception; but, if it can be proved that only positive objects are presented in perception, unassociated with any presentation of difference, then it has to be admitted that the notion of difference is not conveyed to us by perception, and in that case the verdict of the Upaniṣads that reality is one and that no diversity can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. Now follows the argument.

Perception does not reveal merely the difference, nor does it first reveal the difference and then the positive object, nor both of them simultaneously; for the positive object must first be revealed, before any difference can be manifested. Difference must concern itself in a relation between two positive objects, e.g. the cow is different from the horse, or there is no jug here. The negation involved in the notion of difference can have no bearing without that which is negated or that of which it is negated, and both these are positive in their notion. The negation of a chimerical entity (e.g. the lotus of the sky) is to be interpreted as negation of a false relation of its constituents, which are positive in themselves (e.g. both the lotus and the sky are existents, the incompatibility is due to their relationing, and it is such a relation between these two positive entities that is denied), or as denying the objective existence of such entities, which can be imagined only as a mental idea¹. If the category of difference distinguishes two objects from one another, the objects between which the difference is manifested must first be known. Again, it cannot be held that perception, after revealing the positive object, reveals also its difference from other objects; for perception is one unique process of cognition, and there are no two moments in it such that it should first reveal the object with which there is present sense-contact and then reveal other objects which are not at that moment in contact with sense, as also the difference between the two². In the case of the discovery of one's own illusion, such as "this is not silver, but conch-shell," only the latter knowledge is perceptual, and this knowledge refers to and negates after the previous knowledge of the object as silver has been negated. It was

¹ *kutaścin nimittād buddhau labdha-rūpāṇām bahir niśedhaḥ kriyate.*

Brahma-siddhi, 11.

² *kramah samgacchate yuktyā naika-vijñāna-karmaṇoh na sannihita-jam tac ca tadanyāmarśi jāyate. Ibid.* 11. *Kārikā* 3.

only when the presented object was perceived as “this before” that it was denied as being the silver for which it was taken, and when it was thus negated there was the perception of the conch-shell. There is no negative concept without there first being a positive concept; but it does not therefore follow that a positive concept cannot be preceded by a negative concept¹. This is therefore not a case where there are two moments in one unique perception, but there are here different cognitive experiences².

Again, there is a view (Buddhist) that it is by the power or potency of the indeterminate cognition of an object that both the positive determinate cognition and its difference from others are produced. Though the positive and the negative are two cognitions, yet, since they are both derived from the indeterminate cognition, it can well be said that by one positive experience we may also have its difference from others also manifested (*eka-vidhir eva anyavyavacchedah*)³. Against such a view Maṇḍana urges that one positive experience cannot also reveal its differences from all other kinds of possible and impossible objects. A colour perceived at a particular time and particular place may negate another colour at that particular place and time, but it cannot negate the presence of taste properties at that particular place and time; but, if the very perception of a colour should negate everything else which is not that colour, then these taste properties would also be negated, and, since this is not possible, it has to be admitted that perception of a positive entity does not necessarily involve as a result of that very process the negation of all other entities.

There is again a view that things are by their very nature different from one another (*prakṛtyaiva bhinnā bhāvāḥ*), and thus, when by perception an object is experienced, its difference from other objects is also grasped by that very act. In reply to this objection Maṇḍana says that things cannot be of the nature of differences; firstly, in that case all objects would be of the nature of difference, and hence there would be no difference among them; secondly, as

¹ *pūrva-vijñāna-vihite rajatāḍau “idaṁ” iti ca sannihitārtha-sāmānye niṣedho vidhi-pūrva eva, śūktikā-siddhis tu virodhi-niṣedha-pūrva ucyate; vidhi-pūrvatā ca niyamena niṣedhasyocyate, na vidher niṣedha-pūrvakatā niṣidhyate. Brahma-siddhi, 11. Kārikā 3.*

² *na ca tatra eka-jñānasya kramavad-vyāpārāt ubhaya-rūpasya utpatteḥ. Ibid.*

³ *nīlasya nirvikalpaka-darśanasya yat sāmānyam niyataika-kāraṇatvaṁ tena anādi-vāsanā-vasāt pratibhāsitam janitam idaṁ nedam iti vikalpo bhāvābhāva-vyavahāram pravartayati...satyam jñāna-dvayam idaṁ savikalpakam tu nirvikalpakam tayoṛ mūla-bhūtam tat pratyakṣam tatra ca eka-vidhir eva anyavyavaccheda iti brūma iti. Śaṅkhaṇḍī's commentary, *ibid.**

“difference” has no form, the objects themselves would be formless; thirdly, difference being essentially of the nature of negation, the objects themselves would be of the nature of negation; fourthly, since difference involves duality or plurality in its concept, no object could be regarded as one; a thing cannot be regarded as both one and many¹. In reply to this the objector says that a thing is of the nature of difference only in relation to others (*parāpekṣam vastuno bheda-svabhāvaḥ nātmāpekṣam*), but not in relation to itself. In reply to this objection Maṇḍana says that things which have been produced by their own causes cannot stand in need of a relation to other entities for their existence; all relationing is mental and as such depends on persons who conceive the things, and so relationing cannot be a constituent of objective things². If relationing with other things constituted their essence, then each thing would depend on others—they would depend on one another for their existence (*itaretarāśraya-prasaṅgāt*). In reply to this it may be urged that differences are different, corresponding to each and every oppositional term, and that each object has a different specific nature in accordance with the different other objects with which it may be in a relation of opposition; but, if this is so, then objects are not produced solely by their own causes; for, if differences are regarded as their constituent essences, these essences should vary in accordance with every object with which a thing may be opposed. In reply to this it is urged by the objector that, though an object is produced by its own causes, yet its nature as differences appears in relation to other objects with which it is held in opposition. Maṇḍana rejoins that on such a view it would be difficult to understand the meaning and function of this oppositional relation (*apekṣā*); for it does not produce the object, which is produced by its own causes, and it has no causal efficiency and it is also not experienced, except as associated with the other objects (*nānāpekṣa-pratīyoginām bhedaḥ pratīyate*). Difference also cannot be regarded as being of the essence of oppositional relation; it is only when there is an oppositional relation between objects already experienced that difference manifests

¹ *na bhedo vastuno rūpaṃ tad-abhāva-prasaṅgataḥ arūpeṇa ca bhinnatvaṃ vastuno nāvakalpate.*

Brahma-siddhi, II. 5.

² *nāpekṣā nāma kaścīd vastu-dharmo yena vastuṃ vyavasthāpyeran, na khalu sva-hetu-prāpitodayeṣu sva-bhāva-vyavasthāteṣu vastuṣu sva-bhāva-sthūṭaye vastu-antarāpekṣā yujyate. Ibid.* II. 6, *vṛtti*.

itself. Relations are internal and are experienced in the minds of those who perceive and conceive¹. But it is further objected to this that concepts like father and son are both relational and obviously externally constitutive. To this Maṇḍana's reply is that these two concepts are not based on relation, but on the notion of production; that which produces is the father and that which is produced is the son. Similarly also the notions of long and short depend upon the one occupying greater or less space at the time of measurement and not on relations as constituting their essence.

In reply to this the objector says that, if relations are not regarded as ultimate, and if they are derived from different kinds of actions, then on the same ground the existence of differences may also be admitted. If there were no different kinds of things, it would not be possible to explain different kinds of actions. But Maṇḍana's reply is that the so-called differences may be but differences in name; the burning activity of the same fire is described sometimes as burning and sometimes as cooking. In the Vedānta view it is held that all the so-called varied kinds of actions appear in one object, the Brahman, and so the objection that varied kinds of actions necessarily imply the existence of difference in the agents which produce them is not valid. Again, the difficulty in the case of the Buddhist is in its own way none the less; for according to him all appearances are momentary, and, if this be so, how does he explain the similarities of effects that we notice? It can be according to them only on the basis of an illusory notion of the sameness of causes; so, if the Buddhist can explain our experience of similarity on the false appearance of sameness of causes, the Vedāntist may also in his turn explain all appearances of diversity through illusory notions of difference, and there is thus no necessity of admitting the reality of differences in order to explain our notions of difference in experience². Others again argue that the world must be a world of diversity, as the various objects of our experience serve our various purposes, and it is impossible that one and the same thing should serve different purposes. But this objection is not valid, because even the self-same thing can serve diverse purposes; the same fire can burn, illuminate and cook. There is no objection to there being a number of limited (*avacchinna*) qualities

¹ *pauruṣeyīm apekṣām na vastv anuvartate, ato na vastu-svabhāvaḥ. Ibid.*

² *atha nir-anvaya-vināśānām api kalpanā-viśayād abhedāt kāryasya tulyatā hanta tarhi bhedād eva kalpanā-viśayāt kāryābheda-siddher mūḍhā kāraṇa-bheda-kalpanā. Ibid.*

or characters in the self-same thing. It is sometimes urged that things are different from one another because of their divergent powers (e.g. milk is different from sesamum because curd is produced from milk and not from sesamum); but divergence of powers is like divergence of qualities, and, just as the same fire may have two different kinds of powers or qualities, namely, that of burning and cooking, so the same entity may at different moments both possess and not possess a power, and this does not in the least imply a divergence or difference of entity. It is a great mystery that the one self-same thing should have such a special efficiency (*sāmarthyātīśaya*) that it can be the basis of innumerable divergent appearances. As one entity is supposed to possess many divergent powers, so one self-same entity may on the same principle be regarded as the cause of divergent appearances.

Again, it is held by some that "difference" consists in the negation of one entity in another. Such negations, it may be replied, cannot be indefinite in their nature; for then negations of all things in all places would make them empty. If, however, specific negations are implied with reference to determinate entities, then, since the character of these entities, as different from one another, depends on these implied negations, and since these implied negations can operate only when there are these different entities, they depend mutually upon one another (*itaretarāśraya*) and cannot therefore hold their own. Again, it cannot be said that the notion of "difference" arises out of the operation of perceptual processes like determinate perception (occurring as the culmination of the perceptual process); for there is no proof whatsoever that "difference," as apart from mutual negation, can be definitely experienced. Again, if unity of all things as "existents" (*sat*) was not realized in experience, it would be difficult to explain how one could recognize the sameness of things. This sameness or unity of things is by far the most fundamental of experiences, and it is first manifested as indeterminate experience, which later on transforms itself into various notions of difference¹. In this connection Maṇḍana also takes great pains in refuting the view that things are twofold in their nature, both unity and difference, and also

¹ *pratyekam anubiddhatvād abhedena mṛṣā mataḥ
bhedo yathā taraṅgāṇām bhedāḥ kalāvataḥ.
Brahma-siddhi, II. Kārikā 31.*

the Jaina view that unity and difference are both true in their own respective ways. But it is not necessary to enter into these details. The main point in his refutation of the category of difference consists in this, that he shows that it is inconceivable and dialectically monstrous to suppose that the category of difference can be experienced through perception and that it is philosophically more convenient to suppose that there is but one thing which through ignorance yields the various notions of difference than to suppose that there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity and difference just as they are experienced in perception¹.

In the third chapter of the *Brahma-siddhi*, called the *Niyoga-kāṇḍa*, Maṇḍana refutes the Mīmāṃsā view that the Vedāntic texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā canon of interpretation, viz. that Vedic texts imply either a command or a prohibition. But, as this discussion is not of much philosophical importance, it is not desirable to enter into it. In the fourth chapter, called the *Siddhi-kāṇḍa*, Maṇḍana reiterates the view that the chief import of the Upaniṣad texts consists in showing that the manifold world of appearance does not exist and that its manifestation is due to the ignorance (*avidyā*) of the individual souls (*jīva*). The sort of ultimate reality that is described in the Upaniṣad texts is entirely different from all that we see around us, and it is as propounding this great truth, which cannot be known by ordinary experience, that the Upaniṣads are regarded as the only source from which knowledge of Brahman can be obtained.

Sureśvara (A.D. 800).

Sureśvara's chief works are the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* and *Brhad-āraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika*. The *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* has at least five commentaries, such as the *Bhāva-tattva-prakāśikā* by Citsukha, which is based on Jñānottama's *Candrikā*. This *Candrikā* is thus the earliest commentary on the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*. It is difficult to determine Jñānottama's date. In the concluding verses of this commentary the two names Satyabodha and Jñānottama occur; and Mr Hiriyanṇa points out in his introduction to the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* that these two names also occur in the Sarvajña-piṭha of Conjeeveram, to which he claims to have belonged as teacher and pupil,

¹

*ekasyaivāstu mahimā yan nāneva prakāśate
lāghavān na tu bhinnānām yac cakāśaty abhinnavat.*

Brahma-siddhi, II. Kārikā 32.

and according to the list of teachers of that Maṭha Jñānottama was the fourth from Śaṅkara. This would place Jñānottama at a very early date; if, however, the concluding verses are not his, but inserted by someone else, then of course they give no clue to his date except the fact that he must have lived before Citsukha, since Citsukha's commentary was based on Jñānottama's commentary *Candrikā*. Another commentary is the *Vidyā-surabhi* of Jñānāmṛta, the pupil of Uttamāmṛta; another is the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi-vivaraṇa* of Akhilātman, pupil of Daśarathapriya; and there is also another commentary, called *Sārārtha*, by Rāmadatta, which is of comparatively recent date.

Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* is divided into four chapters. The first chapter deals with discussions regarding the relation of Vedic duties to the attainment of Vedāntic wisdom. *Avidyā* is here defined as the non-perception in one's experience of the ultimate oneness of the self: through this rebirths take place, and it is the destruction of this ignorance which is emancipation (*tan-nāśo muktir ātmanah*). The Mīmāṃsists think that, if one ceases to perform actions due to desire (*kāmya-karma*) and prohibited actions, then the actions which have already accumulated will naturally exhaust themselves in time by yielding fruits, and so, since the obligatory duties do not produce any new *karma*, and since no other new *karmas* accumulate, the person will naturally be emancipated from *karma*. There is, however, in the Vedas no injunction in favour of the attainment of right knowledge. So one should attain emancipation through the performance of the Vedic duties alone. As against this Mīmāṃsā view Sureśvara maintains that emancipation has nothing to do with the performance of actions. Performance of Vedic duties may have an indirect and remote bearing, in the way of purifying one's mind, but it has certainly no direct bearing on the attainment of salvation. Sureśvara states a view attributed to Brahmadatta in the *Vidyā-śurabhi* commentary, that ignorance is not removed merely by the knowledge of the identity of oneself with Brahman, as propounded in Vedānta texts, but through long and continuous meditation on the same. So the right apprehension of the Upaniṣadic passages on the identity of the Brahman and the individual does not immediately produce salvation; one has to continue to meditate for a long time on such ideas of identity; and all the time one has to perform all one's obligatory duties, since, if one ceased to perform them, this

would be a transgression of one's duties and would naturally produce sins, and hence one would not be able to obtain emancipation. So knowledge must be combined with the performance of duties (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*), which is vehemently opposed by Śāṅkara. Another view which occurs also in the *Vārttika*, and is there referred to by the commentator Ānandajñāna as being that of Maṇḍana, is that, as the knowledge derived from the Vedāntic texts is verbal and conceptual, it cannot of itself lead to Brahma-knowledge, but, when these texts are continually repeated, they produce a knowledge of Brahman as a mysterious effect by just the same kind of process as gives rise to the mysterious effects of sacrificial or other Vedic duties. The *Vārttika* refers to various schools among the adherents of the joint operation of knowledge and of duties (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*), some regarding *jñāna* as being the more important, others regarding *karma* as more important, and still others regarding them both as being equally important, thus giving rise to three different schools of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya*. Sureśvara tries to refute all these views by saying that true knowledge and emancipation are one and the same thing, and that it does not in the least require the performance of any kind of Vedic duties. Sureśvara also refutes the doctrine of the joint necessity of *karma* and *jñāna* on the view of those modified dualists, like Bhartṛprapañca, who thought that reality was a unity in differences, so that the doctrine of differences was as true as that of unity, and that, therefore, duties have to be performed even in the emancipated state, because, the differences being also real, the necessity of duties cannot be ignored at any stage of progress, even in the emancipated state, though true knowledge is also necessary for the realization of truth as unity. Sureśvara's refutation of this view is based upon two considerations, viz. that the conception of reality as being both unity and difference is self-contradictory, and that, when the oneness is realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and differences is removed, it is not possible that any duties can be performed at that stage; for the performance of duties implies experience of duality and difference¹.

The second chapter of the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* is devoted to the exposition of the nature of self-realization, as won through the proper interpretation of the unity texts of the Upaniṣads by a

¹ See also Prof. Hirianna's introduction to his edition of the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*.

proper teacher. The experience of the ego and all its associated experiences of attachment, antipathy, etc., vanish with the dawn of true self-knowledge of unity. The notion of ego is a changeful and extraneous element, and hence outside the element of pure consciousness. All manifestations of duality are due to the distracting effects of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. When true knowledge dawns, the self together with all that is objectivity in knowledge vanishes. All the illusory appearances are due to the imposition of *ajñāna* on the pure self, which, however, cannot thereby disturb the unperturbed unity of this pure self. It is the *antaḥkaraṇa*, or the intellect, that suffers all modifications in the cognitive operations; the underlying pure consciousness remains undisturbed all the same. Yet this non-self which appears as mind, intellect, and its objects is not a substantive entity like the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya; for its appearance is due merely to ignorance and delusion. This world-appearance is only a product of nescience (*ajñāna*) or false and indescribable illusion on the self, and is no real product of any real substance as the Sāṃkhya holds. Thus it is that the whole of the world-appearance vanishes like the illusory silver in the conch-shell as soon as truth is realized.

In the third chapter Sureśvara discusses the nature of *ajñāna*, its relation with the self, and the manner of its dissolution. There are two entities, the self and the non-self; now the non-self, being itself a product of *ajñāna* (nescience or ignorance), cannot be regarded as its support or object; so the *ajñāna* has for its support and object the pure self or Brahman; the ignorance of the self is also in regard to itself, since there is no other object regarding which ignorance is possible—the entire field of objective appearance being regarded as the product of ignorance itself. It is the ignorance of the real nature of the self that transforms itself into all that is subjective and objective, the intellect and its objects. It is thus clear that according to Sureśvara, unlike Vācaspati Miśra and Maṇḍana, the *avidyā* is based not upon individual persons (*jīva*), but upon the pure intelligence itself. It is this ignorance which, being connected and based upon the pure self, produces the appearances of individual persons and their subjective and objective experiences. This *ajñāna*, as mere ignorance, is experienced in deep dreamless sleep, when all its modifications and appearances shrink within it and it is experienced in itself as pure ignorance, which again in the waking state manifests itself in the whole series of experiences. It is easy to

see that this view of the relation of *ajñāna* to pure intelligence is different from the idealism preached by Maṇḍana, as noticed in the previous section. An objection is raised that, if the ego were as much an extraneous product of *ajñāna* as the so-called external objects, then the ego should have appeared not as a subject, but as an object like other external or internal objects (e.g. pleasure, pain, etc.). To this Sureśvara replies that, when the *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind is transformed into the form of the external objects, then, in order to give subjectivity to it, the category of the ego (*ahaṃkāra*) is produced to associate objective experiences with particular subjective centres, and then through the reflection of the pure intelligence by way of this category of the ego the objective experience, as associated with this category of the ego, appears as subjective experience. The category of the ego, being immediately and intimately related to the pure intelligence, itself appears as the knower, and the objectivity of the ego is not apparent, just as in burning wood the fire and that which it burns cannot be separated. It is only when the pure intelligence is reflected through the *ajñāna* product of the category of the ego that the notion of subjectivity applies to it, and all that is associated with it is experienced as the "this," the object, though in reality the ego is itself as much an object as the objects themselves. All this false experience, however, is destroyed in the realization of Brahman, when Vedāntic texts of unity are realized. In the third chapter of the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* the central ideas of the other three chapters are recapitulated. In the *Vārttika* Sureśvara discusses the very same problems in a much more elaborate manner, but it is not useful for our present purposes to enter into these details.

Padmapāda (A.D. 820).

Padmapāda is universally reputed to be a direct disciple of Śaṅkarācārya, and, since the manner of his own salutation to Śaṅkarācārya confirms this tradition, and since no facts are known that can contradict such a view, it may safely be assumed that he was a younger contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya. There are many traditional stories about him and his relations with Śaṅkarācārya; but, since their truth cannot be attested by reliable evidence, it is not possible to pronounce any judgment on them. Only two works are attributed to him, viz. the *Pañca-pādikā*, which is a commentary on

Śaṅkara's commentary on the first four *sūtras* of the *Brahma-sūtra* and Śaṅkara's introduction to his commentary known as the *adhyāsa* and the *sambhāvanā-bhāṣya*, and the *Ātma-bodha-vyākhyāna*, called also *Vedānta-sāra*. This *Pañca-pādikā* is one of the most important of the Vedānta works known to us. It was commented on by Prakāśātman (A.D. 1200) in his *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*¹. The *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa* was further commented on by Akhaṇḍānanda (A.D. 1350), a pupil of Ānandagiri, in his *Tattva-dīpana*. Ānandapūrṇa (A.D. 1600), who wrote his *Vidyā-sāgarī* commentary on Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* and also a commentary on the *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana*, wrote a commentary on the *Pañca-pādikā*². Nṛsiṃhāśrama also wrote a commentary on the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, called the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa-prakāśikā*, and Śrīkṛṣṇa also wrote one on the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*. Aufrecht refers to another commentary by Amalānanda as *Pañca-pādikā-śāstra-darpaṇa*; but this is undoubtedly a mistake for his *Śāstra-darpaṇa*, which is noticed below. Amalānanda was a follower of the Vācaspati line and not of the line of Padmapāda and Prakāśātman. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, a pupil of Govindānanda, the author of the *Ratna-prabhā* commentary on the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya*, wrote his *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* (a summary of the main theses of the *Vivaraṇa*) as a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*; but this was strictly on the lines of the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, though it was not a direct commentary thereon. Vidyāranya also wrote a separate monograph, called *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*, in which he interpreted the Vedāntic doctrines on the lines of the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*. Of all these the *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* of Rāmānanda Sarasvatī was probably the last important work on the *Vivaraṇa* line; for Rāmānanda's teacher Govindānanda, the pupil of Gopāla Sarasvatī and the pupil's pupil of Śivarāma, refers in his *Ratna-prabhā* commentary to Jagannāthāśrama's commentary on the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya*, called the *Bhāṣya-dīpikā*, and also to Ānandagiri's commentary as "*vr̥ddhāḥ*," p. 5 (Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, 1904). Jagannātha was the teacher of Nṛsiṃhāśrama; Govindānanda must therefore have lived towards the end of the sixteenth century. Rāmānanda may

¹ Prakāśātman also wrote a metrical summary of Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* and a work called *Śabda-nirṇaya*, in which he tried to prove the claims of scriptural testimony as valid cognition.

² As Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana*, it seems that Ānandapūrṇa lived after Śaṅkara Miśra (A.D. 1529), as is seen from his criticism of his reading of a passage of the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, p. 586 (Chowkhambā).

therefore be placed in the early part of the seventeenth century. Govindānanda himself also in his *Ratna-prabhā* commentary followed the *Vivaraṇa* line of interpretation, and he refers to Prakāśātman with great respect as *Prakāśātma-śrī-caraṇaiḥ* (*Ratna-prabhā*, p. 3).

Padmapāda's method of treatment, as interpreted by Prakāśātman, has been taken in the first and the second volumes of the present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedānta. It is not therefore necessary that much should be said in separate sections regarding the Vedāntic doctrines of these two great teachers. But still a few words on Padmapāda's philosophy may with advantage be read separately. Padmapāda says that *māyā*, *avyākṛta*, *prakṛti*, *agrahaṇa*, *avyakta*, *tamaḥ*, *kāraṇa*, *laya*, *śakti*, *mahāsuṣṭi*, *nidrā*, *kṣara* and *ākāśa* are the terms which are used in older literature as synonymous with *avidyā*. It is this entity that obstructs the pure and independently self-revealing nature of Brahman, and thus, standing as the painted canvas (*citra-bhitti*) of ignorance (*avidyā*), deeds (*karma*) and past impressions of knowledge (*pūrva-prajñā-saṃskāra*) produce the individual persons (*jīvatvāpādikā*). Undergoing its peculiar transformations with God as its support, it manifests itself as the two powers of knowledge and activity (*viñāna-kriyā-śakti-dvayāśraya*) and functions as the doer of all actions and the enjoyer of all experiences (*karṣṭva-bhokṣṭvaikādhāraḥ*). In association with the pure unchangeable light of Brahman it is the complex of these transformations which appears as the immediate ego (*ahamkāra*). It is through the association with this ego that the pure self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer of experiences. This transformation is called *antaḥkaraṇa*, *manas*, *buddhi* and the ego or the ego-feeler (*aham-pratyayin*) on the side of its cognitive activity, while on the vibratory side of its activity (*spanda-śaktyā*), it is called *prāṇa* or biomotor functions. The association of the ego with the pure *ātman*, like the association of the redness of a *japā* flower with a crystal, is a complex (*granthi*) which manifests the dual characteristics of activity of the *avidyā* stuff and the consciousness of the pure self (*saṃbhinnobhaya-rūpatvāt*).

On the question as to whether *avidyā* has for both support (*āśraya*) and object (*viśaya*) Brahman Padmapāda's own attitude does not seem to be very clear. He only says that *avidyā* manifests itself in the individual person (*jīva*) by obstructing the real nature of the Brahman as pure self-luminosity and that the

Brahman by its limitation (*avaccheda*) through beginningless *avidyā* is the cause of the appearance of infinite individual persons. But Prakāśātman introduces a long discussion, trying to prove that Brahman is both the support and the object of *avidyā* as against the view of Vācaspati Miśra that *avidyā* has the Brahman as its object and the *jīva* as its support (*āśraya*). This is thus one of the fundamental points of difference between the *Vivaraṇa* line of interpretation and the interpretation of the Vācaspati line. In this Prakāśātman agrees with the view of Sureśvara and his pupil Sarvajñātman, though, as will be noticed, Sarvajñātman draws some nice distinctions which are not noticed by Sureśvara.

Padmapāda draws a distinction between two meanings of falsehood (*mithyā*), viz. falsehood as simple negation (*apahnaṇa-vacana*) and falsehood as the unspeakable and indescribable (*anirvacanīyatā-vacana*). It is probably he who of all the interpreters first described *ajñāna* or *avidyā* as being of a material nature (*jaḍātmikā*) and of the nature of a power (*jaḍātmikā avidyā-śakti*), and interpreted Śaṅkara's phrase "*mithyā-jñāna-nimittaḥ*" as meaning that it is this material power of *ajñāna* that is the constitutive or the material cause of the world-appearance. Prakāśātman, however, elaborates the conception further in his attempts to give proofs in support of the view that *avidyā* is something positive (*bhāva-rūpa*). These proofs have been repeatedly given by many other later writers, and have already been dealt with in the first volume of the present work. Padmapāda is also probably the first to attempt an explanation of the process of Vedāntic perception which was later on elaborated by Prakāśātman and later writers, and his views were all collected and systematized in the exposition of the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in the sixteenth century. Describing this process, Padmapāda says that, as a result of the cognitive activity of the ego, the objects with which that is concerned become connected with it, and, as a result of that, certain changes are produced in it, and it is these changes that constitute the subject-object relation of knowledge (*jñātur jñeya-sambandhaḥ*). The *antaḥkaraṇa*, or psychical frame of mind, can lead to the limited expression of the pure consciousness only so far as it is associated with its object. The perceptual experience of immediacy (*aparokṣa*) of objects means nothing more than the expression of the pure consciousness through the changing states of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The ego thus becomes a perceiver (*pramātr*) through its connection

with the underlying consciousness. Prakāśātman, however, elaborates it by supposing that the *antaḥkaraṇa* goes out to the objective spatial positions, and assumes the spatial form of the objects perceived. Hence what Padmapāda conceived merely as the change of the *antaḥkaraṇa* states through the varying relation of the *antaḥkaraṇa* with its objects, is interpreted in the definite meaning of this relation as being nothing more than spatial superposition of the *antaḥkaraṇa* on its objects. In inference, however, there is no immediate knowledge, as this is mediated through relations with the reason (*liṅga*). Knowledge however would mean both mediate and immediate knowledge; for it is defined as being the manifestation of the object (*artha-prakāśa*).

On the subject of the causality of Brahman Padmapāda says that that on which the world-appearance is manifested, the Brahman, is the cause of the world. On this point Prakāśātman offers three alternative views, viz. (1) that, like two twisted threads in a rope, *māyā* and Brahman are together the joint cause of the world, (2) that that which has *māyā* as its power is the cause, and (3) that the Brahman which has *māyā* supported on it is the cause of the world, but in all these the ultimate causality rests with Brahman, since *māyā* is dependent thereon. Brahman is *sarva-jña* (omniscient) in the sense that it manifests all that is associated with it, and it is the Brahman that through its *māyā* appears as the world of experience. The doctrines of *avaccheda-vāda* and *pratibimba-vāda* explained in the first volume of the present work are also at least as old as Padmapāda's *Pañca-pādikā*, and both Padmapāda and Prakāśātman seem to support the reflection theory (*pratibimba-vāda*), the theory that the *jīva* is but a reflected image of Brahman¹.

Vācaspati Miśra (A.D. 840).

Vācaspati Miśra, the celebrated author of a commentary called *Bhāmātī* on Śaṅkara's commentary, is the author of a *Tattva-samikṣā*, a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi*; he also commented on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, *Vidhi-viveka*, *Nyāya-vārttika*, and he was

¹ See volume I, pp. 475, 476. These two doctrines were probably present in germinal forms as early as the ninth century. But gradually more and more attention seems to have been paid to them. Appaya Dikṣita gives a fairly good summary of these two doctrines in the *Parimala*, pp. 335-343, Śrī Vāṇi Vilāsa Press, Srirangam, without committing either himself or Vācaspati to any one of these views.

the author of a number of other works. In his *Nyāya-sūcinibandha* he gives his date as 898 (*vasv-aṅka-vasu-vatsare*), which in all probability has to be understood as of the Vikrama-saṃvat, and consequently he can safely be placed in A.D. 842. In his commentary called *Bhāmatī* he offers salutation to Mārtaṇḍa-tilaka-svāmin, which has been understood to refer to his teacher. But Amalānanda in commenting thereon rightly points out that this word is a compound of the two names Mārtaṇḍa and Tilakasvāmin, belonging to gods adored with a view to the fruition of one's actions. Tilakasvāmin is referred to in *Yājñavalkya*, I. 294 as a god, and the *Mitākṣarā* explains it as being the name of the god Kārttikeya or Skanda. Udayana, however, in his *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyā-pariśuddhi* (p. 9), a commentary on Vācaspati's *Tātparyā-ṭikā*, refers to one Trilocana as being the teacher of Vācaspati, and Vardhamāna in his commentary on it, called *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa*, confirms this: Vācaspati himself also refers to Trilocanaguru, whom he followed in interpreting the word *vyavasāya* (*Nyāya-sūtra*, I. i. 4) as determinate knowledge (*savikalpa*)¹. It is however interesting to note that in the *Nyāya-kaṇikā* (verse 3) he refers to the author of the *Nyāya-mañjarī* (in all probability Jayanta) as his teacher (*vidyā-taru*)². Vācaspati says at the end of his *Bhāmatī* commentary that he wrote that work when the great king Nṛga was reigning. This king, so far as the present writer is aware, has not yet been historically traced. *Bhāmatī* was Vācaspati's last great work; for in the colophon at the end of the *Bhāmatī* he says that he had already written his *Nyāya-kaṇikā*, *Tattva-samikṣā*, *Tattva-bindu* and other works on Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Yoga.

Vācaspati's Vedāntic works are *Bhāmatī* and *Tattva-samikṣā* (on *Brahma-siddhi*). The last work has not yet been published. Aufrecht, referring to his work, *Tattva-bindu*, says that it is a Vedānta work. This is however a mistake, as the work deals with the *śphoṭa* doctrines of sound, and has nothing to do with Vedānta. In the absence of Vācaspati's *Tattva-samikṣā*, which has not been published, and manuscripts of which have become extremely scarce, it is difficult to give an entirely satisfactory account of the special features of Vācaspati's view of Vedānta. But his *Bhāmatī*

¹ *trilocana-gurūnnīta-mārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ
yathāmānaṃ yathā-vastu vyākhyātam idam idṛśam.*

Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyā-ṭikā, p. 87. Benares, 1898.

² *ajñāna-timira-śamanīm nyāya-mañjarīṃ rucirām
prasavitre prabhavitre vidyā-tarave namo gurave.*

Nyāya-kaṇikā, introductory verse.

commentary is a great work, and it is possible to collect from it some of the main features of his views. As to the method of Vācaspati's commentary, he always tries to explain the text as faithfully as he can, keeping himself in the background and directing his great knowledge of the subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of thoughts, objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred to in the text. The *Bhāmātī* commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* is a very important one, and it had a number of important sub-commentaries. The most important and earliest of these is the *Vedānta-kalpa-taru* of Amalānanda (A.D. 1247-1260), on which Appaya Dikṣita (about A.D. 1600) wrote another commentary called *Vedānta-kalpa-taru-parimala*¹. The *Vedānta-kalpa-taru* was also commented on by Lakṣmīnṛsiṃha, author of the *Tarka-dīpikā*, son of Koṇḍa-bhaṭṭa and grandson of Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa, towards the end of the seventeenth century, and this commentary is called *Ābhoga*. The *Ābhoga* commentary is largely inspired by the *Vedānta-kalpa-taru-parimala*, though in many cases it differs from and criticizes it. In addition to these there are also other commentaries on the *Bhāmātī*, such as the *Bhāmātī-tilaka*, the *Bhāmātī-vilāsa*, the *Bhāmātī-vyākhyā* by Śrīraṅganātha and another commentary on the *Vedānta-kalpa-taru*, by Vaidyanātha Payaṅḍa, called the *Vedānta-kalpa-taru-mañjarī*.

Vācaspati defines truth and reality as immediate self-revelation (*sva-prakāśatā*) which is never contradicted (*abādhita*). Only the pure self can be said to be in this sense ultimately real. He thus definitely rejects the definition of reality as the participation of the class-concept of being, as the Naiyāyikas hold, or capacity of doing work (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*), as the Buddhists hold. He admits two kinds of *ajñāna*, as psychological and as forming the material cause of the mind and the inner psychical nature of man or as the material world outside. Thus he says in his commentary on the *Saṅkara-*

¹ Amalānanda also wrote another work, called *Śāstra-darpaṇa*, in which, taking the different topics (*adhikaraṇas*) of the *Brahma-sūtras*, he tried to give a plain and simple general explanation of the whole topic without entering into much discussion on the interpretations of the different *sūtras* on the topic. These general lectures on the *adhikaraṇas* of the *Brahma-sūtras* did not, however, reveal any originality of views on the part of Amalānanda, but were based on Vācaspati's interpretation, and were but reflections of his views, as Amalānanda himself admits in the second verse of the *Śāstra-darpaṇa* (*Vācaspati-mati-vimbī-tam ādarśam prārābhe vimālam*)—Śrī Vāṇi Vilāsa Press, 1913, Srirangam, Madras.

bhāṣya, I. iii. 30, that at the time of the great dissolution (*mahā-pralaya*) all products of *avidyā*, such as the psychical frame (*antaḥkaraṇa*), cease to have any functions of their own, but are not on account of that destroyed; they are at that time merged in the indescribable *avidyā*, their root cause, and abide there as potential capacities (*sūkṣmeṇa śakti-rūpeṇa*) together with the wrong impressions and psychological tendencies of illusion. When the state of *mahā-pralaya* is at an end, moved by the will of God, they come out like the limbs of a tortoise or like the rejuvenation during rains of the bodies of frogs which have remained inert and lifeless all the year round, and then, being associated with their proper tendencies and impressions, they assume their particular names and forms as of old before the *mahā-pralaya*. Though all creation takes place through God's will, yet God's will is also determined by the conditions of *karma* and the impressions produced by it. This statement proves that he believed in *avidyā* as an objective entity of an indescribable nature (*anirvācya avidyā*), into which all world-products disappear during the *mahā-pralaya* and out of which they reappear in the end and become associated with psychological ignorance and wrong impressions which had also disappeared into it at the time of the *mahā-pralaya*. *Avidyā* thus described resembles very much the *prakṛti* of Yoga, into which all the world-products disappear during a *mahā-pralaya* together with the fivefold *avidyā* and their impressions, which at the time of creation become associated with their own proper *buddhis*. In the very adoration hymn of the *Bhāmātī* Vācaspati speaks of *avidyā* being twofold (*avidyā-dvītaya*), and says that all appearances originate from Brahman in association with or with the accessory cause (*sahakāri-kāraṇa*) of the two *avidyās* (*avidyā-dvītaya-sacivasya*). In explaining this passage Amalānanda points out that this refers to two *avidyās*, one as a beginningless positive entity and the other as the preceding series of beginningless false impressions (*anyā pūrvāpūrvā-bhramasamśkāraḥ*). There is thus one aspect of *avidyā* which forms the material stuff of the appearances; but the appearances could not have been appearances if they were not illusorily identified with the immediate and pure self-revelation (*sva-prakāśa cit*). Each individual person (*jīva*) confuses and misapprehends his psychical frame and mental experiences as intelligent in themselves, and it is by such an illusory confusion that these psychical states

attain any meaning as appearances; for otherwise these appearances could not have been expressed at all. But how does the person come in, since the concept of a person itself presupposes the very confusion which it is supposed to make? To this Vācaspati's reply is that the appearance of the personality is due to a previous false confusion, and that to another previous false confusion (cf. Maṇḍana). So each false confusion has for its cause a previous false confusion, and that another false confusion and so on in a beginningless series. It is only through such a beginningless series of confusions that all the later states of confusion are to be explained. Thus on the one hand the *avidyā* operates in the individual person, the *jīva*, as its locus or support (*āśraya*), and on the other hand it has the Brahman or pure self-revealing intelligence as its object (*viśaya*), which it obscures and through which it makes its false appearances to be expressed, thereby giving them a false semblance of reality, whereby all the world-appearances seem to be manifestations of reality¹. It is easy to see how this view differs from the view of the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* of Sarvajñātma Muni; for in the opinion of the latter, the Brahman is both the support (*āśraya*) and the object (*viśaya*) of *añāna*, which means that the illusion does not belong to the individual person, but is of a transcendental character. It is not the individual person as such (*jīva*), but the pure intelligence that shines through each individual person (*pratyak-cit*), that is both obscured and diversified into a manifold of appearances in a transcendental manner. In Vācaspati's view, however, the illusion is a psychological one for which the individual person is responsible, and it is caused through a beginningless chain of illusions or confusions, where each succeeding illusory experience is explained by a previous illusory mode of experience, and that by another and so on. The content of the illusory experiences is also derived from the indescribable *avidyā*, which is made to appear as real by their association with Brahman, the ultimately real and self-revealing Being. The illusory appearances, as they are, cannot be described as being existent or non-existent; for, though they seem to have their individual existences, they are always negated by other existences, and none of them have that kind of reality which can be said to defy all negation and contradiction; and it is only such uncontradicted self-revelation that can be said to be

¹ It is in the latter view that Vācaspati differs from Maṇḍana, on whose *Brahma-siddhi* he wrote his *Tattva-samīkṣā*.

ultimately real. The unreality of world-appearances consists in the fact that they are negated and contradicted; and yet they are not absolutely non-existent like a hare's horn, since, had they been so, they could not have been experienced at all. So in spite of the fact that the appearances are made out of *avidyā*, they have so far as any modified existence can be ascribed to them, the Brahman as their underlying ground, and it is for this reason that Brahman is to be regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. As soon as this Brahman is realized, the appearances vanish; for the root of all appearances is their illusory confusion with reality, the Brahman. In the *Bhāmati* commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary, II. ii. 28, Vācaspati points out that according to the Śaṅkara Vedānta the objects of knowledge are themselves indescribable in their nature (*anirvacanīyaṃ nīlādi*) and not mere mental ideas (*na hi brahma-vādinō nīlādy-ākārāṃ vittim abhyupagacchanti kintu anirvacanīyaṃ nīlādi*). The external objects therefore are already existent outside of the perceiver, only their nature and stuff are indescribable and irrational (*anirvācya*). Our perceptions therefore refer always to such objects as their excitants or producers, and they are not of the nature of pure sensations or ideas generated from within, without the aid of such external objects.

Sarvajñātma Muni (A.D. 900).

Sarvajñātma Muni was a disciple of Sureśvarācārya, the direct disciple of Śaṅkara, to whom at the beginning of his work *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* he offers salutation by the name Deveśvara, the word being a synonym of the word *sura* in Sureśvara. The identification of Deveśvara with Sureśvara is made by Rāma Tīrtha, the commentator on the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, and this identification does not come into conflict with anything else that is known about Sarvajñātma Muni either from the text of his work or from other references to him in general. It is said that his other name was Nityabodhācārya. The exact date of neither Sureśvara nor Sarvajñātma can be definitely determined. Mr Pandit in his introduction to the *Gauḍa-vāho* expresses the view that, since Bhavabhūti was a pupil of Kumārila, Kumārila must have lived in the middle of the seventh century, and, since Śaṅkara was a contemporary of Kumārila (on the testimony of the *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya*), he must have lived either in the seventh century or in the first half of the eighth century. In the

first volume of the present work Śaṅkara was placed between A.D. 780–820. The arguments of Mr Pandit do not raise any new point for consideration. His theory that Bhavabhūti was a pupil of Kumārila is based on the evidence of two manuscripts, where, at the end of an act of the *Mālātī-Mādhava*, it is said that the work was written by a pupil of Kumārila. This evidence, as I have noticed elsewhere, is very slender. The tradition that Śaṅkara was a contemporary of Kumārila, based as it is only on the testimony of the *Śaṅkara-digvijaya*, cannot be seriously believed. All that can be said is that Kumārila probably lived not long before Śaṅkara, if one can infer this from the fact that Śaṅkara does not make any reference to Kumārila. Hence there seems to be no reason why the traditionally accepted view that Śaṅkara was born in Saṃvat 844, or A.D. 788, or Kali age 3889, should be given up¹. Taking the approximate date of Śaṅkara's death to be about A.D. 820 and taking into consideration that Sureśvara, the teacher of Sarvajñātman, occupied his high pontifical position for a long time, the supposition that Sarvajñātman lived in A.D. 900 may not be very far wrong. Moreover, this does not come into conflict with the fact that Vācaspati, who probably wrote his earlier work the *Nyāya-sūci-nibandha* in A.D. 842, also wrote his commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi* when Sureśvara was occupying the pontifical position.

Sarvajñātma Muni was thus probably a younger contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra. In his *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* he tries to describe the fundamental problems of the Vedānta philosophy, as explained by Śaṅkara. This work, which is probably the only work of his that is known to us, is divided into four chapters, written in verses of different metres. It contains in the first chapter 563 verses, in the second 248, in the third 365 and in the fourth 63. In the first chapter of the work he maintains that pure Brahman is the ultimate cause of everything through the instrumentality (*dvāra*) of *ajñāna*. The *ajñāna*, which rests on (*āśraya*) the pure self and operates on it as its object (*viśaya*), covers its real nature (*ācchādyā*) and creates delusory appearances (*vikṣipati*), thereby producing the threefold appearances of God (*Īśvara*), soul (*jīva*) and the world. This *ajñāna* has no independent existence, and its effects are seen only through the pure self (*cid-ātman*) as its ground and object, and its creations are all false. The pure self is directly perceived in the state of dreamless sleep as being of the nature

¹ See *Ārya-vidyā-sudhā-kara*, pp. 226, 227.

of pure bliss and happiness without the slightest touch of sorrow; and pure bliss can only be defined as that which is the ultimate end and not under any circumstances a means to anything else; such is also the pure self, which cannot be regarded as being a means to anything else; moreover, there is the fact that everyone always desires his self as the ultimate object of attainment which he loves above anything else. Such an infinite love and such an ultimate end cannot be this limited self, which is referred to as the agent of our ordinary actions and the sufferer in the daily concerns of life. The intuitive perception of the seers of the Upaniṣads also confirms the truth of the self as pure bliss and the infinite. The illusory impositions on the other hand are limited appearances of the subject and the object which merely contribute to the possibility of false attribution and cannot therefore be real (*na vāstavaṃ tat*). When the Brahman is associated with *ajñāna* there are two false entities, viz. the *ajñāna* and the Brahman as associated with the *ajñāna*; but this does not imply that the pure Brahman, which underlies all these false associations, is itself also false, since this might lead to the criticism that, everything being false, there is no reality at all, as some of the Buddhists contend. A distinction is drawn here between *ādhāra* and *adhiṣṭhāna*. The pure Brahman that underlies all appearances is the true *adhiṣṭhāna* (ground), while the Brahman as modified by the false *ajñāna* is a false *ādhāra* or a false object to which the false appearances directly refer. All illusory appearances are similarly experienced. Thus in the experience "I perceive this piece of silver" (in the case of the false appearance of a piece of conch-shell as silver) the silvery character or the false appearance of the silver is associated with the "this" element before the perceiver, and the "this" element in its turn, as the false object, becomes associated with the false silver as the "this silver." But, though the objectivity of the false silver as the "this" before the perceiver is false, the "this" of the true object of the conch-shell is not false. It is the above kind of double imposition of the false appearance on the object and of the false object on the false appearance that is known as *parasparādhyāsa*. It is only the false object that appears in the illusory appearance and the real object lies untouched. The inner psychical frame (*antaḥkaraṇa*) to a certain extent on account of its translucent character resembles pure Brahman, and on account of this similarity it is often mistaken for the pure self and the pure

self is mistaken for the *antaḥkaraṇa*. It may be contended that there could be no *antaḥkaraṇa* without the illusory imposition, and so it could not itself explain the nature of illusion. The reply given to such an objection is that the illusory imposition and its consequences are beginningless and there is no point of time to which one could assign its beginning. Hence, though the present illusion may be said to have taken its start with the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the *antaḥkaraṇa* is itself the product of a previous imposition, and that of a previous *antaḥkaraṇa*, and so on without a beginning. Just as in the illusion of the silver in the conch-shell, though there is the piece of conch-shell actually existing, yet it is not separately seen, and all that is seen to exist is the unreal silver, so the real Brahman exists as the ground, though the world during the time of its appearance is felt to be the only existing thing and the Brahman is not felt to be existent separately from it. Yet this *ajñāna* has no real existence and exists only for the ignorant. It can only be removed when the true knowledge of Brahman dawns, and it is only through the testimony of the Upaniṣads that this knowledge can dawn; for there is no other means of insight into the nature of Brahman. Truth again is defined not as that which is amenable to proof, but as that which can be independently and directly felt. The *ajñāna*, again, is defined as being positive in its nature (*bhāvarūpam*) and, though it rests on the pure Brahman, yet, like butter in contact with fire, it also at its touch under certain circumstances melts away. The positive character of *ajñāna* is felt in the world in its materiality and in ourselves as our ignorance. The real ground cause, however, according to the testimony of the Upaniṣads, is the pure Brahman, and the *ajñāna* is only the instrument or the means by which it can become the cause of all appearances; but, *ajñāna* not being itself in any way the material cause of the world, Sarvajñātman strongly holds that Brahman in association and jointly with *ajñāna* cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world. The *ajñāna* is only a secondary means, without which the transformation of appearances is indeed not possible, but which has no share in the ultimate cause that underlies them. He definitely denies that Brahman could be proved by any inference to the effect that that which is the cause of the production, existence and dissolution of the world is Brahman, since the nature of Brahman can be understood only by the testimony of the scriptures. He indulges in long discussions in order to show how the Upaniṣads

can lead to a direct and immediate apprehension of reality as Brahman.

The second chapter of the book is devoted mainly to the further elucidation of these doctrines. In that chapter Sarvajñātma Muni tries to show the difference of the Vedānta view from the Buddhist, which difference lies mainly in the fact that, in spite of the doctrine of illusion, the Vedānta admits the ultimate reality to be Brahman, which is not admitted by the Buddhists. He also shows how the experiences of waking life may be compared with those of dreams. He then tries to show that neither perception nor other means of proof can prove the reality of the world-appearance and criticizes the philosophic views of the Sāṃkhya, Nyāya and other systems. He further clarifies his doctrine of the relation of Brahman to *ajñāna* and points out that the association of *ajñāna* is not with the one pure Brahman, nor with individual souls, but with the pure light of Brahman, which shines as the basis and ground of individual souls (*pratyaktva*); for it is only in connection with this that the *ajñāna* appears and is perceived. When with the dawn of right knowledge pure Brahman as one is realized, the *ajñāna* is not felt. It is only in the light of Brahman as underlying the individual souls that the *ajñāna* is perceived, as when one says, "I do not know what you say"; so it is neither the individual soul nor the pure one which is Brahman, but the pure light as it reveals itself through each and every individual soul¹. The true light of Brahman is always there, and emancipation means nothing more than the destruction of the *ajñāna*. In the third chapter Sarvajñātman describes the ways (*sādhana*) by which one should try to destroy this *ajñāna* and prepare oneself for this result and for the final Brahma knowledge. In the last chapter he describes the nature of emancipation and the attainment of Brahmahood.

The *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* was commented upon by a number of distinguished writers, none of whom seem to be very old. Thus Nṛsiṃhāśrama wrote a commentary called *Tattva-bodhinī*, Puruṣottama Dīkṣita wrote another called *Subodhinī*, Rāghavānanda another called *Vidyāmṛta-varṣiṇī*, Viśvadeva another called *Siddhānta-dīpa*, on which Rāma Tīrtha, pupil of Kṛṣṇa Tīrtha,

¹ *nājñānam advayasamāśrayam iṣṭam evaṃ
nādvaita-vastu-viśayaṃ niṣitekṣaṇānām
nānanda-nitya-viśayāśrayam iṣṭam etat
pratyaktva-mātra-viśayāśrayatānubhūteḥ.*

Samkṣepa-śārīraka, II. 211.

based his commentary *Anvayārtha-prakāśikā*. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī also wrote another commentary, called *Samkṣepa-sārīraka-sāra-saṃgraha*.

Ānandabodha Yati.

Ānandabodha is a great name in the school of Sāṅkara Vedānta. He lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century¹. He refers to Vācaspati's *Tattva-samīkṣā* and criticizes, but without mentioning his name, Sarvajñātman's view of the interpretation of the nature of self as pure bliss. He wrote at least three works on Sāṅkara Vedānta, viz. *Nyāya-makaranda*, *Nyāya-dīpāvalī* and *Pramāṇa-mālā*. Of these the *Nyāya-makaranda* was commented upon by Citsukha and his pupil Sukhaprakāśa in works called *Nyāya-makaranda-ṭīkā* and *Nyāya-makaranda-vivecanī*. Sukhaprakāśa also wrote a commentary on the *Nyāya-dīpāvalī*, called *Nyāya-dīpāvalī-tātparya-ṭīkā*. Anubhūtiśvarūpa Ācārya (late thirteenth century), the teacher of Ānandajñāna, also wrote commentaries on all the three works of Ānandabodha. Ānandabodha does not pretend to have made any original contribution and says that he collected his materials from other works which existed in his time². He starts his *Nyāya-makaranda* with the thesis that the apparent difference of different selves is false, since not only do the Upaniṣads hold this doctrine, but it is also intelligible on grounds of reason that the apparent multiplicity of selves can be explained on an imaginary supposition of diversity (*kālpanika-puruṣa-bheda*), even though in reality there is but one soul. Arguing on the fact that even the illusory supposition of an imaginary diversity may explain all appearances of diversity, Ānandabodha tries to refute the argument of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* that the diversity of souls is proved by the fact that with the birth and death of some there is not birth or death of others. Having refuted the plurality of subjects in his own way, he turns to the refutation of plurality of objects. He holds that difference (*bheda*) cannot be perceived by sense-perception, since difference cannot be perceived without perceiving both the object and all else from which it differs. It cannot be said that first the object is perceived and then the difference; for perception will naturally

¹ Mr Tripathi in his introduction to Ānandajñāna's *Tarka-saṃgraha* gives Ānandabodha's date as A.D. 1200.

² *Nānā-nibandha-kusuma-prabhavāvadāta-nyāyāpadeśa-makaranda-kadamba eṣa.*

cease with awareness of its object, and there is no way in which it can operate for the comprehension of difference; neither can it be held that the comprehension of difference can in any way be regarded as simultaneous with the perception of the sensibles. Nor is it possible that, when two sensibles are perceived at two different points of time, there could be any way in which their difference could be perceived; for the two sensibles cannot be perceived at one and the same time. It cannot, again, be said that the perception of any sensible, say blue, involves with it the perception of all that is not blue, the yellow, the white, the red, etc.; for in that case the perception of any sensible would involve the perception of all other objects of the world. The negation of the difference of an entity does not mean anything more than the actual position of it. It is not, however, right to hold that all positive entities are of the nature of differences; for this is directly against all experience. If differences are perceived as positive entities, then to comprehend their differences further differences would be required, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. Moreover, differences, being negative in their nature, cannot be regarded as capable of being perceived as positive sensibles. Whether difference is taken as a subject or a predicate in the form "the difference of the jug from the pillar," or "the jug is different from the pillar," in either case there is comprehension of an earlier and more primitive difference between the two objects, on the basis of which the category of difference is realized.

Ānandabodha then discusses the different theories of error held by the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhism, etc. and supports the *anirvacanīya* theory of error¹. In this connection he records his view as to why nescience (*avidyā*) has to be admitted as the cause of world-appearance. He points out that the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained without the assumption of a cause which forms its substance. Since this world-appearance is unreal, it cannot come out of a substance that is real, nor can it come out of something absolutely non-existent and unreal, since such a thing evidently could not be the cause of anything; hence, since the cause of world-appearance cannot be either real or unreal, it must have for its cause something which is neither real nor unreal, and the neither-real-nor-unreal entity is *avidyā*².

¹ See the first volume of the present work, ch. x, p. 485.

² *Nyāya-makaranda*, pp. 122, 123.

He next proceeds to prove the doctrine that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness (*ātmanah samvid-rūpatva*). This he does, firstly, by stating the view that awareness in revealing itself reveals also immediately its objects, and secondly, by arguing that even though objects of awareness may be varying, there is still the unvarying consciousness which continues the same even when there is no object. If there were only the series of awarenesses arising and ceasing and if there were constant and persistent awarenesses abiding all the time, how could one note the difference between one awareness and another, between blue and yellow? Referring to *avidyā*, he justifies the view of its being supported on Brahman, because *avidyā*, being indefinable in its nature, i.e. being neither negative nor positive, there can be no objection to its being regarded as supported on Brahman. Moreover, Brahman can only be regarded as omniscient in its association with *avidyā*, since all relations are of the nature of *avidyā* and there cannot be any omniscience without a knowledge of the relations. In his *Nyāya-dīpavalī* he tries by inference to prove the falsity of the world-appearance on the analogy of the falsity of the illusory silver. His method of treatment is more or less the same as the treatment in the *Advaita-siddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī at a much later period. There is practically nothing new in his *Pramāṇa-mālā*. It is a small work of about twenty-five pages, and one can recognize here the arguments of the *Nyāya-makaranda* in a somewhat different form and with a different emphasis. Most of Ānandabodha's arguments were borrowed by the later writers of the Vedānta school. Vyāsātīrtha of the Madhva school of Vedānta collected most of the standard Vedānta arguments from Ānandabodha and Prakāśātman for refutation in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, and these were again refuted by Madhusūdana's great work, the *Advaita-siddhi*, and these refuted in their turn in Rāma Tīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī*. The history of this controversy will be dealt with in the third volume of the present work.

Mahā-vidyā and the Development of Logical Formalism.

The Buddhists had taken to the use of the dialectic method of logical discussions even from the time of Nāgārjuna. But this was by no means limited to the Buddhists. The Naiyāyikas had also adopted these methods, as is well illustrated by the writings

of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana and others. Śaṅkara himself had utilized this method in the refutation of Buddhistic, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika and other systems of Indian philosophy. But, though these writers largely adopted the dialectic methods of Nāgārjuna's arguments, there seems to be little attempt on their part to develop the purely formal side of Nāgārjuna's logical arguments, viz. the attempt to formulate definitions with the strictest formal rigour and to offer criticisms with that over-emphasis of formalism and scholasticism which attained their culmination in the writings of later Nyāya writers such as Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya, Mathurānātha Bhaṭṭācārya and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. It is generally believed that such methods of overstrained logical formalism were first started by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya of Mithilā early in the thirteenth century. But the truth seems to be that this method of logical formalism was steadily growing among certain writers from as early as the tenth and eleventh centuries. One notable instance of it is the formulation of the *mahā-vidyā* modes of syllogism by Kulārka Paṇḍita in the eleventh century. There is practically no reference to this *mahā-vidyā* syllogism earlier than Śrīharṣa (A.D. 1187)¹. References to this syllogism are found in the writings of Citsukha Ācārya (A.D. 1220), Amalānanda, called also Vyāsāśrama (A.D. 1247), Ānandajñāna (A.D. 1260), Veṅkaṭa (A.D. 1369), Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara (A.D. 1450) and others². The *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms were started probably some time in the eleventh century, and they continued to be referred to or refuted by writers till the fifteenth century, though it is curious to notice that they were not mentioned by Gaṅgeśa or any of his followers, such as Raghunātha, Jagadīśa and others, in their discussions on the nature of *kevalānvayi* types of inference.

¹ *gandhe gandhāntara-prasaṅgikā na ca yuktir asti; tadastitve vā kā no hāmiḥ; tasyā apy asmābhiḥ khaṇḍamīyatvāt*. Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, p. 1181, Chowkhambā edition.

² *athavā ayam ghaṭah etadghaṭāmyatve sati vedyatvānadhikaraṇānya-padārhatvāt paṭavād ity-ādimahāvidyā-prayogair api vedyatva-siddhir apy ūhanīyā*.—Citsukha Ācārya's *Tattva-pradīpikā*, p. 13, also p. 304. The commentator Pratyagrūpa-bhagavān mentions Kulārka Paṇḍita by name. *evam sarvā mahavidyās tacchāyā vānye prayogāḥ khaṇḍanīyā iti*.—Amalānanda's *Vedānta-kalpa-taru*, p. 304 (Benares, 1895). *sarvāśv eva mahāvidyāsu*, etc.—Ānandajñāna's *Tarka-saṃgraha*, p. 22. Also Veṅkaṭa's *Nyāya-parīśuddhi*, pp. 125, 126, 273–276, etc., and *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* with *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, pp. 478, 485, 486–491. Mr M. R. Telang has collected all the above references to *mahā-vidyā* in his introduction to the *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1920.

In all probability *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms were first started by Kulārka Paṇḍita in his *Daśa-śloki-mahā-vidyā-sūtra* containing sixteen different types of definitions for sixteen different types of *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms. Assuming that Kulārka Paṇḍita, the founder of *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms, flourished in the eleventh century, it may well be suggested that many other writers had written on this subject before Vādindra refuted them in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. Not only does Vādindra refer to the arguments of previous writers in support of *mahā-vidyā* and in refutation of it in his *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana*, but Bhuvana-sundara Sūri also in his commentary on the *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana* refers to other critics of *mahā-vidyā*. Recently two different commentaries have been discovered on *mahā-vidyā*, by Puruṣottama-vana and Pūrṇaprajña. Veṅkaṭa in his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* refers to the *Mahā-vidyā*, the *Māna-manohara* and the *Pramāṇa-mañjarī*, and Śrīnivāsa in his commentary *Nyāya-sāra* on the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* describes them as works which deal with roundabout syllogisms (*vakrānumāna*)¹. This shows that for four or five centuries *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms were in certain quarters supported and refuted from the eleventh century to the sixteenth century.

It is well known that the great Mīmāṃsā writers, such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers, believed in the doctrine of the eternity of sounds, while the followers of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, called also Yaugācāryas, regarded sound as non-eternal (*anitya*). *Mahā-vidyā* modes were special modes of syllogism, invented probably by Kulārka Paṇḍita for refuting the Mīmāṃsā arguments of the eternity of sounds and proving the non-eternity of sounds. If these modes of syllogism could be regarded as valid, they would also have other kinds of application for the proving or disproving of other theories and doctrines. The special feature of the *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms consisted in their attempt to prove a thesis by the *kevalānvayi* method. Ordinarily concomitance (*vyāpti*) consists in the existence of the reason (*hetu*) in association with the probandum and its non-existence in all places where the probandum is absent (*sādhyābhāvavada-vṛttitvam*). But the *kevalānvayi* form of inference which is admitted by the Naiyāyikas applies to those cases where the probandum is so universal that there is no case where it is absent, and consequently it cannot have a reason (*hetu*) whose concomitance with it can be determined by

¹ See M. R. Telang's introduction to the *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana*.

its non-existence in all cases where the probandum is absent and its existence in all cases where the probandum is present. Thus in the proposition, "This is describable or nameable (*idam abhidheyam*) because it is knowable (*prameyatvāt*)," both the probandum and the reason are so universal that there is no case where their concomitance can be tested by negative instances. *Mahā-vidyā* syllogisms were forms of *kevalānvayi* inference of this type, and there were sixteen different varieties of it which had this advantage associated with them, that, they being *kevalānvayi* forms of syllogism, it was not easy to criticize them by pointing out defects or lapses of concomitance of the reason and the probandum, as no negative instances are available in their case. In order to make it possible that a *kevalānvayi* form of syllogism should be applicable for affirming the non-eternity of sound, Kulārka tried to formulate propositions in sixteen different ways so that on *kevalānvayi* lines such an affirmation might be made about a subject that by virtue of it the non-eternity of sound should follow necessarily as the only consequence, other possible alternatives being ruled out. It is this indirect approach of inference that has been by the critics of *mahā-vidyā* styled roundabout syllogism. Thus *mahā-vidyā* has been defined as that method of syllogism by which a specific probandum which it is desired to prove by the joint method of agreement and difference (3, *anvaya-vyatireki-sādhya-viśeṣaṃ vādy-abhimatam sādhayati*) is proved by the necessary implication of the existence of a particular probandum in a particular subject (2, *pakṣe vyāpaka-pratitya-paryavasāna-balāt*), affirmed by the existence of *hetu* in the subject on *kevalānvayi* lines (1, *kevalānvayini vyāpake pravartamāno hetuḥ*). In other words, a reason which exists in a probandum inseparably abiding in a subject (*pakṣa*) without failure (proposition 1) proves (*sādhayati*), by virtue of the fact, that such an unfailing existence of that probandum in that subject in that way is only possible under one supposition (proposition 2), namely, the affirmation of another probandum in another subject (e.g. the affirmation of the probandum "non-eternity" to the subject "sound"), which is generally sought to be proved by the direct method of agreement and difference (proposition 3). This may be understood by following a typical *mahā-vidyā* syllogism. Thus it is said that by reason of knowability (*mevatva*) as such the self, dissociated from the relations of all eternal and non-eternal qualities of all other objects excepting

sound, is related to a non-eternal entity (*ātmā śabdetarāṇitya-nitya-yaṁvṛttitvānadhikaraṇānitya-vṛtti-dharmavān meyatvād ghaṭavat*). Now by the qualifying adjunct of "self" the self is dissociated from all qualities that it shares with all other eternal and non-eternal objects excepting sound, and the consequence is that it is left only with some kind of non-eternal quality in relation with sound, as this was left out of consideration in the qualifying adjunct, which did not take sound within its purview. Since many relations are also on the Nyāya view treated as qualities, such a non-eternal relation of the self to sound may be their mutual difference or their mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva*). Now, if the self, which is incontestably admitted to be eternal, has such a non-eternal quality or relation to sound, then this can only be under one supposition, viz. that sound is non-eternal. But, since all other non-eternal relations that the self may have to other non-eternal objects, and all other eternal relations that it may have to other eternal objects, and all other such relations that it may have to all eternal and non-eternal objects jointly, except sound, have already been taken out of consideration by the qualifying phrase, the inseparable and unfailing non-eternal quality that the self may have, in the absence of any negative instances, is in relation to sound; but, if it has a non-eternal quality in relation to sound, then this can be so only under one supposition, viz. that sound is itself non-eternal; for the self is incontestably known as eternal. This indirect and roundabout method of syllogism is known as *mahā-vidyā*. It is needless to multiply examples to illustrate all the sixteen types of propositions of *mahā-vidyā* syllogism, as they are all formed on the same principle with slight variations.

Vādindra in his *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana* refuted these types of syllogism as false, and it is not known that any one else tried to revive them by refuting Vādindra's criticisms. Vādindra styles himself in the colophon at the end of the first chapter of his *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana* "*Hara-kīṅkara-nyāyācārya-parama-pāṇḍita-bhaṭṭa-vādindra*," and in the concluding verse of his work refers to Yogīśvara as his preceptor. The above epithets of *Hara-kīṅkara*, *nyāyācārya*, etc. do not show however what his real name was. Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana* that his pupil Bhaṭṭa Rāghava in his commentary on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāya-sāra*, called *Nyāya-sāra-vicāra*, refers to him by the name Mahādeva. Vādindra's real name, then, was Mahādeva,

and the rest of the epithets were his titles. Bhaṭṭa Rāghava says that the name of Vādindra's father was Sāraṅga. Bhaṭṭa Rāghava gives his own date in the Śaka era. The sentence however is liable to two different constructions, giving us two different dates, viz. A.D. 1252 and 1352. But, judging from the fact that Vādindra was a religious counsellor of King Śrīsiṃha (also called Śiṅghana), who reigned in Devagiri A.D. 1210-1247, and that in all probability he lived before Veṅkaṭa (A.D. 1267-1369), who refers to his *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana*, Mr Telang suggests that we should take A.D. 1252 to be the date of Bhaṭṭa Rāghava; and, since he was a pupil of Vādindra, one may deduct about 27 years from his date and fix Vādindra's date as A.D. 1225. Mr Telang points out that such a date would agree with the view that he was a religious counsellor of King Śrīsiṃha. Vādindra refers to Udayana (A.D. 984) and Śivāditya Miśra (A.D. 975-1025). Mr Telang also refers to two other works of Vādindra, viz. *Rasa-sāra* and *Kaṇāda-sūtra-nibandha*, and argues from allusions contained in Vādindra's *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana* that he must have written other works in refutation of *mahā-vidyā*. Vādindra's *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana* consists of three chapters. In the first chapter he gives an exposition of the *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms; the second and third chapters are devoted to the refutation of these syllogisms. Vādindra's *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana* has two commentaries, one called *Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana-vyākhyāna*, by Ānandapūrṇa (A.D. 1600), and the other, called *Vyākhyāna-dīpikā*, by Bhuvanasundara Sūri (A.D. 1400). In addition to these Bhuvanasundara Sūri also wrote a small work called the *Laghu-mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana* and a commentary, *Mahā-vidyā-vivaraṇa-ṭippaṇa*, on a *Mahā-vidyā-daśaśloki-vivaraṇa* by an unknown author.

The main points of Vādindra's criticisms may briefly be stated as follows: He says that it is not possible that there should be a proper reason (*hetu*) which has no negative instances (*kevalānvayī-hetor eva nīrvaktum aśakyatvāt*). It is difficult to prove that any particular quality should exist everywhere and that there should not be any instance or case where it does not occur. In the third chapter he shows that not only is it not possible to have *kevalānvayī hetus*, but that even in arguments on the basis of such *kevalānvayī hetu* there would be great scope for fallacies of self-contradiction (*sva-vyāghāta*) and fallacies of illicit distribution of the middle term (*anaikāntikatva*) and the like. He also shows how all these fallacies apply to all the *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms invented by Kulārka Paṇḍita.

It is needless for our present purposes to enter into any elaborate logical discussion of Vāḍindra; for the present digression on *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms is introduced here only to show that scholastic logicisms were not first introduced by Śrīharṣa, but had already come into fashion a few centuries before him, though Śrīharṣa was undoubtedly the most prominent of those who sought to apply these scholastic methods in philosophy.

It will thus be seen that the fashion of emphasizing the employment of logical formalism as a method in philosophy was inherited by the Naiyāyikas and Vedāntists alike from Buddhists like Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and others in the third and the fourth centuries and their later successors in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries. But during the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries one notices a steady development on this side in the works of prominent Nyāya writers such as Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana and Vedāntic authors such as the great master Śāṅkarācārya, Vācaspati Miśra and Ānandabodha Yati. But the school of abstract and dry formalism may be said to have properly begun with Kulārka Paṇḍita, or the authors of the *Māna-manohara* and *Pramāṇa-mañjari* in the latter part of the eleventh century, and to have been carried on in the works of a number of other writers, until we come to Gaṅgeśa of the early thirteenth century, who enlivened it with the subtleties of his acute mind by the introduction of the new concepts of *avacchedakatā*, which may be regarded as a new turning point after *vyāpti*. This work was further carried on extremely elaborately by his later successors, the great writers of this new school of logic (*navya-nyāya*), Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and others. On the Vedānta side this formalism was carried on by Śrīharṣa (A.D. 1187), Citsukha of about A.D. 1220 (of whom Vāḍindra was a contemporary), Ānandajñāna or Ānandagiri of about A.D. 1260 and through a number of minor writers until we come to Nṛsiṃhāśrama and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī of the seventeenth century. It may be surmised that formal criticisms of Śrīharṣa were probably largely responsible for a new awakening in the Naiyāyikas, who began to direct their entire attention to a perfecting of their definitions and discussions on strict lines of formal accuracy and preciseness to the utter neglect of the collection of new data, new experiences or the investigation of new problems or new lines of enquiry, which is so essential for the development of true philo-

sophy. But, when once they started perfecting the purely logical appliances and began to employ them successfully in debates, it became essential for all Vedāntists also to master the ways of this new formalism for the defence of their old views, with utter neglect of new creations in philosophy. Thus in the growth of the history of the dialectic of logical formalism in the Vedānta system of thought it is found that during the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries the element of formalism was at its lowest and the controversies of the Vedānta with the Buddhists, Mīmāṃsists and Naiyāyikas were based largely on the analysis of experience from the Vedāntic standpoint and its general approach to philosophy. But in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries the controversy was largely with the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and dominated by considerations of logical formalism above everything else. Criticisms became for the most part nothing more than criticisms of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika definitions. Parallel to this a new force was gradually growing during these centuries in the writings of Rāmānuja and his followers, and in the succeeding centuries the followers of Madhva, the great Vaiṣṇava writer, began to criticize the Vedāntists (of the Śāṅkara school) very strongly. It is found therefore that from the thirteenth or fourteenth century the Vedāntic attack was largely directed against the followers of Rāmānuja and Madhva. A history of this controversy will be given in the third and fourth volumes of the present work. But the method of logical formalism had attained such an importance by this time that, though the Vaiṣṇavas brought in many new considerations and points of view in philosophy, the method of logical formalism never lost its high place in dialectic discussions.

Vedānta Dialectic of Śrīharṣa (A.D. 1150).

Śrīharṣa flourished probably during the middle of the twelfth century A.D. Udayana, the great Nyāya writer, lived towards the end of the tenth century, as is evident from the colophon of his *Lakṣaṇāvalī*¹. Śrīharṣa often refutes the definitions of Udayana, and therefore must have flourished after him. Again, the great logician Gaṅgeśa of Mithilā refers to Śrīharṣa and refutes his

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tarkāmbarāṅka(906)*pramiteṣv atīteṣu śakāntataḥ
varṣeśūdayanaś cakre subodhāṃ lakṣaṇāvalīm.*
Lakṣaṇāvalī, p. 72, Surendralāl Gosvāmin's edition, Benares, 1900.

views, and, since Gaṅgeśa lived in A.D. 1200, Śrīharṣa must have lived before that date. Accordingly Śrīharṣa was after Udayana and before Gaṅgeśa, i.e. between the tenth and twelfth centuries A.D. At the end of his book he refers to himself as honoured by the King of Kanauj (*Kānyakubjeśvara*). It is probable that this king may be Jayacandra of Kanauj, who was dethroned about A.D. 1195¹. In his poetical work *Naiṣadha-carita* he mentions at the end of the several chapters many works of his, such as *Arṇava-varṇana*, *Gauḍorviśa-kula-praśasti*, *Nava-sāhasāṅka-carita*, *Vijaya-praśasti*, *Śiva-śakti-siddhi*, *Sthairya-vicāraṇa*, *Chandaḥ-praśasti*, and also *Īśvarābhisandhi* and *Pañcanaliya kāvya*². The fact that he wrote a work eulogizing the race of the kings of Gauḍa leads one to suspect that he may have been one of the five Brahmans invited by Ādiśūra of Bengal from Kanauj in the early part of the eleventh century, in which case Śrīharṣa would have to be placed at that time, and cannot be associated with Jayacandra, who was dethroned in A.D. 1195. Śrīharṣa's most important philosophical contribution was the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* (lit. "the sweets of refutation"), in which he attempts to refute all definitions of the Nyāya system intended to justify the reality of the categories of experience and tries to show that the world and all world-experiences are purely phenomenal and have no reality behind them. The only reality is the self-luminous Brahman of pure consciousness³. His polemic is against the Nyāya, which holds that

¹ Ānandapūrṇa in his commentary on the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, called *Khaṇḍana-phakkikā*, explains Kānyakubjeśvara as Kāśīrāja, i.e. King of Kāśī or Benares.

² None of these however are available.

³ Śrīharṣa at the end of this work speaks of having purposely made it extremely knotty here and there, so that no one could understand its difficulties easily except when explained by the teacher. Thus he says:

*grantha-granthir iha kvacid kvacid api nyāsi prayatnān mayā
prājñāmanya-manā haṭhena pathitmasmin khalaḥ khelatu,
śraddhāraddha-guruḥ ślathūrta-dṛḍha-granthiḥ samāsādayat
tv etat-tarkasormmi-majjana sukheṣv āsañjanaṃ sajjanāḥ.*

Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya, p. 1341. Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914.

Several commentaries have been written on this celebrated work by various people, e.g. *Khaṇḍana-maṇḍana* by Paramānanda, *Khaṇḍana-maṇḍana* by Bhavanātha, *Didhiti* by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, *Prakāśa* by Vardhamāna, *Vidyā-bharaṇi* by Vidyābharaṇa, *Vidyā-sāgarī* by Vidyāsāgara, *Khaṇḍana-ṭīkā* by Padmanābha Paṇḍita, *Ānanda-varḍhana* by Sāṅkara Miśra, *Śrī-darpaṇa* by Śubhāṅkara, *Khaṇḍana-mahā-tarka* by Caritrasimha, *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍana* by Pragalbha Miśra, *Śiṣya-hitaiṣṇī* by Padmanābha, *Khaṇḍana-kuṭhāra* by Gokulanātha Upādhyāya. At least one refutation of it was attempted by the Naiyāyikas, as is evidenced by the work of a later Vācaspati (A.D. 1350) from Bengal, called *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*.

whatever is known has a well-defined real existence, and Śrīharṣa's main point is to prove that all that is known is indefinable and unreal, being only of a phenomenal nature and having only a relative existence based on practical modes of acceptance, customs and conventions. But, though his chief polemic is against the Nyāya, yet, since his criticisms are almost wholly of a destructive nature like those of Nāgārjuna, they could be used, with modifications, no less effectively against any other system. Those who criticize with the object of establishing positive definitions would object only to certain definitions or views of other schools; but both Śrīharṣa and the nihilists are interested in the refutation of all definitions as such, and therefore his dialectic would be valid against all views and definitions of other systems¹.

He starts with the proposition that none of our awarenesses ever stand in need of being further known or are capable of being the objects of any further act of knowledge. The difference of the Vedānta from the idealistic Buddhists consists in this, that the latter hold that everything is unreal and indefinable, not even excepting cognitions (*viññāna*); while the Vedānta makes an exception of cognitions and holds that all the world, excepting knowledge or awareness, is indefinable either as existent or non-existent (*sad-asadbhīyam vilakṣaṇam*) and is unreal². This indefinableness is in the nature of all things in the world and all experiences (*meyasvabhāvānugāmīnyām anirvacanīyatā*), and no amount of ingenuity or scholarship can succeed in defining the nature of that which has no definable nature or existence. Śrīharṣa undertakes to show that all definitions of things or categories put forward by the Nyāya writers are absolutely hollow and faulty even according to the canons of logical discussions and definitions accepted by the Naiyāyika; and, if no definition can stand or be supported, it necessarily follows that there can be no definitions, or, in other words, that no definitions of the phenomenal world are possible and that the world of phenomena and all our so-called experiences

¹ Śrīharṣa himself admits the similarity of his criticisms to those of Nāgārjuna and says: "tathā hi yadi darśaneṣu śūnya-vādānirvacanīya-pakṣayor āśrayaṇam tada tāvad amūṣām nir-bādhaiva sārva-pathīnatā," etc. *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhāḍya*, pp. 229-230, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914.

² By the idealistic Buddhists Śrīharṣa here means the idealism of the *Laṅkāvatāra*, from which he quotes the following verse:

buddhyā vivīcyamānānām svabhāvo nāvadhāryate
ato nirabhilāpyās te miśrasvabhāvas ca deśitāḥ.

Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, p. 287, Otani University Press, 1923.

of it are indefinable. So the Vedāntist can say that the unreality of the world is proved. It is useless for any one to attempt to find out what is true by resorting to arguments; for the arguments can be proved to be false even by the canons on which they are based. If anyone, however, says that the arguments of Śrīharṣa are open to the same objection and are not true, then that would only establish his own contention. For Śrīharṣa does not believe in the reality of his arguments and enters into them without any assumption of their reality or unreality. It can be contended that it is not possible to argue without first admitting the reality of the arguments. But such reality cannot be established without first employing the *pramāṇas* or valid means of proof; and the employment of the *pramāṇas* would require further arguments, and these further employment of the *pramāṇas* and so on until we have vicious infinite regress. If, however, the very arguments employed in accordance with the canons of the opponents to destroy their definitions be regarded as false, this would mean that the opponents reject their own canons, so that the Vedāntic arguments in refuting their position would be effective. The Vedānta is here interested only in destroying the definitions and positions of the opponents; and so, unless the opponents are successful in defending their own positions against the attacks of the Vedānta, the Vedānta point of view is not refuted. So the manifold world of our experience is indefinable, and the one Brahman is absolutely and ultimately real.

Regarding the proof that may be demanded of the ultimate oneness Śrīharṣa says that the very demand proves that the idea of ultimate oneness already exists, since, if the idea were not realized, no one could think of asking for a proof of it. Now, if it is admitted that the idea of absolute oneness is realized (*pratīta*), then the question arises whether such realization is right knowledge (*pramā*) or error (*apramā*). If it is a right idea, then, whatever may have produced it, this right idea is to be regarded as valid proof. If such an idea is false, one cannot legitimately ask the Vedāntist to adduce any proofs to demonstrate what is false. It may be urged that, though the Naiyāyika considers it false, it is regarded by the Vedāntist as true and hence the Vedāntist may be called upon to prove that the way in which or the means of proof through which he came to have his idea was true. This, however, the Vedāntist would readily deny; for, even though the idea of the absolute oneness may

be right, yet the way in which one happened to come by this idea may be wrong. There may be a fire on a hill; but yet, if one infers the existence of such a fire from fog appearing as smoke, then such an inference is false, even though the idea of the fire may itself be right. Leaving aside the discussion of the propriety of such demands on the part of the opponents, the Vedāntist says that the Upaniṣadic texts demonstrate the truth of the ultimate oneness of reality.

The ultimate oneness of all things, taught in the Upaniṣad texts, cannot be said to be negated by our perceptual experience of "many." For our perception deals with individual things of the moment and therefore cannot apply to all things of the past, present, and future and establish the fact of their all being different from one another. Perception applies to the experience of the immediate present and is therefore not competent to contradict the universal proposition of the oneness of all things, as taught by the Upaniṣads. Again, as Śrīharṣa says, in our perception of the things of experience we do not realize the differences of the perceptual objects from ourselves, but the differences among the objects themselves. The self-revelation of knowledge also fails to show its difference from all objects of the world. The difference, again, of the perceived objects from all other things is not revealed in the nature of the perceived objects themselves as *svarūpa-bheda*, or difference as being of the nature of the objects which are differenced—if that were the case, then the false and erroneous perception of silver would also at once manifest its difference from the object (the conch-shell) on which the false silver is imposed. In this way Śrīharṣa tried to prove that the purport of non-duality, as asserted in the Vedic texts, is not contradicted by any other, stronger, proof. Most of these arguments, being of a verbal nature, may better here be dropped. The main stress seems to rest on the idea that the immediate differences between the things perceived do not in the least suggest or imply that they, in their essence or in their totality, could not ultimately, as a result of our progressive and better knowledge of things, be considered as one identical reality (as is asserted in the Upaniṣads). If perception cannot prove anything, inferences by themselves cannot stand alone or contradict the non-duality taught in the Upaniṣads. In our world of phenomenal experience our minds are always impressed with the concept of difference; but Śrīharṣa says that the

mere existence of an idea does not prove its reality. Words can give rise to ideas relating even to absolutely non-existing things.

Again, the concept of "difference" can hardly be defined. If it lies involved within the essential nature of all things that differ, then difference would be identical with the nature of the things that differ. If difference were different from the things that differ, then it would be necessary to find out some way of establishing a relation between "difference" and the things that differ, and this might require another connection, and that another, and so we should have a vicious endless series. He says that "difference" may be looked upon from a number of possible points of view. Firstly, "difference" is supposed to be of the nature of things. But a "difference" which is of the nature of the things which differ must involve them all in one; for there cannot be any difference without referring to the things from which there is difference. If by "book" we mean its difference from table, then the table has to enter into the nature of the book, and that would mean the identity of the table and the book. There is no meaning in speaking of "difference" as being the thing, when such differences can only be determined by a reference to other things. If "difference" be the nature of a thing, such a nature cannot be in need of being determined by other things. One thing, say a book, is realized as being different from a table—the nature of the difference may here be described as being "the quality of being distinguished from a table"; but "the quality of being distinguished" would have no meaning or *locus standi*, unless "the table" were also taken with it. If anyone says that a book is identical with "the quality of being distinguished from," then this will invariably include "the table" also within the essence of the book, as "the table" is a constituent of the complex quality "to be distinguished from," which necessarily means "to be distinguished from a table." So on this view also "the table" and all other things which could be distinguished from the book are involved in the very essence of all things—a conclusion which contradicts the very concept of difference. It may also be pointed out that the concept of difference is entirely extraneous to the concept of things as they are understood or perceived. The notion of "difference" is itself different from the notion of the book and the table, whether jointly or separately. The joint notion of the book and the table is different

from the notion that "the book differs from the table." For understanding the nature of a book it is not necessary that one should understand previously its difference from a table. Moreover, even though the notion of difference may in some sense be said to lead to our apprehension of individual things, the apprehension of such individual things does not carry with it the idea that it is on account of such difference that the individual things are perceived. It is through similarity or resemblance between two things—say between a wild cow (*gavaya*) and the domestic cow (*go*)—that a man can recognize an animal as a wild cow; but yet, when he so considers an animal as a wild cow, he does not invariably because of such a resemblance to a cow think the animal to be a wild cow. The mental decision regarding an animal as a cow or a wild cow takes place immediately without any direct participation of the cause which produced it. So, even though the notion of difference may be admitted to be responsible for our apprehension of the different individual things, an apprehension of an individual thing does not involve as a constituent any notion of difference. It is therefore wrong to think that things are of the nature of difference.

In another view, wherein difference is interpreted as "mental negation" or "otherness" (*anyonyābhāva*), this "otherness" (say of the book from the table) is explained as being the negation of the identity of one with the other. When one says that the book is other than the table, what is meant is that identity of the book with the table is denied. Śrīharṣa here raises the objection that, if the identity of the book with the table was absolutely chimerical, like the hare's horn, such a denial of identity would be absolutely meaningless. It cannot, again, be suggested that this mental negation, or negation as otherness, means the denial of one class-concept in respect of another (e.g. that of book on the table); for there is in these class-concepts no such special characteristic (*dharma*) by virtue of which one could be denied of the other or they could be distinguished from each other, since the Naiyāyika, against whom Śrīharṣa's arguments are directed, does not admit that class-concepts possess any distinguishing qualities. In the absence of such distinguishing qualities they may be regarded as identical: but in that case the denial of one class-concept (say of the table) would involve the denial of the class-concept of the thing itself (e.g. the book), since the class-concepts of the book and the table, not having

any distinguishing qualities, are identical; and, further, through mental denial both the book and the table would be devoid of the class-concepts of book and table, and so there would be no way of distinguishing one thing from another, book from table. It is easy to see therefore that there is no way of making a special case regarding negation as otherness (*anyonyābhāva*). Again, if difference is regarded as the possession of opposite characters (*vaidharmya*), then also it may be asked whether the opposite characters have further opposite characters to distinguish them from one another, and these again others, and so there is a vicious infinite; if these are supposed to stop anywhere, then the final characters at that stage, not having any further opposite characters to distinguish them, would be identical, and hence all opposite characters in the backward series would be meaningless and all things would be identical. If on the contrary it is admitted at the very first stage that opposite or differing characters have no differing characters to distinguish them from one another, then the characters will be identical. Again, it may be asked whether these distinguishing characters are themselves different from the objects which possess them or not. If they are different, one may again ask concerning the opposing characters which lead to this difference and then again about other opposing characters of these, and so on. If these infinite differences were to hold good, they could not arrive in less than infinite time, whereas the object is finite and limited in time. If, again, they came all at once, there would be such a disorderly medley of these infinite differences that there would be no way of determining their respective substrates and their orderly successive dependence on one another. And, since in the series the earlier terms of difference can only be established by the establishment of the later terms of difference, the forward movement in search of the later terms of difference, in support of the earlier terms of difference, makes these earlier terms of difference unnecessary¹.

It cannot, therefore, be said that our perception of differences has any such intrinsic validity that it can contradict the ultimate unity taught in the Upaniṣad texts. Śrīharṣa does not deny that we perceive seeming differences in all things, but he denies their

¹ *prathama-bhedāsvikāra-prayojanasya bheda-vyavahārāder dvitīya-bhedād eva siddheḥ prathama-bhedo vyarthaḥ syād eva, dvitīya-bhedādi-prayojanasya tṛtīya-bhedādinaiva siddheḥ so pi vyarthaḥ syāt. Vidyā-sāgarī on Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, p. 206. Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914.

ultimate validity, since he considers them to be due to *avidyā* or nescience alone¹.

The chief method of Śrīharṣa's dialectic depends upon the assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions; but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of argument in a circle (*cakraka*), and hence there is no way in which the real nature of things can be demonstrated or defined. Our world of experience consists of knower, known and knowledge; if a knower is defined as the possessor of knowledge, knowledge can only be understood by a reference to the knower; the known, again, can be understood only by a reference to knowledge and the knower, and so there is a circle of relativity which defies all attempts at giving an independent definition of any of these things. It is mainly this relativity that in specific forms baffles all attempts at definition of all categories.

Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts.

Śrīharṣa first takes for his criticism the definitions of right cognition. Assuming the definition of right cognition to be the direct apprehension of the real nature of things, he first urges that such a definition is faulty, since, if one accidentally guesses rightly certain things hidden under a cover and not perceived, or makes a right inference from faulty data or by fallacious methods, though the awareness may be right, it cannot be called right cognition². It is urged that cognition, in order to be valid, must be produced through unerring instruments; here, however, is a case of chance guesses which may sometimes be right without being produced by unerring instruments of senses. Nor can correspondence of the cognition with its object (*yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā*) be regarded as a proper definition of right cognition. Such correspondence can be defined as meaning either that which represents the reality of the object itself or similarity to the object. The real nature of

¹ *na vāyam bhedasya sarvathāivāsattvam abhyupagacchāmaḥ, kiṁ nāma na pāramārthikam sattvam; avidyā-vidyamānatvam tu tadityam iṣyata eva. Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, p. 214.

² E.g. when a man rightly guesses the number of shells closed in another man's hand, or when one makes a false inference of fire on a hill from a fog looking like smoke from a distance and there is fire on the hill by chance—his judgment may be right though his inference may be false.

an object is indeterminable, and so correspondence of awareness with the object may rather be defined as similarity of the former to the latter. If this similarity means that the awareness must have such a character as is possessed by the object (*jñāna-viśayīkṛtena rūpeṇa sādṛśyam*), then this is clearly impossible; for qualities that belong to the object cannot belong to the awareness—there may be an awareness of two white hard marbles, but the awareness is neither two, nor white, nor hard¹. It may be urged that the correspondence consists in this, that the whiteness etc. belong to the object as qualities possessed by it, whereas they belong to awareness as being qualities which it reveals². But that would not hold good in the case of illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; the awareness of “before me” in the perception of “before me the silver” has to be admitted as being a right cognition. If this is admitted to be a right cognition, then it was meaningless to define right cognition as true correspondence; it might as well have been defined as mere cognition, since all cognition would have some object to which it referred and so far as that only was concerned all cognitions would be valid. If, however, entire correspondence of thought and object be urged, then partial correspondence like the above can hardly be considered satisfactory. But, if entire correspondence is considered indispensable, then the correctness of the partial correspondence has to be ignored, whereas it is admitted by the Naiyāyika that, so far as reference to an object is concerned, all cognitions are valid; only the nature of cognition may be disputed as to right or wrong, when we are considering the correspondence of the nature of the object and the nature characterized by the awareness of the object. If entire correspondence with the object is not assured, then cognition of an object with imperfect or partial correspondence, due to obstructive circumstances, has also to be rejected as false. Again, since the correspondence always refers to the character, form or appearance of the thing, all our affirmations regarding the objects to which the characters are supposed to belong would be false.

Referring to Udayana's definition of right cognition as *samyak paricchitti*, or proper discernment, Śrīharṣa says that the word

¹ *dvau ghaṭau śuklav ityatra rūpa-saṃkhyādi-samavāyitvaṃ na jñānasya guṇatvād atah prakāśamāna-rūpeṇa artha-sādṛśyam jñānasya nāsti—asti ca tasya jñānasya tatra ghaṭayoh pramātvam. Vidyā-sāgarī on Khaṇḍana, p. 398.*

² *arthasya hi yathā samavāyād rūpaṃ viśeṣaṃbhavati tathā viśayabhāvāj jñānasyāpi tad-viśeṣaṇam bhavaty eva. Khaṇḍana, p. 399.*

“*samyak*” (proper) is meaningless; for, if *samyak* means “entire,” then the definition is useless, since it is impossible to see all the visible and invisible constituent parts of a thing, and no one but an omniscient being could perceive a thing with all its characters, properties or qualities. If right discernment means the discernment of an object with its special distinguishing features, this again is unintelligible; for even in wrong cognition, say of conch-shell as silver, the perceiver seems to perceive the distinguishing marks of silver in the conch-shell. The whole point lies in the difficulty of judging whether the distinguishing marks observed are real or not, and there is no way of determining this. If, again, the distinguishing features be described as being those characteristics without the perception of which there can be no certain knowledge and the perception of which ensures right cognition, then it may well be pointed out that it is impossible to discover any feature of any cognition of which one can be positively certain that it is not wrong. A dreamer confuses all sorts of characters and appearances and conceives them all to be right. It may be urged that in the case of right perception the object is perceived with its special distinguishing features, as in the case of the true perception of silver, whereas in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell no such distinguishing features are observed. But even in this case it would be difficult to define the essential nature of the distinguishing features; for, if any kind of distinguishing feature would do, then in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell the distinguishing feature of being before the eyes is also possessed by the conch-shell. If all the particular distinguishing features are insisted on, then there will be endless distinguishing features, and it would be impossible to make any definition which would include them all. The certitude of a cognition which contradicts a previous wrong cognition would often be liable to the same objection as the wrong cognition itself, since the nature of the special distinguishing features which would establish its validity cannot be established by any definition of right knowledge.

Arguing against the definition of right cognition as “apprehension which is not incorrect or not defective” (*avyabhicāri anubhavaḥ*), Śrīharṣa says that “not incorrect” or “not defective” cannot mean that the cognition must exist only at the time when the object exists; for then inferential cognition, which often refers

to past and future things, would be false. Neither can it mean that the cognition coexists in space with its objects; nor can it mean that the right cognition is similar to its object in all respects, since cognition is so different in nature from the object that it is not possible that there should be any case in which it would be similar thereto in all respects. And, if the view that an awareness and its object are one and the same be accepted, then this would apply even to those cases where one object is wrongly perceived as another; and hence the word “*avyabhicāri*” is not sufficient to distinguish right knowledge from wrong cognition.

Arguing against the Buddhist definition of right cognition as “an apprehension which is not incompatible (*avisamvādi*) with the object known,” Śrīharṣa tries to refute the definition in all the possible senses of incompatibility of cognition with object which determines wrong knowledge. If the definition is supposed to restrict right cognition to cognition which is cognized by another cognition as being in agreement with its object, then a wrong cognition, repeated successively through a number of moments and found to be in agreement with its object through all the successive moments until it is contradicted, would also have to be admitted as right, because in this case the previous cognition is certified by the cognition of the succeeding moments. If, again, right cognition is defined as a cognition the incompatibility of which with its object is not realized by any other cognition, then also there are difficulties in the way. For even a wrong cognition may for some time be not contradicted by any other cognition. Moreover, the vision of the conch-shell by the normal eye as white may be contradicted by the later vision by the jaundiced eye as yellow. If it is urged that the contradiction must be by a faultless later cognition, then it may be pointed out that, if there had been any way of defining faultless cognition, the definition of right cognition would have been very easy. On the other hand, unless right cognition is properly defined, there is no meaning in speaking of faulty or wrong cognition. If right cognition is defined as a cognition which has causal efficiency, that in fact is not a proper definition; for even the wrong cognition of a snake might cause fear and even death. If it is urged that the causal efficiency must be exercised by the object in the same form in which it is perceived, then it is very difficult to ascertain this; and there may be a false cognition of causal effi-

ciency also; hence it would be very difficult to ascertain the nature of right cognition on the basis of causal efficiency. Śrīharṣa points out again that in a similar way Dharmakīrti's definition of right cognition as enabling one to attain the object (*artha-prāpakatva*) is also unintelligible, since it is difficult to determine which object can be actually attained and which not, and the notion that the thing may be attained as it is perceived may be present even in the case of the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell. If right cognition is defined as cognition which is not contradicted, then it may be asked whether the absence of contradiction is at the time of perception only, in which case even the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell would be a right cognition, since it is uncontradicted at least at the time when the illusion is produced. If it is urged that a right cognition is that which is not contradicted at any time, then we are not in a position to assert the rightness of any cognition; for it is impossible to be certain that any particular cognition will never at any time be contradicted.

After showing that it is impossible to define right cognition (*pramā*) Śrīharṣa tries to show that it is impossible to define the idea of instruments (*karāṇa*) or their operative action (*vyāpāra*) as involved in the idea of instruments of cognition (*pramāṇa*). Śrīharṣa attempts to show that instrumentality as an agent cannot be separately conceived as having an independent existence, since it is difficult to determine its separate existence. It would be a long tale to go into all the details of this discussion as set forth by Śrīharṣa, and for our present purposes it is enough to know that Śrīharṣa refuted the concept of "instrumentality" as a separate agent, both as popularly conceived or as conceived in Sanskrit grammar. He also discusses a number of alternative meanings which could be attributed to the concept of "*karāṇa*," or instrument, and shows that none of these meanings can be satisfactorily justified¹.

In refuting the definition of perception he introduces a long discussion showing the uselessness of defining perception as an instrument of right knowledge. Perception is defined in the Nyāya as cognition which arises through the contact of a particular sense with its object; but it is impossible to know whether any cognition has originated from sense-contact, since the fact of the production

¹ Among many other definitions Śrīharṣa also refutes the definition of *karāṇa* as given by Uddyotakara—"yadvān eva karoti tat karāṇam." *Khaṇḍana*, p. 506.

of knowledge from sense-contact cannot itself be directly perceived or known by any other means. Since in perception the senses are in contact on the one hand with the self and on the other hand with the external objects, Śrīharṣa urges by a series of arguments that, unless the specific object with which the sense is in contact is mentioned in each case, it would be difficult to formulate a definition of perception in such a way that it would imply only the revelation of the external object and not the self, which is as much in contact with the sense as is the object. Again, the specification of the object in the case of each perception would make it particular, and this would defeat the purposes of definition, which can only apply to universal concepts. Arguing against a possible definition of perception as immediateness, Śrīharṣa supposes that, if perception reveals some specific quality of the object as its permanent attribute, then, in order that this quality may be cognized, there ought to be another attribute, and this would presuppose another attribute, and so there would be an infinite regress; and, if at any stage of the infinite regress it is supposed that no further attribute is necessary, then this involves the omission of the preceding determining attributes, until the possibility of the perception is also negated. If this immediateness be explained as a cognition produced by the instrumentality of the sense-organs, this again is unintelligible; for the instrumentality of sense-organs is incomprehensible. Śrīharṣa takes a number of alternative definitions of perceptions and tries to refute them all more or less in the same way, mostly by pointing out verbal faults in the formulation of the definitions.

Citsukha Ācārya, a commentator on Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, offers a refutation of the definition of perception in a much more condensed form. He points out that the definition of perception by Akṣapāda as an uncontradicted cognition arising out of sense-contact with the object is unintelligible. How can we know that a cognition would not be contradicted? It cannot be known from a knowledge of the faultlessness of the collocating circumstances, since the faultlessness can be known only if there is no contradiction, and hence faultlessness cannot be known previously and independently, and the collocating circumstances would contain many elements which are unperceivable. It is also impossible to say whether any experience will for ever remain uncontradicted. Nor can it again be urged that right cognition is that which can

produce an effort on the part of the perceiver (*pravr̥tti-sāmar̥thya*); for even an illusory knowledge can produce an effort on the part of the perceiver who is deceived by it. Mere achievement of the result is no test for the rightness of the cognition; for a man may see the lustre of a gem and think it to be a gem and really get the gem, yet it cannot be doubted that his apprehension of the ray of the gem as the gem was erroneous¹. In the case of the perception of stars and planets there is no chance of any actual attainment of those objects, and yet there is no reason to deny the validity of the cognitions.

Passing over the more or less verbal arguments of Śrīharṣa in refutation of the definitions of inference (*anumāna*) as *liṅga-parā-mar̥sa* or the realization of the presence in the minor term (*pakṣa*, e.g. the mountain) of a reason or probans (*liṅga*, e.g. smoke) which is always concomitant with the major term (*sādhya*, e.g. fire), or as invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum or the major term (*sādhya*, e.g. fire), and its other slightly modified varieties, I pass on to his criticism of the nature of concomitance (*vyāpti*), which is at the root of the notion of inference. It is urged that the universal relationship of invariable concomitance required in *vyāpti* cannot be established unless the invariable concomitance of all the individuals involved in a class be known, which is impossible. The Naiyāyika holds that the mind by a sort of mental contact with class-concepts or universals, called *sāmānya-pratyāsatti*, may affirm of all individuals of a class without actually experiencing all the individuals. It is in this way that, perceiving the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire in a large number of cases, one understands the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire by experiencing a sort of mental contact with the class-concept "smoke" when perceiving smoke on a distant hill. Śrīharṣa argues in refutation of such an interpretation that, if all individual smoke may be known in such a way by a mental contact with class-concepts, then by a mental contact with the class-concept "knowable" we might know all individual knowables and thus be omniscient as well. A thing is knowable only as an individual with its specific qualities as such, and therefore to know a thing as a knowable would involve the knowledge of all such specific qualities; for the

¹ *dr̥syate hi maṇi-prabhāyām maṇi-buddhyā pravartamānasya maṇi-prāp̥the pravr̥tti-sāmar̥thyam na cāvyabhicāritvam. Tattva-pradīpikā*, p. 218. Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1915.

class-concept "knowable" would involve all individuals which have a specific knowable character. It may be urged that knowability is one single character, and that things may be otherwise completely different and may yet be one so far as knowability is concerned, and hence the things may remain wholly unknown in their diversity of characters and may yet be known so far as they are merely knowable. To this Śrīharṣa answers that the class-concept "knowable" would involve all knowables and so even the diversity of characters would be involved within the meaning of the term "knowable."

Again, assuming for the sake of argument that it is possible to have a mental contact with class-concepts through individuals, how can the invariable concomitance itself be observed? If our senses could by themselves observe such relations of concomitance, then there would be no possibility of mistakes in the observation of such concomitance. But such mistakes are committed and corrected by later experience, and there is no way in which one can account for the mistake in the sense-judgment. Again, if this invariable concomitance be defined as *avinābhāva*, which means that when one is absent the other is also absent, such a definition is faulty; for it may apply to those cases where there is no real invariable concomitance. Thus there is no real concomitance between "earth" and "possibility of being cut"; yet in *ākāśa* there is absence of earth and also the absence of "possibility of being cut." If it is urged that concomitance cannot be determined by a single instance of the absence of one tallying with the absence of the other, it must be proved that universally in all instances of the absence of the one, e.g. the fire, there is also the absence of the other, e.g. the smoke. But it is as difficult to ascertain such universal absence as it is to ascertain universal concomitance. Again, if this concomitance be defined as the impossibility of the presence of the middle term, the reason or the probans, where the major term or the probandum is also absent, then also it may be said that it is not possible to determine such an impossibility either by sense-knowledge or by any other means.

Now *tarka* or eliminatory consideration in judging of possibilities cannot be considered as establishing invariable concomitance; for all arguments are based on invariable concomitance, and such an assumption would lead to a vicious mutual interdependence. The great logician Udayana objects to this and says that, if invariable concomitance between smoke and fire be denied, then

there are strong arguments (*tarka*) against such a denial (*bādhakas tarkaḥ*), namely, that, if smoke is not regarded as concomitant with fire, then smoke would either exist without any cause or not exist at all, which is impossible. But Śrīharṣa says that there is room for an alternative proposition which Udayana misses, namely, that smoke is due to some cause other than fire. It may be that there are smokes which are not caused by fire. How can one be sure that all smokes are caused by fire? There may be differences in these two classes of fire which remain unnoticed by us, and so there is always room for the supposition that any particular smoke may not be caused by fire, and such doubts would make inference impossible. Udayana had however contended that, if you entertain the doubt, with regard to a future case, that it is possible that there may be a case in which the concomitance may be found wrong, then the possibility of such a doubt (*śaṅkā*) must be supported by inference, and the admission of this would involve the admission of inference. If such an exaggerated doubt be considered illegitimate, there is no obstruction in the way of inference. Doubts can be entertained only so long as such entertainment of doubts is compatible with practical life. Doubts which make our daily life impossible are illegitimate. Every day one finds that food appeases hunger, and, if in spite of that one begins to doubt whether on any particular day when he is hungry he should take food or not, then life would be impossible¹. Śrīharṣa, however, replies to this contention by twisting the words of Udayana's own *kārikā*, in which he says that, so long as there is doubt, inference is invalid; if there is no doubt, this can only be when the invalidity of the inference has been made manifest, and until such invalidity is found there will always be doubts. Hence the argument of possibilities (*tarka*) can never remove doubts².

Śrīharṣa also objects to the definition of "invariable concomitance" as a natural relation (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*). He rejects the term "natural relation" and says that invariable concomitance

¹ *śaṅkā ced anumāsty eva
na cec chaṅkā tatastarām
vyāghātāvadhir āśaṅkā
tarkaḥ śaṅkāvadhir mataḥ.*

² *Kusumāñjali*, III, 7. Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1912.

*vyāghāto yadi śaṅkāsti
na cec chaṅkā tatastarām
vyāghātāvadhir āśaṅkā
tarkaḥ śaṅkāvadhiḥ kutaḥ.*

Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya, p. 693.

would not be justifiable in any of its possible meanings, such as (i) depending on the nature of the related (*sambandhi-svabhāva-śrita*), (ii) produced by the nature of the related (*sambandhi-svabhāva-janya*), (iii) not different from the nature constituting the relatedness, since, as these would be too wide and would apply even to those things which are not invariable concomitants, e.g. all that is earthen can be scratched with an iron needle. Though in some cases earthen objects may be scratched with an iron needle, not all earthen objects can be so scratched. He further refutes the definition of invariable concomitance as a relation not depending upon conditional circumstances (*upādhi*). Without entering into the details of Śrīharṣa's argument it may be pointed out that it rests very largely on his contention that conditionality of relations cannot be determined without knowledge of the nature of invariable concomitance and also that invariable concomitance cannot be determined without a previous determination of the conditionality of relations.

Śrīharṣa's brief refutation of analogy, implication and testimony, as also his refutation of the definitions of the different fallacies of inference, are not of much importance from a philosophical point of view, and need not be detailed here.

Turning now to Śrīharṣa's refutation of the Nyāya categories, we note that he begins with the refutation of "being" or positivity (*bhāvatva*). He says that being cannot be defined as being existent in itself, since non-being is also existent in itself; we can with as much right speak of being as existing as of non-being as existing; both non-being and being may stand as grammatical nominatives of the verb "exists." Again, each existing thing being unique in itself, there is no common quality, such as "existence" or "being," which is possessed by them all. Again, "being" is as much a negation of "non-being" as "non-being" of "being"; hence "being" cannot be defined as that which is not a negation of anything. Negation is a mere form of speech, and both being and non-being may be expressed in a negative form.

Turning to the category of non-being (*abhāva*), Śrīharṣa says that it cannot be defined as negation of anything; for being may as well be interpreted as a negation of non-being as non-being of being (*bhāvābhāvayor dvayor api paraspara-pratikṣepātmakatvāt*). Nor again can non-being be defined as that which opposes being; for not all non-being is opposed to all being (e.g. in "there is no jug

on the ground" the absence of jug does not oppose the ground in respect of which the jug is denied); if non-being opposes some existent things, then that does not differentiate negation; for there are many existent things which are opposed to one another (e.g. the horse and the bull).

In refuting the Nyāya definition of substance (*dravya*) as that which is the support of qualities, Śrīharṣa says that even qualities appear to have numeral and other qualities (e.g. we speak of two or three colours, of a colour being deep or light, mixed or primary—and colour is regarded as quality). If it is urged that this is a mistake, then the appearance of the so-called substances as being endowed with qualities may also be regarded as equally erroneous. Again, what is meant by defining substance as the support (*āśraya*) of qualities? Since qualities may subsist in the class-concept of quality (*guṇatva*), the class-concept of quality ought to be regarded as substance according to the definition. It may be urged that a substance is that in which the qualities inhere. But what would be the meaning here of the particle "in"? How would one distinguish the false appearance, to a jaundiced eye, of yellowness in a white conch-shell and the real appearance of whiteness in the conch-shell? Unless the falsity of the appearance of yellow in the conch-shell is realized, there can be no difference between the one case and the other. Again, substance cannot be defined as the inhering or the material cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), since it is not possible to know which is the inhering cause and which is not; for number is counted as a quality, and colour also is counted as a quality, and yet one specifies colours by numbers, as one, two, or many colours.

Furthermore, the Nyāya definition of quality as that which has a genus and is devoid of qualities is unintelligible; for the definition involves the concept of quality, which is sought to be defined. Moreover, as pointed out above, even qualities, such as colours, have numeral qualities; for we speak of one, two or many colours. It is only by holding to this appearance of qualities endowed with numeral qualities that the definition of quality can be made to stand, and it is again on the strength of the definition of quality that such appearances are to be rejected as false. If colours are known as qualities in consideration of other reasons, then these, being endowed with numeral qualities, could not for that very reason be called qualities; for qualities belong according to definition only to

substances. Even the numerals themselves are endowed with the quality of separateness. So there would not be a single instance that the Naiyāyika could point to as an example of quality.

Speaking of relations, Śrīhaṛṣa points out that, if relation is to be conceived as something subsisting in a thing, then its meaning is unintelligible. The meaning of relation as “in” or “herein” is not at all clear; for the notion of something being a container (*ādhāra*) is dependent on the notion of the concept of “in” or “herein,” and that concept again depends on the notion of a container, and there is no other notion which can explain either of the concepts independently. The container cannot be supposed to be an inhering cause; for in that case such examples as “there is a grape in this vessel” or “the absence of horns in a hare” would be unexplainable. He then takes a number of possible meanings which can be given to the notion of a container; but these, not being philosophically important, are omitted here. He also deals with the impossibility of defining the nature of the subject-object relation (*viśaya-viśayi-bhāva*) of knowledge.

In refuting the definition of cause Śrīhaṛṣa says that cause cannot be defined as immediate antecedence; for immediate antecedence can be ascribed only to the causal operation, which is always an intervening factor between the cause and the effect. If, on the theory that what (e.g. the causal operation) belongs to a thing (e.g. the cause) cannot be considered as a factor which stands between it (cause) and that which follows it (effect), the causal operation be not regarded as a separate and independent factor, then even the cause of the cause would have to be regarded as one with the cause and therefore cause. But, if it is urged that, since the cause of the cause is not an operation, it cannot be regarded as being one with the cause, one may well ask the opponent to define the meaning of operation. If the opponent should define it as that factor without which the cause cannot produce the effect, then the accessory circumstances and common and abiding conditions, such as the natural laws, space, and so forth, without which an effect cannot be produced, are also to be regarded as operation, which is impossible. Further, “operation” cannot be qualified as being itself produced by the cause; for it is the meaning of the concept of cause that has still to be explained and defined. If, again, cause is defined as the antecedence of that which is other than the not-cause, then this again would be faulty; for one cannot understand

the “not-cause” of the definition without understanding what is the nature of cause, and vice-versa. Moreover, space, being a permanent substance, is always present as a not-cause of anything, and is yet regarded as the cause of sound. If, again, cause is defined as that which is present when the effect is present and absent when the effect is absent, this would not explain the causality of space, which is never known to be absent. If, again, cause is defined as invariable antecedence, then permanent substances such as space are to be regarded as the sole causes of effects. If, however, invariable antecedence be understood to mean unconditional antecedence, then two coexistent entities such as the taste and the colour of an earthen pot which is being burnt must mutually be the cause of the colour and the taste of the burnt earthen pot; for neither does the colour condition taste, nor does the taste condition colour. Moreover, if mere invariable antecedents be regarded as cause, then the invariably preceding symptoms of a disease are to be regarded as the cause of the disease on account of their invariable antecedence. Again, causality cannot be regarded as a specific character or quality belonging to certain things, which quality can be directly perceived by us as existing in things. Thus we may perceive the stick of the potter’s wheel to be the cause of the particular jugs produced by it, but it is not possible to perceive causality as a general quality of a stick or of any other thing. If causality existed only with reference to things in general, then it would be impossible to conceive of the production of individual things, and it would not be possible for anyone to know which particular cause would produce a particular effect. On the other hand, it is not possible to perceive by the senses that an individual thing is the cause of a number of individual effects; for until these individual effects are actually produced it is not possible to perceive them, since perception involves sense-contact as its necessary condition. It is not necessary for our present purposes to enter into all the different possible concepts of cause which Śrīharṣa seeks to refute: the above examination is expected to give a fairly comprehensive idea of the methods of Śrīharṣa’s refutation of the category of cause.

Nor is it possible within the limited range of the present work to give a full account of all the different alternative defences of the various categories accepted in Nyāya philosophy, or of all the various ways in which Śrīharṣa sought to refute them in his

Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya. I have therefore attempted to give here only some specimens of the more important parts of his dialectical argument. The chief defect of Śrīharṣa's criticisms is that they often tend to grow into verbal sophisms, and lay greater stress on the faults of expression of the opponent's definitions and do not do him the justice of liberally dealing with his general ideas. It is easy to see how these refutations of the verbal definitions of the Nyāya roused the defensive spirit of the Naiyāyikas into re-stating their definitions with proper qualificatory phrases and adjuncts, by which they avoided the loopholes left in their former definitions for the attack of Śrīharṣa and other critics. In one sense, therefore, the criticisms of Śrīharṣa and some of his followers had done a great disservice to the development of later Nyāya thought; for, unlike the older Nyāya thinkers, later Nyāya writers, like Gaṅgeśa, Raghunātha and others, were mainly occupied in inventing suitable qualificatory adjuncts and phrases by which they could define their categories in such a way that the undesirable applications and issues of their definitions, as pointed out by the criticisms of their opponents, could be avoided. If these criticisms had mainly been directed towards the defects of Nyāya thought, later writers would not have been forced to take the course of developing verbal expressions at the expense of philosophical profundity and acuteness. Śrīharṣa may therefore be said to be the first great writer who is responsible indirectly for the growth of verbalism in later Nyāya thought.

Another defect of Śrīharṣa's criticisms is that he mainly limits himself to criticizing the definitions of Nyāya categories and does not deal so fully with the general ideas involved in such categories of thought. It ought, however, in all fairness to Śrīharṣa to be said that, though he took the Nyāya definitions as the main objective of his criticisms, yet in dealing with the various alternative variations and points of view of such definitions he often gives an exhaustive treatment of the problems involved in the discussion. But in many cases his omissions become very glaring. Thus, for example, in his treatment of relations he only tries to refute the definitions of relation as container and contained, as inherence, and as subject-object relation of cognitions, and leaves out many other varieties of relation which might well have been dealt with. Another characteristic feature of his refutation is, as has already been pointed out, that he has only a destructive point of view and is

not prepared to undertake the responsibility of defining any position from his own point of view. He delights in showing that none of the world-appearances can be defined in any way, and that thus, being indescribable, they are all false. But incapacity to define or describe anything in some particular way cannot mean that the thing is false. Śrīharṣa did not and could not show that the ways of definition which he attempted to refute were the only ways of defining the different categories. They could probably be defined in other and better ways, and even those definitions which he refuted could be bettered and improved by using suitable qualificatory phrases. He did not attempt to show that the concepts involved in the categories were fraught with such contradictions that, in whatever way one might try to define, one could not escape from those inner contradictions, which were inherent in the very nature of the concepts themselves. Instead of that he turned his attention to the actual formal definitions which had been put forward by the Nyāya and sometimes by Prabhākara and tried to show that these definitions were faulty. To show that particular definitions are wrong is not to show that the things defined are wrong. It is, no doubt, true that the refutation of certain definitions involves the refutation of the concepts involved in those definitions; but the refutation of the particular way of presentation of the concept does not mean that the concept itself is impossible. In order to show the latter, a particular concept has to be analysed on the basis of its own occurrences, and the inconsistencies involved in such an analysis have to be shown.

Citsukha's Interpretations of the Concepts of Śaṅkara Vedānta.

Citsukha (about A.D. 1220), a commentator on Śrīharṣa, had all Śrīharṣa's powers of acute dialectical thought, but he not only furnishes, like Śrīharṣa, a concise refutation of the Nyāya categories, but also, in his *Tattva-pradīpikā*, commented on by Pratyagbhagavān (A.D. 1400) in his *Nayana-prasādinī*¹, gives us a very acute

¹ Citsukha, a pupil of Gauḍeśvara Ācārya, called also Jñānottama, wrote a commentary on Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭarakācārya's *Nyāya-makaranda* and also on Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* and an independent work called *Tattva-pradīpikā* or *Cit-sukhī*, on which the study of the present section is based. In this work he quotes Udayana, Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Padmapāda, Vallabha (*Līlāvati*), Śālikanātha, Sureśvara, Śivāditya, Kulārka Paṇḍita and Śrīdhara

analysis and interpretation of some of the most important concepts of Śaṅkara Vedānta. He is not only a protector of the *Advaita* doctrine of the Vedānta, but also an interpreter of the Vedāntic concepts¹. The work is written in four chapters. In the first chapter Citsukha deals with the interpretation of the Vedānta concepts of self-revelation (*sva-prakāśa*), the nature of self as consciousness (*ātmanah samvid-rūpatva*), the nature of ignorance as darkness, the nature of falsity (*mithyātva*), the nature of nescience (*avidyā*), the nature of the truth of all ideas (*sarva-pratyayānām yathā-thatvam*), the nature of illusions, etc. In the second chapter he refutes the Nyāya categories of difference, separateness, quality, action, class-concepts, specific particulars (*viśeṣa*), the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), perception, doubt, illusion, memory, inference, invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), induction (*vyāpti-graha*), existence of the reason in the minor term (*pakṣa-dharmatā*), reason (*hetu*), analogy (*upamāna*), implication, being, non-being, duality, measure, causality, time, space, etc. In the third chapter, the smallest of the book, he deals with the possibility of the realization of Brahman and the nature of release through knowledge. In the fourth chapter, which is much smaller than the first two, he deals with the nature of the ultimate state of emancipation.

Citsukha starts with a formal definition of the most fundamental concept of the Vedānta, namely the concept of self-revelation or self-illumination (*sva-prakāśa*). Both Padmapāda and Prakāśātman in the *Pañca-pādikā* and *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa* had distinguished the self from the ego as self-revelation or self-illumi-

(*Nyāya-kandati*). In addition to these he also wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, called *Bhāṣya-bhūva-prakāśikā*, *Vivaraṇa-tātparya-dīpikā*, a commentary on the *Pramāṇa-mālā* of Ānandabodha, a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi*, called *Abhiprāya-prakāśikā*, and an index to the *adhikaraṇas* of the *Brahma-sūtra*, called *Adhikaraṇa-mañjarī*. His teacher Jñānottama wrote two works on Vedānta, called *Nyāya-sudhā* and *Jñāna-siddhi*; but he seems to have been a different person from the Jñānottama who wrote a commentary on Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*; for the latter was a householder (as he styles himself with a householder's title, *mīśra*), and an inhabitant of the village of Mangala in the Cola country, while the former was an ascetic and a preceptor of the King of Gauḍa, as Citsukha describes him in his colophon to his *Tattva-pradīpikā*. He is also said to have written the *Brahma-stuti*, *Viṣṇu-purāṇa-ṭīkā*, *Ṣaḍ-darśana-saṃgraha-vṛtti*, *Adhikaraṇa-saṅgati* (a work explaining the inter-relation of the topics of the *Brahma-sūtra*) and a commentary on the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, called the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi-ṭīkā* or the *Bhāva-tattva-prakāśikā*. His pupil Sukhaprakāśa wrote a work on the topics of the *Brahma-sūtra*, called *Adhikaraṇa-ratna-mālā*.

¹ Thus Paṇḍita Harinātha Śarmā in his Sanskrit introduction to the *Tattva-pradīpikā* or *Cit-sukhī* speaks of this work as *advaita-siddhānta-raṅgako 'pyadvaita-siddhānta-prakāśako vyutpādakaś ca*.

nation(*svayam-prakāśa*). Thus Prakāśātman says that consciousness (*saṁvid*) is self-revealing and that its self-revelation is not due to any other self-revealing cause¹. It is on account of this natural self-revelation of consciousness that its objects also appear as self-revealing². Padmapāda also says the same thing, when he states that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness; when this consciousness appears in connection with other objects and manifests them, it is called experience (*anubhava*), and, when it is by itself, it is called the self or *ātman*³. But Citsukha was probably the first to give a formal definition of the nature of this self-revelation.

Citsukha defines it as that which is entitled to be called immediate (*aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyā*), though it is not an object of any cognition or any cognizing activity (*avedyatve 'pi*)⁴. It may be objected that desires, feelings, etc. also are not objects of any cognition and yet are entitled to be regarded as immediate, and hence the definition might as well apply to them; for the object of cognition has a separate objective existence, and by a mind-object contact the mind is transformed into the form of the object, and thereby the one consciousness, which was apparently split up into two forms as the object-consciousness which appeared as material objects and the subject-consciousness which appeared as the cognizer, is again restored to its unity by the super-imposition of the subjective form on the objective form, and the object-form is revealed in consciousness as a jug or a book. But in the case of our experience of our will or our feelings these have no existence separate from our own mind and hence are not cognized in the same way as external objects are cognized. According to Vedānta epistemology these subjective experiences of will, emotions, etc. are different mental constituents, forms or states, which, being directly and illusorily imposed upon the self-revealing consciousness, become experienced. These subjective states are therefore not cognized in the same way as external objects. But, since the

¹ *saṁvedanaṁ tu svayam-prakāśa eva na prakāśāntara-hetuḥ. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 52.

² *tasmād anubhavaḥ sajātīya-prakāśāntara-nirapekṣaḥ prakāśamāna eva viśaye prakāśādi-vyavahāra-nimittam bhavitum arhati avyavadhānena viśaye prakāśādi-vyavahāra-nimittatvāt. Ibid.*

³ *tasmāt cit-svabhāva evātmā tena tena prameya-bhedena upadhīyamāno 'nubhāvābhidhāniyakam labhate avivakṣitopādhir ātmādi-śabdaiḥ. Pañca-pādikā*, p. 10.

⁴ *avedyatve saty aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam svayam-prakāśa-lakṣaṇam. Cit-sukhā*, p. 9.

experience of these states is possible only through a process of illusory imposition, they are not entitled to be called immediate¹. So, though they appear as immediate, they have no proper *yogyatā*, or, in other words, they are not entitled to be called immediate. But in the true sense even external objects are but illusory impositions on the self-revealing consciousness, and hence they also cannot be said to be entitled to be called immediate. There is therefore no meaning in trying to distinguish the self-revealing consciousness as one which is not an object of cognition; for on the Vedānta theory there is nothing which is entitled to be called immediate, and hence the phrase *avedyatve* (not being an object of cognition) is unnecessary as a special distinguishing feature of the self-revealing consciousness; the epithet "immediate" is therefore also unnecessary. To such an objection Citsukha's reply is that the experience of external objects is only in the last stage of world-dissolution and Brahmahood found non-immediate and illusory, and, since in all our ordinary stages of experience the experience of world-objects is immediate, the epithet *avedyatva* successfully distinguishes self-revealing consciousness from all cognitions of external objects which are entitled to be called immediate and are to be excluded from the range of self-revealing consciousness only by being objects of cognition. In the field of ordinary experience the perceived world-objects are found to be entitled to be called immediate no less than the self-revealing consciousness, and it is only because they are objects of cognition that they can be distinguished from the self-revealing consciousness.

The main argument in favour of the admission of the category of independent self-revealing consciousness is that, unless an independent self-revealing consciousness is admitted, there would be a vicious series in the process preceding the rise of any cognition; for, if the pure experience of self-revealing consciousness has to be further subjected to another process before it can be understood, then that also might require another process, and that another, and so there would be an unending series. Moreover, that the pure experience is self-revealing is proved by the very fact of the experience itself; for no one doubts his own experience or stands in need of any further corroboration or confirmation as to whether he experienced or not. It may be objected

¹ *avedyatve 'pi nāparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatā teṣām, adhyastatayaiva teṣāṃ siddheḥ. Cīt-sukhā*, p. 10. Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1915.

that it is well known that we may be aware of our awareness of anything (*anu-vyavasāya*), and in such a case the self-revealing consciousness may become further cognized. Citsukha's reply to this is that, when one perceives a jug, there is the mental activity, then a cessation of that activity, then a further starting of new activity and then the knowledge that I know the jug, or rather I know that I know the jug—and hence such a cognizing cannot be said to be directly and immediately cognizing the first awareness, which could not have stayed through so many moments¹. Again, since neither the senses nor the external objects can of themselves produce the self-revelation of knowledge, if knowledge were not admitted as self-revealing, the whole world would be blind and there would be no self-revelation. When one knows that he knows a book or a jug, it is the cognized object that is known and not the awareness that is cognized; there can be no awareness of awareness, but only of the cognized object². If the previous awareness could be made the object of subsequent awareness, then this would amount to an admission of the possibility of the self being known by the self (*svasyāpi svena vedyatvāpātāt*)—a theory which would accord not with the Vedānta idealism, but with the Buddhistic. It is true, no doubt, that the pure self-revealing consciousness shows itself only on the occasion of a mental state; but its difference from other cognitive states lies in the fact that it has no form or object, and hence, though it may be focussed by a mental state, yet it stands on a different footing from the objects illuminated by it.

The next point that Citsukha urges is that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness (*ātmanah samvid-rūpatva*). This is, of course, no new contribution by Citsukha, since this view had been maintained in the Upaniṣads and repeated by Śaṅkara, Padmapāda, Prakāśātman and others. Citsukha says that, like knowledge, the self also is immediately revealed or experienced without itself being the object of any cognizing activity or cognition, and therefore the self is also of the nature of knowledge. No one doubts about his own self; for the self always stands directly and

¹ *ghaṭa-jñānodaya-samaye manasi kriyā tato vibhāgas tataḥ pūrva-samyoga-vināśas tata uttara-samyogotpattis tato jñānāntaram iti aneka-kṣaṇa-vilambena utpadyamānasya jñānasya aparokṣatayā pūrva-jñāna-grāhakatvānupapattēḥ. Citsukhī, p. 17.*

² *vidito ghaṭa ity atra anuvyavasāyena ghaṭasyaiva viditatvam avasiyate na tu vitteḥ. Ibid. p. 18.*

immediately self-revealed. Self and knowledge being identical, there is no relation between the two save that of identity (*jñānātmanoḥ sambandhasyaiva abhāvāt*).

Citsukha defines falsity (*mithyātva*) as the non-existence of a thing in that which is considered to be its cause¹. He shows this by pointing out that a whole, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist in the parts of which it is made, and, if it does not exist even there, it does not exist anywhere and is false. It is, however, evident that a whole cannot exist in the parts, since, being a whole, it cannot be in the parts². Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the falsity of the world-appearance is that it is impossible that there should be any relation between the self-revealing consciousness, the knower (*drk*), and the objects which are cognized (*drśya*). Knowledge cannot be said to arise through sense-contact; for in the illusory perception of silver there is the false perception of silver without any actual sense-contact with silver. A reference to subject-object relation (*viśaya-viśayi-bhāva*) cannot explain it, since the idea of subject-object relation is itself obscure and unexplainable. Arguing as to the impossibility of properly explaining the subject-object relation (*viśaya-viśayi-bhāva*) in knowledge, Citsukha says that it cannot be held that the subject-object relation means that knowledge produces some change in the object (*viśaya*) and that the knower produces such a change. For what may be the nature of such a change? If it be described as *jñātatā*, or the character of being known, how can such a character be by my knowledge at the present moment generated as a positive quality in an object which has now ceased to exist? If such a quality can be produced even in past objects, then there would be no fixed law according to which such qualities should be produced. Nor can such a relationship be explained on a pragmatic basis by a reference to actual physical practical action with reference to objects that we know or the internal volitions or emotions associated with our knowledge of things. For in picking up a piece of silver that we see in front of us we may quite unknowingly be drawing with it the cross contained in the silver, and hence the fact of the physical

¹ *sarveṣāṃ api bhāvānām āśrayatvena saṃmate*

pratiyogitvam atyantābhāvaṃ prati mṛśātmatā. Cīt-sukhī, p. 39.

Some of these definitions of falsity are collected in Madhusūdana's *Advaita-siddhi*, a work composed much later than the *Cīt-sukhī*.

² *aṁśinaḥ svāmśa-gātyantābhāvasya pratiyoginaḥ aṁśitvād itarāṁśtva... vimataḥ paṭaḥ etat-tantu-niṣṭhātāntābhāva-pratiyogi avayavitvāt paṭāntaravat. Cīt-sukhī, pp. 40, 41.*

drawing of the dross cannot on that ground alone make it an object of my knowledge, and hence the subject-object relation of knowledge cannot be defined as a mere physical action following cognition. The internal mental states of volition and the emotions associated with knowledge belong to the knower and have nothing to do with the object of knowledge. If, however, it is urged that objectivity consists in the fact that whatever is known appears in consciousness, the question arises, what does this appearing in consciousness mean? It cannot mean that consciousness is the container and the object is contained in it; for, consciousness being internal and the object external, the object cannot be contained in it. It cannot be a mere undefined relatedness; for in that case the object may as well be considered subject and the subject, object. If objectivity be defined as that which can induce knowledge, then even the senses, the light and other accessories which help the rise of knowledge may as well be regarded as objects. Object cannot be defined as that to which knowledge owes its particular form; for, knowledge being identical with its form, all that helps the rise of knowledge, the senses, light, etc., may as well be regarded as objects. So, in whatever way one may try to conceive the nature of the subject-object relation, he will be disappointed.

Citsukha follows the traditional view of nescience (*ajñāna*) as a positive entity without beginning which disappears with the rise of true knowledge¹. Nescience is different from the conception of positivity as well as of negativity, yet it is called only positive because of the fact that it is not negative². Ignorance or nescience is described as a positive state and not a mere negation of knowledge; and so it is said that the rise of right knowledge of any object in a person destroys the positive entity of ignorance with reference to that object and that this ignorance is something different from what one would understand by negation of right knowledge³. Citsukha says that the positive character of ignorance becomes apparent when we say that "We do not know whether what you say is true." Here there is the right knowledge of the fact that

¹ *anādi-bhāva-rūpaṃ yad-vijñānena vilityate tad ajñānam iti prājñā-lakṣaṇam saṃpracakṣate anāditve sati bhāva-rūpaṃ vijñāna-nivāsyam ajñānam iti lakṣaṇam iha vivakṣitam. Cīt-sukhī, p. 57.*

² *bhāvābhāva-vilakṣaṇasya ajñānasya abhāva-vilakṣaṇatva-mātreṇa bhāvatvo-pacārāt. Ibid.*

³ *vigtaṃ Deva-datta-niṣṭha-pramāṇa-jñānaṃ Devadatta-niṣṭha-pramābhāvā-tiriktānādermivartakam pramāṇatvād Yajñadattādīgata-pramāṇa-jñānavad ity anumānam. Ibid. p. 58.*

what is said is known, but it is not known whether what is said is valid¹. Here also there is a positive knowledge of ignorance of fact, which is not the same as mere absence of knowledge. Such an ignorance, however, is not experienced through sense-contact or sense-processes, but directly by the self-revealing consciousness—the *sākṣin*. Just before the rise of right knowledge about an object there is ignorance (*ajñāna*), and the object, as qualified by such an ignorance, is experienced as being unknown. All things are the objects of the inner unmoved intuitive consciousness either as known or as unknown². Our reference to deep dreamless sleep as a state in which we did not know anything (*na kiṃcid-avediṣam*) is also referred to as a positive experience of ignorance in the dreamless state.

One of the chief tenets of Vedānta epistemology lies in the supposition that a presentation of the false is a fact of experience. The opposite view is that of Prabhākara, that the false is never presented in experience and that falsehood consists in the wrong construction imposed upon experience by the mind, which fails to note the actual want of association between two things which are falsely associated as one. According to this theory all illusion consists of a false association or a false relationing of two things which are not presented in experience as related. This false association is not due to an active operation of the mind, but to a failure to note that no such association was actually presented in experience (*asamśargāgraha*). According to Prabhākara, the great Mīmāṃsā authority, the false is never presented in experience, nor is the false experience due to an arbitrary positive activity of wrong construction of the mind, but merely to a failure to note certain distinctions presented in experience. On account of such a failure things which are distinct are not observed as distinct, and hence things which are distinct and different are falsely associated as one, and the conch-shell is thus regarded as silver. But here there is no false presentation in experience. Whatever is known is true; falsehood is due to omissions of knowledge and failure in noting differences.

Citsukha objects to this view and urges that such an explanation

¹ *tvadukte 'rthe pramāṇa-jñānaṃ mama nāsti ity asya viśiṣṭa-viśaya-jñānasya pramātvāt. Cū-sukhī, p. 59.*

² *asman-mate ajñānasya sākṣi-siddhatayā pramāṇābodhyatvāt, pramāṇa-jñāno-dayāt prāk-kāle ajñānaṃ tad-viśeṣito 'rthaḥ sākṣi-siddhaḥ ajñāta ity anuvāda gocaraḥ . . . sarvaṃ vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā sākṣi-caitanyaśya viśayaḥ. Ibid. p. 60.*

can never explain all cases of false apprehension. Take the proposition, "There are false apprehensions and false presentations"; if this proposition is admitted to be correct, then Prabhākara's contention is false; if it is admitted to be false, then here is a false proposition, the falsehood of which is not due to a failure to note differences. If the falsity of all propositions be said to be due to a failure to note differences, then it would be hard to find out any true proposition or true experience. On the analogy of our false experience of the everchanging flame of a lamp as the same identical one all cases of true recognition might no less be regarded as false, and therefore all inferences would be doubtful. All cases of real and true association could be explained as being due to a failure to note differences. There could be no case in which one could assure himself that he was dealing with a real association and not a failure to apprehend the absence of association (*asaṃsargā-graha*). Citsukha therefore contends that it is too much to expect that all cases of false knowledge can be explained as being due to a mere non-apprehension of difference, since it is quite reasonable to suppose that false knowledge is produced by defective senses which oppose the rise of true knowledge and positively induce false appearance¹. Thus in the case of the illusory perception of conch-shell as silver it is the conch-shell that appears as a piece of silver. But what is the nature of the presentation that forms the object (*ālambana*) of false perception? It cannot be regarded as absolutely non-existent (*asat*), since that which is absolutely non-existent cannot be the object of even a false perception, and moreover it cannot through such a perception (e.g. the tendency of a man to pick up the piece of silver, which is but a false perception of a piece of conch-shell) induce a practical movement on the part of the perceiver. Neither can it be regarded as existent; for the later experience contradicts the previous false perception, and one says that there is no silver at the present time and there was no silver in the past—it was only the conch-shell that appeared as silver. Therefore the false presentation, though it serves all the purposes of a perceptual object, cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent, and it is precisely this character that constitutes the indefinable nature (*anirvacanīyatā*) of all illusions².

¹ *tathā doṣānām api yathārtha-jñāna-pratibandhakatvam ayathārtha-jñāna-janakatvam ca kiṃ na syāt. Cīṭ-sukhī*, p. 66.

² *pratyekaṃ sad asattvābhyāṃ vicāra-padaṃ na yad gāhate tad anirvācyam āhur vedānta-vedināḥ. Ibid.* p. 79.

It is unnecessary to deal with the other doctrines of Vedānta which Citsukha describes, since there is nothing new in them and they have already been described in chapter x of volume 1 of this work. It is therefore desirable to pass on to his dialectic criticism of the Nyāya categories. It will suffice, however, to give only a few of these criticisms, as they mostly refer to the refutation of such kinds of categories as are discussed in Śrīharṣa's great work *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, and it would be tedious to follow the refutation of the same kinds of categories by two different writers, though the arguments of Citsukha are in many cases new and different from those given by Śrīharṣa. Citsukha's general approach to such refutations is also slightly different from that of Śrīharṣa. For, unlike Śrīharṣa, Citsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedānta, and his refutations of the Nyāya categories were not intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable as to show that they were false appearances, and that the pure self-revealing Brahman was the only reality and truth.

Thus, in refuting time (*kāla*), Citsukha says that time cannot be perceived either by the visual sense or by the tactual sense, nor can it be apprehended by the mind (*manas*), as the mind only operates in association with the external senses. Moreover, since there are no perceptual data, it cannot be inferred. The notions of before and after, succession and simultaneity, quickness and duration, cannot by themselves indicate the nature of time as it is in itself. It may be urged that, since the solar vibrations can only be associated with human bodies and worldly things, making them appear as young or old only through some other agency such as days, months, etc., such an agency, which brings about the connection of solar vibrations with worldly things, is called time¹. To this Citsukha replies that, since the self itself can be regarded as the cause of the manifestation of time in events and things in accordance with the varying conditions of their appearance, it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of a new category called time. Again, it cannot be said that the notions of before and after have time as their material cause; for the validity of these notions is challenged by the Vedāntist. They may be regarded as the im-

¹ *taraṇi-parispanda-viśeṣāṇāṃ yuva-sthavira-śarīrādi-piṇḍeṣu māsādi-vicitra-buddhi-janana-dvāreṇa tad-upahīteṣu paratvāparatvādi-buddhi-janakatvaṃ na ca tair asaṃbaddhānāṃ tatra buddhi-janakatvaṃ, na ca sāṅkṣāt sambandho ravi-parispandānāṃ piṇḍair asti atāh tat-sambandhakatayā kaścīd aṣṭadravya-vilakṣaṇo dravya-viśeṣaḥ svīkartavyaḥ, tasya ca kāla iti saṃjñā.* (This is Vallabha's view of time.) *Nayana-prasādīnī* commentary on *Cit-sukhī*, p. 321, by Pratyak-svarupabhagavat. Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1915.

pressions produced by a greater or lesser quantity of solar vibrations. There is therefore no necessity to admit time as a separate category, since its apprehension can be explained on the basis of our known data of experience. From considerations of some data relative space (*dik*) has to be discarded; for relative space cannot be perceived by the senses or inferred for want of data of experience. Both time and relative space originate from a sense of relativity (*apekṣā-buddhi*), and, given that sense of relativity, the mind can in association with our experience of bodily movements form the notion of relative space. It is therefore unnecessary to admit the existence of relative space as a separate category.

In refuting the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas Citsukha says that there is no ground for admitting the Vaiśeṣika atoms. If these atoms are to be admitted on the ground that all things are to be conceived as being divisible into smaller and smaller parts, then the same may apply to the atoms as well. If it is urged that one must stop somewhere, that the atoms are therefore regarded as the last state, and are uniform in size and not further divisible, then the specks of dust that are seen in the windows when the sun is shining (called *irasareṇus*) may equally be regarded as the last stage of divisible size. If it is contended that, since these are visible, they have parts and cannot therefore be considered as indivisible, it may be said in reply that, since the Nyāya writers admit that the atoms can be perceived by the yogins, visibility of the *trasareṇus* could not be put forward as a reason why they could not be regarded as indivisible. Moreover, if the atoms were partless, how could they be admitted to combine to produce the grosser material forms? Again, it is not indispensable that atoms should combine to form bigger particles or make grosser appearances possible; for, like threads in a sheet, many particles may make gross appearances possible even without combining. Citsukha then repeats Śaṅkara's refutation of the concept of wholes and parts, saying that, if the wholes are different from the parts, then they must be in the parts or they would not be there; if they are not in the parts, it would be difficult to maintain that the wholes were made of parts; if they are in the parts, they must be either wholly or partly in them; if they are wholly in the parts, then there would be many such wholes, or in each part the whole would be found; and, if they are partly in the parts, then the same difficulty of wholes and parts would appear.

Again, the concept of contact (*saṃyoga*) is also inexplicable. It

cannot be defined as the coming together of any two things which are not in contact (*aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ saṃyogaḥ*); for, until one knows the meaning of the concept of contact, one cannot understand the meaning of the phrase "not in contact." If it is defined as the coming together of two things which are unrelated, then contact (*saṃyoga*) would include even the relation of inherence, such as that which exists between a piece of cloth and the threads. If it is defined as a relation which is produced in time and is transitory (*anityaḥ sambandhaḥ janyatva-viśeṣito vā*), then cases of beginningless contact would not be included, and even the possession of an article by purchase would have to be included as contact, since this relation of possession is also produced in time. It cannot be objected that "possession" is not a relation, since a relation to be such must be between two things; for, if the objection were valid, the relation between substance and quality would not be a relation, since quality and substance exist together, and there are no two separate things which can be related. If the objector means that the relation must be between two terms, then there are two terms here also, namely, the article possessed and the possessor. Moreover, if contact is defined as relation which does not connect two things in their entirety (*avyāpya-vṛttitva-viśeṣito*), then again it would be wrong, since in the case of partless entities the relation of contact cannot connect the parts, as they have no parts. Citsukha refutes the concept of separation (*vibhāga*) on the same lines and passes over to the refutation of number, as two, three and the like.

Citsukha urges that there is no necessity of admitting the existence of two, three, etc. as separate numbers, since what we perceive is but the one thing, and then by a sense of oscillation and mutual reference (*apekṣā-buddhi*) we associate them together and form the notions of two, three, etc. These numbers therefore do not exist separately and independently, but are imaginatively produced by mental oscillation and association from the experience of single objects. There is therefore no necessity of thinking that the numbers, two, three, etc., are actually produced. We simply deal with the notions of two, three, etc. on the strength of our powers of mental association¹.

¹ *āropita-dvīta-trītvādi-viśeṣitaikatva-samuccayālambanā buddhir dvītvādi-janiketi cet; na; tathābhūtāyā eva buddher dvītvādi-vyavahāra-janakatvopapattau dvītvādy-utpādatva-kalpanā-vaiyarthīyāt. Nayana-prasādinī, p. 300.*

Citsukha then refutes the notion of class-concept (*jāti*) on the ground that it cannot be proved either by perception or by inference. The question is what exactly is meant by class-concept. If it is said that, when in perceiving one individual animal we have the notion of a cow, and in perceiving other individual animals also we have the same notion of cow, there is *jāti*, then it may be replied that this does not necessarily imply the admission of a separate class-concept of cow; for, just as one individual had certain peculiarities which entitled it to be called a cow, so the other individuals had their peculiarities which entitled them to be called cows. We see reflections of the moon in different places and call each of them the moon. What constitutes the essentials of the concept of cow? It is difficult to formulate one universal characteristic of cows; if one such characteristic could be found, then there would be no necessity of admitting the class-concept of cow. For it would then be an individual characteristic, and one would recognize it as a cow everywhere, and there would be no necessity of admitting a separate class-concept. If one admits a class-concept, one has to point out some trait or quality as that which indicates the class-concept. Then again one could not get at this trait or quality independently of the class-concept or at the class-concept independently of it, and this mutual dependence would make the definition of either of them impossible. Even if one admits the class-concept, one has to show what constitutes the essentials of it in each case, and, if such essentials have to be found in each case, then those essentials would be a sufficient justification for knowing a cow as cow and a horse as horse: what then is the good of admitting a class-concept? Again, even if a class-concept be admitted, it is difficult to see how it can be conceived to be related to the individuals. It cannot be a relation of contact, identity, inherence or any other kind of relation existing anywhere. If all class-concepts existed everywhere, there would be a medley of all class-concepts together, and all things would be everywhere. Again, if it is held that the class-concept of cow exists only in the existing cows, then how does it jump to a new cow when it is born? Nor has the class-concept any parts, so as to be partly here and partly there. If each class-concept of cow were wholly existent in each of the individual cows, then there would be a number of class-concepts; and, if each class-concept of cow were spread out over all the individual cows, then, unless all the individual cows were

brought together, one could not have the notion of any class-concept.

Speaking of the refutation of cause (*kāraṇa*), Citsukha says that cause cannot be defined as mere antecedence (*pūrva-kāla-bhāvitva*); for then the ass which is always found in the house of a washerman and on the back of which the washerman carries his clothes might be regarded as a thing antecedent to the smoky fire kindled in the washerman's house and thus as a cause of fire. If this antecedence be further qualified as that which is present in all cases of the presence of the effect and absent in all cases of the absence of the effect, then also the washerman's ass may be considered to satisfy the conditions of such an antecedence with reference to the fire in the washerman's house (when the washerman is away from the house with his ass, the fire in the washerman's house is also absent, and it is again kindled when he returns to his house with his ass). If "unconditionality" (*ananyathā-siddha*) is further added as a qualifying condition of antecedence, even then the ass and the common abiding elements such as space, ether and the like may be regarded as causes of the fire. If it be argued that the ass is present only because of the presence of other conditioning factors, the same may be said of seeds, earth, water, etc., which are all however regarded as being causes for the production of the shoots of plants. If objection be raised against the possibility of ether (*ākāśa*) being regarded as the cause of smoke on the ground of its being a common, abiding and all-pervasive element, then the same argument ought to stand as an objection against the soul (which is an all-pervasive entity) being regarded on the Nyāya view as the cause of the production of pleasure and pain. The cause cannot be defined as that which being there the effect follows; for then a seed cannot be regarded as the cause of the shoot of the plant, since the shoots cannot be produced from seeds without the help of other co-operating factors, such as earth, water, light, air, etc. Cause, again, cannot be defined as that which being present in the midst of the co-operating factors or even accessories (*sahakāri*), the effect follows; for an irrelevant thing, like an ass, may be present among a number of co-operating circumstances, but this would not justify anybody calling an irrelevant thing a cause. Moreover, such a definition would not apply to those cases where by the joint operation of many co-operating entities the effect is produced. Furthermore, unless the cause can be properly defined, there is

no way of defining the co-operating conditions. Nor can a cause be defined as that which being there the effect follows, and which not being there there is no effect (*sati bhāvo 'saty abhāva eva*); for such a maxim is invalidated by the plurality of causes (fire may be produced by rubbing two pieces of wood, by striking hard against a flint, or by a lens). It may be urged that there are differences in each kind of fire produced by the different agencies: to which it may be replied that, even if there were any such difference, it is impossible to know it by observation. Even when differences are noticeable, such differences do not necessarily imply that the different effects belong to different classes; for the differences might well be due to various attendant circumstances. Again, a cause cannot be defined as a collocation of things, since such a collocation may well be one of irrelevant things. A cause cannot be defined as a collocation of different causes, since it has not so far been possible to define what is meant by "cause." The phrase "collocation of causes" will therefore be meaningless. Moreover, it may be asked whether a collocation of causes (*sāmagrī*) be something different from the causes, or identical with them. If the former alternative be accepted, then effects would follow from individual causes as well, and the supposition of a collocation of causes as producing the effects would be uncalled-for. If the latter alternative be accepted, then, since the individuals are the causes of the collocation, the individuals being there, there is always the collocation and so always the effect, which is absurd. Again, what does this collocation of causes mean? It cannot mean occurrence in the same time or place; for, there being no sameness of time and place for time and place respectively, they themselves would be without any cause. Again, it cannot be said that, if the existence of cause be not admitted, then things, being causeless, would be non-existent; for the Nyāya holds that there are eternal substances such as atoms, souls, etc., which have no cause.

Since cause cannot be defined, neither can effect (*kārya*) be satisfactorily defined, as the conception of effect always depends upon the notion of cause.

In refuting the conception of substance (*dravya*) Citsukha says that a substance can be defined only as being that in which the qualities inhere. But, since even qualities are seen to have qualities and a substance is believed by the Naiyāyikas to be without any quality at the moment of its origination, such a definition cannot

properly distinguish or define a substance. If a substance be defined in a roundabout way as that in which there is no presence of the absolute negation of possessing qualities (*guṇavattvātyantābhāvādnadhikaraṇatā*), then also it may be objected that such a definition would make us regard even negation (*abhāva*) as a quality, since the absence of the negation of qualities, being itself a negation, cannot exist in a negation¹. It may again be asked whether the absence of the negation of qualities refers to the negation of a number of qualities or the negation of all qualities; in either case it is wrong. For in the first case a substance, which contains only some qualities and does not possess others, would not be called a substance, and in the latter case it would be difficult to find anything that cannot be called a substance; for where is the substance which lacks all qualities? The fact also remains that even such a roundabout definition cannot distinguish a substance from a quality; for even qualities have the numerical qualities and the qualities of separateness². If it is argued that, if qualities are admitted to have further qualities, there will be a vicious infinite, it may be said in reply that the charge of vicious infinite cannot be made, since the qualities of number and separateness cannot be said to have any further qualities. Substances, again, have nothing in common by virtue of which they could be regarded as coming under the class-concept of substances³. Gold and mud and trees are all regarded as substances, but there is nothing common in them by virtue of which one can think that gold is the same as mud or tree; therefore it cannot be admitted that in the substances one finds any characteristic which remains the same in them all⁴.

Referring to qualities (*guṇa*), Citsukha deals with the definition of *guṇa* in the *Vaiśeṣika-bhāṣya* of Praśastapāda. There Praśastapāda defines *guṇa* as that which inheres in a substance, is associated with the class-concept of substance, is itself without any quality

¹ *tatraiva atyantābhāve'tivyāpteh; sopi hi guṇavattvātyantābhāvas tasyādhi-karaṇam svasya svasminnavrtteḥ. Cīt-sukhā, p. 176.*

² *asminnāpi vakra-lakṣaṇe guṇādīṣu api saṃkhyā-prthaktva-guṇayoḥ pratīteḥ katham nātivyāptiḥ. Ibid. p. 177.*

³ *jātim abhyupagacchatā tajjāti-vyāñjakam kimcid-avaśyam abhyupeyam na ca tannirupaṇam suśakam. Ibid. p. 178.*

⁴ *dravyam dravyam iti anugata-pratyayaḥ pramāṇam iti cenna suvarṇam-upalabhya mṛttikām-upalabhyamānasya laukikasya tad evedam dravyam iti pratyayā-bhāvāt parīkṣakāṇām cānugata-pratyaye vipratipatteḥ. Ibid. p. 179.*

and which has no motion (*niṣkriya*)¹. But the definition of a quality cannot involve the phrase "without a quality"; for quality is still to be defined. Again, unless the *guṇa* is properly defined, its difference from motion is not known, and so the phrase "which has no motion" is meaningless. The class-concept of quality, again, can be determined only when the general character of qualities is known and the nature of class-concepts also is determined. Hence, from whatever point of view one may look at the question, it is impossible to define qualities.

It is needless now to multiply examples of such refutation by Citsukha. It will appear from what has been adduced that Citsukha enters into detail concerning most concepts of particular categories and tries to show their intrinsic impossibility. In some cases, however, he was not equal to the task and remained content with criticizing the definitions given by the Naiyāyikas. But it may be well to point out here that, though Śrīharṣa and Citsukha carried out an elaborate scheme of a critique of the different categories in order to show that the definitions of these categories, as given by the Nyāya, are impossible, yet neither of them can be regarded as the originator of the application of the dialectic method in the Vedānta. Śaṅkara himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyāya and other systems in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*, II. 11.

The Dialectic of Nāgārjuna and the Vedānta Dialectic.

The dialectic of Śrīharṣa was a protest against the realistic definitions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which supposed that all that was knowable was also definable. It aimed at refuting these definitions in order to prove that the natures of all things are indefinable, as their existence and nature are all involved in *māyā*. The only reality is Brahman. That it is easy to pick holes in all definitions was taught long ago by Nāgārjuna, and in that sense (except for a tendency to find faults of a purely verbal nature in Nyāya definitions) Śrīharṣa's method was a continuation of Nāgārjuna's, and an application of it to the actual definitions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the most important part of Nāgārjuna's method was deliberately ignored by Śrīharṣa and his followers, who made no attempt to refute Nāgārjuna's conclusions. Nāgārjuna's main thesis is that all things are relative and hence indefinable in

¹ *rūpādīnāṃ guṇānāṃ sarveṣāṃ guṇatvābhisambandho dravyāśritatvaṃ nīrguṇatvaṃ niṣkriyatvaṃ. Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya*, p. 94, The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895.

themselves, and so there is no way of discovering their essences; and, since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable, but incomprehensible as well, they cannot be said to possess any essences of their own. Nāgārjuna was followed by Āryadeva, a Ceylonese by birth, who wrote a separate work on the same subject in 400 verses. For about two centuries after this the doctrines of Nāgārjuna lay dormant, as is evidenced by the fact that Buddhaghōṣa of the fourth century A.D. does not refer to them. During the Gupta empire, in the fifth century A.D., Asaṅga and Vasubandhu flourished. In the sixth century A.D. the relativist philosophy of Nāgārjuna again flourished in the hands of Buddhapālita, of Valabhī in Surat, and of Bhavya, or Bhāvaviveka, of Orissa. The school of Bhavya was called Mādhyamika-Sautrāntika on account of his supplementing Nāgārjuna's arguments with special arguments of his own. At this time the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna monism developed in the north, and the aim of this school was to show that for the true knowledge of the one consciousness (*vijñāna*) all logical arguments were futile. All logical arguments showed only their own inconsistency¹. It seems very probable that Śrīharṣa was inspired by these Yogācāra authors, and their relativist allies from Nāgārjuna to Bhavya, and Candrakīrti, the master commentator on Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika-kārikā*. Buddhapālita sought to prove that the apprehension and realization of the idealistic monism cannot be made by any logical argument, since all logic is futile and inconsistent, while Bhāvaviveka sought to establish his idealistic monism by logical arguments. Candrakīrti finally supported Buddhapālita's scheme as against the scheme of Bhāvaviveka and tried to prove the futility of all logical arguments. It was this Mādhyamika scheme of Candrakīrti that finally was utilized in Tibet and Mongolia for the realization of idealistic monism.

In taking up his refutation of the various categories of being Nāgārjuna begins with the examination of causation. Causation in the non-Buddhistic systems of philosophy is regarded as being production from the inner changes of some permanent or abiding stuff or through the conglomeration (*sāmagrī*) of several factors or through some factors operating upon an unchangeable and abiding stuff. But Nāgārjuna denies not only that anything is ever produced, but also that it is ever produced in any one of the above ways. Buddhapālita holds that things cannot arise

¹ *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pp. 66–67. Published by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Leningrad, 1927.

of themselves, since, if they are already existing, there is no meaning in their being produced; if things that are existing are regarded as capable of being produced again, then things would eternally continue to be produced. Bhāvaviveka, criticizing Buddhapālita, says that the refutation of Buddhapālita should have been supplemented with reasons and examples and that his refutation would imply the undesirable thesis that, if things are not produced of themselves, they must be produced by other factors. But Candrakīrti objects to this criticism of Bhāvaviveka and says that the burden of proof in establishing the identity of cause and effect lies with the opponents, the Sāṃkhyaists, who hold that view. There is no meaning in the production of what already exists, and, if that which is existent has to be produced again, and that again, there will be an infinite regress. It is unnecessary to give any new argument to refute the Sāṃkhya *sat-kārya-vāda* view; it is enough to point out the inconsistency of the Sāṃkhya view. Thus Āryadeva says that the Mādhyamika view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish, since it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality and unreality¹. This was exactly the point of view that was taken by Śrīharṣa. Śrīharṣa says that the Vedāntists have no view of their own regarding the things of the world and the various categories involved in them. Therefore there was no way in which the Vedānta view could be attacked. The Vedānta, however, is free to find fault with other views, and, when once this is done and the inconsistencies of other positions are pointed out, its business is finished; for it has no view of its own to establish. Nāgārjuna writes in his *Vigraha-vyāvartanī* thus:

When I have these (of my own to prove),
I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving);
But I have none. I cannot be accused (of being inconsistent).
If I did (really) cognize some (separate) things,
I could then make an affirmation or a denial
Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred).
But these (separate) things do not exist for me.
Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis².

¹ *sad asat sad-asat ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate
upālambhaś cireṇāpi tasya vaktum na śakyate.*

Mādhyamika-ṛitti, p. 16.

² *anyat pratītya yadī nāma paro 'bhaviṣyat
jāyeta tarhi bahulaś śikhino 'ndhakāraḥ
sarvasya janma ca bhavet khalu sarvataś ca
tulyam paratvam akhile 'janake 'pi yasmāt.*

Ibid. p. 36.

Candrakīrti thus emphasizes the fact that it is not possible for the Mādhyamikas to offer new arguments or new examples in criticizing any view, since they have no view of their own to support. They cannot even prove their own affirmations, and, if their affirmations contain any thesis, they quarrel with it also themselves. So the Mādhyamika scheme of criticism consists only in finding fault with all theses, whatever they may be, and in replying to the counter-charges so far as inconsistencies can be found in the opponents' theses and methods, but not in adducing any new arguments or any new counter-theses, since the Mādhyamikas have no theses of their own. In an argument one can only follow the principles that one admits; no one can be defeated by arguments carried on on the basis of principles admitted only by his opponents.

Things are not produced by any conglomeration of foreign factors or causes; for, were it so, there would be no law of such production and anything might come from any other thing, e.g. darkness from light¹. And, if a thing cannot be produced out of itself or out of others, it cannot be produced by a combination of them both. Again, the world could not have sprung into being without any cause (*ahetutah*).

The Buddhist logicians try to controvert this view by pointing out that, whatever a view may be, it must be established by proper proof. So, in order to prove the thesis that all existents are unproduced, the Mādhyamikas must give some proofs, and this would involve a further specification of the nature of such proofs and a specification of the number of valid proofs admitted by them. But, if the thesis that "all existents are unproved" is a mere assertion without any proof to support it, then any number of counter-assertions may be made for which no proof need be shown; and, if proofs are not required in one case, they cannot be required in the other. So one could with equal validity assert that all existents are real and are produced from causes. The Mādhyamika answer to such an objection, as formulated by Candrakīrti, is that the Mādhyamika has no thesis of his own and so the question whether his thesis is supported by valid proof or not is as meaningless as the question regarding the smallness or the greatness of a mule's horn. Since there is no thesis, the Mādhyamika has nothing to

¹ *Mādhyamika-vṛtti*, p. 36. See also Stcherbatsky's *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, to which the author is indebted for the translation and some of the materials of the last two paragraphs.

say regarding the nature of valid proofs (*pramāṇa*) or their number. But it may well be asked why, if the Mādhyamika has no thesis of his own, should he hold the proposition that all existents are unproduced (*sarve bhāvā anutpannāḥ*)? To this the Mādhyamika replies that such propositions appear as definite views only to ordinary people, not to the wise. The proper attitude for the wise is always to remain silent. They impart instruction only from a popular point of view to those who want to listen to them. Their arguments are not their own or those which they believe to be right, but only such as would appeal to their hearers.

It is not out of place here to mention that the Mādhyamika school wishes to keep the phenomenal and the real or the transcendental views wide apart. In the phenomenal view things are admitted to be as they are perceived, and their relations are also conceived as real. It is interesting to refer to the discussion of Candrakīrti with Diñnāga regarding the nature of sense-perceptions. While Diñnāga urges that a thing is what it is in itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), Candrakīrti holds that, since relations are also perceived to be true, things are relational as well. Phenomenally substances exist as well as their qualities. The "thing in itself" of Diñnāga was as much a relative concept as the relational things that are popularly perceived as true; that being so, it is meaningless to define perception as being only the thing in itself. Candrakīrti thus does not think that any good can be done by criticizing the realistic logic of the Naiyāyikas, since, so far as popular perceptions or conceptions go, the Nyāya logic is quite competent to deal with them and give an account of them. There is a phenomenal reality and order which is true for the man in the street and on which all our linguistic and other usages are based. Diñnāga, in defining perception, restricts it to the unique thing in itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and thinks that all associations of quality and relations are extraneous to perceptions and should be included under imagination or inference. This however does violence to our ordinary experience and yet serves no better purpose; for the definition of perception as given by Diñnāga is not from the transcendental point of view. If that is so, why not accept the realistic conceptions of the Nyāya school, which fit in with the popular experience? This reminds us of the attitude of the Vedāntists, who on the one hand accepted the view-point of popular experience and regarded all things as having a real objective existence, and on the other

hand considered them as false and unreal from the transcendental point of view of ultimate reality. The attitude of the Vedāntists on this point seems to have been directly inspired by that of the Mādhyamikas. The attempts of Śrīharṣa to refute the realistic definitions of the Nyāya were intended to show that the definitions of the Nyāya could not be regarded as absolute and true, as the Naiyāyikas used to think. But, while the Mādhyamikas, who had no view-points of their own to support, could leave the field of experience absolutely undisturbed and allow the realistic definitions of the Nyāya to explain the popular experience in any way they liked, the Vedānta had a thesis of its own, namely, that the self-luminous Brahman was the only reality and that it was through it that everything else was manifested. The Vedānta therefore could not agree with Nyāya interpretations of experience and their definitions. But, as the Vedānta was unable to give the manifold world-appearance a footing in reality, it regarded it as somehow existing by itself and invented a theory of perception by which it could be considered as being manifested by coming in touch with Brahman and being illusorily imposed on it.

Continuing the discussion on the nature of causation, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti hold that collocations of causal conditions which are different from the effect cannot produce the effect, as is held by the Hīnayāna Buddhists; for, since the effect is not perceived in those causal conditions, it cannot be produced out of them, and, if it is already existent in them, its production becomes useless. Production of anything out of some foreign or extraneous causes implies that it is related to them, and this relation must mean that it was in some way existent in them. The main principle which Nāgārjuna employs in refuting the idea of causation or production in various ways is that, if a thing exists, it cannot be produced, and, if it does not exist, it cannot be produced at all. That which has no essence in itself cannot be caused by anything else, and, having no essence in itself, it cannot be the cause of anything else¹.

Nāgārjuna similarly examines the concepts of going and coming and says that the action of going is not to be found in the space traversed, nor is it to be found in that which is not traversed; and apart from the space traversed and not traversed there cannot be any action of going. If it is urged that going is neither in the space

¹ *Mādhyamika-vṛtti*, p. 90, l. 6.

traversed nor in the space untraversed, but in the person who continues to go, since going is in him in whom there is the effort of going, then this again cannot be right. For, if the action of going is to be associated with the person who goes, it cannot be associated with the space traversed. One action cannot be connected with both; and, unless some space is gone over, there cannot be a goer. If going is in the goer alone, then even without going one could be called a goer, which is impossible. If both the goer and the space traversed have to be associated with going, then there must be two actions and not one; and, if there are two actions, that implies that there are also two agents. It may be urged that the movement of going is associated with the goer and that therefore going belongs to the goer; but, if there is no going without the goer and if there is no goer without going, how can going be associated with the goer at all? Again, in the proposition "the goer goes" (*gantā gacchati*) there is only one action of going, and that is satisfied by the verb "goes"; what separate "going" is there by virtue of association with which a "goer" can be so called? and, since there are no two actions of going, there cannot be a goer. Again, the movement of going cannot even be begun; for, when there is the motion of going, there is no beginning and when there is no motion of going, there cannot be any beginning. Again, it cannot be urged that "going" must exist, since its opposite, "remaining at rest" (*sthiti*), exists; for who is at rest? The goer cannot be at rest, since no one can be a goer unless he goes; he who is not a goer, being already at rest, cannot be the agent of another action of being at rest. If the goer and going be regarded as identical, then there would be neither verb nor agent. So there is no reality in going. "Going" stands here for any kind of passage or becoming, and the refutation of "going" implies the refutation of all kinds of passage (*niṣkarṣaṇa*) as well. If seeds passed into the state of shoots (*aṅkura*), then they would be seeds and not shoots; the shoots neither are seeds nor are different from them; yet, the seeds being there, there are the shoots. A pea is from another pea, yet no pea becomes another pea. A pea is neither in another pea nor different from it. It is as one may see in a mirror the beautiful face of a woman and feel attracted by it and run after her, though the face never passed into the mirror and there was no human face in the reflected image. Just as the essenceless reflected image of a woman's face may rouse attachment in fools,

so are world-appearances the causes of our delusion and attachment.

It is needless to multiply examples and describe elaborately Nāgārjuna's method of applying his dialectic to the refutation of the various Buddhistic and other categories. But from what has been said it may be possible to compare or contrast Nāgārjuna's dialectic with that of Śrīharṣa. Neither Nāgārjuna nor Śrīharṣa is interested to give any rational explanation of the world-process, nor are they interested to give a scientific reconstruction of our world-experience. They are agreed in discarding the validity of world-experience as such. But, while Nāgārjuna had no thesis of his own to uphold, Śrīharṣa sought to establish the validity and ultimate reality of Brahman. But, it does not appear that he ever properly tried to apply his own dialectic to his thesis and attempted to show that the definition of Brahman could stand the test of the criticism of his own dialectic. Both Nāgārjuna and Śrīharṣa were, however, agreed in the view that there was no theory of the reconstruction of world-appearance which could be supported as valid. But, while Śrīharṣa attacked only the definitions of the Nyāya, Nāgārjuna mainly attacked the accepted Buddhistic categories and also some other relevant categories which were directly connected with them. But the entire efforts of Śrīharṣa were directed to showing that the definitions of the Nyāya were faulty and that there was no way in which the Nyāya could define its categories properly. From the fact that the Nyāya could not define its categories he rushed to the conclusion that they were intrinsically indefinable and that therefore the world-appearance which was measured and scanned in terms of those categories was also false. Nāgārjuna's methods differ considerably from those of Śrīharṣa in this, that the concepts which he criticized were shown by him to have been intrinsically based and constructed on notions which had no essential nature of their own, but were understood only in relation to others. No concept revealed any intrinsic nature of its own, and one could understand a concept only through another, and that again through the former or through another, and so on. The entire world-appearance would thus be based on relative conceptions and be false. Nāgārjuna's criticisms are, however, largely of an *a priori* nature, and do not treat the concepts in a concrete manner and are not based on the testimony of our psychological experience. The oppositions shown are therefore

very often of an abstract nature and occasionally degenerate into verbalism. But as a rule they are based on the fundamentally relative nature of our experience. They are never half so elaborate as the criticisms of Śrīharṣa; but at the same time they are fundamentally more convincing and more direct than the elaborate roundabout logical subtleties of Śrīharṣa's dialectic. It cannot be denied that, based on the dialectical methods of Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, Śrīharṣa's criticisms, following an altogether different plan of approach, show wonderful powers of logical subtlety and finesse, though the total effect can hardly be regarded as an advance from the strictly philosophical point of view, while the frequent verbalism of many of his criticisms is a discredit to his whole venture.

Dialectical criticisms of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla
(A.D. 760) as forerunners of Vedānta Dialectics.

(a) *Criticisms of the Sāṃkhya Parīṇāma Doctrine.*

In tracing the history of the dialectical ways of thinking in the Vedānta it has been pointed out in the previous sections that the influence of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti on Śaṅkara and some of his followers, such as Śrīharṣa, Citsukha and others, was very great. It has also been pointed out that not only Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, but many other Buddhist writers, had taken to critical and dialectical ways of discussion. The criticism of the different schools of Indian thought, as contained in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattva-saṃgraha* with Kamalaśīla's commentary *Pañjikā*, is a remarkable instance of this. Śāntarakṣita lived in the first half of the eighth century A.D., and Kamalaśīla was probably his junior contemporary. They refuted the views of Kambalāśvatara, a follower of the Lokāyata school, the Buddhist Vasumitra (A.D. 100), Dharmatrāta (A.D. 100), Ghosaka (A.D. 150), Buddhadeva (A.D. 200), the Naiyāyika Vātsyāyana (A.D. 300), the Mīmāṃsist Śabarāsvāmin (A.D. 300), the Sāṃkhyaist Vindhyasvāmin (A.D. 300), the Buddhist Saṅghabhadra (A.D. 350), Vasubandhu (A.D. 350), the Sāṃkhyaist Īśvarakṛṣṇa (A.D. 390), the Buddhist Dīnnāga (A.D. 400), the Jaina Ācāryasūri (A.D. 478), the Sāṃkhyaist Māthara Ācārya (A.D. 500), the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara (A.D. 600), the rhetorician Bhāmaha (A.D. 640), the Buddhist Dharmakīrti (A.D. 650), the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrihari (A.D. 650), the Mīmāṃsist Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (A.D. 680),

the Jaina Śubhagupta (A.D. 700), the Buddhist Yugasena (A.D. 700), the Naiyāyika Āviddhakarṇa (A.D. 700), Śāṅkarasvāmin (A.D. 700), Praśastamati (A.D. 700), Bhāvivikta (A.D. 700), the Jaina Pātrasvāmin (A.D. 700), Āhrika (A.D. 700), Sumati (A.D. 700), and the Mīmāṃsist Uveyaka (A.D. 700)¹. It is not possible here, of course, to enter into a complete analysis of all the criticisms of the different philosophers by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla; yet some of the important points of these criticisms may be noted in order to show the nature and importance of this work, which also reveals the nature of the critical thinking that prevailed among the Buddhists before Śāṅkara and by which Śāṅkara and his followers, like Śrīharṣa, Citsukha or Ānandajñāna, were in all probability greatly influenced.

In criticizing the Sāṃkhya views they say that, if the effects, the evolutes, be identical with the cause, the *pradhāna*, why should they be produced from the *pradhāna*? If they are identical, then the evolutes themselves might be regarded as cause or the *pradhāna* as effect. The ordinary way of determining causality is invariable antecedence, and that is avowedly not available here. The idea of *pariṇāma*, which means identity in diversity, the causal scheme of the Sāṃkhya, is also inadmissible; for, if it is urged that any entity changes into diverse forms, it may be asked whether the nature of the causal entity also changes or does not change. If it does not change, then the causal and the effect states should abide together in the later product, which is impossible; if it changes, then there is nothing that remains as a permanent cause; for this would only mean that a previous state is arrested and a new state is produced. If it is urged that causal transformation means the assumption of new qualities, it may be asked whether such qualities are different from the causal substance or not; if they are, then the occurrence of new qualities cannot entitle one to hold the view that the causal substance is undergoing transformations (*pariṇāma*). If the changing qualities and the causal substance are identical, then the first part of the argument would reappear. Again, the very arguments that are given in favour of the *sat-kārya-vāda* (existence of the effect in the cause) could be turned against it. Thus, if curds, etc. already exist

¹ These dates are collected from Dr B. Bhattacharya's foreword to the *Tattva-saṃgraha*. The present author, though he thinks that many of these dates are generally approximately correct, yet, since he cannot spare the room for proper discussions, does not take responsibility for them.

in the nature of the milk, then what is the meaning of their being produced from it? If there is no idea of production, there is no idea of causality. If it is urged that the effects are potentially existent in the cause, and causal operations only actualize them, then it is admitted that the effects are actually non-existent in the cause, and we have to admit in the cause some specific characteristic, brought about by the causal operation, on account of the absence of which the effects remained in the potential state in the cause, and that the causal operations which actualize the effects produce some specific determinations in the cause, in consequence of which the effect, which was non-existent before, is actualized; this would mean that what was non-existent could be produced, which would be against the *sat-kārya-vāda* theory. In the light of the above criticisms, since according to the *sat-kārya-vāda* theory causal productions are impossible, the arguments of Sāṃkhya in favour of *sat-kārya-vāda*, that only particular kinds of effects are produced from particular kinds of causes, are also inadmissible.

Again, according to Sāṃkhya, nothing ought to be capable of being definitely asserted, since according to the *sat-kārya-vāda* theory doubts and errors are always existent as a modification of either *buddhi*, *manas* or *caitanya*. Again, the application of all Sāṃkhya arguments might be regarded as futile, since all arguments are intended to arrive at decisive conclusions; but decisive conclusions, being effects, are already existent. If, however, it is contended that decisive conclusions were not existent before, but were produced by the application of arguments, then there is production of what was non-existent, and thus the *sat-kārya-vāda* theory fails. If it is urged that, though the decisive conclusion (*niscaya*) is already existent before the application of the argumentative premises, yet it may be regarded as being manifested by the application of those premises, the Sāṃkhyaist may be asked to define what he means by such manifestation (*abhivyakti*). This manifestation may mean either some new characteristic or some knowledge or the withdrawal of some obscurity to the comprehension. In the first alternative, it may again be asked whether this new character (*svabhāvātīśaya*) that is generated by the application of the premises is different from the decisive conclusion itself or identical with it. If it is identical, there is no meaning in its introduction; if it is different, no relation is admissible between these two, since any attempt to introduce a relation between

two unrelated entities would launch us into a vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). It cannot mean the rise of the knowledge about that particular object for the manifestation of which the premises are applied; for, according to the *sat-kārya-vāda* theory, that knowledge is already there. Again, it cannot mean the removal of the obscuration of knowledge; for, if there is obscuration, that also must be ever-existent. As a matter of fact, the whole of the teachings of Sāṅkhya philosophy directed to the rise of true knowledge ought to be false, for true knowledge is ever-existent, and therefore there ought to be no bondage, and therefore all persons should always remain emancipated. Again, if there is any false knowledge, it could not be destroyed, and therefore there could be no emancipation.

Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla then urge that, though the above refutation of the *sat-kārya-vāda* ought naturally to prove the *a-sat-kārya-vāda* (the production of that which did not exist before) doctrine, yet a few words may be said in reply to the Sāṅkhya refutation of *a-sat-kārya-vāda*. Thus the argument that that which is non-existent has no form (*nairūpya*) and therefore cannot be produced is false; for the operation of production represents itself the character of the thing that is being produced. As the Satkāryavādins think that out of the same three *guṇas* different kinds of effects may be produced according to causal collocations, so here also, according to the law of different kinds of causal forces (*karana-śakti-pratiniyamāt*), different kinds of non-existing effects come into being. It is meaningless to hold that the limitation of causal forces is to be found in the pre-existence of effects; for, in reality, it is on account of the varying capacities of the causal forces that the various effects of the causes are produced. The production of various effects is thus solely due to the diverse nature of the causal forces that produce them. The law of causal forces is thus ultimately fundamental. The name *a-sat-kārya-vāda*, however, is a misnomer; for certainly there is no such non-existent entity which comes into being¹. Production in reality means nothing more than the characteristic of the moment only, divested from all associations of a previous and a succeeding point of time². The meaning of *a-sat-kārya-vāda* is that an entity called the effect is seen immediately

¹ *na hy asan-nāma kiñcid asti yad utpattim āviśet, kintu kālpaniko 'yaṁ vyavahāro yad asad utpadyata iti yāvat. Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā, p. 33.*

² *vastūnām pūrvāpara-koṭi-śūnya-kṣaṇa-mātrāvasthāyī svabhāva eva utpādaḥ ity ucyate. Ibid.*

after a particular causal operation; and it certainly did not exist before this second moment, since, if it did exist at the first moment of the causal operation, it would have been perceived; it is therefore said that the effect did not exist before; but this should not be interpreted to mean that the Buddhists believed in the non-existing existence of the effect, which suddenly came into being after the causal operation.

Refuting the other Sāṃkhya doctrines, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla point out that, if an effect (e.g. curd) is said to exist in the cause (e.g. milk), it cannot do so in the actual form of the effect, since then milk would have tasted as curd. If it is said to exist in the form of a special capacity or potency (*śakti*), then the existence of the effect in the cause is naturally denied; for it is the potency of the effect that exists in the cause and not the effect itself. Again, the Sāṃkhyists believe that all sensible things are of the nature of pleasure and pain; this, however, is obviously impossible, since only conscious states can be regarded as pleasurable or painful. There is no sense at all in describing material things as of the nature of pleasure or pain. Again, if objective material things were themselves pleasurable or painful, then the fact that the same objects may appear pleasurable to some and painful to others would be unexplainable. If, however, it is held that even pleasurable objects may appear painful to someone, on account of his particular state of mind or bad destiny, then the objects themselves cannot be pleasurable or painful. Again, if objects are regarded as being made up of three *guṇas*, there is no reason for admitting one eternal *prakṛti* as the source of them all. If causes are similar to effects, then from the fact that the world of objects is many and limited and non-eternal one ought to suppose that the cause of the objects also should be many, limited and non-eternal. It is sometimes held that, as all earthen things are produced from one earth, so all objects are produced from one *prakṛti*; but this also is a fallacious argument, since all earthen things are produced not out of one lump of earth, but from different lumps. Thus, though it may be inferred that the world of effects must have its causes, this cannot lead us to infer that there is one such cause as the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhyists.

(b) *Criticism of Īśvara.*

One of the chief arguments of the Naiyāyika theists in favour of the existence of God is based on the fact that the specific forms and shapes of the different objects in the world cannot be explained except on the supposition of an intelligent organizer or shaper. To this Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla reply that we perceive only the different kinds of visual and tactile sensibles and that there are no further shaped wholes or so-called objects, which men fancy themselves to be perceiving. It is meaningless to think that the visual sensibles and tactile sensibles go together to form one whole object. When people say that it is the same coloured object, seen in the day, that we touched in the night when we did not see it, they are wrong; for colour sensibles or sense-data are entirely different kinds of entities from tactile sense-data, and it is meaningless to say that it is the same object or whole which has both the colour and tactile characteristics. If two colour sensibles, say yellow and blue, are different, then still more different are the colour sensibles and the tactile ones. What exist therefore are not wholes having colour and tactile characters, but only discrete elements of colour and tactile sense-data; the combining of them into wholes is due only to false imagination. There are no objects which can be perceived by the two senses; there is no proof that it is one identical object that is perceived by the eye as well as touched. There exist therefore only loose and discrete sense-data. There being thus no shaped wholes, the supposition of the existence of God as shaper and organizer is inadmissible. The mere fact that there are the effects cannot lead to the inference that there is one intelligent creator and organizer, since a causal inference cannot be made from mere similarity of any description; there must be a law of unconditional and invariable connection (*pratibandha*). The argument that, since jugs, etc. are made by an intelligent potter, so trees, etc. must also have been made by an intelligent creator, is faulty; for trees, etc., are so different in nature from jugs, etc., that it is wrong to make any assertion from the former to the latter. The general Buddhist arguments against the existence of any eternal entity will also apply against the existence of any eternal God. The argument that, since a state of arrest breaks up into a state of motion or production in all natural phenomena, there must be an intelligent creator, is wrong;

for there is no state of arrest in nature; all things in the world are momentary. Again, if things are happening in succession, at intervals, through the operation of a causal agent, then God also must be operating at intervals and, by the arguments of the opponents themselves, He must have another being to guide His operations, and that another, and that another, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. If God had been the creator, then everything would have sprung into being all at once. He ought not to depend on accessory assistance; for, He being the creator of all such accessory circumstances, they could not render Him any assistance in His creation. Again, if it is urged that the above argument does not hold, because God only creates when He wishes, then it may be replied that, since God's will is regarded as eternal and one, the old objection of simultaneous production holds good. Moreover, since God is eternal and since His will depends only on Him and Him alone, His will cannot be transitory. Now, if He and His will be always present, and yet at the moment of the production of any particular phenomenon all other phenomena are not produced, then those phenomena cannot be regarded as being caused by God or by His will. Again, even if for argument's sake it may be granted that all natural objects, such as trees, hills, etc., presuppose intelligent creators, there is no argument for supposing that one intelligent creator is the cause of all diverse natural objects and phenomena. Therefore there is no argument in favour of the existence of one omniscient creator.

The arguments urged in refutation of *prakṛti* and Īśvara would also apply against the Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya, which admits the joint causality of Īśvara and *prakṛti*; for here also, *prakṛti* and Īśvara being eternal causes, one would expect to have simultaneous production of all effects. If it is urged that the three *guṇas* behave as accessory causes with reference to God's operation, then also it may be asked whether at the time of productive activity (*sarga*) the activity of dissolution or of maintenance (*sthiti*) may also be expected to be operated, or whether at the time of dissolution, there might be productive operation as well. If it is urged that, though all kinds of forces are existent in *prakṛti*, yet it is only those that become operative that take effect, it may be objected that some other kind of cause has to be admitted for making some powers of *prakṛti* operative, while others are inoperative, and this would introduce a third factor; thus the joint causality of *puruṣa*

and *prakṛti* is also easily refuted. Again, the view that God produces the world through kindness is also false; for, had it been so, the world would not have been so full of misery. Again, there being before creation no beings, God could not feel kindness to non-existent beings. He would not have destroyed the world had He been so kind; if He created and destroyed the world in accordance with the good or bad deeds, then He would not be independent. Had He been independent, He would not have allowed Himself to be influenced by the consequences of bad deeds in producing misery in the world. If He created the world out of mere playful instincts, then these playful instincts would be superior to Him. If He derived much enjoyment from His productive and destructive play, then, if He were able, He would have created and destroyed the world simultaneously. If He is not capable of creating and destroying the world simultaneously, then there is no reason to suppose that He would be able to do it at intervals. If it is urged that the world was produced naturally by His own existence, then there would be simultaneous production. If it is objected that, just as spiders, though they naturally go on producing webs, yet do not produce them all at once, so God also may be producing the world gradually and not all at once, it may then be pointed out that the analogy of spider's webs is false, since the spider does not naturally produce webs, but only through greed for eating insects, and its activities are determined by such motives. God, however, is One who can have only one uniform motive. If it is urged that creation flows from God unconsciously, as it were, it may readily be objected that a being who creates such a great universe without any intelligent purpose would indeed be very unintelligent.

(c) *Refutation of the Soul Theory.*

The Nyāya view of the soul, that our thoughts must have a knower and that our desires and feelings must have some entity in which they may inhere and that this entity is soul and that it is the existence of this one soul that explains the fact of the unity of all our conscious states as the experience of one individual, is objected to by Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla. They hold that no thought or knowledge requires any further knower for its illumination; if it had been so, there would be a vicious infinite. Again, desires, feelings, etc., are not like material objects, which would

require a receptacle in which they might be placed. The so-called unity of consciousness is due to a false unifying imagination of the momentary ones as one. It is also well known that different entities may be regarded as combined on account of their fulfilling the same kinds of functions. It is knowledge in its aspect of ego that is often described as the self, though there is no objective entity corresponding to it. It is sometimes argued that the existence of the soul is proved by the fact that a man is living only so long as his vital currents are connected with the soul, and that he dies when they are disconnected from it; but this is false, since, unless the existence of soul be proved, the supposition of its connection with vital currents as determining life is untenable. Some, however, say that the self is directly perceived in experience; if it had not been, there would not have been such diversity of opinion about its existence. The sense of ego cannot be said to refer to the self; for the sense of ego is not eternal, as it is supposed to be. On the other hand, it refers sometimes to our body (as when I say, "I am white"), sometimes to the senses (as when I say, "I am deaf"), and sometimes to intellectual states. It cannot be said that its reference to body or to senses is only indirect; for no other permanent and direct realization of its nature is found in experience. Feelings, desires, etc., also often arise in succession and cannot therefore be regarded as inhering in a permanent self. The conclusion is that, as all material objects are soulless, so also are human beings. The supposed eternal soul is so different from the body that it cannot be conceived how one can help the other or even be related to it. Thus there is hardly any argument in favour of the soul theory of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

(d) *Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of the Self.*

Kumārila believed that, though the nature of the self as pure consciousness was eternal and unchangeable, yet it passed through various changing phases of other feeling and volitional states. That the self was of the nature of pure consciousness was proved by the fact that it perceives itself to be knower in the past and in the present. So the existence of the self is proved by the fact of self-consciousness. To this Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla reply that, if the self is regarded as one eternal consciousness, then knowledge or the knowing faculty (*buddhi*) ought also to be regarded as similarly one and eternal; but seemingly Kumārila does not

consider *buddhi* to be such. If the knowing faculty be regarded as eternal and one, how are the varying states of cognition, such as colour-cognition, taste-cognition, etc., to be explained? If it is urged that, though the knowing faculty is one, yet (just as a fire, though it has always a capacity of burning, yet burns only when combustible substances are put in it) it only passes through various kinds of perception according as various kinds of objects are presented to it; or, just as a mirror, though it has always the power of reflecting, yet only reflects when the objects are presented to it, so the selves are eternally conscious and yet operate only in connection with their specific bodies and grasp the various kinds of sense-data, and all cognitions are forged from them(selves). If the change of cognitions is due to the changing operations of the senses and the sense-objects, then such a cognizing faculty cannot be regarded as eternal and one. If the knowing faculty is to be regarded as eternal owing to an experience of continuity of consciousness, then how can one explain the variety of cognitions? If it is urged that the variety of cognitions is due to the assumption by the cognizing faculty of various forms of objects, then how can one explain the experience of the variety of cognitions in hallucinations, when there are no objects? Moreover the Mīmāṃsist does not think that the cognizing faculty assumes the forms of the objects cognized, but believes that cognition reveals the objects in the objective world and the cognizing faculty has itself no forms (*nirākārā buddhiḥ*). The fact that there may be cognitions without a corresponding real objective presentation proves that our cognitions are subjective and self-revealed and that they do not reveal objective entities. If it is urged that the knowing faculty has always the power of revealing all things, then sound-cognition would be the same as colour-cognition. The analogy of fire is also false, since there is not one fire that is constant; the analogy of the reflecting mirror is also false, since there is really no reflection in the mirror itself; one can see a reflection in a mirror at a particular angle, the mirror therefore is only an apparatus for producing an illusory cognition. Again, the *buddhi* cannot be compared to a mirror as an apparatus for producing illusory images; for then some other *buddhi* would be necessary for perceiving illusory images. Again, if the self is regarded as one and eternal, then it cannot pass through the varying feeling and volitional states. If these states are not entirely different from the self, then their changes would imply the change of the self; and again, if they are entirely different from

the self, how should their change affect the self? Again, if these states all belong to the self and it is urged that it is when the pleasurable state is submerged in the nature of the common self, that the painful state may arise, it may be pointed out in objection that, if the pleasurable states could be submerged in the nature of the self in identity with itself, then they would be identical with the nature of the self. It is also wrong to suppose that the sense of self-consciousness refers to a really existing entity corresponding to it. It has in reality no specific object to refer to as the self. It may therefore be safely asserted that the existence of the self is not proved by the evidence of self-consciousness.

(e) *Refutation of the Sāṃkhya View of the Self.*

Against the Sāṃkhya view of the self it is pointed out that the Sāṃkhya regards the self as pure consciousness, one and eternal, and that, as such, it ought not to be able to enjoy diverse kinds of experiences. If it is held that enjoyment, etc., all belong to *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* only enjoys the reflections in the *buddhi*, it may well be objected that if the reflections in the *buddhi* are identical with *puruṣa*, then with their change the *puruṣa* also undergoes a change; and if they are different, the *puruṣa* cannot be considered to be their enjoyer. Again, if the *prakṛti* concentrates all its activities for the enjoyment of the *puruṣa*, how can it be regarded as unconscious? Again, if all actions and deeds belong to *buddhi*, and if *buddhi* be different from *puruṣa*, why should the *puruṣa* suffer for what is done by the *buddhi*? If, again, the nature of *puruṣa* cannot be affected by the varying states of pleasure and pain, then it cannot be regarded as an enjoyer; and, if it could be affected, it would itself be changeable.

(f) *The Refutation of the Upaniṣad View of the Self.*

The Upaniṣadic thinkers hold that it is one eternal consciousness that illusorily appears as all objects, and that there is in reality no perceiver and perceived, but only one eternal consciousness. Against this view it is urged by Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla that, apart from the individual cognitions of colour, taste, etc., no eternal, unchangeable consciousness is experienced. If one eternal consciousness is the one reality, then there cannot be a distinction of false knowledge and right knowledge, bondage and emancipation. There being only one reality, there is no right knowledge which need be attained.

(g) *Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities.*

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla point out that the Naiyāyikas divide existing entities into two classes, as produced (*kṛtaka*) and unproduced (*a-kṛtaka*), and they hold that those which are produced are destructible. The Vātsīputrīyas also similarly divide existing entities into momentary (e.g. ideas, sound, flame, etc.) and non-momentary (e.g. earth, sky, etc.). On this point Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla urge that whatever is produced is momentary, since the destructibility of momentary things does not depend on any cause excepting the fact that they are produced; for, had the destructibility of such entities depended on conditions or causes other than the fact of their being produced, then the premise that whatever is produced is necessarily destructible would be false. The Naiyāyika view, therefore, that produced entities depend for their destruction on other conditions, is false. If produced entities do not depend for their destruction on any other condition or cause than the fact of their being produced, then they must be destroyed the moment they are produced, or in other words they are momentary. Moreover, destruction, being negation, is not a positive entity and is absolutely contentless, and only positive entities depend on other conditions or causes for their production. Destruction, being negation, is not produced by any conditions or causes like a positive entity. Destruction therefore is not generated by any separate causal apparatus, but the very causes that lead to the production of an entity lead also to its destruction the next moment. Destructibility being a necessary characteristic of productibility, destruction cannot need the interference of any causes. It has also been stated above that destruction is pure negation and has therefore no characteristics which have to be generated by any positive set of causes or conditions¹.

¹ The word *kṣaṇika*, which is translated as "momentary," is, according to Śāntarakṣita, a technical term. The character in an entity of dying immediately after production, is technically called *kṣaṇa*, and whatever has this quality is called *kṣaṇika* (*utpādānāntara-vināśi-svabhāvo vastunaḥ kṣaṇa ucyate, sa yasyāsti sa kṣaṇika iti. Tattva-saṃgraha*, p. 142); *kṣaṇa* therefore does not mean time-moment. It means the character of dying immediately after being produced. The objection of Uddyotakara that what only stays for a moment of time (*kṣaṇa*) cannot be called *kṣaṇika*, because at the expiry of the moment nothing remains which can be characterized as momentary, is therefore inadmissible. There is, however, no entity separate from the momentary character, and the use of the term *kṣaṇika*, which grammatically distinguishes the possessor of the momentary character from the momentary character itself, is due only to verbal license.

Kumalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita urge that existence (*sattva*) can be affirmed only of those entities which are capable of serving a purpose (*artha-kriyā-samarthā*). They urge that entities can only serve a purpose, if they are momentary. Entities that persist cannot serve any purpose and therefore cannot have any existence. In order to prove their thesis they enter into the following argument. If any purpose is to be served, then that can be either in succession or simultaneously, and no middle alternative is possible. If an existing entity persists in time, then all its effects ought to come about simultaneously; for, the complete cause being there, the effects must also be there, and there is no reason why the effects should happen in succession; but it is well known in experience that effects happen only in succession and not simultaneously. If, however, it is objected that even a persisting entity can perform actions in succession owing to its association with successive accessories (*kramiṇaḥ saha-kāriṇaḥ*), then one may well enquire as to the nature of the assistance given by the successive accessories to the persisting entity in the production of the effect; is it by producing a special modification (*atiśayādhāna*) of the persisting cause or by independent working in consonance with the productive action of the persisting entity? In the first alternative, the special modification may be either identical with or different from the nature of the persisting entity, and both these alternatives are impossible; for, if it is identical, then, since the effect follows in consequence of the special modification of the accessories, it is the element of this special modification that is to be regarded as the cause of the effect, and not the persisting entity. If it is again urged that the effect is due to the association of the special modification with the persisting entity, then it would be impossible to define the nature of such association; for an association may be either of identity or of productivity (*tādātmya* and *tad-utpatti*), and neither of them is possible in the present case, since the special modification is recognized as being different from the persisting entity and is acknowledged by assumption to be produced by the accessories. Again, such association cannot be regarded as being of the nature of *samavāya*; for this special modification, being of the nature of an additional assistance (*upakāra*), cannot be regarded as being of the nature of inseparable inherence (*samavāya*). If this special modification be regarded as being neither of the nature of an additional assistance (*upakāra*) nor of the nature of an essence

identical with the persisting entity, and if it is still regarded as being associated with the persisting entity in a relation of *samavāya*, then anything in the world could be regarded as being in the *samavāya* relation with anything else. In the other alternative, in which it is maintained that the persisting entity awaits only the independent working of the accessories, it may well be asked whether the causal nature of the persisting entity is the same together with the totality of the accessories as it is without them? In the former case, the accessories would also be persistent. In the latter case, the persisting entity can no longer be regarded as persisting.

Regarding the objection of Bhadanta Yogasena, that the same difficulties would arise in the assumption of entities as momentary, Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla reply that in their view the accessories behave in two ways, firstly, as independent co-operation (*ekārthakriyā-kāritā*) and, secondly, as mutual help (*parasparopakāritā*). Thus in the first moment the different accessory-units are only independently co-operant, since, in one moment, their mutual actions cannot help one another; but in the second moment, the effects may be regarded as being of a joint nature, and therefore mutually determining one another, in the production of the effect of the third moment. In this view, though each entity operates independently, yet none of their operations are irrelevant. They are all being produced and determined by the respective causes and conditions in a beginningless series.

The objection against the momentariness of all things on the ground that things are perceived and recognized to be the same, and as persisting, is not a valid one. For the fact of persistence cannot be perceived by the senses and must be regarded as due to false imagination. All recognition is due to the operation of memory, which is almost universally recognized as invalid for purposes of right knowledge. On this point it may be argued that in recognition, if the entity now perceived be the same as the entity perceived at a previous time, then how can a cognition in the past comprehend an entity of the present time? If they are held to be different, then it is acknowledged that the entities perceived as the same in recognition are not really the same. The objector's argument that, since things pass by the same name, they must be persistent is invalid; for it is well known that even in ordinary perception, where a flame is known to be destroyed every moment, and produced anew, it is still said in common verbal usage to be

the same flame. Thus all existing things must be regarded as momentary.

(h) *Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities.*

It is objected by the Naiyāyikas and others that, if things are momentary, then the theory of *karma* would fail; for how can it be understood that the deeds be performed by one, and the fruits reaped by another? How, again, can it be understood that a momentary cause which does not abide till the rise of the effect should produce the same? Again, if objects are momentary, how can they be perceived by the eye? The phenomena of recognition would also be inexplicable, as there would be no permanent perceiver who would identify the present and the past as being one. How, again, would the phenomenon of bondage and of emancipation apply to a non-permanent being? In reply to this Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla say that, just as a seed by means of its invariable power produces the shoots, without being superintended by any conscious agent, so the inner states of a man may generate other states, without being superintended by any permanent conscious agent; the formula (*dharma-saṃketa*) for all production is, "this happening, that happens"; "this being produced, that is produced." It is through ignorance that a man cannot discern that all subsequent states are determined by the natural forces of the preceding ones and thinks of himself as performing this or that action or as striving for emancipation. The true nature of things cannot be determined by the illusory experience of ignorant people. It is sometimes objected that the parts of a seed attain a due constitution by assimilating nutritive elements at the second stage, and then again at the third stage attain a new constitution by further accretion of new nutritive elements, and that therefore it cannot be held that the parts of the seed are entirely destroyed at the second stage. To this the reply of Śāntarākṣita is that in the second moment the effect is produced in dependence on the undestroyed causal efficiency of the first causal moment; so that the effect is produced by the causal efficiency of the first moment, when the cause is not destroyed. The cause however perishes in the second moment; for, once the cause has produced the effect, it cannot be producing it again and again; if it did, there would be a vicious infinite. It must therefore be admitted that the causal

efficiency of the cause ceases immediately after production¹. The view that the effect is produced simultaneously with the cause (*sahabhūtaṃ kāryam*) is unreasonable, since the cause cannot produce the effect before it is itself produced; again, it cannot produce after it is itself produced; for then the effect also has to be acknowledged to be of the same nature as the cause; but at the same moment it can have no scope for its efficiency. Thus the cause and effect cannot be produced simultaneously. There is no necessity also for admitting a causal operation (*vyāpāra*), as separate and distinct from the cause. Invariable antecedence is the only qualification of cause². If a causal operation has to be admitted for connecting the cause with the effect, then that would require another operation, and that another, and there would be a vicious infinite. If the causal operation is admitted to be able to generate the effect independently by itself, so can the cause be also admitted to be able to produce the effect. The objection that, if antecedence be admitted to be alone the determinant of causality, then the fact, that a thing is smelled after it is seen may also lead one to infer that colour is the cause of smell, is invalid, for the Buddhists have no objection to regarding colour as an accessory cause of smell. It must also be remembered that the Buddhists do not regard mere antecedence as the definition of cause, but invariable and necessary antecedence³. Again, no difficulty need be experienced in perception, if the objects are admitted to be momentary; for ideas may be considered to have forms akin to the objects, or to be formless, but revealing the objects. In either case the ideas are produced by their causes, and the momentariness or permanence of objects has nothing to do with their determination⁴. There are in reality no agent and no enjoyer, but only the series of passing mental phenomena. Causality consists in the determination of the succeeding states by the previous ones. The objection of Uddyotakara, that, if the mind is momentary, it cannot be modified (*vāsanā*) by deeds (*karma*), is invalid; for, in the Buddhist view, this modification

¹ The Vaibhāṣikas are spoken of by Śāntarakṣita as holding the view that the effect is produced at the third moment. In this view the effect is produced by the destroyed cause.

² *idam eva hi kāryasya kāraṇāpekṣā yat tad-anantara-bhāvitvam. Tattva-saṃgraha*, p. 177.

³ *na hi vāyam ānantarya-mātraṃ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvādhigati-nibandhanam . . . yasyaivānantaram yad bhavati tat tasya kāraṇam iṣyate. Ibid.* p. 180.

⁴ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are Buddhists who style themselves *nirākāra-vijñāna-vādin*.

(*vāsanā*) means nothing more than the production of a new mental state of a modified nature. There is again no permanent perceiver who remembers and recognizes; it is only when in a particular series of conscious states, on account of the strength of a particular perception, such particularly modified mental states are generated as may be said to contain seeds of memory, that memory is possible. The Buddhists also do not consider that there is one person who suffers bondage and is liberated; they think that bondage means nothing more than the production of painful states due to ignorance (*avidyā*) and other mental causes, and that liberation also means nothing more than purity of the mental states due to cessation of ignorance through right knowledge.

(i) *Refutation of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Categories.*

Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla attempt to refute the categories of substance (*dravya*) with its subdivisions, quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality, or class concepts (*sāmānya*), specific peculiarities (*viśeṣa*), relation of inherence (*samavāya*), and the connotation and denotation of words (*śabdārtha*). This refutation may briefly be set out here.

Speaking against the eternity of atoms, they hold that, since no special excellence can be produced in eternal entities, no conditions or collocations of any kind can produce any change in the nature of the atoms; thus, the atoms being always the same in nature, all objects should be produced from them either at once, or not at all. The mere fact that no cause of atoms is known is no ground for thinking that they are causeless. Again, substance, as different from characters and qualities, is never perceived. The refutation of wholes (*avayavī*), which has already been effected, also goes against the acceptance of substantive wholes, and so the four substances earth, water, air and fire, which are ordinarily regarded as substantive—wholes made up of atoms—also stand refuted. Again, it is not easy to prove the existence of separate and independent time and space entities; for spatial and temporal determinations may well be explained as mental modifications due, like other facts of experience, to their specific causes. The Buddhists of course accept the existence of *manas* as an instrument separate from the sense-organs, but they do not admit its existence as an eternal and single entity.

The refutation of substances implies the refutation of *guṇas*,

which are supposed to be dependent on substances. If the substances do not exist, there can also be no relation of inherence, in which relation the *guṇas* are supposed to exist in substances. There is, again, no meaning in acknowledging colours, etc., as different from the atoms in which they are supposed to exist. The perception of numbers also ought to be regarded as due to mental modifications associated with particular cognitions. There is no reason for holding that numbers should stand as separate qualities. In a similar manner Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla proceed with the refutation of the other Nyāya qualities.

Proceeding with the refutation of action (*karma*), they hold that, if all things are admitted to be momentary, then action cannot be attributed to them; for action, involving as it does successive separation of parts and association of contact-points, implies many moments for its execution. If things are admitted to be persistent or eternal, then also movement cannot be explained. If things are admitted to be always moving, then they will be in motion while they are perceived to be at rest, which is impossible. If things are at rest by nature, there cannot be any vibratory movement in them. The main principle involved in the refutation of *guṇas* and *karmas* consists in the fact that the *guṇas* and *karmas* are regarded by the Buddhists as being identical with the particular sense-data cognized. It is wrong, in their view, to analyse the sense-data as substances having qualities and motion as different categories inhering in them. Whatever may be the substance, that is also the quality which is supposed to be inhering in it, as also the motion which it is supposed to execute.

Regarding the refutation of class-concepts the main drift of Buddhist argument is that, though the perception of class-natures may be supposed to be due to some cause, yet it is wrong to assume the existence of eternal class-nature existing constantly in all the changing and diverse individual members of a class. For, howsoever we may try to explain it, it is difficult to see how one thing can remain constantly the same, though all the individual members in which it is supposed to exist are constantly changing. If class-natures are said to inhere owing to specific qualities, e.g. cooking in the cook, then also it may be objected that, since the operation of cooking is different in each case, there is no one character "cooking" by virtue of which the class-nature of cook is admissible. Moreover, a cook is called a cook even when

he is not cooking. Considerations like these should lead any thinking person to deny the existence of eternal class-natures.

Regarding the refutation of specific qualities (*viśeṣa*) it is held that, if *yogins* can perceive the ultimate specific qualities as different from one another, they might equally perceive the atoms to be different from one another; if the atoms cannot be perceived as different except through some other properties, then the same may be required of the specific properties themselves.

Regarding the refutation of *samavāya*, or relation of inherence, the Buddhist objects mainly to the admission of a permanent *samavāya* relation, though all the individuals in which this relation may be supposed to exist should be changing or perishing. It is a false supposition that the relation of inherence, such as that of the cloth in the thread, is ever felt to be, as if the one (e.g. the cloth) was existing in the other (threads), as the Naiyāyikas suppose.

Dialectic of Śaṅkara and Ānandajñāna.

It is well known that Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, II. ii 11-17, criticizes the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. His first thesis is that the production of an effect different in nature from the cause, as in the case of the production of the impure world from pure Brahman, can be justified on the analogy of even the critics of the Vedānta, the Vaiśeṣikas. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that in the production of the *dvya-aṇuka* (containing two atoms) from the *paramāṇu* (single atom) and of the *catur-aṇuka* (containing four atoms) from the *dvya-aṇuka*, all other qualities of the *paramāṇu* and the *dvya-aṇuka* are transferred to the *dvya-aṇuka* and *catur-aṇuka* respectively, excepting the specific measures of *pārimāṇḍalya* (specific atomic measure) and *aṇu-hrasva* (specific measure of the dyads), which are peculiar to *paramāṇu* and *dvya-aṇuka* respectively. Thus, though all other qualities of *paramāṇus* pass over to *dvya-aṇukas* produced by their combination, yet the specific *pārimāṇḍalya* measure of the *paramāṇus* does not pass to the *dvya-aṇukas*, which are of the *aṇu-hrasva parimāṇa*. So also, though all the qualities of *dvya-aṇukas* would pass on to the *catur-aṇukas* made out of their combination, yet their own specific *aṇu-hrasva parimāṇa* would not pass on to the *catur-aṇukas*, which are possessed of their own measure, viz. the *mahat parimāṇa*, uncaused by the *parimāṇa* of the *dvya-aṇukas*. This shows that the

Vaiśeṣikas believe that the *pārimāṇḍalya* measure (*parimāṇa*) of the *paramāṇus* may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the *dvya-aṇukas*, and so the *aṇu-hrasva* measure of the *dvya-aṇukas* may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the *catur-aṇukas*, viz. the *mahat parimāṇa*. On this analogy it may be contended that the Vaiśeṣikas have nothing to object to in the production of an altogether different effect (viz. the impure world) from an altogether different cause, the pure Brahman. If it is urged that the measure of the *paramāṇu* cannot pass on to the *dvya-aṇuka* only because its passage is rendered impossible by the taking possession of it by an opposite quality (the *aṇu-hrasva parimāṇa*), then a similar reply may be given in the case of the difference between the world and Brahman. Moreover, since, according to the Vaiśeṣika theory, all products remain for a moment without qualities, there is no reason why, when the *dvya-aṇuka* was produced, the *pārimāṇḍalya* measure should not pass on to it. At that moment, since the *pārimāṇḍalya* measure did not pass on to it as did the other qualities, it follows, not that the passing of the *pārimāṇḍalya* measure is opposed by the other *parimāṇa*, but that it naturally did not pass on to it. Again, it cannot be objected that the analogy of dissimilarity of qualities (*guṇa*) cannot be cited in support of the dissimilarity of substances.

Śaṅkara's second thesis is that the Vaiśeṣika view that atoms combine is wrong, because, since the atoms are partless, and since combination implies contact and contact implies parts which come in contact, there cannot be any combination of atoms. Moreover, since before creation there is no one who can make an effort, and since the contact of atoms cannot be effected without effort, and since the selves, being unconscious at that time, cannot themselves make any effort, it is impossible to account for the activity without which the contact of the atoms would also be impossible. So the atoms cannot combine, for want of the effort needed for such a contact. Śaṅkara's third point is that the relation of *samavāya* upheld by the Vaiśeṣikas cannot be admitted; for, if to unite two different objects the relation of *samavāya* is needed, then *samavāya*, being itself different from them, would require another *samavāya* to connect itself with them, and that another, and that another, and so on *ad infinitum*. If the relation of contact requires a further relation of *samavāya* to connect it with the objects in contact, there is no reason why *samavāya* should not require some other relation

in its turn. Again, if the atoms are regarded as always operative and combining, then there can be no dissolution (*pralaya*), and, if they are always disintegrating, then creation would be impossible. Again, since the atoms possess the qualities of colour, etc., they must be the product of some simpler causes, just as other objects having qualities are made up of simpler entities. Moreover, it is not right to suppose that, since we have the idea of non-eternality, this must imply eternity and that therefore the atoms must be eternal; for, even though it implies the existence of eternity, it does not imply that the atoms should be eternal, since there is such an eternal thing as Brahman. Again, the fact that the cause of the destruction of the atoms is not known does not imply that they are eternal; for mere ignorance of the ways of destruction does not imply eternity. Again, the Vaiśeṣikas are wrong in speaking of six different categories and yet hold that all the five other categories depend on substance for their existence or manifestation. A substance and its quality do not appear to be as different as two substances. A substance appears black or white, and this implies that the qualities are at bottom identical with the substance (*dravyātmakatā guṇasya*). It cannot, moreover, be urged that the dependence of other categories on substance consists in their inseparableness (*ayuta-siddhatva*) from it. This inseparableness cannot be inseparableness of space; for, when threads constitute as their product a piece of cloth, then the threads and the cloth cannot be regarded as having the same space, yet, being cause and effect, they are to be regarded as *ayuta-siddha*, or inseparable; and yet the whiteness of the cloth is not regarded as abiding in the threads. If inseparableness means inseparableness of time, then the two horns of a bull, which exist at the same time, should also be regarded as inseparable; and, if inseparableness means inseparableness of character or sameness of character, then quality cannot be regarded as being different from substance. Again, since the cause exists prior to the effect, it cannot be regarded as inseparable from the cause, and yet it is asserted by the Vaiśeṣikas that their relation is one of *samavāya*, since they are inseparable in their nature.

Saṅkara, however, seldom indulges in logical dialectic like the above, and there are only a few rare instances in which he attacks his opponents from a purely logical point of view. But even here he does not so much criticize the definitions of the Vaiśeṣikas as point out the general logical and metaphysical confusions that

result from some of the important Vaiśeṣika theories. It is easy to note the difference of a criticism like this from the criticism of Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, where he uses all the power of his dialectical subtleties to demolish the cherished principles of pure logic as formulated by the Nyāya logicians. It is not a criticism of certain doctrines in support of others, but it is a criticism which aims at destroying the possibility of logical or perceptual knowledge as a whole. It does not touch any specific metaphysical views, but it denies the power of perception and inference to give us right knowledge, and it supposes that it achieves its purpose by proving that the Nyāya modes of definition of perception and inference are faulty and self-contradictory. Citsukha's attempts are more positive; for he criticizes not only the Nyāya categories of logic, but also the categories of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, and makes some positive and important statements, too, about the Vedānta doctrine itself. Ānandajñāna's *Tarkasamgraha* is another important work of negative criticism of the Vaiśeṣika categories and in that sense a continuation on a more elaborate scale of Citsukha's criticisms of the Vaiśeṣika categories. The importance of the Vaiśeṣika was gradually increasing, as it was gradually more and more adopted by Vaiṣṇava realistic writers, such as Madhva and his followers, and it was supposed that a refutation of the Vaiśeṣika would also imply a refutation of the dualistic writers who draw their chief support from Vaiśeṣika physics and metaphysics.

Ānandajñāna, also called Ānandagiri, was probably a native of Gujarat and lived in the middle of the thirteenth century. Mr Tripathi points out in his introduction to Ānandajñāna's *Tarkasamgraha* that Ānandajñāna was a spiritual head of the Dvārakā monastery of Śāṅkara, of which Suresvarācārya was the first teacher. He was a pupil of two teachers, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya and Śuddhānanda. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya wrote five works, viz. (1) a grammatical work called *Sārasvata-prakriyā*, (2) a commentary on Śāṅkara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, (3) a commentary on Ānandabodha Yati's *Nyāya-makaranda*, called *Nyāya-makaranda-samgraha*, (4) a commentary, called *Candrikā*, on Ānandabodha's *Nyāya-dīpāvalī*, and (5) another commentary, called *Nibandha*, on Ānandabodha's *Pramāṇa-mālā*. Nothing is known about his other teacher, Śuddhānanda, who is different from the other Śuddhānanda, the teacher of Svayamprakāśa of the

seventeenth century, author of the *Advaita-makaranda-ṭikā*. One of the most distinguished of Ānandagiri's pupils was Akhaṇḍānanda, author of the *Tattva-dīpana*, a commentary on Prakāśātman's *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, as he refers to him as *śrīmad-ānanda-śailāhva-pañcāsyam satatam bhaje* in the fourth verse of his *Tattva-dīpana*. Ānandagiri wrote a large number of works, which are mostly commentaries. Of these his *Īśāvāsya-bhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*, *Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*, *Vākya-vivaraṇa-vyākhyā*, *Kāthopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭikā*, *Muṇḍaka-bhāṣya-vyākhyāna*, *Māṇḍūkya-Gauḍapādiya-bhāṣya-vyākhyā*, *Taittirīya-bhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*, *Chāndogya-bhāṣya-ṭikā*, *Taittirīya-bhāṣya-vārttika-ṭikā*, *Śāstra-prakāśikā*, *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārttika-ṭikā*, *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka-bhāṣya-ṭikā*, *Śārīraka-bhāṣya-ṭikā* (called also *Nyāya-nirṇaya*), *Gītā-bhāṣya-vivecana*, *Pañcikaraṇa-vivaraṇa*, with a commentary called *Tattva-candrikā* by Rāma Tīrtha, a pupil of Jagannāthāśrama (latter part of the fifteenth century), and *Tarka-saṃgraha* have already been printed. But some of his other works, such as *Upadeśa-sāhasri-vivṛti*, *Vākya-vṛtti-ṭikā*, *Ātma-jñānopadeśa-ṭikā*, *Svarūpa-nirṇaya-ṭikā*, *Tripurī-prakaraṇa-ṭikā*, *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya-vivaraṇa* and *Tattvāloka*, still remain to be printed. It will thus be seen that almost all his works are but commentaries on Śaṅkara's commentaries and other works. The *Tarka-saṃgraha* and *Tattvāloka* (attributed to "Janārdana," which was probably the name of Ānandagiri when he was a householder) seem to be his only two independent works¹. Of these the manuscript of the second work, in which he refutes the doctrines of many other philosophers, including Bhāskara's *pariṇāma* doctrines, has, unfortunately, not been available to the present writer. The *Tarka-saṃgraha* is devoted almost wholly to a detailed refutation of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The book is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, dealing with the criticism of substances (*dravya*), he starts with a refutation of the concepts of duality, reality (*tattva*), existence (*sattva*), non-existence, positivity (*bhāva*) and negativity (*abhāva*). Ānandañāna then passes on to a refutation of the definition of substance and its division into nine kinds (according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy). He then criticizes the first substance, earth, and its diverse forms, as atoms (*paramāṇu*) and molecules (*dvyaṇuka*), and its grosser forms and their modified states,

¹ See Mr Tripaṭhi's introduction to his edition of the *Tarka-saṃgraha*, Baroda, 1917.

as bodies, senses and sense-objects, and continues to criticize the other substances such as water, fire, air, and the theory of creation and dissolution, *ākāśa*, time, space, self (*ātman*) and *manas*. In the second chapter he goes on to the criticism of qualities (*guṇa*), such as colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), touch (*sparsa*), the effects of heat on the transformations of objects through molecular or atomic changes (*pīlu-pāka* and *piṭhara-pāka*), number (*saṅkhyā*), measure (*parimāṇa*), separateness (*prthaktva*), contact (*saṃyoga*), separation (*vibhāga*), the nature of knowledge, illusion and dreams, the nature of right knowledge and its means (*pramāṇa* and *pramā*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), concomitance (*vyāpti*), reason (*hetu*), fallacies (*hetv ābhāsa*), examples (*drṣṭānta*), discussions, disputations and wranglings, testimony of the scriptures (*āgama*), analogy (*upamāna*), memory, pleasure, pain, will, antipathy (*dveṣa*), effort (*prayatna*), heaviness, liquidity (*dravatva*), virtue, vice, etc. In the third chapter he refutes the notion of action, class-concept or universality (*jāti*), the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and different kinds of negation. The thesis designed to be proved in all these refutations is the same as that of Śrīharṣa or Citsukha, viz. that in whatsoever manner the Vaiśeṣikas have attempted to divide, classify or define the world of appearances they have failed.

The conclusion at which he arrives after this long series of criticisms and refutations reminds us of Ānandabodha's conclusions in his *Nyāya-makaranda*, on which a commentary was written by his teacher Anubhūtiśvarūpa Ācārya, to which reference has already been made when Ānandabodha's views were under discussion. Thus Ānandajñāna says that an illusory imposition cannot be regarded as existent (*sat*); for, since it is non-existent in the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of its appearance, it cannot be existent anywhere else. Neither can it be regarded as absolutely non-existent (*atyantāsat*); for, had it been so, it would not have appeared as immediately perceived (*aparokṣa-pratīti-virodhāt*); nor can it be regarded as existent and non-existent in the same object. The only alternative left is that the illusory imposition is indescribable in its nature¹. This indescribability (*anirvācyatva*) means that, in whichever way one may try to describe it, it is found that none of those ways can be affirmed of it or, in other words, that it is indescribable

¹ *pāriśeṣyād anirvācyam āropyam upagamyatām sattvādīnām prakārāṇām prāg-ukta-nyāya-bādhānāt. Tarka-saṃgraha*, p. 135.

in each and every one of those ways¹. Now, since all appearances must have something for their cause and since that which is not a real thing cannot have a real thing as its material cause (*na ca avastuno vastu upādānam upapadyate*), and, since they are all indescribable in their nature, their cause must also be of that nature, the nescience of the substratum².

He then asserts that this nescience (*ajñāna*), which is the material out of which all appearances take their form, is associated with Brahman; for Brahman could not be regarded as omniscient or the knower of all (*sarva-jñā*) without its association with *ajñāna*, which is the material stuff of the *all* (the knower, the means of knowledge, the objects and their relations)³. Everything else that appears except the one reality, the self, the Brahman, is the product of this *ajñāna*. This one *ajñāna* then can explain the infinite kinds of appearances, and there is not the slightest necessity of admitting a number of *ajñānas* in order to explain the diversity or the plurality of appearances. The many selves are thus but appearances produced by this one *ajñāna* in association with Brahman⁴. It is the one *ajñāna* that is responsible for appearances of the dream state as well as of the waking state. It is the one *ajñāna* which produces all kinds of diversity by its diversity of functions or modes of operation. If there is only one reality, which through one *ajñāna* appears in all diverse forms of appearances, how is the phenomenon of self-consciousness or self-recognition to be explained? To this difficulty Ānandajñāna's reply is that both the perceiving and the perceived self are but false appearances in the *antaḥkarana* (an *ajñāna* product), and that it does not in any way infect the one true self with any kind of activity. Thus there is the one Brahman and there is one beginningless, indescribable *ajñāna* in connection with it, which is the cause of all the infinitely diverse appearances through which the former appears impure and suffers bondage, as it were, and again appears liberated, as it were, through the

¹ *yena yena prakāreṇa paro nirvaktum icchati tena tenātmanā 'yogas tad-anirvācyatā matā. Tarka-saṃgraha, p. 136.*

² *tasmād rūpyādi-kāryasyānirvācyatvāt tad-upādānam api adhiṣṭhānājñānam upādeyam. Ibid. p. 137.*

³ *pramāṇataḥ sarvajñatve 'pi pramātytvasya pramāṇa-prameya-sambandhasya cājñāna-sambandham antarenāsiddheḥ tasmin ajñānavattvam avaśyam āśrayitavyam anyathā sarvajñatvayogāt. Ibid. pp. 137, 138.*

⁴ *ekas tāvad ātmā dvayor api āvayoh sampratīpanmo 'sti, tasya svājñānād eva avivāda-siddhād ekasmād atiriktaṃ sarvaṃ pratibhāti; . . . samastasyaiva bheda-bhānasyāpāramārthikasyaikaajñāna-sāmarthyād eva sambhavān nājñāna-bhede hetur asti. Ibid. pp. 138, 139.*

realization of the Vedāntic truth of the real nature of the self¹. In fact there is neither bondage nor emancipation.

In view of the above it may be suggested that Ānandajñāna is following the same line of interpretation of the relation of *ajñāna* to Brahman which was upheld by Vācaspati and Ānandabodha. Ānandajñāna's position as an interpreter of Śaṅkara's philosophy is evident from the number of able commentaries which he wrote on the commentaries of Śaṅkara and also from the references made to him by later writers. Mr Tripathi collects the names of some of these writers, as Prajñānānanda, Śeṣa Śārṅgadharma, Vādivāgīśvara, Vādindra, Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, Sadānanda Kāśmīraka (A.D. 1547), Kṛṣṇānanda (A.D. 1650), Maheśvara Tīrtha (A.D. 1650) and others.

Philosophy of the Prakāṣārtha-vivaraṇa (A.D. 1200).

The *Prakāṣārtha-vivaraṇa* (as the writer himself calls it in the colophon of the work—*prārabhyate vivaraṇam prakāṣārtham etat*) is an important commentary still in manuscript on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, which the present writer had an opportunity of going through from a copy in the Adyar Library, Madras, through the kind courtesy of the Librarian, Mr T. R. Chintamani, who is intending to bring out an edition. The author, however, does not anywhere in the work reveal his own name and the references which can be found in other works are all to its name as *Prakāṣar* or to the author of the *Prakāṣārtha* (*prakāṣārtha-kāra*), and not to the author's personal name². This work has been referred to by Ānandajñāna, of the thirteenth century (*Muṇḍaka*, p. 32; *Kena*, p. 23; Ānandāśrama editions A.D. 1918 and 1917), and it may well be supposed that the author of the work lived in the latter half of the twelfth

¹ *Advītyam ātma-tattvam, tatra ca anādy anirvācyam ekam ajñānam ananta-bheda-pratibhāna-mīdānam, tataś cānekārtha-kaluṣitam ātma-tattvam baddham ivānubhūyamānam, vedānta-vākyottha-tattva-sākṣātkūra-parākṛta-sakāryājñānam muktam iva bhāti; paramārthatō na bandho na muktir iti sakāryājñāna-nivṛtty-upalakṣitam paripūrnam ātma-tattvam eva parama-puruṣārtha-rūpaṁ sidhyati. Tarka-saṃgraha, p. 141.*

² The colophon of the work runs as follows:

*jñātvāpi yasya bahu-kālam acintanena
vyākhyātum akṣamatayā paritāpi cetah
tasyopatāpa-haraṇāya mayeha bhāṣye
prārabhyate vivaraṇam prakāṣārtham etat.*

MS. No. I, 38. 27, Govt. MSS. Library, Madras.

century. He certainly preceded Rāmādvaya, the author of the *Vedānta-kaumudī*, who not only refers to the *Prakaṭārtha*, but has been largely influenced in many of his conceptions by the argument of this work¹. The author of the latter holds that the indefinable *māyā* in association with pure consciousness (*cin-mātra-sambandhinī*) is the mother of all existence (*bhūta-prakṛti*). Through the reflection of pure consciousness in *māyā* is produced Īśvara (God), and by a transformation of Him there arises the creator Brahmā, and it is by the reflection of the pure consciousness in the infinite parts of this Brahmā that there arise the infinite number of individual souls through the veiling and creating functions of the *māyā*. *Māyā* or *ajñāna* is not negation, but a positive material cause, just as the earth is of the jug (*ajñānam nābhāva upādānatvān mṛdvaṭ*). But, being of the nature of veiling (*āvaraṇatvāt*) and being destructible through right knowledge (*prakāśa-heyatvāt*), it cannot be known as it is: still it may well be regarded as the positive cause of all illusions². The well-known Vedāntic term *svaparakāśa* is defined in the *Prakaṭārtha* as illumination without the cognition of its own idea (*sva-saṃvin-nairapekṣeṇa sphuraṇam*). The self is to be regarded as self-revealing; for without such a supposition the revelation of the self would be inexplicable³. The author of the *Prakaṭārtha* then criticizes the Kumārila view of cognition as being a subjective act, inferable from the fact of a particular awareness, as also the Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika and Prabhākara views of knowledge as an illumination of the object inhering in the subject (*ātma-samavāyī viśaya-prakāśo jñānam*), and the Bhāskara view of knowledge as merely a particular kind of activity of the self; and he ultimately holds the view that the mind or *manas* is a substance with a preponderance of *sattva*, which has an illuminating nature, and that it is this *manas* which, being helped by the moral destiny (*adr̥ṣṭādi-sahakṛtam*), arrives at the place where the objects stand like a long ray of light and comes in contact with it, and then as a result thereof pure consciousness is reflected upon the object, and this leads to its cognition. Perceptual cognition, thus defined, would be a mental transformation which can excite the

¹ *Vedānta-kaumudī*, MS. transcript copy, p. 99.

² *āvaraṇatvāt prakāśa-heyatvād vā tamovat-svarūpeṇa pramāṇa-yogyatve 'py abhāva-vyāvṛtti-bhrama-kāraṇatvādi-dharma-viśiṣṭasya pramāṇikatvaṃ na virudhyate*. MS. p. 12.

³ *ātma-sva-prakāśas tato 'nyathā'nupapadyamānatve sati prakāśamānatvān na ya evaṃ na sa evaṃ yathā kumbhaḥ*. *Prakaṭārtha* MS.

revelation of an object (*manah-pariṇāmaḥ samvid-vyañjakojñānam*)¹. In the case of inference, however, the transformation of *manas* takes place without any actual touch with the objects; and there is therefore no direct excitation revealing the object; for the *manas* there, being in direct touch with the reason or the *linga*, is prevented from being in contact with the object that is inferred. There is here not an operation by which the knowledge of the object can be directly revealed, but only such a transformation of the *manas* that a rise of the idea about the object may not be obstructed². The author of the *Prakaṣārtha* accepted the distinction between *māyā* and *ajñāna* as conditioning *Īśvara* and *jīva*.

Vimuktātman (A.D. 1200).

Vimuktātman, a disciple of Avyayātman Bhagavat Pūjyapāda, wrote his *Īṣṭa-siddhi* probably not later than the early years of the thirteenth century. He is quoted and referred to by Madhusūdana in his *Advaita-siddhi* and by Rāmādvaya in his *Vedānta-kaumudī* of the fourteenth century. It was commented upon by Jñānottama, the teacher of Citsukha, and this commentary is called *Īṣṭa-siddhi-vyākhyā* or *Īṣṭa-siddhi-vivaraṇa*. For reasons stated elsewhere Jñānottama could not have flourished later than the latter half of the thirteenth century. Vimuktātman wrote also another work, called *Pramāṇa-vṛtti-nirṇaya*, to which he refers in his *Īṣṭa-siddhi* (MS. p. 72). The work has not yet been published, and the manuscript from the Adyar Library, which is a transcript copy of a manuscript of the Nāḍuvil Maṭham, Cochin State, and which has been available to the present writer, is very fragmentary in many parts; so much so, that it is often extremely difficult to follow properly the meaning of the discussions. The work is divided into eight chapters, and is devoted in a very large part to discussions relating to the analysis of illusions in the Vedānta school and in the other schools of philosophy. This work is to be regarded as one of the four traditional *Siddhis*, such as the *Brahma-siddhi* by Maṇḍana, the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* by Sureśvara,

¹ MS. p. 54.

² *upalabdha-sambandhārthā kāreṇa pariṇatam mano
'nāvabhāsa-vyāvṛtti-mātraphalam, na tu samvid-vyañjakam
lingādi-samvid-vyavadhāna-pratibandhāt.*

MS. p. 54.

It is easy to see how Dharmarājadhvarindra elaborated his Vedāntic theory of perception and inference with these and other data worked out by his predecessors.

the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* by Vimuktātman and the *Advaita-siddhi* by Madhusūdana. Hitherto only the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* and the *Advaita-siddhi* have been published. The *Brahma-siddhi* is expected to be published soon in Madras; but as yet the present writer is not aware of any venture regarding this important work.

The work begins with the interpretation of a salutation made by the author, in which he offers his adoration to that birthless, incognizable, infinite intuitive consciousness of the nature of self-joy which is the canvas on which the illusory world-appearance has been painted. Thus he starts the discussion regarding the nature of the ultimate reality as pure intuitive consciousness (*anubhūti*). Nothing can be beginningless and eternal, except pure consciousness. The atoms are often regarded as beginningless; but, since they have colours and other sense-properties, they are like other objects of nature, and they have parts also, as without them no combination of atoms would be possible. Only that can be indivisible which is partless and beginningless, and it is only the intuitive consciousness that can be said to be so. The difference between consciousness and other objects is this, that, while the latter can be described as the "this" or the object, the former is clearly not such. But, though this difference is generally accepted, dialectical reasoning shows that the two are not intrinsically different. There cannot logically be any difference between the perceiving principle (*dṛk*) and the perceived (*dṛśya*); for the former is unperceived (*adrśyatvāt*). No difference can be realized between a perceived and an unperceived entity; for all difference relates two cognized entities. But it may be argued that, though the perceiver may not be cognized, yet he is self-luminous, and therefore the notion of difference ought to be manifested. A reply to this objection involves a consideration regarding the nature of difference. If difference were of the nature of the entities that differed, then difference should not be dependent on a reference to another (*na svarūpa-dṛṣṭiḥ prati-yogy-apekṣā*). The difference has thus to be regarded as a characteristic (*dharma*) different from the nature of the differing entities and cognized by a distinct knowing process like colours, tastes, etc.¹ But this view also is not correct, since it is difficult to admit "difference" as an entity different from the

¹ *tasmāt kathañcit bhinno jñānāntara-gamyo rūpa-rasādivad bhedo 'bhyuṣeyah*. Adyar *Iṣṭa-siddhi* MS. p. 5.

differing entities; for such a difference would involve another difference by which it is known, and that another and that another, we should have an infinite regress; and the same objection applies to the admission of mutual negation as a separate entity. This being so, it is difficult to imagine how "difference" or mutual negation between the perceiver and the perceived can be cognized; for it is impossible that there should be any other cognition by which this "difference," or mutual negation which has the perceiver as one of its alternating poles, could be perceived¹. Moreover, the self-luminous perceiving power is always present, and it is impossible that it could be negated—a condition without which neither difference nor negation could be possible. Moreover, if it is admitted that such a difference is cognized, then that very fact proves that it is not a characteristic of the perceiving self. If this difference is admitted to be self-luminous, then it would not await a reference to another, which is a condition for all notions of difference or mutual negation. Therefore, "difference" or "mutual negation" cannot be established, either as the essence of the perceiving self or as its characteristics; and as there is no other way in which this difference can be conceived, it is clear that there is no difference between the perceiving self and its characteristics.

Again, negation is defined as the non-perception of a perceivable thing; but the perceiving self is of the very nature of perception, and its non-perception would be impossible. Admitting for the sake of argument that the perceiving self could be negated, how could there be any knowledge of such a negation? for without the self there could be no perception, as it is itself of the nature of perception. So the notion of the negation of the perceiving self cannot be anything but illusion. Thus the perceiving self and the perceived (*dṛk* and *dṛśya*) cannot be differentiated from each other. The difficulty, however, arises that, if the perceiving self and the perceived were identical, then the infinite limitations and differences that are characteristic of the perceived would also be characteristic of the perceiver; and there are the further objections to such a supposition that it is against all ordinary usage and experience. It may be argued that the two are identical, since they are both

1

*evam ca sati na dṛg-dṛśyayor bhedo draṣṭum śakyaḥ
nāpy anyonyābhāvaḥ na hi dṛśaḥ svayaṁ dṛṣṭeḥ
prati-yogy-apekṣa-dṛṣṭy-antara-dṛśyaṁ rūpāntaram svam
samasti svayaṁ dṛṣṭitva-hānāt.*

MS. p. 6.

experienced simultaneously (*sahopalambha-niyamāt*); but the reply is that, as two are experienced and not one, they cannot be regarded as identical, for in the very experience of the two their difference is also manifested¹. In spite of such obvious contradiction of experience one could not venture to affirm the identity of the perceiver and the perceived². The maxim of identity of the perceiver and the perceived because of simultaneous perception cannot be regarded as true; for, firstly, the perceiver is never a cognized object, and the perceived is never self-luminous, secondly, the perceiver is always self-revealing, but not so the perceived, and, thirdly, though the "perceived" cannot be revealed without the perceiver, the latter is always self-revealed. There is thus plainly no simultaneity of the perceiver and the perceived. When a perceived object *A* is illuminated in consciousness, the other objects *B, C, D*, etc. are not illuminated, and, when the perceived object *B* is illuminated, *A* is not illuminated, but the consciousness (*saṃvid*) is always self-illuminated; so no consciousness can be regarded as being always qualified by a particular objective content; for, had it been so, that particular content would always have stood self-revealed³. Moreover, each particular cognition (e.g. awareness of blue) is momentary and self-revealed and, as such, cannot be the object of any other cognition; and, if any particular awareness could be the object of any other awareness, then it would not be awareness, but a mere object, like a jug or a book. There is thus an intrinsic difference between awareness and the object, and so the perceiver, as pure awareness, cannot be identified with its object⁴. It has already been pointed out that the perceiver and the perceived cannot be regarded as different, and now it is shown that they cannot be regarded as identical. There is another alternative, viz. that they may be both identical and different (which is the *bhedābheda* view of Bhāskara and Rāmānuja and others), and Vimuktātman tries to show that this alternative is also impossible and that the perceiver and the

¹ *abhede saha-bhānāyogād dvayor hi saha-bhānam na ekasyaiva na hi dṛśyaiva dṛk saha bhānti bhavatāpy ucyate, nāpi dṛśyenaiva dṛśyam saha bhānti kintu dṛg-dṛśyayoḥ saha bhānam ucyate atas tayor bhedo bhāty eva.* MS. p. 25.

² *tasmāt sarva-vyavahāra-lopa-prasaṅgān na bhedo dṛg-dṛśyayoḥ.* Ibid.

³ *kim vidyud-viśeṣitatā nāma saṃvidāḥ svarūpam uta saṃvedyasya, yadi saṃvidāḥ sāpi bhāty eva saṃvid-bhānāt saṃvedya-svarūpaṃ cet tadā bhānān na saṃvido bhānam.* Ibid. p. 27.

⁴ *asaṃvedyaiva saṃvit saṃvedyam cāsaṃvid eva, ataḥ saṃvedyasya ghaṭa-sukhādeḥ saṃvidāś cābheda-gandho 'pi na pramāṇavān.* Ibid. p. 31.

perceived cannot be regarded as being both identical and different. The upholder of the *bhedābheda* view is supposed to say that, though the perceiver and the perceived cannot, as such, be regarded as identical, yet they may be regarded as one in their nature as Brahman. But in reply to this it may be urged that, if they are both one and identical with Brahman, there would be no difference between them. If it is argued that their identity with Brahman is in another form, then also the question arises whether their forms as perceiver and perceived are identical with the form in which they are identical with Brahman; and no one is aware of any form of the perceiver and the perceived other than their forms as such, and therefore it cannot be admitted that in spite of their difference they have any form in which they are one and identical. If again it is objected that it is quite possible that an identical entity should have two different forms, then also the question arises whether these forms are one, different or both identical with that entity and different. In the first alternative the forms would not be different; in the second they would not be one with the entity. Moreover, if any part of the entity be identical with any particular form, it cannot also be identical with other forms; for then these different forms would not be different from one another; and, if again the forms are identical with the entity, how can one distinguish the entity (*rūpin*) from the forms (*rūpa*)? In the third alternative the question arises whether the entity is identical with one particular form of it and different from other forms, or whether it is both identical with the same form and different. In the first case each form would have two forms, and these again other two forms in which they are identical and different, and these other two forms, and so on, and we should have infinite regress: and the same kind of infinite regress would appear in the relation between the entity and its forms. For these and similar reasons it is impossible to hold that the perceiver and the perceived are different as such and yet one and identical as Brahman.

If the manifold world is neither different nor identical nor both different and identical with the perceiver, what then is its status? The perceiver is indeed the same as pure perception and pure bliss, and, if it is neither identical nor different nor both identical with the manifold world and different, the manifold world must necessarily be unsubstantial (*avastu*); for, if it had any substantiality, it might have been related in one of the above three

ways of relation. But, if it is unsubstantial, then none of the above objections would apply. But it may again be objected that, if the world were unsubstantial, then both our common experience and our practical dealing with this world would be contradicted. To this Vimuktātman's reply is that, since the world is admitted to be made up of *māyā* (*māyā-nirmitatvābhyupagamāt*), and since the effects of *māyā* cannot be regarded either as substantial or as unsubstantial, none of the above objections would be applicable to this view. Since the manifold world is not a substance, its admission cannot disturb the monistic view, and, since it is not unsubstantial, the facts of experience may also be justified¹. As an instance of such an appearance which is neither *vastu* (substance) nor *avastu*, one may refer to dream-appearances, which are not regarded as unreal because of their nature as neither substance nor not-substance, but because they are contradicted in experience. Just as a canvas is neither the material of the picture painted on it nor a constituent of the picture, and just as the picture cannot be regarded as being a modification of the canvas in the same way as a jug is a modification of clay, or as a change of quality, like the redness in ripe mangoes, and just as the canvas was there before the painting, and just as it would remain even if the painting were washed away, whereas the painting would not be there without the canvas, so the pure consciousness also is related to this world-appearance, which is but a painting of *māyā* on it².

Māyā is unspeakable and indescribable (*anirvacanīyā*), not as different from both being and non-being, but as involving the characters of both being and non-being. It is thus regarded as a power of ignorance (*avidyā-śakti*) which is the material cause of all objects of perception otherwise called matter (*sarva-jadōpādāna-bhūtā*). But, just as fire springing from bamboos may burn up the same bamboos even to their very roots, so Brahma-knowledge, which is itself a product of ignorance and its processes, destroys the self-same ignorance from which it was produced and its processes and at last itself subsides and leaves the Brahman to

¹ *prapañcasya vastutvābhāvān nādvaita-hōnīḥ avastutvābhāvāc ca pratyakṣādy-aprāmānyam apy-ukta-doṣābhāvāt*. MS. p. 64.

² *yatha citrasya bhūtiḥ sākṣāt nopādānam nāpi saha-jam citraṃ tasyāḥ nāpy-avasthāntaram myda iva ghaṭādīḥ nāpi guṇāntarāgamāḥ āmrasyeva raktatādīḥ na cāsyāḥ janmādiḥ citrāt prāg ūrdham ca bhāvāt, yady api bhūtiṃ vinā citraṃ na bhūti tathāpi na sā citraṃ vinā bhūti ity evam-ādy-amubhūtir bhūti-jagac-citrāyor yojyam*. Ibid. p. 73.

shine in its own radiance¹. The functions of the *pramāṇas*, which are all mere processes of ignorance, *ajñāna* or *avidyā*, consist only in the removal of obstructions veiling the illumination of the self-luminous consciousness, just as the digging of a well means the removal of all earth that was obstructing the omnipresent *ākāśa* or space; the *pramāṇas* have thus no function of manifesting the self-luminous consciousness, and only remove the veiling *ajñāna*². So Brahma-knowledge also means the removal of the last remnants of *ajñāna*, after which Brahma-knowledge as conceptual knowledge, being the last vestige of *ajñāna*, also ceases of itself. This cessation of *ajñāna* is as unspeakable as *ajñāna* itself. Unlike Maṇḍana, Vimuktātman does not consider *avidyā* to be merely subjective, but regards it as being both subjective and objective, involving within it not only all phenomena, but all their mutual relations and also the relation with which it is supposed to be related to the pure consciousness, which is in reality beyond all relations. Vimuktātman devotes a large part of his work to the criticism of the different kinds of theories of illusion (*khyāti*), and more particularly to the criticism of *anyathākhyāti*. These contain many new and important points; but, as the essential features of these theories of illusion and their criticisms have already been dealt with in the tenth chapter of the first volume, it is not desirable to enter into these fresh criticisms of Vimuktātman, which do not involve any new point of view in Vedāntic interpretation. He also deals with some of the principal Vedāntic topics of discussion, such as the nature of bondage, emancipation, and the reconciliation of the pluralistic experience of practical life with the monistic doctrine of the Vedānta; but, as there are not here any strikingly new modes of approach, these may be left out in the present work.

Rāmādvaya (A.D. 1300).

Rāmādvaya, a pupil of Advayāśrama, wrote an important work, called *Vedānta-kaumudī*, in four chapters, in which he discussed in a polemical way many Vedāntic problems while dealing with the subject matter of Śaṅkara's commentary on the first four topics of the *Brahma-sūtra*. The work has not yet been published; but at least one manuscript of it is available in the Government

¹ MS. p. 137.

² *Ibid.* p. 143.

Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras: this through the kindness of the Curator the present author had the opportunity of utilizing. Rāmādvaya also wrote a commentary on his *Vedānta-kaumudī*, called *Vedānta-kaumudī-vyākhyāna*, a manuscript of the first chapter of which has been available to the present writer in the library of the Calcutta Asiatic Society. These are probably the only manuscripts of this work known till now. The date of the writing of the copy of the *Vedānta-kaumudī-vyākhyāna* is given by the copyist Śeṣanṛsiṃha as A.D. 1512. It is therefore certain that the work cannot have been written later than the fifteenth century. Rāmādvaya in the course of his discussions refers to many noted authors on Nyāya and Vedānta, none of whom are later than the thirteenth century. Vimuktātman, author of the *Īṣṭa-siddhi*, has been placed by the present author in the early half of the thirteenth century; but Rāmādvaya always refers to him approvingly, as if his views were largely guided by his; he also in his *Vedānta-kaumudī-vyākhyāna* (MS. p. 14) refers to Janārdana, which is Ānandajñāna's name as a householder; but Janārdana lived in the middle of the thirteenth century; it seems therefore probable that Rāmādvaya lived in the first half of the fourteenth century.

In the enunciation of the Vedāntic theory of perception and inference Rāmādvaya seems to have been very much under the influence of the views of the author of the *Prakaṣārtha*; for, though he does not refer to his name in this connection, he repeats his very phrases with a slight elaboration¹. Just as the cloudless sky covers itself with clouds and assumes various forms, so the pure consciousness veils itself with the indefinable *avidyā* and appears in diverse limited forms. It is this consciousness that forms the real ground of all that is known. Just as a spark of fire cannot manifest itself as fire if there are no fuels as its condition, so the pure consciousness, which is the underlying reality of all objects, cannot illuminate them if there are not the proper conditions to help it in its work². Such a conditioning factor is found in

¹ See *Vedānta-kaumudī*, MS. transcript copy, pp. 36 and 47.

² Rāmādvaya refers here to the *daharādhikaraṇa* of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, presumably to I. 3, 19, where Śaṅkara refers to the supposed distinction between the individual soul (*jīva*) and Brahman. Here Śaṅkara says that his commentary is directed towards the regulation of those views, both outside and inside the circle of Upaniṣadic interpreters, which regard individual souls as real (*aṇare tu vādinah pāramārthikam eva jaiṇam rūpam iti manyante asmadīyāś ca kecit*). Such a view militates against the correct understanding of

manas, which is of the stuff of pure *sattva*: on the occasion of sense-object contact this *manas*, being propelled by the moral destiny (*adr̥ṣṭādi-kṣubdham*), transforms itself into the form of a long ray reaching to the object itself¹. The pure consciousness, as conditioned or limited by the *antaḥkaraṇa* (*antaḥkaraṇānvacchinnaṃ caitanyaṃ*), does by such a process remove its veil of *avidyā*, (though in its limited condition as individual soul this *avidyā* formed its own body), and the object also being in contact with it is manifested by the same process. The two manifestations of the subject and the object, having taken place in the same process (*ṛtti*) there, are joined together in the same cognition as “this object is known by me” (*ṛtter ubhayasaṃlagnatvāc ca tad-abhivṛtyakta-caitanyasyāpi tathātvena mayedam viditam iti saṃśleṣa-pratyayaḥ*); and, as its other effect, the consciousness limited by the *antaḥkaraṇa*, transformed into the form of the process (*ṛtti*) of right knowledge (*pramā*), appears as the cognizer (*ṛtti-lakṣaṇa-pramāśrayāntaḥkaraṇānvacchinnaṃ tat-pramādeti vyapadiśyate*)². The object also attains a new status in being manifested and is thus known as the object (*karma-kāraṇābhivṛtyaktaṃ ca tat prakāśātmanā phalavyapadeśa-bhāk*). In reality it is the underlying consciousness that manifests the *ṛtti* transformation of the *antaḥkaraṇa*; but, as it is illusorily identified with the *antaḥkaraṇa* (*antaḥkaraṇa-caitanyayor aikyādhyāsāt*), like fire and iron in the heated iron, it is also identified with the *ṛtti* transformation of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, and, as the *ṛtti* becomes superimposed on the object, by manifesting the *ṛtti* it also manifests the object, and thus apart from the subjective illumination as awareness, there is also the objective fact of an illumination of the object (*evaṃ ṛtti-vyañjakam api taptāyah-piṇḍa-nyāyena tad-ekatām ivāptaṃ ṛttivad-viśaya-prakāṣyātmanā sampadyate*)³. The moments in the cognitive process in perception according to Rāmādvaya may thus be described. The

the self as the only reality which through *avidyā* manifests itself as individual souls and with its removal reveals itself in its real nature in right knowledge as *paramēśvara*, just as an illusory snake shows itself as a piece of rope. *Paramēśvara*, the eternal unchangeable and upholding consciousness, is the one reality which, like a magician, appears as many through *avidyā*. There is no consciousness other than this (*eka eva paramēśvaraḥ kūṭastha-nityo vijñāna-dhātur avidyayā-māyayā māyāvivad anekadhā vibhāvayate nānyo vijñāna-dhātur asti*).

¹ This passage seems to be borrowed directly from the *Prakāṣārtha*, as may be inferred from their verbal agreement. But it may well be that both the *Vedānta-kaumudī* and the *Prakāṣārtha* borrowed it from the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*.

² *Vedānta-kaumudī*, MS. transcript copy, p. 36.

³ *Ibid.* p. 37.

sense-object contact offers an occasion for the moral destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*) to stir up the *antaḥkaraṇa*, and, as a result thereof, the *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind is transformed into a particular state called *vyrtti*. The pure consciousness underlying the *antaḥkaraṇa* was lying dormant and veiled, as it were, and, as soon as there is a transformation of the *antaḥkaraṇa* into a *vyrtti*, the consciousness brightens up and overcomes for the moment the veil that was covering it. The *vyrtti* thus no longer veils the underlying consciousness, but serves as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness to the object on which the *vyrtti* is superimposed, and, as a result thereof, the object has an objective manifestation, separate from the brightening up of consciousness at the first moment of the *vyrtti* transformation. Now, since the *vyrtti* joins up the subjective brightening up of consciousness and the objective illumination of the object, these two are joined up (*saṁśleṣa-pratyaya*) and this results in the cognition "this object is known by me"; and out of this cognition it is possible to differentiate the knower as the underlying consciousness, as limited by the *antaḥkaraṇa* as transformed into the *vyrtti*, and the known as that which has been objectively illuminated. In the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* we hear of three consciousnesses (*caitanya*), the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* (the consciousness conditioned by the *antaḥkaraṇa*), the *pramāṇa-caitanya* (the same consciousness conditioned by the *vyrtti* of the *antaḥkaraṇa*), and the *viśaya-caitanya* (the same consciousness conditioned by the object). According to this perception (*pratyakṣa*) can be characterized either from the point of view of cognition (*jñāna-gata-pratyakṣatva*) or from the point of view of the object, both being regarded as two distinct phases, cognitional and objective, of the same perceptual revelation. From the point of view of cognition it is defined as the non-distinction (*abheda*) of the *pramāṇa-caitanya* from the *viśaya-caitanya* through spatial superimposition of the *vyrtti* on the object. Perception from the point of view of the object (*viśaya-gata-pratyakṣatva*) is defined as the non-distinction of the object from the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* or the perceiver, which is consciousness conditioned by the *antaḥkaraṇa*. This latter view, viz. the definition of perception from the point of view of the object as the non-distinction of the object from the consciousness as limited by *antaḥkaraṇa* (*ghaṭāder antaḥkaraṇāva-cchinna-caitanyābhedaḥ*), is open to the serious objection that really the non-distinction of the object (or the consciousness conditioned

by the *antaḥkaraṇa*—*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanya*) but with the cognition (*pramāṇa-caitanya* or *vyrtti-caitanya*); for the cognition or the *vyrtti* intervenes between the object and the perceiver, and the object is in immediate contact with the *vyrtti* and not with the perceiver (*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanya*). That this is so is also admitted by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, son of Rāmakṛṣṇa Adhvarin, in his *Sikhā-maṇi* commentary on the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*¹. But he tries to justify Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra by pointing out that he was forced to define *viśaya-gata-pratyakṣatva* as non-distinction of the object from the subject, since this view was taken in Prakāśātman's *Vivaraṇa* and also in other traditional works on Vedānta². This however seems to be an error. For the passage of the *Vivaraṇa* to which reference is made here expounds an entirely different view³. It says there that the perceptibility of the object consists in its directly and immediately qualifying the cognitional state or sense-knowledge (*saṃvid*)⁴. That other traditional Vedāntic interpreters entirely disagreed with the view of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra is also evident from the account of the analysis of the perceptual process given by Rāmādvaya. Rāmādvaya says, as has just been pointed out, that it is the illuminated cognitive process, or the *vyrtti*, that has the subject and the object at its two poles and thus unites the subject and the object in the complex subject-predicate form "this is known by me." The object is thus illuminated by the *vyrtti*, and it is not directly with the subject, but with the *vyrtti*, that the object is united. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra himself raises an objection against his interpretation, that it might be urged, if in perception there was non-distinction of the object from the subject, then in perceiving an object, e.g. a book, one should feel "I am the book," and not "I perceive the book"; in reply to such an objection he says that in the perceptual process

¹ *yad vā yogyatve sati viśaya-caitanyābhinna-pramāṇa-caitanya-viśayatvaṃ ghaṭāder viśayasya pratyakṣatvaṃ tathāpi viśayasyāparokṣatvaṃ samvidābhedāt iti vivaraṇe tatra tatra ca sāmpradāyikāḥ pramātrabhedasyaiva viśaya-pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇatvenābhidhānād evaṃ uktam. Sikhā-maṇi on Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 75, Bombay, 1911, Venkatesvara Press.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Tasmād avyavadhānena saṃvid-upādhitayāparokṣatā viśayasya. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 50, Benares, 1892.

⁴ It should be noted here that *saṃvid* means cognitional idea or sense-knowledge and not the perceiver (*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanya*), as the author of the *Sikhāmaṇi* says. Thus Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattva-dīpana* commentary explains the word *saṃvid* as *saṃvic-chabdena indriyārtha-samprayoga-ja-jñānasya vivakṣitatvāt. Tattva-dīpana*, p. 194, Benares, 1902.

there is only a non-distinction between the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the perceiver, and this non-distinction, being non-relational, does not imply the assertion of a relation of identity resulting in the notion "I am the book"¹. This is undoubtedly so, but it is hardly an answer to the objection that has been raised. It is true that the object and the subject are both but impositions of *avidyā* on one distinctionless pure consciousness; but that fact can hardly be taken as an explanation of the various modes of experiences of the complex world of subject-object experience. The difference of the Vedāntic view of perception, as expounded in the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, from the Buddhist idealism (*viññāna-vāda*) consists in this, that, while the Buddhists did not accord any independent status to objects as outside the ideas or percepts, the Vedānta accepted the independent manifestation of the objects in perception in the external world². There is thus a distinction between visual percept and the object; but there is also a direct and immediate connection between them, and it is this immediate relationship of the object to its awareness that constitutes the perceptivity of the object (*avyavadhānena samvid-upādhitā aparokṣatā viśayasya—Vivaraṇa*, p. 50). The object is revealed in perception only as an object of awareness, whereas the awareness and the subject reveal themselves directly and immediately and not as an object of any further intuition or inference (*prameyaṃ karmatvena aparokṣam pramātr-~~pramiti~~ punar aparokṣe eva kevalaṃ na karmatayā*)³.

The views of the *Vedānta-kaumudī*, however, cannot be regarded as original in any sense, since they are only a reflection of the exposition of the subject in Padmapāda's *Pañca-pādikā* and Prakāśātman's *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*. The development of the whole theory of perception may be attributed to the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, since all the essential points of the perceptual theory can be traced in that work. Thus it holds that all the world objects are veiled by *avidyā*; that, as the *antaḥkaraṇa* is transformed into states by superimposition on objects, it is illuminated by the underlying consciousness; and that through the spatial contact with the objects the veil of the objects is removed by these *antaḥkaraṇa* transformations; there are thus two illuminations, namely

¹ *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, pp. 76, 77.

² *na ca viññānābhedād eva āparokṣyam avabhāṣate bahiṣṭvasyāpi rajatāder āparokṣyāt. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 50.

³ *Pañca-pādikā*, p. 17, Benares, 1891.

of the *antaḥkaraṇa* transformations (called *ṛtti* in the *Vedānta-kaumudī*, and *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* and pure consciousness); to the question that, if there were unity of the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the *antaḥkaraṇa* (i.e. the subject) and the consciousness underlying the *antaḥkaraṇa* modification (or *ṛtti*), there would be nothing to explain the duality in perception (e.g. "I perceive the book," and not "I am the book," and it is only the latter form that could be expected from the unity of the three consciousnesses), Prakāśātman's reply is that, since the unity of the object-consciousness with the *antaḥkaraṇa*-consciousness (subject) is effected through the modification or the *ṛtti* of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and, since the *antaḥkaraṇa* is one with its *ṛtti*, the *ṛtti* operation is rightly attributed to the *antaḥkaraṇa* as its agent, and this is illuminated by the consciousness underlying the *antaḥkaraṇa* resulting in the perception of the knower as distinguished from the illumination of object to which the operation of the *ṛtti* is directed in spatial superimposition—the difference between the subject and the object in perception is thus due to the difference in the mode or the condition of the *ṛtti* with reference to the subject and the object¹. This is exactly the interpretation of the *Vedānta-kaumudī*, and it has been pointed out above that the explanations of the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* are largely different therefrom and are in all probability inexact. As this unity is effected between individual subjects (consciousness limited by specific *antaḥkaraṇas*) and individual objects (consciousness limited by specific *avidyā* materials constituting the objects) through the *ṛtti*, it can result only in revelation of a particular subject and a particular object and not in the revelation of all subjects and all objects². This has been elaborated into the view that there is an infinite number of *ajñāna*-veils, and that each cognitive illumination removes only one *ajñāna* corresponding to the illumination of one object³. But this also is not an original contribution of Rāmādvaya, since it was also propounded by his predecessor Ānandajñāna in his *Tarka-*

¹ See *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 70, and *Tattva-dīpana*, pp. 256–259, Benares, 1902.

² *etat pramāṭr-caitanyābhinnatayaiva abhivyaktam tad viśaya-caitanyam na pramāṭr-antara-caitanyābhedenā abhivyaktam ato na sarveṣāṃ avabhāsyatvam. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 71.

³ *yāvanti jñānāni tāvanti sva-tantrāṇi para-tantrāṇi vā ajñānāni tato na doṣaḥ. Vedānta-kaumudī*, MS. copy, p. 43.

saṃgraha and by others¹. The upshot of the whole discussion is that on the occasion of a cognitive operation of the mind both the mind and the cognitive operation become enlivened and illuminated by the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and awareness, and through contact with this cognitive operation the object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness, but as an objective fact shining forth in the external world. Cognition of objects is thus not a mere quality of the self as knower, as the Nyāya holds, nor is there any immediate contact of the self with the object (the contact being only through the cognitive operation); the cognition is also not to be regarded as unperceived movement, modification or transformation of the self which may be inferred from the fact of the enlightenment of the object (*jñātātā*), as Kumārila held, nor is the illumination of the object to be regarded mere form of awareness without there being a corresponding as a objective entity (*viśayābhivṛtyaktir nāma vijñāne tad-ākārolekha-mātram na bahir-aṅga-rūpasya vijñānābhivṛtyāptiḥ*), as is held by the Buddhist subjective idealists. The cognitive operation before its contact with the object is a mere undifferentiated awareness, having only an objective reference and devoid of all specifications of sense characters, which later on assumes the sense characteristics in accordance with the object with which it comes in contact. It must be noted, however, that the cognitive operation is not an abstract idea, but an active transformation of a real *sattva* stuff, the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*)². Since in the continuous perception of the same object we have only a rapid succession of cognitive acts, each

¹ The theory is that there is an infinite number of the *ajñāna*-veils; as soon as there is the *vyrtti*-object contact, the veil is removed and the object is illuminated; the next moment there is again an *ajñāna*-veil covering the object, and again there is the *vyrtti*-object contact, and again illumination of the object, and thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals, as the perception of the object continues in time. On account of the rapidity of this succession it is not possible to notice it (*vyrtti-vijñānasya sāvayavatvāc ca hrāsa-daśāyām dīpa-jvālāyā iva tamo 'ntaraṃ mohāntaraṃ āvaritum viśayaṃ pravartate tato 'pi kramamāṇaṃ kṣaṇāntare sāmagry-anusāreṇa vijñānāntaraṃ viśayāvaraṇa-bhaṅgenaiva sva-kāryaṃ karoti, tathā sarvāṇy api atisaṅghryāt tu jñāna-bhedavad āvaraṇāntaraṃ na lakṣyate. Vedānta-kaumudī*, MS. copy, p. 46). This view of the *Vedānta-kaumudī* is different from the view of the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, which holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not different successive awarenesses, but there is *one* unchanged continuous *vyrtti* and not different *vyrttis* removing different *ajñānas* (*kiñ ca siddhānte dhāṛvāhika-buddhi-sthale na jñāna-bhedaḥ kintu yāvād ghaṭa-sphuraṇam tāvad ghaṭākārāntaḥkaraṇa-vyrttir ekaiva na tu nānā vyrtteḥ sva-virodhi-vyrtty-utpattiparyantaṃ sthāyitvābhyupagamat. Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, pp. 26, 27, Bombay, 1911).

² *ataḥ sāvayava-sattvātmakam antaḥkaraṇam eva anubhūta-rūpa-sparśam adṛśyam asprśyaṃ ca viśayākāreṇa pariṇamate. Vedānta-kaumudī*, MS. copy, p. 42.

dispelling an intellectual darkness enfolding the object before its illumination, there is no separate perception of time as an entity standing apart from the objects; perception of time is but the perception of the succession of cognitive acts, and what is regarded as the present time is that in which the successive time-moments have been fused together into one concrete duration: it is this concrete duration, which is in reality but a fusion of momentary cognitive acts and awarenesses, that is designated as the present time¹. According to Rāmādvaya the definition of perception would not therefore include the present time as a separate element over and above the object as a separate datum of perception; for his view denies time as an objective entity and regards it only as a mode of cognitive process.

Rāmādvaya's definition of right knowledge is also different from that of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra. Rāmādvaya defines right knowledge (*pramā*) as experience which does not wrongly represent its object (*yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā*), and he defines the instrument of right knowledge as that which leads to it². Verbally this definition is entirely different from that of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, with whom the two conditions of *pramā* or right knowledge are that it should not be acquaintance with what was already known (*anadhigata*) and that it should be uncontradicted³. The latter condition, however, seems to point only to a verbal difference from Rāmādvaya's definition; but it may really mean very much more than a verbal difference. For, though want of contradiction (Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra's condition) and want of wrong representation (Rāmādvaya's condition) may mean the same thing, yet in the former case the definition of truth becomes more subjective than in the latter case; for want of wrong representation refers to an objective correspondence and objective certainty. An awareness may wrongly represent an object, but yet may not be found contradicted in the personal history of one or even many observers. Such a definition of truth becomes very relative, since its limits are not fixed by correspondence with its object. Considering the fact

¹ *na kālaḥ pratyakṣa-gocaraḥ...stambhādīr eva prāg-abhāva-nivṛtti-pradhvaṃ-sānutpatti-rūpo vartamānaḥ tad-avacchināḥ kālo 'pi vartamānaḥ sa ca tathā-vidho 'neka-jñāna-sādhāraṇa eva, na caitāvātā jñāna-yaugapadyāpatih sūksma-kālāpekṣayā kṛama-sambhavāt, na ca sūksma-kālopādhanām apratitih kārya-krameṇaiva unnīyamānatvāt. Vedānta-kaumudī, MS. copy, pp. 20-22.*

² *Ibid.* p. 16.

³ *tatra smṛti-vyāvṛttam pramātvam anadhigatābādhitārtha-viśaya-jñānatvam. Vedānta-paribhāṣā, p. 20.*

that the Vedānta speaks of a real spatial superimposition of the modification of the *antaḥkaraṇa* (which is its cognitive operation) on the object, a Vedānta definition of truth might well be expected to be realistic and not subjectivistic or relativistic. The idealism of the Vedānta rests content in the view that, however realistic these cognitive relations to objects may be, they are impositions and appearances which have as their ultimate ground one changeless consciousness. The definition of *pramā* by Rāmādvaya as an awareness which does not give a wrong representation (*yathārthānubhava*) of objects could not be found faulty because of the fact that according to the Vedānta all dual experience of the world was false; for, though it was ultimately so, for all practical purposes it had a real existence, and Rāmādvaya refers to the *Īṣṭa-siddhi* to justify his view on this point.

As to the other point, viz. that a *pramā* must always be that which acquaints us with what is unknown before (*anadhigata*), Rāmādvaya definitely repudiates such a suggestion¹. He says that it often happens that we perceive things that we perceived before, and this makes recognition possible, and, if we deny that these are cases of right knowledge, we shall have to exclude much that is universally acknowledged as right knowledge. Also it cannot be conceived how in the case of the continuous perception of an object there can be new qualities accruing to the object, so as to justify the validity of the consciousness as right knowledge at every moment; nor can it be said that the sense-organs after producing the right knowledge of an object (which lasts for some time and is not momentary) may cease to operate until a new awareness is produced. There is therefore no justification for introducing *anadhigatatva* as a condition of perception. Turning to the difference between perception and inference, Rāmādvaya says that in inference the inferred object does not form a datum and there is no direct and immediate contact of the *antaḥkaraṇa* with the inferred object (e.g. fire). In inference the *antaḥkaraṇa* is in touch only with the reason or the *liṅga* (e.g. smoke), and through this there arises (*liṅgādibala-labdhākārollekha-mātreṇa*) an idea in the mind (e.g. regarding the existence of fire) which is called inference².

¹ *ajñāta-jñāpanaṃ pramāṇam iti tad asāram. Vedānta-kaumudī*, MS. copy, p. 18.

² *Ibid.* p. 47. One of the earliest explanations of the Vedāntic view of inference occurs in the *Prakāṣārtha-vivaraṇa*, to which the *Vedānta-kaumudī* is in all probability indebted.

On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) Rāmādvaya does not, like Dharmarājādharīndra, include the absence of defects (*doṣābhāva*) in the definition of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*. It may well be remembered that Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra defines validity (*prāmāṇya*) of knowledge as an awareness that characterizes an object as it is (*tadvati tat-prakāra-jñānatvam*), while self-validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) is defined as the acceptance by the underlying *sākṣi* consciousness of this validity in accordance with the exact modes of the awareness (of which the validity is affirmed), and in accordance with the exact objective conditions of the awareness, in absence of any defects¹. Rāmādvaya, however, closely follows Kumārila's view of the self-validity of knowledge and defines it as that which, being produced by the actual data of that cognition, does not contain any element which is derived from other sources². Later knowledge of the presence of any defects or distorting elements may invalidate any cognition; but, so long as such defects are not known, each cognition is valid of itself for reasons similar to those held by Kumārila and already discussed³. In this connection Rāmādvaya points out that our cognitions are entirely internal phenomena and are not in touch with objects, and that, though the objects are revealed outside, yet it is through our own internal conditions, merit and demerit, that they may be perceived by us⁴.

Vidyāraṇya (A.D. 1350).

In addition to the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* Mādhava wrote two works on the Śaṅkara Vedānta system, viz. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* and *Pañcadaśī*; and also *Īvan-mukti-viveka*. Of these the former is an independent study of Prakāśātman's *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, in which Mādhava elaborates the latter's arguments in his own way. His other work, *Pañcadaśī*, is a popular compendium in verse. Both these works attained great celebrity on account of

¹ *doṣābhāve sati yāvāt-svāśraya-grāhaka-sāmagri-grāhyatvam; svāśrayo vṛtti-jñānam, tad-grāhakaṃ sākṣi-jñānam tenāpi vṛtti-jñāne grāhyamāne tad-gata-prāmāṇyam api grāhyate. Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, pp. 336, 337.

² *vijñāna-sāmagri-janyatve sati yat tad-anya-janyatvaṃ tad-abhāvasyaiva svatastvokty-angikārāt. Vedānta-kaumudī*, MS. copy, p. 52.

jñaptāvapi jñāna-jñāpaka-sāmagri-mātra-jñāpyatvaṃ svatastvam. Ibid. p. 61.

³ *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 372-375.

⁴ *prākāṭyena yuktasyāpi tasya na sarvair viditatvaṃ sva-prakāśam api prākāṭyaṃ kasyacid evādṛṣṭa-yogāt sphurati na guṇatve jñānasya kathanācid artha-yogaḥ samastīti. Vedānta-kaumudī*, MS. copy, pp. 67, 68.

their clear and forcible style and diction. Vidyāraṇya is reputed to be the same as Mādhava, brother of Sāyaṇa, the great Vedic commentator. He was a pupil of Śaṅkarānanda, who had written some works of minor importance on the Upaniṣads¹.

Vidyāraṇya in his *Pañcadaśī* repeats the *Vivaraṇa* view of the Vedānta, that, whether in our awakened state or in our dreams or in our dreamless condition, there is no moment when there is no consciousness; for even in dreamless sleep there must be some consciousness, as is evident from the later remembrance of the experience of the dreamless state. The light of consciousness is thus itself ever present without any change or flickering of any kind. It should therefore be regarded as ultimately real. It is self-luminous and neither rises nor sets². This self is pure bliss, because nothing is so much loved by us as our own selves. If the nature of self had been unobscured, we could not have found any enjoyment in sense-objects. It is only because the self is largely obscured to us that we do not rest content with self-realization and crave for other pleasures from sense-objects. *Māyā* is the cause of this obscuration, and it is described as that power by which can be produced the manifold world-appearance. This power (*śakti*), cannot be regarded either as absolutely real or as unreal. It is, however, associated only with a part of Brahman and not with the whole of it, and it is only in association with a part of Brahman that it transforms itself into the various elements and their modifications. All objects of the world are thus but a complex of Brahman and *māyā*. The existence or being of all things is the Brahman, and all that appears identified with being is the *māyā* part. *Māyā* as the power of Brahman regulates all relation and order of the universe. In association with the intelligence of Brahman this behaves as an intelligent power which is responsible for the orderliness of all qualities of things, their inter-relations and interactions³. He compares the world-appearance to a painting, where the white canvas stands for the pure Brahman, the white paste for the inner controller (*antaryāmin*), the dark colour for the dispenser of the crude elements (*sūtrātman*) and the coloration for

¹ Bhāratitīrtha and his teacher Vidyātīrtha also were teachers of Vidyāraṇya. Vidyāraṇya thus seems to have had three teachers, Bhāratī Tīrtha, Vidyā Tīrtha and Śaṅkarānanda.

² *nodeṭi nāstamety ekā saṃvid eṣā svayam-prabhā. Pañcadaśī*, 1. 7, Basumatī edition, Calcutta, 1907.

³ *śaktir aśty aiśvarī kācit sarva-vastu-niyāmikā. 38. ...cic-chāyāveśataḥ śaktiś cetaneva vibhāti sā. 40. Ibid. III.*

the dispenser of the concrete elemental world (*virāt*), and all the figures that are manifested thereon are the living beings and other objects of the world. It is Brahman that, being reflected through the *māyā*, assumes the diverse forms and characters. The false appearance of individual selves is due to the false identification of subjectivity—a product of *māyā*—with the underlying pure consciousness—Brahman. Vidyāraṇya then goes on to describe the usual topics of the Vedānta, which have already been dealt with. The chief and important feature of Vidyāraṇya's *Pañcadaśī* is the continual repetition of the well-established Vedāntic principles in a clear, popular and attractive way, which is very helpful to those who wish to initiate their minds into the Vedāntic ways of self-realization¹. His *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* is a more scholarly work; but, as it is of the nature of an elaboration of the ideas contained in *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, which has generally been followed as the main guide in the account of Vedānta given in this and the preceding chapter, and there being but few ideas which can be considered as an original contribution of Vidyāraṇya to the development of Vedāntic thought, no separate account of its contents need be given here². The *Īvan-mukti-viveka*, the substance of which has already been utilized in section 17 of chapter x, volume I of the present work, is an ethical treatise, covering more or less the same ground as the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* of Sureśvara.

Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni (A.D. 1500).

Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni (A.D. 1500) was a pupil of Gīrvāṇendra Sarasvatī and Jagannāthāśrama and teacher of Nārāyaṇāśrama, who wrote a commentary on his *Bheda-dhikkāra*. He wrote many works, such as *Advaita-dīpikā*, *Advaita-pañca-ratna*, *Advaita-bodha-dīpikā*, *Advaita-vāda*, *Bheda-dhikkāra*, *Vācārambhaṇa*, *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, and commentaries on the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* and *Pañca-*

¹ There are four commentaries on the *Pañcadaśī*:—*Tattva-bodhinī*, *Vṛtti-prabhākara* by Nīśaladāsa Svāmin, *Tātparya-bodhinī* by Rāmakṛṣṇa and another commentary by Sadānanda. It is traditionally believed that the *Pañcadaśī* was written jointly by Vidyāraṇya and Bhārati Tīrtha. Nīśaladāsa Svāmin points out in his *Vṛtti-prabhākara* that Vidyāraṇya was author of the first ten chapters of the *Pañcadaśī* and Bhārati Tīrtha of the other five. Rāmakṛṣṇa, however, in the beginning of his commentary on the seventh chapter, attributes that chapter to Bhārati Tīrtha, and this fits in with the other tradition that the first six chapters were written by Vidyāraṇya and the other nine by Bhārati Tīrtha.

² He also wrote another work on the *Vivaraṇa*, called *Vivaraṇopanyāsa*, which is referred to by Appaya Dīkṣita in his *Siddhānta-leśa*, p. 68—*Vivaraṇopanyāse Bhārati Tīrtha-vacanam*.

pādikā-vivaraṇa, called *Tattva-bodhinī* and *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa-prakāśikā*. Nṛsiṃhāśrama was very well reputed among his contemporaries, but it does not seem that he introduced any new ideas into the Vedānta. He is more interested in emphasizing the fact of the identity of Brahman with the self and the illusory character of the world-appearance than in investigating the nature and constitution of *māyā* and the way in which it can be regarded as the material stuff of world-appearance. He defines the falsehood of world-appearance as its non-existence in the locus in which it appears (*pratipannopādhāv abhāva-pratīyogitva*)¹. When a piece of conch-shell appears to be silver, the silver appears to be existent and real (*sat*), but silver cannot be the same as being or existence (*na tāvad rajata-svarūpaṃ sat*). So also, when we take the world-appearance as existent, the world-appearance cannot be identical with being or existence; its apparent identification with these is thus necessarily false². So also the appearance of subjectivity or egoistic characters in the self-luminous self is false, because the two are entirely different and cannot be identified. Nṛsiṃhāśrama, however, cannot show by logical arguments or by a reference to experience that subjectivity or egoism (*ahaṃkāra*, which he also calls *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind) is different from self, and he relies on the texts of the Upaniṣads to prove this point, which is of fundamental importance for the Vedānta thesis. In explaining the nature of the perceptual process he gives us the same sort of account as is given by his pupil Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in his *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, as described in the tenth chapter in the first volume of this work³. He considers the self to be bliss itself (*sukha-rūpa*) and does not admit that there is any difference between the self and bliss (*sa cātmā sukhān na bhidyate*)⁴. His definition of *ajñāna* is the same as that of Citsukha, viz. that it is a beginningless constitutive cause, which is removable by true knowledge⁵. There is thus practically

¹ *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, p. 12. *The Pandit*, vol. xxv, May 1903. This work has two important commentaries, viz. *Tattva-viveka-dīpana*, and one called *Tattva-viveka-dīpana-vyākhyā* by Bhaṭṭojī.

² *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, p. 15.

³ *yadā antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttīyā ghaṭāvavacchinnaṃ caitanyam upadīyate tadā antaḥkaraṇāvavacchinna-ghaṭāvavacchinna-caitanyayor vastuta ekatve 'py upadīh-bhedād bhinnayor abhedopādhi-sambandhena aikyād bhavaty abheda ity antaḥkaraṇāvavacchinna-caitanyasya viśayābhinna-tad-adhiṣṭhāna-caitanyasyābheda-siddhyartham vṛtter nīrgamaṇam vācyam. Ibid.* p. 22.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 29.

⁵ *anādy upādānatve sati jñāna-nivartyam ajñānam, nikhila-prapañcopādāna-brahma-gocaram eva ajñānam. Ibid.* p. 43.

no new line of argument in his presentation of the Vedānta. On the side of dialectical arguments, in his attempts to refute "difference" (*bheda*) in his *Bheda-dhikkāra* he was anticipated by his great predecessors Śrīharṣa and Citsukha.

Appaya Dīkṣita¹ (A.D. 1550).

Appaya Dīkṣita lived probably in the middle of the sixteenth century, as he refers to Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni, who lived early in that century. He was a great scholar, well-read in many branches of Sanskrit learning, and wrote a large number of works on many subjects. His grandfather was Ācārya Dīkṣita, who is said to have been famous for his scholarship from the Himalayas to the south point of India: the name of his father was Raṅgarāja Makhīndra (or simply Rāja Makhīndra). There is, however, nothing very noteworthy in his Vedāntic doctrines. For, in spite of his scholarship, he was only a good compiler and not an original thinker, and on many occasions where he had opportunities of giving original views he contents himself with the views of others. It is sometimes said that he had two different religious views at two different periods of his life, Śaiva and the Vedānta. But of this one cannot be certain; for he was such an all-round scholar that the fact that he wrote a Śaiva commentary and a Vedāntic commentary need not lead to the supposition that he changed his faith. In the beginning of his commentary *Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā* on Śrīkaṇṭha's Śaiva commentary to the *Brahma-sūtra* he says that, though the right interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* is the monistic interpretation, as attempted by Śaṅkara and others, yet the desire for attaining this right wisdom of oneness (*advaita-vāsanā*) arises only through the grace of Śiva, and it is for this reason that Vyāsa in his *Brahma-sūtra* tried to establish the superiority of the qualified Brahman Śiva as interpreted by Śrīkaṇṭhācārya. This shows that even while writing his commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha's *Śaiva-bhāṣya* he had not lost respect for the monistic interpretations of Śaṅkara, and he was somehow able to reconcile in his mind the Śaiva doctrine of qualified Brahman (*saguṇa-brahma*) as Śiva with the Śaṅkara doctrine of unqualified pure Brahman. It is possible,

¹ He was also called Appayya Dīkṣita and Avadhāni Yajvā, and he studied Logic (*tarka*) with Yajñeśvara Makhīndra. See colophon to Appaya Dīkṣita's commentary on the *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjari* of Jānakinātha, called *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjari-vyākhyāna* (MS.).

however, that his sympathies with the monistic Vedānta, which at the beginning were only lukewarm, deepened with age. He says in his *Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā* that he lived in the reign of King Cinnabomma (whose land-grant inscriptions date from Sadāśiva, mahārāja of Vijayanagara, A.D. 1566 to 1575; *vide* Hultzsch, *S.I. Inscriptions*, vol. 1), under whose orders he wrote the *Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā* commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary. His grandson Nilakaṇṭha Dikṣita says in his *Śiva-līlārṇava* that Appaya Dikṣita lived to the good old age of seventy-two. In the *Oriental Historical Manuscripts* catalogued by Taylor, vol. II, it is related that at the request of the Pāṇḍya king Tirumalai Nayaka he came to the Pāṇḍya country in A.D. 1626 to settle certain disputes between the Śaivas and the Vaiṣṇavas. Kālahasti-śaraṇa-Śivānanda Yogīndra, in his commentary on the *Ātmārpaṇa-stava*, gives the date of Appaya Dikṣita's birth as Kali age 4654, or A.D. 1554, as pointed out by Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppusvami Sastri in his Sanskrit introduction to the *Śiva-līlārṇava*. Since he lived seventy-two years, he must have died some time in 1626, the very year when he came to the Pāṇḍya country. He had for his pupil Bhaṭṭojī Dikṣita, as is indicated by his own statement in the *Tantra-siddhānta-dīpikā* by the latter author. Bhaṭṭojī Dikṣita must therefore have been a junior contemporary of Appaya Dikṣita, as is also evidenced by his other statement in his *Tattva-kaustubha* that he wrote this work at the request of King Keladi-Veṅkaṭendra, who reigned from 1604 to 1626 (*vide* Hultzsch's second volume of *Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts*)¹.

It is said that Appaya Dikṣita wrote about four hundred works. Some of them may be mentioned here: *Advaita-nirṇaya*, *Catur-mata-sāra-saṃgraha* (containing in the first chapter, called *Nyāya-muktāvalī*, a brief summary of the doctrines of Madhva, in the second chapter, called *Naya-mayūkha-mālikā*, the doctrines of Rāmānuja, in the third chapter the decisive conclusions from the point of view of Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary called *Naya-maṇi-mālā* and in the fourth chapter, called *Naya-mañjarī*, decisive conclusions in accordance with the views of Saṅkarācārya); *Tattva-muktāvalī*, a work on Vedānta; *Vyākaraṇa-vāda-naṣṭatra-mālā*, a work on grammar; *Pūrvottara-mīmāṃsā-vāda-naṣṭatra-mālā* (containing various separate topics of discussion in Mīmāṃsā and

¹ See Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppusvami Sastri's introduction to the *Śiva-līlārṇava*, Srirangam, 1911.

Vedānta); *Nyāya-rakṣā-maṇi*, a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* following the monistic lines of Śaṅkara; *Vedānta-kalpa-taru-parimala*, a commentary on Amalananda's *Vedānta-kalpa-taru*, a commentary on Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī* commentary; *Siddhānta-leśa-saṃgraha*, a collection of the views of different philosophers of the monistic school of Śaṅkara on some of the most important points of the Vedānta, without any attempt at harmonizing them or showing his own preference by reasoned arguments, and comprising a number of commentaries by Acyutakṛṣṇānanda Tīrtha (*Kṛṣṇā-lamkāra*), Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī (*Siddhānta-bindu-śikara*), Rāmacandra Yajvan (*Gūḍhārtha-prakāśa*), Viśvanātha Tīrtha, Dharmaya Dīkṣita and others; *Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā*, a commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha's *Śaiva-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*; *Śiva-karṇāmṛta*; *Śiva-tattva-viveka*; *Śiva-purāṇa-tāmasatva-khaṇḍana*; *Śivādvaita-nirṇaya*; *Śivānanda-lahari-candrikā*, a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Śivānanda-lahari*; *Śivārcana-candrikā*; *Śivotkarṣa-candrikā*; *Śivotkarṣa-maṇjarī*; *Śaiva-kalpa-druma*; *Siddhānta-ratnākara*; *Madhva-mukha-bhaṅga*, an attempt to show that Madhva's interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* is not in accordance with the meaning of the texts of the Upaniṣads; *Rāmānuja-mata-khaṇḍana*; *Rāmāyaṇa-tātparyā-nirṇaya*; *Rāmāyaṇa-tātparyā-saṃgraha*; *Rāmāyaṇa-bhārata-sāra-saṃgraha*; *Rāmāyaṇa-sāra*; *Rāmāyaṇa-sāra-saṃgraha*; *Rāmāyaṇa-sāra-stava*; *Mīmāṃsādhikaraṇa-mālā Upakrama-parākrama*, a short Mīmāṃsa work; *Dharma-mīmāṃsā-paribhāṣā*; *Nāma-saṃgraha-mālikā*; *Vidhi-rasāyana*; *Vidhi-rasāyanopajivani*; *Vṛtti-vārttika*, a short work on the threefold meanings of words; *Kuvalayananda*, a work on rhetoric on which no less than ten commentaries have been written; *Citra-mīmāṃsā*, a work on rhetoric; *Jayollāsa-nidhi*, a commentary on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*; *Yādvābhyudaya-ṭikā*, a commentary on Veṅkaṭa's *Yādvābhyudaya*; a commentary on the *Prabodha-candrodaya nāṭaka*, etc.

Prakāśānanda (A.D. 1550—1600).

It has been pointed out that the Vedānta doctrine of monism as preached by Śaṅkara could not shake off its apparent duality in association with *māyā*, which in the hands of the later followers of Śaṅkara gradually thickened into a positive stuff through the evolution or transformation of which all the phenomena of world-appearance could be explained. The Vedāntists held that this *māyā*,

though it adhered to Brahman and spread its magical creations thereon, was unspeakable, indescribable, indefinable, changeable and unthinkable and was thus entirely different from the self-revealing, unchangeable Brahman. The charge of dualism against such a system of philosophy could be dodged by the teachers of Vedānta only by holding that, since Brahman was the ultimate reality, *māyā* was unreal and illusory, and hence the charge of duality would be false. But when one considers that *māyā* is regarded as positive and as the stuff of the transformations of world-appearance, it is hardly intelligible how it can be kept out of consideration as having no kind of existence at all. The positive character of *māyā* as being the stuff of all world-appearance has to be given up, if the strictly monistic doctrine is to be consistently kept. Almost all the followers of Śaṅkara had, however, been interpreting their master's views in such a way that the positive existence of an objective world with its infinite varieties as the ground of perceptual presentation was never denied. The whole course of the development of Vedānta doctrine in the hands of these Vedānta teachers began to crystallize compactly in the view that, since the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained by the pure changeless Brahman, an indefinable stuff, the *māyā*, has necessarily to be admitted as the ground of this world. Prakāśānanda was probably the first who tried to explain Vedānta from a purely sensationalistic view-point of idealism and denied the objective existence of any stuff. The existence of objects is nothing more than their perception (*dṛṣṭi*). The central doctrine of Prakāśānanda has already been briefly described in chapter x, section 15, of volume I of the present work, and his analysis of the nature of perceptual cognition has already been referred to in a preceding section of the present chapter.

Speaking on the subject of the causality of Brahman, he says that the attribution of causality to Brahman cannot be regarded as strictly correct; for ordinarily causality implies the dual relation of cause and effect; since there is nothing else but Brahman, it cannot, under the circumstances, be called a cause. Nescience (*avidyā*), again, cannot be called a cause of the world; for causality is based upon the false notion of duality, which is itself the outcome of nescience. The theory of cause and effect thus lies outside the scope of the Vedānta (*kārya-kāraṇa-vādasya vedānta-bahir-bhūtatvāt*). When in reply to the question, "what is the cause of

the world?" it is said that nescience (*ajñāna*—literally, want of knowledge) is the cause, the respondent simply wants to obviate the awkward silence. The nature of this nescience cannot, however, be proved by any of the *pramāṇas*; for it is like darkness and the *pramāṇas* or the valid ways of cognition are like light, and it is impossible to perceive darkness by light. Nescience is that which cannot be known except through something else, by its relation to something else, and it is inexplicable in itself, yet beginningless and positive. It will be futile for any one to try to understand it as it is in itself. Nescience is proved by one's own consciousness: so it is useless to ask how nescience is proved. Yet it is destroyed when the identity of the self with the immediately presented Brahman is realized. The destruction of nescience cannot mean its cessation together with its products, as Prakāśātman holds in the *Vivaraṇa*; for such a definition would not apply, whether taken simply or jointly. Prakāśānanda, therefore, defines it as the conviction, following the realization of the underlying ground, that the appearance which was illusorily imposed on it did not exist. This view is different from the *anyathā-khyāti* view, that the surmised appearance was elsewhere and not on the ground on which it was imposed; for here, when the underlying ground is immediately intuited, the false appearance absolutely vanishes, and it is felt that it was not there, it is not anywhere, and it will not be anywhere; and it is this conviction that is technically called *bādha*. The indefinability of nescience is its negation on the ground on which it appears (*pratipannopādhau niṣedha-pratīyogitvam*). This negation of all else excepting Brahman has thus two forms; in one form it is negation and in another form this negation, being included within "all else except Brahman," is itself an illusory imposition, and this latter form thus is itself contradicted and negated by its former form. Thus it would be wrong to argue that, since this negation remains after the realization of Brahman, it would not itself be negated, and hence it would be a dual principle existing side by side with Brahman¹.

True knowledge is opposed to false knowledge in such a way

¹ *Brahmaṇy adhyasyamānaṃ sarvaṃ kālātraye nāstīti niṣedhaḥ sa eva rūpadva-
yam ekam bādhatmakam āparam adhyasyamānatvam; tatra adhyasyamānatvena
rūpeṇa sva-viśayatvam; bādhatvena viśayatvam iti nātmāśraya ity arthaḥ tathā ca
nādvaita-kṣatīḥ*. Compare also *Bhāmattī* on *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*. Nānā Dikṣita seems
to have borrowed his whole argument from the *Bhāmattī*. See his commentary
on the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*. *The Pandit*, 1890, p. 108.

This idea, however, is not by any means a new contribution of Prakāśānanda.
Thus Citsukha writes the same thing in his *Tattva-ṭīpikā* (also called *Pratyak-tatt-*

that, when the former dawns, the latter is dispelled altogether. An objection is sometimes raised that, if this be so, then the person who has realized Brahma knowledge will cease to have a bodily existence; for bodily existence is based on illusion and all illusion must vanish when true knowledge dawns. And, if this is so, there will be no competent Vedānta teacher. To this Prakāśānanda replies that, even though the Vedānta teacher may be himself an illusory production, he may all the same lead any one to the true path, just as the Vedas, which are themselves but illusory products, may lead any one to the right path¹.

On the subject of the nature of the self as pure bliss (*ānanda*) he differs from Sarvajñātma Muni's view that what is meant by the statement that the self is of the nature of pure bliss is that there is entire absence of all sorrows or negation of bliss in the self. Bliss, according to Sarvajñātma Muni, thus means the absence of the negation of bliss (*an-ānanda-vyavṛtti-mātram ānandatvam*)². He differs also from the view of Prakāśātman that *ānanda*, or bliss, means the substance which appears as blissful, since it is the object that we really desire. Prakāśātman holds that it is the self on which the character of blissfulness is imposed. The self is called blissful, because it is the ground of the appearance of blissfulness. What people consider of value and desire is not the blissfulness, but that which is blissful. Prakāśānanda holds that this view is not correct, since the self appears not only as blissful, but also as painful, and it would therefore be as right to call the self blissful as to call it painful. Moreover, not the object of blissfulness, which in itself is dissociated from blissfulness, is called blissful, but that which is endowed with bliss is called blissful (*viśiṣṭasyaiva ānanda-padārthatvāt*)³. If blissfulness is not a natural character of the self, it cannot be called blissful because it happens to be the ground on which blissfulness is illusorily imposed. So Prakāśānanda holds that the self is naturally of a blissful character.

Prakāśānanda raises the question regarding the beholder of the *va-pradīpikā*), p. 39, as follows: "*sarveṣām api bhāvānām āsrayatvena sammate pratiyogitvam atyantābhāvam 'prati mṛṣātmatā,*" which is the same as *prati-pannopādau niṣedha-pratiyogitvam*. Compare also *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, pp. 219 and 220, *mithyātvaṃ ca svāśrayatvenābhimata-yāvanniṣṭhātvyantābhāva-pratiyogitvam*. In later times Madhusūdana freely used this definition in his *Advaita-siddhi*.

¹ *kalpito 'pyupadeṣṭā syād yathā-śāstram samādiṣet na cāvinigamo doṣo 'vidyāvattvena nirṇayāt.*

The Pandit, 1890, p. 160.

² *Samkṣepa-śāstraka*, I. 1. 174.

³ *Siddhānta-muktāvalī. The Pandit*, 1890, p. 215.

experienced duality and says that it is Brahman who has this experience of duality; but, though Brahman alone exists, yet there is no actual modification or transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman into all its experiences, since such a view would be open to the objections brought against the alternative assumptions of the whole of Brahman or a part of it, and both of them would land us in impossible consequences. The *vivarta* view holds that the effect has no reality apart from the underlying ground or substance. So *vivarta* really means oneness with the substance, and it virtually denies all else that may appear to be growing out of this one substance. The false perception of world-appearance thus consists in the appearance of all kinds of characters in Brahman, which is absolutely characterless (*niṣprakārikāyāḥ saprakāratvena bhāvaḥ*). Since the self and its cognition are identical and since there is nothing else but this self, there is no meaning in saying that the Vedānta admits the *vivarta* view of causation; for, strictly speaking, there is no causation at all (*vivartasya bāla-vyutpatti-prayojanātayā*)¹. If anything existed apart from self, then the Vedāntic monism would be disturbed. If one looks at *māyā* in accordance with the texts of the Vedas, *māyā* will appear to be an absolutely fictitious non-entity (*tuccha*), like the hare's horn; if an attempt is made to interpret it logically, it is indefinable (*anirvacanīya*), though common people would always think of it as being real (*vāstavi*)². Prakāśānanda thus preaches the extreme view of the Vedānta, that there is no kind of objectivity that can be attributed to the world, that *māyā* is absolutely non-existent, that our ideas have no objective substratum to which they correspond, that the self is the one and only ultimate reality, and that there is no causation or creation of the world. In this view he has often to fight with Sarvajñātma Muni, Prakāśātman, and with others who developed a more realistic conception of *māyā* transformation; but it was he who, developing probably on the lines of Maṇḍana, tried for the first time to give a consistent presentation of the Vedānta from the most thorough-going idealistic point of view. In the colophon of his work he says that the essence of the Vedānta as

¹ *bālān prati vivarto 'yaṁ brahmaṇaḥ sakalaṁ jagat avivartitam ānandam āsthitāḥ kṛtinaḥ sadā.*

The Pandit, 1890, p. 326.

² *tucchānirvacanīyā ca vāstavi cety asau tridhā jñeyā māyā tribhīr bodhaiḥ śrauta-yauktika-laukikāiḥ.*

Ibid. p. 420.

preached by him is unknown to his contemporaries and that it was he who first thoroughly expounded this doctrine of philosophy¹. Prakāśānanda wrote many other works in addition to his *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, such as *Tārā-bhakti-taraṅgiṇī*, *Manoramā tantra-rāja-ṭikā*, *Mahā-lakṣmī-paddhati* and *Śrī-vidyā-paddhati*, and this shows that, though a thoroughgoing Vedāntist, he was religiously attached to *tantra* forms of worship. Nānā Dikṣita wrote a commentary on the *Muktāvalī*, called *Siddhānta-pradīpikā*, at a time when different countries of India had become pervaded by the disciples and disciples of the disciples of Prakāśānanda².

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (A.D. 1500)³.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who was a pupil of Viśveśvara Sarasvatī and teacher of Puruṣottama Sarasvatī, in all probability flourished in the first half of the sixteenth century. His chief works are *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā*, *Advaita-siddhi*, *Advaita-mañjarī*, *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa*, *Ātma-bodha-ṭikā*, *Ānanda-mandākinī*, *Kṛṣṇa-kutūhala-nāṭaka*, *Prasthāna-bheda*, *Bhakti-sāmānya-nirūpaṇa*, *Bhagavad-gītā-gūḍhārtha-dīpikā*, *Bhagavad-bhakti-rasāyana*, *Bhāgavata-purāṇa-prathama-śloka-vyākhyā*, *Veda-stuti-ṭikā*, *Śaṇḍilya-sūtra-ṭikā*, *Śāstra-siddhānta-leśa-ṭikā*, *Samkṣepa-śārīraka-sāra-saṃgraha*, *Siddhānta-tattva-bindu*, *Hari-līlā-vyākhyā*. His most important work, however, is his *Advaita-siddhi*, in which he tries to refute the objections raised in Vyāsātīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta*⁴

¹ *vedānta-sāra-sarvasvam ajñeyam adhunātanañi
aśeṣeṇa mayoktaṃ tat puruṣottama-yatnataḥ.*

The Pandit, 1890, p. 428.

² *yacchiṣya-śiṣya-sandoha-vyāptā bhārata-bhūmayah
vande tam yatibhir vandyam Prakāśānandam īśvaram.*

Ibid. p. 488.

³ Rāmājñā Paṇḍeya in his edition of Madhusūdana's *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* suggests that he was a Bengali by birth. His pupil Puruṣottama Sarasvatī in his commentary on the *Siddhānta-bindu-ṭikā* refers to Balabhadra Bhaṭṭācārya as a favourite pupil of his, and Paṇḍeya argues that, since Bhaṭṭācārya is a Bengali surname and since his favourite pupil was a Bengali, he also must have been a Bengali. It is also pointed out that in a family genealogy (*Kula-paṇjikā*) of Kotalipara of Faridpur, Bengal, Madhusūdana's father is said to have been Pramodapurandara Ācārya, who had four sons—Śrīnātha Cūḍāmaṇi, Yāda-vānanda Nyāyācārya, Kamalajanayana and Vāgīśa Gosvāmin. Some of the important details of Madhusūdana's philosophical dialectics will be taken up in the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in the third volume of the present work in connection with Madhusūdana's discussions with Vyāsātīrtha.

⁴ The *Advaita-siddhi* has three commentaries, *Advaita-siddhy-upanyāsa*, *Bṛhat-ṭikā*, and *Laghu-candrikā*, by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī.

against the monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkara and his followers. Materials from this book have already been utilized in sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the tenth chapter of the present work. More will be utilized in the third volume in connection with the controversy between Vyāsātīrtha and Madhusūdana, which is the subject-matter of *Advaita-siddhi*. Madhusūdana's *Siddhānta-bindu* does not contain anything of importance, excepting that he gives a connected account of the perceptual process, already dealt with in the tenth chapter and also in the section "Vedāntic Cosmology" of the present volume. His *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa* deals with such subjects as the validity of the Upaniṣads: the Upaniṣads do not admit duality; perception does not prove the reality of duality; the duality involved in mutual negation is false; indeterminate knowledge does not admit duality; duality cannot be proved by any valid means of proof, and so forth. There is practically nothing new in the work, as it only repeats some of the important arguments of the bigger work *Advaita-siddhi* and tries to refute the view of dualists like the followers of Madhva, with whom Madhusūdana was in constant controversy. It is unnecessary, therefore, for our present purposes to enter into any of the details of this work. It is, however, interesting to note that, though he was such a confirmed monist in his philosophy, he was a theist in his religion and followed the path of *bhakti*, or devotion, as is evidenced by his numerous works promulgating the *bhakti* creed. These works, however, have nothing to do with the philosophy of the Vedānta, with which we are concerned in the present chapter. Madhusūdana's *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* was written earlier than his *Advaita-siddhi* and his commentary on the *Mahimnaḥ stotra*¹. Rāmājñā Pāṇḍeya points out in his introduction to the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* that the *Advaita-siddhi* contains a reference to his *Gītā-nibandhana*; the *Gītā-nibandhana* and the *Śrīmad-bhāgavata-ṭīkā* contain references to his *Bhakti-rasāyana*, and the *Bhakti-rasāyana* refers to the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā*; and this shows that the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* was written prior to all these works. The *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa* refers to the *Advaita-siddhi* and may therefore be regarded as a much later work. There is nothing particularly new in the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* that deserves special mention as a contribution to Vedāntic thought. The special feature of the work consists in the frequent

¹ He refers to the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* and *Siddhānta-bindu* in his *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 537 (Nirṇaya-Sāgara edition). See also *Mahimnaḥ-stotra-ṭīkā*, p. 5.

brief summaries of doctrines of other systems of Indian philosophy and contrasts them with important Vedānta views. The first problem discussed is the nature of emancipation (*mokṣa*) and the ways of realizing it: Madhusūdana attempts to prove that it is only the Vedāntic concept of salvation that can appeal to men, all other views being unsatisfactory and invalid. But it does not seem that he does proper justice to other views. Thus, for example, in refuting the Sāṃkhya view of salvation he says that, since the Sāṃkhya thinks that what is existent cannot be destroyed, sorrow, being an existent entity, cannot be destroyed, so there cannot be any emancipation from sorrow. This is an evident misrepresentation of the Sāṃkhya; for with the Sāṃkhya the destruction of sorrow in emancipation means that the *buddhi*, a product of *prakṛti* which is the source of all sorrow, ceases in emancipation to have any contact with *puruṣa*, and hence, even though sorrow may not be destroyed, there is no inconsistency in having emancipation from sorrow. It is unnecessary for our present purposes, however, to multiply examples of misrepresentation by Madhusūdana of the views of other systems of thought in regard to the same problem. In the course of the discussions he describes negation (*abhāva*) also as being made up of the stuff of nescience, which, like other things, makes its appearance in connection with pure consciousness. He next introduces a discussion of the nature of self-knowledge, and then, since Brahma knowledge can be attained only through the Upaniṣadic propositions of identity, he passes over to the discussion of import of propositions and the doctrines of *abhihitān-vaya-vāda*, *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* and the like. He then treats of the destruction of nescience. He concludes the work with a discussion of the substantial nature of the senses. Thus the mind-organ is said to be made up of five elements, whereas other senses are regarded as being constituted of one element only. *Manas* is said to pervade the whole of the body and not to be atomic, as the Naiyāyikas hold. Finally, Madhusūdana returns again to the problem of emancipation, and holds that it is the self freed from nescience that should be regarded as the real nature of emancipation.

CHAPTER XII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE *YOGA-VĀSIṢṬHA*

THE philosophical elements in the various Purāṇas will be taken in a later volume. The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa* may be included among the *purāṇas*, but it is devoid of the general characteristics of the *purāṇās* and is throughout occupied with discussions of Vedāntic problems of a radically monistic type, resembling the Vedāntic doctrines as interpreted by Śaṅkara. This extensive philosophical poem, which contains twenty-three thousand seven hundred and thirty-four verses (ignoring possible differences in different manuscripts or editions) and is thus very much larger than the *Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā*, is a unique work. The philosophical view with which it is concerned, and which it is never tired of reiterating, is so much like the view of Śaṅkara and of Vijñānavāda Buddhism, that its claim to treatment immediately after Śaṅkara seems to me to be particularly strong. Moreover, the various interpretations of the *Vedānta-sūtra* which will follow are so much opposed to Śaṅkara's views as to make it hard to find a suitable place for a treatment like that of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* unless it is taken up immediately after the chapter dealing with Śaṅkara.

The work begins with a story. A certain Brahmin went to the hermitage of the sage Agastya and asked him whether knowledge or work was the direct cause of salvation (*mokṣa-sādhana*). Agastya replied that, as a bird flies with its two wings, so a man can attain the highest (*paramam padam*) only through knowledge and work. To illustrate this idea he narrates a story in which Kāruṇya, the son of Agniveśya, having returned from the teacher's house after the completion of his studies, remained silent and did no work. When he was asked for the reason of this attitude of his, he said that he was perplexed over the question as to whether the action of a man in accordance with scriptural injunction was or was not more fitted for the attainment of his highest than following a course of self-abnegation and desirelessness (*tyāga-mātra*). On hearing this question of Kāruṇya Agniveśya told him that he could answer his question only by narrating a story, after hearing which he might decide as he chose. A heavenly damsel (*apsarāh*), Suruci by name, sitting on one of the peaks of the

Himālayas, once saw a messenger of Indra flying through the sky. She asked him where he was going. In reply he said that a certain king, Ariṣṭanemi by name, having given his kingdom to his son and having become free from all passions, was performing a course of asceticism (*tapas*), and that he had had to go to him on duty and was returning from him. The damsel wanted to know in detail what happened there between the messenger and the king. The messenger replied that he was asked by Indra to take a well-decorated chariot and bring the king in it to heaven, but while doing so he was asked by the king to describe the advantages and defects of heaven, on hearing which he would make up his mind whether he would like to go there or not. In heaven, he was answered, people enjoyed superior, medium and inferior pleasures according as their merits were superior, medium or inferior: when they had exhausted their merits by enjoyment, they were reborn again on earth, and during their stay there they were subject to mutual jealousy on account of the inequality of their enjoyments. On hearing this the king had refused to go to heaven, and, when this was reported to Indra, he was very much surprised and he asked the messenger to carry the king to Vālmiki's hermitage and make Vālmiki acquainted with the king's refusal to enjoy the fruits of heaven and request him to give him proper instructions for the attainment of right knowledge, leading to emancipation (*mokṣa*). When this was done, the king asked Vālmiki how he might attain *mokṣa*, and Vālmiki in reply wished to narrate the dialogue of Vaśiṣṭha and Rāma (*Vaśiṣṭha-rāma-samvāda*) on the subject.

Vālmiki said that, when he had finished the story of Rāma—the work properly known as *Rāmāyaṇa*—and taught it to Bharadvāja, Bharadvāja recited it once to Brahmā (the god), and he, being pleased, wished to confer a boon on him. Bharadvāja in reply said that he would like to receive such instructions as would enable people to escape from sorrow. Brahmā told him to apply to Vālmiki and went himself to him (Vālmiki), accompanied by Bharadvāja, and asked him not to cease working until he finished describing the entire character of Rāma, by listening to which people will be saved from the dangers of the world. When Brahmā disappeared from the hermitage after giving this instruction, Bharadvāja also asked Vālmiki to describe how Rāma and his wife, brother and followers behaved in this sorrowful and dangerous world and lived in sorrowless tranquillity.

In answer to the above question Vālmiki replied that Rāma, after finishing his studies, went out on his travels to see the various places of pilgrimage and hermitages. On his return, however, he looked very sad every day and would not tell anyone the cause of his sorrow. King Daśaratha, Rāma's father, became very much concerned about Rāma's sadness and asked Vāsiṣṭha if he knew what might be the cause of it. At this time the sage Viśvāmitra also visited the city of Ayodhyā to invite Rāma to kill the demons. Rāma's dejected mental state at this time created much anxiety, and Viśvāmitra asked him the cause of his dejection.

Rāma said in reply that a new enquiry had come into his mind and had made him averse from all enjoyments. There is no happiness in this world, people are born to die and they die to be born again. Everything is impermanent (*asthira*) in this world. All existent things are unconnected (*bhāvāḥ...parasparam asaṅginah*). They are collected and associated together only by our mental imagination (*manah-kalpanayā*). The world of enjoyment is created by the mind (*manah*), and this mind itself appears to be non-existent. Everything is like a mirage.

Vāsiṣṭha then explained the nature of the world-appearance, and it is this answer which forms the content of the book. When Vālmiki narrated this dialogue of Vāsiṣṭha and Rāma, king Ariṣṭanemi found himself enlightened, and the damsel was also pleased and dismissed the heavenly messenger. Kāruṇya, on hearing all this from his father Agniveśya, felt as if he realized the ultimate truth and thought that, since he realized the philosophical truth, and since work and passivity mean the same, it was his clear duty to follow the customary duties of life. When Agastya finished narrating the story, the Brahmin Sutikṣṇa felt himself enlightened.

There is at least one point which may be considered as a very clear indication of later date, much later than would be implied by the claim that the work was written by the author of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. It contains a *śloka* which may be noted as almost identical with a verse of Kālidāsa's *Kumāra-saṃbhava*¹. It may, in my opinion, be almost unhesitatingly assumed that the author borrowed it from Kālidāsa, and it is true, as is generally supposed, that Kālidāsa

¹ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, III. 16. 50:

*atha tām atimātra-vihvalāṃ
sakyāpākāśabhavā sarasvatī
śapharīm hrada-śoṣa-vihvalāṃ
prathamā vṛṣṭir ivānvakampata.*

lived in the fifth century A.D. The author of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, whoever he may have been, flourished at least some time after Kālidāsa. It may also be assumed that the interval between Kālidāsa's time and that of the author of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* had been long enough to establish Kālidāsa's reputation as a poet. There is another fact which deserves consideration in this connection. In spite of the fact that the views of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* and Śaṅkara's interpretation of Vedānta have important points of agreement neither of them refers to the other. Again, the views of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* so much resemble those of the idealistic school of Buddhists, that the whole work seems to be a Brahmanic modification of idealistic Buddhism. One other important instance can be given of such a tendency to assimilate Buddhistic idealism and modify it on Brahmanic lines, viz. the writings of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. I am therefore inclined to think that the author of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* was probably a contemporary of Gauḍapāda or Śaṅkara, about A.D. 800 or a century anterior to them.

The work contains six books, or *prakaraṇas*, namely, *Vairāgya*, *Mumukṣu-vyavahāra*, *Utpatti*, *Sthiti*, *Upaśama* and *Nirvāṇa*. It is known also by the names of *Ārṣa-Rāmāyaṇa*, *Ĵñāna-vāsiṣṭha*, *Mahā-Rāmāyaṇa*, *Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa* or *Vāsiṣṭha*. Several commentaries have been written on it. Of these commentaries I am particularly indebted to the *Tātparyā-prakāśa* of Ānandabodhendra.

The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is throughout a philosophical work, in the form of popular lectures, and the same idea is often repeated again and again in various kinds of expressions and poetical imagery. But the writer seems to have been endowed with extraordinary poetical gifts. Almost every verse is full of the finest poetical imagery; the choice of words is exceedingly pleasing to the ear, and they often produce the effect of interesting us more by their poetical value than by the extremely idealistic thought which they are intended to convey.

The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* had a number of commentaries, and it was also summarized in verse by some writers whose works also had commentaries written upon them. Thus Advayāraṇya, son of Narahari, wrote a commentary on it, called *Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa-candrikā*. Ānandabodhendra Sarasvatī, pupil of Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī of the nineteenth century, wrote the *Tātparyā-prakāśa*. Gaṅgādharendra also is said to have written a commentary of the same name. Rāmadeva and Sadānanda also wrote two commentaries on

the work, and in addition to these there is another commentary, called *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-tātparya-saṃgraha*, and another commentary, the *Pada-candrikā*, was written by Mādhava Sarasvatī. The names of some of its summaries are *Bṛhad-yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, *Laghu-jñāna-vāsiṣṭha*, *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-ślokāḥ* and *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-saṃkṣepa* by Gauḍa Abhinanda of the ninth century, *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-sāra* or *ġñāna-sāra*, *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-sāra-saṃgraha* and *Vāsiṣṭha-sāra* or *Vāsiṣṭha-sāra-gūḍhārthā* by Ramānanda Tirthā, pupil of Advaitānanda. The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-saṃkṣepa* of Gauḍa Abhinanda had a commentary by Ātmasukha, called *Candrikā*, and another called *Samśāra-taraṇi*, by Mummaḍideva. The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-sāra* also had two commentaries by Pūrṇānanda and Mahīdhara. Mr Sivaprasad Bhattacharya in an article on the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa* in the *Proceedings of the Madras Oriental Conference* of 1924 says that the *Mokṣopāya-sāra*, which is another name for the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-sāra*, was written by an Abhinanda who is not to be confused with Gauḍa Abhinanda. But he misses the fact that Gauḍa Abhinanda had also written another summary of it, called *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-saṃkṣepa*. Incidentally this also refutes his view that the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is to be placed between the tenth and the twelfth centuries. For, if a summary of it was written by Gauḍa Abhinanda of the ninth century, the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* must have been written at least in the eighth century. The date of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* may thus be regarded as being the seventh or the eighth century.

The Ultimate Entity.

The third book of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* deals with origination (*utpatti*). All bondage (*bandha*) is due to the existence of the perceptible universe (*dṛśya*), and it is the main thesis of this work that it does not exist. At the time of each dissolution the entire universe of appearance is destroyed, like dreams in deep sleep (*susupti*). What is left is deep and static (*stimita-gambhira*), neither light nor darkness, indescribable and unmanifested (*anākhyam anabhivyaktam*), but a somehow existent entity. This entity manifests itself as another (*svayam anya ivollasan*); and through this dynamic aspect it appears as the ever-active mind (*manas*)—like moving ripples from the motionless ocean. But in reality whatever appears as the diversified universe is altogether non-existent; for, if it was existent,

it could not cease under any circumstances¹. It does not exist at all. The ultimate indefinite and indescribable entity, which is pure extinction (*nirvāṇa-mātra*), or pure intelligence (*paro bodhaḥ*), remains always in itself and does not really suffer any transformations or modifications. Out of the first movement of this entity arises ego (*svatā*), which, in spite of its appearance, is in reality nothing but the ultimate entity. Gradually, by a series of movements (*spanda*) like waves in the air, there springs forth the entire world-appearance. The ultimate entity is a mere entity of pure conceiving or imagining (*saṃkalpa-puruṣa*)². The Muni held that what appears before us is due to the imagination of *manas*, like dreamland or fairyland (*yathā saṃkalpa-nagaraṃ yathā gandharva-pattanam*). There is nothing in essence except that ultimate entity, and whatever else appears does not exist at all—it is all mere mental creations, proceeding out of the substanceless, essenceless mental creations of the ultimate entity. It is only by the realization that this world-appearance has no possibility of existence that the false notion of ourselves as knowers ceases, and, though the false appearance may continue as such, there is emancipation (*mokṣa*).

This *manas*, however, by whose mental creations everything springs forth in appearance, has no proper form, it is merely a name, mere nothingness³. It does not exist outside or subjectively inside us; it is like the vacuity surrounding us everywhere. That anything has come out of it is merely like the production of a mirage stream. All characteristics of forms and existence are like momentary imaginations. Whatever appears and seems to have existence is nothing but *manas*, though this *manas* itself is merely a hypothetical starting-point, having no actual reality. For the *manas* is not different from the dreams of appearance and cannot be separated from them, just as one cannot separate liquidity from water or movement from air. *Manas* is thus nothing but the hypothetical entity from which all the dreams of appearance proceed, though these dreams and *manas* are merely the same and

¹ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, III. 3.

² *sarveṣāṃ bhūta-jātānāṃ saṃsāra-vyavahāriṇāṃ
prathamō 'sau pratispandaś citta-dehaḥ svatodayaḥ
asmāt pūrvāt pratispandād ananyaitat-svarūpiṇī
iyam pravṛtṭā sṛṣṭiḥ spanda-sṛṣṭir ivāṇilāt.*

III. 3. 14, 15.

³ *rānāsya manaso rūpaṃ na kiṃcid api dṛśyate
nāma-mātrād ṛte vyomno yathā śūnya-jadākṛteḥ.*

III. 4. 38.

it is impossible to distinguish between them¹. *Avidyā*, *saṃsṛti*, *citta*, *manas*, *bandha*, *mala*, *tamas* are thus but synonyms for the same concept². It is the perceiver that appears as the perceived, and it is but the perceptions that appear as the perceiver and the perceived. The state of emancipation is the cessation of this world-appearance. There is in reality no perceiver, perceived or perceptions, no vacuity (*śūnya*), no matter, no spirit or consciousness, but pure cessation or pure negation, and this is what we mean by Brahman³. Its nature is that of pure cessation (*śānta*), and it is this that the Sāṃkhyaists call *puruṣa*, the Vedāntins call "Brahman," the idealistic Buddhists call "pure idea" (*viññāna-mātra*) and the nihilists "pure essencelessness" (*śūnya*)⁴. It is of the nature of pure annihilation and cessation, pervading the inner and the outer world⁵. It is described as that essencelessness (*śūnya*) which does not appear to be so, and in which lies the ground and being of the essenceless world-appearance (*yasmin śūnyam jagat sthitam*), and which, in spite of all creations, is essenceless⁶. The illusory world-appearance has to be considered as absolutely non-existent, like the water of the mirage or the son of a barren woman. The ultimate entity is thus neither existent nor non-existent and is both statical and dynamical (*spandāspandātmaka*)⁷; it is indescribable and unnameable (*kimapy avyapadeśātmā*) and neither being nor non-being nor being-non-being, neither statical being nor becoming (*na bhāvo bhavanam na ca*). The similarity of the philosophy of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* to the idealistic philosophy of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* is so definite and deep that the subject does not require any elaborate discussion and the readers are referred to the philosophy of the *Laṅkāvatāra* in the first volume of the present work. On Vedānta lines it is very similar to Prakāśānanda's interpretation of the Vedānta in later times, called *drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*, which can probably be traced at least as far back as Gauḍapāda or Maṇḍana. Prakāśātman refers to the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* as one of his main authorities.

¹ *pūrṇe pūrṇam prasaratī śānte śāntam vyavasthitam
vyomany evoditam vyoma brahmaṇi brahma tiṣṭhati
na drśyam asti sad-rūpam na draṣṭā na ca darśanam
na śūnyam na jaḍam na cīc chāntam evedam ātatam.*

² III. 4. 46.

³ III. 5. 6-7.

⁴ III. 4. 69, 70.

⁵ *nāśa-rūpo vināśātmā.* III. 5. 16.

⁶ III. 7. 22.

⁷ III. 9. 59.

⁷ III. 9. 49.

Origination.

The world as such never existed in the past, nor exists now, nor will exist hereafter; so it has no production or destruction in any real sense¹. But yet there is the appearance, and its genesis has somehow to be accounted for. The ultimate entity is, of course, of the nature of pure cessation (*śānta*), as described above. The order of moments leading to the manifestation of the world-appearance can be described in this way: At first there is something like a self-reflecting thought in the ultimate entity, producing some indescribable objectivity which gives rise to an egohood. Thus, on a further movement, which is akin to thought, is produced a state which can be described as a self-thinking entity, which is clear pure intelligence, in which everything may be reflected. It is only this entity that can be called conscious intelligence (*cit*). As the thought-activity becomes more and more concrete (*ghana-saṃvedana*), other conditions of soul (*jīva*) arise out of it. At this stage it forgets, as it were, its subject-objectless ultimate state, and desires to flow out of itself as a pure essence of creative movement (*bhāvanā-mātra-sāra*). The first objectivity is *ākāśa*, manifested as pure vacuity. At this moment arise the ego (*ahaṃtā*) and time (*kāla*). This creation is, however, in no sense real, and is nothing but the seeming appearances of the self-conscious movement (*sva-saṃvedana-mātrakam*) of the ultimate being. All the network of being is non-existent, and has only an appearance of existing. Thought (*saṃvit*), which at this moment is like the *ākāśa* and the ego and which is the seed (*bīja*) of all the conceivings of thought (*bhāvanā*), formulates by its movement air². Again,

¹ *bandhyā-putra-vyoma-bane yathā na staḥ kadācana jagad-ādy akhilaṃ dṛśyaṃ tathā nāsti kadācana na cotpamam na ca dhvamsi yat kilādaḥ na vidyate utpattiḥ kādṛṣi tasya nāśa-śabdasya kā kathā.* III. 11. 4, 5.

² *manah saṃpadyate lolaṃ kalanā-kalanonmukham; kalayanāti manah śaktir ādaḥ bhāvayati kṣaṇāt. ākāśa-bhāvanāmacchām śabda-bīja-rasomukhīm; tatas tām ghanatām jātaṃ ghana-spanda-kramān manah.*

IV. 44. 16, 17.

A comparison of numerous passages like these shows that each mental creation is the result of a creative thought-movement called *bhāvanā*, and each successive movement in the chain of a succession of developing creative movements is said to be *ghana*, or concrete. *Ghana* has been paraphrased in the *Tātparyaprakāśa* as accretion (*upacaya*). *Bhāvanā* is the same as *spanda*; as the result of each thought-movement, there was thought-accretion (*ghana*), and corresponding to each *ghana* there was a semi-statical creation, and following each *ghana* there was a *spanda* (*ghana-spanda-kramāt*).

following the *ākāśa* moment and from it as a more concrete state (*ghanibhūya*), comes forth the sound-potential (*kha-tan-mātra*). This sound-potential is the root of the production of all the Vedas, with their words, sentences and valid means of proof. Gradually the conceivings of the other *tan-mātras* of *sparsa*, *tejas*, *rasa* and *gandha* follow, and from them the entire objective world, which has no other reality than the fact that they are conceptions of the self-conscious thought¹. The stages then are, that in the state of equilibrium (*sama*) of the ultimate indescribable entity called the Brahman, which, though pure consciousness in essence, is in an unmanifested state, there first arises an objectivity (*cetyatva*) through its self-directed self-consciousness of the objectivity inherent in it (*sataś cetyāṁśa-cetanāt*); next arises the soul, where there is objective consciousness only through the touch or connection of objectivity (*cetya-samyoga-cetanāt*) instead of the self-directed consciousness of objectivity inherent in itself. Then comes the illusory notion of subjectivity, through which the soul thinks that it is only the conscious subject and as such is different from the object (*cetyaika-paratā-vaśāt*). This moment naturally leads to the state of the subjective ego, which conceives actively (*buddhitvāḥkalanam*), and it is this conceiving activity which leads to the objective conceptions of the different *tan-mātras* and the world-appearance. These are all, however, ideal creations, and as such have no reality apart from their being as mere appearance. Since their nature is purely conceptual (*vikalpa*), they cannot be real at any time. All that appears as existent does so only as a result of the conceptual activity of thought. Through its desire, "I shall see," there comes the appearance of the two hollows of the eye, and similarly in the case of touch, smell, hearing and taste. There is no single soul, far less an infinite number of them. It is by the all-powerful conceptual activity of Brahman that there arises the appearance of so many centres of subjective thought, as the souls (*jīvas*). In reality, however, the *jīvas* have no other existence than the conceptualizing activity which produces their appearance. There is no materiality or form: these are nothing but the self-flashings of thought (*citta-camatkāra*).

Manas, according to this theory, is nothing but that function of pure consciousness through which it posits out of itself an object of itself. Here the pure conscious part may be called the spiritual

part and its objectivity aspect the material part¹. In its objectivity also the *cit* perceives nothing but itself, though it appears to perceive something other than itself (*svam evānyatayā dṛstvā*), and this objectivity takes its first start with the rise of egohood (*ahantā*).

But to the most important question, namely, how the original equilibrium is disturbed and how the present development of the conceptual creation has come about, the answer given in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is that it is by pure accident (*kākatāliya-yogena*) that such a course of events took place. It is indeed disappointing that such a wonderful creation of world-appearance should have ultimately to depend on accident for its origin². It is considered irrelevant to enquire into the possibility of some other cause of the ultimate cause, the Brahman³.

Karma, Manas and the Categories.

Karma in this view is nothing but the activity of the *manas*. The active states of *manas* are again determined by their preceding moments and may in their turn be considered as determining the succeeding moments. When any particular state determines any succeeding state, it may be considered as an agent, or *kartā*; but, as this state is determined by the activity of the previous state, otherwise called the *karma*, it may be said that the *karma* generates the *kartā*, the *kartā* by its activity again produces *karma*, so that *karma* and *kartā* are mutually determinative. As in the case of the seed coming from the tree and the tree coming from the seed, the cycle proceeds on from *kartā* to *karma* and from *karma* to *kartā*, and no ultimate priority can be affirmed of any one of them⁴. But, if this is so, then the responsibility of *karma* ceases; the root desire (*vāsanā*) through which a man is born also makes him suffer or enjoy in accordance with it; but, if *kartā* and *karma* spring forth together, then a particular birth ought not to be determined by the *karma* of previous birth, and this would mean

¹ *cito yac cetya-kalanam tan-manastvam udāhytam
cid-bhāgo 'trājaḥ bhūgo jāḍyam atra hi cetyatā.* III. 91. 37.

² III. 96. 15, IV. 54. 7.

³ *Brahmaṇaḥ kāraṇam kim syād iti vaktum na yujyate
svabhāvo nirviśeṣatvāt paro vaktum na yujyate.* IV. 18. 22.

⁴ *yathā karma ca kartā ca paryāyēṇa saṃgatau
karmaṇā kriyate kartā kartrā karma praṇīyate
bijāṅkurādīvan-nyāyo loka-vedokta eva saḥ.* III. 95. 19, 20.

that man's enjoyment and sorrow did not depend on his *karma*. In answer to such a question, raised by Rāmacandra, Vāsiṣṭha says that *karma* is due not to *ātman*, but to *manas*. It is the mental movement which constitutes *karma*. When first the category of *manas* rises into being from Brahman, *karma* also begins from that moment, and, as a result thereof, the soul and the body associated with it are supposed to be manifested. *Karma* and *manas* are in one sense the same. In this world the movement generated by action (*kriyā-spanda*) is called *karma*, and, as it is by the movement of *manas* that all effects take place, and the bodies with all their associated sufferings or enjoyments are produced, so even the body, which is associated with physical, external *karma*, is in reality nothing but the *manas* and its activity. *Manas* is essentially of the nature of *karma*, or activity, and the cessation of activity means the destruction of *manas* (*karma-nāśe mano-nāśaḥ*)¹. As heat cannot be separated from fire or blackness from collyrium, so movement and activity cannot be separated from *manas*. If one ceases, the other also necessarily ceases. *Manas* means that activity which subsists between being and non-being and induces being through non-being: it is essentially dynamic in its nature and passes by the name of *manas*. It is by the activity of *manas* that the subject-objectless pure consciousness assumes the form of a self-conscious ego. *Manas* thus consists of this constantly positing activity (*ekānta-kalanāḥ*). The seed of *karma* is to be sought in the activity of *manas* (*karma-bijaṃ manāḥ-spanda*), and the actions (*kriyā*) which follow are indeed very diverse. It is the synthetic function (*tad-anusandhatte*) of *manas* that is called the functioning of the conative senses, by which all actions are performed, and it is for this reason that *karma* is nothing but *manas*. *Manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, *citta*, *karma*, *kalpanā*, *saṃsṛti*, *vāsanā*, *vidyā*, *prayatna*, *smṛti*, *indriya*, *prakṛti*, *māyā* and *kriyā* are different only in name, and they create confusion by these varied names; in reality, however, they signify the same concept, namely, the active functioning of *manas* or *citta*. These different names are current only because they lay stress on the different aspects of the same active functioning. They do not mean different entities, but only different moments, stages or aspects. Thus the first moment of self-conscious activity leading in different directions is called *manas*. When, after such oscillating movement, there is

¹ III. 95.

the position of either of the alternatives, as "the thus," it is called *buddhi*. When by the false notions of associations of body and soul there is the feeling of a concrete individual as "I," it is called *aḥamkāra*. When there is reflective thought associated with the memory of the past and the anticipations of the future, it is called *citta*. When the activity is taken in its actual form as motion or action towards any point, it is called *karma*. When, leaving its self-contained state, it desires anything, we have *kalpanā*. When the *citta* turns itself to anything previously seen or unseen, as being previously experienced, we have what is called memory (*smṛti*). When certain impressions are produced in a very subtle, subdued form, dominating all other inclinations, as if certain attractions or repulsions to certain things were really experienced, we have the root inclinations (*vāsanā*). In the realization that there is such a thing as self-knowledge, and that there is also such a thing as the false and illusory world-appearance, we have what is called right knowledge (*vidyā*). When the true knowledge is forgotten and the impressions of the false world-appearance gain ground, we have what are called the impure states (*mala*). The functions of the five kinds of cognition please us and are called the senses (*indriya*). As all world-appearance has its origin and ground in the highest self, it is called the origin (*prakṛti*). As the true state can neither be called existent nor non-existent, and as it gives rise to all kinds of appearance, it is called illusion (*māyā*)¹. Thus it is the same appearance which goes by the various names of *jīva*, *manas*, *citta* and *buddhi*².

One of the peculiarities of this work is that it is not a philosophical treatise of the ordinary type, but its main purpose lies in the attempt to create a firm conviction on the part of its readers, by repeating the same idea in various ways by means of stories and elaborate descriptions often abounding in the richest poetical imagery of undeniably high aesthetic value, hardly inferior to that of the greatest Sanskrit poet, Kālidāsa.

¹ III. 96. 17-31.

² *Jīva ity ucyate loke mana ity api kathyate
cittam ity ucyate saiva buddhir ity ucyate tathā.*

III. 96. 34.

The World-Appearance.

The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is never tired of repeating that this world is like a hare's horn, a forest in the sky, or a lotus in the sky. The state of Brahman is higher than the state of *manas*. It is by becoming *manas* that Brahman transforms itself into thought-activity and thus produces the seeming changeful appearances. But Brahman in itself cannot have anything else (*brahma-tattve 'nyatā nāsti*). But, though there is this change into *manas*, and through it the production of the world-appearance, yet such a change is not real, but illusory; for during all the time when this change makes its appearance and seems to stay, Brahman remains shut up within itself, changeless and unchangeable. All objective appearance is thus nothing but identically the same as the Brahman, and all that appears has simply no existence. The seer never transforms himself into objectivity, but remains simply identical with himself in all appearances of objectivity. But the question arises, how, if the world-appearance is nothing but the illusory creative conception of *manas*, can the order of the world-appearance be explained? The natural answer to such a question in this system is that the seeming correspondence and agreement depend upon the similarity of the imaginary products in certain spheres, and also upon accident. It is by accident that certain dream series correspond with certain other dream series¹. But in reality they are all empty dream constructions of one *manas*. It is by the dream desires that physical objects gradually come to be considered as persistent objects existing outside of us. But, though during the continuance of the dreams they appear to be real, they are all the while nothing but mere dream conceptions. The self-alienation by which the pure consciousness constructs the dream conception is such that, though it always remains identical with itself, yet it seems to posit itself as its other, and as diversified by space, time, action and substance (*deśa-kāla-kriyā-dravyaiḥ*).

The difference between the ordinary waking state and the dream state consists in this, that the former is considered by us as associated with permanent convictions (*sthira-pratyaya*), whereas the latter is generally thought to have no permanent basis. Any experience which persists, whether it be dream or not,

¹ *melanam api svakīya-parakīya-svapnānām daivāt kvacit saṁvādat svāntaḥ-kalpanātmakam eva. Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-tātparya-prakāśa, IV. 18. 46.*

comes to be regarded as permanent, whereas, if even our waking conceptions come to be regarded as changeful, they lose their validity as representing permanent objects, and our faith in them becomes shaken. If the dream experiences persisted in time and the waking experiences were momentary, then the waking state would be considered as a dream and the dream experiences would be considered as ordinary experiences in the dream state. It is only with the coming of the waking state that there is a break of the dream experiences, and it is then that the latter are contradicted and therefore regarded as false. But so long as the dream experiences lasted in the dream state, we did not consider them to be false; for during that time those dream experiences appeared somehow to be permanent and therefore real. There is thus no difference between dream states and waking states except this, that the latter are relatively persistent, continuous and permanent (*sthira*), while the former are changeful and impermanent (*asthira*)¹.

There is within us a principle of pure consciousness, which is also the vital principle (*jīva-dhātu*), vitality (*vīrya*), and body heat (*tejas*). In the active condition, when the body is associated with *manas*, action and speech, the vital principle moves through the body, and on account of this all sorts of knowledge arise, and the illusion of world-appearance inherent in it is manifested as coming from outside through the various sense apertures. This being of a steady and fixed character is called the waking state (*jāgrat*). The *suṣupta*, or deep sleep state, is that in which the body is not disturbed by the movement of the *manas*, action or speech. The vital principle remains still in itself, in a potential state without any external manifestation, as the oil remains in the sesamum (*taila-samvid yathā tile*)². When the vital principle (*jīva-dhātu*) is very much disturbed, we have experiences of the dream state.

Whenever the *manas* strongly identifies itself with any of its concepts, it appears to itself as that concept, just as an iron ball in fire becomes itself like fire. It is the *manas* that is both the perceiver (*puṛuṣa*) and the perceived universe (*viśva-rūpatā*)³.

¹ *jāgrat-svapna-daśā-bhedo na sthīrāsthīrate vinā
samaḥ sadaiva sarvatra samasto 'nubhavo 'nayoḥ
svapno 'pi svapna-samaye sthāiryājājāgrattvam ychati
asthairyāt jāgrad evāste svapnas tādṛśa-bodhataḥ.*

IV. 19. 11, 12.

² IV. 19. 23.

³ IV. 20. 4.

The followers of the Sāṃkhya consider *manas* to be pure consciousness; they have also explained their doctrines in other details, and they think that emancipation cannot be attained by any way other than that which the Sāṃkhya suggests. The followers of the Vedānta also consider that emancipation is attained if one understands that all this world is Brahman and if there is self-control and cessation of desires together with this knowledge, and that this is the only way of salvation. The Vijñānavādins (Idealistic Buddhists) think that, provided there is complete self-control and cessation of all sense desires, one may attain emancipation, if he understands that the world-appearance is nothing but his own illusion. Thus each system of thought thinks too much of its own false methods of salvation (*svair eva niyama-bhramaiḥ*), springing from the traditional wrong notions. But the truth underlying all these conceptions is that *manas* is the root of all creations. There is nothing intrinsically pleasurable or painful, sweet or bitter, cold or hot, and such appearances arise only through the habitual creations of the mind. When one believes and thinks with strong faith in any particular manner, he begins to perceive things in that particular manner during that particular time¹.

Nature of Agency (Kartṛtva) and the Illusion of World Creation.

Whenever we ascribe agency (*kartṛtva*) to any person in respect of deeds producing pleasure or pain, or deeds requiring strenuous exercise of will-power, as those of the Yoga discipline, we do it wrongly; for agency consists in the grasp of will and resolution, and so it is an internal determination of the mind, of the nature of dominant and instinctive desires and inclinations (*vāsanābhīdhānah*)². The inner movement of feeling in the person towards the enjoyment of experiences takes place in accordance with these fixed desires or inclinations leading him to specific forms of enjoyment. All enjoyment is thus a natural consequence of our nature and character as active agents. Since all active agency (*kartṛtva*) consists in the

¹ *na jñenehu padārtheṣu rūpam ekam udīryate
dṛḍha-bhāvanayā ceto yad yathā bhāvayaty alam
tat tat-phalam tad-ākāraṃ tāvat-kālam prapaśyati.
na tad asti na yat satyaṃ na tad asti na yan mṛṣā.*

IV. 21. 56, 57.

² *yohyantara-sthāyāḥ manovṛtter niṣṭayaḥ upādeyatā-pratyayo vāsanābhīdhā-
natatkartṛtva-śabdenocyate.* IV. 38. 2.

inner effort of will, the enjoyment following such an inner exercise of will is nothing but the feeling modifications of the mind following the lead of the active exercise of the will. All action or active agency is thus associated with root inclinations (*vāsanā*), and is thus possible only for those who do not know the truth and have their minds full of the root inclinations. But those who have no *vāsanā* cannot be said to have the nature of active agents or of enjoying anything. Their minds are no doubt always active and they are active all the time; but, as they have no *vāsanā*, they are not attached to fruit, and there is the movement without any attachment. Whatever is done by *manas* is done, and what is not done by it is not done; so it is the *manas* that is the active agent, and not the body; the world has appeared from the mind (*citta* or *manas*), is of the essence of *manas*, and is upheld in *manas*. Everything is but a mental creation and has no other existence.

Ultimately, everything comes from Brahman; for that is the source of all powers, and therefore all powers (*śaktayaḥ*) are seen in Brahman—existence, non-existence, unity, duality and multiplicity all proceed from Brahman. The *citta*, or mind, has evolved out of pure consciousness (*cit*) or Brahman, as has already been mentioned, and it is through the latter that all power of action (*karma*), root desires (*vāsanā*), and all mental modifications appear. But, if everything has proceeded from Brahman, how is it that the world-appearance happens to be so different from its source, the Brahman? When anything comes out of any other thing, it is naturally expected to be similar thereto in substance. If, therefore, the world-appearance has sprung forth from Brahman, it ought to be similar in nature thereto; but Brahman is sorrowless, while the world-appearance is full of sorrow; how is this to be explained? To such a question the answer is, that to a person who has a perfect realization of the nature of the world-appearance, as being a mere conceptual creation from the Brahman and having no existence at all, there is no sorrow in this world-appearance nor any such quality which is different from Brahman. Only in the eyes of a person who has not the complete realization does this difference between the world-appearance and Brahman seem to be so great, and the mere notion of the identity of Brahman and the universe, without its complete realization, may lead to all sorts of mischief. On this account instruction in the identity of the Brahman and the world-appearance should never be given to

anyone whose mind has not been properly purified by the essential virtues of self-control and disinclination to worldly pleasures¹. As in magic (*indrajāla*), non-existent things are produced and existent things are destroyed, a jug becomes a cloth, and a cloth becomes a jug, and all sorts of wonderful sights are shown, though none of these appearances have the slightest essence of their own; so is the entire world-appearance produced out of the imagination of the mind. There is no active agent (*kartr*) and no one enjoyer (*bhoktr*) of the pleasures and sorrows of the world, and there is no destruction whatsoever².

Though the ultimate state is the indescribable Brahman or *cit*, yet it is from *manas* that all creation and destruction from cycle to cycle take their start. At the beginning of each so-called creation the creative movement of *manas* energy is roused. At the very first the outflow of this *manas* energy in the direction of a conceptual creation means an accumulation of energy in *manas*, called *ghana*, which is a sort of statical aspect of the dynamical energy (*spanda*). At the next stage there is a combination of this statical state of energy with the next outflow of energy, and the result is the stabilized accretion of energy of the second order; this is again followed by another outflow of energy, and that leads to the formation of the stabilized energy of the third order, and so on. The course of thought-creation is thus through the interaction of the actualized energy of thought with the active forms of the energy of thought, which join together, at each successive outflow from the supreme fund of potential energy. Thus it is said that the first creative movement of *manas* manifests itself as the *ākāśa* creation, and that, as a result of this creative outflow of energy, there is an accretion of energy in *manas*; at this moment there is another outflow (*spanda*) or movement on the part of *manas*, as modified by the accretion of energy of the previous state, and this outflow of *manas* thus modified is the creation of air. The outflow of this second order, again, modifies *manas* by its accretion, and there is a third outflow of energy of the *manas* as modified by the previous accretion, and so on. This process of the modification of energy by the outflow of the *manas* modified at each stage by the accretion of the outflow of energy at each of the preceding states is called

¹ *ādau śama-dama-prāyair guṇaiḥ śiṣyaṃ viśodhayet
paścāt sarvaṃ idaṃ brahma śuddhas tvam iti bodhayet.*

IV. 39. 23.

² *nātra kaścit kartā na bhoktā na vināśam eti.*

IV. 39. 41.

*ghana-spanda-krama*¹. The creation of all the so-called *tan-mātras* (subtle states) of *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, *tejas*, *ap* and *kṣiti* takes place in this order, and afterwards that of the *ahaṃkāra* and *buddhi*, and thus of the subtle body (*purī-aṣṭaka*); thereafter the cosmic body of Brahman is formed and developed in accordance with the root desire (*vāsanā*) inherent in *manas*. Thus here we have first the *ākāśa tan-mātra*, then the *vāyu tan-mātra* from the *ākāśa tan-mātra* plus the outflow of energy, then, from the *ākāśa tan-mātra* plus the *vāyu tan-mātra* plus the outflow of energy of the third order, *tejas tan-mātra*, and so on. Then, after the *tan-mātra*, the *ahaṃkāra* and the *buddhi*, we have the subtle body of eight constituents (five *tan-mātras*, *ahaṃkāra*, *buddhi* and the root *manas*), called the *purī-aṣṭaka* of Brahṁā. From this develops the body of Brahṁā, and from the creative imagination of Brahṁā we have the grosser materials and all the rest of the world-appearance. But all this is pure mental creation, and hence unreal, and so also are all the scriptures, gods and goddesses and all else that passes as real.

The Stage of the Saint (Jīvan-mukta).

Emancipation (*mukti*) in this system can be attained in the lifetime of a person or after his death; in the former case it is called *sa-deha-mukṭatā*, or *jīvan-mukṭatā*. The *jīvan-mukta* state is that in which the saint has ceased to have any desires (*apagatai-ṣaṇaḥ*), as if he were in a state of deep sleep (*suṣuptavat*). He is self-contained and thinks as if nothing existed. He has always an inward eye, even though he may be perceiving all things with his external eye and using his limbs in all directions. He does not wait for the future, nor remain in the present, nor remember the past. Though sleeping, he is awake and, though awake, he is asleep. He may be doing all kinds of actions externally, though he remains altogether unaffected by them internally. He internally renounces all actions, and does not desire anything for himself. He is full of bliss and happiness, and therefore appears to ordinary eyes to be an ordinary happy man; but in reality, though he may be doing all kinds of things, he has not the delusion of being himself an active agent (*tyakta-kartṛtva-vibhramah*). He has no antipathy, grief, emotions, or outbursts of pleasure. He is quite neutral to all who

¹ IV. 44. 13-30.

do him ill or well; he shows sympathetic interest in each person in his own way; he plays with a child, is serious with an old man, an enjoyable companion to a young man, sympathetic with the sorrows of a suffering man. He is wise and pleasant and loving to all with whom he comes in contact. He is not interested in his own virtuous deeds, enjoyments, sins, in bondage or emancipation. He has a true philosophic knowledge of the essence and nature of all phenomena, and, being firm in his convictions, he remains neutral to all kinds of happenings, good, bad, or indifferent. But from the descriptions it appears that this indifference on the part of a saint does not make him an exclusive and unnatural man; for, though unaffected in every way within himself, he can take part in the enjoyment of others, he can play like a child and can sympathize with the sorrows of sufferers¹.

Jīvan-mukti, or emancipation while living, is considered by Śaṅkara also as a possible state, though he does not seem to have used the term in his works. Thus, on the basis of *Chāndogya*, VI. 14. 2, he says that knowledge destroys only those actions which have not already begun to yield their fruits; those actions which have already begun to yield fruits cannot be destroyed by true knowledge, and so it is not possible for anyone to escape from their effects, good or bad; and it has to be admitted that even after the dawning of true knowledge the body remains until the effects of the actions which have already begun to yield fruits are exhausted by enjoyment or suffering. In explaining such a condition Śaṅkara gives two analogies: (1) as a potter's wheel goes on revolving when the vessel that it was forming is completed, so the body, which was necessary till the attainment of true knowledge, may continue to exist for some time even after the rise of knowledge; (2) as, when a man through some eye-disease sees two moons instead of one, he continues to do so even when he is convinced that there are not two moons but one, so, even when the saint is firmly convinced of the unreality of the world-appearance, he may still continue to have the illusion of world-appearance, though internally he may remain unaffected by it². Of the Upaniṣads only the later *Muktika Upaniṣad*, which seems to have drawn its inspiration from the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, mentions the word *jīvan-mukta*, meaning those saints who live till their fruit-yielding

¹ v. 77.

² Śaṅkara's *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* or the *Brahma-sūtra*, IV. i. 15, 19.

actions (*prārabdha-karma*) are exhausted¹. But, though the word is not mentioned, the idea seems to be pretty old.

The conception of *sthita-prajña* in the *Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā* reminds us of the state of a *jīvan-mukta* saint. A *sthita-prajña* (man of steady wisdom) has no desires, but is contented in himself, has no attachment, fear or anger, is not perturbed by sorrow nor longs for pleasure, and is absolutely devoid of all likes and dislikes. Like a tortoise within its shell, he draws himself away from the sense-objects². This conception of the *Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā* is referred to in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, which gives a summary of it in its own way³. But it seems as if the conception of the saint in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* has this advantage over the other, that here the saint, though absolutely unaffected by all pleasures and sufferings, by virtue and vice, is yet not absolutely cut off from us; for, though he has no interest in his own good, he can show enjoyment in the enjoyment of others and sympathy with the sufferings of others; he can be as gay as a child when with children, and as serious as any philosopher when with philosophers or old men. The *Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā*, though it does not deny such qualities to a saint, yet does not mention them either, and seems to lay stress on the aspect of the passivity and neutral character of the saint; whereas the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, as we have already said, lays equal stress on both these special features of a saint. He is absolutely unattached to anything, but is not cut off from society and can seemingly take part in everything without losing his mental balance in any way. The *Gītā*, of course, always recommends even the unattached saint to join in all kinds of good actions; but what one misses there is the taking of a full and proper interest in life along with all others, though the saint is internally absolutely unaffected by all that he may do.

The saint in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* not only performs his own actions in an unattached manner, but to all appearance mixes with the sorrows and joys of others.

The question whether a saint is above the tyranny of the effects of his own deeds was also raised in Buddhist quarters. Thus we find in the *Kathā-vatthu* that a discussion is raised as to whether a saint can be killed before his proper time of death, and it is said that no one can attain *nirvāṇa* without enjoying the

¹ *Muktika Upaniṣad*, I. 42, also II. 33, 35, 76.

² *Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā*, II. 55-58.

³ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, VI. 52-58.

fruits of accumulated intentional deeds¹. A story is told in the *Dhamma-pada* commentary (the date of which, according to E. W. Burlingame, is about A.D. 450), how the great saint Moggallāna was torn in pieces by thieves, and his bones were pounded until they were as small as grains of rice; such a miserable death of such a great saint naturally raised doubts among his disciples, and these were explained by Buddha, who said that this was due to the crime of parricide, which Moggallāna had committed in some previous birth; even though he had attained sainthood (*arhattva*) in that life, he could not escape suffering the effect of his misdeeds, which were on the point of bearing fruit². This would naturally imply the view that sainthood does not necessarily mean destruction of the body, but that even after the attainment of sainthood the body may continue to exist for the suffering of the effects of such actions as are on the point of bearing fruit.

The different Indian systems are, however, not all agreed regarding the possibility of the *jīvan-mukta* state. Thus, according to the Nyāya, *apavarga*, or emancipation, occurs only when the soul is absolutely dissociated from all the nine kinds of qualities (will, antipathy, pleasure, pain, knowledge, effort, virtue, vice and rooted instincts). Unless such a dissociation actually occurs, there cannot be emancipation; and it is easy to see that this cannot happen except after death, and so emancipation during the period while the body remains is not possible³. The point is noticed by Vātsyāyana in a discussion on *Nyāya-sūtra*, IV. 2. 42-45, where he raises the question of the possibility of knowledge of external objects through the senses and denies it by declaring that in emancipation (*apavarga*) the soul is dissociated from the body and all the senses, and hence there is no possibility of knowledge; and that with the extinction of all knowledge there is also ultimate and absolute destruction of pain⁴. The Vaiśeṣika holds the same view on the subject. Thus Śrīharṣa says that, when through right knowledge (*paramārtha-darśana*) all merit ceases, then the

¹ *Kathā-vatthu*, xvii. 2.

² *Buddhist Legends* by E. W. Burlingame, vol. II. p. 304. The same legend is repeated in the introduction to *Jātaka* 522.

³ *tad evaṃ navānāṃ ātma-guṇānāṃ nirmūlochedo 'pavargah
tad evedam uktaṃ bhavati tad-atyanta-viyogo 'pavargah.*

Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 508.

⁴ *yasmāt sarva-duḥkha-bījaṃ sarva-duḥkhāyatanāṃ cāpavarge
vichidyate tasmāt sarveṇa duḥkhena vimuktiḥ
apavargo no nīrbījaṃ nīrāyatanam ca duḥkham utpadyate.*

Vātsyāyana on *Nyāya-sūtra*, IV. 2. 43.

soul, being devoid of the seeds of merit and demerit, which produce the body and the senses, etc., and the present body having been destroyed by the exhaustive enjoyment of the fruits of merit and demerit, and there being no further production of any new body by reason of the destruction of all the seeds of *karma*, there is absolute cessation of the production of body, like the extinction of fire by the burning up of all the fuel; and such an eternal non-production of body is called *mokṣa* (emancipation)¹.

Prabhākara seems to hold a similar view. Thus Śālikanātha, in explaining the Prabhākara view in his *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, says that emancipation means the absolute and ultimate destruction of the body, due to the total exhaustion of merit and demerit². The difficulty is raised that it is not possible to exhaust by enjoyment or suffering the fruits of all the *karmas* accumulated since beginningless time; he who, being averse to worldly sorrows and all pleasures which are mixed with traces of sorrow, works for emancipation, desists from committing the actions prohibited by Vedic injunctions, which produce sins, exhausts by enjoyment and suffering the good and bad fruits of previous actions, attains true knowledge, and is equipped with the moral qualities of passionless tranquillity, self-restraint and absolute sex-control, exhausts in the end all the potencies of his *karmas* (*niḥśeṣa-karmāśaya*) and attains emancipation³. This view, however, no doubt has reference to a very advanced state in this life, when no further *karma* is accumulating; but it does not call this state *mokṣa* during life; for *mokṣa*, according to this view, is absolute and ultimate non-production of body.

The *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, however, holds that, when true knowledge is attained (*samyagjñānādhiḡama*), and when in consequence none of the *karmas* of undetermined fruition (*aniyata-vipāka*), accumulated through beginningless time, are able to ripen for bearing fruit, the body may still continue to remain simply by the inertia, as it were, of the old *avidyā*; just as even after the potter has ceased to operate the potter's wheel may continue to move as a

¹ *yathā dagdhendhanasyānalasyopāśamaḥ punar anutpāda evaṃ punaḥ śarīrānutpādo mokṣaḥ*. *Nyāya-kandālī*, p. 283.

Prāśastapāda also writes: *tadā nirodhāt nirbījasyātmanaḥ śarīrādi-nivṛttiḥ punaḥ śarīrādy-anutpattau dagdhendhanānalavad upāśamo mokṣa iti*. *Prāśastapāda-bhāṣyā*, p. 282.

² *ātyantikas tu dehocchedo niḥśeṣa-dharmādharma-parikṣaya-nibandhano mokṣa iti*. *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, p. 156.

³ *Ibid.* p. 157.

result of the momentum which it has acquired (*cakra-bhramivad dhṛta-śarīraḥ*)¹.

The word *jīvan-mukta* is not used either in the *Kārikā* or in the *Tattva-kaumudī* or in the *Tattva-vibhākara*. The *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, however, uses the term and justifies it on the same grounds as does Vācaspati². The *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, more particularly the *Pravacana-bhāṣya*, raises the threefold conception of *manda-viveka* (feeble discrimination), *madhya-viveka* (middle discrimination), and *viveka-niṣpatti* (finished discrimination)³. The stage of *manda-viveka* is that in which the enquirer has not attained the desired discrimination of the difference between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, but is endeavouring to attain it; the *madhya-viveka* stage is the state of the *jīvan-mukta*. But this is an *asamprajñāta* state, i.e. a state in which there is still subject-object knowledge and a full conscious discrimination. The last stage, *viveka-niṣpatti*, is an *asamprajñāta* state in which there is no subject-object knowledge, and therefore there cannot in this stage be any reflection of pleasure or sorrow (due to the fructifying *karma*—*prārabdha-karma*) on the *puruṣa*.

The Yoga also agrees with the general conclusion of the *Sāṃkhya* on the subject. A man who nears the state of emancipation ceases to have doubts about the nature of the self, and begins to re-live the nature of his own self and to discriminate himself as being entirely different from his psychosis (*sattva*); but, as a result of the persistence of some decayed roots of old impressions and instincts, there may, in the intervals of the flow of true discriminative knowledge, emerge other ordinary cognitive states, such as "I am," "mine," "I know," "I do not know"; yet, inasmuch as the roots of the old impressions have already been burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states cannot produce further new impressions. The general impressions of cognition (*jñāna-saṃskāra*), however, remain until the final destruction of *citta*. The point here is that, the roots in the world of sub-conscious impressions being destroyed, and the occasional appearance of ordinary cognitive states being but remnants produced by some of the old impressions, the roots of which have already

¹ *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 67, 68. The *Tattva-kaumudī* here essays to base its remarks on *Chāndogya*, vi. 14. 2, as Śaṅkara did in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*. The *Tattva-vibhākara* of Vamśīdhara Miśra, in commenting on Vācaspati's *Tattva-kaumudī*, quotes *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, II. 2. 8, and also *Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā*, IV. 37, for its support. Compare *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*: *ghanā na vāsanā yasya punar-janana-varjitā*.

² *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, III. 77-83.

³ *Ibid.* III. 77, 78.

been burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states are like passing shadows which have no basis anywhere; they cannot, therefore, produce any further impressions and thus cannot be a cause of bondage to the saint. With the advance of this state the sage ceases to have inclinations even towards his processes of concentration, and there is only discriminative knowledge; this state of *samādhi* is called *dharma-megha*. At this stage all the roots of ignorance and other afflictions become absolutely destroyed, and in such a state the sage, though living (*jīvaṇṇ eva*), becomes emancipated (*vimukta*). The next stage is, of course, the state of absolute emancipation (*kaivalya*), when the *citta* returns back to *prakṛti*, never to find the *puruṣa* again¹.

Among later writers Vidyāraṇya wrote on this subject a treatise which he called *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*². It is divided into five chapters. In the first he deals with the authorities who support *jīvan-mukti*; in the second, with the nature of the destruction of instinctive root inclinations (*vāsanā*); in the third, with the destruction of *manas* (*mano-nāśa*); in the fourth, with the final object for which *jīvan-mukti* is sought; and in the fifth, with the nature and characteristics of those saints who have attained *jīvan-mukti* by wisdom and right knowledge (*vidvat-saṁnyāsa*), and have virtually renounced the world, though living. The work is more a textual compilation from various sources than an acute philosophical work examining the subject on its own merits. The writer seems to have derived his main inspiration from the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, though he refers to relevant passages in several other works, such as *Bṛhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad*, *Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa*, *Kahola-brāhmaṇa*, *Śārīra-brāhmaṇa*, *Jābālu-brāhmaṇa*, *Kaṭha-vallī*, *Gītā*, *Bhāgavata*, *Brhaspati-smṛti*, *Sūta-saṁhitā*, *Gauḍa-pāda-kārikā*, *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya*, *Brahma-sūtra*, *Pañca-pādikā*, *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, *Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa*, *Yoga-sūtra*, *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, *Kauṣītaki*, *Pañcadaśī*, *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa*, *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, *Brahma-upaniṣad*, the works of Yama, Parāśara, Bodhāyana, Medhātithi, Viśvarūpa Ācārya, etc.

Disinclination to passions and desires (*vīrakti*) is, according to him, of two kinds, intense (*tīvra*) and very intense (*tīvratara*).

¹ *Yoga-sūtra* and *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, iv. 29-32.

² This Vidyāraṇya seems to be later than the Vidyāraṇya who wrote the *Pañcadaśī*, as quotations from the chapter *Brahmānanda* of the *Pañcadaśī* are found in it (chap. II, pp. 195, 196, Chowkhamba edition). So my identification of the Vidyāraṇya of the *Pañcadaśī* with the writer of *Jīvan-mukti-viveka* in the first volume (p. 419) of the present work seems to be erroneous.

Intense *virakti* is that in which the person does not desire anything in this life, whereas very intense *virakti* is that in which the person ceases to have any desires for all future lives¹. Vidyāraṇya takes great pains to prove, by reference to various scriptural texts, that there are these two distinct classes of renunciation (*saṁnyāsin*), though one might develop into the other². As regards the nature of *jīvan-mukti*, Vidyāraṇya follows the view of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, though he supports it by other scriptural quotations. On the subject of bodiless emancipation (*videha-mukti*) also he refers to passages from the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*. *Jīvan-mukti* is the direct result of the cessation of all instinctive root desires (*vāsanā-kṣaya*), the dawning of right knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*), and the destruction of *manas* (*mano-nāśa*). Vidyāraṇya, however, holds that on account of steady right knowledge even the seeming appearance of passions and attachment cannot do any harm to a *jīvan-mukta*, just as the bite of a snake whose fangs have been drawn cannot do him any harm. Thus he gives the example of Yājñavalkya, who killed Śākalya by cursing and yet did not suffer on that account, because he was already a *jīvan-mukta*, firm in his knowledge of the unreality of the world. So his anger was not real anger, rooted in instinctive passions, but a mere appearance (*ābhāsa*) of it³.

Energy of Free-will (Pauruṣa).

One of the special features of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is the special emphasis that it lays upon free-will and its immense possibilities, and its power of overruling the limitations and bondage of past *karmas*. *Pauruṣa* is defined in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* as mental and physical exertions made in properly advised ways (*sādhūpadiṣṭa*-

¹ If the ascetic has ordinary desires he is called *haṁsa*; if he desires emancipation, he is called *parama-haṁsa*. The course of their conduct is described in the *Parāśara-smṛti*, *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, I. 11. When a man renounces the world for the attainment of right knowledge, it is called *vividiṣā-saṁnyāsa* (renunciation for thirst of knowledge), as distinguished from *vidvat-saṁnyāsa* (renunciation of the wise) in the case of those who have already attained right knowledge. The latter kind of *saṁnyāsa* is with reference to those who are *jīvan-mukta*.

² It is pointed out by Vidyāraṇya that the *Ārunikopaniṣad* describes the conduct and character of *vividiṣā-saṁnyāsa*, in which one is asked to have a staff, one loin-cloth and to repeat the *Āraṇyaka*s and the *Upaniṣad*s only, and the *Parama-haṁsopaniṣad* describes the conduct and character of *vidvat-saṁnyāsa*, in which no such repetition of the *Upaniṣad*s is held necessary, since such a person is fixed and steady in his *Brahma* knowledge. This makes the difference between the final stages of the two kinds of renunciation (*Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, I. 20-24).

³ *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, pp. 183-186.

mārgeṇa), since only such actions can succeed¹. If a person desires anything and works accordingly in the proper way, he is certain to attain it, if he does not turn back in midway². *Pauruṣa* is of two kinds, of the past life (*prāktana*) and of this life (*aīhika*), and the past *pauruṣa* can be overcome by the present *pauruṣa*³. The *karma* of past life and the *karma* of this life are thus always in conflict with each other, and one or the other gains ground according to their respective strength. Not only so, but the endeavours of any individual may be in conflict with the opposing endeavours of other persons, and of these two also that which is stronger wins⁴. By strong and firm resolution and effort of will the endeavours of this life can conquer the effect of past deeds. The idea that one is being led in a particular way by the influence of past *karmas* has to be shaken off from the mind; for the efforts of the past life are certainly not stronger than the visible efforts of the moment.

All efforts have indeed to be made in accordance with the direction of the scriptures (*śāstra*). There is, of course, always a limit beyond which human endeavours are not possible, and therefore it is necessary that proper economy of endeavours should be observed by following the directions of the scriptures, by cultivating the company of good friends, and by adhering to right conduct, since mere random endeavours or endeavours on a wrong line cannot be expected to produce good results⁵. If one exerts his will and directs his efforts in the proper way, he is bound to be successful. There is nothing like destiny (*daiva*), standing as a separate force: it has a continuity with the power of other actions performed in this life, so that it is possible by superior exertions to destroy the power of the actions of previous lives, which would have led to many evil results. Whenever a great effort is made or a great energy is exerted, there is victory. The whole question, whether the *daiva* of the past life or the *pauruṣa* of this life will win, depends upon the relative strength of the two, and any part of the *daiva* which becomes weaker than the efforts of the present life

¹ *sādhūpadiṣṭa-mārgeṇa yan mano-'nga-vicēṣṭitam
tat pauruṣaṃ tat sapthalam anyad unmatta-ceṣṭitam.*

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, II. 4. 11.

² *yo yam arthaṃ prārthayate tad-arthaṃ cehate kramāt
avaśyaṃ sa tam āpnoti na ced ardhān nivartate.*

Ibid. II. 4. 12.

³ *Ibid.* II. 4. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.* II. 5. 5, 7.

⁵ *sa ca sac-chāstra-sat-saṅga-sad-ācārāiḥ nijaṃ phalaṃ
dadāti svabhāvo 'yam anyathā nārtha-siddhaye.*

Ibid. II. 5. 25.

in a contrary direction is naturally annulled. It is only he who thinks that destiny must lead him on, and consequently does not strive properly to overcome the evil destiny, that becomes like an animal at the mercy of destiny or God, which may take him to heaven or to hell. The object of all endeavours and efforts in this life is to destroy the power of the so-called destiny, or *daiva*, and to exert oneself to his utmost to attain the supreme end of life.

The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* not only holds that *pauruṣa* can conquer and annul *daiva*, but it even goes to the extreme of denying *daiva* and calling it a mere fiction, that, properly speaking, does not exist at all. Thus it is said that endeavours and efforts manifest themselves as the movement of thought (*saṃvit-spanda*), the movement of *manas* (*manah-spanda*), and the movement of the senses (*āindriya*). Thought movement is followed by movement of the psychosis or *cetas*; the body moves accordingly, and there is also a corresponding enjoyment or suffering. If this view is true, then *daiva* is never seen anywhere. Properly speaking, there is no *daiva*, and wherever any achievement is possible, it is always by continual strenuous effort of will, standing on its own account, or exercised in accordance with the *śāstra* or with the directions of a teacher¹. It is for all of us to exert ourselves for good and to withdraw our minds from evil. By all the *pramāṇas* at our disposal it is found that nothing but the firm exercise of will and effort achieves its end, and that nothing is effected by pure *daiva*; it is only by the effort of eating that there is the satisfaction of hunger, it is only by the effort of the vocal organs that speech is effected, and it is only by the effort of the legs and corresponding muscles that one can walk. So everything is effected by personal efforts, when directed with the aid of the *śāstra* and proper advisers or teachers. What passes as *daiva* is a mere fiction; no one has ever experienced it, and it cannot be used by any of the senses; and the nature of efforts being essentially vibratory (*spanda*), one can never expect such movement from the formless, insensible, so-called *daiva*, which is only imagined and can never be proved. Visible efforts are all tangible and open to immediate perception; and, even if it is admitted that *daiva* exists, how can this supposed formless (*amūrta*) entity come in contact with it? It is only fools who conceive the

1

*śāstrato gurutaś caiva svataś ceti tri-siddhayaḥ
sarvatra puruṣārthasya na daivasya kadācana.*

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, II. 7. 11.

existence of *daiva*, and depend on it, and are ruined, whereas those who are heroes, who are learned and wise, always attain their highest by their free-will and endeavour¹.

Rāma points out to Vasiṣṭha in II. 9 that *daiva* is fairly well accepted amongst all people, and asks how, if it did not exist, did it come to be accepted, and what does it mean after all? In answer to this Vasiṣṭha says that, when any endeavour (*pauruṣa*) comes to fruition or is baffled, and a good or a bad result is gained, people speak of it as being *daiva*. There is no *daiva*, it is mere vacuity, and it can neither help nor obstruct anyone in any way. At the time of taking any step people have a particular idea, a particular resolution; there may be success or failure as the result of operation in a particular way, and the whole thing is referred to by ordinary people as being due to *daiva*, which is a mere name, a mere consolatory word. The instinctive root inclinations (*vāsanā*) of a prior state become transformed into *karma*. A man works in accordance with his *vāsanā* and by *vāsanā* gets what he wants. *Vāsanā* and *karma* are, therefore, more or less like the potential and actual states of the same entity. *Daiva* is but another name for the *karmas* performed with strong desire for fruit, *karma* thus being the same as *vāsanā*, and *vāsanā* being the same as *manas*, and *manas* being the same as the agent or the person (*puruṣa*); so *daiva* does not exist as an entity separate from the *puruṣa*, and they are all merely synonyms for the same indescribable entity (*durniścaya*). Whatever the *manas* strives to do is done by itself, which is the same as being done by *daiva*. There are always in *manas* two distinct groups of *vāsanās*, operating towards the good and towards the evil, and it is our clear duty to rouse the former against the latter, so that the latter may be overcome and dominated by the former. But, since man is by essence a free source of active energy, it is meaningless to say that he could be determined by anything but himself; if it is held that any other entity could determine him, the question arises, what other thing would determine that entity, and what else that entity, and there would thus be an endless vicious regression². Man is thus a free source

¹ *mūdhaiḥ prakalpitaṃ daivam tat-parāś te kṣayaṃ gatāḥ
prājñāś tu pauruṣārthena padam uttamatām gatāḥ.*

² *anyas tvām cetayati cet taṃ cetayati ko 'paraḥ
ka inam cetayet tasmād anavasthā na vāstavi.*

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, II. 8. 16.

Ibid. II. 9. 29.

of activity, and that which appears to be limiting his activity is but one side of him, which he can overcome by rousing up his virtuous side. This view of *puṛuṣa-kāra* and *karma* seems to be rather unique in Indian literature.

Prāṇa and its Control.

The mind (*citta*), which naturally transforms itself into its states (*vṛtti*), does so for two reasons, which are said to be like its two seeds. One of these is the vibration (*parispanda*) of *prāṇa*, and the other, strong and deep-rooted desires and inclinations which construct (*dṛḍha-bhāvanā*)¹. When the *prāṇa* vibrates and is on the point of passing through the nerves (*nāḍī-saṃsparśanodyata*), then there appears the mind full of its thought processes (*saṃvedanamaya*). But when the *prāṇa* lies dormant in the hollow of the veins (*śīrā-saraṇi-koṭare*), then there is no manifestation of mind, and its processes and the cognitive functions do not operate². It is the vibration of the *prāṇa* (*prāṇa-spanda*) that manifests itself through the *citta* and causes the world-appearance out of nothing. The cessation of the vibration of *prāṇa* means cessation of all cognitive functions. As a result of the vibration of *prāṇa*, the cognitive function is set in motion like a top (*viṭā*). As a top spins round in the yard when struck, so, roused by the vibration of *prāṇa*, knowledge is manifested; and in order to stop the course of knowledge, it is necessary that the cause of knowledge should be first attacked. When the *citta* remains awake to the inner sense, while shut to all extraneous cognitive activities, we have the highest state. For the cessation of *citta* the yogins control *prāṇa* through *prāṇāyāma* (breath-regulation) and meditation (*dhyāna*), in accordance with proper instructions³.

Again, there is a very intimate relation between *vāsanā* and *prāṇa-spanda*, such that *vāsanā* is created and stimulated into activity, *prāṇa-spanda*, and *prāṇa-spanda* is set in motion through *vāsanā*. When by strong ideation and without any proper deliberation of the past and the present, things are conceived to be one's own—the body, the senses, the ego and the like—we have what is

¹ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, v. 91. 14.

² I have translated *śīrā* as veins, though I am not properly authorized to do it. For the difference between veins and arteries does not seem to have been known.

³ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, v. 91. 20-27.

called *vāsanā*. Those who have not the proper wisdom always believe in the representations of the ideations of *vāsanā* without any hesitation and consider them to be true; and, since both the *vāsanā* and the *prāṇa-spanda* are the ground and cause of the manifestations of *citta*, the cessation of one promptly leads to the cessation of the other. The two are connected with each other in the relation of seed and shoot (*bijāṅkuravat*); from *prāṇa-spanda* there is *vāsanā*, and from *vāsanā* there is *prāṇa-spanda*. The object of knowledge is inherent in the knowledge itself, and so with the cessation of knowledge the object of knowledge also ceases¹.

As a description of *prāṇa* we find in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* that it is said to be vibratory activity (*spanda-śakti*) situated in the upper part of the body, while *apāna* is the vibratory activity in the lower part of the body. There is a natural *prāṇāyāma* going on in the body in waking states as well as in sleep. The mental outgoing tendency of the *prāṇas* from the cavity of the heart is called *recaka*, and the drawing in of the *prāṇas* (*dvādaśāṅgulī*) by the *apāna* activity is called *pūraka*. The interval between the cessation of one effort of *apāna* and the rise of the effort of *prāṇa* is the stage of *kumbhaka*. Bhuṣuṇḍa, the venerable old crow who was enjoying an exceptionally long life, is supposed to instruct Vāsiṣṭha in VI. 24 on the subject of *prāṇa*. He compares the body to a house with the ego (*ahaṁkāra*) as the householder. It is supposed to be supported by pillars of three kinds², provided with nine doors (seven apertures in the head and two below), tightly fitted with the tendons (*snāyu*) as fastening materials and cemented with blood, flesh and fat. On the two sides of it there are the two *nāḍis*, *idā* and *piṅgalā*, lying passive and unmanifested (*nimīlita*). There is also a machine (*yantra*) of bone and flesh (*asthi-māṁsa-maya*) in the shape of three double lotuses (*padma-yugma-traya*) having pipes attached to them running both upwards and downwards and with their petals closing upon one another (*anyonya-mīlat-komala-saddala*). When it is slowly

¹ *saṁulāṁ naśyataḥ kṣipraṁ mūla-cchedād iva drumah.
saṁvidam viddhi saṁvedyaṁ bijam dhīratayā vinā
na saṁbhavati saṁvedyaṁ taila-hīnas tilo yathā
na bahir nāntare kimcit saṁvedyaṁ vidyate pṛthak.*

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, v. 91. 66 and 67.

² *tri-prakāra-mahā-sthūṇam*, VI. 24. 14. The commentator explains the three kinds of pillars as referring to the three primal entities of Indian medicine—*vāyu* (air), *pitta* (bile) and *kapha* (phlegm)—*vāta-pitta-kapha-lakṣaṇa-tri-prakārā mahāntaḥ sthūnā viṣṭambha-kāṣṭhāni yasya*. I am myself inclined to take the three kinds of pillars as referring to the bony structure of three parts of the body—the skull, the trunk, and the legs.

filled with air, the petals move, and by the movement of the petals the air increases. Thus increased, the air, passing upwards and downwards through different places, is differently named as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, etc. It is in the threefold machinery of the lotus of the heart (*hṛt-padma-yantra-tritaye*) that all the *prāṇa* forces operate and spread forth upwards and downwards like the rays from the moon's disc. They go out, return, repulse and draw and circulate. Located in the heart, the air is called *prāṇa*: it is through its power that there is the movement of the eyes, the operation of the tactual sense, breathing through the nose, digesting of food and the power of speech¹. The *prāṇa* current of air stands for exhalation (*recaka*) and the *apāna* for inhalation (*pūraka*), and the moment of respite between the two operations is called *kumbhaka*; consequently, if the *prāṇa* and *apāna* can be made to cease there is an unbroken continuity of *kumbhaka*. But all the functions of the *prāṇa*, as well as the upholding of the body, are ultimately due to the movement of *citta*². Though in its movement in the body the *prāṇa* is associated with air currents, still it is in reality nothing but the vibratory activity proceeding out of the thought-activity, and these two act and react upon each other, so that, if the vibratory activity of the body be made to cease, the thought-activity will automatically cease, and vice-versa. Thus through *spanda-nirodha* we have *prāṇa-nirodha* and through *prāṇa-nirodha* we have *spanda-nirodha*. In the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, III. 13. 31, *vāyu* is said to be nothing but a vibratory entity (*spandate yat sa tad vāyuh*).

In v. 78 it is said that *citta* and movement are in reality one and the same, and are therefore altogether inseparable, like the snow and its whiteness, and consequently with the destruction of one the other is also destroyed. There are two ways of destroying the *citta*, one by Yoga, consisting of the cessation of mental states, and the other by right knowledge. As water enters through the crevices of the earth, so air (*vāta*) moves in the body through the *nāḍis* and is called *prāṇa*. It is this *prāṇa* air which, on account of its diverse functions and works, is differently named as *apāna*, etc.

¹ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, VI. 24. It is curious to note in this connection that in the whole literature of the Āyur-veda there is probably no passage where there is such a clear description of the respiratory process. *Pupphusa*, or lungs, are mentioned only by name in *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, but none of their functions and modes of operation are at all mentioned. It is probable that the discovery of the respiratory functions of the lungs was made by a school of thought different from that of the medical school.

² *Ibid.* VI. 25. 61-74.

But it is identical with *citta*. From the movement of *prāṇa* there is the movement of *citta*, and from that there is knowledge (*samvid*). As regards the control of the movement of *prāṇa*, the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* advises several alternatives. Thus it holds that through concentrating one's mind on one subject, or through fixed habits of long inhalation associated with meditation, or through exhaustive exhalation, or the practice of not taking breath and maintaining *kumbhaka*, or through stopping the inner respiratory passage by attaching the tip of the tongue to the uvula¹, or, again, through concentration of the mind or thoughts on the point between the two brows, there dawns all of a sudden the right knowledge and the consequent cessation of *prāṇa* activities².

Professor Macdonell, writing on *prāṇa* in the *Vedic Index*, vol. II, says, "*prāṇa*, properly denoting 'breath,' is a term of wide and vague significance in Vedic literature." In the narrow sense *prāṇa* denotes one of the vital airs, of which five are usually enumerated, viz. *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. The exact sense of each of these breaths, when all are mentioned, cannot be determined. The word *prāṇa* has sometimes merely the general sense of breath, even when opposed to *apāna*. But its proper sense is beyond question "breathing forth," "expiration." But, though in a few cases the word may have been used for "breath" in its remote sense, the general meaning of the word in the Upaniṣads is not air current, but some sort of biomotor force, energy or vitality often causing these air currents³. It would be tedious to refer to the large number of relevant Upaniṣad texts and to try to ascertain after suitable discussion their exact significance in each

¹ *tālu-mūla-gatām yatnāj jihvayākramya ghaṇṭikām
ūrdhva-randhra-gate prāṇe prāṇa-spando nirudhyate.*

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, v. 78. 25.

² It is important to notice in this connection that most of the forms of *prāṇa-yāma* as herein described, except the *haṭha-yoga* process of arresting the inner air passage by the tongue, otherwise known as *khecari-mūdrā*, are the same as described in the *sūtras* of Patañjali and the *bhāṣya* of Vyāsa; and this fact has also been pointed out by the commentator Ānandabodhendra Bhikṣu in his commentary on the above.

³ Difference between *prāṇa* and *vāyu*, *Aitareya*, II. 4; the *nāsikya prāṇa*, I. 4. Relation of *prāṇa* to other functions, *Kauṣītaki*, II. 5; *prāṇa* as life, II. 8; *prāṇa* connected with *vāyu*, II. 12; *prāṇa* as the most important function of life, II. 14; *prāṇa* as consciousness, III. 2. Distinction of *nāsikya* and *mukhya prāṇa*, *Chāndogya*, II. 1-9; the function of the five *vāyus*, III. 3-5; *prāṇa* as the result of food, I. 8. 4; of water, VI. 5. 2, VI. 6. 5, VI. 7. 6; *prāṇa* connected with *ātman*, as everything else connected with *prāṇa*, like spokes of a wheel, *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, II. 5. 15; *prāṇa* as strength, *ibid.* v. 14. 4; *prāṇa* as force running through the *suṣumnā* nerve, *Maitrī*, VI. 21; etc.

case. The best way to proceed therefore is to refer to the earliest traditional meaning of the word, as accepted by the highest Hindu authorities. I refer to the *Vedānta-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, which may be supposed to be the earliest research into the doctrines discussed in the Upaniṣads. Thus the *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. 4. 9 (*na vāyu-kriye prthag upadeśāt*), speaking of what may be the nature of *prāṇa*, says that it is neither air current (*vāyu*) nor action (*kriyā*), since *prāṇa* has been considered as different from air and action (in the Upaniṣads). Śaṅkara, commenting on this, says that from such passages as *yaḥ prāṇaḥ sa eṣa vāyuh pañca 'vidhaḥ prāṇo pāno vyāna udānaḥ samānaḥ* (what is *prāṇa* is *vāyu* and it is fivefold, *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna*), it may be supposed that *vāyu* (air) is *prāṇa*, but it is not so, since in *Chāndogya*, III. 18. 4, it is stated that they are different. Again, it is not the action of the senses, as the Sāṃkhya supposes; for it is regarded as different from the senses in *Muṇḍaka*, II. 1. 3. The passage which identifies *vāyu* with *prāṇa* is intended to prove that it is the nature of *vāyu* that has transformed itself into the entity known as *prāṇa* (just as the human body itself may be regarded as a modification or transformation of *kṣiti*, earth). It is not *vāyu*, but, as Vācaspati says, "*vāyu-bheda*," which Amalānanda explains in his *Vedānta-kalpataru* as *vāyoh pariṇāma-rūpa-kārya-viśeṣaḥ*, i.e. it is a particular evolutionary product of the category of *vāyu*. Śaṅkara's own statement is equally explicit on the point. He says, "*vāyur evāyam adhyātman āpannaḥ pañca-vyūho viśeṣātmanāvatiṣṭhamānaḥ prāṇo nāma bhanyate na tattvāntaram nāpi vāyu-mātram*," i.e. it is *vāyu* which, having transformed itself into the body, differentiates itself into a group of five that is called *vāyu*; *prāṇa* is not altogether a different category, nor simply air. In explaining the nature of *prāṇa* in II. 4. 10-12, Śaṅkara says that *prāṇa* is not as independent as *jīva* (soul), but performs everything on its behalf, like a prime minister (*rāja-mantrivaj jīvasya sarvārtha-karaṇatvena upakaraṇa-bhūto na svatantraḥ*). *Prāṇa* is not an instrument like the senses, which operate only in relation to particular objects; for, as is said in *Chāndogya*, v. 1. 6, 7, *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, IV. 3. 12 and *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, I. 3. 19, when all the senses leave the body the *prāṇa* continues to operate. It is that by the functioning of which the existence of the soul in the body, or life (*jīva-sthiti*), and the passage of the *jīva* out of the body, or death (*jīvotkrānti*), are possible. The five *vāyus* are the five functionings of this vital

principle, just as the fivefold mental states of right knowledge, illusion, imagination (*vikalpa*), sleep and memory are the different states of the mind. Vācaspati, in commenting on *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. 4. 11, says that it is the cause which upholds the body and the senses (*dehendriya-vidhāraṇa-kāraṇam prāṇaḥ*), though it must be remembered that it has still other functions over and above the upholding of the body and the senses (*na kevalam śarīrendriya-dhāraṇam asya kāryam*, Vācaspati, *ibid.*). In *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. 4. 13, it is described as being atomic (*aṇu*), which is explained by Śaṅkara as “subtle” (*sūkṣma*), on account of its pervading the whole body by its fivefold functionings. Vācaspati in explaining it says that it is called “atomic” only in a derivative figurative sense (*upacaryate*) and only on account of its inaccessible or indefinable character (*duradhigamatā*), though pervading the whole body. Govindānanda, in commenting upon *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. 4. 9, says that *prāṇa* is a vibratory activity which upholds the process of life and it has no other direct operation than that (*parispanda-rupa-prāṇanānukūlatvād avāntara-vyāpārābhāvāt*). This seems to be something like biomotor or life force. With reference to the relation of *prāṇa* to the motor organs or faculties of speech, etc., Śaṅkara says that their vibratory activity is derived from *prāṇa* (*vāg-ādiṣu parispanda-lābhasya prāṇāyattatvam*, II. 4. 19). There are some passages in the *Vedānta-sūtra* which may lead us to think that the five *vāyus* may mean air currents, but that it is not so is evident from the fact that the substance of the *prāṇa* is not air (*etat prāṇādi-pañcakam ākāśādi-gata-rajo-’mśebhyo militebhya utpadyate*), and the *rajas* element is said to be produced from the five *bhūtas*, and the *prāṇas* are called *kriyātmaka*, or consisting of activity. Rāma Tīrtha, commenting on the above passage of the *Vedānta-sāra*, says that it is an evolutionary product of the essence of *vāyu* and the other *bhūtas*, but it is not in any sense the external air which performs certain physiological functions in the body (*tathā mukhya-prāṇo ’pi vāyor bāhyasya sūtrātmakasya vikāro na śārīra-madhye nabhovad vṛtti-lābha-mātreṇa avasthito bāhya-vāyur eva*)¹. Having proved that in Vedānta *prāṇa* or any of the five *vāyus* means biomotor force and not air current, I propose now to turn to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga differs from the Vedānta in rejecting the view that the *prāṇa* is in any sense an evolutionary product of the

¹ *Vidvan-mano-rañjanī*, p. 105, Jacob’s edition, Bombay, 1916.

nature of *vāyu*. Thus Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya* on *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. 4. 10, says that *prāṇa* is called *vāyu* because it is self-active like the latter (*svataḥ kriyāvattvena ubhayoḥ prāṇa-vāyvoḥ sājātyāt*). Again, in II. 4. 9, he says that *prāṇa* is neither air nor the upward or downward air current (*mukhya-prāṇo na vāyuh nāpi śārīrasya ūrdhv-ādho-vgamana-lakṣaṇā vāyu-kriyā*).

What is *prāṇa*, then, according to Sāṃkhya-Yoga? It is *mahat-tattva*, which is evolved from *prakṛti*, which is called *buddhi* with reference to its intellective power and *prāṇa* with reference to its power as activity. The so-called five *vāyus* are the different functionings of the *mahat-tattva* (*sāmānya-kārya-sādhāraṇaṃ yat kāraṇaṃ mahat-tattvaṃ tasyaiva vṛtti-bhedāḥ prāṇāpānādayaḥ*; see *Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya*, II. 4. 11). Again, referring to *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 29, we find that the five *vāyus* are spoken of as the common functioning of *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*, and Vācaspati says that the five *vāyus* are their life. This means that the three, *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*, are each energizing, in their own way, and it is the joint operation of these energies that is called the fivefold *prāṇa* which upholds the body. Thus in this view also *prāṇa* is biomotor force and no air current. The special feature of this view is that this biomotor force is in essence a mental energy consisting of the specific functionings of *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*¹. It is due to the evolutionary activity of *antaḥkaraṇa*. In support of this view the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, II. 31, *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, III. 39, Vācaspati's *Tattva-vaiśārādī*, Bhikṣu's *Yoga-varttika*, and Nāgeśa's *Chāyā-vyākhyā* thereon may be referred to. It is true, no doubt, that sometimes inspiration and expiration of external air are also called *prāṇa*; but that is because in inspiration and expiration the function of *prāṇa* is active or it vibrates. It is thus the entity which moves and not mere motion that is called *prāṇa*². Rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkara in holding that *prāṇa* is not air (*vāyu*), but a transformation of the nature of air. But it should be noted that this modification of air is such a modification as can only be known by Yoga methods³.

The Vaiśeṣika, however, holds that it is the external air which

¹ Gauḍapāda's *bhāṣya* on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 29 compares the action of *prāṇa* to the movement of birds enclosed in a cage which moves the cage: compare Śaṅkara's reference to *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. 4. 9.

² Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* on *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. 4. 8.

³ See the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, 53-55, and also Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* and *Śruta-prakāśikā*, II. 4. 1-15.

according to its place in the body performs various physiological functions¹. The medical authorities also support the view that *vāyu* is a sort of driving and upholding power. Thus the *Bhāva-prakāśa* describes *vāyu* as follows: It takes quickly the *doṣas*, *dhātus* and the *malas* from one place to another, is subtle, composed of *rajo-guṇa*; is dry, cold, light and moving. By its movement it produces all energy, regulates inspiration and expiration and generates all movement and action, and by upholding the keenness of the senses and the *dhātus* holds together the heat, senses and the mind². Vāhaṭa in his *Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha* also regards *vāyu* as the one cause of all body movements, and there is nothing to suggest that he meant air currents³. The long description of Caraka (I. 12), as will be noticed in the next chapter, seems to suggest that he considered the *vāyu* as the constructive and destructive force of the universe, and as fulfilling the same kinds of functions inside the body as well. It is not only a physical force regulating the physiological functions of the body, but is also the mover and controller of the mind in all its operations, as knowing, feeling and willing. Suśruta holds that it is in itself *avyakta* (unmanifested or unknowable), and that only its actions as operating in the body are manifested (*avyakto vyakta-karmā ca*).

In the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, as we have already seen above, *prāṇa* or *vāyu* is defined as that entity which vibrates (*spandate yat sa tad vāyuh*, III. 13) and it has no other reality than vibration. *Prāṇa* itself is, again, nothing but the movement of the intellect as *ahamkāra*⁴.

Prāṇa is essentially of the nature of vibration (*spanda*), and mind is but a form of *prāṇa* energy, and so by the control of the mind the five *vāyus* are controlled⁵. The Śaiva authorities also agree with the view that *prāṇa* is identical with cognitive activity, which passes through the *nāḍīs* (nerves) and maintains all the body movement and the movement of the senses. Thus Kṣemarāja says that it is the cognitive force which passes in the form of *prāṇa* through the *nāḍīs*, and he refers to Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa as also holding the same view, and *prāṇa* is definitely spoken of by him as force (*kuṭīla-vāhinī prāṇa-śaktiḥ*)⁶. Śivopādhyaya in his *Vivṛti* on the

¹ *Nyāya-kandali* of Śrīdhara, p. 48.

² *Bhāva-prakāśa*, Sen's edition, Calcutta, p. 47.

³ Vāhaṭa's *Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha* and the commentary by Indu, Trichur, 1914, pp. 138, 212.

⁴ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, III. 14.

⁵ *Ibid.* v. 13, 78.

⁶ *Śiva-sūtra-vimarśinī*, III. 43, 44.

Vijñāna-bhairava also describes *prāṇa* as force (*śakti*), and the *Vijñāna-bhairava* itself does the same¹. Bhaṭṭa Ānanda in his *Vijñāna-kaumudī* describes *prāṇa* as a functioning of the mind (*citta-vṛtti*).

Stages of Progress.

It has been already said that the study of philosophy and association with saintly characters are the principal means with which a beginner has to set out on his toil for the attainment of salvation. In the first stage (*prathamā bhūmikā*) the enquirer has to increase his wisdom by study and association with saintly persons. The second stage is the stage of critical thinking (*vicāraṇā*); the third is that of the mental practice of dissociation from all passions, etc. (*asaṅga-bhāvanā*); the fourth stage (*vilāpanī*) is that in which through a right understanding of the nature of truth the world-appearance shows itself to be false; the fifth stage is that in which the saint is in a state of pure knowledge and bliss (*śuddha-saṃvit-mayā-nanda-rūpa*). This stage is that of the *jīvan-mukta*, in which the saint may be said to be half-asleep and half-awake (*ardha-supta-prabuddha*). The sixth stage is that in which the saint is in a state of pure bliss; it is a state which is more like that of deep dreamless sleep (*suṣupta-saḍśā-sthiti*). The seventh stage is the last transcendental state (*turyātita*), which cannot be experienced by any saint while he is living. Of these the first three stages are called the waking state (*jāgrat*), the fourth stage is called the dream state (*svapna*), the fifth stage is called the dreamless (*suṣupta*) state, the sixth stage is an unconscious state called the *turya*, and the seventh stage is called the *turyātita*³.

Desire (*icchā*) is at the root of all our troubles. It is like a mad elephant rushing through our system and trying to destroy it. The senses are like its young, and the instinctive root inclinations (*vāsanā*) are like its flow of ichor. It can only be conquered by the close application of patience (*dhairya*). Desire means the imaginations of the mind, such as "let this happen to me," and this is also called *saṅkalpa*. The proper way to stop this sort of imagining is to cease by sheer force of will from hoping or desiring in this manner, and for this one has to forget his memory; for

¹ *Vijñāna-bhairava* and *Vivṛti*, verse 67.

² See the *Nyāya-kandali* of Śrīdhara, p. 48, and also *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarūdrī* on the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* on *Bhāṣā-parichheda*, p. 44.

³ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, VI. 120.

so long as memory continues such hopes and desires cannot be stopped. The last stage, when all movement has ceased (*asṇanda*) and all thoughts and imaginations have ceased, is a state of unconsciousness (*avedanam*)¹. *Yoga* is also defined as the ultimate state of unconsciousness (*avedana*), the eternal state when everything else has ceased². In this state *citta* is destroyed, and one is reduced to the ultimate entity of consciousness; and thus, being free of all relations and differentiations of subject and object, one has no knowledge in this state, though it is characterized as *bodhātma* (identical with consciousness). This last state is indeed absolutely indescribable (*avyapadeśya*), though it is variously described as the state of Brahman, Śiva, or the realization of the distinction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*³. The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, however, describes this state not as being essentially one of bliss, but as a state of unconsciousness unthinkable and indescribable. It is only the fifth state that manifests itself as being of the nature of *ānanda*; the sixth state is one of unconsciousness, which, it seems, can somehow be grasped; but the seventh is absolutely transcendental and indescribable.

The division of the progressive process into seven stages naturally reminds one of the seven stages of *prajñā* (wisdom) in Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra* and *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*. The seven stages of *prajñā* are there divided into two parts, the first containing four and the second three. Of these the four are psychological and the three are ontological, showing the stages of the disintegration of *citta* before its final destruction or *citta-vimukti*⁴. Here also the first four stages, ending with *vilāpanī*, are psychological, whereas the last three stages represent the advance of the evolution of *citta* towards its final disruption. But, apart from this, it does not seem that there is any one to one correspondence of the *prajñā* states of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* with those of Patañjali. The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* occasionally mentions the name *Yoga* as denoting the highest state and defines it as the ultimate state of unconsciousness (*avedanam vidur yogam*) or as the cessation of the poisonous effects of desire⁵. In the first half of the sixth book, chapter 125, the ultimate state is described as the state of universal negation (*sarvāpahnava*). Existence of *citta* is pain, and its destruction bliss; the destruction

¹ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, vi. 126. ² *Ibid.* vi. 126. 99. ³ *Ibid.* vi. 126. 71-72.

⁴ See my *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, p. 273.

⁵ *Ichā-ṛiṣa-vikārasya viyogam yoga-nāmakam. Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, vi. 37. 1; also *ibid.* vi. 126. 99.

of *citta* by cessation of knowledge—a state of neither pain nor pleasure nor any intermediate state—a state as feelingless as that of the stone (*pāṣāṇavat-samam*), is the ultimate state aimed at¹.

Karma, according to the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, is nothing but thought-activity manifesting itself as subject-object knowledge. Abandonment of *karma* therefore means nothing short of abandonment of thought-activity or the process of knowledge². Cessation of *karma* thus means the annihilation of knowledge. The stirring of *karma* or activity of thought is without any cause; but it is due to this activity that the ego and all other objects of thought come into being; the goal of all our endeavours should be the destruction of all knowledge, the unconscious, stone-like knowledgeless state³.

As there are seven progressive stages, so there are also seven kinds of beings according to the weakness or strength of their *vāsanās*. There are *svapna-jāgara*, *saṅkalpa-jāgara*, *kevala-jāgrat-sthita*, *cirā-jāgrat-sthita*, *ghana-jāgrat-sthita*, *jāgrat-svapna* and *kṣīṇa-jāgaraka*. *Svapna-jāgara* (dream-awake) persons are those who in some past state of existence realized in dream experience all our present states of being and worked as dream persons (*svapna-nara*). The commentator in trying to explain this says that it is not impossible; for everything is present everywhere in the spirit, so it is possible that we, as dream persons of their dream experience, should be present in their minds in their *vāsanā* forms (*tad-antaḥ-karaṇe vāsanātmanā sthitāḥ*)⁴. As both past and present have no existence except in thought, time is in thought reversible, so that our existence at a time future to theirs does not necessarily prevent their having an experience of us in dreams. For the limitations of time and space do not hold for thought, and as elements in thought everything exists everywhere (*sarvaṃ sarvatra vidyate*)⁵. By dreams these persons may experience changes of life and even attain to final emancipation. The second class, the *saṅkalpa-jāgaras*, are those who without sleeping can by mere imagination continue to conceive all sorts of activities and existences, and may ultimately attain emancipation. The third class, the *kevala-jāgaras*, are those who are born in this life for the first time. When such beings pass

¹ This *turyāṅgīta* stage should not be confused with the sixth stage of *suṣupti*, which is often described as a stage of pure bliss.

² *sarveṣāṃ karmaṇāṃ evaṃ vedanaṃ bījaṃ uttamam
svarūpaṃ cetayitvāntas tataḥ spandaḥ pravartate.*

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, VI. 11. 2. 26.

³ *Ibid.* III. 15. 16.

⁴ *Ibid.* VI. 2. 50. 9. *Tātparya-prakāśa*.

⁵ *Ibid.*

through more than one life, they are called *cira-jāgaras*. Such beings, on account of their sins, may be born as trees, etc., in which case they are called *ghana-jāgaras*. Those of such beings suffering rebirth who by study and good association attain right knowledge are called *jāgrat-svapna-sthita*; and finally, those that have reached the *turya* state of deliverance are called *kṣīṇa-jāgaraka*.

Bondage (*bandha*), according to the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, remains so long as our knowledge has an object associated with it, and deliverance (*mokṣa*) is realized when knowledge is absolutely and ultimately dissociated from all objects and remains in its transcendent purity, having neither an object nor a subject¹.

Methods of Right Conduct.

The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* does not enjoin severe asceticism or the ordinary kinds of religious gifts, ablutions or the like for the realization of our highest ends, which can only be achieved by the control of attachment (*rāga*), antipathy (*dveṣa*), ignorance (*tamaḥ*), anger (*krodha*), pride (*mada*), and jealousy (*mātsarya*), followed by the right apprehension of the nature of reality². So long as the mind is not chastened by the clearing out of all evil passions, the performance of religious observances leads only to pride and vanity and does not produce any good. The essential duty of an enquirer consists in energetic exertion for the achievement of the highest end, for which he must read the right sort of scriptures (*sac-chāstra*) and associate with good men³. He should somehow continue his living and abandon even the slightest desire of enjoyment (*bhoga-gandham parityajet*), and should continue critical thinking (*vicāra*). On the question whether knowledge or work, *jñāna* or *karma*, is to be accepted for the achievement of the highest end, the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* does not, like Śaṅkara, think that the two cannot jointly be taken up, but on the contrary emphatically says that, just as

¹ *jñānasya jñeyatāpattir bandha ity abhidhīyate
tasyaiva jñeyatā-śāntir mokṣa ity abhidhīyate.*

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, VI. II. 190. 1.

² *sva-pauruṣa-prayātṇena vivekena vikāśinā
sa devo jñāyate rāma na tapaḥ-snāna-karmabhiḥ.*

Ibid. III. 6. 9.

³ Good men are defined in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* as follows:
*deṣe yaṃ sujana-prāyā lokāḥ sādhuṃ pracakṣate
sa viśiṣṭaḥ sa sādhuḥ syāt taṃ prayātṇena saṃśrayet.*

Ibid. III. 6. 20.

a bird flies with its two wings, so an enquirer can reach his goal through the joint operation of knowledge and work¹.

The main object of the enquirer being the destruction of *citta*, all his endeavours should be directed towards the uprooting of instinctive root inclinations (*vāsanā*), which are the very substance and root of the *citta*. The realization of the truth (*tattva-jñāna*), the destruction of the *vāsanās* and the destruction of the *citta* all mean the same identical state and are interdependent on one another, so that none of them can be attained without the other. So, abandoning the desire for enjoyment, one has to try for these three together; and for this one has to control one's desires on one hand and practise breath-control (*prāṇa-nirodhena*) on the other; and these two would thus jointly co-operate steadily towards the final goal. Such an advancement is naturally slow, but this progress, provided it is steady, is to be preferred to any violent efforts to hasten (*haṭha*) the result². Great stress is also laid on the necessity of self-criticism as a means of loosening the bonds of desire and the false illusions of world-appearance and realizing the dissociation from attachment (*asaṅga*)³.

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, Śāṅkara Vedānta and Buddhist Vijñānavāda.

To a superficial reader the idealism of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* may appear to be identical with the Vedānta as interpreted by Śāṅkara; and in some of the later Vedānta works of the Śāṅkara school, such as the *jīvan-mukti-viveka*, etc., so large a number of questions dealt with in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* occur that one does not readily imagine that there may be any difference between this idealism and that of Śāṅkara. This point therefore needs some discussion.

The main features of Śāṅkara's idealism consist in the doctrine that the self-manifested subject-objectless intelligence forms the ultimate and unchangeable substance of both the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and the external world. Whatever there is of change and mutation is outside of this Intelligence, which is also the Reality. But, nevertheless, changes are found associated with this reality or Brahman, such as the external forms of objects and the diverse mental states. These are mutable and have therefore a different kind of indescribable existence from Brahman; but still they are

¹ *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, I. I. 7, 8.

² *Ibid.* v. 92.

³ *Ibid.* v. 93.

somehow essentially of a positive nature¹. Śaṅkara's idealism does not allow him to deny the existence of external objects as apart from perceiving minds, and he does not adhere to the doctrine of *esse est percipi*. Thus he severely criticizes the views of the Buddhist idealists, who refuse to believe in the existence of external objects as apart from the thoughts which seem to represent them. Some of these arguments are of great philosophical interest and remind one of similar arguments put forth by a contemporary British Neo-realist in refutation of Idealism.

The Buddhists there are made to argue as follows: When two entities are invariably perceived simultaneously they are identical; now knowledge and its objects are perceived simultaneously; therefore the objects are identical with their percepts. Our ideas have nothing in the external world to which they correspond, and their existence during dreams, when the sense-organs are universally agreed to be inoperative, shows that for the appearance of ideas the operation of the sense-organs, indispensable for establishing connection with the so-called external world, is unnecessary. If it is asked how, if there are no external objects, can the diversity of percepts be explained, the answer is that such diversity may be due to the force of *vāsanās* or the special capacity of the particular moment associated with the cognition². If the so-called external objects are said to possess different special capacities which would account for the diversity of percepts, the successive moments of the mental order may also be considered as possessing special distinctive capacities which would account for the diversity of percepts generated by those cognition moments. In dreams it is these diverse cognition moments which produce diversity of percepts.

Śaṅkara, in relating the above argument of the Buddhist idealist, says that external objects are directly perceived in all our perceptions, and how then can they be denied? In answer to this, if it is held that there is no object for the percepts excepting the sensations, or that the existence of anything consists in its being perceived, that can be refuted by pointing to the fact that the independent existence of the objects of perception, as apart from their being perceived, can be known from the perception itself, since the

¹ See the account of Śaṅkara Vedānta in my *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, chapter x.

² *Kasyacid eva jñāna-kṣaṇasya sa tādṛśaḥ sāmāthyātīśayo vāsanā-pariṇāmaḥ. Bhāmati*, II. 11. 28.

perceiving of an object is not the object itself; it is always felt that the perception of the blue is different from the blue which is perceived; the blue stands forth as the object of perception and the two can never be identical. This is universally felt and acknowledged, and the Buddhist idealist, even while trying to refute it, admits it in a way, since he says that what is inner perception appears as if it exists outside of us, externally. If externality as such never existed, how could there be an appearance of it in consciousness? When all experiences testify to this difference between knowledge and its object, the inner mental world of thoughts and ideas and the external world of objects, how can such a difference be denied? You may see a jug or remember it: the mental operation in these two cases varies, but the object remains the same¹.

The above argument of Śaṅkara against Buddhist idealism conclusively proves that he admitted the independent existence of objects, which did not owe their existence to anybody's knowing them. External objects had an existence different from and independent of the existence of the diversity of our ideas or percepts.

But the idealism of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is more like the doctrine of the Buddhist idealists than the idealism of Śaṅkara. For according to the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* it is only ideas that have some sort of existence. Apart from ideas or percepts there is no physical or external world having a separate or independent existence. *Esse est percipi* is the doctrine of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, while Śaṅkara most emphatically refutes such a doctrine. A later exposition of Vedānta by Prakāśānanda, known as *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, seems to derive its inspiration from the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* in its exposition of Vedānta on lines similar to the idealism of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, by denying the existence of objects not perceived (*ajñāta-sattvānabhyupagama*)². Prakāśānanda disputes the ordinarily accepted view that cognition of objects arises out of the contact of senses with objects; for objects for him exist only so long as they are perceived, i.e. there is no independent external existence of objects apart from their perception. All objects have only perceptual existence (*prātītika-sattva*). Both Prakāśānanda and the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* deny the existence of objects when they are not perceived, while Śaṅkara not only admits their existence, but also holds that they exist in the same form in which they are known; and this amounts virtually to the admission that our knowing an object does not add

¹ Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, II. 2. 28.

² *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*. See *The Pandit*, new series, vol. XI, pp. 129-139.

anything to it or modify it to any extent, except that it becomes known to us through knowledge. Things are what they are, even though they may not be perceived. This is in a way realism. The idealism of Śaṅkara's Vedānta consists in this, that he held that the Brahman is the immanent self within us, which transcends all changeful experience and is also ultimate reality underlying all objects perceived outside of us in the external world. Whatever forms and characters there are in our experience, internal as well as external, have an indescribable and indefinite nature which passes by the name of *māyā*¹. Śaṅkara Vedānta takes it for granted that that alone is real which is unchangeable; what is changeful, though it is positive, is therefore unreal. The world is only unreal in that special sense; *māyā* belongs to a category different from affirmation and negation, namely the category of the indefinite.

The relation of the real, the Brahman, to this *māyā* in Śaṅkara Vedānta is therefore as indefinite as the *māyā*; the real is the unchangeable, but how the changeful forms and characters become associated with it or what is their origin or what is their essence, Śaṅkara is not in a position to tell us. The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* however holds that formless and characterless entity is the ultimate truth; it is said to be the Brahman, *cit*, or void (*śūnya*); but, whatever it may be, it is this characterless entity which is the ultimate truth. This ultimate entity is associated with an energy of movement, by virtue of which it can reveal all the diverse forms of appearances. The relation between the appearances and the reality is not external, indefinite and indescribable, as it is to Śaṅkara, but the appearances, which are but the unreal and illusory manifestations of the reality, are produced by the operation of this inner activity of the characterless spirit, which is in itself nothing but a subject-objectless pure consciousness. But this inner and immanent movement does not seem to have any dialectic of its own, and no definite formula of the method of its operation for its productions can be given; the imaginary shapes of ideas and objects, which have nothing but a mere perceptual existence, are due not to a definite order, but to accident or chance (*kākatāliya*). Such a conception is indeed very barren, and it is here that the system of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is particularly defective. Another important defect of the system is that it does not either criticize knowledge or admit its validity, and the characterless entity which forms its absolute is never revealed in experience.

¹ See my *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, ch. x.

With Śaṅkara the case is different; for he holds that this absolute Brahman is also the self which is present in every experience and is immediate and self-revealed. But the absolute of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is characterless and beyond experience. The state of final emancipation, the seventh stage, is not a stage of bliss, like the Brahmahood of the Vedānta, but a state of characterlessness and vacuity almost. In several places in the work it is said that this ultimate state is differently described by various systems as Brahman, distinction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, pure *vijñāna* and void (*śūnya*), while in truth it is nothing but a characterless entity. Its state of *mukti* (emancipation) is therefore described, as we have already seen above, as *pāṣāṇavat* or like a stone, which strongly reminds us of the Vaiśeṣika view of *mukti*. On the practical side it lays great stress on *pauruṣa*, or exertion of free-will and energy, it emphatically denies *daiva* as having the power of weakening *pauruṣa* or even exerting a superior dominating force, and it gives us a new view of *karma* as meaning only thought-activity. As against Śaṅkara, it holds that knowledge (*jñāna*) and *karma* may be combined together, and that they are not for two different classes of people, but are both indispensable for each and every right-minded enquirer. The principal practical means for the achievement of the highest end of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* are the study of philosophical scripture, association with good men and self-criticism. It denounces external religious observances without the right spiritual exertions as being worse than useless. Its doctrine of *esse est percipi* and that no experiences have any objective validity outside of themselves, that there are no external objects to which they correspond and that all are but forms of knowledge, reminds us very strongly of what this system owes to Vijñānavāda Buddhism. But, while an important Vijñānavāda work like the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* tries to explain through its various categories the origin of the various appearances in knowledge, no such attempt is made in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, where it is left to chance. It is curious that in the Sanskrit account of Vijñānavāda by Hindu writers, such as Vācaspati and others, these important contributions of the system are never referred to either for the descriptive interpretation of the system or for its refutation. While there are thus unmistakable influences of Vijñānavāda and Gauḍapāda on the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, it seems to have developed in close association with the Śaiva, as its doctrine of *spanda*, or immanent activity, so clearly shows. This point will, however, be more fully discussed in my treatment of Śaiva philosophy.

CHAPTER XIII

SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS

It may be urged that the speculations of the thinkers of the medical schools do not deserve to be recorded in a History of Indian Philosophy. But the force of such an objection will lose much in strength if it is remembered that medicine was the most important of all the physical sciences which were cultivated in ancient India, was directly and intimately connected with the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika physics and was probably the origin of the logical speculations subsequently codified in the *Nyāya-sūtras*¹. The literature contains, moreover, many other interesting ethical instructions and reveals a view of life which differs considerably from that found in works on philosophy; further, it treats of many other interesting details which throw a flood of light on the scholastic methods of Indian thinkers. Those, again, who are aware of the great importance of Haṭha Yoga or Tantra physiology or anatomy in relation to some of the Yoga practices of those schools will no doubt be interested to know for purposes of comparison or contrast the speculations of the medical schools on kindred points of interest. Their speculations regarding embryology, heredity and other such points of general enquiry are likely to prove interesting even to a student of pure philosophy.

Āyur-veda and the Atharva-Veda.

Suśruta says that Āyur-veda (the science of life) is an *upāṅga* of the *Atharva-Veda* and originally consisted of 100,000 verses in one thousand chapters and was composed by Brahmā before he created all beings (*Suśruta-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 5). What *upāṅga* exactly means in this connection cannot easily be satisfactorily explained. Dalhaṇa (A.D. 1100) in explaining the word in his *Nibandha-saṃgraha*, says that an *upāṅga* is a smaller *aṅga* (part)—“*aṅgam eva alpatvād upāṅgam.*” Thus, while hands and legs are regarded as *aṅgas*, the toes or the palms of the hands are called *upāṅga*. The *Atharva-Veda* contains six thousand verses and about

¹ The system of Sāṃkhya philosophy taught in *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 1, has already been described in the first volume of the present work, pp. 213-217.

one thousand prose lines. If the Āyur-veda originally contained 100,000 verses, it cannot be called an *upāṅgu* of the *Atharva-Veda*, if *upāṅga* is to mean a small appendage, as Ḍalhaṇa explains it. For, far from being a small appendage, it was more than ten times as extensive as the *Atharva-Veda*. Caraka, in discussing the nature of Āyur-veda, says that there was never a time when life did not exist or when intelligent people did not exist, and so there were always plenty of people who knew about life, and there were always medicines which acted on the human body according to the principles which we find enumerated in the Āyur-veda. Āyur-veda was not produced at any time out of nothing, but there was always a continuity of the science of life; when we hear of its being produced, it can only be with reference to a beginning of the comprehension of its principles by some original thinker or the initiation of a new course of instruction at the hands of a gifted teacher. The science of life has always been in existence, and there have always been people who understood it in their own way; it is only with reference to its first systematized comprehension or instruction that it may be said to have a beginning¹. Again, Caraka distinguishes Āyur-veda as a distinct Veda, which is superior to the other Vedas because it gives us life, which is the basis of all other enjoyments or benefits, whether they be of this world or of another². Vāgbhaṭa, the elder, speaks of Āyur-veda not as an *upāṅga*, but as an *upaveda* of the *Atharva-Veda*³. The *Mahā-bhārata*, II. 11. 33, speaks of *upaveda*, and Nīlakaṇṭha, explaining this, says that there are four *upavedas*, *Āyur-veda*, *Dhanur-veda*, *Gāndharva* and *Artha-sāstra*. *Brahma-vaivarta*, a later *purāṇa*, says that after creating the Ṛk, Yajus, Sāma and Atharva Brahmā created the Āyur-veda as the fifth Veda⁴. Roth has a quotation in his *Wörterbuch* to the effect that Brahmā taught Āyur-veda, which was a *vedāṅga*, in all its eight parts⁵.

¹ Caraka, I. 30. 24. This passage seems to be at variance with Caraka, I. 1. 6; for it supposes that diseases also existed always, while Caraka, I. 1. 6 supposes that diseases broke out at a certain point of time. Is it an addition by the reviser Ḍṛḍhabala?

² Caraka, I. 1. 42 and *Āyur-veda-dīpikā* of Cakrapāṇi on it.

³ *Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha*, I. 1. 8. *Gopatha-Brahmaṇa*, I. 10, however, mentions five vedas, viz. *Sarpa-veda*, *Pisāca-veda*, *Asura-veda*, *Itihāsa-veda* and *Purāṇa-veda*, probably in the sense of *upaveda*, but Āyur-veda is not mentioned in this connection.

⁴ *Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa*, I. 16. 9, 10.

⁵ *Brahmā vedāṅgam aṣṭāṅgam āyur-vedam abhāṣata*. This quotation, which occurs in the *Wörterbuch* in connection with the word *āyur-veda*, could not

We thus find that Āyur-veda was regarded by some as a Veda superior to the other Vedas and respected by their followers as a fifth Veda, as an *upaveda* of the *Atharva-Veda*, as an independent *upaveda*, as an *upāṅga* of the *Atharva-Veda* and lastly as a *vedāṅga*. All that can be understood from these conflicting references is that it was traditionally believed that there was a Veda known as Āyur-veda which was almost co-existent with the other Vedas, was entitled to great respect, and was associated with the *Atharva-Veda* in a special way. It seems, however, that the nature of this association consisted in the fact that both of them dealt with the curing of diseases and the attainment of long life; the one principally by incantations and charms, and the other by medicines. What Suśruta understands by calling Āyur-veda an *upāṅga* of the *Atharva-Veda* is probably nothing more than this. Both the *Atharva-Veda* and Āyur-veda dealt with the curing of diseases, and this generally linked them together in the popular mind, and, the former being the holier of the two, on account of its religious value, the latter was associated with it as its literary accessory. Dārila Bhaṭṭa, in commenting upon *Kauśika-sūtra*, 25. 2, gives us a hint as to what may have been the points of contact and of difference between Āyur-veda and the *Atharva-Veda*. Thus he says that there are two kinds of diseases; those that are produced by unwholesome diet, and those produced by sins and transgressions. The Āyur-veda was made for curing the former, and the Atharvan practices for the latter¹. Caraka himself counts penance (*prāyaś-citta*) as a name of medicine (*bheṣaja*) and Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says that as *prāyaś-citta* removes the diseases produced by sins, so medicines (*bheṣaja*) also remove diseases, and thus *prāyaś-citta* is synonymous with *bheṣaja*².

But what is this Āyur-veda? We now possess only the treatises of Caraka and Suśruta, as modified and supplemented by later revisers. But Suśruta tells us that Brahmā had originally produced the Āyur-veda, which contained 100,000 verses spread over one thousand chapters, and then, finding the people weak in intelligence and short-lived, later on divided it into eight subjects, be verified owing to some omission in the reference. It should be noted that *vedāṅga* is generally used to mean the six *āṅgas*, viz. *Śikṣā*, *Kalpa*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Chandas*, *Jyotiṣ* and *Nirukta*.

¹ *dvi-prakārā vyādhayaḥ āhāra-nimittā aśubhanimittāś ceti; tatra āhāra-samutthānāṃ vaiṣamyā āyurvedaṃ cakāra adharma-samutthānāṃ tu sāstramidam ucyate*. Dārila's comment on *Kauśika-sūtra*, 25. 2.

² Caraka, vi. 1. 3 and *Āyur-veda-ṭīpikā*, *ibid*.

viz. surgery (*śalya*), treatment of diseases of the head (*śālākya*), treatment of ordinary diseases (*kāya-cikitsā*), the processes of counteracting the influences of evil spirits (*bhūta-vidyā*), treatment of child diseases (*kaumāra-bhṛtya*), antidotes to poisons (*agadatantra*), the science of rejuvenating the body (*rasāyana*) and the science of acquiring sex-strength (*vājīkaraṇa*)¹. The statement of Suśruta that Āyur-veda was originally a great work in which the later subdivisions of its eight different kinds of studies were not differentiated seems to be fairly trustworthy. The fact that Āyur-veda is called an *upāṅga*, an *upaveda*, or a *vedāṅga* also points to its existence in some state during the period when the Vedic literature was being composed. We hear of compendiums of medicine as early as the *Prātiśākhya*². It is curious, however, that nowhere in the Upaniṣads or the Vedas does the name “Āyur-veda” occur, though different branches of study are mentioned in the former³. The Aṣṭāṅga Āyur-veda is, however, mentioned in the *Mahā-bhārata*, and the three constituents (*dhātu*), *vāyu* (wind), *pitta* (bile) and *śleṣman* (mucus), are also mentioned; there is reference to a theory that by these three the body is sustained and that by their decay the body decays (*etaiḥ kṣīṇaiś ca kṣīyate*), and Kṛṣṇātreya is alluded to as being the founder of medical science (*cikitsitam*)⁴. One of the earliest systematic mentions of medicines unmixed with incantations and charms is to be found in the *Mahā-vagga* of the *Vinaya-Piṭaka*, where the Buddha is prescribing medicines for his disciples⁵. These medicines are of a simple nature, but they bear undeniable marks of methodical arrangement. We are also told there of a surgeon, named Ākāśagotto, who made surgical operations (*satthakamma*) on fistula (*bhagandara*). In Rockhill's *Life of the Buddha* we hear of Jīvaka as having studied medicine in the Taxila Univer-

¹ *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 5-9.

² R.V. *Prātiśākhya*, 16. 54 (55), mentioned by Bloomfield in *The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brahmaṇa*, p. 10. The name of the medical work mentioned is *Subheṣaja*.

³ *Rg-vedaṃ bhagavo 'dhyemi Yajur-vedaṃ sāmavedaṃ ātharvaṇaś caturtham itihāsa-purāṇaṃ pañcamaṃ vedānāṃ vedam pītryaṃ rāṣiṃ daivaṃ nidhiṃ vāko-vākyam ekāyanaṃ deva vidyāṃ brahma-vidyāṃ bhūta-vidyāṃ kṣattra-vidyāṃ nakṣatra-vidyāṃ sarpa-deva-jana-vidyāṃ, Chāndogya*, VII. 1. 2. Of these *bhūta-vidyā* is counted as one of the eight *tantras* of Āyur-veda, as we find it in the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* or elsewhere.

⁴ *Mahā-bhārata*, II. 11. 25, XII. 342. 86, 87, XII. 210. 21. Kṛṣṇātreya is referred to in *Caraka-saṃhitā*, VI. 15. 129, and Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this, says that Kṛṣṇātreya and Ātreya are two authorities who are different from Ātreya Punarvasu, the great teacher of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*.

⁵ *Vinaya-Piṭaka, Mahā-vagga*, VI. 1-14.

sity under Ātreya¹. That even at the time of the *Atharva-Veda* there were hundreds of physicians and an elaborate pharmacopœia, treating diseases with drugs, is indicated by a *mantra* therein which extols the virtues of amulets, and speaks of their powers as being equal to thousands of medicines employed by thousands of medical practitioners². Thus it can hardly be denied that the practice of medicine was in full swing even at the time of the *Atharva-Veda*; and, though we have no other proofs in support of the view that there existed a literature on the treatment of diseases, known by the name of Āyur-veda, in which the different branches, which developed in later times, were all in an undifferentiated condition, yet we have no evidence which can lead us to disbelieve Suśruta, when he alludes definitely to such a literature. The *Caraka-saṃhitā* also alludes to the existence of a beginningless traditional continuity of Āyur-veda, under which term he includes life, the constancy of the qualities of medical herbs, diet, etc., and their effects on the human body and the intelligent enquirer. The early works that are now available to us, viz. the *Caraka-saṃhitā* and *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, are both known as *tantras*³. Even Agniveśa's work (*Agniveśa-saṃhitā*), which Caraka revised and which was available at the time of Cakrapāṇi, was a *tantra*. What then was the Āyur-veda, which has been variously described as a fifth Veda or an *upaveda*, if not a literature distinctly separate from the *tantras* now available to us⁴? It seems probable, therefore, that such a literature existed, that the systematized works of Agniveśa and others superseded it and that, as a consequence, it came ultimately to be lost. Caraka, however, uses the word "Āyur-veda" in the general sense of "science of life." Life is divided by Caraka into four kinds, viz. *sukha* (happy), *duḥkha* (unhappy), *hita* (good) and *ahita* (bad). *Sukham āyuh* is a life which is not affected by bodily or mental diseases, is endowed with vigour, strength, energy, vitality, activity and is full of all sorts of enjoyments and successes. The opposite of this is the *asukham āyuh*. *Hitam āyuh* is the life of a person who is always willing to do good to all beings, never steals others' property, is truthful, self-controlled, self-restrained and works

¹ Rockhill's *Life of the Buddha*, p. 65.

² *Atharva-veda*, II. 9. 3, *śataṃ hy asya bhiṣajāḥ sahasram uta vīrudhaḥ*.

³ *Gurv-ājñā-lābhānantaram etat-tantra-karaṇam*. Cakrapāṇi's *Āyur-veda-dīpikā*, I. 1. 1; also *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 52.

⁴ Cakrapāṇi quotes the *Agniveśa-saṃhitā* in his *Āyur-veda-dīpikā*, VI. 3. 177-185.

with careful consideration, does not transgress the moral injunctions, takes to virtue and to enjoyment with equal zeal, honours revered persons, is charitable and does what is beneficial to this world and to the other. The opposite of this is called *ahita*. The object of the science of life is to teach what is conducive to all these four kinds of life and also to determine the length of such a life¹.

But, if Āyur-veda means "science of life," what is its connection with the *Atharva-Veda*? We find in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* that a physician should particularly be attached (*bhaktir ādeśyā*) to the *Atharva-Veda*. The *Atharva-Veda* deals with the treatment of diseases (*cikitsā*) by advising the propitiatory rites (*svastyayana*), offerings (*balī*), auspicious oblations (*maṅgala-homa*), penances (*niyama*), purificatory rites (*prāyaś-citta*), fasting (*upavāsa*) and incantations (*mantra*)². Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says that, since it is advised that physicians should be attached to the *Atharva-Veda*, it comes to this, that the *Atharva-Veda* becomes Āyur-veda (*Atharva-vedasya āyurvedatvam uktam bhavati*). The *Atharva-Veda*, no doubt, deals with different kinds of subjects, and so Āyur-veda is to be considered as being only a part of the *Atharva-Veda* (*Atharva-vedaikadeśa eva āyur-vedaḥ*). Viewed in the light of Cakrapāṇi's interpretation, it seems that the school of medical teaching to which Caraka belonged was most intimately connected with the *Atharva-Veda*. This is further corroborated by a comparison of the system of bones found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* with that of the *Atharva-Veda*. Suśruta himself remarks that, while he considers the number of bones in the human body to be three hundred, the adherents of the Vedas hold them to be three hundred and sixty; and this is exactly the number counted by Caraka³. The *Atharva-Veda* does not count the bones; but there are with regard to the description of bones some very important points in

¹ *Caraka*, I. 1. 40 and I. 30. 20-23:

*hitāhitam sukham duḥkham āyus tasya hitāhitam
mānam ca tac ca yatroktaṃ āyur-vedaḥ sa ucyate.*

In I. 30. 20 the derivation of Āyur-veda is given as *āyur vedayati iti āyur-vedaḥ*, i.e. that which instructs us about life. Suśruta suggests two alternative derivations—*āyur asmin vidyate anena vā āyur vindatīty āyur-vedaḥ*, i.e. that by which life is known or examined, or that by which life is attained. *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 14.

² *Caraka*, I. 30. 20.

³ *Trīṇi śaṣṭhāny asthi-śatāni veda-vādinō bhāṣante; śalya-tantre tu trīṇy eva śatāni*. *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 5. 18. *Trīṇi śaṣṭhāni śatāny asthnam saha dantanakkena*. *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 7. 6.

which the school to which Caraka belonged was in agreement with the *Atharva-Veda*, and not with Suśruta. Dr Hoernle, who has carefully discussed the whole question, thus remarks: "A really important circumstance is that the Atharvic system shares with the Charakiyan one of the most striking points in which the latter differs from the system of Suśruta, namely, the assumption of a central facial bone in the structure of the skull. It may be added that the Atharvic term *pratiṣṭhā* for the base of the long bones obviously agrees with the Charakiyan term *adhiṣṭhāna* and widely differs from the Suśrutian *kūrca*¹." The *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, which, as Dr Hoernle has pointed out, shows an acquaintance with both the schools to which Caraka and Suśruta respectively belonged, counts, however, 360 bones, as Caraka did². The word *veda-vādino* in *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 5. 18 does not mean the followers of Āyur-veda as distinguished from the Vedas, as Ḍalhaṇa interprets it, but is literally true in the sense that it gives us the view which is shared by Caraka with the *Atharva-Veda*, the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, the legal literature and the *purāṇas*, which according to all orthodox estimates derive their validity from the Vedas. If this agreement of the Vedic ideas with those of the Ātreya school of medicine, as represented by Caraka, be viewed together with the identification by the latter of Āyur-Veda with *Atharva-Veda*, it may be not unreasonable to suppose that the Ātreya school, as represented by Caraka, developed from the *Atharva-Veda*. This does not preclude the possibility of there being an Āyur-veda of another school, to which Suśruta refers and from which, through the teachings of a series of teachers, the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* developed. This literature probably tried to win the respect of the people by associating itself with the *Atharva-Veda*, and by characterizing itself as an *upāṅga* of the *Atharva-Veda*³.

Jayanta argues that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that they have been composed by an absolutely trustworthy

¹ A. F. Rudolf Hoernle's *Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India*, p. 113.

² *Ibid.* pp. 105-106. See also *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, x. 5. 4. 12, also XII. 3. 2. 3 and 4, XII. 2. 4. 9-14, VIII. 6. 2. 7 and 10. The *Yājñavalkya-Dharma-śāstra*, *Viṣṇu-smṛti*, *Viṣṇu-dharmottara* and *Agni-Purāṇa* also enumerate the bones of the human body in agreement with Caraka as 360. The source of the last three was probably the first (*Yājñavalkya-Dharma-śāstra*), as has been suggested by Dr Hoernle in his *Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India*, pp. 40-46. But none of these non-medical recensions are of an early date: probably they are not earlier than the third or the fourth century A.D.

³ The word *upāṅga* may have been used, however, in the sense that it was a supplementary work having the same scope as the *Atharva-Veda*.

person (*āpta*). As an analogy he refers to Āyur-veda, the validity of which is due to the fact that it has been composed by trustworthy persons (*āpta*). That the medical instructions of the Āyur-veda are regarded as valid is due to the fact that they are the instructions of trustworthy persons (*yato yatrāptavādātram tatra prāmānyam iti vyāptir grhyate*). But it may be argued that the validity of Āyur-veda is not because it has for its author trustworthy persons, but because its instructions can be verified by experience (*nanvāyur-vedādaṁ prāmānyam pratyakṣādi-saṁvādāt pratipannam nāpta-prāmānyāt*). Jayanta in reply says that the validity of Āyur-veda is due to the fact of its being composed by trustworthy persons; and it can be also verified by experience. He argues also that the very large number of medicines, their combinations and applications, are of such an infinite variety that it would be absolutely impossible for any one man to know them by employing the experimental methods of agreement and difference. It is only because the medical authorities are almost omniscient in their knowledge of things that they can display such superhuman knowledge regarding diseases and their cures, which can be taken only on trust on their authority. His attempts at refuting the view that medical discoveries may have been carried on by the applications of the experimental methods of agreement and difference and then accumulated through long ages are very weak and need not be considered here.

The fourth Veda, known as the *Atharva-Veda* or the *Brahma-Veda*, deals mainly with curatives and charms¹. There is no reason to suppose that the composition of this Veda was later than even the earliest Ṛg-Vedic hymns; for never, probably, in the history

¹ Some of the sacred texts speak of four Vedas and some of three Vedas, e.g. "*asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam etad ṛg-vedoyajur-vedaḥ sāma-vedo 'tharvān-girasaḥ*," *Brh.* II. 4. 10 speaks of four Vedas; again "*Yam ṛṣayas trayī-vido viduḥ ṛcaḥ sāmānyajūṣi*," *Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa*, I. II. 1. 26 speaks of three Vedas. Sāyaṇa refers to the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, II. 1. 37 "*śeṣe Yajuh-śabdah*" and says that all the other Vedas which are neither Ṛk nor Sāma are Yajuṣ (Sāyaṇa's *Upodghāta* to the *Atharva-Veda*, p. 4, Bombay edition, 1895). According to this interpretation the *Atharva-Veda* is entitled to be included within Yajuṣ, and this explains the references to the three Vedas. The *Atharva-Veda* is referred to in the *Gopatha-brāhmaṇa*, II. 16 as *Brahma-Veda*, and two different reasons are adduced. Firstly, it is said that the *Atharva-Veda* was produced by the ascetic penances of Brahman; secondly it is suggested in the *Gopatha-brāhmaṇa* that all Atharvanic hymns are curative (*bheṣaja*), and whatever is curative is immortal, and whatever is immortal is Brahman—"Ye 'tharvāṇas tad bheṣajaṁ, yad bheṣajaṁ tad amṛtaṁ, yad amṛtaṁ tad Brahma." *Gopatha-brāhmaṇa*, III. 4. See also *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 250-261.

of India was there any time when people did not take to charms and incantations for curing diseases or repelling calamities and injuring enemies. The *Ṛg-Veda* itself may be regarded in a large measure as a special development of such magic rites. The hold of the Atharvaṇic charms on the mind of the people was probably very strong, since they had occasion to use them in all their daily concerns. Even now, when the *Ṛg-Vedic* sacrifices have become extremely rare, the use of Atharvaṇic charms and of their descendants, the Tantric charms of comparatively later times, is very common amongst all classes of Hindus. A very large part of the income of the priestly class is derived from the performance of auspicious rites (*svastyayana*), purificatory penances (*prāyaścitta*), and oblations (*homa*) for curing chronic and serious illnesses, winning a law-suit, alleviating sufferings, securing a male issue to the family, cursing an enemy, and the like. Amulets are used almost as freely as they were three or four thousand years ago, and snake-charms and charms for dog-bite and others are still things which the medical people find it difficult to combat. Faith in the mysterious powers of occult rites and charms forms an essential feature of the popular Hindu mind and it oftentimes takes the place of religion in the ordinary Hindu household. It may therefore be presumed that a good number of Atharvaṇic hymns were current when most of the *Ṛg-Vedic* hymns were not yet composed. By the time, however, that the *Atharva-Veda* was compiled in its present form some new hymns were incorporated with it, the philosophic character of which does not tally with the outlook of the majority of the hymns. The *Atharva-Veda*, as Sāyaṇa points out in the introduction to his commentary, was indispensable to kings for warding off their enemies and securing many other advantages, and the royal priests had to be versed in the Atharvaṇic practices. These practices were mostly for the alleviation of the troubles of an ordinary householder, and accordingly the *Gṛhya-sūtras* draw largely from them. The oldest name of the *Atharva-Veda* is *Atharvāṅgīrasaḥ*, and this generally suggested a twofold division of it into hymns attributed to Atharvan and others attributed to Aṅgīras; the former dealt with the holy (*śānta*), promoting of welfare (*pauṣṭika*) and the curatives (*bheṣajāni*), and the latter with offensive rites for molesting an enemy (*ābhicārika*), also called terrible (*ghora*). The purposes which the Atharvaṇic charms were supposed to fulfil were numerous. These may

be briefly summed up in accordance with the *Kauśika-sūtra* as follows: quickening of intelligence, accomplishment of the virtues of a Brahmacārin (religious student); acquisition of villages, cities, fortresses and kingdoms, of cattle, riches, food grains, children, wives, elephants, horses, chariots, etc.; production of unanimity (*aikamatya*) and contentment among the people; frightening the elephants of enemies, winning a battle, warding off all kinds of weapons, stupefying, frightening and ruining the enemy army, encouraging and protecting one's own army, knowing the future result of a battle, winning the minds of generals and chief persons, throwing a charmed snare, sword, or string into the fields where the enemy army may be moving, ascending a chariot for winning a battle, charming all instruments of war music, killing enemies, winning back a lost city demolished by the enemy; performing the coronation ceremony, expiating sins, cursing, strengthening cows, procuring prosperity; amulets for promoting welfare, agriculture, the conditions of bulls, bringing about various household properties, making a new-built house auspicious, letting loose a bull (as a part of the general rites—*śrāddha*), performing the rites of the harvesting month of Agrahāyaṇa (the middle of November to the middle of December); securing curatives for various otherwise incurable diseases produced by the sins of past life; curing all diseases generally, Fever, Cholera, and Diabetes; stopping the flow of blood from wounds caused by injuries from weapons, preventing epileptic fits and possession by the different species of evil spirits, such as the *bhūta*, *piśāca*, *Brahma-rākṣasa*, etc.; curing *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman*, heart diseases, Jaundice, white leprosy, different kinds of Fever, Pthisis, Dropsy; curing worms in cows and horses, providing antidotes against all kinds of poisons, supplying curatives for the diseases of the head, eyes, nose, ears, tongue, neck and inflammation of the neck; warding off the evil effects of a Brahmin's curse; arranging women's rites for securing sons, securing easy delivery and the welfare of the foetus; securing prosperity, appeasing a king's anger, knowledge of future success or failure; stopping too much rain and thunder, winning in debates and stopping brawls, making rivers flow according to one's wish, securing rain, winning in gambling, securing the welfare of cattle and horses, securing large gains in trade, stopping inauspicious marks in women, performing auspicious rites for a new house, removing the sins of prohibited

acceptance of gifts and prohibited priestly services; preventing bad dreams, removing the evil effects of unlucky stars under whose influence an infant may have been born, paying off debts, removing the evils of bad omens, molesting an enemy; counteracting the molesting influence of the charms of an enemy, performing auspicious rites, securing long life, performing the ceremonies at birth, naming, tonsure, the wearing of holy thread, marriage, etc.; performing funeral rites, warding off calamities due to the disturbance of nature, such as rain of dust, blood, etc., the appearance of *yakṣas*, *rākṣasas*, etc., earthquakes, the appearance of comets, and eclipses of the sun and moon.

The above long list of advantages which can be secured by the performance of Atharvaṇic rites gives us a picture of the time when these Atharvaṇic charms were used. Whether all these functions were discovered when first the Atharvaṇic verses were composed is more than can be definitely ascertained. At present the evidence we possess is limited to that supplied by the *Kauśika-sūtra*. According to the Indian tradition accepted by Sāyaṇa the compilation of the *Atharva-Veda* was current in nine different collections, the readings of which differed more or less from one another. These different recensions, or *śākhās*, were Paippalāda, Tāṇḍa, Maṇḍa, Śaunakiya, Jājala, Jalada, Brahmagāda, Devādarsa, and Cāraṇavaidya. Of these only the Paippalāda and Śaunakiya recensions are available. The Paippalāda recension exists only in a single unpublished Tübingen manuscript first discovered by Roth¹. It has been edited in facsimile and partly also in print. The Śaunakiya recension is what is now available in print. The Śaunakiya school has the *Gopatha-brāhmaṇa* as its Brāhmaṇa and five *sūtra* works, viz. *Kauśika*, *Vaitāna*, *Nakṣatra-kalpa*, *Āṅgīrasa-kalpa* and *Śānti-kalpa*²; these are also known as the five *kalpas* (*pañca-kalpa*). Of these the *Kauśika-sūtra* is probably the earliest and most important, since all the other four depend upon it³. The *Nakṣatra-kalpa* and *Śānti-kalpa* are more or less of an astrological character. No manuscript of the *Āṅgīrasa-kalpa* seems to be available; but from the brief notice of Sāyaṇa it appears to

¹ *Der Atharvaveda in Kashmir* by Roth.

² The *Kauśika-sūtra* is also known as *Samhitā-vidhi* and *Samhitā-kalpa*. The three *kalpas*, *Nakṣatra*, *Āṅgīrasa* and *Śānti*, are actually *Parīṣṭas*.

³ 'tatra Śākalyena samhitā-mantrāṇāṃ śāntika-pauṣṭikādiṣu karmasu vinīyogavīdhānāt samhitā-vidhir nāma Kauśikam sūtram; tad eva itarair upajīvyatvāt. Upodghāta of Sāyaṇa to the *Atharva-Veda*, p. 25.

have been a manual for molesting one's enemies (*abhicāra-karma*). The *Vaitāna-sūtra* dealt with some sacrificial and ritualistic details. The *Kauśika-sūtra* was commented on by Dārila, Keśava, Bhadra and Rudra. The existence of the *Cāraṇa-vaidya* (wandering medical practitioners) *śākhā* reveals to us the particular *śākhā* of the *Atharva-Veda*, which probably formed the old *Āyur-veda* of the *Ātreya-Caraka* school, who identified the *Atharva-Veda* with *Āyur-veda*. The suggestion, contained in the word *Cāraṇa-vaidya*, that the medical practitioners of those days went about from place to place, and that the sufferers on hearing of the arrival of such persons approached them, and sought their help, is interesting¹.

Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Āyur-veda.

The main interest of the present chapter is in that part of the *Atharva-Veda* which deals with curative instructions, and for this the *Kauśika-sūtra* has to be taken as the principal guide. Let us first start with the anatomical features of the *Atharva-Veda*². The bones counted are as follows: 1. heels (*pārṣṇī*, in the dual number, in the two feet)³; 2. ankle-bones (*gulphau* in the dual number)⁴;

¹ Is it likely that the word *Caraka* (literally, a wanderer) had anything to do with the itinerant character of Caraka's profession as a medical practitioner?

² Hymns II. 33 and X. 2 are particularly important in this connection.

³ Caraka also counts one *pārṣṇī* for each foot. Hoernle (*Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India*, p. 128) remarks on the fact, that Caraka means the backward and downward projections of the os calcis, that is, that portion of it which can be superficially seen and felt, and is popularly known as the heel. The same may be the case with the *Atharva-Veda*. Suśruta probably knew the real nature of it as a cluster (*kūrca*); for in *Sātrīya-sthāna* VI he speaks of the astragalus as *kūrca-śiras*, or head of the cluster, but he counts the *pārṣṇī* separately. Hoernle suggests that by *pārṣṇī* Suśruta meant the os calcis, and probably did not think that it was a member of the tarsal cluster (*kūrca*). It is curious that Vāgbhaṭa I makes a strange confusion by attributing one *pārṣṇī* to each hand (*Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha*, II. 5; also Hoernle, pp. 91-96).

⁴ *Gulpha* means the distal processes of the two bones of the leg, known as the malleoli. As counted by Caraka and also by Suśruta, there are four *gulphas*. See Hoernle's comment on Suśruta's division, Hoernle, pp. 81, 82, 102-104. Suśruta, III. v. 19, has "*tala-kūrca-gulpha-saṃśritāni duṣa*," which Dāhāṇa explains as *tala* (5 *śālākās* and the one bone to which they are attached)—6 bones, *kūrca*—2 bones, *gulpha*—2 bones. Hoernle misinterpreted Dāhāṇa, and, supposing that he spoke of two *kūrcas* and two *gulphas* in the same leg, pointed out a number of inconsistencies and suggested a different reading of the Suśruta text. His translation of *valaya* as "ornament" in this connection is also hardly correct; *valaya* probably means "circular." Following Dāhāṇa, it is possible that the interpretation is that there are two bones in one cluster (*kūrca*) in each leg, and the two bones form one circular bone (*valayāsthī*) of one *gulpha* for each leg. If this is accepted, much of what Hoernle has said on the point loses its value and becomes hypercritical. There are two *gulphas*, or one in each leg, according as the constituent pieces, or the one whole *valayāsthī*, is referred to. On my interpretation Suśruta

3. digits (*aṅgulayaḥ* in the plural number)¹; 4. metacarpal and metatarsal bones (*ucchlaṅkhau* in the dual number, i.e. of the hands and feet)²; 5. base (*pratiṣṭhā*)³; 6. the knee-caps (*aṣṭhivantau* in the dual)⁴; 7. the knee-joints (*jāmunoh sandhi*)⁵; 8. the shanks (*jaṅghe* in the dual)⁶; 9. the pelvic cavity (*śroni* in the dual)⁷; 10. the thigh bones (*ūrū* in the dual)⁸; 11. the breast bones

knew of only two bones as forming the *kūrca*, and there is no passage in Suśruta to show that he knew of more. The os calcis would be the *pārṣṇi*, the astragalus, the *kūrca-śiras*, the two malleoli bones and the two *gulpha* bones.

¹ Both Caraka and Suśruta count sixty of these phalanges (*pāṇi-pādāṅgulī*), whereas their actual number is fifty-six only.

² Caraka counts these metacarpal and metatarsal bones (*pāṇi-pāda-śalākā*) as twenty, the actual number. Suśruta collects them under *tala*, a special term used by him. His combined *tala-kūrca-gulpha* includes all the bones of the hand and foot excluding the *aṅgulī* bones (phalanges).

³ Caraka uses the term *pāṇi-pāda-śalākādhiṣṭhāna*, Yājñavalkya, *sthāna*, and Suśruta, *kūrca*. Caraka seems to count it as one bone. *Kūrca* means a network of (1) flesh (*māṃsa*), (2) *śirā*, (3) *snāyu*, (4) bones (*māṃsa-śirā-snāyu-asthi-jālāni*). All these four kinds of network exist in the two joints of the hands and feet.

⁴ Hoernle remarks that in the *Atharva-Veda aṣṭhivat* and *jānu* are synonymous; but the text, x. 2. 2, seems clearly to enumerate them separately. The *aṣṭhivat* is probably the patella bone. Caraka uses the terms *jānu* and *kapālikā*, probably for the knee-cap (patella) and the elbow pan (*kapālikā*). *Kapālikā* means a small shallow basin, and this analogy suits the construction of the elbow pan. Suśruta uses the term *kūrpara* (elbow pan), not in the ordinary list of bones in *Sātra*, v. 19, but at the time of counting the *marma* in *ibid.* vi. 25.

⁵ This seems to be different from *aṣṭhivat* (patella).

⁶ The tibia and the fibula in the leg. Caraka, Bhela, Suśruta and Vāgbhaṭa I describe this organ rightly as consisting of two bones. The *Atharva-Veda* justly describes the figure made by them as being a fourfold frame having its ends closely connected together (*catuṣṭayam yuyate samhitāntam*). The corresponding two bones of the fore-arm (*aratni*)—radius and ulna—are correctly counted by Caraka. Curiously enough, Suśruta does not refer to them in the bone-list. The *bāhu* is not enumerated in this connection.

⁷ Caraka speaks of two bones in the pelvic cavity, viz. the os innominatum on both sides. Modern anatomists think that each os innominatum is composed of three different bones: ilium, the upper portion, ischium, the lower part, and the pubis, the portion joined to the other innominate bone. The ilium and ischium, however, though they are two bones in the body of an infant, become fused together as one bone in adult life, and from this point of view the counting of ilium and ischium as one bone is justifiable. In addition to these a separate *bhagāsthi* is counted by Caraka. He probably considered (as Hoernle suggests) the sacrum and coccyx to be one bone which formed a part of the vertebral column. By *bhagāsthi* he probably meant the pubic bone; for Cakrapāṇi, commenting upon *bhagāsthi*, describes it as "*abhimukhaṃ kaṭi-sandhāna-kārakaṃ tiryag-asthi*" (the cross bone which binds together the haunch bones in front). Suśruta, however, counts five bones: four in the *guda*, *bhaga*, *nitamba* and one in the *trika*. *Nitamba* corresponds to the two *śroni-phalaka* of Caraka, *bhaga* to the *bhagāsthi*, or pubic bone, *guda* to the coccyx and *trika* to the triangular bone sacrum. Suśruta's main difference from Caraka is this, that, while the latter counts the sacrum and coccyx as one bone forming part of the vertebral column, the former considers them as two bones and as separate from the vertebral column. Vāgbhaṭa takes *trika* and *guda* as one bone, but separates it from the vertebral column.

⁸ Caraka, Suśruta and Vāgbhaṭa I count it correctly as one bone in each leg. Caraka calls it *ūru-nalaka*.

(uras)¹; 12. the windpipe (*grīvāḥ* in the plural)²; 13. the breast (*stanau* in the dual)³; 14. the shoulder-blade (*kaphoḍau* in the dual)⁴; 15. the shoulder-bones (*skandhān* in the plural)⁵; 16. the backbone (*prṣṭhīḥ*

¹ Caraka counts fourteen bones in the breast. Indian anatomists counted cartilages as new bones (*taruṇa asthī*). There are altogether ten costal cartilages on either side of the sternum. But the eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages are attached to the seventh. So, if the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages are considered as a single bone, there are altogether seven bones on either side of the sternum. This gives us the total number of fourteen which Caraka counts. The sternum was not counted by Caraka separately. With him this was the result of the continuation of the costal cartilages attached to one another without a break. Suśruta and Vāgbhaṭa I curiously count eight bones in the breast, and this can hardly be accounted for. Hoernle's fancied restoration of the ten of Suśruta does not appear to be proved. Yājñavalkya, however, counts seventeen, i.e. adds the sternum and the eighth costal cartilage on either side to Caraka's fourteen bones, which included these three. Hoernle supposes that Yājñavalkya's number was the real reading in Suśruta; but his argument is hardly convincing.

² The windpipe is composed of four parts, viz. larynx, trachea, and two bronchi. It is again not a bone, but a cartilage; but it is yet counted as a bone by the Indian anatomists, e.g. Caraka calls it "*jatru*" and Suśruta "*kaṇṭha-nāḍī*." Hoernle has successfully shown that the word *jatru* was used in medical books as synonymous with windpipe or neck generally. Hoernle says that originally the word denoted cartilaginous portions of the neck and breast (the windpipe and the costal cartilages), as we read in the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*: "*tasmād imā ubhayatra parśavo baddhāḥ kikasāsu ca jatruṣu*" (the ribs are fastened at either end, exteriorly to the thoracic vertebrae and interiorly to the costal cartilages—*jatru*). In medical works it means the cartilaginous portion of the neck, i.e. the windpipe (Caraka), and hence is applied either to the neck generally or to the sterno-clavicular articulation at the base of the neck (Suśruta). It is only as late as the sixth or seventh century A.D. that, owing to a misinterpretation of the anatomical terms *sandhi* and *aṃsa*, it was made to mean clavicle. See Hoernle's *Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India*, p. 168.

³ "*Pārśvayoś catur-viṃśatiḥ pārśvayos tāvanti caiva sthālakāni tāvanti caiva sthālakārbudāni*," i.e. there are twenty-four bones in the *pārśva* (ribs), twenty-four *sthālakas* (sockets), and twenty-four *sthālakārbudas* (tubercles). Suśruta speaks of there being thirty-six ribs on either side. A rib consists of a shaft and a head; "at the point of junction of these two parts there is a tubercle which articulates with the transverse process of corresponding vertebrae, and probably this tubercle is *arbuda*." There are, no doubt, twenty-four ribs. The *sthālakas* and *arbudas* cannot properly be counted as separate bones; but, even if they are counted, the total number ought to be 68 bones, as Hoernle points out, and not 72, since the two lowest have no tubercles.

⁴ *Kaphoḍa* probably means scapula or shoulder-blade. Caraka uses the word *aṃsa-phalaka*. Caraka uses two other terms, *aḥṣaka* (collar-bone) and *aṃsa*. This word *aṃsa* seems to be a wrong reading, as Hoernle points out; for in reality there are only two bones, the scapula and the collar-bone. But could it not mean the acromion process of the scapula? Though Suśruta omits the shoulder-blade in the counting of bones in *Śātrīa*, v. (for this term is *aḥṣaka-saṃjñā*), yet he distinctly names *aṃsa-phalaka* in *Śātrīa*, vi. 27, and describes it as triangular (*trika-sambaddhe*); and this term has been erroneously interpreted as *grīvāyā aṃsa-dvayasya ca yaḥ saṃyogas sa trikaḥ* by Dāhapa. The junction of the collar-bone with the neck cannot be called *trika*.

⁵ Caraka counts fifteen bones in the neck. According to modern anatomists there are, however, only seven. He probably counted the transverse processes

in the plural)¹; 17. the collar-bones (*aṃsau* in the dual)²; 18. the brow (*lalāṭa*); 19. the central facial bone (*kakāṭikā*)³; 20. the pile of the jaw (*hanu-citya*)⁴; 21. the cranium with temples (*kapālam*)⁵.

and got the number fourteen, to which he added the vertebrae as constituting one single bone.

Suśruta counts nine bones. The seventh bone contains spinous and transverse processes and was probably therefore counted by him as three bones, which, together with the other six, made the total number nine.

¹ Caraka counts forty-three bones in the vertebral column (*prsthā-gatāsthī*), while the actual number is only twenty-six. Each bone consists of four parts, viz. the body, the spinous process, and the two transverse processes, and Caraka counts them all as four bones. Suśruta considers the body and the spinous process as one and the two transverse processes as two; thus for the four bones of Caraka, Suśruta has three. In Caraka the body and the spinous process of the twelve thoracic vertebrae make the number twenty-four; the five lumbar vertebrae (body + spine + two transverses) make twenty. He adds to this the sacrum and the coccyx as one pelvic bone, thus making the number forty-five; with Suśruta we have twelve thoracic vertebrae, six lumbar vertebrae, twelve transverses, i.e. thirty bones. The word *kikasa* (A.V. II. 33. 2) means the whole of the spinal column, *anūkyā* (A.V. II. 33. 2) means the thoracic portion of the spine, and *udara* the abdominal portion.

² Both Caraka and Suśruta call this *akṣaka* and count it correctly as two bones. Cakrapāṇi describes it as "*akṣa-vivakṣakau jatru-sandheḥ kilakau*" (they are called *akṣaka* because they are like two beams—the fastening-pegs of the junction of the neck-bones).

Suśruta further speaks of *aṃsa-pīṭha* (the glenoid cavity into which the head of the humerus is inserted) as a *samudga* (casket) bone. The joint of each of the anal bones, the pubic bone and the hip bone (*nīṭamba*) is also described by him as a *samudga*. This is the "acetabulum, or cotyloid cavity, in which the head of the femur, is lodged" (*Suśruta, Sāhita*, v. 27, *aṃsa-pīṭha-guda-bhaga-nīṭambeṣu samudgāḥ*).

³ *Lalāṭa* is probably the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brow and *kakāṣikā* the lower portion, comprising the body of the superior maxillary together with the molar and nasal bones. Caraka counts the two molar (*gaṇḍa-kūṭa*), the two nasal, and the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brows as forming one continuous bone (*ekāsthī nāsikā-gaṇḍa-kūṭa-lalāṭam*).

⁴ According to Caraka, the lower jaw only is counted as a separate bone (*ekaṃ hanu-asthi*), and the two attachments are counted as two bones (*dve hanu-mūla-bandhane*). Suśruta, however, counts the upper and the lower jaws as two bones (*hanuṃ dve*). Though actually each of these bones consists of two bones, they are so fused together that they may be considered as one, as was done by Suśruta. Caraka did not count the upper jaw, so he counted the sockets of the teeth (*dantolūkhala*) and the hard palate (*tāluṣaka*). Suśruta's counting of the upper *hanu* did not include the palatine process; so he also counts the *tālu* (*ekaṃ tāluni*).

⁵ *Śaṅkha* is the term denoting the temples, of which both Caraka and Suśruta count two. Caraka counts four cranial bones (*catvāri śiraḥ-kaṇḍālāni*) and Suśruta six (*śirasi ṣaṭ*). The brain-case consists of eight bones. Of these two are inside and hence not open to view from outside. So there are only six bones which are externally visible. Of these the temporal bones have already been counted as *śaṅkha*, thus leaving a remainder of four bones. Suśruta divides the frontal, parietal and occipital bones into two halves and considers them as separate bones, and he thus gets the number six. Both the frontal and occipital are really each composed of two bones, which become fused in later life.

Though the author has often differed from Dr Hoernle, yet he is highly indebted to his scholarly explanations and criticisms in writing out this particular section of this chapter.

Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Āyur-veda.

We have no proofs through which we could assert that the writer of the *Atharva-Veda* verse knew the number of the different bones to which he refers; but it does not seem possible that the references made to bones could have been possible without a careful study of the human skeleton. Whether this was done by some crude forms of dissection or by a study of the skeletons of dead bodies in a state of decay is more than can be decided. Many of the organs are also mentioned, such as the heart (*hṛdaya*), the lungs (*kloma*)¹, the gall-bladder (*halikṣṇa*)², the kidneys (*matsnābhyām*)³, the liver (*yakna*), the spleen (*plīhan*), the stomach and the smaller intestine (*antrebhyaḥ*), the rectum and the portion above it (*gudābhyaḥ*), the

¹ Caraka counts *kloma* as an organ near the heart, but he does not count *pupphusa*. In another place (*Cikitsā*, xvii. 34) he speaks of *kloma* as one of the organs connected with hiccough (*hṛdayaṃ kloma kaṇṭhaṃ ca tālukaṃ ca samāsritā mṛdvi sā kṣudra-hikveti nr̥ṇām sādhyā prakīrtitā*). Cakrapāṇi describes it as *pipāsā-sthāna* (seat of thirst). But, whatever that may be, since Caraka considers its importance in connection with hiccough, and, since he does not mention *pupphusa* (lungs—*Mahā-vyutpatti*, 100), *kloma* must mean with him the one organ of the two lungs. Suśruta speaks of *pupphusa* as being on the left side and *kloma* as being on the right. Since the two lungs vary in size, it is quite possible that Suśruta called the left lung *pupphusa* and the right one *kloma*. Vāgbhaṭa I follows Suśruta. The *Atharva-Veda*, Caraka, Suśruta, Vāgbhaṭa and other authorities use the word in the singular, but in *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, i. the word *kloma* is used in the plural number; and Śaṅkara, in commenting on this, says that, though it is one organ, it is always used in the plural (*nitya-bahu-vacanānta*). This, however, is evidently erroneous, as all the authorities use the word in the singular. His description of it as being located on the left of the heart (*yakrc ca klomāṇaś ca hṛdayasyādhistād dakṣiṇottarau māṃsu-khaṇḍau*, Br. i. 1, commentary of Śaṅkara) is against the verdict of Suśruta, who places it on the same side of the heart as the liver. The *Bhāva-prakāśa* describes it as the root of the veins, where water is borne or secreted. That *kloma* was an organ which formed a member of the system of respiratory organs is further proved by its being often associated with the other organs of the neighbourhood, such as the throat (*kaṇṭha*) and the root of the palate (*tālu-mūla*). Thus Caraka says, “*udaka-vahānām srotasām tālu-mūlaṃ kloma ca... jihvā-tālu-oṣṭha-kaṇṭha-kloma-śoṣam... dṛṣtvā*” (*Vimāna*, v. 10). *Sārṅgadhara*, i. v. 45, however, describes it as a gland of watery secretions near the liver (*jala-vāhi-śirā-mūlaṃ tṛṣṇā-tchādanakaṃ tilam*).

² This word does not occur in the medical literature. Sāyaṇa describes it as “*etat-saṅgīnakāt tat-saṃbandhāt māṃsa-piṇḍa-viśeṣāt*.” This, however, is quite useless for identification. Weber thinks that it may mean “gall” (*Indische Studien*, 13, 206). Macdonell considers it to be “some particular intestine” (*Vedic Index*, vol. II, p. 500).

³ Sāyaṇa paraphrases *matsnābhyām* as *vṛkyābhyām*. Caraka's reading is *vukka*. Sāyaṇa gives an alternative explanation: “*matsnābhyām ubhaya-pārśva-saṃbandhābhyām vṛkyābhyām tat-samīpa-sṭha-pittādhāra-pātrābhyām*.” If this explanation is accepted, then *matsnā* would mean the two sacs of *pitta* (bile) near the kidneys. The two *matsnās* in this explanation would probably be the gall bladder and the pancreas, which latter, on account of its secretions, was probably considered as another *pittādhāra*.

larger intestine (*vaniṣṭhu*, explained by Sāyaṇa as *sthavirāntra*), the abdomen (*udara*), the colon (*plāśī*)¹, the umbilicus (*nābhi*), the marrow (*majjābhyah*), the veins (*snāvabhyah*) and the arteries (*dhamanibhyah*)². Thus we see that almost all the important organs reported in the later Ātreya-Caraka school or the Suśruta school were known to the composers of the Atharvanic hymns³.

Bolling raises the point whether the *Atharva-Veda* people knew the difference between the *śirā* and the *dhamanī*, and says, "The apparent distinction between veins and arteries in I. 17. 3 is offset by the occurrence of the same words in VII. 35. 2 with the more general sense of 'internal canals' meaning entrails, vagina, etc.—showing how vague were the ideas held with regard to such subjects⁴." But this is not correct; for there is nothing in I. 17. 3 which suggests a knowledge of the distinction between veins and arteries in the modern sense of the terms, such as is not found in VII. 35. 2. The *sūkta* I. 17 is a charm for stopping the flow of blood from an injury or too much hemorrhage of women. A handful of street-dust was to be thrown on the injured part and the hymn was to be uttered. In I. 17. 1 it is said, "Those *hirās* (veins?) wearing red garment (or the receptacles of blood) of woman which are constantly flowing should remain dispirited, like daughters without a brother⁵." Sāyaṇa, in explaining the next verse, I. 17. 2, says that it is a prayer to *dhamanīs*. This verse runs as follows: "Thou (Sāyaṇa says 'thou *śirā*') of the lower part, remain (i.e. 'cease from letting out blood,' as Sāyaṇa says), so thou of the upper part remain, so thou of the middle part, so thou

¹ *Plāśī* is paraphrased by Sāyaṇa as "*bahu-ccidrān mala-pātrāt*" (the vessel of the excreta with many holes). These holes are probably the orifices of the glands inside the colon (*mala-pātra*). The *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, XII. 9. 1. 3 enumerates all these organs as being sacred to certain gods and sacrificial instruments—*hṛdayam evāsyaindraḥ puroḍāśaḥ, yakṛt sāvitraḥ, klomā vāruṇaḥ, matsne evāsyāśvatthaṇi ca pātram audumbaram ca pīttam naiyagrodham antrāṇi sthālyah guḍa upāśayāni śyena-pātre plihāsandī nābhīḥ kumbho vaniṣṭhuḥ plāśīḥ śātātṛṇā tad yat sā bahudhā vītrṇā bhavati tasmāt plāśir bahudhā vīkṛtāḥ*. *Vasti*, or bladder, is regarded as the place where the urine collects (A.V. I. 3. 6).

² Sāyaṇa says that *snāva* means here the smaller *śirās* and *dhamanī* the thicker ones (the arteries)—*sūksmāḥ śirāḥ snāva-śabdena ucyante dhamanī-śabdena sthūlāḥ* (A.V. II. 33).

³ A.V. x. 9 shows that probably dissection of animals was also practised. Most of the organs of a cow are mentioned. Along with the organs of human beings mentioned above two other organs are mentioned, viz. the pericardium (*puritat*) and the bronchial tubes (*saha-kaṇṭhikā*). A.V. x. 9. 15.

⁴ *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, "Diseases and medicine: Vedic."

⁵ Sāyaṇa paraphrases *hirā* as *śirā* and describes it as a canal (*nāḍī*) for carrying blood (*rajo-vahana-nāḍyah*), and the epithet "*lohita-vāsasah*" as either "wearing red garment" or "red," or "the receptacle of blood" (*rudhirasya nivāsa-bhūtāḥ*).

small, so thou the big *dhamani*¹." In the third verse both the *hirās* and *dhamanis* are mentioned. "These in the middle were formerly (letting out blood) among a hundred *dhamanis* and thousands of *hirās* (and after that) all the other (*nāḍis*) were playing with (others which have ceased from letting out blood)²." Hymn VII. 35 is for stopping the issue of a woman who is an enemy. The third verse says, "I close with a stone the apertures of a hundred *hirās* and a thousand *dhamanis*." Sāyaṇa, in explaining this verse, says that the *hirās* are fine *nāḍis* inside the ovary (*garbha-dhāraṇārtham antar-avasthitāḥ sūkṣmā yā nāḍyaḥ*) and the *dhamanis* the thicker *nāḍis* round the ovary for keeping it steady (*garbhāśayasya avaṣṭambhikā bāhyā sthūlā yā nāḍyaḥ*). The only point of difference between this verse and those of I. 17 is that here *śīrās* are said to be a hundred and *dhamanis* a thousand, whereas in the latter, the *dhamanis* were said to be a hundred and the *śīrās* a thousand. But, if Sāyaṇa's interpretation is accepted, the *dhamanis* still appear as the bigger channels and the *śīrās* as the finer ones. *Nāḍi* seems to have been the general name of channels. But nowhere in the *Atharva-Veda* is there any passage which suggests that the distinction between veins and arteries in the modern sense of the terms was known at the time. In A.V. I. 3. 6 we hear of two *nāḍis* called *gavīnyau* for carrying the urine from the kidneys to the bladder³. The gods of the eight quarters and other gods are said to have produced the foetus and, together with the god of delivery (*Sūṣā*), facilitated birth by loosening the bonds of the womb⁴.

¹ The previous verse referred to *śīrās* as letting out blood, whereas this verse refers to *dhamanis* as performing the same function. Sāyaṇa also freely paraphrases *dhamani* as *śīrā* (*mahā mahatī sthūlatarā dhamaniḥ śīrā tiṣṭhād it tiṣṭhaty eva, anena prayogeṇa nirvṛta-rudhira-srāvā avatiṣṭhatām*).

² Here both the *dhamani* and the *hirā* are enumerated. Sāyaṇa here says that *dhamanis* are the important *nāḍis* in the heart (*hṛdaya-gatānām pradhāna-nāḍīnām*), and *hirās* or *śīrās* are branch *nāḍis* (*śīrāṇām sākhā-nāḍīnām*). The number of *dhamanis*, as here given, is a hundred and thus almost agrees with the number of *nāḍis* in the heart given in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, VI. 16 (*śatam caikā ca hṛdayasya nāḍyaḥ*).

The *Praśna Upaniṣad*, III. 6 also speaks of a hundred *nāḍis*, of which there are thousands of branches.

³ *antrebhyo vinirgatasya mūtrasya mūtrāśaya-prāpti-sādhane pārśva-dvaya-sṭhe nāḍyau gavīnyau ity ucyete*. Sāyaṇa's *Bhāṣya*. In I. 11. 5 two *nāḍis* called *gavīnikā* are referred to and are described by Sāyaṇa as being the two *nāḍis* on the two sides of the vagina controlling delivery (*gavīnike yoneḥ pārśva-vartinyau nirgamana-pratibandhike nāḍyau*—Sāyaṇa). In one passage (A.V. II. 12. 7) eight *dhamanis* called *manya* are mentioned, and Sāyaṇa says that they are near the neck. A *nāḍi* called *sikatāvati*, on which strangury depends, is mentioned in A.V. I. 17. 4.

⁴ Another goddess of delivery, *Sūṣāṇi*, is also invoked.

The term *jarāyu* is used in the sense of placenta, which is said to have no intimate connection with the flesh and marrow, so that when it falls down it is eaten by the dogs and the body is in no way hurt. A reference is found to a first aid to delivery in expanding the sides of the vagina and pressing the two *gavīnikā nāḍis*¹. The *snāvas* (tendons) are also mentioned along with *dhamanis*, and Sāyaṇa explains them as finer *śīrās* (*śuksmāḥ śīrāḥ snāva-śabdena ucyante*). The division of *dhamanis*, *śīrās* and *snāvas* thus seems to have been based on their relative fineness: the thicker channels (*nāḍis*) were called *dhamanis*, the finer ones were called *śīrās* and the still finer ones *snāvas*. Their general functions were considered more or less the same, though these probably differed according to the place in the body where they were situated and the organs with which they were associated. It seems to have been recognized that there was a general flow of the liquid elements of the body. This probably corresponds to the notion of *srotas*, as we get it in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, and which will be dealt with later on. Thus A.V. x. 2. 11 says, "who stored in him floods turned in all directions moving diverse and formed to flow in rivers, quick (*tivrā*), rosy (*aruṇā*), red (*lohini*), and copper dark (*tāmra-dhūmrā*), running all ways in a man upward and downward?" This clearly refers to the diverse currents of various liquid elements in the body. The semen, again, is conceived as the thread of life which is being spun out². The intimate relation between the heart and the brain seems to have been dimly apprehended. Thus it is said, "together with his needle hath Atharvan sewn his head and heart³." The theory of the *vāyus*, which we find in all later literature, is alluded to, and the *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna* and *samāna* are mentioned⁴. It is however difficult to guess what these *prāṇa*, *apāna*, etc. exactly meant. In another passage of the *Atharva-Veda* we hear of nine *prāṇas* (*nava prāṇān navabhiḥ saṃmimite*), and in another seven *prāṇas* are mentioned⁵. In another passage

¹ *vi te bhīnadmi vi yoniṃ vi gavīnike*. A.V. i. 11. 5.

² *Ko asmin reto nyadadhāt tantur ātayatām iti* (Who put the semen in him, saying, Let the thread of life be spun out? A.V. x. 2. 17).

³ *Mūrdhānam asya saṃstvyātharvā hrdayaṃ ca yat* (A.V. x. 2. 26). See also Griffith's translations.

⁴ *Ko asmin prāṇam avayat ko apānaṃ vyānaṃ u samānaṃ asmin ko deve 'dhi śīrāya pūruṣe* (Who has woven *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna* and *samāna* into him and which deity is controlling him? A.V. x. 2. 13).

⁵ *Sapta prāṇān aṣṭau munyas* (or *majjñās*) *tāṃs te vṛścāmi brahmaṇā* (A.V. 11. 12. 7). The *Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa*, i. 2. 3. 3 refers to seven *prāṇas*, *sapta vai*

we hear of a lotus with nine gates (*nava-dvāraṃ*) and covered with the three *guṇas*¹. This is a very familiar word in later Sanskrit literature, as referring to the nine doors of the senses, and the comparison of the heart with a lotus is also very common. But one of the most interesting points about the passage is that it seems to be a direct reference to the *guṇa* theory, which received its elaborate exposition at the hands of the later Sāṃkhya writers: it is probably the earliest reference to that theory. As we have stated above, the real functions of the *prāṇa*, etc. were not properly understood; *prāṇa* was considered as vital power or life and it was believed to be beyond injury and fear. It was as immortal as the earth and the sky, the day and the night, the sun and the moon, the Brāhmaṇas and the Kṣattriyas, truth and falsehood, the past and the future². A prayer is made to *prāṇa* and *apāna* for protection from death (*prāṇāpānau mṛtyor mā pātāṃ svāhā*)³. In A.V. III. 6. 8 *manas* and *citta* are separately mentioned and Sāyaṇa explains *manas* as meaning *antaḥkaraṇa*, or inner organ, and *citta* as a particular state of the *manas* (*mano-vṛtti-viśeṣeṇa*), as thought⁴. Here also the heart is the seat of consciousness. Thus in a prayer in III. 26. 6 it is said, "O Mitra and Varuṇa, take away the thinking power (*citta*) from the heart (*hṛt*) of this woman and, making her incapable of judgment, bring her under my control⁵." The *ojas* with which we are familiar in later medical works of Caraka and others is mentioned in A.V. II. 18, where

śīrṣaṇyāḥ prāṇāḥ. Again a reference to the seven senses is found in A.V. x. 2. 6: *kaḥ sapta khāni vitatarā śīrṣaṇi*. In A.V. xv. 15. 16. 17 seven kinds of *prāṇa*, *apāna* and *vyāna* are described. These seem to serve cosmic functions. The seven *prāṇas* are *agni*, *āditya*, *candramāḥ*, *pavamāna*, *āpaḥ*, *paśavaḥ* and *prajāḥ*. The seven *apānas* are *paurṇamāsī*, *aṣṭakā*, *amāvāsyā*, *śruddhā*, *dikṣā*, *yajña* and *dakṣiṇā*. The seven kinds of *vyāna* are *bhūmi*, *antarikṣaṃ*, *dyauḥ*, *nakṣatrāṇi*, *ṛtaṇuḥ*, *ārtavaḥ* and *saṃvatsarāḥ*.

¹ *puṇḍarikāṃ nava-dvāraṃ tribhir guṇebhīr āvṛtaṃ
tasmin yad yakṣaṃ ātmanvat tad vai Brahma-vido viduḥ.*

(Those who know Brahman know that being to be the self which resides in the lotus flower of nine gates covered by the three *guṇas*. A.V. x. 8. 43.) The *nāḍis* *ṛdā*, *piṅgalā* and *suṣumnā*, which figure so much in the later Tāntric works, do not appear in the *Atharva-Veda*. No reference to *prāṇāyāma* appears in the *Atharva-Veda*.

² A.V. II. 15.

³ *Ibid.* II. 16. 1. *Prāṇa* and *apāna* are asked in another passage to enter a man as bulls enter a cow-shed. Sāyaṇa calls *prāṇa*, *apāna* "*śarīras-dhāraka*" (A.V. III. II. 5). They are also asked not to leave the body, but to bear the limbs till old age (III. II. 6).

⁴ *Manas* and *citta* are also separately counted in A.V. III. 6. 8.

⁵ The word *cittinaḥ* is sometimes used to mean men of the same ways of thinking (*cittinaḥ samāna-citta-yuktāḥ*—Sāyaṇa. A.V. III. 13. 5).

Agni is described as being *ojas* and is asked to give *ojas* to the worshipper¹.

Practice of Medicine in the Atharva-Veda.

As we have said above, there is evidence to show that even at the time of the *Atharva-Veda* the practice of pure medicine by professional medical men had already been going on. Thus the verse II. 9. 3, as explained by Sāyaṇa, says that there were hundreds of medical practitioners (*śataṃ hy asya bhaiṣajāḥ*) and thousands of herbs (*sahasraṃ uta vīrudhaḥ*), but what can be done by these can be effected by binding an amulet with the particular charm of this verse². Again (II. 9. 5), the Atharvan who binds the amulet is described as the best of all good doctors (*subhīṣaktama*). In VI. 68. 2 Prajāpati, who appears in the Ātreya-Caraka school as the original teacher of Āyur-veda and who learnt the science from Brahmā, is asked to treat (with medicine) a boy for the attainment of long life³. In the *Kauśika-sūtra* a disease is called *liṅgī*, i.e. that which has the symptoms (*liṅga*), and medicine (*bhaiṣajya*) as that which destroys it (*upatāpa*). Dārila remarks that this *upatāpa-karma* refers not only to the disease, but also to the symptoms, i.e. a *bhaiṣajya* is that which destroys the disease and its symptoms⁴. In the *Atharva-Veda* itself only a few medicines are mentioned, such as *jaṅgiḍa* (XIX. 34 and 35), *gulgulu* (XIX. 38), *kuṣṭha* (XIX. 39) and *śata-vāra* (XIX. 36), and these are all to be used as amulets for protection not only from certain diseases, but also from the witchcraft (*krtyā*) of enemies. The effect of these herbs was of the same miraculous nature as that of mere charms or incantations. They did not operate in the manner in which the medicines prescribed

¹ *Ojo' sy ojo me dāh svāhā* (A.V. II. XVIII. 1). Sāyaṇa, in explaining *ojah*, says, "*ojah śarīra-sthiti-kāraṇam aṣṭamo dhātuḥ*." He quotes a passage as being spoken by the teachers (*ācāryaiḥ*): "*ksetrajñasya tad ojas tu kevalāśraya iṣyate yathā snehaḥ pradīpasya yathābhram aśani-tviṣaḥ*" (Just as the lamp depends on the oil and the lightning on the clouds so the *ojah* depends on the *kṣhetra-jña* (self) alone).

² *Śataṃ yā bheṣajāni te sahasraṃ saṃgatāni ca śreṣṭham āsrāva-bheṣajam vaśiṣṭham roga-nāśanam.*
(Oh sick person! you may have applied hundreds or thousands of medicinal herbs; but this charm is the best specific for stopping hemorrhage. A.V. VI. 45. 2.) Here also, as in II. 9. 3, the utterance of the charm is considered to be more efficacious than the application of other herbs and medicines. Water was often applied for washing the sores (VI. 57. 2).

³ *Cikitsatu Prajāpatir dirghāyutvāya cakṣase* (VI. 68. 2).

⁴ Dārila's comment on the *Kauśika-sūtra*, 25. 2.

in the ordinary medical literature acted, but in a supernatural way. In most of the hymns which appear as pure charms the *Kauṣika-sūtra* directs the application of various medicines either internally or as amulets. The praise of Atharvan as physician *par excellence* and of the charms as being superior to all other medicines prescribed by other physicians seems to indicate a period when most of these Atharvaṇic charms were used as a system of treatment which was competing with the practice of ordinary physicians with the medicinal herbs. The period of the *Kauṣika-sūtra* was probably one when the value of the medicinal herbs was being more and more realized and they were being administered along with the usual Atharvaṇic charms. This was probably a stage of reconciliation between the drug system and the charm system. The special hymns dedicated to the praise of certain herbs, such as *jaṅgiḍa*, *kuṣṭha*, etc., show that the ordinary medical virtues of herbs were being interpreted on the miraculous lines in which the charms operated. On the other hand, the drug school also came under the influence of the *Atharva-Veda* and came to regard it as the source of their earliest authority. Even the later medical literature could not altogether free itself from a faith in the efficacy of charms and in the miraculous powers of medicine operating in a supernatural and non-medical manner. Thus Caraka, VI. 1. 39 directs that the herbs should be plucked according to the proper rites (*yathā-vidhi*), and Cakrapāṇi explains this by saying that the worship of gods and other auspicious rites have to be performed (*maṅgala-devatārcanādi-pūrvakam*); in VI. 1. 77 a compound of herbs is advised, which, along with many other virtues, had the power of making a person invisible to all beings (*adrśyo bhūtānām bhavati*); miraculous powers are ascribed to the fruit *āmalaka* (Emblic Myrobalan), such as that, if a man lives among cows for a year, drinking nothing but milk, in perfect sense-control and continence and meditating the holy *gāyatrī* verse, and if at the end of the year on a proper lunar day in the month of Pauṣa (January), Māgha (February), or Phālguna (March), after fasting for three days, he should enter an *āmalaka* garden and, climbing upon a tree full of big fruits, should hold them and repeat (*japa*) the name of Brahman till the *āmalaka* attains immortalizing virtues, then, for that moment, immortality resides in the *āmalaka*; and, if he should eat those *āmalakas*, then the goddess Śrī, the incarnation of the Vedas, appears in person to him (*svayaṃ*

cāsyopatiṣṭhanti śrīr vedavākya-rūpiṇi, vi. 3. 6). In vi. 1. 80 it is said that the *rasāyana* medicines not only procure long life, but, if they are taken in accordance with proper rites (*yathā-vidhi*), a man attains the immortal Brahman. Again in vi. 1. 3 the word *prāyaścitta* (purificatory penance) is considered to have the same meaning as *auśadha* or *bheṣaja*. The word *bheṣaja* in the *Atharva-Veda* meant a charm or an amulet which could remove diseases and their symptoms, and though in later medical literature the word is more commonly used to denote herbs and minerals, either simple or compounded, the older meaning was not abandoned¹. The system of simple herbs or minerals, which existed independently of the *Atharva-Veda*, became thus intimately connected with the system of charm specifics of the *Atharva-Veda*; whatever antagonism may have before existed between the two systems vanished, and Āyur-veda came to be treated as a part of the *Atharva-Veda*². Prajāpati and Indra, the mythical physicians of the *Atharva-Veda*, came to be regarded in the Ātreya-Caraka school as the earliest teachers of Āyur-veda³.

Bloomfield arranges the contents of the *Atharva-Veda* in fourteen classes: 1. Charms to cure diseases and possession by demons (*bhaiṣajyāni*); 2. Prayers for long life and health (*āyuṣyāni*); 3. Imprecations against demons, sorcerers and enemies (*ābhicāri-*

¹ The A.V. terms are *bheṣajam* (remedy), *bheṣajī* (the herbs), and *bheṣajīh* (waters). The term *bhaiṣajya* appears only in the *Kauśika* and other *sūtras* and Brāhmaṇas. Bloomfield says that the existence of such charms and practices is guaranteed moreover at least as early as the Indo-Iranian (Aryan) period by the stems *baeṣaza* and *baeṣazya* (*mañthra baeṣaza* and *baeṣazya*; *haoma baeṣazya*), and by the pre-eminent position of water and plants in all prayers for health and long life. Adalbert Kuhn has pointed out some interesting and striking resemblances between Teutonic and Vedic medical charms, especially in connection with cures for worms and fractures. These may perhaps be mere anthropological coincidences, due to the similar mental endowment of the two peoples. But it is no less likely that some of these folk-notions had crystallized in prehistoric times, and that these parallels reflect the continuation of a crude Indo-European folklore that had survived among the Teutons and Hindus. See Bloomfield's *The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brahmaṇa*, p. 58, and Kuhn's *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*, xiii. pp. 49-74 and 113-157.

² The *Atharva-Veda* itself speaks (xix. 34. 7) of herbs which were current in ancient times and medicines which were new, and praises the herb *jaṅgiḍa* as being better than them all—*na tvā pūrva oṣadhayo na tvā taranti yā navāḥ*.

³ A.V. vi. 68. 2—*Cikitsatu prajāpatir dīrghāyutvāya cakṣase*; *ibid.* xix. 35. 1—*Indrasya nāma gṛhṇanto ṛṣayaḥ jaṅgiḍam dadan* (The ṛṣis gave *jaṅgiḍa*, uttering the name of Indra). This line probably suggested the story in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, that Indra first instructed the ṛṣis in Āyur-veda. See *ibid.* xi. viii. 23—*yan mātaliḥ rathakṛitāṃ amṛtaṃ veda bheṣajam tad indro apsu praveśayat tad āpo datta bheṣajam*. The immortalizing medicine which Mātali (the charioteer of Indra) bought by selling the chariot was thrown into the waters by Indra, the master of the chariot. Rivers, give us back that medicine!

kāni and *krtyā-pratiharaṇāni*); 4. Charms pertaining to women (*stri-karmāni*); 5. Charms to secure harmony, influence in the assembly, and the like (*saumanasyāni*); 6. Charms pertaining to royalty (*rāja-karmāni*); 7. Prayers and imprecations in the interest of Brahmins; 8. Charms to secure property and freedom from danger (*pauṣṭikāni*); 9. Charms in expiation of sin and defilement (*prāyaścittāni*); 10. Cosmogonic and theosophic hymns; 11. Ritualistic and general hymns; 12. The books dealing with individual themes (books 13–18); 13. The twentieth book; 14. The *kuntāpa* hymns¹; of these we have here to deal briefly with 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9, more or less in the order in which they appear in the *Atharva-Veda*. A.V. 1. 2 is a charm against fever (*jvara*), diarrhoea (*atisāra*), diabetes (*atimūtra*), glandular sores (*nāḍi-vraṇa*); a string made of *muñja* grass is to be tied, the mud from a field or ant-hill is to be drunk, clarified butter is to be applied and the holes of the anus and penis and the mouth of the sore are to be aerated with a leather bladder and the charm is to be chanted. The disease *āsrāva*, mentioned in this hymn, is explained by Sāyaṇa as meaning diabetes (*mūtrātisāra*)². 1. 3 is a charm against stoppage of urine and stool (*mūtra-puriṣa-nirodha*). Along with a chanting of the hymn the patient is to be made to drink either earth from a rat's hole (*mūṣika-mṛttikā*), a *pūtikā* plant, curd, or saw-dust from old wood, or he is to ride an elephant or a horse, or to throw an arrow; a fine iron needle was to be passed through the urinal canal. This is probably the earliest stage of what developed in later times as the *vasti-kriyā*³. 1. 7 and 1. 8 are charms for driving away evil spirits, *yātudhānas* and *kimidins*, when a man is possessed by them. 1. 10 is a charm for dropsy (*jalodara*): a jugful of water containing grass, etc. is to be sprinkled over the body of the patient. 1. 11 is a charm for securing easy delivery. 1. 12 is a charm for all diseases arising from disturbance of *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman*—fat, honey and clarified butter or oil have to be drunk. Head-disease (*śirṣakti*) and cough (*kāsa*) are specially mentioned. 1. 17

¹ Mr Bloomfield's *The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brahmaṇa*, p. 57.

² Bloomfield says that *āsrāva* means *atisāra* or diarrhoea (*ibid.* p. 59). The same physical applications for the same diseases are directed in A.V. 11. 3. *Āsrāva* denotes any disease which is associated with any kind of diseased ejection. Thus in 11. 3. 2 Sāyaṇa says that *āsrāva* means *atisārātimūtra-nāḍi-vraṇādayaḥ*.

³ *Pra te bhinadmī mehanam vartram veśantya iva evā te mūtram mucyatām buhir bāl iti sarvakam* (I open your urinal path like a canal through which the waters rush. So may the urine come out with a whizzing sound—A.V. 1. 3. 7). All the verses of the hymn ask the urine to come out with a whizzing sound.

is a charm for stopping blood from an injury of the veins or arteries or for stopping too much hemorrhage of women. In the case of injuries a handful of street-dust is to be thrown on the place of injury or a bandage is to be tied with sticky mud¹. I. 22 is a charm against heart-disease and jaundice—hairs of a red cow are to be drunk with water and a piece of a red cow's skin is to be tied as an amulet. It is prayed that the red colour of the sun and the red cow may come to the patient's body and the yellow colour due to jaundice may go to birds of yellow colour. I. 23, which mentions *kilāsa* or *kuṣṭha* (white leprosy) of the bone, flesh and skin and the disease by which hairs are turned grey (*palita*), is a charm against these². The white parts are to be rubbed with an ointment made of cow-dung, *bhr̥ṅga-rāja*, *haridrā* *indravaruṇī* and *nīlikā* until they appear red. The black medicines applied are asked to turn the white parts black. I. 25 is a charm against *takman*, or fever—the patient has to be sprinkled with the water in which a red-hot iron axe has been immersed. The description shows that it was of the malarial type; it came with cold (*śīta*) and a burning sensation (*śoci*). Three types of this fever are described: that which came the next day (*anyedyuh*), the second day (*ubhayedyuh*), or the third day (*tr̥tīyaka*)³. It was also associated with yellow, probably because it produced jaundice. II. 9 and 10 are charms against hereditary (*kṣetriya*) diseases, leprosy, dyspepsia, etc.⁴ Amulets of *arjuna* wood, barley, sesamum and its flower had also to be tied when the charm was uttered⁵. II. 31 is a charm against various diseases due to worms. The priest, when uttering this charm, should hold street-dust in his left hand and press it with his right hand and throw it on the patient. There are visible and invisible worms; some of them are called *algaṇḍu* and others *śaluna*; they are generated in the intestines, head and

¹ IV. 12 is also a charm for the same purpose.

² VI. 135–137 is also a charm for strengthening the roots of the hair. *Kāka-māci* with *bhr̥ṅga-rāja* has to be drunk.

³ *Na mahi śītāya takmane namo rūrāya śociṣe kṛṇomi
yo anyedyur ubhayedyur abhyeti tr̥tīyakāya namo astu takmane.*

See also A.V. VII. 123. 10, where the third-day fever, fourth-day fever and irregular fevers are referred to.

⁴ The word *kṣetriya* has been irregularly derived in Pāṇini's rule, v. 2. 92 (*kṣetriyac paraḥṣetre cikitsyah*). Commentaries like the *Kāśika* and the *Padamañjarī* suggest one of its meanings to be "curable in the body of another birth" (*jānmāntara-śarīre cikitsyah*), that is, incurable. I, however, prefer the meaning "hereditary," as given by Sāyaṇa in his commentary on A.V. II. 10. 1, as being more fitting and reasonable.

⁵ *Yakṣman* is also counted as a *kṣetriya* disease (II. 10. 6).

heels; they go about through the body by diverse ways and cannot be killed even with various kinds of herbs. They sometimes reside in the hills and forests and in herbs and animals, and they enter into our system through sores in the body and through various kinds of food and drink¹. II. 33 is a charm for removing *yakṣman* from all parts of the body. III. 7. 1 is a charm for removing all hereditary (*kṣetriya*) diseases; the horn of a deer is to be used as an amulet. III. 11 is a charm against phthisis (*rāja-yakṣman*)—particularly when it is generated by too much sex-indulgence; the patient is to eat rotten fish². IV. 4 is a charm for attaining virility—the roots of the *kapittha* tree boiled in milk are to be drunk when the charm is uttered. IV. 6 and 7 are charms against vegetable poisoning—the essence of the *kṛmuka* tree is to be drunk. V. 4 is a charm against fever (*takman*) and phthisis; the patient is to take the herb *kuṣṭha* with butter when the charm is uttered³. V. 11 is a charm against fever⁴. V. 23 is a charm against worms—the patient is given the juice of the twenty kinds of roots⁵. VI. 15 is a charm for eye-diseases; the patient has to take various kinds of vegetable leaves fried in oil, particularly the mustard plant⁶. VI. 20 is a charm against bilious fever (*śuṣmīṇo jvarasya*); it is said to produce a great burning sensation, delirium and jaundice. VI. 21 is a charm for increasing the hair—the hair is to be sprinkled with a decoction of various herbs. VI. 23 is a charm against heart-disease, dropsy and jaundice. VI. 25 is a charm for inflammation of the glands of the neck (*ganḍa-mālā*)⁷. VI. 85 is a charm against consumption (*rājay-akṣman*); VI. 90 for colic pain (*śūla*)⁸; VI. 105 for cough and

¹ II. 31. 5. I have adopted Sāyaṇa's interpretation.

² VII. 78 is also a charm for inflammation of the neck (*ganḍa-mālā*) and phthisis (*yakṣma*).

³ *Kuṣṭha* was believed to be good for the head and the eyes (v. 4. 10).

⁴ Gāndhāra Mahāvṛṣa, Muñjavān, and particularly Bālhika (Balkh), were regarded as the home of fever; so also the country of Aṅga and Magadha. It was accompanied by cold (*śīta*) and shivering (*rūrah*). It was often attended with cough (*kāsa*) and consumption (*valāsa*). It attacked sometimes on the third or fourth day, in summer or in autumn (*śarada*), or continued all through the year.

⁵ This is one of the few cases where a large number of roots were compounded together and used as medicine along with the charms.

⁶ Some of the other plants are *alasālā*, *silāñjālā*, *mālagasālā*.

⁷ Also VII. 78, where *apacit* appears as a name for the inflammation of the neck (*gala-ganḍa*). Three different types of the disease are described. *Apacit* is at first harmless, but when it grows, it continues more to secrete its discharges, like boils on the joints. These boils grow on the neck, the back, the thigh-joint and the anus. See further VI. 83, where conch-shell is to be rubbed and applied. VIII. 83 is also a charm for it. Blood had to be sucked off the inflamed parts by a leech or an iguana (*grha-godhikā*).

⁸ A piece of iron is to be tied as an amulet.

other such diseases due to phlegm (*śleṣmā*); VI. 109 for diseases of the rheumatic type (*vāta-vyādhi*¹). VI. 127 is a charm for abscess (*vidradha*), phlegmatic diseases (*valāsa*) and erysipelatous inflammation (*visarpa*). Various kinds of *visarpa* in different parts of the body are referred to. Heart-disease and phthisis are also mentioned². There are said to be a hundred kinds of death (*mṛtyu*) (A.V. VIII. 5. 7), which are explained by Sāyaṇa as meaning diseases such as fever, head-disease, etc. Several diseases are mentioned in IX. 18—first the diseases of the head, *śirṣakti*, *śirṣāmaya*, *karna-śūla* and *visalpaka*, by which secretions of bad smell come out from the ear and the mouth, then fever proceeding from head troubles with shivering and cracking sensations in the limbs. *Takman*, the dreaded autumnal fever, is so described. Then comes consumption; then come *valāsa*, *kāhābāha* of the abdomen, diseases of *kloma*, the abdomen, navel and heart, diseases of the spine, the ribs, the eyes, the intestines, the *visarpa*, *vidradha*, wind-diseases (*vātikāra*), *alaji* and diseases of the leg, knee, pelvis, veins and head.

Bolling, in his article on diseases and medicine (Vedic) in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, makes the following remark concerning the theory of the origin of diseases. "To be noted however is the fact that the Hindu theory of the constitution of the body of three elements, bile, phlegm and wind, does not appear in early Atharvan texts. *Vāti-kṛta-nāśanī* of VI. 44. 3 cannot be urged as proof to the contrary, as it means, not destructive of (diseases) produced by the wind in the body (*vāti-kṛta-nāśanī*), but destructive of that which has been made into wind. Evidently, from its association with diarrhoea, it refers to wind in the intestines." This does not seem to me to be correct. The phrase which Bolling quotes is indeed of doubtful meaning; Sāyaṇa takes it as being composed of two words, *vāti* (healer by aeration) and *kṛta-nāśanī* (destroyer of evil deeds which brought about the disease). But, however that may be, there are other passages on the subject, which Bolling seems to have missed. Thus in I. 12. 3 diseases are divided into three classes, viz. those produced by water, by wind, and those which are dry—*yo abhrajā vātajā yaś ca śuṣmaḥ*³. The phlegm of the later medical writers was also considered watery, and the word

¹ *Pippalī* is also to be taken along with the utterance of the charm. It is regarded as the medicine for all attacked by the diseases of the wind (*vāti-kṛtasya bheṣajīm*). It is also said to cure madness (*kṣiptasya bheṣajīm*).

² *Cīpudru* is a medicine for *valāsa*. *Cīpudrur abhicakṣaṇam* (VI. 127. 2).

³ Compare also *vātikārasya* (IX. 13. 20).

abhraja probably suggests the origin of the theory of phlegm, as being one of the upholders and destroyers of the body. The word *vātaja* means, very plainly, diseases produced by wind, and the *pitta*, or bile, which in later medical literature is regarded as a form of fire, is very well described here as *śuṣma*, or dry. Again in VI. 109 we have *pippalī* as *vāti-kṛtasya bheṣajīm*. The context shows that the diseases which are referred to as being curable by *pippalī* are those which are considered as being produced by wind in later literature; for "madness" (*kṣipta*) is mentioned as a *vāti-kṛta* disease. The word *śuṣma* comes from the root "śuṣ," to dry up, and in slightly modified forms is used to mean a "drying up," "burning," "strength," and "fiery." In one place at least it is used to describe the extremely burning sensation of delirious bilious fever, which is said to be burning like fire¹. My own conclusion therefore is that at least some Atharvaṇic people had thought of a threefold classification of all diseases, viz. those produced by wind, those by water, and those by fire, or those which are dry and burning. This corresponds to the later classification of all diseases as being due to the three *doṣas*, wind (*vāyu*), phlegm (*kapha* or *śleṣma*) and bile (*pitta*). Apart from the ordinary diseases, many were the cases of possession by demons and evil spirits, of which we have quite a large number. Some of the prominent ones are *Yātudhāna*, *Kimūdin*, *Piśāca*, *Piśāci*, *Amivā*, *Dvayāvin*, *Rakṣaḥ*, *Magundī*, *Alimśa*, *Vatsapa*, *Palāla*, *Anupalāla*, *Śarku*, *Koka*, *Malimluca*, *Palijaka*, *Vavrivāsas*, *Āśreṣa*, *Rkṣagrīva*, *Pramilin*, *Durnāmā*, *Sunāmā*, *Kuṣṣila*, *Kusūla*, *Kakubha*, *Śrīma*, *Arāya*, *Karuma*, *Khalaja*, *Śakadhūmaja*, *Uruṇḍa*, *Maṭmaṭa*, *Kumbhamuṣka*, *Sāyaka*, *Nagnaka*, *Taṅgalva*, *Pavinasa*, *Gandharva*, *Brahmagraha*, etc.² Some of the diseases with their troublous symptoms were (poetically) personified, and diseases which often went together were described as being related as brothers and sisters. Diseases due to worms were well known, in the case of both men

¹ VI. 20. 4. For other references where the word *śuṣma* occurs in more or less modified forms see I. 12. 3, III. 9. 3, IV. 4. 3, IV. 4. 4, V. 2. 4, V. 20. 2, VI. 65. 1, VI. 73. 2, IX. 1. 10, 20, IX. 4. 22, etc.

² See I. 28. 35, II. 9. 11, 14, VIII. 6. The last passage contains a good description of some of these beings. There were some good spirits which fought with evil ones and favoured men, such as *Piṅga*, who preserved the babe at birth and chased the amorous *Gandharvas* as wind chases cloud. VIII. 6. 19, 25 says that sometimes the higher gods are also found to bring diseases. Thus *Takman* was the son of *Varuṇa* (VI. 96. 2) and he produced dropsy (I. 10. 1-4, II. 10. 1, IV. 16. 7, etc.). *Parjanya* (rain-god) produced diarrhoea, and *Agni* produced fever, headache and cough.

and of cattle. There were also the diseases due to sorcery, which played a very important part as an offensive measure in Vedic India. Many of the diseases were also known to be hereditary (*kṣetriya*). From the names of the diseases mentioned above it will be found that most of the diseases noted by Caraka existed in the Vedic age.

The view-point from which the Vedic people looked at diseases seems to have always distinguished the different diseases from their symptoms. Thus the fever was that which produced shivering, cold, burning sensation, and the like, i.e. the diagnosis was mainly symptomatic. In addition to the charms and amulets, and the herbs which were to be internally taken, water was considered to possess great medical and life-giving properties. There are many hymns which praise these qualities of water¹. The medicinal properties of herbs were often regarded as being due to water, which formed their essence. Charms for snake poisons and herbs which were considered to be their antidotes were in use. Scanty references to diseases and their cures are found sparsely scattered in other R̥g-Vedic texts and Brāhmaṇas. But nothing in these appears to indicate any advance on the *Atharva-Veda*² in medical knowledge. Apart from these curatives there were also the already mentioned charms, amulets and medicines for securing long life and increasing virility, corresponding to the *Rasāyana* and the *Vāji-karaṇa* chapters of Caraka and other medical works. We cannot leave this section without pointing to the fact that, though most diseases and many remedies were known, nothing in the way of *nidāna*, or causes of diseases, is specified. The fact that there existed a threefold classification of diseases, viz. *abhraja*, *vātaja* and *śuṣma*, should not be interpreted to mean that the Vedic people had any knowledge of the disturbance of these elements operating as *nidānas* as they were understood in later medical literature. The three important causes of diseases were evil deeds, the sorcery of enemies, and possession by evil spirits or the anger of certain gods.

¹ *apsu antar amṛtam apsu bheṣajam* (There is immortality and medicine in water—1. 4. 4). See also 1. 5. 6, 33, 11. 3, 111. 7. 5, IV. 33, VI. 24. 92, VI. 24. 2, etc.

² For a brief survey of these R̥g-Vedic and other texts see Bolling's article "Disease and Medicine (Vedic)" in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

The Foetus and the Subtle Body.

A human body is regarded by Caraka as a modification of the five elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth, and it is also the seat of consciousness (*cetanā*)¹. The semen itself is made of the four elements, air, fire, water and earth; ether is not a constituent of it, but becomes connected with it as soon as it issues forth, since *ākāśa* or *antarikṣa* (ether) is all-pervading. The semen that is ejected and passes into the ovary is constituted of equal parts of air, fire, water and earth; the ether becomes mixed with it in the ovary; for *ākāśa* itself is omnipresent and has no movement of its own²; the semen is the product of six kinds of fluids (*rasa*). But the foetus cannot be produced simply by the union of the semen of the father and the blood (*śoṇita*) of the mother. Such a union can produce the foetus only when the *ātman* with its subtle body, constituted of air, fire, water and earth, and *manas* (mind—the organ involved in all perception and thought), becomes connected with it by means of its *karma*. The four elements constituting the subtle body of the *ātman*, being the general causes of all productions, do not contribute to the essential bodily features of the child³. The elements that contribute to the general features are, (1) the mother's part—the blood, (2) the father's part—the semen, (3) the *karma* of each individual; the part played by the assimilated food-juice of the mother need not be counted separately, as it is determined by the *karma* of the individual. The mental traits are determined by the state of mind of the individual in its previous birth. Thus, if the previous state of life was that of a god, the mind of the child

¹ *gurbhas tu khalu antarikṣa vāyuv-agni-toya-bhūmi-vikāraś cetanādhiṣṭhāna-bhūtaḥ*. Caraka, IV. 4. 6.

² *vāyuv-agni-bhūmy-ab-guṇa-pādavat tat śaḍbhyo rasebhyah prabhāvaś ca tasya*. Caraka, IV. 2. 4. *ākāśam tu yady-apī śukre pāñca-bhautike 'sti tathāpi na puruṣa-śarīrān nirgatya garbhāsayam gacchati, kintu bhūta-catuṣṭayam eva kriyāvad yāi ākāśam tu vyāpakam eva tatragatena śukreṇa sambaddham bhavati*. Cakrapāṇi's *Āyur-veda-dīpikā*, IV. 2. 4. Sūśruta however considers *śukra* (semen) as possessing the qualities of *soma*, and *ārtava* (blood) as possessing the qualities of fire. He says, however, that particles of the other *bhūtas* (earth, air and ether, as *Ḍalhaṇa* enumerates them) are separately associated with them (*saumyam śukram ārtavam āgneyam itareṣām apy atra bhūtānām sāmīdhyam asty aṇunā viśeṣeṇa paraśparopākārāt parānugrahāt paraśparāmupraveśāc ca*—Sūśruta, III. 3. 1), and they mutually co-operate together for the production of the foetus.

³ *yāni tv ātmani sūksmāṇi bhūtāni ātivāhika-rūpāṇi tāni sarva-sādhāraṇatvena aviśeṣa-sādrśya-kāraṇānti neha boddhavyāni*. Cakrapāṇi's *Āyur-veda-dīpikā*, IV. 2. 23-27.

will be pure and vigorous, whereas, if it was that of an animal, it will be impure and dull¹. When a man dies, his soul, together with his subtle body, composed of the four elements, air, fire, water and earth, in a subtle state and *manas*, passes invisibly into a particular womb on account of its *karma*, and then, when it comes into connection with the combined semen and blood of the father and mother, the foetus begins to develop². The semen and blood can, however, operate as causes of the production of the body only when they come into connection with the subtle body transferred from the previous body of a dying being³. Suśruta (III. 1. 16) says that the very subtle eternal conscious principles are manifested (*abhivyañjyate*) when the blood and semen are in union (*parama-sūkṣmās cetanāvantah śāśvatā lohita-retasaḥ sannipāteṣv abhivyañjyante*). But later on (III. 3. 4) this statement is modified in such a way as to agree with Caraka's account; for there it is said that the soul comes into contact with the combined semen and blood along with its subtle elemental body (*bhūtātmanā*). In another passage a somewhat different statement is found (Suśruta, III. 4. 3). Here it is said that the materials of the developing foetus are *agni*, *soma*, *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, the five senses, and the *bhūtātmanā*—all these contribute to the life of the foetus and are also called the *prāṇas* (life)⁴. Ḍalhaṇa, in explaining this, says that the *agni* (fire) spoken of here is the heat-power which manifests itself in the fivefold functionings of digestion (*pācaka*), viz. brightening of the skin (*bhrājaka*), the faculty of vision

- ¹ *Teṣāṃ viśeṣād balavanti yāni
bhavanti mātā-pitṛ-karma-jāni
tāni vyavasyet sadṛśatva-līṅgaṃ
satvaṃ yathānūkam api vyavasyet.*

Caraka, IV. 2. 27.

*Anūkaṃ prāktanāvyavahitā deha-jātiḥ tena yathānūkaṃ
iti yo deva-śarīrād avyavadhānenāgatya bhavati sa
deva-satvo bhāvati, etc.*

Cakrapāṇi, IV. 2. 23-27.

- ² *bhūtāis caturbhūh sahitaḥ su-sūkṣmair
mano-javo deham upaiti dehāt
karmāt-makatvān na tu tasya dṛśyaṃ
divyaṃ vinā darśanam asti rūpaṃ.*

Caraka, IV. 2. 3.

³ *yady api śukra-rajast kārāṇe, tathāpi yadāivātivāhikaṃ sūkṣma-bhūta-rūpa-
śarīraṃ prāpnutaḥ, tadaiva te śarīraṃ janayataḥ, nānyadā.* Cakrapāṇi, IV. 2. 36.

⁴ This *bhūtātmanā*, i.e. the subtle body together with the soul presiding over it, is called by Suśruta *karma-puruṣa*. Medical treatment is of this *karma-puruṣa* and his body (*śa eṣa karma-puruṣaḥ cikitsādhikṛtaḥ*—Suśruta, III. 1. 16). Suśruta (I. 1. 21) again says, “*pañca-mahābhūta-śarīri-samavāyah puruṣa ity ucyate; tasmin kṛiyā so 'dhiṣṭhānam.*” (In this science, the term *puruṣa* is applied to the unity of five elements and the self (*śarīri*), and this is the object of medical treatment.)

(*ālocaka*), coloration of the blood, the intellectual operations and the heat operations involved in the formation and work of the different constituent elements (*dhātu*), such as chyle, blood, etc.; the *soma* is the root-power of all watery elements, such as mucus, chyle, semen, etc., and of the sense of taste; *vāyu* represents that which operates as the fivefold life-functionings of *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna*, and *vyāna*. Dalhaṇa says further that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* refer to *manas*, the mind-organ, which is a product of their combined evolution. The five senses contribute to life by their cognitive functionings. The first passage seemed to indicate that life was manifested as a result of the union of semen and blood; the second passage considered the connection of the soul with its subtle body (*bhūtātma*) necessary for evolving the semen-blood into life. The third passage introduces, in addition to these, the five senses, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, and the place of semen-blood is taken up by the three root-powers of *agni*, and *vāyu*. These three powers are more or less of a hypothetical nature, absorbing within them a number of functionings and body-constituents. The reason for these three views in the three successive chapters cannot be satisfactorily explained, except on the supposition that Suśruta's work underwent three different revisions at three different times. Vāgbhaṭa the elder says that the moment the semen and the blood are united, the life principle (*jīva*), being moved by *manas* (*mano-javana*), tainted, as the latter is, with the afflictions (*kleśa*) of attachment, etc., comes in touch with it¹.

The doctrine of a subtle body, as referred to in the medical works, may suitably be compared with the Sāṃkhya view. Cakrapāṇi himself, in explaining *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 2. 36, says that this doctrine of a subtle body (*ātivāhika śarīra*) is described in the *āgama*, and by *āgama* the Sāṃkhya *āgama* is to be understood (*tena āgamād eva sāmkhya-darśana-rūpād ātivāhika-śarīrāt*). The *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 39 speaks of a subtle body (*sūkṣma deha*) and the body inherited from

¹ gate purāṇe rajasi nave 'vasthite śuddhe garbhasyāśaye mārge ca bijātmanā śuklam avikṛtam avikṛtena vāyunā preritam anyaiś ca mahā-bhūtair anugataṃ ārtavena abhīmūrchitam anvaṣaṃ eva rāgādi-kleśa-vaśānuvartinā sva-karma-coditenamano-javenajīvenābhisaṃśṛṣṭaṃ garbhāśayam upayāti. Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha, II. 2. Indu, in explaining this, says, "bijātmanā garbha-kāraṇa-mahā-bhūta-svabhāvena . . . sūkṣma-svarūpāḥ manas-sahacāribhis tanmātrākhyair mahā-bhūtair anugataṃ strī-kṣetra-prāptiā karma-vaśād ārtavena miśrī bhūtaṃ anvaṣaṃ miśrī-bhāva-hīna-kālam eva . . . mano-javena jīvenābhisaṃśṛṣṭaṃ prāpta-saṃyogam garbhāśayam śuklam upayāti." His further explanations of the nature of applications of the *jīva* show that he looked up Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtras* for the details of *avidyā*, etc., and the other *kleśas*.

the parents. The *sūkṣma* continues to exist till salvation is attained, and at each birth it receives a new body and at each death it leaves it. It is constituted of *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra*, the eleven senses and the five *tan-mātras*. On account of its association with the *buddhi*, which bears the impress of virtue, vice, and other intellectual defects and accomplishments, it becomes itself associated with these, just as a cloth obtains fragrance through its connection with campak flowers of sweet odour; and hence it suffers successive rebirths, till the *buddhi* becomes dissociated from it by the attainment of true discriminative knowledge. The necessity of admitting a subtle body is said to lie in the fact that the *buddhi*, with the *ahaṃkāra* and the senses, cannot exist without a supporting body; so in the interval between one death and another birth the *buddhi*, etc. require a supporting body, and the subtle body is this support¹. In the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, v. 103, it is said that this subtle body is like a little tapering thing no bigger than a thumb, and that yet it pervades the whole body, just as a little flame pervades a whole room by its rays². The *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, in refuting the Sāṃkhya view, says that according to it the *citta* (mind), like the rays of a lamp in a jug or in a palace, contracts and dilates according as the body that it occupies is bigger or smaller³. Vācaspati, in explaining the Yoga view as expounded by Vyāsa, says that in the Sāṃkhya view the *citta* is such that it cannot, simply by contraction and expansion, leave any body at death and occupy another body without intermediate relationship with a subtle body (*ātivāhika-śarīra*). But, if the *citta* cannot itself leave a body and occupy another, how can it connect itself with a subtle body at the time of death? If this is to be done through another body, and that through another, then we are led to a vicious infinite. If it is argued that the *citta* is connected with such a subtle body from beginningless time, then the reply is that such a subtle body has never been perceived by anyone (*na khalu etad adhyakṣa-gocaram*); nor can it be regarded as indispensably necessary through inference, since the Yoga view can explain the situation without the hypothesis of any such body. The *citta* is all-pervading,

¹ *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, 39, 40, 41.

² *yathā dīpasya sarva-gṛha-vyāpīve 'pi kalikā-kāratvaṃ...tathaiṣa līṅga-dehasya deha-vyāpīve 'py anguṣṭha-parimāṇatvaṃ. Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, v. 103.

³ *ghaṭa-prāsāda-pradīpa-kalpaṃ saṅkoca-vikāśi cittam śarīra-parimāṇākāra-mātram ity āpare pratipannāḥ. Vyāsa-bhāṣya on Patañjali's Yoga-sūtras*, iv. 10.

and each soul is associated with a separate *citta*. Each *citta* connects itself with a particular body by virtue of the fact that its manifestations (*vr̥tti*) are seen in that body. Thus the manifestations of the all-pervading *citta* of a soul cease to appear in its dying body and become operative in a new body that is born. Thus there is no necessity of admitting a subtle body (*ātivāhikatvaṃ tasya na mṛṣyāmahe*)¹.

The Vaiśeṣika also declines to believe in the existence of a subtle body, and assigns to it no place in the development of the foetus. The development of the foetus is thus described by Śrīdhara in his *Nyāya-kandālī*²: “After the union of the father’s semen and the mother’s blood there is set up in the atoms constituting them a change through the heat of the womb, such that their old colour, form, etc. become destroyed and new similar qualities are produced; and in this way, through the successive formation of dyads and triads, the body of the foetus develops; and, when such a body is formed, there enters into it the mind (*antahkaraṇa*), which could not have entered in the semen-blood stage, since the mind requires a body to support it (*na tu śukra-śoṇitāvasthāyām śarīrāśrayatvān manasaḥ*). Small quantities of food-juice of the mother go to nourish it. Then, through the unseen power (*adr̥ṣṭa*), the foetus is disintegrated by the heat in the womb into the state of atoms, and atoms of new qualities, together with those of the food-juice, conglomerate together to form a new body.” According to this view the subtle body and the mind have nothing to do with the formation and development of the foetus. Heat is the main agent responsible for all disintegration and re-combination involved in the process of the formation of the foetus.

The Nyāya does not seem to have considered this as an important question, and it also denies the existence of a subtle body. The soul, according to the Nyāya, is all-pervading, and the *Mahā-bhārata* passage quoted above, in which Yama draws out the *puruṣa*

¹ Vācaspati’s *Tattva-vaiśārādī*, IV. 10. Reference is made to *Mahā-bhārata*, III. 296. 17, *aṅguṣṭha-mātram puruṣaṃ niśakaraṣa yamo balāt*. Vācaspati says that *puruṣa* is not a physical thing and hence it cannot be drawn out of the body. It must therefore be interpreted in a remote sense as referring to the cessation of manifestation of *citta* in the dying body (*na cāsya niśkarṣaḥ sambhāvati, ity aupacāriko vyākhyeyas tathā ca cīteṣ cittasya ca tatra tatra vr̥tty-abhāva eva niśkarṣārthah*).

² The *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, v. 103, says that the thumb-like *puruṣa* referred to in *Mahā-bhārata*, III. 296. 17, which Yama drew from the body of Satyavān, has the size of the subtle body (*līṅga-deha*).

² *Nyāya-kandālī*, Vizianagram Sanskrit series, 1895, p. 33.

of the size of a thumb, has, according to Nyāya, to be explained away¹. In rebirth it is only the all-pervading soul which becomes connected with a particular body (*ya eva dehāntara-saṃgamo 'sya, tam eva taj-jñāh-para-lokam āhuh*)².

Candrakīrti gives us an account of the Buddhist view from the *Śāli-stamba-sūtra*³. The foetus is produced by the combination of the six constituents (*ṣaṇṇāṃ dhātūnāṃ samavāyāt*). That which consolidates (*saṃśleṣa*) the body is called earth (*prthivī-dhātu*); that which digests the food and drink of the body is called fire (*tejo-dhātu*); that which produces inhalation and exhalation is called air (*vāyu-dhātu*); that which produces the pores of the body (*antaḥ-sauśīryam*) is called ether (*ākāśa-dhātu*); that by which knowledge is produced is called the *viññāna-dhātu*. It is by the combination of them all that a body is produced (*sarveṣāṃ samavāyāt kāyasyotpattir bhavati*). The seed of *viññāna* produces the germ of name and form (*nāma-rūpāṅkura*) by combination with many other diverse causes. The foetus is thus produced of itself, not by another, nor by both itself and another, nor by god, nor by time, nor by nature, nor by one cause, nor by no cause, but by the combination of the mother's and the father's parts at the proper season⁴. The combination of father's and mother's parts gives us the five *dhātus*, which operate together when they are in combination with the sixth *dhātu*, the *viññāna*.

The view that the foetus is the result of the joint effect of the six *dhātus* reminds us of a similar expression in *Caraka*, IV. 3. Caraka gives there a summary of the discussions amongst various sages on the subject of the causes of the formation and development of the foetus: where there is a union between a man with effective semen and a woman with no defect of organ, ovary and blood, if at the time of the union of the semen and blood the soul comes in touch with it through the mind, then the foetus begins to develop⁵. When it is taken care of by proper nourishment, etc., then at the right time

¹ *tasmān na hṛt-puṇḍarīke yāvad-avasthānam ātmanaḥ ata eva aṅguṣṭha-mātram puruṣaṃ niścakārṣa balād yama iti Vyāsa-vacanam evam-param avagantavyam* (Jayanta's *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 469).

² *Ibid.* p. 473.

³ *Mādhyamika-vṛtti* (Bibliotheca Buddhica), pp. 560-61.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 567.

⁵ In the Vaiśeṣika also the all-pervading *ātman* comes into touch with the foetus through the *manas*; but the difference is this, that here the *manas* is an operative factor causing the development of the foetus, whereas there the *manas* goes to the foetus when through the influence of body-heat it has already developed into a body.

the child is born, and the whole development is due to the combined effect of all the elements mentioned above (*samudayād eṣāṃ bhāvānām*). The foetus is born of elements from the mother and the father, the self, the proper hygienic care of the parents' bodies (*sātmya*) and the food-juice; and there is also operant with these the *sattva* or *manas*, which is an intermediate vehicle serving to connect the soul with a former body when it leaves one (*aupapāduka*)¹. Bharadvāja said that none of these causes can be considered as valid; for, in spite of the union of the parents, it often happens that they remain childless; the self cannot produce the self; for, if it did, did it produce itself after being born or without being born? In both cases it is impossible for it to produce itself. Moreover, if the self had the power of producing itself, it would not have cared to take birth in undesirable places and with defective powers, as sometimes happens. Again, proper hygienic habits cannot be regarded as the cause; for there are many who have these, but have no children, and there are many who have not these, but have children. If it was due to food-juice, then all people would have got children. Again, it is not true that the *sattva* issuing forth from one body connects itself with another; for, if it were so, we should all have remembered the events of our past life. So none of the above causes can be regarded as valid. To this Ātreya replied that it is by the combined effect of all the above elements that a child is produced, and not by any one of them separately². This idea is again repeated in IV. 3. 20, where it is said that just as a medical room (*kūṭāgāraṃ vartulākāraṃ grhaṃ jantāka-sveda-pratipāditam* —Cakrapāṇi) is made up of various kinds of things, or just as a chariot is made up of a collection of its various parts, so is the foetus made up of the combination of various entities which contribute to the formation of the embryo and its development (*nānā-vidhānāṃ garbha-kārāṇāṃ bhāvānāṃ samudayād abhinirvartate*)³. The idea of such a combined effect of causes as leading to the production of a perfect whole seems to have a peculiar Buddhistic ring about it.

Bharadvāja, in opposing the above statement of Ātreya, asks what, if the foetus is the product of a number of combined causes,

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 3. 3.

² *neti bhagavān Ātreyaḥ sarvebhya ebhyo bhāvebhyaḥ samudātebhya garbho 'bhinirvartate. Ibid.* IV. 3. 11.

³ *Ibid.* IV. 3. 20.

is the definite order in which they co-operate together to produce the various parts (*katham ayaṃ sandhiyate*)? Again, how is it that a child born of a woman is a human child and not that of any other animal? If, again, man is born out of man, why is not the son of a stupid person stupid, of a blind man blind, and of a madman mad? Moreover, if it is argued that the self perceives by the eye colours, by the ear sounds, by the smell odours, by the organ of taste the different tastes, and feels by the skin the different sensations of touch, and for that reason the child does not inherit the qualities of the father, then it has to be admitted that the soul can have knowledge only when there are senses and is devoid of it when there are no senses; in that case the soul is not unchangeable, but is liable to change (*yatra caitad ubhayaṃ sambhavati jñatvaṃ ajñatvaṃ ca sa-vikāraś cātmā*)¹. If the soul perceives the objects of sense through the activity of the senses, such as perceiving and the like, then it cannot know anything when it has no senses, and, when it is unconscious, it cannot be the cause of the body-movements or of any of its other activities and consequently cannot be called the soul, *ātman*. It is therefore simple nonsense to say that the soul perceives colours, etc. by its senses.

To this Ātreya replies that there are four kinds of beings, viz. those born from ovaries, eggs, sweat and vegetables. Beings in each class exist in an innumerable diversity of forms². The forms that the foetus-producing elements (*garbha-karā bhāvāḥ*) assume depend upon the form of the body where they assemble. Just as gold, silver, copper, lead, etc. assume the form of any mould in which they are poured, so, when the foetus-producing elements assemble in a particular body, the foetus takes that particular form. But a man is not infected with the defect or disease of his father, unless it be so bad or chronic as to have affected his semen. Each of our limbs and organs had their germs in the semen of the father, and, when the disease or defect of the father is so deep-rooted as to have affected (*upatāpa*) the germ part of any particular organ in the seed, then the child produced out of the semen is born defective in that limb; but, if the defect or disease of the father is so superficial that his semen remains unaffected, then the disease or defect is not inherited by the son. The child does not owe sense-organs to his parents; he alone is responsible for the goodness or badness of his sense-organs; for

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 3. 21.

² *Ibid.* IV. 3. 22, 23.

these are born from his own self (*ātma-jānindriyāṇi*). The presence or absence of the sense-organs is due to his own destiny or the fruits of *karma* (*daiva*). So there is no definite law that the sons of idiots or men with defective senses should necessarily be born idiots or be otherwise defective¹. The self (*ātman*) is conscious only when the sense-organs exist. The self is never without the *sattva* or the mind-organ, and through it there is always some kind of consciousness in the self². The self, as the agent, cannot without the sense-organs have any knowledge of the external world leading to practical work; no practical action for which several accessories are required can be performed unless these are present; a potter who knows how to make a jug cannot succeed in making it unless he has the organs with which to make it³. The fact that the self has consciousness even when the senses do not operate is well illustrated by our dream-knowledge when the senses lie inoperative⁴. Ātreya further says that, when the senses are completely restrained and the *manas*, or mind-organ, is also restrained and concentrated in the self, one can have knowledge of all things even without the activity of the senses⁵. The self is thus of itself the knower and the agent.

This view of Caraka, as interpreted by Cakrapāṇi, seems to be somewhat new. For the self is neither pure intelligence, like the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya-yoga, nor the unity of being, intelligence and bliss, like that of the Vedānta. Here the soul is the knower by virtue of its constant association with *manas*. In this, however, we are nearer to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. But in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view the soul is not always in contact with *manas* and is not always conscious. The *manas* in that view is atomic. The view that the

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 3. 25.

² *Ibid.* IV. 3. 26, *na hy-asattvaḥ kadācid ātmā sattva-viśeṣāc copalabhyate jñāna-viśeṣaḥ*. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says that our knowledge of the external world is due to the operation of the sense-organs in association with the mind-organ. If these sense-organs do not exist, we cannot have any knowledge of the external world, but the internal organ of mind is always associated with the self: so the knowledge which is due to this mind-organ is ever present in the self (*yat tu kevala-mano-janyam ātma-jñānam, tad bhavaty eva sarvadā*). It seems that both *sattva* and *manas* are used to denote the mind-organ.

³ The word *kārya-jñānam* in *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 3. 27, has been explained by Cakrapāṇi as *kārya-pravṛtti-janaka-bāhya-viśaya-jñānam*. The knowledge that the self has when it has no sense-organs operating in association with the mind has no object (*nirviśaya*); in other words, this knowledge which the self always has is formless.

⁴ *Ibid.* IV. 3. 31.

⁵ *vināpīndriyāṇi samādhi-balād eva yasmāt sarvajño bhavati; tasmā jñāna-svabhāva eva nirindriyo 'py ātmā* (Cakrapāṇi's *Caraka-tātparya-ṭīkā*, IV. 3. 28-29).

soul has always a formless consciousness has undoubtedly a Vedāntic or Sāṃkhyaic tinge; but the other details evidently separate this view from the accepted interpretations of these schools. The theory of the soul, however, as here indicated comes as a digression and will have to be discussed more adequately later on.

On the subject of the existence of subtle bodies we have already quoted the views of different Indian schools of philosophy for the purpose of suggesting comparisons or contrasts with the views of Caraka. Before concluding this section reference must be made to the Vedānta views with regard to the nature of subtle bodies.

According to the Vedānta, as interpreted by Śaṅkara, the subtle body is constituted of five particles of the elements of matter (*bhūta-sūkṣmaḥ*), with which are also associated the five *vāyus*, *prāṇa*, *apāna*, etc.¹ Those who perform good deeds go to the region of the moon, and those who commit sins suffer in the kingdom of Yama and then are again born in this world². Those who, as a reward of their good deeds, go to the kingdom of the moon and afterwards practically exhaust the whole of their fund of virtue and consequently cannot stay there any longer, begin their downward journey to this earth. They pass through *ākāśa*, air, smoke and cloud and then are showered on the ground with the rains and absorbed by the plants and again taken into the systems of persons who eat them, and again discharged as semen into the wombs of their wives and are reborn again. In the kingdom of the moon they had watery bodies (*candra-maṇḍale yad am-mayam śarīram upabhogārtham ārabdham*) for the enjoyment available in that kingdom; and, when they exhaust their good deeds through enjoyment and can no longer hold that body, they get a body which is like *ākāśa* and are thus driven by the air and come into association with smoke and cloud. At this stage, and even when they are absorbed into the body of plants, they neither enjoy pleasure nor suffer pain. A difference must be made between the condition of those who are endowed with plant-bodies as a punishment for their misdeeds and those who pass through the plant-bodies merely as stations on their way to rebirth. In the case of the former the plant life is a life of enjoyment and sorrow, whereas in the case of the latter there is neither enjoyment nor sorrow.

¹ The *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara on the *Brahma-sūtra*, III. i. 1-7.

² *Ibid.* III. i. 13.

Even when the plant-bodies are chewed and powdered the souls residing in them as stations of passage do not suffer pain; for they are only in contact with these plant-bodies (*candra-maṇḍala-skhalitānām vrihy ādi-saṁśleṣa-mātram tad-bhāvaḥ*)¹.

We thus see that it is only the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta that agree to the existence of a subtle body and are thus in accord with the view of Caraka. But Caraka is more in agreement with the Vedānta in the sense that, while according to the Sāṃkhya it is the *tan-mātras* which constitute the subtle body, it is the fine particles of the gross elements of matter that constitute the subtle bodies in the case both of the Vedānta and of Caraka. The soul in one atomic moment becomes associated successively with *ākāśa*, air, light, heat, water, and earth (and not in any other order) at the time of its entrance into the womb².

Foetal Development³.

When the different elements of matter in conjunction with the subtle body are associated with the self, they have the appearance of a little lump of mucus (*kheṭa-bhūta*) with all its limbs undifferentiated and undeveloped to such an extent that they may as well be said

¹ *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, III. i. 25, also III. i. 22-27.

² *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 4. 8. Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this, says that there is no special reason why the order of acceptance of gross elements should be from subtler to grosser; it has to be admitted only on the evidence of the scriptures—*ayaṃ ca bhūta-grahaṇa-krama āgama-siddha eva nātra yuktis tathā-vidhā hṛdayaṅgamāsti*.

³ In the *Garbha Upaniṣad*, the date of which is unknown, there is a description of foetal development. Its main points of interest may thus be summarized: the hard parts of the body are earth, the liquid parts are water, that which is hot (*uṣṇa*) is heat-light (*tejaḥ*), that which moves about is *vāyu*, that which is vacuous is *ākāśa*. The body is further said to depend on six tastes (*ṣaḍ-āśraya*), sweet (*madhura*), acid (*amla*), salt (*lavaṇa*), bitter (*tikta*), hot (*kaṭu*) and pungent (*kaṣāya*), and it is made up of seven *dhātus* of chyle (*rasa*), blood (*śonita*) and flesh (*māṃsa*). From the six kinds of *rasa* comes the *śonita*, from *śonita* comes *māṃsa*, from *māṃsa* comes fat (*medas*), from it the tendons (*snāyu*), from the *snāyu* bones (*asthā*), from the bones the marrow (*majjā*), from the marrow the semen (*śukra*). By the second night after the union of semen and blood the foetus is of the form of a round lump called *kalala*, at the eighth night it is of the form of a vesicle called *budbuda*, after a fortnight it assumes the form of a spheroid, *piṇḍa*; in two months the head appears, in three months the feet, in four months the abdomen, heels and the pelvic portions appear, in the fifth month the spine appears, in the sixth month the mouth, nose, eyes and ears develop; in the seventh month the foetus becomes endowed with life (*jīvena saṃyukto bhavati*), in the eighth month it becomes fully developed. By an excess of semen over blood a male child is produced, by the excess of blood a female child is produced, when the two are equal a hermaphrodite is produced. When air somehow enters and divides the semen into two, twins are produced. If the minds of the parents are disturbed (*vyākulita-mānasaḥ*), the issue becomes either blind or lame or dwarf. In the ninth month, when the foetus is well developed

not to exist as to exist. Suśruta remarks that the two main constituents of the body, semen and blood, are respectively made up of the watery element of the moon (*saumya*) and the fiery element (*āgneya*); the other elements in atomic particles are also associated with them, and all these mutually help one another and co-operate together for the formation of the body¹. Suśruta further goes on to say that at the union of female and male the heat (*tejaḥ*) generated rouses the *vāyu*, and through the coming together of heat and air the semen is discharged². Caraka, however, thinks that the cause of discharge of semen is joy (*harṣa*)³. The semen is not produced from the body, but remains in all parts of the body, and it is the joy which causes the discharge and the entrance of the semen into the uterus⁴. Thus he says that, being ejected by the self as joy (*harṣa-bhūtenātmanodiritaś cādhiṣṭhitaś ca*), the semen constituent or the seed, having come out of the man's body, becomes combined with the menstrual product (*ārtava*) in the uterus (*garbhāśaya*) after it has entrance thereinto through the proper channel (*ucitena pathā*). According to Suśruta the ejected semen enters into the female organ (*yonim abhiprapadyate*) and comes into association there with the menstrual product⁵. At that very moment, the soul with its subtle body comes into association with it and thus becomes associated with the material characteristics of *sattva*,

with all its organs, it remembers its previous birth and knows its good and bad deeds and repents that, on account of its previous *karma*, it is suffering the pains of the life of a foetus, and resolves that, if it can once come out, it will follow the Sāṃkhya-yoga discipline. But as soon as the child is born it comes into connection with *Vaiṣṇava vāyu* and forgets all its previous births and resolutions. A body is called *śarīra*, because three fires reside in it (*śrayante*), viz. the *koṣṭhāgni*, *darśanāgni* and *jñānāgni*. The *koṣṭhāgni* digests all kinds of food and drink, by the *darśanāgni* forms and colours are perceived, by the *jñānāgni* one performs good and bad deeds. This Upaniṣad counts the cranial bones as being four, the vital spots (*marman*) as being 107, the joints as 180, the tissues (*snāyu*) as 109, the *śīrās*, or veins, as 700, the marrow places as 500, and the bones as 300.

¹ *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 3. 3.

² *Ibid.* III. 3. 4, Nirṇaya-Sāgara edition, 1915. Ḍalhaṇa, commenting on this, says, "sukha-lakṣaṇa-vyāyāmaśoṣma-vilīnaṃ vidrutam anilāc cyutam."

³ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 4. 7.

⁴ Cakrapāṇi, commenting on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 4. 7, says that "nāṅgebhyaḥ śukram utpadyate kintu śukra-rūpatayaiva vyajyate," i.e. the semen is not produced from the different parts of the body, but it exists as it is and is only manifested in a visible form after a particular operation (Suśruta, III. 3. 4).

⁵ As Ḍalhaṇa interprets this, the female organ here means the uterus; thus Ḍalhaṇa says, "yones trītyāvartāvasthita-garbhāśayam pratipadyate," i.e. the semen enters into the third chamber of the female organ, the place of the foetus. The uterus is probably considered here as the third chamber, the preceding two being probably the vulva and the vagina.

rajas and *tamas*, and godly (*deva*), demonic (*asura*), and other characteristics. Caraka, referring to the question of the association of the soul with the material elements, says that this is due to the operation of the soul acting through the mind-organ (*sattva-karaṇa*)¹. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on the above passage, says that the self (*ātman*) is inactive; activity is however attributed to the soul on account of the operative mind-organ which is associated with it. This, however, seems to be a compromise on the part of Cakrapāṇi with the views of the traditional Sāṃkhya philosophy, which holds the soul to be absolutely inactive; but the text of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* does not here say anything on the inactivity of the soul; for Caraka describes the soul as active (*pravartate*) as agent (*kartṛ*) and as universal performer (*viśva-karman*), and the *sattva* is described here only as an organ of the soul (*sattva-karaṇa*).

In the first month, the foetus has a jelly-like form (*kalala*)²; in the second month, the material constituents of the body having undergone a chemical change (*abhiprapacyamāna*) due to the action of cold, heat and air (*śītoṣmānilaiḥ*), the foetus becomes hard (*ghana*). If it is the foetus of a male child, it is spherical (*piṇḍa*); if it is of a female child, it is elliptical (*peśī*); if it is of a hermaphrodite, it is like the half of a solid sphere (*arbuda*)³. In the third month five special eminences are seen, as also the slight differentiation of limbs. In the fourth month the differentiation of the limbs is much more definite and well manifested; and owing to the manifestation of the heart of the foetus the entity of consciousness becomes also manifested, since the heart is the special seat of consciousness; so from the fourth month the foetus manifests a desire for the objects of the senses. In the fifth month the consciousness becomes more awakened; in the sixth intelligence begins to develop; in the seventh the division and differentiation of

¹ *Sattva-karaṇo guṇa-grahaṇāya pravartate*—*Caraka-saṃhitā*, iv. 4. 8. Cakrapāṇi rightly points out that *guṇa* here means material elements which possess qualities—*guṇavanti bhūtāni*. The word *guṇa* is used in all these passages in the sense of material entity or *bhūta*. Though *guṇa* means a quality and *guṇin* a substance, yet the view adopted here ignores the difference between qualities and substances, and *guṇa*, the ordinary word for quality, stands here for substance (*guṇa-guṇinor abhedopacārāt*—Cakrapāṇi, *ibid.*).

² Dalhaṇa explains *kalala* as *siṅghāna-prakhyam*.

³ On the meanings of the words *peśī* and *arbuda* there is a difference of opinion between Dalhaṇa and Gayī. Thus Gayī says that *peśī* means quadrangular (*catur-aśra*) and *arbuda* means the form of the bud of a silk cotton tree (*śālmali-mukulākāraṇa*).

limbs become complete; in the eighth, the vital element (*ojas*) still remains unsettled, and so, if a child is born at this time, it becomes short-lived¹.

Caraka, in describing the part played by different material elements in the formation of the body, says that from the element *ākāśa* are formed sound, the organ of hearing, lightness (*lāghava*), subtleness of structure (*saukṣmya*) and porosity (*vireka*); from *vāyu* (air) are formed the sensation of touch, the organ of touch, roughness, power of movement, the disposition of the constituent elements (*dhātu-vyūhana*), and bodily efforts; from fire, vision, the organ of vision, digestion, heat, etc.; from water, the sensation of taste and the taste-organ, cold, softness, smoothness and watery characteristics; from earth, smell, organ of smell, heaviness, steadiness and hardness. The parts of the body which are thus formed from different material elements grow and develop with the accession of those elements from which they have grown². As the whole world is made up of five elements (*bhūta*), so the human body is also made up of five elements³. Caraka maintains that the senses and all other limbs of the body which grow before birth make their appearance simultaneously in the third month⁴. When, in the third month, the sense-organs grow, there grow in the heart feelings and desires. In the fourth month the foetus becomes hard, in the fifth it gets more flesh and blood, in the sixth there is greater development of strength and colour, in the seventh it becomes complete with all its limbs, and in the eighth month there is a constant exchange of vital power (*ojas*) between the mother and the foetus. The foetus being not yet perfectly developed, the vital fluid passes from the mother to the foetus; but, since the latter cannot retain it, it returns to the mother⁵. Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this, says that such an exchange is only possible because the foetus

¹ *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 3. 30.

² *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 4. 12.

³ *evam ayaṃ loka-sammitaḥ puruṣaḥ—yāvanto hi loka bhāva-viśeṣaś tāvantaḥ puruṣe, yāvantaḥ puruṣe tāvanto loka* (*Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 4. 13). In *ibid.* IV. 3, it is said that the foetus gets its skin, blood, flesh, fat, navel, heart, *kloma*, spleen, liver, kidneys, bladder, colon, stomach, the larger intestines, and the upper and the lower rectum from the mother, and its hair, beard, nails, teeth, bones, veins and semen from the father; but, however this may be, it is certain that the development of all these organs is really due to the assimilation of the five elements of matter. So the development of the human foetus is, like the development of all other things in the world, due to the accretion of material elements.

⁴ *Ibid.* IV. 4. 14.

⁵ *mātur oja garbham gacchatīti yad ucyate, tad-garbhaḥ eva mātṛ-sambaddhaḥ san mātṛo ja iti vyapadiśyate*. Cakrapāṇi, IV. 4. 24.

is still undeveloped, and the foetus, being associated with the mother, serves also as the mother's vital power (*ojas*); for otherwise, if the *ojas* went out altogether from the mother, she could not live.

There is a good deal of divergence of opinion as regards the order of the appearance of the different limbs of the foetus. Two different schools of quarrelling authorities are referred to by Caraka and Suśruta. Thus, according to Kumārasīras and Śaunaka the head appears first, because it is the seat of the senses; according to Kāṅkāyana, the physician of Bālhika, and Kṛtavīrya the heart appears first, because according to Kṛtavīrya (as reported in Suśruta) this is the seat of consciousness (*cetanā*) and of *buddhi* and *manas*; according to Bhadrakāpya (as reported by Caraka) the navel comes first, since this is the place where food is stored, and according to Pārāśara (as reported in Suśruta), because the whole body grows from there. According to Bhadra Śaunaka (as reported by Caraka) the smaller intestine and the larger intestine (*pakvāśaya*) appear first, since this is the seat of air (*mārutādhiṣṭhānatvāt*); according to Baḍiśa (as reported by Caraka) the hands and feet come out first, because these are the principal organs, and according to Mārkaṇḍeya (as reported by Suśruta), because they are the main roots of all efforts (*tan-mūlatvāc ceṣṭāyāḥ*); according to Vaideha Janaka (as reported by Caraka) the senses appear first, for they are the seats of understanding (*buddhy-adhiṣṭhāna*); according to Mārici (as reported by Caraka) it is not possible to say which part of the body develops first, because it cannot be seen by anyone (*parokṣatvād acintyam*); according to Subhūti Gautama (as reported by Suśruta) the middle part of the body (*madhya-śarīra*) appears first, since the development of other parts of the body is dependent on it (*tan-nibaddhatvāt sarva-gātra-sambhavasya*); according to Dhanvantari (as reported by both Caraka and Suśruta) all the parts of the body begin to develop together (*yugapat sarvāṅgābhivṛtti*), though on account of their fineness and more or less undifferentiated character such development may not be properly noticed, as with the parts of a growing bamboo-shoot or a mango fruit (*garbhasyasūkṣmatvān nopalabhyante vaṁśāṅkuravat cūta-phalavaca*)¹. Just as the juicy parts and the stone, which are undifferentiated in a green mango at its early stages, are all found clearly developed and differentiated when it

¹ *Suśruta-saṁhitā*, III. 3. 32 and *Caraka-saṁhitā*, IV. 6. 21.

is ripe, so, when the human foetus is even in the early stages of development, all its undifferentiated parts are already developing there *pari passu*, though on account of their fineness of structure and growth they cannot then be distinguished.

Referring to the early process of the growth of the foetus, Suśruta says that, as the semen and blood undergo chemical changes through heat, seven different layers of skin (*kalā*) are successively produced, like the creamy layers (*santānikā*) formed in milk. The first layer, one-eighteenth of a paddy seed (*dhānya*) in thickness, is called *avabhāsinī*; the second, one-sixteenth of a paddy seed, *lohitā*; the third, one-twelfth of a paddy seed, *śvetā*; the fourth, one-eighth, is called *tāmrā*; the fifth, one-fifth, *vedinī*; the sixth, of the size of a paddy seed, *rohini*; the seventh, of the size of two paddy seeds, *māṃsa-dharā*. All these seven layers of skin come to about six paddy seeds, or roughly one inch. This is said to hold good only in those places of the body which are fleshy. Apart from these seven *kalās* of skin there are also seven *kalās* between the different *dhātus*. A *dhātu* (from the root *dhā*, to hold) is that which supports or sustains the body, such as chyle (*rasa*), blood (*rakta*), flesh (*māṃsa*), fat (*medas*), bone (*asthi*), marrow (*majjā*), semen (*śukra*) and the last vital fluid (*ojas*). Lymph (*kapha*), bile (*pitta*) and excreta (*purīṣa*) have also to be counted as *dhātus*. These *kalās*, however, are not visible; their existence is inferred from the fact that the different *dhātus* must have separate places allotted to them, and the *kalās* are supposed to divide the layer of one *dhātu* from another and are covered with lymph and tissues (*snāyu*)¹. In the first *kalā*, known as the *māṃsa-dharā*, the veins, tissues, etc. of the flesh are found; in the second, the *rakta-dharā*, is found the blood inside the flesh; in the third, called the *medo-dharā*, there is the fat which is found in the abdomen and also between the smaller bones². The fourth *kalā* is the *śleṣma-dharā*, which exists in the joints; the fifth is the *purīṣa-dharā*, which exists in the intestine (*pakvāsaya*) and separates the excreta; the sixth and the seventh are the *pitta-dharā* and the *śukra-dharā*.

Suśruta thinks that the liver and spleen are produced from

¹ The *kalā* is defined by Vṛddha-Vāgbhaṭa as *yas tu dhātu āśayāntareṣu kledo 'vatiṣṭhate yathāsvam uṣmabhīr vipakvaḥ snāyu-śleṣma-jarāyu-cchannah kāṣṭha iva sāro dhātu-sāra-śeṣol 'patvāt kalā-saṃjñāḥ* (*Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha*, *Śāstra*, v).

² The fat inside the smaller bones is called *medas*, whereas that inside the larger ones is called *majjā*, or marrow, and the fat of pure flesh only is called *vapā*, or fat.

blood, *pupphusa* (lungs) from the froth of blood, and *uṇḍuka* (a gland in the colon?) from the dirt of blood (*śoṇita-kiṭṭa-prabhava*). The best parts (*prasāda*) of blood and lymph are acted upon by bile, and *vāyu* works in association therewith; by this process the entrails, rectum and bladder are produced; and, when the heating process goes on in the abdomen, the tongue is produced, as the essence of lymph, blood and flesh. The air, being associated with heat, enters the flesh and changes the currents, the muscles (*peśī*) are differentiated, and by the oily part of fat the *vāyu* produces the veins (*śīrā*) and tissues (*snāyu*). From the essential part of blood and fat the kidneys (*vrkka*) are produced, from the essential part of flesh, blood, lymph and fat the testicles, and from the essence of blood and lymph the heart, which is the centre of the *dhamanī* through which flows the current of life (*prāṇa-vahā*). Underneath the heart on the left side there are the spleen and the *pupphusa*, and on the right side the liver and the *klōma* (right lung?), and this is particularly the place of consciousness. At the time of sleep, when it is covered with *śleṣman* having a superabundance of *tamas*, the heart remains contracted.

The foetus grows through the chyle of the mother and also through the inflation of the body of the foetus by air¹. The navel of the body is the heating centre (*jyotiḥ-sthāna*), and the air, starting from here, continues to inflate the body.

It must be borne in mind that a foetus is the product of several causes operating jointly. A defect of any particular limb at birth is due to some defect in that part of one or more of the operating causes through the influence of which that particular limb was produced. The cause of foetal development is not a question of organs or limbs which were absolutely non-existent: they already existed, in the potential form, in the causes operating jointly. The joint causes did not produce something absolutely new, but their joint operation helped to actualize all that was already inherent in them. Of all the joint causes the self remains unchanged in all changes of the body. The changes of pleasure and pain or such other characteristics as are considered to be due to the soul are really due either to *sattva* or *manas*, or to the body². Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this, says that the fact that a soul may

¹ *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 4. 57.

² *nir-vikāraḥ paraś tv ātmā sarva-bhūtānāṃ nirviśeṣa-sattva-śarīrayoḥ tu viśeṣād viśeṣopalabdhīḥ. Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 4. 34.

take its birth as this or that animal does not imply that the soul is liable to change (*paramātma-vikārā na bhavanti*); for such a change is due to the excessive preponderance of *sattva*, *rajas* or *tamas*, which are in reality due to virtue and vice, which in themselves are but the characteristics of mind (*sattva-rajas-tamaḥ-prabalatā-rūpa-vikāraja-manojanya-dharmādharma-janyāny eva*)¹.

There are three kinds of morbid elements (*doṣa*) of the body, viz. *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman*, and two morbid elements which affect the mind (*sattva*), viz. *rajas* and *tamas*. By the disorder of the first three the body becomes diseased, and by that of the second two the mind becomes affected. These, however, will be dealt with more fully later on.

Growth and Disease.

The three elements, *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha*, are counted both as constituents (*dhātus*) and as *doṣas*, or morbid elements. *Dhātus* are those elements which uphold the body. The body is the conglomeration (*samudāya*) of the modification of five *bhūtas*, or elements, and it works properly so long as these elements are in proper proportions (*sama-yoga-vāhin*) in the body². The modifications of the five elements which co-operate together to uphold the body are called *dhātus*. When one or more of the *dhātus* fall off or exceed the proper quantity (*dhātu-vaiṣamya*), one or more *dhātus* may be in excess or deficient either in partial tendencies or in entirety (*akārtsnyena prakṛtyā ca*). It has to be noted that, as Cakrapāṇi explains, not every kind of excess or deficiency of *dhātus* produces *dhātu-vaiṣamya*, or disturbance of the equilibrium of the *dhātus*: it is only when such deficiency or excess produces affections of the body that it is called *dhātu-vaiṣamya*. That amount of excess or deficiency which does not produce trouble or affection of the body is called the normal measure of the *dhātus* (*prākṛta-māna*)³. It is indeed obvious that such a definition of *prākṛta-māna* and *dhātu-vaiṣamya* involves a vicious circle, since the normal measure or *prākṛta-māna* of *dhātus* is said to be that which exists when there is no trouble or affection, and *dhātu-vaiṣamya* is that which exists when there is trouble

¹ Cakrapāṇi's commentary, *Caraka*, IV. 4.

² *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 6. 4. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on the word *sama-yoga-vāhin*, explains *sama* as meaning *ucita-pramāṇa* (proper quantity).

³ *etad eva dhātūnām prākṛta-mānam yad avikāra-kāri*, Cakrapāṇi's comment on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 6. 4.

in the body; the trouble or affection of the body has thus to be defined in terms of *dhātu-vaiṣaṃya*. The only escape from this charge is that *dhātu-vaiṣaṃya* and disease are synonymous, and the *prākṛta-māna* of *dhātus* is the same as health. When the *dhātus* are in their normal measure, there cannot be any *vaiṣaṃya*, except of a local nature, as when, for example, the *pitta* existing in its own proper measure is somehow carried by *vāyu* to a part of the body and there is consequently a local excess. Whatever leads to the increase of any particular *dhātu* automatically leads also to the decrease of other *dhātus* which are opposed to it. Things having the same sort of composition as a particular bodily *dhātu* increase it, and things having a different composition decrease it (*sāmānyam ekatva-karaṇi viśeṣas tu prthaktva-kṛt*)¹. The normal health of a man is but another name for his *dhātu-sāmya*; a man is said to be unhealthy, or to be in a state of *dhātu-vaiṣaṃya*, when symptoms of disease (*vikāra*) are seen. Slight variations of the due proportion of *dhātu* do not entitle us to call them instances of *dhātu-vaiṣaṃya* unless there is *vikāra* or symptoms of it externally expressed. The daily course of a healthy man ought to be such that the equilibrium of *dhātus* may be properly maintained. The sole aim of Āyur-veda is to advise diet, medicines, and a course of behaviour, such that, if they are properly followed, a normally healthy person may maintain the balance of his *dhātus* and a man who has lost the equilibrium of his *dhātus* may regain it. The aim of Āyur-veda is thus to advise men how to secure *dhātu-sāmya* (*dhātu-sāmya-kriyā cuktā tantrasyāśya prayojanam*)².

If a normally healthy man wishes to keep his health at its normal level, he has to take things of different tastes, so that there may not be an excess of any particular kind of substance in the body. Diseases are caused through the excessive, deficient, and wrongful administration of sense-objects, the climatic characteristics of heat and cold, and the misuse of intelligence³. Thus the sight of objects with powerful light, the hearing of loud sounds like the roaring of thunder, the smelling of very strong odours, too much eating, the touching of too much cold or heat or too much bathing or massage are examples of *atiyoga*, or excessive association with sense-objects. Not to see, hear, smell, taste or

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 44.

² *Ibid.* I. 1. 52.

³ *kāla-buddhīndriyārthānām yogo mithyā na cāti ca dvayaśrayānām vyādhinām tri-vidho hetu-saṃgrahaḥ.*

Ibid. I. 1. 53.

touch at all would be *ayoga*, or deficient association with sense-objects. To see objects very near the eye, at a very great distance, or to see frightful, hideous, unpleasant and disturbing sights, would be examples of the improper use (*mithyā-yoga*) of the visual sense. To hear grating and unpleasant sounds would be examples of the improper use of the ear; to smell bad and nauseating odours would be examples of *mithyā-yoga* of the nose; to eat together different kinds of things, which in their combination are so opposed as to be unhealthy, is an example of the improper use of the tongue; to be exposed to sudden heat and cold are examples of the improper use of touch¹. Similarly, all activities of speech, mind and body, when they are performed to an excessive degree, or not performed at all, or performed in an undesirable or unhealthy manner, are to be considered respectively as examples of *atiyoga*, *ayoga* and *mithyā-yoga* of the effort of speech, mind and body (*vān-manah-śarīra-pravṛtti*)². But these are all due to the misuse of intelligence (*prajñāparādha*). When a particular season manifests its special characteristics of heat, cold or rains to an excessive degree or to a very deficient degree or in a very irregular or unnatural manner, we have what are called *atiyoga*, *ayoga* and *mithyā-yoga* of time (*kāla*)³. But the misuse of intelligence, or *prajñāparādha*, is at the root of all excessive, deficient or wrongful association with sense-objects⁴; for, when proper things are not taken at the proper time or proper things are not done at the proper time, it is all misuse of intelligence and is therefore included under *prajñāparādha*. When certain sinful deeds are performed by *prajñāparādha*, and, by the sins (*adharma*) associated with those deeds, which become efficient only after a certain lapse of time, illness is produced, the real cause of the illness is primarily *adharma* or its root cause, *prajñāparādha*; *kāla*, or time, however, may still be regarded in some sense as the cause through which the *adharma* is matured and becomes productive.

The principle of growth and decay is involved in the maxim

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 11. 37.

² *Ibid.* I. 11. 39, 40. Cakrapāṇi says that this includes sinful deeds which produce illness and unhappiness, *śāstra-mānasika-vācanika-karma-mithyā-yogaivā-dharmotpādāvāntara-vyūpāreṇaivādharma-janyānām vikārāṇām kriya-mānatvāt*.

³ Three seasons only are mentioned, *Śiṭoṣma-varṣa-lakṣaṇāḥ punar heman-ta-grīṣma-varṣāḥ*. *Ibid.* I. 11. 42.

⁴ Thus Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this, says, "*buddhy-aparādhasyaiva indri-yārthātiyogādi-hetutvāt*." *Ibid.* I. 1. 53.

that the different constituents of the body grow when articles of food having similar constituents are taken, and that they decay when articles of food having opposite qualities are taken (*evam eva sarva-dhātu-guṇānām sāmānya-yogād vṛddhir viparyayādd hrāsaḥ*)¹. Thus, flesh increases by the intake of flesh, so does blood by taking blood, fat by fat, bones by cartilages, marrow by marrow, semen by semen and a foetus by eggs². But the principle applies not only to the same kind of substances as taken in the above example, but also to substances having largely similar qualities, just as the seminal fluid may be increased by taking milk and butter (*samāna-guṇa-bhūyiṣṭhānām anyaprakṛtīnām apy-āhāra-vikārānām upayogaḥ*)³. The ordinary conditions of growth always hold good, namely, proper age of growth, nature, proper diet and absence of those circumstances that retard growth. The assimilation of food is effected by heat which digests, air which collects together all things for the action of heat, water which softens, fat which makes the food smooth, and time which helps the process of digestion⁴. As any particular food is digested and changed, it becomes assimilated into the body. The hard parts of the food form the hard parts of the body and the liquid parts form the liquid parts such as blood and the like; and unhealthy food, i.e. food which has qualities opposed to the natural qualities of the body, has a disintegrating influence on the body.

As regards the growth of the body through the essence of the food-juice, there are two different views summed up by Cakrapāṇi (I. 28. 3). Some say that the chyle is transformed into blood, and the blood into flesh, and so forth. As regards the method of this transformation, some say that, just as the whole milk is changed into curd, so the whole chyle is transformed into blood, while others say that this transformation is somewhat like the circulation in irrigation (*kedari-kulyā-nyāya*). The *rasa* (chyle) produced as a result of the digestive process, coming into association with *rasa* as the body-constituent (*dhātu-rūpa-rasa*), increases it to a certain extent; another part of the *rasa*, having the same colour and smell as blood, goes to blood and increases it, and another part similarly goes to flesh and increases it; and the same process takes place with reference to its increasing fat, etc. Here the whole circula-

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 43 and 44, also IV 6. 9 and particularly IV. 6. 10.

² *Ibid.* IV. 6. 10. Cakrapāṇi explains *āma-garbha* as *aṇḍa*.

³ *Ibid.* IV. 6. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.* IV. 6. 14 and 15.

tion begins by the entrance of the entire chyle into the constituent *rasa* (*rasa-dhātu*); in passing through some part remains in the *rasa* and increases it, the unabsorbed part passes into blood, and what is unabsorbed there passes into flesh and so on to the other higher constituents of bones, marrow and semen¹. But others think that, just as in a farm-house pigeons of different descriptions sit together (*khale kapota-nyāya*), so not all the digested food-juice passes through the channel of the *rasa-dhātu*, but different parts of it pass through different channels from the very first stage. That part of it which nourishes *rasa* enters into the channel of its circulation, that part of it which nourishes the blood goes directly into that, and so on. But there is generally this time limitation, that the part which nourishes the blood enters into it only when the part which nourishes *rasa-dhātu* has been absorbed in it; so again the part which enters into flesh can only do so when the part which nourishes blood has been absorbed in it. Thus the circulatory system is different from the very beginning; and yet the nourishment of blood takes place later than that of *rasa*, the nourishment of flesh later than that of blood, and so on (*rasād raktaṃ tato māṃsam ityāder ayam arthaḥ yad rasa-puṣṭi-kālād uttara-kālāṃ raktaṃ jāyate*, etc.). The upholders of the last view maintain that the other theory cannot properly explain how a nourishing diet (*vr̥ṣya*), such as milk, can immediately increase the seminal fluid, and that, if it had to follow the lengthy process of passing through all the circulatory systems, it could not do its part so quickly; but on the second theory, milk through its special quality (*prabhāva*) can be immediately associated with the seminal fluid and thereby increase it². But Cakrapāṇi remarks that the earlier theory (*kedāri-kulyā*) is as good as the later one. For on that view also it might be held that by milk its special quality (*prabhāva*)

¹ There are two kinds of *rasa*, called *dhātu-rasa* and *poṣaka-rasa*. See Cakrapāṇi's comment on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, vi. 15. 14 and 15.

² *pariṇāma-pakṣe, vr̥ṣya-prayogasya raktādi-rūpāpatti-krameṇāticireṇa śukraṃ bhavattīti; kṣīrādayaś ca sadya eva vr̥ṣyā dysyante, khale-kapota-pakṣe tu vr̥ṣyotpanno rasaḥ prabhāvāc chighram eva śukreṇa saṃbaddhaḥ san tat-puṣṭim karotīti yuktam* (Cakrapāṇi on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, i. 28. 3). Elsewhere (*ibid.* vi. 15. 32) it is said that those articles of food which stimulate semen (*vr̥ṣya*) are, according to some authorities, changed into semen in six days and nights, whereas in the ordinary course, as is said in *Suśruta*, it takes a month for the transformation of ordinary articles of food into semen. But Caraka does not favour any time limitation and urges that, just as the movement of a wheel depends upon the energy spent on it, so the time that a particular food takes for getting itself transformed into semen or into any other *dhātu* depends upon the nature of the food and the powers of digestion.

passed quickly through the various stages and became associated with the seminal fluid. Nor can it be said that according to the first theory every case of impurity of *rasa* (*rasa-duṣṭi*) is also a case of impurity of blood (*rakta-duṣṭi*), as is argued; for not the whole of *rasa* is transformed into blood, but only a part of it. So the *rasa* part may be impure, but still the part that goes to form blood may be pure; thus both theories are equally strong, and nothing can be said in favour of either. In *Caraka-saṃhitā*, VI. 15. 14 and 15, it is said that from *rasa* there is *rakta* (blood), from *rakta* flesh, from flesh fat, from fat bones, from bones marrow, from marrow semen. The two theories above referred to deal with the supposed ways in which such transformations occur.

In addition to the seven *dhātus*, or body-constituents, spoken of above there are ten *upā-dhātus*, which are counted by Bhoja as *śirā*, *snāyu*, ovarian blood and the seven layers of skin¹. Caraka says in VI. 15. 15 that from *rasa* is also produced milk, and from milk ovarian blood; again, the thick tissues or ligaments (*kaṇḍarā*) and *śirās* are produced from blood, and from flesh are produced fat (*vasā*) and the six layers of skin, and from fat (*medas*) are produced the five tissues. The chyle, or *rasa*, becomes tinged with red by the heat of bile. The blood, again, being worked upon by *vāyu* and heat, becomes steady and white, and is called fat (*medas*). The bones are a conglomeration of earth, heat and air and therefore, though produced from flesh and fat, are hard. They are made porous by *vāyu* running through them, and the pores are filled in by fat, which is called marrow. From the oily parts of marrow, again, semen is produced. Just as water percolates through the pores of a new earthen jug, the semen percolates through the pores of the bones, and there is also a flow of this seminal fluid through the body by way of its own ducts. By the rousing of desires and sex joy and by the heat of the sex act the semen oozes out and collects in the testes, from which it is ultimately liberated through its proper channel².

¹ Cakrapāṇi on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, VI. 15. 14 and 15, a quotation from Bhoja. *Ojas* is counted as an *upā-dhātu*.

² *Caraka-saṃhitā*, VI. 15. 22-29.

Vāyu, Pitta and Kapha.

The qualities of the body are briefly of two kinds, those which make the system foul, the *mala*, and those which sustain and purify the body, the *prasāda*. Thus in the pores of the body are formed many undesirable bodily growths which seek egress; some constituents of the body, such as blood, are often turned into pus; the *vāyu* (air), *pitta* (bile) and *kapha* (phlegm or lymph) may become less or more than their normal measure (*prakupita*), and there are other entities which, existing in the body, tend to weaken or destroy it; these are all called *malas*. Others which go towards the sustenance and the growth of the body are called *prasāda*¹.

But *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* are primarily responsible for all kinds of morbidities of the body, and they are therefore called *doṣa*. It must, however, be noted that the *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* and all other *malas*, so long as they remain in their proper measure (*svamāna*), do not pollute or weaken the body or produce diseases. So even *malas* like *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha*, or sweat, urine, etc., are called *dhātus*, or body-constituents, so long as they do not exceed their proper measure, and thus instead of weakening the body they serve to sustain it. Both the *mala-dhātus* and the *prasāda-dhātus* in their proper measure co-operate together in sustaining the body². When various kinds of healthy food and drink are exposed in the stomach to the internal fire of the digestive organs, they become digested by heat. The essential part of the digested food is the chyle (*rasa*), and the impurities which are left out and cannot be assimilated into the body as its constituents are called *kiṭṭa* or *mala*. From this *kiṭṭa* are produced sweat, urine, excreta, *vāyu*, *pitta*, *śleṣman* and the dirt of ear, eye, nose, mouth and of the holes of the hairs of the body, the hair, beard, hair of the body, nails, etc.³ The impurity of food is excreta and urine, that of *rasa* is phlegm (*kapha*), that of flesh bile (*pitta*) and that of fat (*medas*) sweat⁴. This view of *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* seems to indicate that these are secretions, waste-products (*kiṭṭa*), like the other waste-products of the body. But the theory of waste-products is that, when they are in their proper measure, they serve to sustain the body and perform important functions, but, when

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, iv. 6. 17.

² *evaṃ rasa-malau sva-pramāṇāvasthitav āśrayasya sama-dhātor dhātu-sām-
yam anuvartayataḥ* (*ibid.* 1. 28. 3).

³ *Ibid.* i. 28. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.* vi. 15. 30.

they exceed the proper limit or become less than their proper measure, they pollute the body and may ultimately break it. But of all waste-products *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* are regarded as being fundamentally the most important entities, and they sustain the work of the body by their mutual co-operation in proper measure, and destroy it by the disturbance of balance due to the rise or fall of one, two or all three of them.

As has already been said, the body is composed of certain constituents, such as *rasa* and *rakta*. The food and drink which we take go to nourish the different *dhātus*. Not all the food and drink that we take, however, can be absorbed into the system, and consequently certain waste-products are left¹. The question arises, what is it that sustains the system or breaks it? It has already been noticed that the due proportion of the *dhātus* is what constitutes the health of the body. This due proportion, however, must, as is easy to see, depend on the proper absorption of food and drink in such a way that each of the *dhātus* may have its due share and that only, neither less nor more. It is also necessary that there should be a due functioning of the causes of waste or accretion, working in a manner conducive to the preservation of the proper proportion of the constituents with reference to themselves and the entire system. Deficiency or excess of waste-products is therefore an invariable concomitant of all disturbances of the balance of *dhātus*, and hence the deficiency or excess of waste-products is regarded as the cause of all *dhātu-vaiṣamya*. So long as the waste-products are not in deficiency or excess, they are the agents which constitute the main working of the system and may themselves be therefore regarded as *dhātus*. It is when there is excess or deficiency of one or more of them that they oppose in various ways the general process of that working of the system and are to be regarded as *doṣas* or polluting agents. There are various waste-products of the body; but of all these *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* are regarded as the three most important, being at the root of all growth and decay of the body, its health and disease. Thus

¹ Śārṅgadharma (iv. 5) counts seven visible waste-products which are different from the three *malas* referred to here as *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha*. These are (1) the watery secretions from tongue, eyes and cheeks, (2) the colouring *pitta*, (3) the dirt of ears, tongue, teeth, armpits and penis, (4) the nails, (5) the dirt of the eyes, (6) the glossy appearance of the face, (7) the eruptions which come out in youth, and beards. Rāḍhamalla, in commenting on this, refers to *Caraka-saṃhitā*, vi. 15. 20-30, in support of the above passage of Śārṅgadharma. Most of the *malas* are *chidra-malas*, or impurities of the openings.

Ātreya says in answer to Kāpyavaca's remarks in the learned discussions of the assembly of the sages, "In one sense you have all spoken correctly; but none of your judgments are absolutely true. Just as it is necessary that religious duties (*dharma*), wealth (*artha*) and desires (*kāma*) should all be equally attended to, or just as the three seasons of winter, summer and rains all go in a definite order, so all the three, *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman* or *kapha*, when they are in their natural state of equilibrium, contribute to the efficiency of all the sense-organs, the strength, colour and health of the body, and endow a man with long life. But, when they are disturbed, they produce opposite results and ultimately break the whole balance of the system and destroy it¹." There is one important point to which the notice of the reader should particularly be drawn. I have sometimes translated *mala* as "polluting agents or impurities" and sometimes as "waste-products," and naturally this may cause confusion. The term *mala* has reference to the production of diseases². *Kiṭṭa* means waste-products or secretions, and these may be called *mala* when they are in such proportions as to cause diseases. When, however, a *mala* is in such proportions that it does not produce any disease, it is not a *mala* proper but a *mala-dhātu* (*nirbādha-karāṇ malādīn prasāṃde saṃcaks-mahe*)³. In another passage of *Caraka* (I. 28. 3), which has been referred to above, it is said that out of the digested food and drink there are produced *rasa* and *kiṭṭa* (secretion) called *mala* (*tatrāhāra-prasādākhyā-rasaḥ kiṭṭam ca malākhyam abhinirvartate*), and out of this *kiṭṭa* is produced sweat, urine, excreta, *vāyu*, *pitta* and *śleṣman*. These *malas* are also *dhātus*, inasmuch as they sustain the body as much as the other *dhātus*, *rasa* or *rakta*, etc. do, so long as they are in their proper proportions and balance (*te sarva eva dhātavo malākhyāḥ prasādākhyāś ca*)⁴. Vāgbhaṭa, however, takes a different view of this subject. He separates the *doṣa*, *dhātu* and *mala* and speaks of them as being the roots of the body. Thus he says that *vāyu* sustains the body, contributing energy (*utsāha*), exhalation (*ucchvāsa*), inspiration (*niḥśvāsa*), mental and bodily movement (*ceṣṭā*), ejective forces (*vega-pravartana*); *pitta* helps the body by

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 12. 13.

² *tatra mala-bhūtās te ye śūvīrasya bādhakarāḥ syuḥ. Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 6. 17.

³ Cakrapāṇi on *Caraka-saṃhitā*. Compare *Śārngadhara*, IV. 8: *vāyuh pittaṃ kapho doṣā dhātavaś ca malā matāḥ*, i.e. *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* are known as *doṣa*, *dhātu* and *mala*.

⁴ Also *evam rasa-malau sva-pramāṇāvasthitav āśrayasya sama-dhātor dhātu-sāmyam anuvartayataḥ* (*Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 28. 3).

digestive function, heat, the function of sight, imagination (*medhā*), power of understanding (*dhī*), courage (*śaurya*), softness of the body; and *śleṣman*, by steadiness, smoothness, by serving to unite the joints, etc. The functions of the seven *dhātus*, beginning with *rasa*, are said to be the giving of satisfaction through the proper functioning of the senses (*prīṇana* or *rasa*), the contribution of vitality (*jīvana*), the production of oiliness (*sneha*), the supporting of the burden (*dhāraṇa*) of the bones (*asthi*), the filling up of bone cavities (*pūraṇa* or *majjā*) and productivity (*garbhotpāda* of *śukra*); of males it is said that the excreta has the power of holding the body, while urine ejects the surplus water and sweat holds it back¹. The elder Vāgbhaṭa distinguishes the *dhātus* from *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* by calling the latter *doṣa* (polluting agents) and the former *dūṣya* (the constituents which are polluted). He further definitely denies that the *malas* of *dhātus* could be the cause of disease. He thus tries to explain away this view (that of Caraka as referred to above) as being *aupacārika*, i.e. a metaphorical statement². The body, according to him, is a joint product of *doṣa*, *dhātu* and *mala*³. Indu, the commentator on the *Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha*, however, emphasizes one important characteristic of the *doṣas* when he says that the dynamic which sets the *dhātus* in motion (*doṣebhya eva dhātūnām pravṛttiḥ*) is derived from the *doṣas*, and the circulation chemical activities, oiliness, hardness, etc. of the chyle (*rasa*) are derived from them⁴. Owing to the predominance of one or other of the *doṣas* from the earliest period, when the foetus begins to develop, the child is said to possess the special features of one or other of the *doṣas* and is accordingly called *vāta-prakṛti*, *pitta-prakṛti* or *śleṣma-prakṛti*. Vāgbhaṭa further says that disease is not *dhātu-vaīṣamya*, but *doṣa-vaīṣamya*, and the equilibrium of *doṣas* or *doṣa-sāmya* is health. A disease, on this view, is the disturbance of *doṣas*, and, as *doṣas* are entities independent of the *dhātus*, the disturbance of *doṣas* may not necessarily mean the disturbance of *dhātus*⁵. In another passage the elder Vāgbhaṭa says

¹ *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya*, I. 11. 1-5.

² *tajjān ity-upacāreṇa tān āhur ghr̥ta-dāhavaṭ
rasādīsteṣu doṣeṣu vyādhayas sambhavanti ye.*

Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha, I. 1.

³ Indu, the commentator on the *Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha*, puts it as *śarīraṃ ca doṣa-dhātu-mala-samudāyaḥ* (I. 1).

⁴ *tathā ca dhātu-ṣoṣāya rasasya vahana-pāka-sneha-kāthinyādi doṣa-prasāda-labhyam eva* (ibid.).

⁵ Āyur-veda is closely associated with the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which alone deal with some sort of physics in Indian philosophy. It is pointed

that, as the manifold universe is nothing but a modification of the *guṇas*, so all diseases are but modifications of the three *doṣas*, or, as in the ocean waves, billows and foam are seen which are in reality the same as the ocean, so all the different diseases are nothing but the three *doṣas*¹. The elder Vāgbhaṭa uses also in another place the simile of the three *guṇas* with reference to the three *doṣas*. Thus he says, "As the three *guṇas* co-operate together for the production of the world in all its diversity, in spite of the mutual opposition that exists among themselves, so the three *doṣas* also co-operate together, in spite of natural opposition, for the production of the diverse diseases²." In the treatment of the bone system the present writer agrees with Dr Hoernle that Vāgbhaṭa always attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Caraka and Suśruta by explaining away the unadjustable views of one or the other. Here also the same tendency is seen. Thus, on the one hand, he explained away as being metaphorical (*aupacārikī*) the expressed views of Caraka that the *dhātu-malas* are the *doṣas*. On the other hand, he followed the statements of the *Uttara-tantra* that the three *doṣas*, the *dhātus*, excreta and urine sustain a man's body. He further follows the *Uttara-tantra* in holding that the three *doṣas* are the three *guṇas* (*bhinnā doṣāḥ trayo guṇāḥ*). Ḍalhaṇa identifies *vāyu* with *rajas*, *pitta* with *sattva* and *kapha* with *tamas*³.

In the *Sūtra-sthāna* Suśruta mentions blood (*śoṇita*) as having the same status as *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* and holds that the body out by Narasiṃha Kavirāja (a writer from the south) in his *Vivaraṇa-siddhānta-cintāmaṇi* (the only manuscript of which is in possession of the present writer) that according to Sāṃkhya it is the *doṣa* transforming itself from a state of equilibrium to a state of unbalanced preponderance of any of them that is to be called a disease (*vaiṣamyā-sāmyāvasthā-bhinnāvasthā-viśeṣavad doṣatvaṃ rogatvaṃ*). The Naiyāyikas, however, hold that disease is a separate entity or substance, which is produced by *doṣa*, but which is not itself a *doṣa* (*dravyatve sati doṣa-bhinnā-doṣa-janyatvaṃ rogatvaṃ*). So a disease is different from its symptoms or effects. Narasiṃha further holds that, since Caraka speaks of diseases as being fiery (*āgneya*) and aerial (*vāyavya*), he tacitly accepts the diseases as separate substances. That Caraka sometimes describes a disease as being *dhātu-vaiṣamyā* is to be explained as due to the fact that, since *dhātu-vaiṣamyas* produce diseases, they are themselves also called diseases in a remote sense (*yat tu Carakena dhātu-vaiṣamyasya rogatvaṃ uktam tat teṣāṃ tathāvidha-duḥkha-kartytvād aupacārikam*. *Vivaraṇa-siddhānta-cintāmaṇi*, MS. p. 3).

¹ *Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha*, 1. 22.

² *ārambhakaṃ virodhe 'pi mitho yad yad guṇa-trayaṃ viśvasya dṛṣṭaṃ yugapad vyādher doṣa-trayaṃ tathā* (ibid. 1. 21).

³ *rajo-bhuyiṣṭho mārutaḥ, rajo hi pravartakaṃ sarva-bhāvānāṃ pittaṃ sattvot-kaṣaṇaṃ laghu-prakāśakatvāt, rajo-yuktaṃ vā ity eke kaphas tamo-bahulaḥ, guru-prāvaraṇātmakatvāt ity āhur bhiṣajāḥ. Yady evam tat katham kapha-prakṛtike puṃsi sattva-guṇopapannatā pañhiā, ucyate, guṇa-dvīṭayam api kapha jñātavyaṃ sattva-tamo-bahulā āpa* (Ḍalhaṇa on Suśruta, *Uttara-tantra*, 66. 9).

depends on food and drink as well as on the various combinations of *vāyu*, *pitta*, *kapha* and *śoṇita* in health and disease. Ḍalhaṇa, in commenting on this, says that, Suśruta's work being principally a treatise on surgery, its author holds that blood with all its impurities plays an important part in producing disturbances in all wounds¹. Suśruta further speaks of *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman* as the causes of the formation of the body (*deha-sambhava-hetavaḥ*). The *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha*, situated in the lower, middle and upper parts of the body, are like three pillars which support the body, and blood also co-operates with them in the same work. Ḍalhaṇa remarks that *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* are concomitant causes, working in co-operation with semen and blood². Suśruta further derives *vāta* from the root *vā*, to move, *pitta* from *tap*, to heat, and *śleṣman* from *śliṣ*, to connect together. The *Sūtra-sthāna* of Suśruta compares *kapha*, *pitta* and *vāyu* with the moon (*soma*), the sun (*sūrya*) and air (*amīla*) but not with the three *guṇas*, as is found in the supplementary book, called the *Uttara-tantra*. In discussing the nature of *pitta*, he says that *pitta* is the fire in the body and there is no other fire but *pitta* in the body. *Pitta* has all the qualities of fire, and so, when it diminishes, articles of food with fiery qualities serve to increase it, and, when it increases, articles of food with cooling properties serve to diminish it. *Pitta*, according to Suśruta, is situated between the stomach (*āmāśaya*) and the smaller intestines (*pakvāśaya*), and it cooks all food and drink and separates the chyle on the one hand, and the excreta, urine, etc. on the other. Being situated in the above place, between the stomach and the smaller intestines (*tatra-stham eva*), by its own power (*ātma-śaktyā*) it works in other *pitta* centres of the body and by its heating work (*agni-karma*) sets up the proper activities at those places. In its function of cooking it is called *pācaka*, in its function in the liver and spleen, as supplying the colouring matter of blood, it is called "colouring" (*rañjaka*), in its function in the heart it serves intellectual purposes (*sādhaka*), in its function in the eyes it is called "perceiving," or *locaka*, in its function of giving a glossy appearance to the skin it is called *bhrājaka*. It is hot, liquid and blue or yellow, possesses bad smell, and after

¹ *etad dhi śalya-tantram, śalya-tantre ca vranṇṇ pradhāna-bhūtaḥ vranṇe ca duṣṭyeṣu madhye raktasya prādhānyam iti śoṇitopādānam (ibid.)*. Suśruta also uses the word *doṣa* to mean pus (*pūya*) (I. 5. 12).

² Suśruta, I. 21. 3 and 4. Ḍalhaṇa, commenting on this, writes: "*śukrārtavādi sahakāritayā deha-janakā abhipretāḥ*."

passing through unhealthy digestive actions tastes sour. Coming to *śleṣman*, Suśruta says that the stomach is its natural place; being watery, it flows downwards and neutralizes the bile-heat, which otherwise would have destroyed the whole body by its excessive heat. Being in *āmāśaya*, it works in the other centres of *śleṣman*, such as the heart, the tongue, the throat, the head and in all the joints of the body. The place of *vāyu* is the pelvic regions and the rectum (*śroni-guda-saṁśraya*); the main place of the blood, which is counted as *doṣa* by Suśruta, is regarded as being the liver and the spleen¹. I have noticed above, that in the *Atharva-Veda* mention is found of three kinds of diseases, the airy (*vātaja*), the dry (*śuṣma*) and the wet (*abhraja*)². In the *Caraka-saṁhitā* *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* are regarded as being produced from *kiṭṭa*, or secretions. They are thus regarded here as being of the nature of internal waste-products of unassimilated food-juice at the different stages of its assimilation, as chyle, flesh, etc., which have important physiological functions to perform for the preservation of the process of the growth of the body, when they are in due proportions, and they break up the body when they are in undue proportions. What exactly *kiṭṭa* means is difficult to determine. It may mean merely the part of the food-juice unassimilated as chyle, or the part of it unassimilated as blood, and so forth; or it may mean such unassimilated products, together with the secretions from the respective *dhātus*, which absorb the substantial part of the food-juice and throw off some of its impurities into the unabsorbed material; this at least is what *kiṭṭa* ought to mean, if it is interpreted as *dhātu-mala*, or impurities of *dhātus*. These secretions and waste-products form the source of most of the constructive and destructive forces of the body. The watery character of *kapha* and the fiery character of *pitta* are not ignored; but their essence or substance is considered to be secretive, or of the nature of waste-product. Suśruta, however, does not seem to refer to this secretive aspect, but he seems to have grasped the essential physiological activity of the body as being of the nature of digestive operation and the distribution of the heat and the products of digestion; and the analogy of cooking, as requiring fire, water and air, seems to have been well before his mind. Suśruta also seems to

¹ *Suśruta-saṁhitā*, I. 11. 8-16.

² *Ye abhrajā vātajā yaś ca śuṣmo* (*Atharva-Veda*, I. 12. 3); again, *agner ivāśya dahata eti śuṣmaṇaḥ* (*ibid.* VI. 20. 4).

have leant more towards the view of the physiological operations of the body as being due to elemental activities, the food-juice taking the place of earth and the other three principles being fire (*pitta*), water (*śleṣman*) and air (*vāta*). The reason why the principles of the body are here regarded as being transformations of fire, water and air is not explained by Suśruta. The supplementary *Uttara-tantra*, however, thinks that they are the three *guṇas*. Vāgbhaṭa, always fond of taking a middle course in his endeavour to reconcile the different attempts to grasp the principles under discussion, holds that they are comparable to the three *guṇas*, because, though opposed to one another, they also co-operate together; and, because diseases are but modifications of the *doṣas*, he further thinks that *doṣas*, *dhātus* and *dhātu-malas* are quite different entities; but he is unable to give any definite idea as to what these *doṣas* are. The person who seems to have had the most definite conception of the *doṣas* was Caraka. In the *Uttara-tantra* and by Vāgbhaṭa the Sāṃkhya analogy of the *guṇas* seems to have had a very distracting influence, and, instead of trying to find out the true physiological position of the *doṣas*, these writers explain away the difficulty by a vague reference to the Sāṃkhya *guṇas*.

Let us now return to Caraka. By him *vāyu* is described as being dry (*rukṣa*), cold (*śīta*), light (*laghu*), subtle (*sūkṣma*), moving (*cala*), scattering everything else in different directions (*viśada*) and rough (*khara*)¹. It is neutralized in the body by those things which have opposite qualities. In the healthy constructive process the *vāyu* is said to perform physiological functions as follows: it sustains the machinery of the body (*tantra-yantra-dharaḥ*), it manifests itself as *prāṇa*, *udāna*, *samāna* and *apāna* and is the generator of diverse kinds of efforts; it is the force which controls (*niyantā*) the mind from all undesirables and directs (*praṇetā*) it to all that is desirable, is the cause of the employment of the sense-organs, is the carrier of the stimulation of sense-objects, collects together

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 58. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says that, though *vāyu* is described as neither hot nor cold according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, yet, since it is found to increase by cold and decrease by heat, it is regarded as cold. Of course, when connected with *pitta* it is found to be hot, but that is on account of its association with the heat of *pitta* (*yoga-vāhivāt*). In the Vāta-kālā-kaliya chapter (I. 12. 4), six qualities of *vāta* are mentioned; *sūkṣma* is not mentioned, however, and, in place of *cala*, *dāruṇa* is mentioned. Cakrapāṇi says that *dāruṇa* means the same as *cala*. In the same chapter (I. 12. 7) *vāyu* is qualified as *śuṣīra-kara*, i.e. that which makes holes.

the *dhātus* of the body, harmonizes the functions of the body as one whole, is the mover of speech, is the cause of touch and sounds, as also of the corresponding sense-organs, the root of joy and mental energy, the air for the digestive fire, the healer of morbidities, the ejecter of extraneous dirt, the operating agent for all kinds of circulation, the framer of the shape of the foetus, and is, in short, identical with the continuity of life (*āyuso 'nuvṛtti-pratyaya-bhūta*). When it is in undue proportions, it brings about all sorts of troubles, weakens the strength, colour, happiness and life, makes the mind sad, weakens the functions of the sense-organs, causes malformations of the foetus, produces diseases and all emotions of fear, grief, delirium, etc., and arrests the functions of the *prāṇas*.

It is interesting to note how Vāyorveda describes the cosmic functions of air as the upholding of the earth, causing the burning of fire, the uniform motion of the planets and stars, the production of clouds, the showering of rains, the flow of rivers, the shaping of flowers and fruits, the shooting out of plants, the formation of the seasons, the formation of the strata of minerals, the production of the power of seeds to produce shoots, the growing up of crops, etc.¹ In the same discussion Mārīci considers fire to be contained in the *pitta* and productive of all good and bad qualities, digestion and indigestion, vision and blindness, courage and fear, anger, joy, ignorance, etc., according as it is in equilibrium or is disturbed. Kāpya maintains that *soma*, contained in *śleṣman*, produces all good and bad qualities, such as firmness and looseness of the body, fatness, leanness, energy and idleness, virility and impotence, knowledge and ignorance, etc.²

These discussions seem to indicate that before Ātreya's treatise was written attempts were made to explain the physiological functions of the body in health and disease by referring them to the operation of one operative principle. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* speaks of earth, water and fire as being world-principles of construction: the different *vāyus* were known as early as the *Atharva-Veda*, and *vāyu* is regarded in many of the Upaniṣads as the principle of life. It seems fairly certain that the theory of *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* is a later development of the view which regarded air (*pavana*), fire (*dahana*) and water (*toya*) as the fundamental constitutive principles of the body. Thus Suśruta refers to this view

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 12. 8.

² *Ibid.* I. 12. 11 and 12.

in III. 4. 80: "Some say that the constitution (*prakṛti*) of the human body is elemental (*bhautikī*), the three constitutive elements being air, fire and water¹." The advance of the medical schools of thought over these speculations and over others which consider the body to be a product of one *bhūta* or of many *bhūtas* is to be sought in this, that, besides allowing the material causes (*upādāna*) of the body to be the *dhātus*, they emphasized the necessity of admitting one or more inherent dynamic principles for the development and decay of the body. This explains how *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* are regarded both as *dhātu* and as *doṣa*, as *prakṛti* and as *vikṛti*. Thus Caraka says, as has already been mentioned, that from the time of the formation of the foetus the *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* are working, but in more or less diverse ways and in diverse systems, with equal *vāyu*, *pitta*, *mala* and *kapha* (*sama-pittāmila-kapha*) or different degrees of predominance of them as *vātala*, *pittala* and *śleṣmala*². Men of the *śleṣmala* type are generally healthy, whereas *vātala* and *pittala* persons are always of indifferent health. Later on, when there is a disease with the predominance of that *doṣa* which is predominant in man's constitution from his birth, the newly collected *doṣa* produces morbidity on the lines on which the predominating *doṣa* of his constitution is working; but this newly collected *doṣa* does not augment the corresponding original *doṣa*. The original *doṣa* is never increased, and, whatever may be the predominance of a *doṣa* due to any disease, the constitutional condition of the *doṣas* remains the same. Thus a *vāta-prakṛti* person does not become *śleṣma-prakṛti* or *pitta-prakṛti*, and vice-versa. The *doṣas* which are constitutional always remain as the

*prakṛtim iha narāṇām bhautikīm kecid āhuḥ
pavana-dahana-toyair kīrtitās tās tu tisrah.*

Suśruta, III. 4. 80.

² Caraka refers to a view that there are none who may be regarded as *sama-vāta-pitta-śleṣman* (or having equal *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman*). Since all men take various kinds of diet (*viśamāhāropayogitvāt*), they must be either *vāta-prakṛti*, *pitta-prakṛti*, or *śleṣma-prakṛti*. Against this Caraka says that *sama-vāta-pitta-śleṣman* is the same thing as health or freedom from disease (*aroga*). All medicines are applied for attaining this end, and there cannot be any doubt that such a state exists. Again, the terms *vāta-prakṛti*, *pitta-prakṛti* and *śleṣma-prakṛti* are incorrect; for *prakṛti* means health. What they mean by *vāta-prakṛti* is that *vāta* is quantitatively predominant (*ādhyakya-bhāvāt sā doṣa-prakṛtir ucyate*), and quantitative predominance is the same as *vikāra*; so the proper terms are *vātala*, *pittala*, etc. When a *vātala* person takes things which increase *vāta*, his *vāta* increases at once; but when he takes things which increase *pitta* or *śleṣman*, these do not increase in him as rapidly as *vāta* does. So in the case of a *pittala* person *pitta* increases rapidly when articles which increase *pitta* are taken, and so with regard to *śleṣman* (*Caraka-saṃhitā*, III. 6. 14-18).

constant part engaged in their physiological operations. The later accretion of the *doṣas* or their deficiency has a separate course of action in producing diseases, and there is no interchange between these later collections of *doṣas* or their deficiency and the constitutional constant parts of the *doṣas* known as *prakṛti*¹. The only sense (as Cakrapāṇi says) in which a *doṣa* is related to a constitutional (*prakṛti*) *doṣa* is that a *doṣa* grows strong in a system in which a corresponding *doṣa* is constitutionally predominant, and it grows weaker when the opposite is the case². It is not out of place in this connection to say that, though the *doṣas* are mutually opposed to one another, they do not always neutralize one another, and it is possible for them to grow simultaneously violent in a system. In the six seasons of rains (*varṣā*), autumn (*śarat*), late autumn (*hemanta*), winter (*śīta*), spring (*vasanta*) and summer (*grīṣma*) there is an alternate collection (*caya*), disturbance (*prakopa*) and lowering down (*praśama*) of the three *doṣas*, *pitta*, *śleṣman* and *vāyu* respectively. Thus, for example, in the rains (*varṣā*) there is collection of *pitta*, in the autumn (*śarat*) there is disturbance of *pitta*, in the harvesting season (*hemanta*) there is lowering of *pitta* and collection of *śleṣman*, in the summer there is collection of *vāta*, and so forth³. Contrasting the functions of the *doṣas* in the normal (*prakṛti*) and abnormal (*vikṛti*) states, Caraka says that in the normal state the heat of

¹ *Ibid.* 1. 7. 38-41. The passage *prakṛti-stham yadā pittam mārutaḥ śleṣmanāḥ kṣaye* (1. 17. 45) is often referred to in support of the view that the new accretions of *doṣas* affect the *prakṛti-doṣas*. But Cakrapāṇi explains it differently. He says that a disease may be caused by a *doṣa* which is not in excess of the constant constitutional quantity (*prakṛti-māna*) by virtue of the fact that it may be carried from one part of the body to another and thereby may produce a local accretion or excess, though the total quantity of *doṣa* may not be in excess.

² *samānām hi prakṛtiṃ prāpya doṣaḥ pravṛddha-balo bhavati, asamānām tu prāpya tathā balavān na syāt* (Cakrapāṇi on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, 1. 17. 62).

³ *Ibid.* 1. 17. 112. See also Cakrapāṇi's comments on these. Ḍalhana, in commenting on *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, 1. 21. 18, says that *sañcaya* of *doṣas* means aggregation or accumulation in general (*dehe 'tirupāṇyāddhīḥ cayaḥ*); *prakopa* of *doṣas* means that the accumulated *doṣas* are spread through the system (*vilayana-rūpā vṛddhiḥ prakopah*). The external signs of the *caya* of *vāta* are fullness of the stomach and want of motions; of *pitta* yellowish appearance and reduction of heat (*mandoṣnatā*); of *kapha* heaviness of the limbs and feeling of laziness. In all cases of *caya* there is a feeling of aversion to causes which increase the particular *doṣa* of which there has been *caya* (*caya-kāraṇa-vidveṣaś ca*). The stage of *caya* is the first stage of operation in the growth and prevention of diseases. If the *doṣas* can be removed or neutralized at this stage, there is no further disease. The usual indication of the disturbance (*prakopa*) of *vāyu* is disorders of the stomach; of *pitta*, acidity, thirst and burning; of *kapha*, aversion to food, palpitation (*hṛdayotkleda*), etc. The *prakopa* of blood (*śonita*) is always due to the *prakopa* of *vāta*, *pitta* or *kapha*. This is the second stage of the progress of diseases. The

pitta occasions digestion; *śleṣman* is strength and vitality, and *vāyu* is the source of all activities and the life of all living beings; but in the abnormal state *pitta* produces many diseases; *śleṣman* is the dirt of the system and the cause of many troubles, and *vāta* also produces many diseases and ultimately death. The places (*sthānāni*) at which the affections of *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* are mostly found are thus described by Caraka: of *vāta* the bladder, rectum, waist and the bones of the leg, but the smaller intestine (*pakvāsaya*) is its particular place of affection; of *pitta* sweat, blood and the stomach, of which the last is the most important; of *śleṣman* the chest, head, neck, the joints, stomach and fat, of which the chest is the most important. There are eighty affections of *vāta*, forty of *pitta* and twenty of *śleṣman*¹. But in each of these various affections of *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman* the special features and characteristics of the corresponding *doṣas* are found. Thus Caraka in I. 20. 12–23 describes certain symptoms as leading to a diagnosis of the disease as being due to the disturbance of *vāta*, *pitta* or *kapha*. But a question may arise as to what may consistently with this view be considered to be the nature of *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha*. Are they only hypothetical entities, standing as symbols of a number of symptoms without any real existence? In such an interpretation reality would belong to the symptoms, and the agents of morbidity, or the *doṣas*, would only be convenient symbols for collecting certain groups of these symptoms under one name. Wherever there is one particular set of symptoms, it is to be considered that there is disturbance of *vāyu*; wherever there is another set of symptoms, there is disturbance of *pitta*, and so

third stage is called *prasāra*. At this stage there is something like a fermentation of the *doṣas* (*paryuṣita-kīnvodaka-piṣṭa-samavāya iva*). This is moved about by *vāyu*, which though inanimate, is the cause of all motor activities. When a large quantity of water accumulates at any place, it breaks the embankment and flows down and joins on its way with other streams and flows on all sides; so the *doṣas* also flow, sometimes alone, sometimes two conjointly, and sometimes all together. In the whole body, in the half of it, or in whatever part the fermented *doṣas* spread, there the symptoms of diseases are showered down, as it were, like water from the clouds (*doṣo vikāraṃ nabhasi meghavat tatra varṣati*). When one *doṣa*, e.g. *vāyu*, spreads itself in the natural place of another *doṣa*, e.g. *pitta*, the remedy of the latter will remove the former (*vāyoh pitta-sthānagatasya pittavat pratikārah*). The difference between *prakopa* and *prasāra* is thus described by Dālhaṇa: just as when butter is first stirred up, it moves a little; this slight movement is like *prakopa*; but, when it is continuously and violently stirred to flow out, in froths and foams, it may then be called *prasāra* (*Suśruta-saṃhitā*, I. 21. 18–32). The fourth stage is when the *pūrva-rūpa* is seen, and the fifth stage is the stage of *rūpa* or *vyādhi* (disease) (*ibid.* 38, 39).

¹ Caraka-saṃhitā, I. 20. 11.

forth. But there are serious objections against such an interpretation. For, as we have shown above, there are many passages where these *doṣas* are described as secretions and waste-products, which in their normal proportions sustain and build the body and in undue proportions produce diseases and may ultimately break up the system. These passages could not be satisfactorily explained upon the above interpretation. Moreover, there are many passages which describe *pitta* and *kapha* as entities having a particular colour and material consistency, and it is also said that there are particular places in the body where they collect, and this would be impossible upon the interpretation that they are not real entities, but hypothetical, having only a methodological value as being no more than convenient symbols for a collective grasp of different symptoms¹.

The attribution of a certain number of specific qualities to the *doṣas* is due to a belief that the qualities of effects are due to the qualities of causes. So, from the diverse qualities of our bodies considered as effects, the causes were also considered as having those qualities from which those of the effects were derived. Thus, in connection with the description of the qualities of *vāta*, Caraka says that on account of the qualities of *rauḥṣya* the bodies of those having congenital *vāta* tendency are rough, lean and small, and

¹ The secretory character of these *doṣas* is amply indicated by such passages as those which regard *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman* as requiring some space in the stomach for digesting the food materials, e.g. *ekaṃ punar vāta-pitta-śleṣmanām* (*ibid.* III. 2. 3); *śleṣma hi snigdha-ślakṣṇa-mṛdu-madhura-sāra-sāndra-manda-stimīta-guru-śīta-vijjalācchaḥ* (*śleṣman* is smooth, pleasing, soft, sweet, substantial, compact, inert, benumbed, heavy, cold, moist and transparent—*ibid.* III. 8. 14. 7. 5); *pittam uṣṇaṃ tīkṣṇaṃ dravaṃ visraṃ amlaṃ kaṭukaṃ ca* (*pitta* is hot, sharp and liquid, and possesses bad odour, and is acid and pungent and bitter—*ibid.* III. 8. 14. 7. 6); *vātas tu rūkṣa-laghu-cala-bahu-śīghra-śīta-paruṣa-viśadaḥ* (*vāta* is rough, light, moving, manifold, quick, cold, coarse and scattering—*ibid.* III. 8. 14. 7. 7).

It must, however, be noted that the translation I have given of some of these words cannot be regarded as satisfactory; for in the translation I could only give one sense of a word, which in the original Sanskrit has been used in a variety of senses which the word has. Thus, for example, I have translated *rūkṣa* as "rough." But it also means "slim," "lean," "having insomnia," or (of a voice) "broken," and so forth. There is no English synonym which would have so many senses. Mahāmahopādhyāya Kaviraj Gaṇanātha Sen, of Calcutta, tries to divide the *doṣas* into two classes, invisible (*sūkṣma*) and visible (*sthūla*)—*Siddhānta-mīdāna*, pp. 9-11. But though such a distinction can doubtless be made, it has not been so distinguished in the medical literature, as it is of little value from the medical point of view; it also does not help us to understand the real nature of the *doṣas*. The nature and the functions of the *doṣas* do not depend in the least on their visibility or invisibility, nor can the visible *doṣa* be regarded as always the product of the invisible one.

the voices of such people are rough, weak, grating, slow and broken, and they cannot sleep well (*jāgarūka*); again, on account of the quality of lightness of *vāyu*, the movements of a man with congenital *vāta* tendency would be light and quick, and so would be all his efforts, eating, speech, and so forth. It is easy to see that the resemblance of the qualities of *vāyu* to the qualities of the body is remote; yet, since the special features and characteristics of one's body were considered as being due to one or the other of the body-building agents, these characteristics of the body were through remote similarity referred to them.

There is another point to be noted in connection with the enumeration of the qualities of the *doṣas*. The disturbance of a *doṣa* does not necessarily mean that all its qualities have been exhibited in full strength; it is possible that one or more of the qualities of a *doṣa* may run to excess, leaving others intact. Thus *vāyu* is said to possess the qualities of *rūkṣa*, *laghu*, *cala*, *bahu*, *śighra*, *śīta*, etc., and it is possible that in any particular case the *śīta* quality may run to excess, leaving others undisturbed, or so may *śīta* and *rūkṣa*, or *śīta*, *rūkṣa* and *laghu*, and so forth. Hence it is the business of the physician not only to discover which *doṣa* has run to excess, but also to examine which qualities of which *doṣa* have run to excess. The qualities of *doṣas* are variable, i.e. it is possible that a *doṣa* in its state of disturbance will remain a *doṣa*, and yet have some of its qualities increased and others decreased. The nature of the disturbance of a *doṣa* is determined by the nature of the disturbance of the qualities involved (*aṁśāṁśa-vikalpa*)¹. The natural inference from such a theory is that, since the entities having this or that quality are but component parts of a *doṣa*, a *doṣa* cannot be regarded as a whole homogeneous in all its parts. On this view a *doṣa* appears to be a particular kind of secretion which is a mixture of a number of different secretions having different qualities, but which operate together on the same lines. When a particular *doṣa* is in a healthy order, its component entities are in certain definite proportions both with regard to themselves and to

¹ *Caraka-saṁhitā*, II. 1. 10. 4. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says: “*tatra doṣāṇāmaṁśāṁśu-vikalpoyuthā—vāteprakūpīte* ’*pi kadācid vātasya śītāṁśo balavān bhavati, kadācil laghu-aṁśaḥ, kadācid rūkṣāṁśaḥ kadācil laghu-rūkṣāṁśaḥ.*” The *doṣa* or *doṣas* which become prominently disturbed in a system are called *anubandhya*, and the *doṣa* or *doṣas* which at the time of diseases are not primarily disturbed are called *anubandha*. When three of the *doṣas* are jointly disturbed, it is called *sannipāta*, and when two are so disturbed it is called *samsarga* (*ibid.* III. 6. 11).

the total *doṣa*. But, when it is disturbed, some of the component secretions may increase in undue proportions, while others may remain in the normal state; of course, the quantity of the whole *doṣa* may also increase or decrease. A *doṣa* such as *kapha* or *pitta* should therefore be regarded as a name for a collection of secretions rather than one secretion of a homogeneous character. It will be easily seen that, on taking into consideration the comparative strengths of the different components of a *doṣa* and the relative strengths of the other components of other *doṣas* and the relative strengths and proportions of each of the *doṣas* amongst themselves, the number of combinations is innumerable, and the diseases proceeding from such combinations are also innumerable. The whole system of Caraka's treatment depends upon the ascertainment of the nature of these affections; the names of diseases are intended to be mere collective appellations of a number of affections of a particular type¹.

One further point which ought to be noted with regard to the constructive and destructive operations of *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* is that they are independent agents which work in unison with a man's *karma* and also in unison with a man's mind. The operations of the mind and the operations of the body, as performed by *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* on the materials of the *dhātus*, *rasa*, *rakta*, etc., run parallel to each other; for both follow the order of human *karma*, but neither of them is determined by the other, though they correspond to each other closely. This psycho-physical parallelism is suggested throughout Caraka's system. Caraka, in trying to formulate it, says: "*śārīram api satvaṁ anuvīdhīyate satvaṁ ca śārīram*" (the mind corresponds to the body and the body to the mind). It may be remembered in this connection that the ultimate cause of all *dhātu-vaiṣaṇya* or *abhighāta* (bodily injuries through accidents, a fall and the like) is foolish action (*prajñā-parādha*). Again *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* are found to perform not only physical operations, but also intellectual operations of various kinds. But all intellectual operations belong properly to mind. What is meant by attributing intellectual functions to *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* seems to be a sort of psycho-physical parallelism, mind corresponding to body, body corresponding to mind, and both corresponding to *karma*.

¹ *yad vātārabdhavādi-jñānam eva kāraṇam rogāṇāṁ cikitsāyām upakāri; nāma-jñānam tu vyavahāra-mātra-prayojanārtham* (Cakrapāṇi on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 18. 53).

Head and Heart¹.

The most vital centres of the body are the head, the heart and the pelvis (*vasti*). The *prāṇas*, i.e. the vital currents, and all the senses are said to depend (*śritāḥ*) on the head². The difference between head (*śiṛṣa*) and brain (*mastiṣka*) was known as early as the *Atharva-Veda*. Thus in A.V. x. 2. 6 the word *śiṛṣa* is used in the sense of "head," and in verses 8 and 26 of the same hymn the word *mastiṣka* is used in the sense of "brain³." Head-disease is also mentioned in the *Atharva-Veda*, I. 12. 3, as *śiṛṣakti*. The brain-matter is called *mastuluṅga* in *Caraka-saṃhitā*, VIII. 9. 101; the word *mastiṣka* is used in the same chapter in the sense of brain-matter (VIII. 9. 80), as has also been explained by Cakrapāṇi⁴. The passage from Caraka, VIII. 9. 4, quoted above shows that at least Dṛḍhabala considered the head to be the centre of the senses and all sense currents and life currents. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting upon this passage, says that, though the currents of sensation and life pass through other parts of the body as well, yet they are particularly connected with the head (*śiṛasi viśeṣeṇa prabaddhāni*), because, when there is an injury to the head, they are also injured. According to Caraka and Dṛḍhabala all the senses are particularly connected with the head, as well as the *prāṇas*, but the heart is regarded as the vital centre of the *prāṇas*, as well as of the *manas*, as I shall point out later on. Bhela, who is as old as Caraka, considers the brain to be the centre of the *manas*, a view which is, so far as I know, almost unique in the field of Sanskrit

¹ The different names of the heart in *Caraka-saṃhitā* are *mahat*, *artha*, *hṛdaya* (I. 30. 3).

² Cakrapāṇi, however, explains it as *śritā iva śritāḥ*, i.e. "as if they depended on" (I. 17. 12), because, when the head is hurt, all the senses are hurt. It is said in *ibid.* vi. 26. 1 that there are one hundred and seven vital centres (*marma*), and of these the three most important are the head, the heart and the pelvis. Also in VIII. 9. 16, *hṛdi mūrdhni ca vastau ca nṛṇām prāṇāḥ pratiṣṭhītāḥ*. In VIII. 9. 4 it is distinctly said that all the senses and the currents of senses and *prāṇa* are dependent on the head as the rays of the sun are dependent on the sun—*śiṛasi indriyāṇi indriya-prāṇa-vahāni ca srotāṃsi sūryam iva gabhastayaḥ saṃśritāni*.

³ "Which was that god who (produced) his brain, his forehead, his hindhead (*kakāṭika*), who first his skull, who, having gathered a gathering in man's jaw, ascended to heaven" (A.V. x. 2. 8). "Atharvan, having sewed together his head (*mūrdhānam*) and also his heart, aloft from the brain the purifying one sent (them) forth, out of the head" (*ibid.* 26). (Whitney's translation, Harvard oriental series.)

⁴ *Mastiṣkam śiro-majjū*. Cakrapāṇi, VIII. 9. 80 of *Caraka-saṃhitā*. The word *mastiṣka* is sometimes, though rarely, used in the sense of head, as in the passage quoted by Cakrapāṇi in VIII. 9. 80—*mastiṣke 'ṣṭāṅgulam paṭtam*.

literature. He says that *manas*, which is the highest of all senses (*sarvendriya-param*), has its seat between the head and the palate (*śiras-tālv-antara-gatam*). Being situated there, it knows all the sense-objects (*viśayān indriyāṇām*) and the tastes which come near it (*rasādikān samīpa-sthān*). The original cause of *manas* and the energy of all the senses and the cause of all feelings and judgments (*buddhi*), the *citta*, is situated in the heart. The *citta* is also the cause of all motor functions and activities, such that those who are possessed of good *cittas* follow a good course and those who are possessed of bad *cittas* follow a bad course. The *manas* knows the *citta*, and thence proceeds the choice of action; then comes the understanding, deciding what is worth doing and what is not. *Buddhi*, or understanding, is the understanding of certain actions as good (*śubha*) and certain others as bad (*aśubha*)¹. It seems plain that Bhela distinguishes between *manas*, *citta* and *buddhi*. Of these *manas* is entirely different from *citta* and, so far as can be made out from Bhela's meagre statements, it is regarded as the cause of all cognitions and as having its seat in the brain. The *citta* was regarded as the cause of all activities, feelings and judgments, and the heart was regarded as its seat. *Buddhi* was probably the determinate understanding and judgment which was but a function of the *citta*. Bhela says that the *doṣas* in the brain affect the *manas*, and, as a result of this, the heart is affected, and from the affections of the heart the understanding (*buddhi*) is affected, and this leads to madness². In another passage, while describing the different functions of *pitta*, Bhela says that there is a special kind of *ālocaka pitta* called the *caḥsur-vaiśeṣika*, which, by bringing about the contact of *manas* with the soul, causes cognition and, transmitting it to the *citta*, produces the discriminative visual knowledge by which different objects are comprehended by the eye. The

¹ *śiras-tālv-antara-gatam sarvendriya-param manah tatra-stham tad dhi viśayān indriyāṇām rasādikān...kāraṇam sarva-buddhinām cittam hṛdaya-saṁśṛitam kriyāṇām cetarāsāṁ ca cittam sarvasya kāraṇam*. Bhela's chapter on "Ummāda-cikitsitam." Calcutta University edition, p. 149.

²

*ūrdhvam prakupitā doṣāḥ
śiras-tālv-antare sthitāḥ,
mānasam dūṣayanty āśu
tataś cittam vipadyate
citte vyāpadam āpamne
buddhir nāśam niyacchati
tatas tu buddhi-vyāpattau
kāryākāryam na budhyate
evam pravartate vyādhir
ummādo nāma dāruṇaḥ.*

judgmental state, however, is different, and it is produced by a special kind of *ālocaka pitta* called the *buddhi-vaiśeṣika*, which is situated at the point between the eyebrows, and, being there, holds together the subtle forms emanating from the self (*susūkṣmān arthān ātma-kṛtān*), associates the data (*dhārayati*), integrates them with other similar known facts (*pratyudāharati*), remembers the past, and, after producing our knowledge in conceptual and judgmental forms, wills for future realization, generates instructive actions, and is the force which operates in meditation (*dhyāna*) and restraint of thoughts (*dhāraṇā*)¹.

Suśruta does not state anything of importance concerning the brain; but there seems to be little doubt that he knew that particular nerves in the head were connected with particular sense functions. Thus he says in III. 6. 28 that there are two nerves (*śīrā*) lower down the ears on their back, called *vidhurā*, which, if cut, would produce deafness; on both sides of the nasal aperture inside the nasal organ there are two nerves called *phaṇa*, which, if cut, would destroy the sensation of smell; at the back of the eyebrows, below the eyes, there are the nerves called the *apāṅga*, which, if cut, would produce blindness. All these cognitive nerves meet in passing at the centre of the eyebrow (*śṛṅgātaka*)². He further says that the nerves are attached to the brain inside the skull on the upper part of it (*mastakābhyantaropariṣṭhāt śīrā-sandhi-sannipāta*) and this place, called the *romāvarta*, is the supreme superintendent (*adhipati*). Caraka says that the head is the place for the senses. It cannot be decided whether he took this in any deeper sense or whether he means simply that the sense-organs of ear, eyes, nose and taste are situated in the head.

Caraka considers the heart (*hṛdaya*) to be the only seat of consciousness³. The seats of *prāṇa* are said to be the head, throat, heart, navel, rectum, bladder, the vital fluid *ojas*, semen, blood and flesh⁴. In I. 19. 3 Caraka, however, excludes navel and flesh and includes the temples (*śaṅkha*) in their place. It is difficult to determine what is exactly meant by *prāṇa* here. But in all probability the word is used here in a general way to denote the vital parts. In I. 30. 4 and 5 Caraka says that the whole body with

¹ Bhela's chapter on "*Puruṣa-mīśaya*," p. 81.

² *ghrāṇa-śrotākṣi-jihvā-santarpaṇīnām śīrāṇām madhye śīrā-sannipātaḥ śṛṅgātakāni*. Suśruta-saṃhitā, III. 6. 28.

³ Caraka-saṃhitā, IV. 7. 8, *hṛdayam cetanādhiṣṭhānam ekam*.

⁴ *Ibid.* 9.

the four extremities, the trunk, and the head, collectively called *ṣaḍ-aṅga*, knowledge (*vijñāna*), the senses, the sense-objects, the self, *manas* and the objects of thought (*cintya*), are all supported (*saṁśrita*) by the heart, just as a house is supported by pillars and rafters¹. It is plain, as Cakrapāṇi explains, that the body cannot subsist in the heart. What is meant is that, when all is well with the heart, it is well with all the rest. Caraka holds that the *manas* and the soul reside in the heart and so also do cognition, pleasure and pain, not, however, in the sense that the heart is the place where these reside, but in the sense that they depend on the heart for their proper functioning; if the heart is wrong, they also go wrong, if the heart is well, they also work well. Just as rafters are supported by pillars, so are they all supported by the heart. But Cakrapāṇi does not seem to agree with this view of Caraka, and he holds that, since the heart is affected by strong thoughts, pleasure and pain, the mind and the soul actually reside in the heart and so do pleasure and pain. The self, which is the cause of all knowledge of sense-objects and the upholder (*dhārin*) of the system, resides in the heart. It is for this reason that, if a man is struck in the heart, he swoons away, and, if the heart bursts, he dies. It is also the place of the supreme vitality (*param ojas*)². The heart is also regarded as the place where all consciousness is concentrated (*tatra caitanya-saṁgrahaḥ*). Caraka says that the heart is the centre of the *prāṇa* currents (*prāṇa-vahānām srotasām hṛdayam mūlam*, III. 5. 9) and also of the currents of mental activity (II. 7. 3). In the *Aśmāra-nidāna* (II. 8. 4) Caraka speaks of the heart as being the supreme place of the inner self (*antar-ātmanah śreṣṭham āyatanam*).

It may not be out of place here to point out that the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (I. 6. 1) also speaks of the heart as being the space where

¹ *Caraka-saṁhitā*, I. 30. 5.

² Cakrapāṇi says that the mention of *param ojas* here proves that Caraka believed in another, *aparam ojas*. The total quantity of *aparam ojas* in the body is half a handful (*urdhūñjali-parimāṇa*), while that of *param ojas* is only eight drops of a white-red and slightly yellowish liquid in the heart. The *dhamanīs* of the heart contain half a handful of *aparam ojas*, and in the disease known as *prameha* (urinary disease) it is this *ojas* that is wasted; but even with waste of this *ojas* a man may live, whereas with the slightest waste of the *param ojas* a man cannot live. *Ojas* ought not to be regarded as the eighth *dhātu*; for it only supports (*dhārayati*) the body, but does not nourish it. *Ojas*, however, is sometimes used also in the sense of *rasa* (*Caraka-saṁhitā* I. 30. 6, Cakrapāṇi's commentary). See also *ibid.* I. 17. 74 and 75 and Cakrapāṇi's comment on the same. *Ojas* is, however, regarded in the *Atharva-Veda*, II. 17, as the eighth *dhātu*.

manomaya puruṣa, i.e. the mind-person, resides. In many other Upaniṣads the heart is the centre of many *nāḍis*, or channels¹. Śaṅkara, in explaining *Bṛh.* II. 1. 19, says that the *nāḍis* or *śīrās*, called *hitā*, which are developed out of the food-juice and are 272,000 in number, emanate from the heart and spread over the whole body (*purītat*)². The *buddhi* resides in the heart and from there controls the external senses. Thus, for example, at the time of hearing in the awakened state the *buddhi* passes through these *nāḍis* to the ear and from there expands the auditory organ and superintends it. When the *buddhi* thus expands, we have the state of awakening, when it contracts, the state of deep sleep (*susupti*).

The Circulatory and the Nervous System.

The names *śīrā* (also *hirā*) and *dhamanī*, of two different kinds of channels in the body, seem to have been distinguished at a period as early as the *Atharva-Veda*³. The *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* describes the *hitā nāḍis* of the heart as being as fine as a thousandth part of a hair, and they are said to carry white, blue, yellow and green liquids; Śaṅkara, commenting on this, says that these various colours are due to the various combinations of *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman* which the *nāḍis* carry⁴. He states that the seventeen elements (five *bhūtas*, ten senses, *prāṇa* and *antaḥkaraṇa*) of the subtle body, which is the support of all instinctive desires, abide

¹ See *Bṛh.* II. 1. 19, IV. 2. 2 and 3, IV. 3. 20, IV. 4. 8 and 9; *Chānd.* VIII. 6. 6; *Kaṭha*, VI. 16; *Kaus.* IV. 19; *Muṇḍ.* II. 2. 6; *Maitrī*, Bibliotheca Indica, 1870, VI. 21, VII. 11; *Praśna*, III. 6 and 7.

² The word *purītat* means principally the covering of the heart. But Śaṅkara takes it here to mean the whole body.

³ *śatam hirāṇ sahasraṃ dhamanī uta. Atharva-Veda*, VII. 36. 2. Sāyaṇa explains *hirā* as *garbha-dhāraṇārtham antar-avasthītāḥ sūkṣmā nāḍyaḥ* and *dhamanī* as *garbhāśayasya avasthambhikā sthūlā nāḍyaḥ. Atharva-Veda*, I. 17. 1, 2, also seems to distinguish *hirā* from *dhamanī*. In I. 17. 1 the *hirās* are described as being of red garments (*lohita-vāsasah*), which Sāyaṇa explains as *lohitasya rudhīrasya nīvāsa-bhūtā hi* (the abode of blood) and paraphrases as *rajo-vahana-nāḍyaḥ*. It seems, therefore, that the larger ducts were called *dhamanīs*. In I. 17. 3 the *Atharva-Veda* speaks of hundreds of *dhamanīs* and thousands of *hirās*.

⁴ *Bṛh.* IV. 3. 20, with Śaṅkara's commentary. Ānandagiri, in commenting on the same, quotes a passage from *Suśruta* which is substantially the same as *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 7. 18, to show that those *śīrās* which carry *vāta* are rosy (*aruṇa*), those which carry *pitta* are blue, those which carry blood are red, and those which carry *śleṣman* are white:

*aruṇāḥ śīrā vāta-vahā nīlāḥ pitta-vahāḥ śīrāḥ
asṛg-vahās tu rohiṇyo gauryaḥ śleṣma-vahāḥ śīrāḥ.*

in these *nāḍis*. In *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, IV. 2. 3 it is said that there is the finest essence of food-juice inside the cavity of the heart; it is this essence which, by penetrating into the finest *nāḍis*, serves to support the body. It is surrounded by a network of *nāḍis*. From the heart it rushes upwards through the extremely fine *hitā nāḍis*, which are rooted in the heart. *Chāndogya*, VIII. 6. 6 speaks of 101 *nāḍis* proceeding from the heart, of which one goes towards the head¹. In *Mund.* II. 2. 6 it is said that, like spokes in a wheel, the *nāḍis* are connected with the heart. *Praśna*, III. 6 and 7, however, says that in the heart there are one hundred *nāḍis* and in each of these are twenty-two hundred branches and the *vyāna vāyu* moves through these. The *Maitrī Upaniṣad* mentions the *suṣumnā nāḍī* proceeding upwards to the head, through which there is a flow of *prāṇa*². None of these passages tell us anything definite about the *nāḍis*. All that can be understood from these passages is that they are some kind of ducts, through which blood and other secretions flow, and many of these are extremely fine, being about the thousandth part of a hair in breadth. The *naḍa*, or hollow reed, is described in the *Rg-Veda* (VIII. 1. 33) as growing in ponds and in the *Atharva-Veda* (IV. 19. 1) as being *vārṣika*, or "produced in the rains." This word may have some etymological relation with *nāḍī*³. In another place it is said that women break *naḍa* with stones and make mats out of them⁴. The word *nāḍī* is also used in the *Atharva-Veda* in the sense of "ducts"⁵. In *Atharva-Veda*, V. 18. 8 the word *nāḍikā* is used

¹ This passage is sometimes referred to in later literature to show that the *suṣumnā nāḍī*, which goes towards the head, was known as early as the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. See also *Kaṭha*, VI. 16.

² *Ūrdhva-gā nāḍī suṣumnākhyā prāṇa-saṃcārīṇī*. *Maitrī*, VI. 21. Sāyaṇa, in his commentary on A.V. I. 17. 3, quotes the following verse:

*madhya-sthāyāḥ suṣumnāyāḥ parva-pañcaka-saṃbhavāḥ
śākhopasākhātām prāptūḥ śirā lakṣa-trayāt param
ardha-lakṣam iti prāhuḥ sarīrārtha-vicārakāḥ.*

³ Macdonell makes the following remarks in his *Vedic Index*, vol. I, p. 433: "*Naḍa* is found in several passages of the *Rg-Veda* (I. 32. 8; 179. 4; II. 34. 3; VIII. 69. 2; X. 11. 2; 105. 4) but its sense is still obscure. It is identified by Pischel (*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 35, 717 *et seq.*; *Vedische Studien*, I. 183 *et seq.*) with *Naḍa*, being explained by him in one passage (I. 32. 8). Here Caland and Henry, *L'Agniṣṭoma*, p. 313 would read *naḷam*. See also Wackernagel, *Altindische Grammatik*, I. 173, as a reed boat, which is split, and over which the waters go, etc."

⁴ *yathā naḍam kaṣipune striyo bhindanty aśmanā* (*Atharva-Veda*, VI. 138. 5).

⁵ In the *Atharva-Veda*, VI. 138. 4, the *nāḍis* are described as ducts over the testes, through which the seminal fluid flows: *ye te nāḍyau deva-krte yayoḥ tiṣṭhati vṛṣṇyam te te bhīnadmi* (I break with a stone upon a stone those two ducts of yours

to denote the speech organ (*vāk*). The word *dhamanī* is used in *Rg-Veda*, II. 11. 8 and is paraphrased by Sāyaṇa as sound (*śabda*) and by Macdonell as "reed" or "pipe¹." If Sāyaṇa's explanations are to be accepted, then in A.V. II. 33. 6 the word *snāva* means fine *śīrās* (*sūkṣmāḥ-śīrāḥ*) and *dhamanī* the larger ducts (*dhamanī-śabdena sthūlāḥ*). In VI. 90. 5 one hundred *dhamanīs* are said to surround the body of a person suffering from colic or gout (*śūla*), and Sāyaṇa paraphrases *dhamanī* here as *nāḍī*. In *Chāndogya*, III. 19. 2, the rivers are said to be *dhamanīs* (*yā dhamanayas tā nāḍyaḥ*), and Śaṅkara paraphrases *dhamanī* as *śīrā*. I have already referred to the use of the word *hirā* in the *Atharva-Veda*; the word is also used in the *Rg-Veda*².

The above references show that *nāḍīs*, *śīrās* (or *hirās*) and *dhamanīs* were all ducts in the body, but sometimes the *nāḍīs* or *śīrās* had also the special sense of finer channels, whereas the *dhamanīs* were the larger ducts. I shall now come to Caraka: it will be found that there was not much advance towards a proper understanding of the significance of their distinction and functions.

Caraka plainly regards *dhamanīs*, *śīrās* and *srotas* (secretory currents) as ducts and thinks that different names are applied to them on account of their different functions. He says that the roots of the ten *dhamanīs* are in the heart. These carry throughout the body the *ojas*, by which all people live and without which they all die. It is the essence by which the foetus is formed, and which goes to the heart at a later stage, when the heart is formed; when it is lost, life also ceases to exist; it is the essence of the body and the seat of the *prāṇus*. These ducts are called *dhamanīs*, because they are filled with chyle from outside; they are called *srotas*, because the chyle, etc. which nourish the body are secreted (*sraṇāt*) out of these; and they are called *śīrā*,

made by God over your two testes, through which your semen flows). In X. 7. 15 and 16, the hollows of the seas are described as *nāḍīs* (*samudro yasya nāḍyaḥ*), and so also the interspace of the quarters of the sky (*yasya catasraḥ pradiśo nāḍyaḥ*).

¹ "Dhamanī, 'reed,' appears to denote 'pipe' in a passage of the *Rg-Veda* (II. 11. 8) and in a citation appearing in the *Nirukta* (VI. 24)." *Vedic Index*, vol. I, p. 390. The word *śīrā* is spelt with a palatal "ś" in Caraka and with a dental in the Vedas, and it has therefore been differently spelt in this chapter in different contexts.

² *tvaṃ vjtram āśayānaṃ śīrāsu maho vajreṇa śiṣvapaḥ*. R.V. I. 121. 11. The word *dhamanī* is spelt with a long "ī" in Caraka and with a short "i" in the *Atharva-Veda*.

because they go (*saraṇāt śīrāḥ*) to the different parts of the body¹. The ten *dhamanīs* spread out in manifold branches throughout the body. In the *Caraka-saṃhitā* *srotas* means properly the path through which the successive evolutionary products of the body-constituents (*dhātus*) or other kinds of secretion run and accumulate together with elements of their own types². Cakrapāṇi explains it thus: The transformation into blood takes place in connection with chyle (*rasa*). The coming together of *rasa* with blood at a different part of the body cannot take place without a path of transmission, called *srotas*. So the transformation of *dhātus* takes place through the function of this path of transmission. So for each kind of product there is a separate *srotas*. *Vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* may be said to go about through all the *srotas*, though there are, no doubt, special channels for each of the three³. Gaṅgādhara, however, takes the *srotas* as being the apertures through which the *dhātus* and other waste-products flow⁴. In whatever way it may be looked at, the *srotas* is, according to Caraka, nothing but the duct of the *dhamanīs*. Caraka opposes the view of those who think that the body is nothing but a collection of *srotas*, for the simple reason that the substances which pass through these *srotas* and the parts of the body where they are attached are certainly different from the *srotas* themselves. There are separate *srotas* for the flow of *prāṇu*, water, food-juice, blood, flesh, fat, bony materials, marrow, semen, urine, excreta and sweat; *vāta*, *pitta* and *śleṣman*, however, flow through the body and all the channels (*sarva-srotāṃsi ayana-bhūtāni*). For the supply of materials for the suprasensual elements of the body, such as *manas*, etc., the whole of the living body serves as a channel⁵. The heart is the root of all

¹ *dhmānād dhamanyaḥ sraṇāṇāt srotāṇsi saraṇāt śīrāḥ*. *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 30. II.

² *Ibid.* III. 5. 3.

³ *Doṣāṇāṃ tu sarva-śarīra-caratvena yathā-sthūla-sroto 'bhūdhāne 'pi sarva-srotāṃsy eva gamanārthaṃ vaksyante . . vātādīnāṃ api pradhāna bhūtādhamanyaḥ santi eva*. Cakrapāṇi's comment on *ibid.*

⁴ *āhāra-pariṇāma-raso hi srotasāṃ chidra-rūpaṃ panthānaṃ vinā gantuṃ na śaknoti, na ca srotas chidra-pathena gamanaṃ vinā tad-uttarottara-dhātutvena paripamati*, etc. Gaṅgādhara's *Jalpa-kalpa-taru* on *ibid.*

⁵ Gaṅgādhara, in commenting on this passage (*Caraka-saṃhitā*, III. 5. 7), "*tadvad atīndriyāṇāṃ punaḥ sattvādīnāṃ kevalaṃ cetanāvac charīram ayana-bhūtāṃ adhiṣṭhāna-bhūtaṃ ca*," says, "*mana ātmā śrotra-sparśana-nayana-rasaṇa-ghrāṇa-buddhy-ahāṅkāradīnāṃ kevalaṃ cetanāvat sajjvaṃ śarīra-sroto 'yana-bhūtaṃ adhiṣṭhāna-bhūtaṃ ca*." There are several passages in Caraka where we hear of *mano-vaha* currents (currents carrying *manas*); if *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahāṅkāra*, etc. can all be carried in currents, they must be considered as having some material spatial existence. These *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahāṅkāra* may be *atīndriya*, but they are not on that account non-physical.

prāṇa channels, i.e. the channels of the *prāṇa vāyu*; for *vāyu* in general moves through all parts of the body. When these are affected, there is either too much or too little respiration; the respiration may be very slow or very quick, and it is attended with sound and pain. From these signs therefore one can infer that the *prāṇa* channels have been affected. The source of water channels is the palate, and the seat of thirst is in the heart (*kloma*)¹. When these are affected, the tongue, palate, lips, throat and *kloma* become dried up, and there is great thirst. The stomach is the source of all currents carrying food, and, when these are affected, there is no desire for food, but indigestion, vomiting and the like. The heart is the source, and the ten *dhamanīs* are the paths, of the chyle (*rasa*) currents. The liver and spleen are the source of blood currents. The tendons and skin are the sources of flesh currents. The kidneys are the sources of fat channels; fat and pelvis, of bone channels; the bones and joints, of marrow channels; the testes and penis, of semen channels; the bladder, the pubic and the iliac regions, of urine channels; the intestines and the rectum, of the excreta channels, and the fat and pores of hairs, of perspiration channels². It is curious, however, to note that, in spite of the fact that here the *śīrās* and *dhamanīs* are regarded as synonymous, their number is differently counted in iv. 7. 13, where it is said that there are two hundred *dhamanīs* and seven hundred *śīrās*, and the finer endings of these are counted as 29,956. It is reasonable to suppose, in accordance with the suggestions found in the *Atharva-Veda*, that, though the *dhamanīs* and *śīrās* were regarded by Caraka as having the same functions, the former were larger than the latter³. Gaṅgādhara, in commenting on this passage, says that *śīrās*, *dhamanīs* and *srotas* are different on account of their being different in number and of their having different functions and different appearances. It is well known that a distinction between *śīrās* and *dhamanīs* is drawn by Suśruta, to which I shall presently refer, but Caraka positively denies any such distinction; and this

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, III. 5. 10. Cakrapāṇi explains it (*kloma*) as *hṛdaya-stham pipāsā-sthānam*, and Gaṅgādhara as the point of conjunction between the throat and the heart (*kaṇṭhorasoḥ sandhiḥ*).

² The synonyms for *srotas* given by Caraka are *śīrā*, *dhamanī*, *rasa-vāhini*, *nāḍī*, *panthā*, *mārga*, *śarīra-chidra*, *saṃvṛtāsaṃvṛtāni* (open at the root, but closed at the end), *sthāna*, *āśaya* and *niketa*.

³ There is one passage of Dṛḍhabala (*Caraka-saṃhitā*, VI. 29. 23) which seems to draw a distinction between *śīrās* and *dhamanīs*; for there, as a symptom of a disease, it is said that the *śīrās* have expanded (*āyāma*) and the *dhamanīs* have become contracted (*saṅkoca*).

is accepted by his commentator Cakrapāṇi also¹. Gaṅgādhara is unable to point out any passage in *Caraka* to prove his opinion or to state more explicitly what is the difference of functions and appearances between the *dhamanīs* and *śīrās*. In fact Gaṅgādhara's remarks are directly borrowed from *Suśruta*, III. 9. 3, without acknowledgment, and it is very surprising that he should not know the difference of views on this point between Caraka and Suśruta and should try to support Caraka by a quotation from Suśruta on the very point on which they materially differ.

Suśruta refers to Caraka's view that *śīrās*, *srotas* and *dhamanīs* are the same and opposes it, saying that they are different in appearance, number and functions. Ḍalhaṇa, in explaining this, says that the *śīrās* carry *vāta*, *pitta*, *śleṣman*, blood, etc., and are rosy, blue, white and red, whereas the *dhamanīs* that carry sense-impressions of sound, etc. have no distinctive colour, and the *srotas* have the same colour as the *dhātus* which flow through them. Again, the principal *śīrās* are forty in number, the principal *dhamanīs* twenty-four and the principal *srotas* twenty-two in number. The *śīrās* permit us to contract or expand our limbs or perform other motor functions, and they allow the mind and senses to operate in their own ways and serve also to fulfil other functions of moving rapidly (*prasyandana*), etc., when *vāyu* works in them. When *pitta* flows through the *śīrās*, they appear shining, create desire for food, increase digestive fire and health. When *śleṣman* passes through them, they give an oily appearance to the body, firmness of joints and strength. When blood passes through them, they become coloured and filled also with the different *dhātus* and produce the sense-cognition of touch. *Vāyu*, *pitta*, *śleṣman* and blood—any one of these may flow through any and every *śīrā*². The *dhamanīs* are more like sensory nerves, since they carry sensations of sound, colour, taste and smell (*śabda-rūpa-rasa-gandha-vahatvādikam dhamaninām*). The *srotas* carry *prāṇa*, food, water, chyle, blood, flesh and fat³. It is on account of their close proximity, similar functions, fineness (*saukṣmyāt*), and also because of the fact that they have been referred to in similar terms by older authorities, that they have sometimes been regarded as performing the same work, though their functions are really different⁴.

¹ *na ca Carake Suśruta iva dhamanī-śīrā-srotasām bhedo vivakṣitaḥ*. Cakrapāṇi's commentary on *Caraka*, III. 5. 3.

² *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 7. 8-17.

³ Ḍalhaṇa on *ibid.* III. 9. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Ḍalhaṇa, in explaining this, says that, as, when a bundle of grass is burning, the burning of each separate blade of grass cannot be perceived on account of their contiguity, so the *śirās*, *dhamanīs* and *srotas* are situated so close to one another that it is very difficult to observe their separate functions and work. *Śirā*, *srotas*, *mārga*, *kha* and *dhamanī* are the general names used to denote the canals or ducts of the body¹. It is on account of the similarity of action of all these ducts that their functions are sometimes confused.

The *dhamanīs* start from the navel; ten proceed to the upper part of the body, ten to the lower part and four crosswise (*tiryag-gāḥ*). Those ten which go to the upper part of the body, branch out, are divided into three classes, and are thirty in number. Of these there are altogether ten for carrying *vāta*, *pitta*, *kapha*, *śoṇita* and *rasa*, two for each; there are eight for carrying *śabda*, *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha*, two for each; there are two for the organ of speech, two for making noise (*ghoṣa*), as distinguished from speech; two for going to sleep, two for being awake; two for bearing tears, two for carrying milk in women, and it is the same two *dhamanīs* that carry the semen in men. It is by these *dhamanīs* that the body on the upper side of the navel (e.g. sides, back, chest, shoulders, hands, etc.) is held fast to the lower part. The carrying of *vāta*, etc. is the common quality of all these *dhamanīs*.

Those *dhamanīs* which branch out downwards are thirty in number. They eject *vāta*, urine, excreta, semen, menstrual blood, etc. downwards. They are connected with the place of *pitta* (*pittāśaya*), draw downwards the materials not fit for being absorbed, and nourish the body with the assimilable products of digestion. The *dhamanīs* connected with the *pittāśaya* carry the food-juice throughout the body, as soon as it is digested by the action of heat, by supplying it to the upper circulatory *dhamanīs* and through them to the heart, which is designated as the seat of *rasa* (*rasa-sthāna*)². Ten *dhamanīs* carry *vāta*, *pitta*, *śoṇita*,

¹ Thus Ḍalhaṇa remarks:

*ākāṣṭyāvākāśānām dehe nāmāni dehinām
śirāḥ srotāṃsi mārgāḥ khaṃ dhamanyah.*

² *Suśruta*, *Śārīra*, ix. 7 and 8; see also Ḍalhaṇa's commentary on it. The apertures of some *dhamanīs* by which the food-juice is circulated through the body are as fine as lotus fibres, and some grosser than them, as the apertures of lotus stalks. Thus some *dhamanīs* have very fine apertures, and others grosser apertures.

*yathā svabhāvataḥ khāni mṛṇāleṣu biseṣu ca
dhamanīnām tathā khāni raso yair upacṛiyate.*

Ibid. ix. 10.

kapha and *rasa*; two, connected with the intestines, carry the food-juice; two carry water; two are connected with the bladder for ejecting urine; two are for the production of semen (*śukra-prādur-bhāva*), two for its ejection, and it is these which regulate the menstrual flow in the case of women; two, connected with the larger intestines, eject the excreta; there are eight others which carry perspiration. It is by these *dhamanīs* that the intestines, waist, urine, excreta, rectum, bladder and penis are held together.

Each of the other four *dhamanīs*, which go crosswise (*tiryag-gāh*), has hundreds and thousands of branches, which, innumerable as they are, are spread all over the body, like so many windows; their mouths are at the holes of the hairs, through which perspiration goes out and which nourish the body with *rasa*, and through these the effective principles (*vīrya*) of oil, watery sprinklings, ointments, etc. enter the body after being acted on by *bhrājaka* (heat of the skin)¹. It is again these which carry the pleasurable and painful sense-impressions of touch². The *dhamanīs* direct the five senses to the five sense-objects for their cognition. There is the cognizer (*mantr*) and the *manas* organ; the *dhamanī* which is connected with *manas* on one side and the *dhamanīs* which carry the different sense-impressions on the other make the sense-data cognized by the self³. The various sensory and motor *dhamanīs* are further named in Suśruta, III. vi. 28. Down below the back of the ear there are two *dhamanīs*, called *vidhura*, which, when injured, produce deafness; inside the two nostrils there are the two *dhamanīs* called *phaṇa* which, when hurt, arrest the sensation of smell. Below the eyebrows on the two sides of the eye there are the two *dhamanīs*, called *apāṅga*, which, when hurt, produce blindness: there are also two other *dhamanīs*, above the eyebrows and below them, called *āvarta*, which, when hurt, also produce blindness. Suśruta also speaks in this connection of a place inside

¹ Suśruta, *Sārīra*, ix. 7 and 8; see also Dalhaṇa's commentary on it.

² Dalhaṇa, in commenting on this passage of Suśruta, III. ix. 9, says: "*tair eva mano-'nugataiḥ sukhāsukha-rūpaṃ sparśaṃ karmātmā grhṇāte.*" (It is through these *dhamanīs*, as connected by *manas*, that the self, as associated with the subtle body, receives the pleasurable and painful impressions of touch.)

³

*pañcābhūbhūtās tv atha pañca-kṛtvāḥ
pañcendriyaṃ pañcasu bhāvayanti
pañcendriyaṃ pañcasu bhāvayitvā
pañcatvaṃ āyānti vināśa-kāle.*

Suśruta, III. ix. 11.

Dalhaṇa, in commenting on the above, says: "*mantā hi śarīre eka eva, mano 'py ekam eva, tena manasā yaiva dhamanī śabdādi-vahāsu dhamanīṣu abhiprapannā saiva dhamanī sva-dharmaṃ grāhayati mantāraṃ nānyeti.*"

the skull on the upper part of the brain, where all the *śirās* have met together, as the *adhipati* superintendent.

In describing the *śirās* (700 in number) Suśruta says that these are like so many canals by which the body is watered and by the contraction and expansion of which the movements of the body are rendered possible. They start from the navel and branch out like so many fibres of leaves. The principal *śirās* are forty in number; of these ten are for the circulation of *vāta*, ten for *pitta*, ten for *kapha* and ten for *rakta* (blood). The *śirās* of *vāta* circulation again branch out into 175 *śirās*, and the same is the case with those which circulate *pitta*, *kapha* and *rakta*. We have thus altogether 700 *śirās*. When *vāta* is properly circulated through the *śirās*, it becomes possible for us to move our limbs without obstruction and to exercise our intellectual functions. But it should be noted that, though some *śirās* are regarded as mainly circulating *vāyu* or *pitta* or *kapha*, yet they all, at least to some extent, circulate all three¹.

There are 900 *snāyus*, and these have also holes within them (*suśirāḥ*), and these, as well as the *kaṇḍarās*, which are also but special kinds of *snāyus*, serve to bind the joints of the body, just as the several pieces of planks are held together in a boat. Suśruta also mentions five hundred muscles. The *marmas* are vital spots in flesh, *śirā*, *snāyu* and bones which are particularly the seats of *prāṇa*: when persons are hurt in these places, they may either lose their lives or suffer various kinds of deformity. The *srotas* are again described by Suśruta as being ducts, other than *śirā* and *dhamanī*, which start from the cavity of the heart and spread out through the body². These *srotas* carry the currents of *prāṇa*, food-juice, water, blood, flesh, fat, urine, excreta, semen and menstrual blood.

The Nervous System of the Tantras.

The nerve system of the Tantras, however, is entirely different from that of the medical systems of Caraka and Suśruta. It starts with the conception of the spinal column (*meru-daṇḍa*), which is regarded as one bone from the bottom of the back to the root of

¹ *na hi vātaṃ śirāḥ kāscin na pittaṃ kevalaṃ tathā
śleṣmānam vā vahanty etā atah sarvavahāḥ smṛtāḥ.*

Suśruta, III. vii. 16.

² *Suśruta*, *Sārira*, IX. 13:

*mūlāt khād antaraṃ dehe prasṛtaṃ tv abhivāhi yat
srotas tad iti vijñeyaṃ śirā-dhamanī-varjitaṃ.*

the neck. In the passage inside this spinal column there is a nerve (*nāḍī*), called *suṣumnā*, which is again in reality made up of three *nāḍīs*, *suṣumnā*, *vajrā* and *citrinī*¹. All *nāḍīs* start from the root at the end of the vertebral column, called *kāṇḍa*, and they proceed upwards to the highest cerebral nerve-plexus, called *sahasrāra*, and are seventy-two thousand in number. The place of the root of these *nāḍīs* (*kāṇḍa*) is an inch above the anus and an inch below the root of the penis. If *suṣumnā* is the central nerve of the spinal cord, then on its extreme right side is the *idā*, and then parallel to it towards the *suṣumnā* are the *gāndhārī*, stretching from the corner of the left eye to the left leg, *hastī-jihvā*, stretching from the left eye to the left foot, *śaṅkhinī*, branching on the left, *kuḥū* (the pubic nerve on the left) and also the *viśvodarā*, the lumbar nerves. On the extreme left of it is the *piṅgalā*, and between it and the *suṣumnā* are the *pūṣā*, stretching from below the corner of the right eye to the abdomen, *paśyantī*, the auricular branch or the cervical plexus, *sarasvatī* and *vāraṇā* (the sacral nerve). The *śaṅkhinī* (the auricular branch or the cervical plexus on the left) goes parallel to the *suṣumnā*, but takes a turn in the region of the neck and passes on to the root of the left ear-holes; in another branch it passes through the inner side of the region of the forehead, where it gets joined with the *citrinī nāḍī* and enters into the cerebral region. The *suṣumnā nāḍī* is a sort of duct inside the spine, which encases within it the *vajrā nāḍī*, and that again encases within it the *citrinī nāḍī*, which has within it a fine aperture running all through it, which is the fine aperture running through the spinal cord². This inner passage

¹ But according to the *Tantra-cūḍāmaṇi*, *suṣumnā* is not inside the spinal column but outside it. Thus it says, “*tad-bāhye tu tāyora madhye suṣumnā vahnī-samyuta*.” This, however, is against the view of the *Ṣaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa*, which takes *suṣumnā* to be inside the passage of the spine. According to the *Nigama-tattva-sāra-tantra*, *idā* and *piṅgalā* are both inside the spine, but this is entirely against the accepted view. Dr Sir B. N. Seal thinks that *suṣumnā* is the central passage or channel of the spinal cord and not a separate *nāḍī* (*The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, pp. 219, 226, 227). Mr Rele in his *The Mysterious Kuṇḍalinī* (pp. 35, 36) thinks that it is a *nāḍī* which is situated centrally and passes through the spinal column (*meru-daṇḍa*); but, judging from the fact that it is said to originate in the sacrum, from which it goes upwards to the base of the skull, where it joins with the plexus of a thousand nerves called *brahma-cakra* (cerebrum in the vault of the skull) and is divided at the level of the larynx (*kaṇṭha*) into anterior and posterior parts between the two eyebrows (*ājñā-cakra*) and the cavity in the brain (*brahma-randhra*) respectively, Rele thinks that this *suṣumnā nāḍī* is nothing but the spinal cord.

² *Nāḍī* is derived by Pūrṇānanda Yati, in his commentary on the *Ṣaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa*, from the root *naḍ*, to go, as a passage or duct (*naḍa gatau iti dhātor naḍyate gamyate* ‘*naḍa padavyā iti nāḍī*’). Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṇanātha Sen makes a

within the *citrinī nāḍi* is also called *brahma-nāḍi*; for there is no further duct or *nāḍi* within the *citrinī*¹. The *suṣumṇā* thus in all probability stands for our spinal cord. The *suṣumṇā*, however, is said to take a turn and get connected with the *śaṅkhiṇī* in the inside region of the forehead, whence it becomes connected with the aperture of the *śaṅkhiṇī* (*śaṅkhiṇī-nālam ālambya*) and passes to the cerebral region. All the *nāḍis* are connected with the *suṣumṇā*. *Kuṇḍalinī* is a name for supreme bodily energy, and, because the channel of the *suṣumṇā*, the *brahma-nāḍi*, is the passage through which this energy flows from the lower part of the trunk to the regions of the nerve-plexus of the brain, *suṣumṇā* is sometimes called *kuṇḍalinī*; but *kuṇḍalinī* itself cannot be called a nerve, and it is distinctly wrong to call it the vagus nerve, as Mr Rele does². The *iḍā nāḍi* on the left side of the *suṣumṇā* outside the spine goes upwards to the nasal region, and *piṅgalā* follows a corresponding course on the right side. Other accounts of these *nāḍis* hold that the *iḍā* proceeds from the right testicle and the *piṅgalā* from the left testicle and passes on to the left and the right of the *suṣumṇā* in a bent form (*dhanur-ākāre*). The three, however, meet at the root of the penis, which is thus regarded as the junction of the three rivers, as it were (*trivenī*), viz. of *suṣumṇā* (compared to the river Gaṅgā), *iḍā* (compared to Yāmuna) and *piṅgalā* (compared to Sarasvatī). The two *nāḍis*, *iḍā* and *piṅgalā*, are also described as being like the moon and the sun respectively, and *suṣumṇā* as fire³. In addition to these *nāḍis* the *Yogi-yājñavalkya* mentions the name of another *nāḍi*, called *alambuṣā*, making the number of the important *nāḍis* fourteen, including *suṣumṇā* and counting *suṣumṇā* as one *nāḍi* (i.e. including *vajrā* and *citrinī*), though the total number of *nāḍis* is regarded as being seventy-two thousand. Śrīkaṇāda in his *Nāḍi-vijñāna* counts the number of *nāḍis* as thirty-five millions. But, while the Tantra school, as represented in the works *Ṣaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa*, *Jñāna-saṃkalinī*, *Yogi-yājñavalkya*, etc., regards the *nāḍis* as originating from the nerve-plexus very serious mistake in his *Pratyakṣa-śārīraka* when he thinks that the *nāḍis* are to be regarded as being without apertures (*nirandhra*). They are certainly not so regarded in the Āyur-veda or in the *Ṣaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa* and its commentaries. In Yoga and Tantra literature the term *nāḍi* generally supersedes the term *śīrā* of the medical literature.

¹ *Śabda-brahma-rūpāyāḥ kuṇḍalinyāḥ parama-śiva-sannidhi-gamana-pātha rūpa-citrinī-nāḍy-antargata-śūnya-bhāga iti*. Pūrṇananda's commentary on *Ṣaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa*, St. 2.

² *Suṣumṇāyai kuṇḍalinyai. Haṭha-yoga-pradīpikā*, IV. 64.

³ *Ṣaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa*, St. 1 and *Yogi-yājñavalkya-saṃhitā*, p. 18.

lying between the root of the penis and the anus, and while Caraka regards them as originating from the heart, Śrīkaṇāda regards them as originating from the region of the navel (*nābhi-kanda*) and going upwards, downwards and sideways from there. Śrīkaṇāda, however, compromises with the Tantra school by holding that of these thirty-five millions there are seventy-two thousand *nāḍīs* which may be regarded as gross and are also called *dhamanīs*, and which carry the sense-qualities of colour, taste, odour, touch and sound (*pañcendriya-guṇāvahā*). There are again seven hundred *nāḍīs* with fine apertures, which carry food-juice by which the body is nourished. Of these again there are twenty-four which are more prominent.

The most important feature of the Tantra school of anatomy is its theory of nerve-plexuses (*cakra*). Of these the first is the *ādhāra-cakra*, generally translated as sacro-coccygeal plexus. This plexus is situated between the penis and the anus, and there are eight elevations on it. It is in touch with the mouth of the *suṣumṇā*. In the centre of the plexus there is an elevation called *svayambhū-līṅga*, like a fine bud with an aperture at its mouth. There is a fine thread-like fibre, spiral in its form, attached to the aperture of the *svayambhū-līṅga* on one side and the mouth of the *suṣumṇā* on the other. This spiral and coiled fibre is called *kula-kunḍalinī*; for it is by the potential mother-energy, as manifested in its movement of a downward pressure of the *apāna vāyu* and an upward pressure of the *prāṇa vāyu*, that exhalation and inhalation are made possible and life functions operate. Next comes the *svādhiṣṭhāna-cakra*, the sacral plexus, near the root of the penis. Next comes the lumbar plexus (*maṇi-pura-cakra*), in the region of the navel. Next is the cardiac plexus (*anāhata-cakra* or *viśuddha-cakra*), in the heart, of twelve branches. Next is the laryngeal and pharyngeal plexus, at the junction of the spinal cord and the medulla oblongata, called the *bhārati-sthāna*. Next comes the *lalanā-cakra*, opposite the uvula. Next to this is the *ājñā-cakra* between the eyebrows, within which is the *manas-cakra*, the centre of all sense-knowledge and dream-knowledge, and the seat of *manas*, the mind-organ. Vijñānabhikṣu says in his *Yoga-vārttika* that one branch of the *suṣumṇā* goes upwards from here, which is the *nāḍī* for carrying the functions of *manas* and is called *mano-vahā nāḍī*; the *jñāna-saṃkalinī tantra* calls it *jñāna-nāḍī*. It seems, therefore, that it is through this *nāḍī* that connection is established

between the soul, residing in the brain, and the *manas*, residing in the *manas-cakra*. Śaṅkara Miśra argues in his commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, v. 2. 14 and 15, that the *nāḍīs* are themselves capable of producing tactile impressions; for, had it not been so, then eating and drinking, as associated with their corresponding feelings, would not have been possible, as these are effected by the automatic functions of *prāṇa*¹. Above the *ājñā-cakra* comes the *soma-cakra*, in the middle of the cerebrum, and finally, in the upper cerebrum, there is the *sahasrāra-cakra*, the seat of the soul. The process of Yoga consists in rousing the potential energy located in the *ādhāra-cakra*, carrying it upwards through the aperture of the *citrīṇī* or the *brahma-nāḍī*, and bringing it to the *brahma-randhra* or the *sahasrāra*. This *kuṇḍalinī* is described as a fine fibre like a lightning flash (*taḍid iva vilasat tantu-rūpa-svarūpa*), which raises the question whether this is actually a physical nerve or merely a potential energy that is to be carried upwards to the upper cerebrum in the *sahasrāra-cakra*; and it cannot, I think, be yet satisfactorily explained. But, judging from a wide comparison of the texts, it seems pretty certain that it is the *kuṇḍalī śakti* or the *kuṇḍalī* energy which is carried upwards. If the *kuṇḍalī* energy is inexhaustible in its nature, the whole discussion as to whether the *ādhāra-cakra* is depleted or not or whether the *kuṇḍalinī* herself rises or her eject, as raised in Sir John's *Serpent Power*, pp. 301–320, loses its point. How far the *cakras* can themselves be called nerve-plexuses is very doubtful, since the nerve-plexuses are all outside the spinal aperture; but, if the *kuṇḍalinī* is to pass through the aperture of the *citrīṇī nāḍī* and at the same time pass through the *cakras*, the *cakras* or the lotuses (*padma*) must be inside the spinal cord. But, supposing that these nerve-plexuses represent the corresponding places of the *cakras* inside the spinal cord, and also because it has become customary to refer to the *cakras* as plexuses, I have ventured to refer to the *cakras* as such. But it must be borne in mind that, as the *kuṇḍalinī* is a mysterious power, so also are the *cakras* the mysterious centres in the path of the ascent of the *kuṇḍalinī*. A nerve-physical interpretation of them as nerve-plexuses would be very unfaithful to the texts. A more detailed discussion on these subjects will be found in the treatment of Tantra philosophy in a later volume of this work. The chief interest of the present section is only to show that the Tantra

¹ See Dr Sir B. N. Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, pp. 222–225.

anatomy is entirely different in its conception from the Āyur-veda anatomy, which has been the subject of our present enquiry. Another fact of importance also emerges from these considerations, namely, that, though in Dr̥ḥabala's supplementary part of the *Siddhi-sthāna* the head is associated with sensory consciousness, Caraka's own part refers to the heart as the central seat of the soul. But the Tantra school points to the upper cerebrum as the seat of the soul and regards the spinal cord and its lower end as being of supreme importance for the vital functions of the body.

The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry.

The theory of *Rasas* or tastes plays an important part in Āyur-veda in the selection of medicines and diet and in diagnosing diseases and arranging their cures. In 1. 26 of Caraka we hear of a great meeting of sages in the Caitraratha Forest, attended by Ātreya, Bhadrakāpya, Śākunteya, Pūrṇākṣa Maudgalya, Hiranyākṣa Kauśika, Kumāraśiras Bharadvāja, Vāryovida, the Vaideha king Nimi, Baḍiśa and Kāṅkāyana, the physician of Balkh, for the purpose of discussing questions of food and tastes.

Bhadrakāpya held that taste, or *rasa*, was that which could be perceived by the organ of the tongue and it was one, viz. that of water. Śākunteya held that there were two *rasas*, nutritive (*upaśamanīya*) and denutritive (*chedanīya*). Pūrṇākṣa held that there were three *rasas*, *upaśamanīya*, *chedanīya* and neutral (*sādhāraṇa*). Hiranyākṣa held that there were four *rasas*, sweet and good, sweet and harmful, distasteful and good, distasteful and harmful. Kumāraśiras held that there were five *rasas*, earthy, watery, fiery, airy and ethereal (*āntarikṣa*). Vāryovida held that there were six *rasas*, heavy (*guru*), light (*laghu*), cold (*śīta*), hot (*uṣṇa*), smooth (*snigdha*) and dry (*rūkṣa*). Nimi held that there were seven *rasas*, sweet (*madhura*), sour (*amla*), salt (*lavaṇa*), hot (*kaṭu*), bitter (*tikta*), pungent (*kaṣāya*) and alkaline (*kṣāra*). Baḍiśa added one more to these, viz. unmanifested (*avyakta*), and held that there were eight *rasas*. Kāṅkāyana held that the *rasas* were of infinite variety and could not be counted, on account of the diversity of substances in which they are located (*āśraya*), their specific properties as light or heavy (*guṇa*), their action in developing or reducing the constituents of the body (*karma*) and their diversity as apparent to the organ of taste. Ātreya Punarvasu held that there are six *rasas* only,

sweet (*madhura*), acid (*amla*), saline (*lavana*), hot and pungent (*katu*), bitter (*tikta*) and astringent (*kaṣāya*). The source (*yonī*) of all these *rasas* is water. Its actions are sedative (*upāśamana*) and denutritive (*chedana*), and a basis of equilibrium (*sādhāraṇatva*) of the *rasas* is reached when those having the above opposite actions are mixed together. Pleasantness (*svādu*) or unpleasantness (*asvādu*) of taste depends on liking or disliking. The seats of *rasas* are the essences of the five elements (*pañca-mahā-bhūta-vikārāḥ*) modified in accordance with five conditions, viz. (1) specific nature of the substance (*prakṛti*); (2) as acted upon by heat or other agents (*vikṛti*); (3) association with other things (*vicāra*); (4) the place in which the substance is grown (*deśa*); (5) the time at which it is produced (*kāla*)¹. The *guṇas* of heaviness, lightness, cold, warm, moisture and dryness belong to the things to which the *rasas* belong. The alkaline (*kṣāra*) should not be counted as a separate *rasa*, as it is made up of more than one *rasa* and affects more than one sense-organ; for it has at least two important *rasas* (of “hot and pungent” and “saline”) and it affects not only the organ of taste, but also that of touch, and does not naturally belong to any substance, but has to be created by artificial processes. There is no such separate *rasa* which can be called unmanifested (*avyakta*). Water is the origin of all *rasas*; so all *rasas* may be considered as existing in an unmanifested state in water, but that is no reason why we should say that water has a separate taste called “unmanifested”; moreover, when a substance has two *rasas*, one dominant and the other extremely feeble, the feeble *rasa* may be regarded as unmanifested; or, when in a compound of different *rasas*, say, of a syrup, a slight hot taste is added, this may be considered as unmanifested; but certainly there is no *rasa* to which the name “unmanifested” (*avyakta*) could be given. The view that there is an infinite number of *rasas* is untenable; for, though it may be urged that the same *rasa* may occur differently in different objects, that would only go to show that there are various grades of forms of each particular *rasa* and not prove that with each variety of a particular *rasa* the *rasa* itself is wholly different. Again,

¹ Thus *mudga* (a sort of kidney-bean), which is a *bhūta-vikāra*, has the *rasas* of astringent and sweet and is yet light by nature, though one would expect it to be heavy on account of its *rasas* of astringent and sweet. *Vikṛti* is best exemplified in the case of fried paddy, which is lighter than rice. It is well known that by composition wholly new properties may be generated in the product. Medicinal herbs vary in their properties in accordance with the time of plucking.

if different *rasas* are mixed together, the mixed *rasa* itself is not entitled to be counted as a separate *rasa*; for its qualities are just as the sum total of the qualities of the different *rasas* which are its constituents, and no independent work can be attributed to this mixed *rasa* (*na saṃśṛṣṭānāṃ rasānāṃ karmopadiśanti bud-dhimantaḥ*), as in the case of a compound of two or more substances, as mentioned above (*vicāra*).

Though on account of the predominance of one or the other of them they are called earthy (*pārthiva*), watery (*āpya*), fiery (*āgneya*), airy (*vāyavya*) or ethereal (*ākāśātma*), yet all substances are compounded of the five elements. All substances, whether animate or inanimate, are to be considered as medicines (*auśadha*), provided they are applied in the proper way (*yukti*) and for specific purposes (*artha*). A substance can be a medicine only when it is applied in the proper way and for specific purposes; nothing can unconditionally be considered a medicine. The medicative influence is exerted both by virtue of the specific agency of a substance (*dravya-prabhāva*) and by the specific agency of its qualities, as also by their joint influence¹. The action of medicines is called *karman*, its potency *vīrya*, the place where they operate *adhikaraṇa*, the time of operation *kāla*, the mode of operation *upāya*, and the result achieved *phala*.

As regards the origin of *rasas*, it is suggested that water gets mixed with the five elements in the air and also after its fall on the ground. These *rasas* nourish the bodies of all plants and animals. All the five elements are present in all *rasas*; but in some *rasas* some of the elements predominate, and in accordance with this there are differences among the various *rasas*. Thus, with the predominance of *soma* there is a sweet taste, with the predominance of earth and fire an acid taste, with water and fire a saline taste, with air and fire, hot and pungent, with air and *ākāśa*, bitter, with air and earth, astringent. The different elements

¹ The medicinal effect of substances may be distinguished from the medicinal effect of qualities, as when by certain stones (*maṇi*) poison may be removed or by the use of certain amulets certain diseases may be cured. Again, there may be cases where simply by the application of heat a certain disease may be cured, irrespective of the substance which possesses heat as its property. It seems that only the sense-properties and mechanical properties are here counted as *guṇas*; other kinds of properties were considered as being due to the thing (*dravya*) itself. For, in addition to the sense-properties, the twenty qualities, *guru*, *laghu*, *śīta*, *uṣṇa*, *snigdha*, *rūkṣa*, *manda*, *tikṣṇa*, *sthira*, *sāra*, *mṛdu*, *kāṭhina*, *viśada*, *picchīla*, *ślakṣṇa*, *khara*, *sūkṣma*, *sthūla*, *sāndra* and *drava*, are counted as *guṇas* (*Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. i. 48; I. 25. 35; I. 26. 11).

which take part in the formation of *rasas* are said to be instrumental causes (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the *rasas*; this explains how, though fire has no *rasa*, yet it may help the generation of a particular *rasa*¹. Destiny or unknown cause (*adṛṣṭa*) is, however, the general cause of such combinations of elements with water.

In the very first chapter of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, substances (*dravya*) are counted as being the five elements, viz. *ākāśa*, air, light, heat, water and earth, together with soul, *manas*, time and space. Of these those substances which possess sense-organs are called animate and those which do not are called inanimate². The *guṇas* are the sense-properties of hearing, touch, colour, taste and smell, the mechanical and other properties which all elements have in common, such as heaviness, lightness, cold, heat, and moisture, dryness, dullness, sharpness, steadiness, mobility, softness, hardness, motion, slipperiness, smoothness, roughness, grossness, fineness, thickness, liquidity, etc., and desire, hatred, pleasure, pain and effort, intelligence (including memory), consciousness, patience, egoism, etc., distance (*para*), nearness (*apara*), combination (*yukti*), number, contact, disjunction (*vibhāga*), separateness, measure, inertia (*saṃskāra*) and repetition (*abhyāsa*). The definition of substance (*dravya*) is, that which possesses quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*) in the relation of inherence and is also the inseparable material cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of all effects. *Guṇas* are things which are themselves inactive and exist in *dravyas* in an inseparable relation of inherence. The *guṇas* themselves cannot contain any further *guṇas*³.

The above being the theory of *dravya* and *guṇa*, the question arises as to the way in which medicines operate in human bodies. The most general and obvious way in which the different medicines were classified was by their different tastes, which were considered primarily to be six in number, as has already been pointed out. Each of the tastes was considered as being capable of producing certain good or bad physiological effects. Thus the sweet taste is

¹ *Iha ca kāraṇatvaṃ bhūtānāṃ rasasya madhuratvādi-viśeṣa eva nimitta-kāraṇatvaṃ ucyate*. Cakrapāṇi on *Caraka*, I. 26. 38.

² *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 47. Even trees were regarded as being possessed of senses and therefore animated or *cetana*. Cakrapāṇi says that, since the sunflower continues to turn its face towards the sun, it may be regarded as being possessed of the sense of sight; again, since the *lavalī* (*Averrhoa acida*) plant fructifies through hearing the sound of thunder, the plants have auditory organs, etc.

³ *Ibid.* I. 1. 47, 48 and 50, with Cakrapāṇi's commentary.

said to increase blood, flesh, fat, marrow, semen, life, to do good to the six senses, and to produce strength and colour of the body; to do good to the skin and throat, to destroy *pitta*, poison and *māruta* (morbidness of air), and to produce moistening, cold and heaviness, etc. The acid (*amla*) is said to rouse digestion, develop the body, and to remove *vāta*; it is light, warm, moist, etc. The saline taste is digestive; it removes *vāta*, secretes *kapha*; and it is moist, warm, etc. And so on with the other tastes. But, of course, all these qualities cannot belong to the tastes; as has already been pointed out, the *guṇas* cannot possess further *guṇas*, and the tastes (*rasa*) are themselves *guṇas*; so, when certain functions or properties are attributed to the *rasas*, they must be considered as belonging to the substances which possess those specific *rasas* (*rasā iti rasa-yuktāni dravyāṇi*)¹.

From Suśruta's statements it appears that there was a great difference of opinion regarding the relative prominence of *dravya* and its properties². There were some who held that *dravya* was the most important, since *dravya* remained permanent, whereas *rasa*, etc. are always changed; so *dravya* is relatively permanent. Again, *dravya* is grasped by the five senses, and not its *guṇas*. The *dravya* is also the support of the *rasas*, etc. All operations have to be done with the *dravya*, and the authoritative texts also speak of operations with the *dravyas*, and not with the *rasas*; the *rasas* depend largely on the nature of the *dravyas*. Others hold that *rasas* are the most important, since it is of them that we become directly aware when we take our food, and it is said that they remove the various morbidities of *vāta*, etc. Others hold that the potency (*vīrya*) of things is the most important, since it is by their potency that medicines act³. This potency is of two kinds, hot (*uṣṇa*) and cold (*śīta*); some think that it is of eight kinds, hot (*uṣṇa*), cold (*śīta*), moist (*snigdha*), dry (*rūkṣa*), moving (*viśada*), slippery (*picchila*), soft (*mṛdu*) and sharp (*tikṣṇa*). Sometimes potency or *vīrya* overcomes *rasa* by its power and makes its own tendencies felt; thus, though sugar-cane ought to remove *vāta* on account of its sweetness, it really increases it on account of its being *śīta-vīrya* (of cold

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 26. 39, Cakrapāṇi's commentary.

² *Suśruta, Sūtra-sthāna*, 40. 3. *Dravya* is defined by Suśruta as *kriyā-guṇavat samavāyi-kāraṇam*.

³ *iha uṣadha-karmāṇi ūrdhvādho-bhāgobhayabhāga-saṃśodhana-saṃśamana-saṃgrāhākāgni-dīpaina-praṇīdana-lekhana-rasāyana-vājīkaraṇa-śvaya-thūkāra-vilāyana-dahana-dāraṇa-mādana-prāṇaghna-viṣa-praśamanāni vīrya-prādhanyād bhavanti. Suśruta*, I. 40. 5.

potency)¹. Others say that the *rasa*, as digested by the stomach (*pāka*), is most important, since things can produce good or bad effects only when they are digested. Some hold that each *rasa* remains unchanged by digestion, though according to others there are only three kinds of *rasa* resulting from digestion or *pāka*, viz. sweet, acid and hot (*kaṭu*); whereas Suśruta held that there were only two kinds of *rasa* resulting from digestion, viz. sweet and hot; for, in his view, acid was not the result of digestion (*amlo vipāko nāsti*). According to Suśruta it is the *pitta* which is turned into acid. Those objects which have more of earth and water in them are turned into sweet taste, whereas those which have *tejas*, air and *ākāśa* as their ingredients are turned into hot taste (*kaṭu*).

Speaking of the differences of view regarding the relative importance of *dravya*, *rasa*, *virya* and *vipāka*, Suśruta says that they are all important, since a medicine produces effects in all those four ways according to its own nature². The view of Suśruta, as explained by Cakrapāṇi in the *Bhānumatī*, seems to be that food, drink and medicine are all products of the five *mahā-bhūtas*, and *rasa*, *virya* and *vipāka* are dependent on the *dravya* and are like its potency (*śakti*), through which it works³. Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this in the *Bhānumatī*, says that even in those cases where certain *rasas* are said to remove or increase certain morbidities (*doṣa*) it is only because of their importance that they are so described; the real agent in all such cases is the *dravya*, since the *rasa*, etc. are always dependent on the *dravya*. Apart from the *śakti* as manifested in *rasa*, etc., the *dravya* also operates by itself in an unthinkable way (*acintya*), which is also called *prabhāva* and which is comparable with the attractive force exerted by magnets on iron. The *dravya* by itself is thus differentiated from its *śakti*, and it is said to have a peculiar operative mode of its own, as distinguished from that of its *śakti* or potency, as manifested in *rasa*, *virya* or *vipāka*, and this mode of operation is considered to

¹ *etāni khalu vīryāṇi sva-bala-guṇotkarṣāt rasam abhībhuṣyātma-karma kurvanti. Suśruta, ibid.* The *virya* is said to remain both in the *dravya* and in the *rasa*. Thus in Suśruta, I. 40. 5-8, it is said that, if in those *rasas* which remove *vāta* there is dryness (*rauḁṣya*), lightness (*lāghava*) and cold (*śaitya*), then they will not remove *vāyu*; so, if in those which remove *pitta* there is sharpness (*taikṣṇya*), heat (*auṣṇya*) and lightness (*laghutā*), then they will not remove *pitta*, and so on.

² *caturṇām api sāmāgryam icchanty atra vipāścītaḥ. Suśruta, I. 40. 13.*

³ *dravya-śakti-rūpakā rasa-vīrya-vipākā yathā-yogam nimitta-kāraṇatām samavāyi-kāraṇatām vā bhajanto na kartṛtaya vyapadiśyante dravya-parā-dhīnatvāt. Bhānumatī, I. 40. 13.*

be quite unthinkable (*acintya*) as to the way in which it operates¹. Thus some medicines operate by *rasa*, some by *vipāka*, or the *rasa* resulting from the digestive operation (e.g. *śuṇṭhī*, which, though hot in taste and hot in *vīrya*, is sweet after digestive operation), some by *vīrya* (e.g. *kulattha*, though pungent, yet removes *vāyu* on account of its hot *vīrya*), some by both *rasa* and *vipāka*, some by *dravya-prabhāva*, *vīrya* and *rasa*, some by *dravya-prabhāva*, *vīrya*, *rasa* and *vipāka*.

Caraka, however, differs from Suśruta in this view of *dravya* and *rasa*, *vīrya* and *vipāka*; for, according to him, *rasa*, *vīrya* and *vipāka*, themselves being *guṇas*, cannot possess further *guṇas*. He does not admit a *śakti* as different from the *dravya*. Thus in the case of *prabhāva*, while Suśruta holds that it is a specific *śakti*, or the thing operating in unaccountable ways, Caraka thinks that this *śakti* is identical with the thing itself. Thus Cakrapāṇi in explaining *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 26. 72, says, “*śaktir hi svarūpam eva bhāvānām, nātiriktaṃ kincid dharmāntaraṃ bhāvānām*” (potency is the nature of things and is no separate property distinct from them). *Vīrya* in its general sense means “the potency or power of medicines to produce effects,” and as such includes within it both *rasa* and *vipāka*; but, since these have special names, the term *vīrya* is not applied to them². Apart from this there is special *vīrya* in a technical sense (*pāribhāṣika*). In the view which considers this *vīrya* to be of two kinds, *snigdha* and *rūkṣa*, these are to be taken as specific characteristics; but in the view which considers the *vīrya* to be of eight kinds, these are to be taken as a different set of characteristics of *dravya* or substance³. This *vīrya* is believed to be more powerful than *rasa*, so that, when the *vīrya* and *rasa* of a thing come into conflict, it is the *vīrya* which predominates and not the *rasa*.

Vāgbhaṭa junior makes some remarks in support of the name *vīrya*, as given to the characteristics which go by that name. He says that, since the *vīrya* characteristics of things remain unchanged even after digestion, and since the things are primarily

¹ *dravyam ātmanā śaktyā prabhāvākhyayā doṣaṃ hanti . . atra dravya-śakti-kāryodāharaṇam yathā karṣaka-mañir loha-śalyam ākarṣati. Bhānumati*, I. 40. 13.

² *tasya pākasya tad-rasasya vipākasya ca prthaṅ-nirdeśān na vīrya-vyavahāraḥ śāstre . . . Carake tu sāmānya-vīrya-śabdena te 'pi grhīṭāḥ. Ibid.* I. 40. 5.

³ *yadā dvividhaṃ vīryam tadā snigdha-rūkṣādīnām . . . rasādi-dharmatayaiva kārya-grahaṇaṃ vakṣyati hi madhuro rasaḥ snigdha ity ādi aṣṭavidha-vīrya-pakṣe tu . . . balavat-kārya-karṭṛtva-vivakṣayā vīryatvam iti sthītiḥ. Ibid.* I. 40. 4.

in use for medical purposes and each of them would include many substances and *rasas*, this character justly deserves to be called *vīrya*, or the potency-in-chief for producing medical effects¹. He further says that *rasa* is baffled by *vipāka*, that *rasa* and *vipāka* can baffle *vīrya*, if they work in the same direction, and that they may all be baffled by *prabhāva*. These remarks, however, are true only in those cases where *rasa*, *vīrya* and *vipāka* exist in the same proportion, and it must be borne in mind that some objects may have *rasa* of such a predominant type that it may overcome the *vipāka* or the *vīrya*². As regards the relative priority of *vīrya* and *vipāka*, Śivadāsa in commenting on Cakrapāṇi's *Dravya-guṇa-saṃgraha* says that *vīrya* is prior to *vipāka*; and this would imply that, as *vīrya* can supersede *rasa*, so *vipāka* may supersede *vīrya*.

If we look back to the earliest history of the development of Indian medical ideas in the *Atharva-Veda*, we see that there were two important classes of medicines, viz. the amulets, *maṇis* and water. *Atharva-Veda*, I. 4. 4, I. 5, I. 6, I. 33, VI. 24, VI. 92, etc. are all in praise of water as medicine, and water is regarded there as the source of all *rasa* or taste. Thus from the earliest times two different kinds of medicines were used. Of these the amulets were more or less of a miraculous effect. It was not possible to judge which kind of amulet or *maṇi* would behave in which way; their mode of operation was unthinkable (*acintya*). It is easy to see that this mode of operation of medicines was what was considered a *prabhāva* by Caraka and Suśruta. With them *prabhāva* means the mysterious operation of a medicine acting in an unaccountable way, so that, though two medicines might be exactly similar in *rasa*, *vīrya* and *vipāka*, they might behave differently with regard to their medicinal effects³. Such an effect was thus naturally considered as unthinkable. But the analogy of the old *maṇis* was fresh in the minds of these medical thinkers when conceiving this *prabhāva*, and it was in reality an extension of that idea to other unaccountable effects of medicines⁴. As none of the chemical effects

¹ *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya*, I. 9. 15.

² *Ibid.* I. 28.

³ *rasa-vīrya-vipākāṇaṃ sāmānyam yatra lakṣyate viśeṣaḥ karmaṇāṃ caiva prabhāvas tasya ca smṛtaḥ. Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 26. 69. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says, “*rasādi-kāryatvena yan nāvadhārayitūṃ śakyate kāryaṃ tat prabhāva-kṛtaṃ iti sūcayati; ata evoktaṃ 'prabhāvo 'cintya ucyate' rasa-vīrya-vipākā-tayācintya ity arthaḥ.*”

⁴ *maṇinām dhāraṇyānām karma yad vivīdhātmaṃ, tat-prabhāva-kṛtaṃ teṣāṃ prabhāvo 'cintya ucyate.* (The various actions of amulets are to be considered as being due to a *prabhāva* which is unthinkable—*ibid.* I. 26. 72.)

(in the modern sense) of medicines on human organs were known, the most obvious way in which the medical effects of herbs, roots, etc. could be classified was on the basis of taste, and by Caraka and Suśruta we are told the effects of the different *rasas* on the different morbidities of the body, *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha*. As the main source of all diseases was unequal increase or decrease of *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha*, a classification which described the *rasas* in such a way that one could know which *rasa* increased or decreased which of the morbidities was particularly useful. But it is obvious that such a classification, though simple, could not be universally true; for, though the taste is some indication of the medicinal property of any substance, it is not an infallible one. But no other mode of classification was known; it was supposed that the taste (*rasa*) of some substances changed altogether after digestion and that in such cases the taste which changed after digestion (*pāka*) would be operative. Cakrapāṇi says that in those cases where the taste on the tongue (*rasa*) agrees with the taste as produced after the digestive process, the effect in that direction becomes very strong, but in the case where the latter differs from the former the operation of *rasa* becomes naturally weak, because the force of the taste produced by the final operation of the digestive process is naturally strong¹. Caraka thought that there were only three *rasas* as the result of digestion, viz. *kaṭu*, *madhura* and *amla*; Suśruta rejected the last, as has already been described. But even this was not sufficient; for there were many other effects of medicine which could not be explained on the above suppositions. In explaining this, the theory of *virya* was introduced. In addition to taste substances were considered to possess other properties of heat and cold, as judged by inference, tactual properties of slipperiness, movement, moisture and dryness, etc., sharpness, etc. as manifested by odour, and these were supposed to produce effects in supersession of *rasa* and *vipāka*. It was only in the cases where no sensible data of any kind could be found to indicate the medical properties of the thing that the idea of *prabhāva* was introduced. The chapters in Āyur-veda on *dravya*

¹ Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, 1. 26. 65. Cakrapāṇi points out that the hot (*kaṭu*) taste is at first useful in cleaning the phlegm of the throat, but, since it becomes sweet after digestion, it acts as a nutrient (*viśya*). But, except in the case of such local actions, it is difficult to understand why the *rasa* which was altered by digestion should have any such effect as Cakrapāṇi suggests (*viparyaye tu durbalam iti jñeyam*).

and *guṇa* deal with the enumeration of *prabhāva* and also of *rasa*, *vipāka* and *vīrya* wherever there is a divergence among them, as determined by empirical observation. This is very necessary not only for the selection of medicines and diet in the cure of diseases, but also for prevention of diseases. It is well to remember that many diseases were supposed to arise through eating together things which are opposed to each other in *rasa*, *vipāka* or *vīrya*.

The Psychological Views and other Ontological Categories.

Caraka in the eighth chapter of the *Sūtra-sthāna* counts the senses as being five in number. Though both the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika systems, to which Āyur-veda is largely indebted for its philosophical ideas, admit *manas*, or mind-organ, as a separate sense (*indriya*), Āyur-veda here differs from them and, as Cakrapāṇi says, separates *manas* from the ordinary senses by reason of the fact that it has many functions which are not possessed by any of the other senses (*caḥsur-ādibhyo 'dhika-dharma-yogitayā*)¹. Caraka himself, however, in another place speaks incidentally of a sixth sense (*ṣaḍ-indriya*) in connection with the description of sweet taste². *Manas* is, however, here described as transcending the senses (*atindriya*). Cakrapāṇi, in explaining the *atindriya* character of *manas*, says that it is called *atindriya* because it is not a cause of the knowledge of external objects like the other senses. *Manas* is, indeed, the direct cause of pleasure and pain, but it is the superintendent of all the senses (*adhiṣṭhāyaka*). *Manas* is also called *sattva* and *cetas*. The self is, however, the permanent subject of all acts of consciousness (*cetanā-pratisandhātā*). When the *manas* comes into contact with its objects, viz. pleasure or pain or the objects of thought, and the self makes an effort at grasping these objects, then there is a movement on the part of *manas*, by which it feels pleasure or pain, or thinks the objects of thought, or moves the sense-organs. Thus, when the self makes an effort and the objects of pleasure or pain or thought are present, then the *manas* turns to these as its objects and moves the senses, and the senses, guided by it, grasp their respective objects and produce their knowledge.

¹ Cakrapāṇi's commentary on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 8. 3.

² *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 26. 41, *tatra madhuro rasah...ṣaḍ indriya-prasādanah*.

The one *manas* appears as diverse on account of the diversity of its objects of thought (e.g. the mind may sometimes take religious thoughts and appear religious and at other times take lustful thoughts and appear lustful), diversity of sense-objects with which it is associated (e.g. the mind may grasp colour, smell or sound, etc.), and diversity of ways of imagination (e.g. "This will do good to me" or "This will do me harm," etc.). In the same man the mind may sometimes appear as angry, ignorant or virtuous. But in reality the *manas* is one and the same for each person; all these differences do not appear at the same time with the same person, as might have been the case if there were many minds for one and the same person. Moreover, the *manas* is atomic; for otherwise many different objects or functions could be performed by one and the same *manas* at the same time.

It may be asked, if one and the same *manas* can show different kinds of moral propensities, *sattva*, *rajas* or *tamas*, how can any person be characterized as *sāttvika*, *rājasika* or *tāmasika*? The answer is that a man is called *sāttvika*, *rājasika* or *tāmasika* according as predominance of one or other of these *guṇas* is observed in that man.

Manas is supposed to move the senses, which are constituted of *ākāśa*, air, light, heat, water and earth; and the seats of the senses are the physical sockets of the eye, the ear, the nostrils, the tongue and the skin. The five sense-cognitions are produced through the contiguity of the senses, the sense-objects, *manas* and soul. They are short-lived (*kṣaṇika*), but not exactly momentary, as the Buddhists would like to have them¹. They also are of determinate nature (*niścayātmikāḥ*). As Cakrapāṇi says, it is quite possible for transitory sense-cognitions to give a determinate report of their objects. Though all the senses are made up of the five elements, yet those senses which contain any element in a preponderating degree were conceived as made up of that element. The sense that has a particular element in a preponderating degree is regarded as having by virtue of that a special capacity for grasping that particular element².

The connection of the body, the senses, the *manas* and the self

¹ Cakrapāṇi's commentary on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, 1. 8. 11. *Kṣaṇikā ity āsutaravinaśīnyah na tu bauddha-siddhāntavad eka-kṣaṇāvasthāyīnyah.*

² *tatra yad-yad-ātmakam indriyaṃ viśeṣāt tat-tad-ātmakam evārtham anugrhmāti tat-svabhāvād vibhūtvāc ca.* (Caraka, 1. 8. 14.)

is called life (*jīvita*)¹. The self is everywhere regarded as the agent which unites the acts of consciousness (*jñāna-pratisandhātā*). Cakrapāṇi says that, since the body is momentary (*śarīrasya kṣaṇikatvena*), it may be argued that the union of the self with the body is also momentary. The answer that Cakrapāṇi gives to such an objection is that, though the body is momentary, yet, since the momentary bodies are repeated in a series, the series as a whole may be looked upon as one; and, though the union of the self with each term of the series is momentary, yet, since the series may be looked upon as one, its union with the self may also be regarded as one (*santāna-vyavasthito 'yam ekatayā ucyate*)². In another place Caraka says that the *manas*, the self and the body are connected together like a tripod, on which life rests; if any one of the components is missing, the unity is broken³.

It has already been pointed out that, according to Caraka, the self is active and that by its activity the mind moves; and it is by the operation of mind that the senses move. The self is also regarded as being *cetana* (conscious). But this consciousness does not belong to the self in itself, it is attained only by its connection with the senses through *manas*⁴. It is, however, necessary to note that apart from this self there is, according to Caraka, another transcendent self (*paraḥ ātmā*), different from the self which participates in the union of the body and the senses (which is also technically called the *saṃyogi-puruṣa*)⁵. The subtler, or transcendent, self is unchangeable (*nir-vikāra*). Knowledge implies a process and a change, and this self manifests consciousness only in those parts where it becomes associated with *manas* and the senses. Thus, though the self is eternal, yet the rise of consciousness in it is occasional. The unchangeableness of the self consists in its being able to unite with itself its past and future states⁶. If the self were not permanent, it could not unite with itself all its past experiences. The sufferings and enjoyment

¹ Caraka, I. 1. 41. The other synonyms of life are *dhāri*, *nityaga* and *anubandha*.

² *Ibid.* I. 1. 41.

³ *sattvaṃ ātmā śarīraṃ ca trayam etat tri-daṇḍavat
lokas tiṣṭhati saṃyogāt tatra sarvaṃ pratiṣṭhitam.* *Ibid.* I. 1. 45.

⁴ *idam eva cātmanas cetanatvaṃ, yad indriya-saṃyoge sati jñāna-śālitvaṃ,
na nīkṣṭasyātmanas cetanatvaṃ.* Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, I. 1. 47.

⁵ *nirvikārah paras tv ātmā satva-bhūta-guṇendriyaiḥ.* Caraka, I. 1. 55. *tena
sattva-śarīrātma-melaka-rūpo ya ātma-śabdena ucyate taṃ vyāvartayati.* Cakra-
pāṇi on the above.

⁶ *nityatvaṃ cātmanasḥ pūrvāparāvasthānubhūtārtha-pratisandhānāt.* Cakra-
pāṇi on Caraka, I. 1. 55.

that affect us should not be attributed to the self, but to *manas* (*dṛśyamāna-rāgādi-vikāras tu manasi*).

The special feature of this view of self is that it is permanent and unchangeable; this self seems to hold within it all the individual egos which operate in association with their respective senses, *manas* and body. It becomes endowed with consciousness only when it is in association with the senses. Pleasure, pain and the movements involved in thought-processes are attributed to *manas*, though the *manas* is also considered to derive its activity from the self. The states of consciousness that are produced are all united in the self. The self, thus diverted in its subtler aspect from the senses and *manas*, is eternal and unchangeable, whereas in its aspect as associated with *manas* and the senses it is in the sphere of change and consciousness. This view is therefore different from those of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy.

It is well to note in this connection that the *Caraka-saṃhitā* begins with an enumeration of the Vaiśeṣika categories, and, though it often differs from the Vaiśeṣika view, it seems to take its start from the Vaiśeṣika. It enumerates the five elements, *manas*, time, space and self as substances (*dravya*); it enumerates the *guṇas*, such as the sensible qualities, the mechanical or physical qualities given in the list beginning with heaviness (*gurv ādayaḥ*), intelligence (*buddhi*), and those beginning with remoteness (*para*) and ending with effort (*prayatna*). But what is this *gurv ādi* list? There is no such list in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. Cakrapāṇi, however, refers to an enumeration given in a later chapter (I. 25. 35) by Caraka, where however these *guṇas* are not enumerated as belonging to all substances, but only to the food and drink that we take¹. But the list referred to as *parādi* (beginning with *parādi*) *prayatnānta* (ending in *prayatna*) is not to be found anywhere in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*. This may be a reference to the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, I. 1. 6². But, if this is so, it leaves out a number of other *guṇas* enumerated in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* which were counted there in the *parādi* list³. Caraka himself gives a list of *guṇas* beginning with *para* which includes some of those *guṇas* included in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* already

¹ *āhāratvam āhārasyaikavidham arthābhedāt sa punaḥ...viṃśati-guṇo guru-laghu-śītoṣṇa-snigdha-rūkṣa-manda-tikṣṇa-sthīra-sara-mṛdu-kāṭhina-viśada-pic-chīla-ślakṣṇa-khara-sūkṣma-sthūla-sāndra-dravānugamāt. Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 5. 35.

² *paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukha-duḥkhe icchā-dveṣau prayatnā ca guṇāḥ. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, I. 1. 6.

³ *rūpa-rasa-gandha-śparśāḥ saṃkhyā-parimāṇāni prthaktvaṃ saṃyoga-vibhāgau paratvāparatve. Ibid.*

referred to and some more. The *guṇas* enumerated are *para*, *apara*, *yukti*, *saṃkhyā*, *saṃyoga*, *vibhāga*, *prthaktva*, *parimāṇa*, *saṃskāra*, and *abhyāsa*¹. *Para* means “superiority” or “importance” (*pradhāna*), *apara* means “inferiority” or “unimportance” (*apradhāna*). This importance or unimportance is with reference to country, time, age, measure, the *rasa* resulting from digestion (*pāka*), potency (*vīrya*) and taste (*rasa*). Thus, a dry country is called *para* and a marshy one *apara*; the rains (*visarga*) of early and late autumn (*śarat* and *hemanta*) are called *para*, whereas the season of drought (winter, spring and summer) is called *apara*; with reference to *pāka*, *vīrya* and *rasa*, *para* and *apara* mean “suitability” and “unsuitability”—that which is suitable to one is *para* and that which is unsuitable to him is *apara*. *Yukti* means proper selection of medicines with reference to certain diseases (*doṣādyapekṣayā bheṣajasya samīcīna-kalpanā*); *saṃkhyā* means “number”; *saṃyoga*, the mixing up or compounding of two or more substances; *vibhāga*, separation; *prthaktva*, difference. The mountains Himālaya and Meru are *prthak*, because they are situated in different places and cannot unite; again, even though a pig and a buffalo may meet together, they always remain different from each other; and again, in the same class, say in a collection of peas, each pea is different in identity from the other; in the last case difference in number constitutes a difference in identity; thus, wherever there is a numerical difference (*anekatā*), there is difference in identity. *Prthaktva* thus stands for three kinds of difference, spatial difference, difference of characters and difference of identity due to numerical distinction. *Parimāṇa* means measurement by weight, *saṃskāra* means the production of new qualities and *abhyāsa* means habit due to constant practice (*satata-kriyā*). It is evident from the above that, though the terms used are the same as those used by Kaṇāda in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, yet they are mostly used in different senses in accordance, probably, with medical tradition. But this list does not end with *prayatna*; it seems therefore that *parādi* and *prayatnānta* stand for two different lists and should not be combined together. We have above the *parādi* list. The *prayatnānta* is a different list of *guṇas*. It includes, as Cakrapāṇi says, *icchā* (desire), *dveṣa* (hatred), *sukha*

¹ *Parāparatve yuktis ca saṃkhyā saṃyoga eva ca, vibhāgaś ca prthaktvaṃ ca parimaṇam athāpi ca, saṃskārābhyāsa ity ete guṇāḥ jñeyāḥ parādayaḥ. Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 26. 27-29.

(pleasure), *duḥkha* (pain) and *prayatna* (effort). *Prayatna* means that particular quality by the rise of which in the soul the *manas* is moved to activity.

Karma (movement) is described as *prayatnādi-ceṣṭitam*, i.e. a movement of the nature of conscious effort; the word *ādi* in *prayatnādi* is explained by Cakrapāṇi as meaning "of the nature of¹."

Samavāya means the relation of inseparable inherence, as in the case of qualities and substances. Cakrapāṇi, in explaining the nature of *samavāya*, says that it is eternal, so that, even when in a particular case it may disappear, it continues to exist in other cases. It is never destroyed or created anew, but only its appearance is or is not manifested in particular cases². In the case of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, again, Caraka seems to add a new sense to the words. In the Vaiśeṣika systems the word *sāmānya* means a class concept; but here it means the concrete things which have similar constituents or characteristics; and *viśeṣa*, which means in Vaiśeṣika ultimate specific properties differentiating one atom from another, means in Caraka concrete things which have dissimilar and opposite constituents or characteristics. *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* thus have a significance quite different from what they have in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. The principle of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* is the main support of Āyur-veda; for it is the principle which underlies the application of medicines and the course of diets. Substances having similar constituents or characteristics will increase each other, and those having dissimilar constituents or characteristics will decrease each other. Thus a substance having the characteristics of *vāta* will increase *vāta* and decrease *śleṣman*, which is dissimilar to it, and so on. *Sāmānya* is thus defined as *tulyārthatā*, i.e. performing similar purposes. Instead of having only a conceptual value, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are here seen to discharge a pragmatic work of supreme value for Āyur-veda. As regards the theory of substances (*dravya*) also, though Caraka borrowed the enumeration of categories, Cakrapāṇi says that the simpler *bhūtas* formed parts of the complex ones (*bhūtāntarānupraveśa*), and in support of this idea he quotes a *sūtra* from the *Nyāya-sūtra*, which, however, there occurs as an opponent's view, since the theory of *bhūtānupraveśa* was not believed in by the Nyāya-

¹ *ādi-śabdāḥ prakāravāci*. Cakrapāṇi's commentary on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 48.

² *Ibid.* I. 1. 49.

Vaiśeṣika school; with that school none of the elements entered into any other, and their qualities were fixed in themselves. However, in spite of these modifications, the relation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with Caraka seems to be close. But the detailed description of the school of Sāṃkhya, in IV. 1, as has already been mentioned and explained in the first volume of the present work, in the chapter on Sāṃkhya, does not seem to have much bearing on the needs of Āyur-veda; and so the whole chapter does not appear to fit in with the rest of the work, and it is not referred to in other parts of the book. It is not improbable that this chapter was somehow added to the book from some other treatise.

Suśruta does not, like Caraka, enumerate the categories of the Vaiśeṣika, and his account of Sāṃkhya is very faithful to the traditional account given in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Kārikā* and in the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*. Having described the Sāṃkhya theory, Suśruta says that according to medical science the causes of things are sixfold, viz. (1) nature of things (*svabhāva*), (2) God (*Īśvara*), (3) time (*kāla*), (4) accidental happenings (*yadycchā*), (5) destiny (*niyati*) and (6) evolution (*pariṇāma*)¹. As Ḍalhaṇa points out, Suśruta has in several places referred to the operation of all these causes. Thus the formation of the limbs of the body in the foetus-state is said to be due to nature (*svabhāva*); God as fire is said to operate as the digestive fire in the stomach and to help digestion; time as seasons is said to be the cause of the increase and decrease of *doṣas*; destiny means virtue and vice, and diseases and recovery from them are sometimes attributed to these. Jejjāta, in commenting on Suśruta (as reported by Ḍalhaṇa), says that all the above six causes, with the exception of God, are but different names of *prakṛti*. Gayī, however, thinks that the above six causes represent the instrumental cause, though *prakṛti* may still be considered as being the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*).

As Ḍalhaṇa and Gayī think, there is no reason to suppose that Suśruta described the Sāṃkhya doctrine; for, immediately after describing the sixfold causes, he speaks of the elements as being constituted of the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Even the senses are regarded as being material. Souls are according to Āyur-veda eternal, though they are limited to their bodies and are not all-pervasive. They are manifested when the semen and the blood combine, and it is this bodily self, suffering transmigration owing

¹ *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 1. 11.

to virtue and vice (called *karma-puruṣa*), with which medical science is concerned. When the self is in association with *manas*, it has the following qualities: pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, *prāṇa* and *apāna* (the upward current of breath and the downward force acting in the direction of the rectum), the opening and closing of the eyelids, the action of the intellect as decision or *buddhi* (*niścaya*), imagination (*saṃkalpa*), thought (*vicāraṇā*), memory (*smṛti*), scientific knowledge (*viññāna*), energy (*adhyavasāya*) and sense-cognitions (*viśayopalabdhi*). The qualities of *manas* are divided into three classes, viz. *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*; of these the *sāttvika* ones are kind actions, the desire of enjoying gradually, mercy, truthfulness, virtue, faith, self-knowledge, retentive power (*medhā*), intelligence (*buddhi*), self-control (*dhṛti*), and sense of duty for the sake of duty (*anabhiśaṅga*); the *rājasa* qualities are suffering, impatience, pride, untruthfulness, cruelty, boastfulness, conceit (*māna*), joy, passion and anger; the *tāmasa* qualities are dullness, viciousness, want of retentive power, idleness and sleepiness.

Logical Speculations and Terms relating to Academic Dispute.

Things are either existent (*sat*) or non-existent (*asat*), and they can be investigated by the four *pramāṇas*, viz. the testimony of trusty persons (*āptopadeśa*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and the coming to a conclusion by a series of syllogisms of probability (*yukti*)¹.

Those whose minds are free from the impurities of *rajas* and *tamas* through the force of their ascetic endeavours, who possess unlimited knowledge extending through the past, present and future, are to be considered as trustworthy (*āpta*). Such persons neither have any deficiency of knowledge nor would they willingly say anything untrue. They must be considered as absolutely trusty (*āpta*), and their testimony may be regarded as true².

The valid and certain knowledge that arises as the result of the relation of self, senses, *manas* and sense-objects is called "perception." This contact of the sense with the object is regarded by Cakrapāṇi as being of five kinds, viz. (1) contact with the *dravya* (substance), called *saṃyoga*; (2) contact with the *guṇas*

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. II. 17.

² *Ibid.* I. II. 18, 19.

(qualities) through the thing (*saṃyukta-samavāya*) in which they inhere by *samavāya* (inseparable) relation; (3) contact with the *guṇas* (such as colour, etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colouredness (*rūpatva*), which exist in the *guṇas* in the *samavāya* relation; this is called *saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya* since the eye is in contact with the thing and the colour is in the thing by *samavāya* relation, and in the specific colour there is the universal colour or the generic character of colour by *samavāya* relation; (4) the contact called *samavāya* by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear: the auditory sense is *ākāśa*, and the sound exists in *ākāśa* by the *samavāya* relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound by a peculiar kind of contact called *samaveta-samavāya*; (5) the generic character of sound as the sound universal (*śabdatva*) is perceived by the kind of contact known as *samaveta-samavāya*. It is only immediately resulting (*tadātve*) cognition of such a contact that is called perception (*pratyakṣa*); for inference, memory, etc. also may come in as a result of such a cognition at later stages through other successive processes (*pāramparya*).. Cakrapāṇi further notes that the four kinds of contact spoken of here are the real causes of the phenomenon of perception; in reality, however, “knowledge that results as the effect of sense-contact” would be a sufficient definition of *pratyakṣa*; so in the perception of pleasure, though none of these contacts are necessary, it is regarded as a valid case of direct perception. Contact with the self is, of course, necessary for all kinds of cognition¹. It is easy to see that the above theory of perception is of the same type as that found in the Nyāya system. The *nir-vikalpa* perception is not taken into consideration; for there is nothing corresponding to the term *avyapadeśya* in the *Nyāya-sūtra*². Inference must be based on perception, by which the concomitance of the *hetu* can first be observed. Inference is of three kinds, viz. from *kārya* (effect) to *kāraṇa* (cause), as the inference of cohabitation from pregnancy; from cause to effect, as the inference of the future production of

¹ Cakrapāṇi on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 11. 20.

² The definition of *pratyakṣa* given in *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 11. 20, is:

*ātmendriya-mano-rthānām sannikarṣāt pravartate
vyaktā tadātve yā buddhiḥ pratyakṣam sā nirucyate.*

The definition of *pratyakṣa* in the *Nyāya-sūtra* is as follows:

*indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam
avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam.*

For a discussion thereon see vol. I, pp. 333-343.

fruit from a seed with the other attendant causes, sprinkling with water and the like; and inference by associations other than that of cause and effect, as the inference of fire from smoke¹.

Yukti is not counted as a separate *pramāṇa* by any other system of Indian thought. When our intelligence judges a fact by a complex weighing in mind of a number of reasons, causes or considerations, through which one practically attains all that is desirable in life, as virtue, wealth or fruition of desires, we have what may be called *yukti*². As Cakrapāṇi points out, this is not in reality of the nature of a separate *pramāṇa*; but, since it helps *pramāṇas*, it is counted as a *pramāṇa*. As an example of *yukti*, Caraka mentions the forecasting of a good or bad harvest from the condition of the ground, the estimated amount of rains, climatic conditions and the like. Cakrapāṇi rightly says that a case like this, where a conclusion is reached as the combined application of a number of reasonings, is properly called *ūha* and is current among the people by this name. It is here counted as a separate *pramāṇa*. It is in reality an inference of an effect from causes and, as such, cannot be used at the present time, and hence it cannot be called *tri-kāla*, valid in all the three times, past, present and future, as Caraka says.

The Buddhist, writes Śāntarakṣita in discussing Caraka's doctrine of *yukti* as a separate *pramāṇa*, holds that *yukti* consists in the observation that, since, when this happens, that happens, and, since, when this does not happen, that does not happen, this is the cause of that. It may be argued that this is not a case of inference, since there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with a *dr̥ṣṭānta*, or example, in Nyāya inference (e.g. whatever is smoky is fiery, as the kitchen). It is held, as Kamalaśīla interprets, that the cause-effect idea is derived from the idea of "this happening, that happens," and there is no other idea in the notion of causality; if in any case any particular example is given, then another example might be asked for, and after that another, and we should have *regressus*

1

*pratyakṣa-pūrvam tri-vidham
tri-kālam cānumīyate
vahnir nigūḍho dhūmena
maithunam garbha-darśanāt.
Evam vyavasyanty atītam
bijāt phalam anāgatam
dr̥stvā bijāt phalam jātam
ihaiva sadṛśam budhāḥ.*

Caraka-saṃhitā, I. 11. 21, 22.

2

*buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhāvān bahu-kāraṇa-yogajān
yuktis tri-kāla sā jñeyā tri-vargaḥ sādhyate yayā. Ibid.* I. 11. 25.

*ad infinitum*¹. These arguments in support of *yukti* as the concluding of the cause-effect relation from "this happening, that happens" relation are refuted by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who point out that there are no separate cognitive processes which link up the relation of "this happening, that happens" with the cause-effect relation, because both these convey the same concept. The cause-effect relation is the same as "this happening, that happens." It may be argued that, whenever anything invariably and unconditionally happens on the happening of any other thing, then the two are considered to be related as cause and effect, just as a jug, etc. are invariably seen to appear after the proper operations of the potter and his wheels. If this is *yukti*, then it is not a different source of knowledge.

Cakrapāṇi, however, points out that these criticisms are all beside the point, since *yukti*, according to Caraka, is not *kārya-kāraṇatā* from *tad-bhāva-bhāvitā*; it is the arriving at a conclusion as a result of a series of reasonings. But it is important to note that in III. 4. 6 and 7 Caraka speaks of three kinds of *pramāṇas*, viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*, and describes *anumāna* as being *tarka* depending on *yukti*. *Tarka* is explained by Cakrapāṇi as being the knowledge of things which cannot be perceived (*tarko 'pratyakṣa-jñānam*), and *yukti* is here paraphrased by Cakrapāṇi as the relation of *a-vinā-bhāva*. It is said in this connection that a disease is to be determined by *pratyakṣa*, the medical texts (*āptopadeśa*) and inference. But in III. 8. 6. 33 and 34 Caraka counts *aitihya* as *āptopadeśa*, though ordinarily *aitihya* is considered in

¹ *drṣtānte 'py ata eva tad-bhāva-bhāvitvāt kāryatā-pratipattiḥ, tatrāpi drṣtānto 'nyo 'nveṣaṇīyah, tatrāpy apara ity anavasthā*. Kamalaśīla as quoted by Cakrapāṇi on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 11. 25.

Śāntarakṣita misrepresents Caraka's view of *yukti* in a very strange manner. He says that, when from the fact that in all cases when *A* is present *B* is present and in all cases when *A* is absent *B* is also absent one thinks *A* to be the cause of *B*, this is regarded by Caraka as the new *pramāṇa* of *yukti*. Śāntarakṣita's exact words are:

*asmīn sati bhavaty eva na bhavaty asaṁtīti ca
tasmād ato bhavaty eva yuktir eṣa 'bhidhīyate
pramāṇāntaram evaṃ ity āha carako munīḥ
nānumānam iyaṃ yasmād drṣtānto 'tra na labhyate.*

Tattva-saṃgraha, p. 482.

This, however, is entirely different from what Caraka says, as is pointed out by Cakrapāṇi in his commentary on *Caraka-saṃhitā*. Caraka's idea of *yukti* is the logic of probability, i.e. when from a number of events, circumstances, or observations one comes to regard a particular judgment as probable, it is called *yukti*, and, as it is different from inference or any of the other accepted *pramāṇas*, it is to be counted as a separate *pramāṇa*. So far as I know, this is the only example of the introduction of the logic of probability in Indian thought.

Indian philosophy as being "tradition" or long-standing popular belief, different from *āptopadeśa*; *upamāna*, under the name of *aupamya*, is also referred to.

It may not be out of place here to note that the obstacles to perception referred to in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* are all mentioned here. Thus it is said that even those things which have colour (*rūpa*) cannot be perceived if they are covered by a veil, or if the senses are weak, or if the mind is unsettled, or if they are mixed up in any homogeneous medium indistinguishable from them, or when in the case of smaller lights they are overcome by stronger luminaries, or when they are too fine or too subtle¹.

Logic was of use with Indian medical men not only in diagnosing a disease, but also in the debates which they had with one another. The rival practitioners often had to show their skill and learning in debates on occasions of the treatment of illness of rich patients. The art of carrying on a dispute successfully was considered an important acquisition among medical practitioners. Thus we have a whole set of technical terms relating to disputes, such as are never found in any other literature, excepting the *Nyāya-sūtra*. In the *Caraka-saṃhitā* almost the whole of the chapter called the "*Roga-bhīṣag-jītiya-vimāna*" (III. 8) is devoted to this purpose. It is well to remember that different kinds of disputes and fallacies are mentioned in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, and it will be useful to refer to these when dealing with similar topics from either the *Caraka-saṃhitā* or the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*.

The four terms referred to in connection with disputes in the *Nyāya-sūtra* are *tarka*, *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā*. *Tarka* is said to be the same as *ūha*, and this is explained as a process of reasoning carried on in one's mind before one can come to any right conclusion. It is a name for the subjective weighing of different alternatives on the occasion of a doubt before a conclusive affirmation or denial (*nirṇaya*) is made. Disputes are said to be of three kinds, *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā*. *Vāda* means a discussion for the ascertainment of truth, *jalpa* a dispute in which the main object is the overthrow of the opponent rightly or wrongly, and *vitandā* a dispute in which attempts are made to discover the faults of the opponent's thesis without any attempt to offer any alternative thesis. *Vāda* is thus essentially different in its purpose from *jalpa* and *vitandā*; for *vāda* is an academical discussion with pupils,

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 11. 8.

teachers, fellow-students and persons seeking truth solely for the purpose of arriving at right conclusions, and not for fame or gain¹. *Jaḷpa*, on the other hand, is that dispute which a man carries on while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable to defend himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other unfair methods of argument.

Caraka, in III. 8, says that a medical man should hold discussions (*sambhāṣā*) with other medical men. Discussion increases zeal for knowledge (*saṃharṣa*), clarifies knowledge, increases the power of speech and of achieving fame, removes doubts in the learning acquired before and strengthens convictions. In the course of these discussions many new things may be learnt, and often out of zeal an opponent will disclose the most cherished secret teachings of his teachers. These discussions are of two classes, friendly (*sandhāya sambhāṣā*) and hostile (*vighya sambhāṣā*). A friendly discussion is held among wise and learned persons who frankly and sincerely discuss questions and give their views without any fear of being defeated or of the fallacies of their arguments being exposed. For in such discussions, even though there may be the fallacies described, no one would try to take advantage of the other, no one is jubilant over the other's defeat and no attempt is made to misinterpret or misstate the other's views.

Caraka then proceeds to give instructions as to how one should behave in an assembly where one has to meet with hostile disputes. Before engaging oneself in a hostile discussion with an opponent a man ought carefully to consider whether his opponent is inferior (*para*) to him and also the nature of the assembly (*pariṣat*) in which the discussion is undertaken. A *pariṣat* may be learned (*jñānavatī*) or ignorant (*mūḍhā*), and these again may be friendly (*suhṛt*), neutral (*udāsīnā*), or hostile (*pratiniṣṭā*). When an opponent is to be judged, he is to be judged from two points of view, intellectual and moral. Thus, on the one hand, it has to be considered whether he is learned and wise, whether he remembers the texts and can reproduce them quickly and has powers of speech, and on the other hand, whether he is of an irritable temperament, or of a fearful nature, etc. A man must carefully consider whether his opponent is superior to him in these qualifications or not.

¹ *vādam ca nirmaya-phalārthūbhīr eva śiṣya-sabrahmacāri-gurubhiḥ saha vīta-rāgaib, na khyāti-lābha-rabhāsa-pratīvardhamāna-spardhāmubandha-vidhurātma-bhīr ārabheta. Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 594.*

No disputes should be undertaken in a hostile assembly; for even the best arguments might be misinterpreted. In an ignorant, friendly or neutral assembly it is possible to win a debate by proceeding tactfully against an opponent who is looked down upon by famous or otherwise great persons. In beginning conversations with such persons attempts may be made to puzzle them by reciting long *sūtras* and to demoralize or stun them, as it were, by jokes, banter and gestures and by using satirical language.

When a man has to enter into a dispute with his equal, he should find out the special point in which his opponent is weak and attack him there and should try to corner him in such positions as are generally unacceptable to people in general. Caraka then proceeds to explain a number of technical terms in connection with such disputes. Like the Nyāya, Caraka divides such hostile disputes (*vāda*) into two classes, *jalpa* and *vitandā*. *Pratijñā* is the enunciation of a thesis which is sought to be proved, e.g. "The *puruṣa* is eternal." *Sthāpanā* is the establishing of a thesis by syllogistic reasonings involving propositions with *hetu*, *drṣtānta*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*. Thus the above thesis (*pratijñā*), "The *puruṣa* is eternal," is to be supported by a reason (*hetu*), "because it is uncreated"; by an example (*drṣtānta*), "The sky is uncreated and it is eternal"; by a proposition showing the similarity between the subject of the example and the subject of the thesis (*upanaya*), viz. "Just as the *ākāśa* is uncreated, so the *puruṣa* is also uncreated"; and finally by establishing the thesis (*nigamana*), "Therefore the *puruṣa* is eternal¹."

Pratiṣṭhāpanā is the attempt to establish a proposition contrary to the proposition or the thesis put forth by the opponent. Thus, when the thesis of the *sthāpanā* is "*Puruṣa* is eternal," the *prati-sthāpanā* proposition would be "*Puruṣa* is non-eternal," because "it is perceivable by the senses," and "The jug which is perceptible to the senses is non-eternal," and "*Puruṣa* is like the jug," so "*Puruṣa* is non-eternal."

Caraka defines *hetu* as "the cause of knowledge" (*hetur nāma upalabdhi-kāraṇam*), and the cause of knowledge is the *pramāṇas* of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *aitihya* and *aupamya*. The definition of *hetu* in the *Nyāya-sūtra* refers only to the perceived *hetu* in the case of inference, through a similarity or dissimilarity to which a

¹ It is easy to see that Caraka admitted in a syllogism all the five propositions that are admitted in the *Nyāya-sūtra*.

relation is established by inference¹. Here Caraka points out that a *hetu* may be either perceived, inferred or found by analogy or from the scriptures, but, in whichever way it may be found, when it leads to knowledge, it is called a *hetu*. Thus, when I say, "The hill is fiery, because it smokes" (*parvato vahnimān dhūmavattvāt*), the smoke is the *hetu*, and it is directly perceived by the eye. But when I say, "He is ill, because he is of low digestion," the *hetu* is not directly perceived, but is only inferred; for the fact of one's being in low digestion cannot be directly perceived. Again, when it is said, "*Puruṣa* is eternal, because it is uncreated" (*nityaḥ puruṣaḥ a-kṛtakatvāt*), the uncreatedness (*a-kṛtakatva*) is the *hetu*, but it is neither perceived, nor inferred, but accepted from the testimony of the scriptures. Again, in the proposition, "His face is most beautiful, because it has been compared with the moon" (*asya mukhaṃ kāntatamaṃ candropamatvāt*), the fact of being compared with the moon is the *hetu* and it is known by *upamā*². Thus Caraka's definition of *hetu* does not really come into conflict with that of Gautama: he only says that a *hetu* may be discovered by any of the *pramāṇas*, and, by whichever *pramāṇa* it may be discovered, it may be called a *hetu*, if it is invariably and unconditionally (*a-vinā-bhāva*) associated with the major term (*sādhya*)³.

Caraka then proceeds to describe *uttara*, which is in purport the same as the *jāti* of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. When an opponent wants to prove a thesis on the basis of a similarity of the subject of the thesis with the *hetu*, attempts have to be made to upset the thesis by showing its dissimilarity to the *hetu*. Thus one may say that the feeling of cold in a man must be due to his being affected by snow, dews, or chilly air, because effects arise from causes similar to them; in reply it may be said that effects are dissimilar from their causes, since a burning fever may often be an effect of cold⁴.

¹ *udāharaṇa-sādharmyāt sādhyā-sādhanaṃ hetuḥ
tathā vaidharmyāt. Nyāya-sūtra, I. 1. 34, 35.*

² See Gaṅgādhara's *Ṣaḍpa-kalpa-taru*, III. 8. 122.

³ *hetuḥ cāvinābhāva-līṅga-vacanaṃ yady api, tathāpiḥa līṅga-pragrāhakaṇi
pratyakṣādi-pramāṇāṇy eva yathokta-hetu-mūlatvena hetu-śabdenāha.*

Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, III. 8. 6. 25.

⁴ *sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyāṃ pratyavasthānaṃ jātiḥ. Nyāya-sūtra, I. 2. 18.* There are twenty-four kinds of this *jāti*, e.g. (1-2) *sādharmya-vaidharmya-sama*, (3-8) *utkarṣāpakarṣa-varṇyāvārṇya-vikalpa-sādhyā-sama*, (9-10) *prāpti-aprāpti-sama*, (11-12) *prasaṅga-pratidrṣṭānta-sama*, (13) *anutpatti-sama*, (14) *saṃśaya-sama*, (15) *prakaraṇa-sama*, (16) *ahetu-sama*, (17) *arthāpatti-sama*, (18) *aviśeṣa-sama*, (19) *upapatti-sama*, (20) *upalabdhi-sama*, (21) *anupalabdhi-sama*, (22) *nitya-sama*, (23) *amitya-sama*, (24) *kārya-sama*.

Sādharmya-vaidharmya-sama is that in which, when an argument is given on

The long list of *jātis* given in the *Nyāya-sūtra* and explained in the commentaries and in the *Nyāya-mañjari* is not referred to

the basis of the similarity or dissimilarity to a certain *hetu*, it is pointed out that quite the opposite conclusions may be drawn from other points of similarity or dissimilarity with other *hetus*. Thus, when it is said, "*Śabda* is non-eternal, because it is produced by an effort, and whatever is produced by an effort is non-eternal, as a jug," it may be answered, "*Śabda* is eternal, because it is partless: a partless entity like the *ākāśa* is found to be eternal; there is no special reason why on account of its similarity to a jug sound should be non-eternal, and not eternal owing to its similarity to *ākāśa*." An escape from the dilemma is possible by enquiring as to what may constitute an unconditional and invariable (*avyabhicāri*) similarity.

Utkarṣāpakarṣa-varṇyāvārṇya-vikalpa-sādhyā-sama is that in which similarity is pressed too far. Thus it is urged that, because sound is non-eternal like a jug, it must also be visible like a jug, and, if it is not so, it cannot be non-eternal like a jug. Moreover, it may be said that the reason why sound is expected to be non-eternal like a jug is that the former is produced by an effort (*prayatnāntariyaka*). But things which are produced by efforts differ in many of their qualities; thus a cloth is soft, and a jug is hard, though both of them are produced by effort; so it may be argued that, though *śabda* is as much a product of effort as a jug, it may not agree with the jug in being non-eternal. Moreover, instead of arguing that sound is like a jug, it may as well be argued that a jug is like sound; so that the status of the jug is as uncertain as sound itself (*yadī yathā ghaṭas tathā śabdaḥ prāptam tarhi yathā śabdaḥ tathā ghaṭa iti śabdaś cānityatayā sādhyā iti ghaṭo 'pi sādhyā eva syād anyathā hi na tena tulyo bhavet*—*Nyāya-mañjari*, p. 624). In answer to these kinds of fault-finding the proper argument is that no similarity should be extended beyond its limits, and an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) should not be considered to have the same status as a probandum (*sādhyā*); for an example is that which is already agreed upon among the disputants and the common people (*laukika-parīkṣakāṇām yasmīn arthe buddhi sāmyam sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ*).

Prāpty-aprāpti-sama is that in which it is urged that, if the *hetu* and the probandum are together, they cannot be distinguished from each other; if they are separate, *hetu* cannot lead us to the *sādhyā*. The answer to this is that a *hetu* can produce an effect either by direct contact (e.g. the rope and the stick in contact with clay produce a jug) or from a distance (e.g. the *śyena* sacrifice can destroy an enemy from a distance).

Prasaṅga-sama is that in which a reason for the *hetu* is asked. Thus, if the character of immediately following an effort (*prayatnāntariyakatva*) is the cause of non-eternality, what can establish the *prayatnāntariyakatva* of a jug, etc.? The answer to this is that a reason is necessary only for that which is not directly experienced as being evident in itself. That a jug immediately follows the efforts that produce it is directly experienced and does not require any argument or reason to establish it, as no light is required to see a burning lamp.

Dṛṣṭānta-sama is that in which from the same *hetu* two different conclusions are seen to result. Thus it may be said that both the jug and *ākāśa* have the character of immediately following an effort (e.g. as by digging new space is produced in underground wells which before the effort of digging were solid earth without space—*kūpa-khanana-prayatnānantaram tad-upalambhāt*—and this character is therefore to be regarded as *prayatnāntariyaka*); yet, as a jug is non-eternal and *ākāśa* eternal, so *śabda*, though it immediately follows an effort, is eternal. The answer is that, if such an opposite conclusion is drawn, a separate *hetu* has to be given, which is not done in the present case.

If sound is non-eternal, it must possess the character of coming into existence immediately after an effort that produces it; but how can it possess that character before being produced or coming into existence? If it cannot at that stage

by Caraka; nor does the technical name of *jāti* find any place in Caraka's description of it. If these elaborate descriptions of *jāti*

possess that character, it must be eternal, since the cause of its non-eternality is absent. This objection is called *anutpatti-sama*. The reply is that, unless the sound is in existence, its eternality or non-eternality cannot be discussed. If it is non-existent, of what is the eternality to be affirmed by the opponent?

Again, it may be argued that *śabda* has *prayatnāntariyakatva*, and therefore it may be expected to be non-eternal; it is perceived by the senses, and therefore it may be expected to be eternal, like so many other sensible objects. This doubt is called *saṁśaya-sama*. A doubt remains a doubt only so long as the special features which remove a doubt are not discovered. Though a man may have many qualities in common with a post, the doubt cannot remain when the special features of a man (e.g. his having a head and hands and feet) are known.

Prakarana-sama is that in which an entity is equally related to *hetu*s, so that no one conclusion can properly be drawn. Thus, sound has both *prayatnāntariyakatva* and *niravayavatva* (partlessness). Though, according to the first, it may be said to be non-eternal, according to the second it may be said to be eternal; so it is eternal. The answer is that the second *hetu* cannot be pressed as leading to a conclusion, because the first also is admitted to exist.

Ahetu-sama is the objection that there can be no argument from a *hetu*; for, if there is no *sādhya* (probandum), what is it that the *hetu* produces? and again, if there is no *hetu* before the *sādhya*, how can the *sādhya* be produced? So, as *hetu* is only a concomitant of *sādhya*, no inference is possible from it. The answer is that it is quite possible that from the previously existing *hetu* the non-existing *sādhya* should be produced. *Arthāpatti-sama* is where, for example, owing to the fact that sound is partless, it appears to be similar to *ākāśa* and hence by implication to be eternal. This is against the previous thesis that it is non-eternal owing to its being *prayatnāntariyaka*. *Aviśeṣa-sama* is the objection, that if on account of having the same characteristic of *prayatnāntariyakatva*, *śabda* and *ghaṭa* are said to be equally non-eternal, then, owing to all things having the same quality of existence (*sattā*), they are all the same. The answer to this is that equality in one respect does not mean equality in all respects.

Upapatti-sama is where a jug may be expected to be non-eternal owing to its *prayatnāntariyakatva* and eternal owing to its being partless like *ākāśa*. *Upalabdhi-sama* is where it is urged that, when by a terrible storm a tree is broken, there is sound which is not the result of any human effort (*prayatnāntariyakatva*), and yet it is non-eternal; again, lightning is not the result of human effort, still it is non-eternal. The answer is that the concomitance is between *prayatnāntariyakatva* and non-eternality and not between non-eternality and *prayatnāntariyakatva*; so that all that is produced by human effort is non-eternal, but not vice-versa. It should also be noted that by *prayatnāntariyakatva* emphasis is laid on the fact that all things that possess this character are produced. *Anitya-sama* is an objection where it is urged, for example, that, if on account of the similarity of sound to a jug, the former is non-eternal, then, since in some way or other all things in the world must have some similarity to a jug, all things must be non-eternal. The *anitya-sama* objection runs as follows: Is non-eternality in sound non-eternal or eternal? If the latter, then in order that an eternal quality may abide in it, sound itself must be eternal. If the former, then on some occasions at least sound must be eternal.

The *kārya-sama* objection suggests that *prayatnāntariyakatva* leads to production in two ways, either by bringing into existence that which was non-existent, or by removing the veil from something which was in a veiled condition; and it remains undecided what sort of *prayatnāntariyakatva* applies to *śabda*.

The above interpretations are all based on Jayanta's *Nyāya-mañjari*.

were known to Caraka, it is unlikely that he should have passed them over without referring to them.

An example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) is that on which the common folk and the learned are of the same opinion, since examples involve facts which are perceived by all and known to all, e.g. the fire is hot, water is liquid, the earth is firm. A *siddhānta*, or conclusion, is that to which one could arrive after a searching enquiry and demonstration by proper reasons. This *siddhānta* is of four kinds, viz. (1) *sarva-tantra-siddhānta*, or conclusions accepted by all, e.g. "There are causes of diseases; there are diseases; curable ones can be cured"; (2) *prati-tantra-siddhānta*, or conclusions which are not accepted by all, but are limited to particular books or persons: e.g. some say that there are eight *rasas*, others say that there are six; some say that there are five senses, others, that there are six; (3) *adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*, or conclusions which being accepted or proved, other conclusions also become proved or accepted: e.g. if it is proved that emancipated souls do not reap the fruits of *karma*, as they are without any desire, then the doctrine of the suffering of the fruits of *karma*, emancipation, the existence of soul and existence after death will have to be considered as refuted; (4) *abhyupagama-siddhānta*, or conclusions which are accepted only for the sake of an argument, and which are neither examined critically nor considered as proved¹.

Śabda is a collection of letters which may be of four kinds, viz. (1) *dr̥ṣṭārtha*—of experienced purport (e.g. "The *doṣas* lose their equilibrium through three causes"); (2) *adr̥ṣṭārtha*—of unperceivable purport (e.g. "There is after-life; there is emancipation"); (3) *satya*, or truth, that which tallies with facts (e.g. "There is Āyur-veda; there are means for curing curable diseases"); (4) *anṛta*, the opposite of truth, untruth². *Samśaya*, or doubt, occurs with reference to things about which no certainty is attained. Thus those who are unhealthy and inactive die soon, whereas those who are healthy and active live a long life. So there is a doubt whether in this world death happens timely or untimely. *Prayojana*, or the object of action, is that for which anything is begun. Thus one may think that, if there is untimely death, I shall form healthy habits and leave off unhealthy habits, so that untimely death may

¹ All these *siddhāntas* occur under the same names in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 1. 28, 29, 30, 31.

² The first two divisions, *dr̥ṣṭārtha* and *adr̥ṣṭārtha*, occur in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 1. 8, *sa dvividho dr̥ṣṭārthatvāt*.

not touch me¹. *Sa-vyabhicāra* means variability, e.g. "This may or may not be a medicine for this disease²." *Jijñāsā* means experimenting; a medicine is to be advised after proper experiments (*jijñāsā*). *Vyavasāya* means decision (*niscaya*), e.g. "This is a disease due to predominance of *vāyu*; this is the medicine for this disease." *Artha-prāpti* is the same as the well-known *arthāpatti*, or implication, when on making a statement, some other thing which was not said becomes also stated; it is a case of implication, e.g. the statement, "This disease cannot be cured by allowing the patient to take his normal food and drink," implies that it can be cured by fasting, or, if it is said, "He should not eat during the day," this means that "He should eat during the night³." *Sambhava* is the source from which anything springs, e.g. the six *dhātus* may be considered as the *sambhava* of the foetus; wrong diet, of disease; and right course of treatment, of health.

Anuyojya means a faulty answer which omits such details as should have been given in the answer, e.g. "This disease can be cured by purificatory action"; such an answer is faulty, as it does not state whether the purification should be made by vomiting or purging. *Ananuyojya* is what is different from *anuyojya*. *Anuyoga* is a question put by a learned man in a discussion as an enquiry about the reason for a thesis put forward by a learned colleague: e.g. a learned man says, "*Puruṣa* is eternal," and another learned man asks, "What is the reason?" Such a question is called *anuyoga*. A counter-question, such as "What is the reason for your asking such a question?" is called *pratya-anuyoga*.

Vākya-doṣa, or faulty statement, is of five kinds, viz. *nyūna*, *adhika*, *anarthaka*, *apārthaka* and *viruddha*. *Nyūna*, or the fault of omission, is that in which any of the five propositions necessary for a syllogism is omitted. It may also be applied to those cases in which, when a statement has to be supported by a number of

¹ *Prayojana*, which means pleasure and pain, is referred to in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 1. 1, though it is nowhere critically examined. It is explained by Vātsyāyana as that which goads men to action (*yena prayuktaḥ pravartate*). Uddyotakara explains it as the realization of pleasure and the fear of pain (*sukha-prāpti-duḥkha-hāni*).

² *anāikāntikaḥ sa-vyabhicāraḥ*. *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 2. 5. E.g. "sound is eternal" because it is untouchable; but untouchability does not lead to eternality, since the touchable atoms are eternal, whereas untouchable thoughts are short-lived.

³ Cakrapāṇi says that Caraka does not think that *artha-prāpti* is a separate *pramāṇa*; according to him it is a case of inference, and hence is not included in the list of *pramāṇas*.

reasons, only one is offered and others are omitted, materially affecting the strength of the support of the original statement. Thus several reasons are given in support of the eternality of *puruṣa*, viz. beginninglessness, not being the product of any effort, unchangeableness, etc. Proposing to give all these reasons, and giving only one, is an instance of *nyūna*. *Adhika* is where, when Āyurveda is being discussed, the opponent makes irrelevant references to learned works on politics or the art of government. It may also mean cases where words or statements are needlessly repeated. Such a repetition is of two kinds, verbal repetition and sense repetition. Verbal repetition is the repetition of the same word, while the other is the repetition of the sense only, though different words may be used. *Anarthaka* and *apārthaka* mean the use of meaningless and unconnected words or expressions. *Viruddha*, or contrary statement, means the making of a statement contrary to the example (*drṣṭānta-viruddha*) or the accepted conclusion (*siddhānta*), e.g. cold water is hot, for so is fever; or when a medical man (*vaidya*) says that medicine does not cure diseases.

Samaya-viruddha is the making of any statement against the accepted conclusions of any particular *śāstra*. Thus, for example, if a Mīmāṃsaka says that animals should not be sacrificed, it will be against his accepted doctrine that animals should be sacrificed. Or, if in any system of philosophy treating of emancipation (*mokṣa-śāstra*) it be said that injury to living beings is good, then this is against the accepted tenet of that *śāstra*. *Vākya-praśaṃsā* is that kind of statement in which the faults mentioned above in *vākya-doṣa* do not occur.

Chala means a rejoinder in which the statement of the opponent is wilfully misinterpreted. It is of two kinds, *vāk-chala* and *sāmānyachala*. The word *nava* means "nine" as well as "new," and if, when one says about one's opponent, "This physician is *nava-tantra*" (has newly learnt his texts), and the opponent replies, "I have not nine text-books, I have one text," the other person objects, "I do not say you have nine texts, I say that you are *navābhyasta-tantra*" (have newly learnt the texts), *navābhyasta-tantra* might also mean "read nine times"; and then the opponent might well say, "I have several times read the texts, and not nine times, as you say." This is an example of *vāk-chala*.

Again, when a physician says "Medicine cures diseases," the opponent may take the most general characteristics of the terms

and say that the above statement comes to this, that an existent entity cures another existent entity; and, if this is so, then, since bronchitis exists (*san kāsah*) and consumption exists (*san kṣayah*), bronchitis, being an existent entity, must cure another existent entity, consumption. This is called *sāmānya-chala*¹.

Fallacies (*a-hetu*) are of three kinds, *prakaraṇa-sama*, *saṁśaya-sama* and *varṇya-sama*². *Prakaraṇa-sama* is where that which

¹ *Chala* is treated in the *Nyāya-sūtra* exactly on the same lines as here. Thus the definition of *chala* there (*Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 2. 10) is *vacana-vighāto 'rtha-vikalpopapattiyā chalam* (to attack one's speech by a wilful misinterpretation of it is *chala*). This is divided into three classes, *vāk-chala*, *sāmānya-chala* and *upacāra-chala*; of these *vāk-chala* is exactly the same as in *Caraka-saṁhitā*, and so also the *sāmānya-chala* (because a Brahman is well-read in scriptures, a *vrātya* (outcast Brahman) is also well-read, because he also is a Brahman in some sense). *Upacāra-chala*, which, however, resembles *vāk-chala*, is not mentioned in the *Caraka-saṁhitā*. Its definition in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 2. 14, is *dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe 'rtha-sad-bhāva-pratiṣedha upacāra-chalam*: (to make one's statement impossible by taking it in one sense, say the primary, when the secondary one was intended). Thus, if it is said, "This porter is an ass," it may be objected that the porter, being a man, cannot at the same time be an ass. Gautama, however, tentatively raises the objection that *chalas* should be regarded as three in number and not two, taking *upacāra-chala* within *sāmānya-chala*. This means a criticism in view of Caraka's division of *chala* into two classes. For Gautama argues that, if on account of some similarity *upacāra-chala* should be included within *sāmānya-chala*, and *chalas* should be counted as being of two kinds instead of three, then for the very same reason of similarity *chalas* may as well be regarded as being of one kind instead of two. So, in view of the specific differences that exist between the *chalas*, they should be regarded as being of three kinds.

² *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 2. 4, describes the fallacies (*hetu-ābhāsa*) as of five kinds, *sa-vyabhicāra*, *viruddha*, *prakaraṇa-sama*, *sādhyā-sama* and *kālātita*.

Sa-vyabhicāra hetu is that which has no invariable concomitance with the probandum, e.g. sound is eternal because it is untouchable, and that which is touchable is non-eternal, like a jug. But untouchability has no invariable concomitance with eternity; for an atom is touchable and at the same time eternal, and thoughts (*buddhi*) are untouchable and at the same time non-eternal.

Viruddha hetu is where the reason (*hetu*) demolishes the very theory on which its security depends, e.g. this changeable world (*vikāro*) disappears (*vyakter apaiti*), because it is non-eternal (*nityatva-pratiṣedhāt*); but, though it disappears (*apeto 'pi*), yet it exists (*asti*), because it is not destructible (*vināśa-pratiṣedhāt*). Now a thing which is non-eternal cannot but be destructible. Destructibility and eternity cannot abide together.

Prakaraṇa-sama is where two opposite *hetus* exist in a thing, so that nothing can be affirmed by either of them. Thus it may be argued with as much force that "sound is eternal, because it has in it the qualities of eternal things," as that "sound is non-eternal, because it has in it the qualities of non-eternal things"; so no conclusion can be drawn from either of these *hetus*.

Sādhyā-sama is where the *hetu* itself remains to be proved. Thus in the argument, "shadow is a substance because it moves," the movability of shadows is a doubtful point and is itself in need of proof. Does a shadow move like a man, or is it that because the covering entity moves that at different places the light is veiled and this gives rise to the formation of shadows at different places?

Kālātita is where the *hetus* in the case of the accepted example and the case to be proved vary, because in the latter case the *hetu* is not properly a

is given as the *hetu* remains to be proved. Thus, when it is said that, since the self is different from the body, it is eternal, and because the body is unconscious it is non-eternal, it may be urged (as by the Cārvāka school of philosophers) that both the points, viz. that the self is different from the body and that the body is not endowed with consciousness, which are offered as the *hetu*, are themselves to be proved; for according to the Cārvākas the body is endowed with consciousness and is non-eternal. A reference to the footnote below shows that this *prakaraṇa-sama* is different from the *prakaraṇa-sama* of the *Nyāya-sūtra*. *Samśaya-sama* is that in which that which is the cause of doubt is offered as the *hetu* for a particular conclusion, e.g. This person quotes a passage from Āyur-veda—is he or is he not a physician? Even a man who is not a physician might have heard a passage somewhere and quoted it. Now, therefore, quoting a passage from Āyur-veda leaves us in doubt as to the man's being a physician or not. If this itself is offered as the *hetu* for a particular conclusion and if it is said, "He is a physician because he has quoted a passage from Āyur-veda," it becomes a case of *saṁśaya-sama*. Gautama speaks of *saṁśaya-sama* as an instance of *jāti*; but the former is a case where a doubt is not removed because of the fact that the thing about which anything is affirmed possesses two opposite qualities, so that no affirmation can be made on the strength of any of these characteristics. Here, however, *saṁśaya-sama* is used in the sense that what is itself doubtful is adduced as the reason for a particular conclusion.

Varṇya-sama is where an affirmation is made about a thing on the strength of another affirmation which itself remains to be proved and is hence in the same condition as the previous affirmation, e.g. "Buddhi is non-eternal, like sound, as it is un-touchable, like the latter." But the non-eternality of sound stands as much in need of proof as that of *buddhi*, and the former affirmation cannot be made on the basis of the latter. This fallacy is

hetu; for the *hetu* and *sādhya* exist in two successive moments and are therefore not concomitant; but in the former case they are concomitant and simultaneous, e.g. sound is eternal, because it is manifested, like colour, owing to a particular contact, like light, being manifested by the contact of a stick and a drum, just as colour is manifested by the contact of light with a thing. But the similarity fails; for, while colour is manifested simultaneously with the contact of light and the things, sound is heard at a moment different from that at which actual contact of the stick and the drum takes place.

similar to the *jāti* called *sādhya-sama* and the fallacy *sādhya-sama* of Gautama already described in the footnotes to page 386.

Atīta-kāla is that in which that which should be said first is said later, e.g. the thesis, or *pratijñā*, should be stated first and the conclusion, or *niḡamana*, last; if instead the *niḡamana* is stated first and the *pratijñā* after, then we have the fault of *kālātīta*.

Upālambha (criticism) is the finding fault with the *hetu*, also called *a-hetu*, as described above, or *hetv-ābhāsas*. *Parihāra* (reply) means the reply given to the objections pointed out by an opponent; e.g. the self is eternal, since so long as it remains in the body it shows signs of life, and, when it is away, though the body still remains the same, yet there is no sign of life; therefore the self is different from the body and is eternal. *Pratijñā-hāni* (to give up one's thesis) is where, being cornered by the opponent, one is forced to give up one's original thesis. Thus one may start with the thesis that *puruṣa* is eternal, but, being cornered, one may give it up and say that *puruṣa* is not eternal. *Abhyanuññā* (to bring a counter-charge) is that in which a disputant, instead of refuting the charge brought against him by his opponent, charges his opponent with the same defects¹. *Hetu-antara* (dodging with a wrong reason) is where, when the cause of some root fact (*prakṛti*) is asked, the reply refers to the cause of the modifications or manifestations (*vikṛti*) of that root fact². *Arthāntara* (wrong answer) is where, when the definition of one thing (e.g. fever) is asked, a definition of another thing (e.g. diabetes) is given³. *Nigraha-sthāna* is where, in a learned assembly, a statement, though thrice repeated, is not understood by the opponent. Caraka counts among the *nigraha-sthānas* many of the cases which have already been enumerated and described. Thus he counts *pratijñā-hāni*, *abhyanuññā*, *kālātīta*, *a-hetu*, *nyūna*, *atirikta*, *vyartha*, *apārthaka*, *punar-ukta*, *viruddha*, *hetv-antara*, *arthāntara*⁴.

¹ This corresponds to *matāmññā* of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, v. 1. 42.

² In *Nyāya-sūtra*, v. 2. 6, we hear of a *hetv-antara*, but that seems to be different from this. The significance of *hetv-antara*, as it stands there, may be illustrated as follows. An adherent of Sāṃkhya says that all this world of things is derived from one root cause, because all these are limited and whatever is limited is derived from one root cause. This may be refuted by pointing out that there are many limited things which are derived from more than one root cause. To this the Sāṃkhya adherent replies that only those which are associated with pleasure and pain and ignorance are to be regarded as proceeding from one root cause; but this is an addition which was not contained in the original thesis.

³ This is also mentioned in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, v. 2. 7.

⁴ The *nigraha-sthānas* mentioned in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, v. 2. 1, are the following: *pratijñā-hāni*, *pratijñāntara*, *pratijñā-virodha*, *pratijñā-sannyāsa*, *hetv-antara*,

After this Caraka further describes the ten categories, a knowledge of which he thinks is very necessary for a mastery of the subject-matter of Āyur-veda. These are *kāraṇa* (the agent or the mover), *kaṛaṇa* (the instrument necessary for an agent to bring about an effort), *kārya-yoni* (the material cause by the modification of which effects are produced), *kārya* (that for the production of which the mover makes his effort), *kārya-phala* (that for which a particular effect is intended by the agent), *anubandha* (the good or bad result which attaches itself to the doer after the production of the effect), *deśa* (place), *kāla* (the seasons, days, etc.), *pravṛtti* (the effort and the action needed for the production of the effect) and *upāya* (the passivity and special aptitude of the agent, the instrument and the material cause which can make the effect possible). The physician is the cause (*kāraṇa*), the medicines the instruments (*kaṛaṇa*); the want of equilibrium of the *dhātus* the *kārya-yoni*; the restoration of the equilibrium of the *dhātus* the *kārya*; the happy state of body and mind the *kārya-phala*; length of life, *anubandha*; the place and the diseased person, *deśa*; the year and the condition of the diseased person, *kāla*; the efforts of the physician, *pravṛtti*; the qualifications of the physician, the qualities of the medicine, etc., *upāya*.

It may be pointed out in this connection that the *Uttara-tantra* of Suśruta also mentions thirty-two technical terms helpful to physicians in refuting the statements of hostile critics and in establishing their own points, which are called *tantra-yukti*¹. These are said to be *adhikaraṇa*, *yoga*, *padārtha*, *hetv-artha*, *uddēśa*, *nirdeśa*, *upadeśa*, *apadeśa*, *pradeśa*, *atideśa*, *apavarja*, *vākya-śeṣa*, *arthāpatti*, *viparyaya*, *prasaṅga*, *ekānta*, *anekānta*, *pūrva-pakṣa*, *nirṇaya*, *anumata*, *vidhāna*, *anāgatāvekṣaṇa*, *atīkrāntāvekṣaṇa*, *saṁśaya*, *vyākhyāna*, *sva-saṁjñā*, *nirvacana*, *nidarśana*, *niyoga*, *samuccaya*, *vikalpa* and *ūhya*. But these technical terms are maxims for the interpretation of textual topics, like the maxims of Mīmāṃsā, and are not points of dispute or logical categories. It is said that these maxims are like the sun to a group of lotuses, or like a lamp to a house,

arthāntara, *nīrarthaka*, *avijñātārtha*, *apārthaka*, *aprāpta-kāla*, *nyūna*, *adhika*, *punar-ukta*, *ananubhāṣana*, *ajñāna*, *apratibhā*, *vikṣepa*, *matāmujñā*, *paryanuyojoyo-pekṣeṇa*, *niranuyojoyānyoga*, *apa-siddhānta*, *hetv-ābhāsa*. Many of these, however, are not mentioned by Caraka.

¹ *asad-vādi-prayuktānām vākyaṇām pratiṣedhānam sva-vākya-siddhir api ca kriyate tantra-yuktitaḥ*. *Suśruta-saṁhitā*, *Uttara-tantra*, 65. 5.

for the illumination or the expression of the subject of discourse¹. This remark very much resembles the remark of Vātsyāyana that *ānvīkṣikī* (logic) is like a light to all sciences (*pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām*). But the difference between *tantra-yukti* and *ānvīkṣikī* is this, that, while the former refers to the laws of thought, the latter refers to technical modes of expression in medical science in general and in the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* in particular. They therefore refer to the ways of deducing the inner meaning or intention of the medical texts from their abbreviated forms of expression. Thus, when one reads in the text, “about *rasa* or *doṣa*,” and nothing else is said, one understands that this style of expression signifies that it is an *adhikaraṇa* (topic of discourse) and that something is going to be related about *rasa* or *doṣa*, though it is not explicitly so stated. Now the maxim (*tantra-yukti*) of *yoga* means that the verb at a distant part of the sentence may be joined with its relevant case in another part of the sentence². The maxim of *padārtha* means that, when a word having two or more senses is used, then that meaning alone has to be accepted which suits the previous and the later contexts. Thus, when it is said in a medical text that we shall now describe the origin of the Veda, then only Āyur-veda is to be meant and not Ṛg, Yajus or Atharva. The maxim of *hetv-artha* illustrates the condition of invisible things by visible and known examples. Thus it is said that, just as a muddy ball becomes dissolved and sticky through water, so do milk and other drugs dissolve a boil by their application. The maxim of *uddeśa* is the method of briefly touching a subject without going into details. Thus, when one says “disease” (*śalya*), it means both internal and external diseases without any kind of specification. The maxim of *nirdeśa* is the method of describing a thing in detail. The maxim of *upadeśa* is the method of giving a general instruction. Thus it is said that one should not sit up at night nor sleep during the day. This is, however, only a general instruction which has its exceptions. The

¹ *yathāmbuśa-vanasyārkaḥ pradīpo veśmano yathā
prabodhyasya prakāśārthas tathā tantrasya yuktayaḥ.*

Suśruta-saṃhitā, Uttara-tantra, 65. 7.

² *tailam pivec cāmyta-vallī-nimba-himsrābhayā-vṛkṣaka-pippalibhiḥ
siddham balābhyāṃ ca sa-devadāru hitāya nityaṃ gala-gaṇḍa-roge.*

Ibid. 9, 10.

In the above verse it is enjoined that a particular medical decoction is to be made with a number of drugs which are to be boiled (*siddham*), and this boiled decoction has to be drunk (*pivet*). But the word *pivet* is in the first line and the word *siddham* is in the third line, and it is allowed that these two distant words may be combined (*yoga*).

maxim of *apadeśa* is the method of showing the reasons of things. Thus it is said that phlegm (*śleṣman*) increases through the taking of sweet things (*madhureṇa śleṣmā 'bhivardhate*). The maxim of *pradeśa* is the analogy by which a present difficulty is solved in the way in which a past difficulty was solved (*prakṛtasya atikrāntena sādhanam pradeśaḥ*). Thus it may be said that, since this has cured Devadatta in this way in the past, it would also cure Yajñadatta in a similar way now. The maxim of *atideśa* is that of anticipating a future event from a present indication or prognostication. Thus from the fact of the increase of uprising wind in a man's system it may be predicted that he will have a specific bowel-disease (*udāvarta*). The maxim of *apavarja* consists in allowing exceptions to general directions (e.g. cases of poisoning should not be fomented, except in the case of poisoning through the bites of insects). The maxim of *vākya-śeṣa* consists in supplying an idea suggested by the context, but not expressly mentioned. Thus when it is said "of the head, hands, feet, sides, back, belly, heart," it is the whole man that is to be understood though it is not expressly stated in the context. That which is understood, by implication, though not directly mentioned, is called the maxim of *arthāpatti*. Thus, when a man says "I shall eat rice," it is understood that he is not thirsty, but hungry. The maxim of *viparyaya* is that by virtue of which from a positive or a negative assertion its contrary is asserted also, e.g. when it is said that those who are lean, weak and of fearful temperament are difficult to be cured. The maxim of *prasaṅga* is that by virtue of which allusion is made to things repeatedly described in another chapter. The maxim of *ekānta* allows of affirming a specific action of things unexceptionably (e.g. *madana* fruit induces vomiting, i.e. under all circumstances). The maxim of *anekānta* is that by virtue of which one understands that different opinions prevail on a particular subject. Thus some teachers think that substances are the most important, while others think that *rasa* is so; others, again, think that the inner essence (*vīrya*) is the most important, while still others think that chemical action through digestion (*vipāka*) is so. The maxims of *pūrva-pakṣa* and *uttara-pakṣa* allow of discussing a matter in the form of question and answer. The maxim of *anumata* is that by virtue of which it is to be understood that, when the opinion of other authorities is referred to and not contradicted, it is signified that it is approved. The maxim of *vidhāna* is that by virtue of

which one understands that, when certain descriptions follow certain enumerations, the former are to be taken in the order in which the latter are related. The maxim of *anāgatāvekṣaṇa* allows of leaving certain things for future description and elaboration, and *atīkrāntāvekṣaṇa* permits alluding to things described before (e.g. it is said in the *Śloka-sthāna* that this matter will be described in the *Cikitsā* chapter, and about another matter it may be said in the *Cikitsā* chapter that it has been described in the *Śloka-sthāna*). The maxim of *saṁśaya* allows a way of statement which may create doubt and confusion in the mind of the reader. The method of elaborate description is called *vyākhyāna*. The method of using words in a sense different from what they have in other literatures is called *śva-saṁjñā*, i.e. technical use (e.g. *mithuna* in Āyur-veda means honey and clarified butter). A definition is called *nirvacana*. The maxim of *nidarśana* allows of describing anything after the analogy of other things. Thus it may be said that, just as fire in a room grows bigger and bigger with wind, so does a boil grow with *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha*. *Niyoga* means a direction (e.g. "only what is good to the system is to be taken"). *Samuccaya* means the taking of two or more things together as having equal value. *Vikalpa* is the method of giving alternative or optional directions. *Ūhya* is the maxim by which things which are apparent from the context can be understood.

It is easy to see that of these thirty-two maxims some are ways of interpreting ideas, others are ways of interpreting the arrangement and manner of textual words and their connections, while there are others which are but descriptions of specific peculiarities of style. The redactor (Nāgārjuna) says that he has collected all these maxims as general principles of textual understanding, and he calls them *śabda-nyāyārtha*, i.e. the meaning of the maxims of verbal interpretation.

Did Logic Originate in the Discussions of Āyur-veda Physicians?

Dr Mahāmahopādhyāya Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan in his *History of Indian Logic* supposes without adducing any reason that the *Caraka-saṁhitā* gives a summary of the principal doctrines of Ānvikṣikī, possibly as propounded by Medhātithi Gautama. He further says that the doctrines of Ānvikṣikī evidently did not con-

stitute a part of the original Āyur-veda of Punarvasu Ātreya, and that these doctrines seem to have been incorporated into the *Caraka-saṃhitā* by the redactor Caraka, in whose time they were widely known and studied. Dr Vidyabhusan's theory is that both Caraka and Akṣapāda borrowed the Nyāya doctrines from Medhātithi Gautama, but, while Caraka accepted them in their crude forms, Akṣapāda pruned them thoroughly before they were assimilated in the *Nyāya-sūtra*¹.

But Dr Vidyabhusan's Medhātithi Gautama is more or less a mythical person, and there is no proof that he ever wrote anything, or that Caraka borrowed anything from a Medhātithi Gautama, or that the Nyāya doctrines found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* were not contained in the original treatise of Agniveśa, now lost. Dr Vidyabhusan refers to the evidence of a number of works, such as the *Kusumāñjali*, *Naiṣadha-carita* and *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*, which refer to Gautama as being the founder of Ānvikṣikī. But none of these authorities are earlier than the tenth century. He refers also to the authority of the *Padma-purāṇa*, *Skanda-purāṇa* and *Gandharva-tantra*, none of which can be regarded as a work of any considerable antiquity. Vātsyāyana himself refers to Akṣapāda as the person to whom Nyāya (the science of Logic) revealed itself². Uddyotakara also refers to Akṣapāda as the utterer of the *Nyāya-śāstra*, and so also does Vācaspati³. There is therefore absolutely no reason why the original authorship of Nyāya should be attributed to a Gautama, as against Akṣapāda, on evidence which cannot be traced to any period earlier than the tenth century and which is collected from Purāṇa sources directly contradicted by the earliest Nyāya authorities. The *Nyāya-śāstra*, therefore, cannot be traced on the evidence of the earliest Nyāya authorities to any earlier Gautama; for, had this been so, it would certainly have been mentioned

¹ *History of Indian Logic*, pp. 25 and 26, by Mahāmahopādhyāya Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan. Calcutta University, 1921.

² *Yo 'kṣapādam ṛṣim nyāyah pratyabhād vadatām varam tasya Vātsyāyana idaṃ bhāṣya-jātam avartayat.*

Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, 2. 24, A.D. 400.

Dr Vidyabhusan's translation of it as "The Nyāya philosophy manifested itself (in a regular form) before Akṣapāda" is inexact.

³ *yad Akṣapādaḥ pravaro munīnām śamāya śāstram jagato jagāda.*

Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakara (A.D. 600). Opening lines. *atha bhagavatā Akṣapādena mīśreyasa-hetau śāstre pranīte. Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyā-ṅkā* of Vācaspati. Dr Vidyabhusan's translation of the *Nyāya-vārttika* word *śāstra* as "Nyāyaśāstra in a systematic way" is again inexact.

by either Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara or Vācaspati. Jayanta also attributes the elaborate Nyāya work to Akṣapāda and does not seem to know that this elaborate treatise, the *Nyāya-sūtra*, was based on the teachings of an earlier authority¹. If any such authorities were known, they would certainly have been mentioned for the dignity and the prestige of the *Śāstra*. Gautama is an old name, and we find it attached to one of the Ṛṣis of the *Rg-veda* (I. 62. 78. 85; IV. 4); he is mentioned in the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* (I. 4. I. 10; III. 3. 4. 19, etc.); in the *Taittirīya-prātiśākhya* (I. 5), in the *Āśvalāyana-śrauta-sūtra* (I. 3; II. 6, etc.) and in other similar older works; but nowhere is he spoken of as being the author of the *Nyāya-śāstra*. Gautama is also mentioned in the *Mahā-bhārata* several times, but nowhere is he referred to as the author of the *Nyāya-śāstra*. The passage of the *Mahā-bhārata* on which Dr Vidyabhusan bases his theory of a Medhātithi Gautama does not say that Medhātithi was the author of Ānvikṣikī or Nyāya, nor does it say that Medhātithi and Gautama were identical persons². The name Gautama is a patronymic, and the passage of the *Mahā-bhārata* referred to by Dr Vidyabhusan clearly means that the highly wise Medhātithi of the Gautama race was engaged in asceticism. This is corroborated by the fact that the passage of Bhāsa referred to by Dr Vidyabhusan mentions Medhātithi as a teacher of *Nyāya-śāstra* and does not call him Gautama, nor does it say that Medhātithi was the originator of Nyāya³. Dr Vidyabhusan's theory, therefore, of Medhātithi Gautama being the originator of the *Nyāya-śāstra* falls down like a house of cards. His identification of Medhātithi Gautama's birthplace as Mithilā, his ascertainment of his date, his identification of Persian references to Medhātithi Gautama and his so-styled references to Medhātithi Gautama in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* and the *Brahma-jāla-sutta* are no less fictitious⁴. The Gautama tradition of Nyāya need not be followed; but it may incidentally be mentioned that an Ātreya Gautama, who is described as being Sāṃkhya (probably in the sense of wise, philosopher, or learned), is counted in the list of the

¹ *Akṣapāda-praṇito hi vitato Nyāya-pādapaḥ.*

Opening lines of the *Nyāya-mañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa (A.D. 880).

² *Medhātithir mahā-prājño Gautamas tapasi sthitaḥ
vimṛśya tena kālena patnyāḥ saṁsthyā-vyatikramam.*

Mahā-bhārata, Śānti-parva, 265. 45, Vangavasi edition.

³ *Medhātithir Nyāya-śāstram* (having learnt *Nyāya-śāstra* from Medhātithi). Bhāsa's *Pratimā-nāṭaka*, Act v, p. 79. M. M. Ganapati Sastri's edition.

⁴ *History of Indian Logic*, by Dr Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan, pp. 17-21.

sages who assembled together to discover the causes and remedies of diseases; side by side with this Ātreya, another Ātreya is also mentioned as *bhikṣu Ātreya*¹. A number of sages are mentioned in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* as persons who discussed the problem of the rise of diseases and how they could be removed. Among these Bharadvāja volunteered to proceed to Indra to learn from him the science of healing. Indra instructed him in the subject, being learned in the three subjects of the (*hetu*) causes (of diseases), knowledge of the (*liṅga*) signs (of diseases) and the knowledge of medicines. Bharadvāja, having learnt this elaborate science in three divisions, repeated it to the sages in exactly the same manner in which he learnt it. After this it is said that Punarvasu taught Āyur-veda to his six disciples, Agniveśa, Bhela and others. Cakra-pāṇi, the commentator, says that Punarvasu was the disciple of Bharadvāja, and quotes as his authority a statement of Hārīta. But on this point Caraka himself is silent.

But one thing emerges from this half-mythical account of the origin of Āyur-veda, viz. that the Āyur-veda was occupied from the beginning with the investigation of the nature of causes (*hetu*) and reasons (*liṅga*) for legitimate inferences in connection with the enquiry into the causes of diseases and the apprehension of signs or indications of the same. In the *Nidāna-sthāna* of Caraka eight synonyms for reason (*hetu*) are given, viz. *hetu*, *nimitta*, *āyatana*, *karṭṛ*, *kāraṇa*, *pratyaya*, *samutthāna* and *nidāna*. It is curious enough that the words *pratyaya* and *āyatana* are used, which are presumably Buddhistic. The word *pratyaya*, in the sense of cause, is hardly found in Indian philosophy, except in Buddhism. The use of so many terms to denote cause evidently suggests that before Caraka's redaction there must have been an extensive literature which had used these words to denote cause. As a matter of fact, the word *pratyaya* is hardly ever used in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* to signify cause, though it is counted here as one of the synonyms of *hetu*, or cause. The natural implication of this is that the word *pratyaya* was used for *hetu* in some earlier literature, from which Caraka collected it; so with other words, such as *samutthāna*, *āyatana*, which are counted in the list as synonyms for *hetu*, but are not actually used in the body of the text. This may lead us to think that the discussion of *hetu* under

¹ *Ātreya Gautamaḥ sāmṅkhyah*. In this passage Ātreya may, however, be taken as a man separate from the wise Gautama.

various names is an old subject in Āyur-veda literature existing before Caraka, from which Caraka collected them.

We know that Āyur-veda was primarily concerned with three questions, viz. how diseases originated, how they were known, and what were their cures. It was in this connection that the principle of causality was first from a practical necessity applied in Āyur-veda. Thus, if it is known that a person has been exposed to sudden cold or has enjoyed a heavy feast, then, since it is known that cold leads to fever and over-feeding to indigestion, with the very first symptoms of uneasiness one may at once infer that the patient is likely to get fever or to have diarrhœa or acute indigestion. Or, if it is known that the patient has a strong diarrhœa, then it can similarly be inferred that he has eaten indigestible articles. Thus the two principal kinds of inference which were of practical use to the Āyur-veda physicians were inference of the occurrence of a disease from a knowledge of the presence of the causes of that disease, i.e. from cause to effect, and inference of the specific kinds of unhygienic irregularity from the specific kind of disease of the patient, i.e. from the effect to the cause. The other and third kind of inference is that of inference of disease from its early prognostications (*pūrva-rūpa*). Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on the possibility of inference of specific diseases from their early specific prognostications, compares it with inference of rain from an assemblage of dark clouds or of the future rise of the Kṛttika constellation from the rise of the constellation Rohiṇī, which immediately precedes it. Both these are cases of inference of future occurrences of causation or coexistence. The prognostication may, however, be of the nature of an immediately and invariably associated antecedent which may drop altogether when the disease shows itself. Thus before a high fever the hair of the patient may stand erect; this standing erect of the hair in a specific manner is neither the cause nor is it coexistent with fever, since it may vanish when the fever has actually come. It is, however, so invariably associated with a specific kind of fever that the fever can be inferred from it¹. Again, when there is any doubt among a number of causes as to which may be the real cause of the disease, the physician has to employ the method of difference or

¹ These two kinds of *pūrva-rūpa* are thus described by Cakrapāṇi in his commentary on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, II. 1. 7: *tac ca pūrva-rūpaṃ dvi-vidham ekam bhāvi-vyādhy-avyakta-liṅgam...dvitīyaṃ tu doṣa-dūṣya-sammūrchanā-janyam avyakta-liṅgād anyad eva yathā jvare bāla-pradveṣa-roma-harṣādi.*

the method of concomitant variation for its proper ascertainment. That similar things produce the same kind of effects and opposite things produce opposite results are two of the accepted postulates of the law of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*¹. Now, applying these two principles, it is held that in a case of doubt as to any kind of irregularity being the cause of any particular disease it has to be found out by experiment whether the application of the suspected cause (e.g. cold) increases the disease (e.g. fever); if it does, and if the application of its opposite (e.g. heat) decreases the disease, then cold is to be regarded as the cause of the disease. If the application of any particular kind of element increases an effect (a particular kind of disease) and the application of its opposite decreases it, then that particular element may be regarded as the cause of that effect. Caraka holds that the three methods, viz. the cause and effect relation (*nidāna*), the method of invariable prognostication (*pūrva-rūpa*) and the method of concomitant variation (*upāśaya*, which includes *anupāśaya* also) are to be employed either jointly or separately for the ascertainment of the nature of diseases which have already occurred or which are going to happen in the near future². Caraka thus urges that the physician should examine carefully the causes of diseases by the application of all these methods, so that they may be ascertained from their visible effects. Caraka then goes on to give examples of a number of diseases and the causes or prognostications by which their nature can be ascertained. He then says that a disease which is at first only an effect of some other causes may act as a cause of other diseases and may thus be regarded both as an effect and as a cause. There is therefore no absolute difference between a cause and an effect, and that which is a cause may be an effect and that which is an effect may also in its turn be a cause. Sometimes a disease may behave as cause of another disease and then cease to exist itself, whereas again, one disease may exist side by side with another disease which it has produced and aggravate its effects. Then, again, a disease (cause) may produce a disease (effect), and that effect another effect. Thus one cause may produce one effect as well as many effects, and one effect may be due to one or to many causes, and

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 44.

² The other two methods of *saṃprāpti* and *rūpa* need not be discussed in this connection.

again many causes may jointly produce many effects. Thus, though fever, delirium, etc. may all be produced by dryness (*rūkṣa*), yet under certain circumstances fever alone may be produced by it. Again, fever may also be produced by the combination of a number of causes which under other circumstances may produce jointly a number of diseases. So one entity may be an invariable concomitant (*liṅga*) of one event or of many events, and there may also be a number of invariable concomitants of one event. Thus fever is the invariable concomitant of hygienic irregularities in general, and all fevers have heat as their invariable concomitant. From certain kinds of hygienic irregularities fever can be inferred; but these can also be associated with a number of other diseases¹.

Hence it is evident that the determination of the nature of causes and effects and the inference of facts or events of invariable concomitance were an indispensable necessity for the Āyur-veda physicians in connection with the diagnosis of diseases and the ascertainment of their causes and cures. It was for this reason that Caraka divided inference into three classes, from causes to effects, from effects to causes and from the association of other kinds of invariable concomitants. The *Nyāya-sūtra* of Akṣapāda contains expressions which seem to have been borrowed from Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika-kārikā* and from the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and the regulations of Buddhistic idealism, and hence it is generally believed to have been composed in the second or the third century A.D.² In this fundamental and earliest work of Nyāya philosophy inference (*anumāna*) is described as being of three kinds, viz. from cause to effect (*pūrvavat*), from effect to cause (*śeṣavat*), and inference from similarities (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*) not comprehended under the cause-effect relation. Now it is exactly these three forms of inference that are described in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, and, so far as is known to the present writer, this is the earliest work which describes inference in such a systematic manner, and so it

¹ See *Caraka-saṃhitā*, II. 8. 22-27.

² H. Ui's *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 16. L. Suali's *Filosofia Indiana*, p. 14. Jacobi, article in *J.A.O. Society*, vol. XXXI, p. 29, 1911.

A commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana* called *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana-sambhāṣita-vṛtti* reproduces Nāgārjuna's definition of the categories, which are the same as the categories enumerated in the first *sūtra* of Akṣapāda's *Nyāya-sūtra*. But, as Walleser points out in his *Life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources*, it is impossible to fix Nāgārjuna's date exactly. He may have lived at any time between the second and the fourth centuries A.D. So no fruitful result can be attained by considerations of this kind.

may naturally be regarded as the source from which Akṣapāda drew his ideas. Now Caraka's work may be regarded as a revision of Agniveśa's work, based on Atri's teachings, based on Bhara-dvāja's instructions. Agniveśa's work is now lost, and it is not known what exactly were the contributions of Caraka in his revision of Agniveśa's work; but, since we find no work of an earlier date, Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina, which treats of the logical subjects found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, and since these logical discussions seem to be inextricably connected with medical discussions of diagnosis of diseases and the ascertainment of their causes, it seems very natural to suppose that Caraka got his materials from Agniveśa, who probably got them from still earlier sources. Incidentally it may be mentioned that Jayanta, in his *Nyāya-mañjarī*, discussing the question of the probable sources from which Akṣapāda drew his materials, suggests that he probably elaborated his work from what he may have gathered from some other science (*śāstrāntarābhyāsāt*); but it is difficult to say whether by *śāstrāntara* Jayanta meant Āyur-veda. The *Nyāya-sūtra*, however, expressly justifies the validity of the Vedas on the analogy of the validity of Āyur-veda, which is a part of the Vedas¹.

The similarity of the *Nyāya-sūtra* definition of inference to Caraka's definition is also very evident; for while the former begins *tat-pūrvakam tri-vidham* (where *tat-pūrvakam* means *pratyakṣa-pūrvakam*), the latter begins *pratyakṣa-pūrvakam tri-vidham tri-kālam*. But, while Caraka knows only the three forms of inference, he has no names for these three types such as are supplied by Akṣapāda, viz. *pūrvavat* (related to *pūrvā*, the prior, or the cause), *śeṣavat* (related to *śeṣa*, the later, or the effect) and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* (from observed similarity in the past, present and future, which is also emphasized by Caraka in the same manner)². From the con-

¹ *Mantrāyurveda-prāmāṇyavac ca tat-prāmāṇyam āpta-prāmāṇyāt.*

Nyāya-sūtra, II. 1. 68.

Jayanta enters into a long discussion in his *Nyāya-mañjarī*, trying to prove that it was through his omniscience that Caraka could write his work and that he neither discovered the science by inductive methods nor derived it from previous traditional sources.

² *Evam vyavasyanty alītam bijāt phalam anāgatam
dṛṣṭvā bijāt phalam jātam ihaiva sadṛśam budhāḥ.*

Caraka-saṃhitā, I. 11. 22.

Vātsyāyana, in his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, illustrates *pūrvavat* (from cause to effect) as the inference of rain from the rise of clouds, *śeṣavat* (from effect to cause) as the inference of rain in the uplands from the flooding of the river in the lower regions and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* (from similar behaviour) as the inference of the motion of heavenly bodies from their changes of position in the sky at

siderations detailed in the preceding footnote it may well be assumed that Akṣapāda's contribution to the definition of inference consists in his giving names to the types of floating inference described in *Caraka-saṃhitā*. It is not improbable that the *Nyāya-sūtra* derived its theory of five propositions, and in fact most of the other logical doctrines, from Caraka, as there are no earlier works to which these can be traced¹. Caraka's definition of perception as the knowledge

different times. But he also gives another meaning of these three terms *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. He interprets *pūrvavat* here as the inference of fire from smoke "on the analogy of past behaviour of co-presence," *śeṣavat* as the inference of the fact that sound is quality because it is neither substance nor action, by the method of residues (*śeṣa*), and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* as the inference of the existence of soul from the existence of desire, which is a quality and as such requires a substance in which it would inhere. This is not an inference from similarity of behaviour, but from the similarity of one thing to another (e.g. that of desire to other qualities), to extend the associations of the latter (inference in a substance) to the former (desire), i.e. the inference that desire must also inhere in a substance.

In the case of the terms *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat*, as these two terms could be grammatically interpreted in two different ways (with *matuṣ* suffix in the sense of possession and *vati* suffix in the sense of similarity of behaviour), and as the words *pūrvā* and *śeṣa* may also be used in two different ways, Vātsyāyana interprets them in two different ways and tries to show that in both these senses they can be justified as modes of inference. It seems obvious that the names *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* were given for the first time to the threefold inference described by Caraka, as this explains the difficulty felt by Vātsyāyana in giving a definite meaning to these terms, as they had no currency either in traditional or in the contemporaneous literature of Vātsyāyana. Uddyotakara, in his commentary on Vātsyāyana, contributes entirely original views on the subject. He takes Akṣapāda's sūtra, *atha tat-pūrvakam tri-vidham anumānam pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam ca*, and splits it up into *atha tat-pūrvakam tri-vidham anumānam* and *pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam ca*; by the first *tri-vidha* he means inference from positive instances (*anvayi*), from negative instances (*vyatireki*) and from both together (*anvaya-vyatireki*). He gives two possible interpretations of the terms *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*, one of which is that *pūrvavat* means argument from cause to effect, *śeṣavat* that from effect to cause and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* is the inference on the basis of relations other than causal. The *Saṃkhyā-kārikā* also mentions these kinds of inference. The *Māthara-vṛtti* again interprets the threefold character of inferences (*tri-vidha anumāna*) in two ways; it says, firstly, that *tri-vidha* means that an inference has three propositions, and, secondly, that it is of three kinds, viz. *pūrvavat* (from the effect, e.g. flooding of the river, to the inference of the cause, e.g. showers in the upper region), *śeṣavat* (from part to whole, e.g. tasting a drop of sea-water to be saline, one infers that the whole sea is saline), and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* (inference from general association, e.g. by seeing flowering mangoes in one place one infers that mangoes may have flourished in other places as well). Curiously enough, the *Māthara-vṛtti* gives another example of *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* which is very different from the examples of *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* hitherto considered. Thus it says that, when one says, "It is illuminated outside," another replies, "The moon must have risen."

¹ For more or less fanciful reasons Mr Dhruva suggests that the terms *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* were borrowed in the *Nyāya-sūtra* from the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* and that this *sūtra* must therefore be very old (*Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference*, Poona, 1922). This argument is invalid for more

that arises through the contact of the self, the senses, the mind and the objects seems very much like an earlier model for Akṣapāda's definition of perception, which adds three more qualifications to make the meaning more complex and precise¹. The idea that in the first instance perception is indeterminate (*nir-vikalpa* or *a-vyapadeśya*) is a later development and can hardly be traced in Hindu philosophy earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtra*². The similarity of the various categories of *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitandā*, *chala*, *jāti*, *nigraha-sthāna*, etc., as enumerated in Caraka, to those of the *Nyāya-sūtra* has been duly pointed out in a preceding section. The only difference between the two sets of enumeration and their elaboration is that Caraka's treatment, being the earlier one, is less full and less complex than that of Akṣapāda.

The fact that physicians in counsel earnestly discussed together, in order to arrive at right conclusions regarding both the theoretical causes of diseases and their cures and their actual practical discernment in individual cases, is abundantly clear from even a very superficial study of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*. The entire work seems to be a collection of discussions of learned physicians with Atri as their chairman. Where differences of opinion are great, they are all noted, and Atri's own opinion on them is given, and, where there was more or less unanimity, or where Atri himself lectured on specific problems, his own opinion alone is given. It is also related how a good and clever physician is to defeat his opponents in dispute, not only in a legitimate and scientific way, but also by sophistic wrangling and unfair logical tricks. It was a practical necessity for these physicians to earn their bread in the face of strong competition, and it is easy to see how the logical tricks of *chala*, *jāti* and *nigraha-sthāna* developed into a regular art of debate, not always for the discovery of truth, but also for gaining the victory over opponents. We hear of debates, discussions or logical disputes in literature much earlier than the

than one reason. Firstly, granting that the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* is very old (which is doubtful), the fact that these two logical terms were borrowed from it does not show that it must be a very old work; for even a modern work may borrow its terminology from an older treatise. Secondly, the fact that these three terms were borrowed from early sources does not show that the theory of *tri-vidha anumāna* in the *Nyāya-sūtra* is either its own contribution or very old. Mr Dhruva's arguments as to the *Māthara-vṛtti* being subsequent to Vātsyāyana's commentary are also very weak and do not stand criticism.

¹ *indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpattim jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam. Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 1. 4.

² Caraka uses the word *vikalpa* in II. 1. 10. 4 in the sense of distinction (*bheda*) of superiority and inferiority (*utkarṣa-prakarṣa-rūpa*).

Caraka-saṃhitā; but nowhere was the acquirement of this art deemed so much a practical necessity for earning a living as among the medical men. And, since there is no mention of the development of this in any other earlier literature, it is reasonable to suppose that the art of debate and its other accessories developed from early times in the traditional medical schools, whence they are found collected in Caraka's work. The origin of the logical art of debate in the schools of Āyur-veda is so natural, and the illustrations of the modes of dispute and the categories of the art of debate are so often taken from the medical field, that one has little reason to suspect that the logical portions of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* were collected by Caraka from non-medical literature and grafted into his work.

Āyur-veda Ethics.

The length of the period of a man's lifetime in this iron age (*kali-yuga*) of ours is normally fixed at one hundred years. But sinful actions of great enormity may definitely reduce the normal length to any extent. Ordinary vicious actions, however, can reduce the length of life only if the proper physical causes of death, such as poisoning, diseases and the like, are present. If these physical causes can be warded off, then a man may continue to live until the normal length of his life, one hundred years, is reached, when the body-machine, being worn out by long work, gradually breaks down. Medicines may, however, in the case of those who are not cursed by the commission of sins of great enormity, prolong the normal length of life. It is here that Caraka and his followers differ from all other theories of *karma* that flourished on the soil of India. The theory is not accepted in any Indian system of thought except that of Caraka. In spite of the many differences that prevail amongst these theories, they may still be roughly divided into four classes. Thus there are, first, the *pauruṣa-vādins*, such as those who follow the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* school of thought and are idealists of the extreme type, thinking that all our experiences can be controlled by a determined effort of the will and that there is no bond of previous *karma*, destiny, or fatality which cannot be controlled or overcome by it. Human will is all-powerful, and by it we can produce any change of any kind in the development of our future well-being. There is, again, the view that God alone is responsible for all our actions, and that He makes those whom He wants to

raise perform good actions and those whom He wants to take the downward path commit sinful deeds. There is also the view that God rewards or praises us in accordance with our good or bad deeds, and that we alone are responsible for our actions and free to act as we choose. There is a further view, elaborately dealt with in Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra*, that our deeds determine the particular nature of our birth, the period of our lifetime and the nature of our enjoyments or sufferings. Ordinarily the fruits of the actions of a previous birth are reaped in the present birth, and the ripened fruits of the actions of the present birth determine the nature of the future birth, period of life and pleasurable or painful experiences, while the fruits of extremely good or bad actions are reaped in this life. In none of these theories do we find the sort of common-sense eclecticism that we find in Caraka. For here it is only the fruits of extremely bad actions that cannot be arrested by the normal efforts of good conduct. The fruits of all ordinary actions can be arrested by normal physical ways of well-balanced conduct, the administration of proper medicines and the like. This implies that our ordinary non-moral actions in the proper care of health, taking proper tonics, medicines and the like, can modify or arrest the ordinary course of the fruition of our *karma*. Thus, according to the effects of my ordinary *karma* I may have fallen ill; but, if I take due care, I may avoid such effects and may still be in good health. According to other theories the laws of *karma* are immutable. Only the fruits of unripe *karma* can be destroyed by true knowledge. The fruits of ripe *karma* have to be experienced in any case, even if true knowledge is attained. The peculiar features of Caraka's theory consist in this, that he does not introduce this immutability of ripe *karmas*. The effects of all *karmas*, excepting those which are extremely strong, can be modified by an apparently non-moral course of conduct, involving the observance of the ordinary daily duties of life. Ordinarily the law of *karma* implies the theory of a moral government of the universe in accordance with the good or bad fruits of one's own *karma*. We may be free to act as we choose; but our actions in this life, excepting those of great enormity, determine the experiences of our future lives, and so an action in this life cannot ordinarily be expected to ward off any of the evils of this life which one is predestined to undergo in accordance with the *karma* of a previous birth. Moreover, it is the moral or immoral aspects of an action that

determine the actual nature of their good or bad effects, success or failure. This implies a disbelief in our power of directly controlling our fortunes by our efforts. The theory of *karma* thus involves a belief in the mysterious existence and ripening of the sinful and virtuous elements of our actions, which alone in their course of maturity produce effects. If the theory that sins bring their punishment, and virtues produce their beneficial effects, of themselves, is accepted, its logical consequences would lead us to deny the possibility of mere physical actions modifying the fruition of these *karmas*. So the acceptance of the moral properties of actions leads to the denial of their direct physical consequences. If through my honest efforts I succeed in attaining a happy state, it is contended that my success is not due to my present efforts, but it was predestined, as a consequence of the good deeds of my previous birth, that I should be happy. For, if the fruition was due to my ordinary efforts, then the theory that all happy or unhappy experiences are due to the ripening of the *karmas* of the previous births falls to the ground. If, on the other hand, all success or failure is due to our proper or improper efforts, then the capacity of sins or virtues to produce misery or happiness may naturally be doubted, and the cases where even our best efforts are attended with failure are not explained. But, if our ordinary efforts cannot effect anything, and if the modes of our experiences, pleasures and sufferings, and the term of our life are already predestined, then none of our efforts are of any use in warding off the calamities of this life, and the purpose of the science of medicine is baffled. In common-sense ways of belief one refers to "fate" or "destiny" only when the best efforts fail, and one thinks that, unless there is an absolute fatality, properly directed efforts are bound to succeed. Caraka's theory seems to embody such a common-sense view. But the question arises how, if this is so, can the immutability of the law of *karma* be preserved? Caraka thinks that it is only the extremely good or bad deeds that have this immutable character. All other effects of ordinary actions can be modified or combated by our efforts. Virtue and vice are not vague and mysterious principles in Caraka, and the separation that appears elsewhere between the moral and the physical sides of an action is not found in his teaching¹.

He seems to regard the "good," or the all-round manifold

¹ *Caraka-samhitā*, III. 3. 28-38.

utility (*hita*) of an action, as its ultimate test. What a man has to do before acting is carefully to judge and anticipate the utility of his action, i.e. to judge whether it will be good for him or not; if the effects are beneficial for him, he ought to do it, and, if they are harmful, he ought not to do it¹. Our ultimate standard of good actions lies in seeking our own good, and to this end the proper direction and guidance of our mind and senses are absolutely necessary. Caraka applies here also his old principle of the golden mean, and says that the proper means of keeping the mind in the right path consists in avoiding too much thinking, in not thinking of revolting subjects, and in keeping the mind active. Thoughts and ideas are the objects of the mind, and one has to avoid the *atiyoga*, *mithyā-yoga* and *a-yoga* of all thoughts, as just described. "Self-good," or *ātma-hita*, which is the end of all our actions, is described as not only that which gives us pleasure and supplies the material for our comfort, ease of mind and long life, but also that which will be beneficial to us in our future life. Right conduct (*sad-vṛtta*) leads to the health and well-being of body and mind and secures sense-control (*indriya-vijaya*).

The three springs of action are our desire for self-preservation (*prāṇaiśaṇā*), our desire for the materials of comfort (*ghanaiśaṇā*), and our desire for a happy state of existence in the future life (*paralokaiśaṇā*). We seek our good not only in this life, but also in the after-life, and these two kinds of self-good are summed up in our threefold desire—for self-preservation, for the objects that lead to happiness, and for a blessed after-life. Right conduct is not conduct in accordance with the injunctions of the Vedas, or conduct which leads ultimately to the cessation of all sorrows through cessation of all desires or through right knowledge and the extinction of false knowledge, but is that which leads to the fulfilment of the three ultimate desires. The cause of sins is not transgression of the injunctions of the scriptures, but errors of right judgment or of right thinking (*prajñāparādha*). First and foremost is our desire for life, i.e. for health and prolongation of life; for life is the precondition of all other good things. Next to our desire for life is our desire for wealth and the pursuit of such vocations of life as lead to it. The third is

¹ *buddhyā samyag idaṃ mama hitam idaṃ mamāhitam ity avekṣyāvekṣya karmaṇāṃ pravṛttināṃ samyak pratipādanena ity ahita-karma-parityāgena hita-karmācāraṇena ca.* Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, 1. 8. 17.

the desire for a blessed after-life. In this connection Caraka introduces a discussion to prove the existence of a future state of existence. He says that a wise man should not entertain doubts regarding the existence of a future life, since such doubts might hinder the performance of right conduct. The mere fact that we cannot experience its existence with our senses is not a sufficient negative proof. For there are few things which can be directly experienced by the senses, and there are many which exist, but are never experienced by the senses. The very senses with which we experience other things cannot themselves be subject to sense-experience¹. Even sensible things cannot be perceived if they are too near or too distant, if they are covered, if the senses are weak or diseased, if the mind is otherwise engaged, if they are mixed up with similar things, if their light is overcome by stronger light, or if they are too small². It is therefore wrong to say that what is not perceived by the senses does not exist. If, again, it is argued that the foetus must derive its soul from the parents, then it may be pointed out that, if the soul of the foetus migrated from either of the parents, then, since the soul is without parts, it could not have migrated in parts, and such a total migration would mean that the parents would be left without any soul and would die. As the soul could not migrate from the parents to the child, so neither can the mind nor the intellect be said to have so migrated. Moreover, if all life must be derived from the migration of other souls, then how can insects come into being, as many do, without parent insects³? Consciousness exists as a separate and beginningless entity, and it is not created by anyone else. If, however, the supreme soul be regarded as its cause, then in that sense it may be conceived as having been produced therefrom⁴. The theory of the after-life consists according to Caraka principally in the view that the soul is existent and uncreated, and that it is associated with the foetus at a certain stage of its development in the womb. He also refers to the evidence of rebirth which we

¹ *yair eva tavad indriyair pratyakṣam upalabhyate tāny eva santi cāpratyakṣāṇi*. Caraka, I. 11. 7.

² *satām ca rūpānām ati-sannikarṣād ati-viprakarṣād āvaraṇāt karaṇa-daurbalyān mano 'navasthānāt samānābhīhārāt abhībhavād ati-saukṣmyāc ca pratyakṣānupalabdhiḥ*. *Ibid.* 11. 8.

³ *śaṃsveda-jānām maśakādīnām tathodbhij-jānām gaṇḍūpadādīnām cetanānām mātā-pitarau na vidyete tatas teṣām accaitanyaṃ syān mātā-pitroś cetana-kāraṇayorabhāvāt*. Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, II. 11.

⁴ On this point Cakrapāṇi gives a different interpretation in I. 11. 13.

have in the difference of the child from the parents; in the fact that, though other causes are more or less the same, two children differ in colour, voice, appearance, intelligence and luck; in the fact that some are servants, whereas others are their rich masters; in the fact that some are naturally in good health, while others are in bad, or are different in the length of life; from the fact that infants know how to cry, suck, smile or fear without any previous instruction or experience; that with the same kind of efforts two persons reap two different kinds of results; that some are naturally adepts in certain subjects and dull in others; and that there are at least some who remember their past lives; for from these facts the only hypothesis that can be made is that these differences are due to the *karma* of one's past life, otherwise called *daiva*, and that the fruits of the good and bad deeds of this life will be reaped in another. It has also been pointed out in a previous section that a child does not owe his or her intellectual parts to the father or to the mother. These gifts belong to the soul of the child, and there is therefore no reason to suppose that the son of an intellectually deficient person will on that account be necessarily dull.

Caraka further urges that the truth of rebirth can be demonstrated by all possible proofs. He first refers to the verdict of the Vedas and of the opinions of philosophers, which are written for the good of the people and are in conformity with the views of the wise and the virtuous and not in opposition to the opinions of the Vedas. Such writings always recommend gifts, penances, sacrifices, truthfulness, non-injury to all living beings and sex-continence as leading to heavenly happiness and to liberation (*mokṣa*). The sages say that liberation, or the cessation of rebirth, is only for those who have completely purged off all mental and bodily defects. This implies that these sages accepted the theory of rebirth as true; and there have been other sages who also have distinctly announced the truth of rebirth. Apart from the testimony of the Vedas and of the sages, even perception (*pratyakṣa*) also proves the truth of rebirth. Thus it is seen that children are often very different from their parents, and even from the same parents the children born are often very different in colour, voice, frame of body, mental disposition, intelligence and luck, as described above. The natural inference to be based on these data directly experienced is that no one can avoid the effects of the

deeds he has performed, and that therefore what was performed in a past birth is indestructible and always follows a man in his present birth as his *daiva*, or *karma*, the fruits of which show in his present life. The deeds of the present birth will again accumulate fruits, which will be reaped in the next birth. From the present fruits of pleasurable or painful experiences their past seeds as past *karma* are inferred, and from the present deeds as seeds their future effects as pleasurable or painful experiences in another birth are also inferred. Apart from this inference other reasons also lead to the same condition. Thus the living foetus is produced by the combination of the six elements, to which connection with the self from the other world is indispensable; so also fruits can only be reaped when the actions have been performed and not if they are not performed—there cannot be shoots without seeds. It may be noted in this connection that in no other system of Indian thought has any attempt been made to prove the theory of rebirth as has here been done. A slight attempt was made in the Nyāya system to prove the theory on the ground that the crying, sucking and the natural fear of infants implies previous experience. But Caraka in a systematic manner takes up many more points and appeals to the different logical proofs that may be adduced. Again, we find the nature of the fruits of action (*karma*) discussed in the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali. It is said in the *Yoga-sūtra*, II. 13, that the *karmas* of past life determine the particular birth of the individual in a good or bad or poor or rich family and the length of life and pleasurable or painful experiences. But that physical differences of body, colour, voice, temperament, mental disposition and special intellectual features are also due to the deeds of the past life seems to be a wholly new idea. It is, however, interesting to note that, though Caraka attributes the divergence of intelligence to deeds of the past life, yet he does not attribute thereto the weakness or the strength of the moral will.

Caraka further refers to the collective evil effects of the misdeeds of people living in a particular locality, which may often lead to the outbreak of epidemics. Speaking of the outbreak of epidemic diseases, he says that they are due to the pollution of air and water, and to country and climatic revolutions. The pollution of air consists in its being unnatural for the season, dull and motionless, too violent, too dry, too cold, too warm, stormy, of the nature of whirlwind, too humid, dusty, smoky, impure or of

bad smell. The pollution of water consists in its being of unnatural colour, bad smell, bad taste, containing impurities (when devoid of its natural qualities), which are often avoided by water birds, and being unpleasant, and having its sources largely dried up. The pollution of a particular locality occurs when it is infested with lizards, wild animals, mosquitoes, flies, insects, mice, owls, predatory birds or jackals, or when it is full of wild creepers, grass, etc., or when there is a failure of crops, the air smoky, etc. The pollution of time consists in the happening of unnatural climatic conditions. The cause of these epidemic conditions is said to be the demerit (*adharma*) due to the evil deeds of past life, the commission of which is again due to bad deeds of previous life. When the chief persons of a country, city or locality transgress the righteous course and lead the people in an unrighteous manner, the people also in their conduct continue to grow vicious and sinful. And, as a result of the misdeeds of the people of the locality, the gods forsake that place, there is no proper rain, the air, water and the country as a whole become polluted and epidemics break out. Thus the misdeeds of a people can, according to Caraka, pollute the whole region and ultimately ruin it. When a country is ruined by civil war, then that also is due to the sins of the people, who are inflated with too much greed, anger, pride and ignorance. Thus epidemics are caused by the conjoint sins of the people of a particular region. But even at the time of the outbreak of such epidemics those who have not committed such bad actions as to deserve punishment may save themselves by taking proper medicines and by leading a virtuous life. Continuing to establish his theory that all climatic and other natural evils are due to the commission of sins or *adharma*, Caraka says that in ancient times people were virtuous, of strong and stout physique and extremely long-lived, and on account of their virtuous ways of living there were no climatic disturbances, no famines, no failure of crops, no drought and no pollutions leading to epidemics and diseases. But at the close of the *satya-yuga*, through over-eating some rich men became too fat, and hence they became easily tired, and hence became lazy, and on account of laziness they acquired the storing habit (*sañcaya*), and, through that, the tendency to receive things from others (*parigraha*), and, through that, greed (*lobha*). In the next, Tretā, age, from greed there arose malice, from malice lying, from lying desire, anger, conceit, antipathy, cruelty,

violence (*abhighāta*), fear, sorrow and anxiety. Thus in the Tretā age *dharma* diminished by a quarter, and so the earthly production of harvest, etc. also diminished by a quarter, and the bodies of living beings lost their vitality accordingly; their length of life diminished, and diseases began to grow. So in the Dvāpara age there was a further diminution of the quantities of earthly productions and a further weakening of human constitution and shortening of the length of life.

It may be remembered that in Suśruta, III. 1, it is said that many persons of the medical school of thought had conceived this world to have come into being either through time (*kāla*), in the natural process by a blind destiny (*niyati*), or through a mere nature (*svabhāva*), accidental concourse of things (*yadycchā*), or through evolution (*pariṇāma*) by the will of God; and they called each of these alternatives the *prakṛti*, or the origin of the world¹. But the notion of the Sāṃkhya *prakṛti* holds within it all these concepts, and it is therefore more appropriate to admit one *prakṛti* as the evolving cause of the world. Gayī, in interpreting this, holds that *prakṛti* is to be regarded as the evolving material cause, whereas time, natural process, etc. are to be regarded as instrumental causes for the world-manifestation. According to Suśruta the selves (*kṣetra-jñā*) are not in the medical school regarded as all-pervasive (*a-sarva-gata*), as they are in the Sāṃkhya system of thought. These selves, on account of their virtues or vices, transmigrate from one life to another as men or as different animals; for, though not all-pervasive, they are eternal and are not destroyed by death. The selves are not to be regarded as self-revealing, as in Sāṃkhya or the Vedānta; but they can be inferred, as the substance or entity to which the feelings of pleasure and pain belong, and they are always endowed with consciousness, though they may not themselves be regarded as of the nature of pure consciousness. They are *cetanāvantah* (endowed with con-

¹ The primary use of *prakṛti* may have been due to the idea of an enquiry regarding the source and origin of the world. *Prakṛti* literally means "source" or "origin." So the term was probably used in reference to other speculations regarding the origin of the world before it was technically applied as a Sāṃkhya term. The ideas of *svabhāva*, *kāla*, etc. seem to have been combined to form the technical Sāṃkhya concept of *prakṛti*, and two schools of Sāṃkhya, the Kapila and the Patañjali schools, arose in connection with the dispute as to the starting of the evolution of *prakṛti* accidentally (*yadycchā*) or by the will of God. The idea of *prakṛti* was reached by combining all the alternative sources of world-manifestation that were current before, and so they are all conserved in the notion of *prakṛti*.

sciousness) and not *cit-svarūpāh* (of the nature of consciousness). They are extremely subtle or fine (*parama-sūkṣma*), and this epithet is explained by Ḍalhaṇa as meaning that the selves are as small as atoms. But, being always endowed with consciousness, they can also through self-perception (*pratyakṣa*) be perceived as existing. The transmigration of these selves is regulated by the merit and demerit of their deeds. Ḍalhaṇa says that through excessive sins they are born as animals, through an admixture of virtues and sins they are born as men, and through a preponderance of virtues they are born as gods. But according to Caraka not only is the nature of transmigration controlled by the good or bad deeds of a man, but even the productivity of nature, its purity or pollution; and the thousand and one things in which nature is helpful or harmful to men are determined by good and bad deeds (*dharma* and *adharma*). *Dharma* and *adharma* are therefore regarded as the most important factors in determining most of the human conditions of life and world-conditions of environment. Such a view is not opposed to the Sāṃkhya theory of world-creation; for there also it is held that the evolution of *prakṛti* is determined by the good or bad deeds of the selves; but, though implied, yet in no Sāṃkhya work is such a clear and specific determination of world-conditions and world-evolution through the merit and demerit of human beings to be found. Freedom of human will is almost wholly admitted by Caraka, and, where the fruits of previous actions are not of a confirmed character, they can be averted or improved by our efforts. Our efforts thus have on the one hand a cosmical or universal effect, as determining the conditions of the development of the material world, and on the other hand they determine the fate of the individual. The fruits of our actions determine our birth, our experiences and many intellectual gifts; but they do not determine the nature of our will or affect its strength of application in particular directions.

Springs of action in the Caraka-saṃhitā.

The chief feature of Caraka's springs of action consists in the fact that he considers three primary desires as the motive causes of all our actions. These are, as has already been said, the desire for life, the desire for riches and the desire for future life. In this Caraka seems to have a view uniquely different from that of most

of the systems of philosophy, which refer to a number of emotions as the root causes prompting us to action. Thus the Vaiśeṣika regards attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain as the cause of all our actions. Pleasure is defined as being a sort of feeling which is approved and welcomed and towards which an attraction is naturally felt. Pleasures, therefore, when they arise, must always be felt, and there cannot be anything like unfelt pleasures. Apart from sensory pleasures, Śrīdhara in his *Nyāya-kandalī* discusses the existence of other kinds of pleasure, due to the remembering of past things, or to calmness and contentedness of mind or self-knowledge. Pleasures are, however, regarded as the fruits of meritorious deeds (*dharma*) performed before. Pain, the reverse of pleasure, may be defined as an experience from which we are repelled and which is the result of past misdeeds. Desire, as the wish to have what is unattained (*aprāpta-prārthanā*), may be either for the self (*svārtha*) or for others (*parārtha*). Such desires may be prompted by any of the following: longing for happiness in heaven or on earth (*kāma*), appetites (*abhilāṣa*), longing for the continuation and recurrence of the enjoyment of pleasurable objects, compassion for others (*karuṇā*), disinclination to worldly enjoyment (*vairāgya*), intention of deceiving others (*upadhā*), subconscious motives (*bhāva*). Praśastapāda, however, distinguishes between desires for enjoyment and desires for work. But he does not include the positive Buddhist virtues of friendship (*maitrī*) and a feeling of happiness in the happiness of others (*mudītā*), and he is content with only the negative virtue of compassion (*karuṇā*). He also counts anger, malice, suppressed revengefulness (*manyu*), jealousy of the good qualities of others (*akṣamā*), and envy arising from a sense of one's inferiority (*amarṣa*). But, in spite of this elaborate classification, Praśastapāda makes in reality two broad divisions, namely, desires arising from attachment to pleasures, and those from aversion to pain. Pain is as much a positive feeling as pleasure and cannot be regarded as mere negation of pleasure. Though Praśastapāda knows that there is such a thing as desire for work, yet he does not give it any prominent consideration, and the net result of his classification of the springs of action is that he thinks that all desires are prompted by attachment to feelings of pleasure and antipathy to pain. Feelings, therefore, are to be regarded here as fundamentally determining all desires and through them all actions.

The Naiyāyikas think that attachment and antipathy can be

traced to a more fundamental root, viz. ignorance or delusion (*moha*). Thus Vātsyāyana, by tracing attachment or antipathy to ignorance, tends to intellectualize the psychological basis of Praśastapāda. For *moha* would mean want of knowledge, and, if attachment and antipathy be due to want of knowledge, then one can no longer say that feelings ultimately determine our actions, as it is the absence of right knowledge that is found to be ultimately the determinant of the rise of all feelings and emotions. Jayanta, however, in his *Nyāya-mañjarī*, counts ignorance (*moha*), attachment (*rāga*) and antipathy (*dveṣa*) as being three parallel defects (*doṣa*) which prompt our efforts¹. Under attachment he counts sex-inclination (*kāma*), disinclination to part with that which would not diminish by sharing with others (*matsara*), jealousy (*spṛhā*), inclination towards birth again and again (*trṣṇā*) and inclination towards taking forbidden things (*lobha*). Under *dveṣa* he counts emotional outbursts of anger with burning bodily conditions, envy (*īrṣyā*), jealousy at the good qualities of others (*asūyā*), injuring others (*droha*) and concealed malice (*manyu*). Under ignorance he counts false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*), perplexity due to indecision (*vicikitsā*), sense of false superiority (*mada*) and mistakes of judgment (*pramāda*). But he adds that of the three defects, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha*, *moha* is the worst, since the other two arise through it. For it is only the ignorant who are under the sway of attachment and antipathy. To the objection that in that case *moha* ought not to be counted as a defect in itself, but as the source of the other two defects, Jayanta replies that, though it is a source of the other two defects, it of itself also leads people to action and should therefore be counted as a defect in itself. It is no doubt true that all defects are due to false knowledge and are removed by right knowledge; yet it would be wrong to count the defects as being of only one kind of false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*); for the three defects are psychologically felt to have three distinctive characteristics. Jayanta, while admitting that the feelings of attachment or antipathy are due to ignorance, considers them to be psychologically so important as to be regarded as independent springs of action. Thus, while he was in nominal agreement with Vātsyāyana in regarding attachment and antipathy as being due to *moha*, he felt their independent

¹ *Teṣāṃ doṣāṇāṃ trayo rāśayo bhavanti rāgo dveṣo moha iti. Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 500.

psychological importance and counted them as parallel defects prompting our efforts.

Patañjali divides all our actions into two classes, vicious (*kliṣṭa*) and virtuous (*akliṣṭa*). The virtuous actions are prompted by our natural propensity towards emancipation, while the vicious ones are prompted by ignorance (*avidyā*), egoism (*asmitā*), attachment (*rāga*), antipathy (*dveṣa*) and the will to live (*abhiniveśa*). The latter four, though of the nature of feeling, are yet regarded as being only manifestations of the growth and development of ignorance (*avidyā*). It is a characteristic peculiarity of the Sāṃkhya philosophy that thoughts and feelings are not regarded there as being intrinsically different; for the *guṇas* form the materials of both thoughts and feelings. What is thought in one aspect is feeling in another. It was on this account that false knowledge could be considered to have developed into the feelings of egoism, attachment and antipathy, and could be regarded as being of the same stuff as false knowledge. In the Nyāya psychology, thought and feelings being considered intrinsically different, a difficulty was felt in reconciling the fact that, while ignorance could be regarded as being the cause of the feelings of attachment and antipathy, the latter could not be regarded as being identical with ignorance (*moha*). Jayanta, therefore, while he traced *rāga* and *dveṣa* to *moha*, ontologically considered them as parallel factors determining our actions psychologically. In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysics this difficulty could be obviated; for that school did not consider feelings to be different from thoughts, since the thoughts are themselves made up of feeling-stuff; hence even false knowledge (*avidyā*) need not be regarded as being wholly an intellectual element, since it is itself the product of the feeling-stuff—the *guṇas*.

It is needless to refer in detail to the theories of the springs of action in other systems of Indian thought. From what has already been said it would appear that most systems of Indian Philosophy consider false knowledge to be at the root of all our worldly activities through the mediation of feelings of attachment, antipathy and self-love. There is an inherent pessimism in most systems of Indian thought, which consider that normally we are all under the evil influence of false knowledge and are all gliding on the downward path of sins and afflictions. They also consider that all attachments lead to bondage and slavery to passions, and thereby lead us away from the path of liberation. Actions are

judged as good or bad according as they lead to liberation or bondage; their efficacy is in securing the transcendental realization of the highest truth and the cessation of rebirth, or obscuration of the nature of reality and exposure to the miseries of rebirth.

But Caraka gives us a scheme of life in which he traces the springs of all our actions to the three fundamental motives or biological instincts of life-preservation, worldly desire of acquiring riches for enjoyment, and other worldly aspirations of self-realization. According to him these three fundamental desires sum up all springs of action. On this view will appears to be more fundamental than feeling or knowledge. Caraka does not seem to begin from the old and stereotyped idea that false knowledge is the starting-point of the world. His is a scheme of a well-balanced life which is guided by the harmonious play of these three fundamental desires and directed by perfect wisdom and unerring judgment. Evil and mischief creep in through errors of judgment, by which the harmony of these desires is broken. All kinds of misdeeds are traced, not to feelings of attachment or antipathy, but to errors of judgment or foolishness (*prajñāparādha*). This *prajñāparādha* may be compared to the *moha* or *avidyā* of the Nyāya and Yoga. But, while the Nyāya and Yoga seem to refer to this *moha* or *avidyā* as a fundamental defect inherent in our mental constitution and determining its activities as a formative element, Caraka's *prajñāparādha* is not made to occupy any metaphysical status, but expresses itself only in the individual lapses of judgment.

Caraka, however, did not dare to come into conflict with the prevailing ethical and philosophical opinions of his time, and we find that in *Śārīra*, I he largely accepts the traditional views. He says there that it is the phenomenal self (*bhūtātman* or *saṃyoga-puruṣa*) that feels pleasure and pain, and in connection with the duty of a physician to remove all physical sufferings produced by diseases he says that the ultimate healing of all pain consists in the permanent *naiṣṭhikī* (removal) of pain by the removal of grasping (*upadhā*)¹. He says there that grasping (*upadhā*) is itself sorrowful and the cause of all sorrows. All sorrows can be removed by the removal of all grasping tendencies. Just as a silk-worm draws out its cocoon thread to its own destruction, so does

¹ Cakrapāṇi interprets *upadhā* as desire (*tṛṣṇā*); but it seems to me that it would have been more correct to interpret it as the Buddhist *upādāna*, or grasping. Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, IV. 1. 93.

the miserable man of ignorance draw desires and longings from the objects of sense. He is wise indeed who considers all objects as fire and withdraws himself from them. With the cessation of all actions (*anārambha*) and dissociation from sense-objects there is no more fear of being afflicted with sorrows. Sorrows, again, are said to proceed from four causes, namely, the wrong notion of non-eternal things (e.g. sense-objects) as eternal (*buddhi-vibhramśa*), the want of the power of controlling the mind from undesirable courses (*dhṛti-vibhramśa*), forgetfulness of the nature of right knowledge (*smṛti-vibhramśa*) and the adoption of unhygienic courses (*asātmya-arthāgama*). *Prajñāparādha* is defined here as a wrong action that is done through the confusion of intelligence and want of self-control and right knowledge (*dhī-dhṛti-smṛti-vibhramśa*), and this is supposed to rouse up all maladies and defects (*sarva-doṣa-prakopana*). Some of the offences that may be counted under *prajñāparādha* are as follows: to set things in motion, to try to stop moving objects, to let the proper time for doing things pass by, to begin an action in the wrong manner, not to behave in the accustomed manner, not to behave modestly and politely, to insult respected persons, to go about in wrong places or at wrong times, to take objects which are known to be harmful, not to abide by the proper course of conduct described in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 6; the passions of jealousy, vanity, fear, anger, greed, ignorance, egoism, errors, all actions prompted by these and whatever else that is prompted by ignorance (*moha*) and self-ostentation (*rajas*). *Prajñāparādha* is further defined as error of judgment (*viśama-vijñāna*) and as wrong enterprise (*viśama-pravartanā*), proceeding out of wrong knowledge or erroneous judgment. It will thus appear that it is wise to take *prajñāparādha* in the wider sense of error of judgment or misapplied intelligence, regarding it as the cause of all kinds of moral depravity, unhealthy and unhygienic habits and accidental injuries of all kinds. As Caraka admitted the existence of the self and of rebirth and regarded moral merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) as the causes of all human enjoyment and sufferings, and of the productivity or unproductivity of the ground, and the hygienic or unhygienic conditions of water, air and the seasons, he had to include within *prajñāparādha* the causes that led to vices and sins. The causes of all sorrows are, firstly, wrong consideration of the non-eternal as eternal and of the injurious as good; secondly, want of self-control; and, thirdly, the defect of

memory (*smṛti-bhramśa*), through which the right knowledge and right experience of the past cannot be brought into effect. Thus, though in a sense Caraka compromises with the traditional schools of philosophy in including philosophical ignorance or misconception within *prajñāparādha*, and though he thinks that philosophical ignorance produces sins, yet he takes *prajñāparādha* in the very wide sense of error of judgment, leading to all kinds of transgression of laws of health and laws of society and custom, risky adventures, and all other indiscreet and improper actions. *Prajñāparādha*, therefore, though it includes the philosophical *moha* of the traditional school of philosophy, is yet something very much more, and is to be taken in the wider sense of error of judgment. Caraka, no doubt, admits jealousy, vanity, anger, greed, ignorance (*moha*), etc., as producing improper action, but he admits many other causes as well. But the one supreme cause of all these subsidiary causes is *prajñāparādha*, or error of judgment, taken in its wide sense. It will not, therefore, be wrong to suppose that, according to Caraka, all proper actions are undertaken through the prompting of three fundamental desires, the desire for life, the desire for wealth and enjoyment, and the desire for spiritual good. And all improper actions are due to improper understanding, confusion of thought, and misdirected intelligence (*prajñāparādha*). The three fundamental desires, unassociated with any error of judgment or lack of understanding, may thus be regarded as the root cause of all proper actions. There is, therefore, nothing wrong in giving full play to the functioning of the three fundamental desires, so long as there is no misdirected understanding and confusion to turn them into the wrong path. Caraka does not seem to agree with other systems of philosophy in holding the feelings of attachment and antipathy to be the springs of all actions. Actions are prompted by the normal active tendencies of the three fundamental desires, and they become sinful when our energies are wrongly directed through lack of understanding. Though Caraka had to compromise with the acknowledged view of the systems of Indian Philosophy that the cessation of all sorrows can be only through the cessation of all actions, yet it seems clear that the course of conduct that he approves consists in the normal exercise of the three fundamental desires, free from the commission of any errors of judgment (*prajñāparādha*). Thus Caraka does not preach the ideal of leaving off desires,

attachments, feelings and actions of all kinds, nor does he advocate the *Gitā* ideal of the performance of duties without attachment. His is the ideal of living one's life in a manner that is most conducive to health, long life, and proper enjoyment. Our only care should be that we do not commit any mistake in eating, drinking and other actions of life which may directly or indirectly (through the production of sins) produce diseases and sufferings or jeopardize our life and enjoyment in any way. This unique character of Caraka's ethical position is very clearly proved by the code of conduct, virtues and methods of leading a good life elaborated by Caraka. He no doubt shows a lip-sympathy with the ideal of giving up all actions (*sannyāsa*); but his real sympathies seem to be with the normal scheme of life, involving normal enjoyments and fruition of desires. A normal life, according to Caraka, ought also to be a virtuous life, as vices and sins are the sources of all sorrows, sufferings and diseases in this life and the next.

Good Life in Caraka.

It is well worth pointing out at the outset that "good life" in Caraka means not only an ethically virtuous life, but a life which is free from diseases, and which is so led that it attains its normal length. Moral life thus means a life that is free from the defect of *prajñāparādha*. It means wise and prudent life; for it is only the want of wisdom and prudence that is the cause of all physical, social, physiological, moral and spiritual mischiefs. To be a good man, it is not enough that one should practise the ethical virtues: a man should practise the physical, physiological and social virtues as well. He must try to live a healthy and long life, free from diseases and sufferings and free from reproaches of any kind. It is important to note that Caraka does not believe in the forced separation of the physical life from the mental and the moral. Physical diseases are to be cured by medicines, while mental diseases are to be cured by right and proper knowledge of things, self-control and self-concentration. The close interconnection between body and mind was well known from early times, and even the *Mahā-bhārata* (XII. 16) says that out of the body arise the mental diseases and out of the mind arise the bodily diseases. Caraka also thinks that a physician should try to cure not only the bodily diseases but also the mental diseases.

The *Mahā-bhārata* further says in the same chapter that there are three elements in the body, viz. heat, cold and air; when they are in a state of equipoise, the body is healthy, and when any one of them predominates, there is disease. The mind is constituted of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*; when these are in a state of equipoise, the mind is in proper order, and when any one of them predominates, it becomes diseased. Caraka, however, thinks that it is only when *rajas* and *tamas* predominate that the mind gets diseased. But, whatever these differences may be, it is evident that, when Caraka speaks of life, he includes both mind and body, and it is the welfare of both that is the chief concern of the physician. Caraka's prohibitions and injunctions are therefore based on this twofold good of body and mind that ought to be aimed at.

After speaking of the harmfulness of attempting to control some of the bodily excretory movements, he recommends the necessity of attempting to control certain other mental and bodily tendencies. Thus he forbids all persons to indulge rashly in their unthinking tendencies to commit mistakes of mind, speech and action. A man should also control his passion of greed, and his feelings of grief, fear, anger, vanity, shamelessness, envy, attachment and solicitude. He should not speak harshly or talk too much or use stinging words or lie or speak irrelevantly or untimely. He should not injure others by his body, indulge in unrestricted sex-gratifications, or steal. Injury to living beings (*hiṃsā*) is supposed to produce sins and thereby affects one's longevity. Non-injury is thus described as being the best way of increasing life (*ahimsā prāṇa-vardhanānām*). The man who follows the above right course of life is called virtuous, and he enjoys wealth, satisfies his desires, abides by the laws (*dharma*) of a good life, and is happy. Along with the proper and well-controlled exercise of the moral functions Caraka advises people to take to well-controlled bodily exercises (*vyāyāma*). When moderately performed, they give lightness, power of doing work, steadiness (*sthāirya*) and fortitude (*duḥkha-sahiṣṇutā*). Avoidance of unwise courses and non-commission of errors of judgment (*tyāgaḥ prajñāparādhānām*), sense-control, remembrance of past experiences (*smṛti*), due knowledge of one's own powers, due regard to proper time and place and good conduct prevent the inrush of mental and bodily diseases; for it is these which are the essentials of a good life, and a wise man always does what is good for himself. Caraka further advises

that one should not keep company with those who are sinful in character, speech and mind, or with those who are quarrelsome, greedy, jealous, crooked, light-minded or fond of speaking ill of others or cruel or vicious, or with those who associate with one's enemies. But one should always associate with those who are wise, learned, aged, with men of character, firmness, self-concentration, ready experience, with those who know the nature of things and are full of equanimity, and those who direct us in the right path, are good to all beings, possess a settled character and are peaceful and self-contented. In these ways a man should try, on the one hand, to secure himself against the inrush of mental troubles which upset one's moral life and, on the other hand, properly to attend to his bodily welfare by taking the proper kind of food at the proper time and attending to other details of physical well-being¹.

The rules of good conduct (*sad-vṛtta*) are described in detail by Caraka as follows²:

A man should respect gods, cows, Brāhmaṇas, preceptors (*guru*), elderly persons, saints and teachers (*ācārya*), hold auspicious amulets, bathe twice and clean all the pores of the body and feet and cut his hair, beard and nails three times in a fortnight. He should be well-dressed, should always oil his head, ears, nose and feet, comb his hair, scent himself and smoke (*dhūma-pā*). He should recognize others with a pleasant face, help others in difficulties, perform sacrifices, make gifts, talk delightfully, nicely and for the good of others, be self-controlled (*vaśyātman*) and of a virtuous temperament. He should envy the cause of another's prosperity in the form of his good character and other causes of his personal efficiency (*hetāv irṣyu*), but should not be jealous of the fruits of these in the form of a man's prosperity or wealth (*phale nerṣyu*). He should be of firm decision, fearless, susceptible to the feeling of shame, intelligent, energetic, skilful, of a forgiving nature, virtuous and a believer (*āstika*). He should use umbrellas, sticks, turbans and shoes, and should at the time of walking look four cubits of ground in front of him; he should avoid going to impure, unclean and dirty places; he should try to appease those who are angry, soothe the fears of those who have become afraid, help the poor, keep his promises, bear harsh words, be self-controlled, remove the causes of attachments and antipathy (*rāga-dveṣa*) and behave as the friend of all living beings. Again,

¹ See Caraka-saṃhitā, I. 7.

² Ibid. I. 8.

one should not tell lies, or take that which belongs to others, should not commit adultery, or be jealous at other people's wealth, should not be given to creating enemies, should not commit sins, or do wrong even to a sinner, or speak about the defects or secrets of others; should not keep company with the sinful or with those who are the king's enemies or with madmen, the mean, wicked, out-cast, or those who make abortions. One should not climb into bad vehicles, lie on hard beds, or beds without sheets or pillows, should not climb steep mountain sides or trees or bathe in fast flowing rivers with strong currents; one should not go about places where there are great fires raging, or laugh loudly or yawn or laugh without covering the face, or pick one's teeth. Again, one should not break the laws ordained by a large number of persons, or other laws in general; should not go about at night in improper places, or make friends with youngsters, old or greedy people, fools, sinners or eunuchs; one should not be fond of wines, gambling, prostitutes, divulge secrets, insult others, be proud or boastful or speak ill of old people, teachers, kings or assemblages of persons, or talk too much; one should not turn out relations, friends or those who know one's secrets. One should attend at the proper time to every action, should not undertake to do anything without properly examining it, or be too procrastinating, or be under the influence of anger and pleasure; one should not be very down-hearted in afflictions, or too elated in success, or too disappointed in failures; should practice sex-continence, try to be wise, make gifts, be friendly and compassionate to all and always contented. It is needless to continue to enumerate all the qualities, which would commonly be included within the requisites of a good life. In this Caraka seems to cut an absolutely new way, and in no other branch of Indian thought can we note such an assemblage of good qualities of all the different kinds necessary not only for a virtuous life, but for the healthy and successful life of a good citizen.

It has already been pointed out that error of judgment or delusion, in whichever sphere it may be exercised, is the root of all mischiefs and all troubles. And Caraka demonstrates this by enumerating in his schedule of good conduct proper behaviour in all the different concerns and spheres of life. To Caraka the conception of life is not as moral or immoral, but as good (*hita*) and bad (*ahita*). It is true, no doubt, that here and there stray statements are

found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* which regard the cessation of all sorrows as the ultimate end of life; but it is obvious that Caraka's main approach to the subject shows very clearly that, though moral virtues are always very highly appreciated, yet the non-moral virtues, such as the proper taking care of the well-being of one's own body and the observance of social rules and forms of etiquette or normal prudent behaviour, are regarded as being equally necessary for the maintenance of a good life. Transgressions and sins are the causes of mental worries, troubles and also of many mental and physical diseases, and one ought therefore to take proper care that they may not enter into one's life; and it is said that the diseases produced by strong sinful acts cannot be cured by the ordinary means of the application of medicines and the like, until with the proper period of their sufferings they subside of themselves. But sins and transgressions are not the only causes of our desires, accidents and other domestic, social and political troubles. It is through our imprudent behaviour and conduct, which are due to error of judgment (*prajñāparādha*), as our other sins and immoral acts are, that all our bodily and mental troubles happen to us. A good life, which is the ideal of every person, is a life of peace, contentment and happiness, free from desires and troubles of all kinds. It is a life of prudence and well-balanced judgment, where every action is done with due consideration to its future consequences and where all that may lead to troubles and difficulties is carefully avoided. It is only such a life that can claim to be good and can be regarded as ideal. A merely moral or virtuous life is not our ideal, which must be good in every respect. Any transgression, be it of the rules of hygiene, rules of polite society, rules of good citizenship, or any deviation from the path which prudence or good judgment would recommend to be wise, may disturb the peace of life. A scheme of good life thus means a wise life, and observance of morality is but one of the many ways in which wisdom can be shown.

Āyur-veda, or the Science of Life, deals primarily with the ways in which a life may be good (*hita*), bad (*ahita*), happy (*sukha*) or unhappy (*asukha*). A happy life is described as a life undisturbed by bodily and mental diseases, full of youth and proper strength, vitality, energy, power of launching new efforts, endowed with wisdom, knowledge and efficient sense-organs—a life which is full of all kinds of desirable enjoyments and in which the ventures that

are undertaken are all successful. The opposite of this is what may be called an unhappy life. The happy life thus represents a life so far as it is happy and enjoyable and so far as it satisfies us. The good life is the life as it is moulded and developed by our right conduct. In a way it is the good life that makes a happy life. They who seek a good life should desist from the sins of taking other people's possessions and be truthful and self-controlled. They should perform every action with proper observation, care and judgment, and should not be hasty or make mistakes by their carelessness; they should attend to the attainment of virtue, wealth and the enjoyments of life without giving undue emphasis to any of them; they should respect those who are revered, should be learned, wise and of a peaceful mind and control their tendencies to attachment, anger, jealousy and false pride; they should always make gifts; they should lead a life of rigour (*tapas*) and attain wisdom, self-knowledge or philosophy (*adhyātma-vidāḥ*), and behave in such a way that the interests of both the present life on earth and the life hereafter may be attended to with care and judgment, always remembering the lessons of past experience¹. It is now clear that the ideal of good life in Caraka is not the same as that of the different systems of philosophy which are technically called the Science of Liberation (*mokṣa-śāstra*). The fundamental idea of a good life is that a life should be so regulated that the body and mind may be free from diseases, that it should not run into unnecessary risks of danger through carelessness, that it should be virtuous, pure and moral; that it should be a prudent and wise life which abides by the laws of polite society and of good and loyal citizens, manifesting keen alertness in thought and execution and tending constantly to its own good—good for all interests of life, body, mind and spirit.

Āyur-veda Literature.

The systematic development of Indian medicine proceeded primarily on two principal lines, viz. one that of Suśruta and the other that of Caraka. It is said in Suśruta's great work, *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, that Brahmā originally composed the Āyur-veda in one hundred verses, divided into one thousand chapters, even before he had created human beings, and that later on, having regard to the shortness of human life and the poverty of the human intellect,

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, 1. 30. 22.

he divided it into the eight parts, *Śalya*, *Śālākya*, etc., alluded to in a previous section. But this seems to be largely mythical. It is further said in the same connection in the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, I. 1 that the sages Aupadhenava, Vaitaraṇa, Aurabhra, Pauṣkalāvata, Karavīrya, Gopurarakṣita, Suśruta and others approached Dhanvantari or Divodāsa, king of Kāśī, for medical instruction. Suśruta's work is therefore called a work of the Dhanvantari school. Though it was revised at a later date by Nāgārjuna, yet Suśruta himself is an old writer. A study of the Jātakas shows that the great physician Ātreya, a teacher of Jivaka, lived in Taxila shortly before Buddha¹. It has been said in a preceding section that in the enumeration of bones Suśruta shows a knowledge of Ātreya's system of osteology. Hoernle has further shown in sections 42, 56, 60 and 61 of his "Osteology," that the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, which is at least as old as the sixth century B.C., shows an acquaintance with Suśruta's views concerning the counting of bones. But, since Ātreya could not have lived earlier than the sixth century B.C., and since the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* of about the sixth century B.C. shows an acquaintance with Suśruta's views, Hoernle conjectures that Suśruta must have been contemporary with Ātreya's pupil, Agniveśa². But, admitting Hoernle's main contentions to be true, it may be pointed out that by the term *veda-vādinah* in *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 5. 18 Suśruta may have referred to authorities earlier than Ātreya, from whom Ātreya also may have drawn his materials. On this view, then, the lower limit of Suśruta's death is fixed as the sixth or seventh century B.C., this being the date of the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, while practically nothing can be said about the upper limit.

But it is almost certain that the work which now passes by the name of *Suśruta-saṃhitā* is not identically the same work that was composed by this elder Suśruta (*vrddha Suśruta*). Ḍalhaṇa, who lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century, says in his *Nibandha-saṃgraha* that Nāgārjuna was the reviser of the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*³; and the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* itself contains a supplementary part after the *Kalpa-sthāna*, called the *Uttara-tantra* (later work). In the edition of Suśruta by P. Muralidhar, of Pharuknagar, there is a verse at the beginning, which says that that which was

¹ Rockhill's *Life of Buddha*, pp. 65 and 96.

² Hoernle's *Medicine of Ancient India*, Part I, "Osteology," pp. 7 and 8.

³ *Pratisaṃskartāpītha Nāgārjuna eva*. Ḍalhaṇa's *Nibandha-saṃgraha*, I. 1. 1.

so well taught for the good of the people by the great sage Dhanvantari to the good pupil Suśruta became famous all over the world as *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, and is regarded as the best and the chief of the threefold Āyur-veda literature, and that it was strung together in the form of a book by no other person than Nāgārjuna¹. Cakra-pāṇi also in his *Bhānumatī* refers to a reviser (*pratisaṃskartṛ*); but he does not mention his name. Gayadāsa's *pañjikā* on Suśruta, *Suśruta-candrikā* or *Nyāya-candrikā*, has an observation on the eighth verse of the third chapter of the *Nidāna-sthāna*, in which he gives a different reading by Nāgārjuna, which is the same as the present reading of Suśruta in the corresponding passage². Again, Bhaṭṭa Narahari in his *Ṭippaṇī* on the *Astāṅga-hṛdaya-saṃhitā*, called *Vāgbhaṭa-khaṇḍana-maṇḍana*, in discussing *mūḍha-garbha-nidāna*, annotates on the reading *vasti-dvāre vipannāyāh*, which Vāgbhaṭa changes in borrowing from Suśruta's *vastimāra-vipannāyāh* (II. 8. 14), and says that *vasti-dvāre* is the reading of Nāgārjuna³. That Nāgārjuna had the habit of making supplements to his revisions of works is further testified by the fact that a work called *Yoga-śataka*, attributed to Nāgārjuna, had also a supplementary chapter, called *Uttara-tantra*, in addition to its other chapters, *Kāya-cikitsā*, *Śālākya-tantra*, *Śalya-tantra*, *Viśa-tantra*, *Bhūtavidyā*, *Kaumāra-tantra*, *Rasāyana-tantra* and *Vājikaraṇa-tantra*. This makes it abundantly clear that what passes as the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* was either entirely strung together from the traditional teachings of Suśruta or entirely revised and enlarged by Nāgārjuna on the basis of a nuclear work of Suśruta which was available to Nāgārjuna. But was Nāgārjuna the only person who revised the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*? Ḍalhaṇa's statement that it was Nāgārjuna who was the reviser of the work (*pratisaṃskartāpiha Nāgārjuna eva*) is attested by the verse of the Muralidhar edition (*Nāgārjunenaiva grathitā*); but the use of the emphatic word *eva* in both suggests that there may have been other editions or revisions of Suśruta by other writers as well. The hopelessly muddled condition of the readings,

¹ Upadiṣṭā tu yā samyag Dhanvantari-maharṣiṇā
Suśrutāya suśiṣyāya lokānām hita-vāñchayā
sarvatra bhuvī vikhyātā nāmnā Suśruta-saṃhitā
Āyur-vedut-rayimadhye sreṣṭhā mānyā tathottamā
sā ca Nāgārjunenaiva grathitā grantha-rūpatah.

² Nāgārjunas tu paṭhati; śarkarā sikatā meho bhasmākhyo 'smari-vaikṛtam iti. In the Nirṇaya-Sāgara edition of 1915 this is II. 3. 13, whereas in Jivānanda's edition it is II. 3. 8. See also Dr Cordier's *Récents Découvertes de MSS. Médicaux Sanscrits dans l'Inde*, p. 13.

³ ata eva Nāgārjunair vasti-dvāra iti paṭhyate.

chapter-divisions and textual arrangements in the chapters in different editions of the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* is such that there can be no doubt that from time to time many hands were in operation on this great work. Nor it is proper to think that the work of revising Suśruta was limited to a pre-Cakrapāṇi period. It is possible to point out at least one case in which it can be almost definitely proved that a new addition was made to the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* after Cakrapāṇi, or the text of Suśruta known to Ḍalhaṇa was not known to Cakrapāṇi. Thus, in dealing with the use of catheters and the processes of introducing medicine through the anus (*vasti-kriyā*) in IV. 38, the texts of the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* commented on by Ḍalhaṇa reveal many interesting details which are untouched in the chapter on *Vasti* in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* (*Uttara-vasti*, *Siddhi-sthāna*, XII). This chapter of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* was an addition by Dṛḍhabala, who flourished in Kāśmīra or the Punjab, probably in the eighth or the ninth century. When Cakrapāṇi wrote his commentary in the eleventh century, he did not make any reference to the materials found in the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, nor did he introduce them into his own medical compendium, which passes by the name of *Cakradatta*. Cakrapāṇi knew his *Suśruta-saṃhitā* well, as he had commented on it himself, and it is extremely unlikely that, if he had found any interesting particulars concerning *vasti-kriyā* in his text, he should not have utilized them in his commentary or in his own medical work. The inference, therefore, is almost irresistible that many interesting particulars regarding *vasti-kriyā*, absent in the texts of the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* in the ninth and eleventh centuries, were introduced into it in the twelfth century. It is difficult, however, to guess which Nāgārjuna was the reviser or editor of the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*; it is very unlikely that he was the famous Nāgārjuna of the *Mādhyamika-kārikā*, the great teacher of Śūnyavāda; for the accounts of the life of this Nāgārjuna, as known from Chinese and Tibetan sources, nowhere suggest that he revised or edited the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*. Alberuni speaks of a Nāgārjuna who was born in Dihaka, near Somanātha (Gujarat), about one hundred years before himself, i.e. about the middle of the ninth century, and who had written an excellent work on alchemy, containing the substance of the whole literature of the subject, which by Alberuni's time had become very rare. It is not improbable that this Nāgārjuna was the author of the *Kakṣapuṭa-tantra*, which is

avowedly written with materials collected from the alchemical works of various religious communities and which deals with the eightfold miraculous acquirements (*aṣṭa-siddhi*). But Vṛnda in his *Siddha-yoga* refers to a formula by Nāgārjuna which was said to have been written on a pillar in Pāṭaliputra¹. This formula is reproduced by Cakrapāṇi Datta, Vaṅgasena and by Nityanātha Siddha in his *Rasa-ratnākara*. But since Vṛnda, the earliest of these writers, flourished about the eighth or the ninth century, and since his formula was taken from an inscription, it is not improbable that this Nāgārjuna flourished a few centuries before him.

Of the commentaries on the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* the most important now current is Ḍalhaṇa's *Nibandha-saṃgraha*. Ḍalhaṇa quotes Cakrapāṇi, of A.D. 1060, and is himself quoted by Hemādri, of A.D. 1260. He therefore flourished between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries. It has been pointed out that sufficient textual changes in the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* had occurred between Cakrapāṇi and Ḍalhaṇa's time to have taken at least about one hundred years. I am therefore inclined to think that Ḍalhaṇa lived late in the twelfth, or early in the thirteenth, century at the court of King Sahapāla Deva. Cakrapāṇi had also written a commentary on the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, called *Bhānumatī*, the first book of which has been published by Kaviraj Gangaprasad Sen. Dr Cordier notes that there is a complete manuscript of this at Benares. Niścala Kara and Śrikanṭha Datta sometimes quote from Cakrapāṇi's commentary on the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*. Ḍalhaṇa's commentary is called *Nibandha-saṃgraha*, which means that the book is collected from a number of commentaries, and he himself says in a colophon at the end of the *Uttara-tantra* that the physician Ḍalhaṇa, son of Bharata, had written the work after consulting many other commentaries². At the beginning of his *Nibandha-saṃgraha* he refers to Jaiyyaṭa, Gayadāsa, Bhāskara's *pañjikā*, Śrīmādhava and Brahmadeva. In his work he further mentions Caraka, Hārīta, Jatukarṇa, Kāśyapa, Kṛṣṇātreya, Bhadrāśunaka, Nāgārjuna, the two Vāgbhaṭas, Videha, Hariścandra, Bhoja, Kārttika Kuṇḍa and others. Hariścandra was a commentator on the *Caraka-saṃhitā*. It is curious, however, that, though Ḍalhaṇa refers to Bhāskara and Śrīmādhava

¹ Nāgārjuna likhitā stambhe Pāṭaliputrake, v. 149.

² Nibandhān bahuśo vikṣya vaidyaḥ Śrībhāratātmanajā
uttara-sthānam akarot suspaṣṭam Ḍalhaṇo bhīṣak.

Concluding verse of Ḍalhaṇa's commentary on Suśruta's *Uttara-tantra*, chap. 66.

at the beginning of his commentary, he does not refer to them in the body of it. Hoernle, however, is disposed to identify Bhāskara and Kārttika Kuṇḍa as one person. Vijayarakṣita and Śrīkaṇṭha Datta, commentators on Mādhava's *Nidāna*, refer to Kārttika Kuṇḍa in connection with their allusions to the *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, but not to Bhāskara. A Patna inscription (E.I.I. 340, 345) says that King Bhoja had given the title of Vidyapati to Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa. Hoernle thinks that this Bhāskara was the same as Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa. Hoernle also suggests that Vṛnda Mādhava was the same as Śrīmādhava referred to by Ḍalhaṇa. Mādhava in his *Siddha-yoga* often modifies Suśruta's statements. It may be that these modifications passed as Mādhava's *Ṭippaṇa*. Since Gayadāsa and Cakrapāṇi both refer to Bhoja and do not refer to one another, it may be that Gayadāsa was a contemporary of Cakrapāṇi. Hoernle thinks that the Brahmadeva referred to by Ḍalhaṇa was Śrībrahma, the father of Maheśvara, who wrote his *Sāhasāṅka-carita* in A.D. 1111. Maheśvara refers to Hariścandra as an early ancestor of his. It is not improbable that this Hariścandra was a commentator on Caraka. The poet Maheśvara was himself also a Kavirāja, and Heramba Sena's *Gūḍha-bodhaka-saṃgraha* was largely based on Maheśvara's work. Jejjāta's commentary passed by the name of *Bṛhal-laghu-pañjikā*; Gayadāsa's commentary was called the *Suśruta-candrikā* or *Nyāya-candrikā* and Śrīmādhava or Mādhava-Kara's *Ṭippaṇa* was called *Śloka-vārttika*. Gayadāsa mentions the names of Bhoja, Suranandī and Svāmidāsa. Gayadāsa's *pañjikā* has been discovered only up to the *Nidāna-sthāna*, containing 3000 *granthas*. Among other commentators of Suśruta we hear the names of Gomin, Āṣāḍhavarman, Jinadāsa, Naradanta, Gadādhara, Bāṣpacandra, Soma, Govardhana and Praśnanidhāna.

It may not be out of place here to mention the fact that the Sāṃkhya philosophy summed up in the *Śārīra-sthāna* of Suśruta is decidedly the Sāṃkhya philosophy of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, which, as I have elsewhere pointed out, is later than the Sāṃkhya philosophy so elaborately treated in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*¹. This fact also suggests that the revision of Suśruta was executed after the composition of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's work (about A.D. 200), which agrees with the view expressed above that the revision of Suśruta was the work of Nāgārjuna, who flourished about the fourth or the fifth century A.D. But it is extremely improbable that the elaborate medical doctrines

¹ *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1, pp. 313-322.

of an author who lived at so early a date as the sixth century B.C. could have remained in a dispersed condition until seven, eight or nine hundred years later. It is therefore very probable that the main basis of Suśruta's work existed in a codified and well-arranged form from very early times. The work of the editor or reviser seems to have consisted in introducing supplements, such as the *Uttara-tantra*, and other chapters on relevant occasions. It does not seem impossible that close critical and comparative study of a number of published texts of the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* and of unpublished manuscripts may enable a future student to separate the original from the supplementary parts. The task, however, is rendered difficult by the fact that additions to the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* were probably not limited to one period, as has already been pointed out above.

It is well known that Atri's medical teachings, as collected by Agniveśa in his *Agniveśa-tantra*, which existed at least as late as Cakrapāṇi, form the basis of a revised work by Caraka, who is said to have flourished during the time of Kaṇiṣka, passing by the name of *Caraka-saṃhitā*¹. It is now also well known that Caraka did not complete his task, but left it half-finished at a point in the *Cikitsā-sthāna*, seventeen chapters of which, together with the books called *Siddhi-sthāna* and *Kalpa-sthāna*, were added by Kapilabala's son, Dṛḍhabala, of the city of Pañcanada, about the ninth century A.D. The statement that Dṛḍhabala supplemented the work in the above way is found in the current texts of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*². Niścala Kara in his *Ratna-prabhā* describes him as author of the *Caraka-pariśiṣṭa*, and Cakrapāṇi, Vijayarakṣita and Aruṇadatta (A.D. 1240), whenever they have occasion to quote passages from his supplementary parts, all refer to Dṛḍhabala as the author. The city of Pañcanada was identified as the Punjab by Dr U. C. Dutt in his *Materia Medica*, which identification was accepted by Dr Cordier and referred to a supposed modern Panjpur, north of Attock in the Punjab. There are several Pañcanadas in different parts of India, and one of them is mentioned in the fifty-ninth chapter of the *Kāśi-khaṇḍa*; Gaṅgādhara in his commentary identifies this with Benares, assigning no reason for such identification. Hoernle, however, thinks that this Pañcanada is the modern village of

¹ On Caraka's being the court-physician of Kaṇiṣka see S. Levi, *Notes sur les Indo-Scythes*, in *Journal Asiatique*, pp. 444 sqq.

² *Caraka-saṃhitā*, vi. 30 and *Siddhi-sthāna*, vii. 8.

Pantzinor ("five channels" in Kashmir) and holds that Dr̥ḍhabala was an inhabitant of this place. There are many passages in Caraka which the commentators believe to be additions of the Kāśmīra recension (*Kāśmīra-pāṭha*). Mādhava quotes a number of verses from the third chapter of the sixth section, on fevers, which verses are given with the omission of about twenty-four lines. Vijaya-rakṣita, in his commentary on Mādhava's *Nidāna*, says that these lines belong to the Kāśmīra recension. Existing manuscripts vary very much with regard to these lines; for, while some have the lines, in others they are not found. In the same chapter there are other passages which are expressly noted by Cakrapāṇidatta as belonging to Kāśmīra recensions, and are not commented upon by him. There are also other examples. Hoernle points out that Jīvānanda's edition of 1877 gives the Kāśmīra version, while his edition of 1896, as well as the editions of Gaṅgādhara, the two Sens and Abinas, have Caraka's original version. Mādhava never quotes readings belonging to the Kāśmīra recension. Hoernle puts together four points, viz. that Caraka's work was revised and completed by Dr̥ḍhabala, that there existed a Kāśmīra recension of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, that Dr̥ḍhabala calls himself a native of Pañcanada city, and that there existed a holy place of that name in Kāśmīra; and he argues that the so-called Kāśmīra recension represents the revision of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* by Dr̥ḍhabala. Judging from the fact that Mādhava takes no notice of the readings of the Kāśmīra recension, he argues that the latter did not exist in Mādhava's time and that therefore Mādhava's date must be anterior to that of Dr̥ḍhabala.

But which portions were added to the *Caraka-saṃhitā* by Dr̥ḍhabala? The obvious assumption is that he added the last seventeen chapters of the sixth book (*Cikitsā*) and the seventh and eighth books¹. But such an assumption cannot hold good, since there is a great divergence in the counting of the number of the chapters in different manuscripts. Thus, while Jīvānanda's text marks Arśas, Atisāra, Visarpa, Madātyaya and Dvivraṇīya as the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters of *Cikitsā* and therefore belonging to the original Caraka, Gaṅgādhara's text

1

*asmīn sapṭādaśādhyā kalpāḥ siddhaya eva ca
nāsādyante 'grīveśasya tantrē Carakasamskṛte
tān etān Kāpilabalaḥ śeṣān Dr̥ḍhabalo 'karot
tantrasyāśya mahārthasya pūranārthaṃ yathāyatham.*

calls the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters Unmāda, Apasmāra, Kṣataksīṇa, Śvayathu and Udara. The seventeen chapters attributed to Dṛḍhabala have consequently different titles in the Gaṅgādhara and Jīvānanda editions. Hoernle has discussed very critically these textual problems and achieved notable results in attributing chapters to Caraka or Dṛḍhabala¹. But it is needless for us to enter into these discussions.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Kaviraj Gaṇanātha Sen, merely on the strength of the fact that the *Rāja-taraṅgiṇī* is silent on the matter², disputes the traditional Chinese statement that Caraka was the court-physician of Kaṇiṣka. There is no ground to believe as gospel truth a tradition, which cannot be traced to any earlier authority than Bhoja (eleventh century), that Patañjali was the author of a medical work, and that therefore Patañjali and Caraka could be identified. His comparisons of some passages from Caraka (IV. 1) with some *sūtras* of Patañjali are hardly relevant and he finally has to rest for support of this identification on the evidence of Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita, a man of the seventeenth or the eighteenth century, who holds that Patañjali had written a work on medicine. He should have known that there were more Patañjalis than one, and that the alchemist and medical Patañjali was an entirely different person from Patañjali, the grammarian.

The most important commentary now completely available to us is the *Āyur-veda-dīpikā*, or *Caraka-tātparyā-ṭikā*, of Cakrapāṇi-datta. Another important commentary is the *Caraka-pañjikā* by Svāmikumāra. He was a Buddhist in faith, and he refers to the commentator Hariścandra. The *Caraka-tattva-pradīpikā* was written in later times by Śivadāśasena, who also wrote the *Tattva-candrikā*, a commentary on Cakradatta. We hear also of other commentaries on Caraka by Bāṣpacandra or Vāpyacandra, Īśāna-deva, Īśvarasena, Vakulakara, Jinadāsa, Munidāsa, Govardhana, Sandhyākara, Jaya nandī and the *Caraka-candrikā* of Gayadāsa.

Among other ancient treatises we may mention the *Kāśyapa-saṃhitā*, discovered in Kaṭhmāṇḍū, a medical dialogue between Kāśyapa, the teacher and Bhārgava, the student. It is interesting to note that it has some verses (MS., pp. 105-110) which are identical with part of the fifth chapter of the first book of Caraka. There is another important manuscript, called *Bhāradvāja-*

¹ *J.R.A.S.*, 1908 and 1909.

² *Pratyakṣa-śārīram*, introduction.

saṃhitā, which contains within it a small work called *Bhesaja-kalpa*, a commentary by Venkaṭeśa¹. Agniveśa's original work, the *Agniveśa-saṃhitā*, which was the basis of Caraka's revision, was available at least up to the time of Cakrapāṇi; Vijayarakṣita and Śrīkaṇṭhadatta also quote from it². Jātūkarṇa's work also existed till the time of the same writers, as they occasionally quote from *Jātūkarṇa-saṃhitā*³. The *Parāśara-saṃhitā* and *Kṣārāpāṇi-saṃhitā* were also available down to Śrīkaṇṭhadatta's, or even down to Śivadāsa's, time. The *Hārīta-saṃhitā* (different from the printed and more modern text) was also available from the time of Cakrapāṇi and Vijayarakṣita, as is evident from the quotations from it in their works. Bhela's work, called *Bhela-saṃhitā*, has already been published by the University of Calcutta. It may be remembered that Agniveśa, Bhela, Jātūkarṇa, Parāśara, Hārīta and Kṣārāpāṇi were all fellow-students in medicine, reading with the same teacher, Ātreya-Punarvasu; Agniveśa, being the most intelligent of them all, wrote his work first, but Bhela and his other fellow-students also wrote independent treatises, which were read before the assembly of medical scholars and approved by them. Another work of the same school, called *Kharaṇada-saṃhitā*, and also a *Viśvāmītra-saṃhitā*, both of which are not now available, are utilized by Cakrapāṇi and other writers in their commentaries. The name *saṃhitā*, however, is no guarantee of the antiquity of these texts, for the junior Vāgbhaṭa's work is also called *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-saṃhitā*. We have further a manuscript called *Vararuci-saṃhitā*, by Vararuci, and a *Siddha-sāra-saṃhitā* by Ravigupta, son of Durgāgupta, which are of comparatively recent date. The *Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa* refers to a number of early medical works, such as the *Cikitsā-tattva-vijñāna* of Dhanvantari, *Cikitsā-darśana* of Divodāsa, *Cikitsā-kaumudī* of Kāśīrāja, *Cikitsā-sāra-tantra* and *Bhrama-ghna* of Āśvinī, *Vaidyaka-sarvasva* of Nakula, *Vyādhi-sindhu-vimardana* of Sahadeva, *Jñānārṇava* of Yama, *Jivādāna* of Cyavana, *Vaidya-sandeha-bhañjana* of Janaka, *Sarva-sāra* of Candrasuta, *Tantra-sāra* of Jābāla, *Vedāṅga-sāra* of Jājali, *Nidāna* of Paila, *Sarva-dhara* of Karaṭha and *Dvaidha-nirṇaya-tantra* of

¹ See Dr Cordier's *Récents Découvertes de MSS. Médicaux Sanscrits dans l'Inde* (1898-1902).

² See Cakrapāṇi's commentary on *Caraka-saṃhitā*, II. 2, also Śrīkaṇṭha on the *Siddha-yoga*, *Jvarādhikāra*.

³ Cakrapāṇi's commentary, II. 2 and II. 5, also Śrīkaṇṭha on the *Nidāna* (*Kṣudra-roga*).

Agastya¹. But nothing is known of these works, and it is difficult to say if they actually existed.

It is well known that there were two Vāgbhaṭas (sometimes spelt Vāhaṭa). The earlier Vāgbhaṭa knew Caraka and Suśruta. It is conjectured by Hoernle and others that the statement of I-tsing (A.D. 675–685), that the eight arts formerly existed in eight books, and that a man had lately epitomized them and made them into one bundle, and that all physicians in the five parts of India practised according to that book, alludes to the *Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha* of Vāgbhaṭa the elder. In that case Vāgbhaṭa I must have flourished either late in the sixth century or early in the seventh century; for I-tsing speaks of him as having epitomized the work “lately,” and on the other hand time must be allowed for the circulation of such a work in the five parts of India. A comparison of Suśruta and Vāgbhaṭa I shows that the study of anatomy had almost ceased to exist in the latter’s time. It is very probable that Vāgbhaṭa was a Buddhist. The *Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha* has a commentary by Indu; but before Indu there had been other commentators, whose bad expositions were refuted by him².

Mādhava, Dṛḍhabala and Vāgbhaṭa II all knew Vāgbhaṭa I. Mādhava mentions him by name and occasionally quotes from him both in the *Siddha-yoga* and in the *Nidāna*, and so also does Dṛḍhabala³. Hoernle has shown that Dṛḍhabala’s 96 diseases of the eye are based on Vāgbhaṭa’s 94. Vāgbhaṭa II towards the end of the *Uttara-sthāna* of his *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-saṃhitā* definitely expresses his debt to Vāgbhaṭa I. But they must all have flourished before Cakrapāṇi, who often refers to Dṛḍhabala and Vāgbhaṭa II. If, as Hoernle has shown, Mādhava was anterior to Dṛḍhabala, he also must necessarily have flourished before Cakrapāṇi. Hoernle’s argument that Mādhava flourished before Dṛḍhabala rests upon the fact that Suśruta counts 76 kinds of eye-diseases, while Vāgbhaṭa I has 94. Dṛḍhabala accepts Vāgbhaṭa I’s 94 eye-diseases with the addition of two more, added by Mādhava, making his list come to 96. Mādhava had accepted Suśruta’s 76 eye-diseases and

¹ It is curious to notice that the *Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa* makes Dhanvantari, Kāśirāja and Divodāsa different persons, which is contrary to Suśruta’s statement noted above.

² *Durvyākhyā-viṣa-sūptasya Vāhaṭasyāsmad-uktayaḥ santu saṃvitti-dāyinyas sad-āgama-pariṣkṛtā*. Indu’s commentary, I. 1.

³ *Siddha-yoga*, I. 27, *Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha*, II. 1, *Nidāna*, II. 22 and 23, *Samgraha*, I. 266, *Caraka-saṃhitā* (Jivānanda, 1896), *Cikitsita-sthāna*, XVI. 31, *Samgraha*, II. 26. Again, *Cikitsita-sthāna*, XVI. 53, etc., *Samgraha*, II. 27, etc.

added two of his own¹. The second point in Hoernle's argument is that Mādhava in his quotations from Caraka always omits the passages marked by Vijayarakṣita as Kāśmīra readings, which Hoernle identifies with the revision work of Dṛḍhabala. These arguments of Hoernle appear very inconclusive; for, if the so-called Kāśmīra recension can be identified with Dṛḍhabala's revision, both Dṛḍhabala's Kāśmīra nativity and his posteriority to Mādhava can be proved; but this proposition has not been proved. On the other hand, Cakrapāṇi alludes to a Dṛḍhabala saṃskāra side by side with a Kāśmīra reading, and this seems to indicate that the two are not the same². The suggestion of Mādhava's anteriority on the ground that he counts 78 eye-diseases is rather far-fetched. Mādhava's date, therefore, cannot be definitely settled. Hoernle is probably correct in holding that Dṛḍhabala is anterior to Vāgbhaṭa³. However, the relative anteriority or posteriority of these three writers does not actually matter very much; for they lived at more or less short intervals from one another and their dates may roughly be assigned to a period between the eighth and tenth centuries A.D.

Vāgbhaṭa II's *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-saṃhitā* has at least five commentaries, viz. by Aruṇadatta (*Sarvāṅga-sundarī*), Āśādharma, Candracandana (*Padārtha-candrikā*), Rāmanātha and Hemādri (*Āyur-veda-rasāyana*). Of these Aruṇadatta probably lived in A.D. 1220. Mādhava's *Rug-viniścaya*, a compendium of pathology, is one of the most popular works of Indian Medicine. It has at least seven commentaries, viz. by Vijayarakṣita (*Madhu-kośa*), Vaidya-vācaspati (*Ātanka-dīpana*), Rāmanātha Vaidya, Bhavānīśahāya, Nāganātha (*Nidāna-pradīpa*), Gaṇeśa Bhisaj and the commentary known as *Siddhānta-candrikā* or *Vivaraṇa-siddhānta-candrikā*, by Narasiṃha Kavirāja⁴. Vijayarakṣita's commentary, however,

¹ Hoernle thinks that the total number of 76 eye-diseases ordinarily found in the printed editions of Mādhava's *Nidāna* is not correct, as they do not actually tally with the descriptions of the different eye-diseases given by Mādhava and do not include *pakṣma-kopa* and *pakṣma-śātā* varieties. Hoernle's "Osteology," p. 13.

² Cakra's commentary, I. 7. 46-50.

³ See Hoernle's "Osteology," pp. 14-16.

⁴ Narasiṃha Kavirāja was the son of Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa and the pupil of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa. He seems to have written another medical work, called *Madhu-matī*. His *Vivaraṇa-siddhānta-candrikā*, though based on Vijaya's *Madhu-kośa*, is an excellent commentary and contains much that is both instructive and new. The only manuscript available is probably the one that belongs to the family library of the author of the present work, who is preparing an edition of it for publication.

closes with the 33rd chapter, and the rest of the work was accomplished by Śrīkaṇṭhadatta, a pupil of Vijayarakṣita. Vṛnda (who may be the same as Mādhava) wrote a *Siddha-yoga*, a book of medical formulas, well known among medical writers.

In connection with this brief account of Indian medical works the *Nava-nītaka*, and the other mutilated medical treatises which have been discovered in Central Asia and which go by the name of "Bower manuscript," cannot be omitted. This manuscript is written on birch leaves in Gupta characters and is probably as old as the fifth century A.D. It is a Buddhist work, containing many medical formulas taken from Caraka, Suśruta and other unknown writers. It will, however, be understood that an elaborate discussion of chronology or an exhaustive account of Indian medical works would be out of place in a work like the present. The Āyur-veda literature, and particularly that part which deals with medical formulas and recipes, medical lexicons and the like, is vast. Aufrecht's catalogue contains the names of about 1500 manuscript texts, most of which have not yet been published, and there are many other manuscripts not mentioned in Aufrecht's catalogue. Among the books now much in use may be mentioned the works of Śārṅgadharma, of the fourteenth century, Śivadāsa's commentary on Cakrapāṇi, of the fifteenth century, and the *Bhāva-prakāśa* of Bhāvamiśra, of the sixteenth. Vaṅgasena's work is also fairly common. Among anatomical texts Bhoja's work and Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa's *Śārīra-padminī* deserve mention. The *Aupadhenava-tantra*, *Pauṣkalāvata-tantra*, *Vaitaraṇa-tantra* and *Bhoja-tantra* are alluded to by Ḍalhaṇa. The *Bhāluki-tantra* and *Kapīla-tantra* are mentioned by Cakrapāṇi in his *Bhānumati* commentary. So much for the anatomical treatises. *Videha-tantra*, *Nīmi-tantra*, *Kāṅkāyana-tantra*, *Sātyaki-tantra*, *Karāla-tantra* and *Kṛṣṇātreyā-tantra* on eye-diseases are alluded to in Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary on Mādhava's *Nidāna*. The *Śaunaka-tantra* on eye-diseases is named in the commentaries of Cakrapāṇi and Ḍalhaṇa. The *Jīvaka-tantra*, *Parvataka-tantra* and *Bandhaka-tantra* are alluded to by Ḍalhaṇa as works on midwifery. The *Hiraṇyākṣya-tantra* on the same subject is named by Śrīkaṇṭha, whereas the *Kāśyapa-saṃhitā* and *Ālambāyana-saṃhitā* are cited by Śrīkaṇṭha on toxicology. The *Uśanas-saṃhitā*, *Sanaka-saṃhitā*, *Lātyāyana-saṃhitā* are also mentioned as works on toxicology.

Among some of the other important Tantras may be mentioned

Nāgārjuna's *Yoga-śataka*, containing the eight regular divisions of Indian Medicine, and Nāgārjuna's *Īva-sūtra* and *Bheṣaja-kalpa*, all of which were translated into Tibetan. Three works on the *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya*, called *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-nāma-vaidūryaka-bhāṣya*, *Padārtha-candrikā-prabhāsa-nāma*, *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-vṛtti* and *Vaidyakā-ṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-vṛtter bheṣaja-nāma-sūci*, were also translated into Tibetan.

The *Āyur-veda-sūtra* is a work by Yogānandanātha, published with a commentary by the same author in the Mysore University Sanskrit series in 1922, with an introduction by Dr Shama Sastry. It is rightly pointed out in the introduction that this is a very modern work, written after the *Bhāva-prakūṣa*, probably in the sixteenth century. It contains sixteen chapters and is an attempt to connect Āyur-veda with Patañjali's Yoga system. It endeavours to show how different kinds of food increase the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* qualities and how *yoga* practices, fasting and the like, influence the conditions of the body. Its contribution, whether as a work of Āyur-veda or as a work of philosophy, is rather slight. It shows a tendency to connect *Yoga* with Āyur-veda, while the *Vira-siṃhāvalokita* is a work which tries to connect astrology with the same.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE *BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ*

The *Gītā* Literature.

THE *Gītā* is regarded by almost all sections of the Hindus as one of the most sacred religious works, and a large number of commentaries have been written on it by the adherents of different schools of thought, each of which explained the *Gītā* in its own favour. Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* is probably the earliest commentary now available; but from references and discussions found therein there seems to be little doubt that there were previous commentaries which he wished to refute.

Śaṅkara in his interpretation of the *Gītā* seeks principally to emphasize the dogma that right knowledge can never be combined with Vedic duties or the duties recommended by the legal scriptures. If through ignorance, or through attachment, a man continues to perform the Vedic duties, and if, as a result of sacrifices, gifts and *tapas* (religious austerities), his mind becomes pure and he acquires the right knowledge regarding the nature of the ultimate reality—that the passive Brahman is the all—and then, when all reasons for the performance of actions have ceased for him, still continues to perform the prescribed duties just like common men and to encourage others to behave in a similar manner, then such actions are inconsistent with right knowledge. When a man performs actions without desire or motive, they cannot be considered as *karma* at all. He alone may be said to be performing *karma*, or duties, who has any interest in them. But the wise man, who has no interest in his *karma*, cannot be said to be performing *karma* in the proper sense of the term, though to all outward appearances he may be acting exactly like an ordinary man. Therefore the main thesis of the *Gītā*, according to Śaṅkara, is that liberation can come only through right knowledge and not through knowledge combined with the performance of duties. Śaṅkara maintains that all duties hold good for us only in the stage of ignorance and not in the stage of wisdom. When once the right knowledge of identity with Brahman dawns and ignorance ceases, all notions of duality, which are presupposed by

the performance of actions and responsibility for them, cease¹. In interpreting *Gītā*, III. 1, Śaṅkara criticizes the opinions of some previous commentators, who held that obligatory duties cannot be given up even when true wisdom is attained. In reply he alludes to legal scriptures (*smṛti-śāstra*), and asserts that the mere non-performance of any duties, however obligatory, cannot lead to evil results, since non-performance is a mere negation and of mere negation no positive results can come out. The evil effects of the non-performance of obligatory duties can happen only to those who have not given up all their actions (*a-saṁnyāsi-viṣayatvāt pratyavāya-prāpteh*). But those who have attained true wisdom and have consequently given up all their actions transcend the sphere of duties and of the obligatory injunctions of the Vedas, and the legal scriptures cannot affect them at all. The performance of duties cannot by itself lead to liberation; but it leads gradually to the attainment of purity of mind (*sattva-sūddhi*) and through this helps the dawning of the right knowledge, with which all duties cease². In a very lengthy discussion on the interpretation of *Gītā*, XVIII. 67, Śaṅkara tries to prove that all duties presuppose the multiplicity of the world of appearance, which is due to ignorance or nescience, and therefore the sage who has attained the right knowledge of Brahman, the only reality, has no duties to perform. Final liberation is thus produced, not by true knowledge along with the performance of duties, but by true knowledge alone. The wise man has no duties of any kind. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Gītā* presupposes that the *Gītā* holds the same philosophical doctrine that he does. His method of interpretation is based not so much on a comparison of textual passages, as simply on the strength of the reasonableness of the exposition of a view which can be consistently held according to his Vedānta philosophy, and which he ascribes to the *Gītā*. The view taken in the present exposition of the *Gītā* philosophy is diametrically opposite to that of Śaṅkara. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the *Gītā* asserts that even the wise man should perform his allotted duties, though he may have nothing to gain by the performance of such duties. Even God Himself as Kṛṣṇa, though He had no unsatisfied cravings, passions or desires of any kind,

¹ Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Gītā*, II. 69. Yogāśrama edition, Benares, 1919.

² *Ibid.* III. 4.

performed His self-imposed duties in order to set an example to all and to illustrate the fact that even the wise man should perform his prescribed duties¹.

Ānandajñāna wrote a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya*, called *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa*, and Rāmānanda wrote another commentary on that of Śaṅkara, called *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya-vyākhyā*. He is also said to have written another work on the *Gītā*, called *Gītāśāya*. After Śaṅkara there seems to have been some pause. We have two commentaries, one in prose and one in verse, by two persons of the same name, Yāmunācārya. The Yāmunācārya who was the author of a prose commentary is certainly, though a *viśiṣṭādvaita-vādin*, not the celebrated Yāmuna, the teacher of Rāmānuja. His commentary, which has been published by the Sudarśana Press, Conjeeveram, is very simple, consisting mainly of a mere paraphrase of the *Gītā* verses. He thinks that the first six chapters of the *Gītā* deal with the nature of true knowledge of God as a means to devotion, the second six with the nature of God as attainable by devotion and adoration, and the third six repeat the same subjects for a further clearing up of the problems involved.

Yāmuna, the great teacher of Rāmānuja, who is said to have been born in A.D. 906, summarized the subject-matter of the *Gītā* in a few verses called *Gītārtha-saṁgraha*, on which Nigamānta Mahādeśika wrote a commentary known as *Gītārtha-saṁgraha-rakṣā*. This also was commented on by Varavara Muni, of the fourteenth century, in a commentary called *Gītārtha-saṁgraha-dīpikā*, published by the Sudarśana Press, Conjeeveram. Another commentary, called *Bhagavad-gītārtha-saṁgraha-ṭīkā*, by Pratyakṣadevayathācārya, is mentioned by Aufrecht. Yāmuna says that the object of the *Gītā* is to establish the fact that Nārāyaṇa is the highest Brahman, attained only by devotion (*bhakti*), which is achieved through caste duties (*sva-dharma*), right knowledge and disinclination to worldly pleasures (*vairāgya*). It is said that the first six chapters of the *Gītā* describe the process of attaining self-knowledge by self-concentration (*yoga*) through knowledge and action along with self-subordination to God, the performance of all actions for God and detachment from all other things. Nigamānta Mahādeśika notes that *karma* may lead to self-realization either indirectly, through the production of knowledge, or directly by itself.

¹ *Gītā*, III. 22.

From the seventh to the twelfth chapters the processes of the attainment of devotion (*bhakti-yoga*) by knowledge and by actions are described, and it is held that the true nature of God can be realized only by such devotion. From the thirteenth to the eighteenth chapters, the nature of *pradhāna*, of *puruṣa*, of the manifested world and of the supreme lord are described and distinguished along with the nature of action, of knowledge and of devotion. Yāmunā then goes on to describe the contents of the chapters of the *Gītā* one by one. Thus he says that in the second chapter the nature of the saint of imperturbable wisdom (*sthita-dhī*) is described. Such right knowledge can be achieved only by a knowledge of the self as immortal and the habit of performing one's duties in an unattached manner. In the third chapter it is said that a man should perform his duties for the preservation of the social order (*loka-rakṣā*) without attachment, leaving the fruits of all his actions to God, and considering at the same time that the *guṇas* are the real agents of actions and that it is wrong to pride oneself upon their performance. The fourth chapter describes the nature of God, how one should learn to look upon actions as implying no action (on account of unattachment), the different kinds of duties and the glory of knowledge. The fifth describes the advantages and the diverse modes of the path of duties and also the nature of the state of realization of Brahman. The sixth describes the nature of *yoga* practice, four kinds of *yogins*, the methods of *yoga*, the nature of *yoga* realization and the ultimate superiority of *yoga* as communion with God. The seventh describes the reality of God, how His nature is often veiled from us by *prakṛti* or the *guṇas*, how one should seek protection from God, the nature of the different kinds of devotees, and the superiority of the truly enlightened person. The eighth describes the lordly power of God and the reality of His nature as the unchanged and the unchangeable; it also describes the duties of those who seek protection in God and the nature of the true wisdom. The ninth describes the glory of God and His superiority even when He incarnates Himself as man, and the nature of devotional communion. The tenth describes the infinite number of God's noble qualities and the dependence of all things on Him, for initiating and increasing devotion. The eleventh describes how the true nature of God can be perceived, and demonstrates that it is only through devotion that God can be known or attained. The twelfth

describes the superiority of devotion, methods of attaining devotion, and different kinds of devotion; it is also held that God is highly pleased by the devotion of His devotees. The thirteenth describes the nature of the body, the purification of the self for self-realization, the cause of bondage and right discrimination. The fourteenth describes how the nature of an action is determined by the ties of *guṇa*, how the *guṇas* may be made to cease from influencing us, and how God alone is the root of all the ways of the self's future destiny. The fifteenth describes how the supreme lord is different from the pure selves, as well as from selves in association with non-selves, on account of his all-pervasiveness and his nature as upholder and lord. The sixteenth describes the division of beings into godly and demoniac and also the privileged position of the scriptures as the authority for laying the solid foundation of knowledge of the true nature of our duties. The seventeenth distinguishes unscriptural things from scriptural. The eighteenth describes how God alone should be regarded as the ultimate agent of all actions, and states the necessity of purity and the nature of the effects of one's deeds. According to Yāmuna *karma-yoga*, or the path of duties, consists of religious austerities, pilgrimage, gifts and sacrifices; *jñāna-yoga*, or the path of knowledge, consists of self-control and purity of mind; *bhakti-yoga*, or the path of devotion, consists in the meditation of God, inspired by an excess of joy in the communion with the divine. All these three paths mutually lead to one another. All three are essentially of the nature of the worship of God, and, whether regarded as obligatory or occasional, are helpful for discovering the true nature of one's self. When by self-realization ignorance is wholly removed, and when a man attains superior devotion to God, he is received into God.

Rāmānuja, the celebrated Vaiṣṇava teacher and interpreter of the *Brahma-sūtra*, who is said to have been born in A.D. 1017, wrote a commentary on the *Gītā* on *viśiṣṭādvaita* lines, viz. monism qualified as theism. Veṅkaṭanātha, called also Vedāntācārya, wrote a sub-commentary thereon, called *Tātparyā-candrikā*. Rāmānuja generally followed the lines of interpretation suggested in the brief summary by his teacher Yāmuna. On the question of the imperativeness of caste duties Rāmānuja says that the *Gītā* holds that the duties allotted to each caste must be performed, since the scriptures are the commands of God and no one can transgress His orders; so the duties prescribed by the scriptures as obligatory

are compulsory for all. The duties have, therefore, to be performed without desire for their fruits and purely because they are the injunctions of the scriptures (*eka-śāstrārthatayā anuṣṭheyam*). It is only when duties performed simply to please God, and as adoration of Him, have destroyed all impurities of the mind, and when the senses have become controlled, that a man becomes fit for the path of wisdom. A man can never at any stage of his progress forsake the duty of worshipping God, and it is only through such adoration of God that the sins accumulating in him from beginningless time are gradually washed away and he can become pure and fit for the path of knowledge¹. In interpreting III. 8 Rāmānuja says that the path of duties (*karma-yoga*) is superior to the path of knowledge (*jñāna-yoga*). The path of duties naturally leads to self-knowledge; so self-knowledge is also included within its scope. The path of knowledge alone cannot lead us anywhere; for without work even the body cannot be made to live. Even those who adhere to the path of knowledge must perform the obligatory and occasional (*nitya-naimittika*) duties, and it is through the development of this course that one can attain self-realization by duty alone. The path of duties is to be followed until self-realization (*ātmāvalokana*) and, through it, emancipation are obtained. But the chief duty of a man is to be attached to God with supreme devotion.

Madhvācārya, or Ānandatīrtha, who lived in the first three-quarters of the thirteenth century, wrote a commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, called *Gītā-bhāṣya*, commented on by Jayatīrtha in his *Prameya-dīpikā*, and also a separate monograph interpreting the main purport of the *Gītā*, called *Bhagavad-gītā-tātparya-nirṇaya*, commented on by Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya-dīpikā*. His main emphasis was on the fact that God is different from everything else, and that the only way of attaining our highest goal is through devotion (*bhakti*) as love and attachment (*sneha*). In the course of his interpretation he also introduced long discussions in refutation of the monistic theory of Śaṅkara. Since everything is dominated by the will of Hari the Lord, no one ought to feel any attachment to mundane things. Duties are to be performed by all. Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa Vidyādhirāja, the sixth disciple from

¹ *Anabhisamṛhita-phalena kevala-parama-puruṣārādhana-rūpenānuṣṭhītena karmaṇā vidhvasta-mano-malo 'vyākulendriyo jñāna-niṣṭhāyām adhikaroti*. Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Gītā*, III. 3. See also *ibid.* III. 4. Gujarati Press, Bombay, 1908.

Madhva, who lived in the first quarter of the fourteenth century, wrote a commentary on the *Gītā*, called *Gītā-ṭikā*. Rāghavendra Svāmin, who lived in the seventeenth century and was a pupil of Sudhīndra Yati, wrote three works on the *Gītā*, called *Gītā-vivṛti*, *Gītārtha-saṃgraha* and *Gītārtha-vivaraṇa*. Commentaries were also written by Vallabhācārya, Vijñānabhikṣu, Keśava Bhaṭṭa of the Nimbārka school (called *Gītā-tattva-prakāśikā*), Āñjaneya (called *Hamamad-bhāṣya*), Kalyāṇa Bhaṭṭa (called *Rasika-rañjini*), Jagaddhara (called *Bhagavad-gītā-pradīpa*), Jayarāma (called *Gītā-sārārtha-saṃgraha*), Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (called *Gītā-bhūṣaṇa-bhāṣya*), Madhusūdana (called *Gūdhārtha-dīpikā*), Brahmānanda Giri, Mathurānātha (called *Bhagavad-gītā-prakāśa*), Dattātreyā (called *Prabodha-candrikā*), Rāmakṛṣṇa, Mukundadāsa, Rāmanārāyaṇa, Viśveśvara, Śaṅkarānanda, Śivadayālu Śrīdharasvāmin (called *Subodhini*), Sadānanda Vyāsa (called *Bhāva-prakāśa*), Sūryapandita (*Paramārtha-prapā*), Nīlakaṇṭha (called *Bhāva-dīpikā*), and also from the Śaiva point of view by Rājānaka and Rāmakaṇṭha (called *Sarvato-bhadra*). Many other works were also written on the general purport of the *Gītā*, such as *Bhagavad-gītārtha-saṃgraha* by Abhinavagupta and Nṛsiṃha Ṭhakkura, *Bhagavad-gītārtha-sāra* by Gokulacandra, *Bhagavad-gītā-lakṣābharaṇa* by Vādirāja, *Bhagavad-gītā-sāra* by Kaivalyānanda Sarasvatī, *Bhagavad-gītā-sāra-saṃgraha* by Narahari and *Bhagavad-gītā-hetu-nirṇaya* by Viṭṭhala Dīkṣita. Most of these commentaries are written either from the point of view of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*, repeating the same ideas in other language, or from the Vaiṣṇava point of view, approving of the hold of normal duties of men in all stages of life and sometimes differing only in the conception of God and His relation with men. These can claim but little originality either of argument or of opinions, and so may well be left out of detailed consideration for our present purposes.

Gītā and Yoga.

Whoever may have written the *Gītā*, it seems very probable that he was not acquainted with the technical sense of *yoga* as the cessation of mental states (*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*), as used by Patañjali in his *Yoga-sūtra*, I. 1. I have elsewhere shown that there are three roots, *yujir yogē* and *yuj samādhau*, i.e. the root *yujir*, to join, and the root *yuj* in the sense of cessation of mental states or one-

pointedness, and *yuj samyamane*, i.e. *yuj* in the sense of controlling. In the *Gītā* the word *yoga* appears to have been used in many senses, which may seem to be unconnected with one another; yet it may not be quite impossible to discover relations among them. The primary sense of the word *yoga* in the *Gītā* is derived from the root *yujir yoge* or *yuj*, to join, with which is connected in a negative way the root *yuj* in the sense of controlling or restricting anything to that to which it is joined. Joining, as it means contact with something, also implies disjunction from some other thing. When a particular type of mental outlook or scheme of action is recommended, we find the word *buddhi-yoga* used, which simply means that one has intimately to associate oneself with a particular type of wisdom or mental outlook. Similarly, when the word *karma-yoga* is used, it simply means that one has to associate oneself with the obligatoriness of the performance of duties. Again, the word *yoga* is used in the sense of fixing one's mind either on the self (*ātman*) or on God. It is clear that in all these varying senses the dominant sense is that of "joining." But such a joining implies also a disjunction, and the fundamental and indispensable disjunction implied is dissociation from all desires for pleasures and fruits of action (*phala-tyāga*). For this reason cases are not rare where *yoga* is used to mean cessation of desires for the fruits of action. Thus, in the *Gītā*, VI. 2, it is said, "What is called cessation (of desires for the fruits of action) is what you should know, O Pāṇḍava, as Yoga: without renouncing one's desires (*na hy asaṁnyasta-saṅkalpa*) one cannot be a yogin¹." The reason why this negative concept of cessation of desires should be regarded as *yoga* is that without such a renunciation of desires no higher kind of union is possible. But even such a dissociation from the fruits of desires (which in a way also means *samyamana*, or self-control) is to be supplemented by the performance of duties at the preliminary stages; and it is only in the higher stages, when one is fixed in *yoga* (*yogārūḍha*), that meditative peace (*śama*) can be recommended. Unless and until one succeeds in conquering all attachments to sense-objects and actions and in giving up all desires for fruits of actions, one cannot be fixed in *yoga*. It is by our attempts at the performance of our duties, trying all the time

¹ *Asaṁnyasto 'parityaktaḥ phala-viśayaḥ saṅkalpo 'bhisandhir yena so 'saṁnyasta-saṅkalpaḥ*. Śaṅkara's commentary, VI. 2. *Na saṁnyastaḥ phala-saṅkalpo yena*. Śrīdhara's commentary on the above. Yogāśrama edition, Benares, 1919.

to keep the mind clear from motives of pleasure and enjoyment, that we gradually succeed in elevating it to a plane at which it would be natural to it to desist from all motives of self-interest, pleasure and enjoyment. It is at this stage that a man can be called fixed in *yoga* or *yogārūḍha*. This naturally involves a conflict between the higher self and the lower, or rather between the real self and the false; for, while the lower self always inclines to pathological and prudential motives, to motives of self-interest and pleasure, it has yet within it the higher ideal, which is to raise it up. Man is both a friend and a foe to himself; if he follows the path of his natural inclinations and the temptations of sense-enjoyment, he takes the downward path of evil, and is an enemy to his own higher interests; whereas it is his clear duty to raise himself up, to strive that he may not sink down but may elevate himself to a plane of detachment from all sense-pleasures. The duality involved in this conception of a friend and a foe, of conqueror and conquered, of an uplifting power and a gravitating spirit, naturally involves a distinction between a higher self (*paramātman*) and a lower self (*ātman*). It is only when this higher self conquers the lower that a self is a friend to itself. In a man who has failed to conquer his own passions and self-attachments the self is its own enemy. The implication, however, is that the lower self, though it gravitates towards evil, has yet inherent in it the power of self-elevation. This power of self-elevation is not something extraneous, but abides in the self, and the *Gītā* is emphatic in its command, "Thou shouldst raise thyself and not allow thyself to sink down; for the self is its own friend and its foe as well¹."

It is only when the self thus conquers its lower tendencies and rises to a higher plane that it comes into touch with the higher self (*paramātman*). The higher self always remains as an ideal of elevation. The *yoga* activity of the self thus consists, on the one hand, in the efforts by which the *yogin* dissociates himself from the sense-attachments towards which he was naturally gravitating, and on the other hand, in the efforts by which he tries to elevate himself and to come into touch with the higher self. At the first stage a man performs his duties in accordance with the injunctions of the *śāstras*; then he performs his duties and tries to dissociate himself from all motives of self-interest and

enjoyment, and at the next stage he succeeds in conquering these lower motives and is in touch with the higher self. Even at this stage he may still continue to perform his duties, merely for the sake of duty, or he may devote himself to meditative concentration and union with the higher self or with God. Thus the *Gītā* says that the person who has conquered himself and is at peace with himself is in touch with *paramātman*. Such a person is a true philosopher; for he not only knows the truths, but is happy in the inner realization and direct intuitive apperception of such truths; he is unshakable in himself; having conquered his senses, he attaches the same value to gold and to stones; he is the same to friends and to enemies, to the virtuous as to the sinful; he is in union (with *paramātman*) and is called a *yogin*¹. The fact that the word *yogin* is derived here from the root *yuj*, to join, is evident from a number of passages where the verb *yuj* is used in this connection².

The *Gītā* advises a *yogin* who thus wants to unite himself with *paramātman*, or God, in a meditative union, to lead a lonely life, controlling his mind and body, desiring nothing and accepting nothing³. The *yogin* should seat himself on level ground, in a clean place, and, being firm on his threefold seat composed of *kuśa* grass, a leopard skin and soft linen, he should control his thoughts, senses and movements, make his mind one-pointed in God (*tatra*), gather himself up in union, and thus purify himself⁴. The *yogin* should eat neither too much nor too little, should neither sleep too much, nor dispense with sleep. He should thus

¹ *Yukta ity ucyate yogi sama-loṣṭāśma-kāñcanaḥ*, vi. 8. Śaṅkara, however, splits it up into two independent sentences, as follows: *ya idr̥ṣo yuktaḥ samāhita itī sa ucyate kathyate; sa yogi sama-loṣṭāśma-kāñcanaḥ*. Śrīdhara, again, takes a quite different view and thinks it to be a definition of the *yogārūḍha* state and believes *yukta* to mean *yogārūḍha*, which in my opinion is unjustifiable. My interpretation is simpler and more direct than either of these and can be justified by a reference to the context in vi. 7 and vi. 10.

² *Yogī yuñjita satatam ātmānaṃ rahasi sthitaḥ*. *Ibid.* vi. 10.

Upaviśyāsane yuñjyāt yogam ātma-viśuddhaye. vi. 12.

Yukta āsita mat-parah. vi. 14.

Yuñjann evaṃ sadātmānaṃ yogī niyata-mānasaḥ. vi. 15, etc.

³ *Ekāki yata-cittātmā nirāśīr aparigrahaḥ*. vi. 10. The word *ātmā* in *yata-cittātmā* is used in the sense of body (*deha*), according to Śaṅkara, Śrīdhara and others.

⁴ Both Śaṅkara and Śrīdhara make *tatra* an adjective to *āsane*. Such an adjective to *āsane* would not only be superfluous, but would also leave *ekūgram* without an object. The verb *yuñjyāt*, literally meaning "should link up," is interpreted by Śrīdhara as "should practise," apparently without any justification (vi. 12).

lead the middle course of life and avoid extremes. This avoidance of extremes is very unlike the process of *yoga* advised by Patañjali. Patañjali's course of *yoga* formulates a method by which the *yogin* can gradually habituate himself to a condition of life in which he can ultimately dispense with food and drink altogether and desist from all movements of body and mind. The object of a *yogin* in making his mind one-pointed is ultimately to destroy the mind. According to Patañjali the advancement of a *yogin* has but one object before it, viz. the cessation of all movements of mind (*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*). Since this absolute cessation cannot be effected without stopping all movements of the body, desires and passions are to be uprooted, not only because they would make the mind fly to different objects, but also because they would necessitate movements of the body, which would again disturb the mind. The *yogin* therefore has to practise a twofold control of movements of body and mind. He has to habituate himself to dispensing with the necessity of food and drink, to make himself used to all kinds of privations and climatic inconveniences of heat and cold and ultimately to prepare himself for the stoppage of all kinds of bodily movements. But, since this cannot be successfully done so long as one inhales and exhales, he has to practise *prāṇāyāma* for absolute breath-control, and not for hours or days, but for months and years. Moral elevation is regarded as indispensable in *yoga* only because without absolute and perfect cessation of all desires and passions the movements of the body and mind could not be absolutely stopped. The *yogin*, however, has not only to cut off all new causes of disturbance leading to movements of body and mind, but also to practise one-pointedness of mind on subtler and subtler objects, so that as a result thereof the sub-conscious forces of the mind can also be destroyed. Thus, on the one hand, the mind should be made to starve by taking care that no new sense-data and no new percepts, concepts, thoughts, ideas or emotions be presented to it, and, on the other hand, steps are to be taken to make the mind one-pointed, by which all that it had apprehended before, which formed the great storehouse of the sub-conscious, is destroyed. The mind, thus pumped out on both sides, becomes absolutely empty and is destroyed. The ideal of Patañjali's Yoga is absolute extremism, consisting in absolute stoppage of all functions of body and mind.

The *Gītā*, on the other hand, prescribes the golden middle course

of moderate food, drink, sleep, movements of the body and activity in general. The object of the *yogin* in the *Gītā* is not the absolute destruction of mind, but to bring the mind or the ordinary self into communion with the higher self or God. To the *yogin* who practises meditation the *Gītā* advises steadiness of posture; thus it says that the *yogin* should hold his body, head and shoulders straight, and, being unmoved and fixed in his posture, should avoid looking to either side and fix his eyes on the tip of his nose. The *Gītā* is, of course, aware of the process of breath-control and *prāṇāyāma*; but, curiously enough, it does not speak of it in its sixth chapter on *dhyāna-yoga*, where almost the whole chapter is devoted to *yoga* practice and the conduct of *yogins*. In the fifth chapter, v. 27, it is said that all sense-movements and control of life-movements (*prāṇa-karmāṇi*) are like oblations to the fire of self-control. In the two obscure verses of the same chapter, v. 29 and 30, it is said that there are some who offer an oblation of *prāṇa* to *apāna* and of *apāna* to *prāṇa* and thus, stopping the movement of inhalation and exhalation (*prāṇāpāna-gatī ruddhvā*), perform the *prāṇāyāma*, while there are others who, taking a low diet, offer an oblation of *prāṇa* to *prāṇa*. Such actions on the part of these people are described as being different kinds of sacrifices, or *yajña*, and the people who perform them are called *yajña-vidah* (those who know the science of sacrifice), and not *yogin*. It is difficult to understand the exact meaning of offering an oblation of *prāṇa* to *prāṇa* or of *prāṇa* to *apāna* and of calling this sacrifice. The interpretations of Śaṅkara, Śrīdhara and others give us but little help in this matter. They do not tell us why it should be called a *yajña* or how an oblation of *prāṇa* to *prāṇa* can be made, and they do not even try to give a synonym for *juhvati* (offer oblation) used in this connection. It seems to me, however, that there is probably a reference to the mystical substitution-meditations (*pratīkopāsanā*) which were used as substitutes for sacrifices and are referred to in the Upaniṣads. Thus in the *Maitri Upaniṣad*, vi. 9, we find that Brahman is to be meditated upon as the ego, and in this connection, oblations of the five *vāyus* to fire with such *mantras* as *prāṇāya svāhā*, *apānāya svāhā*, etc. are recommended. It is easy to imagine that, in a later process of development, for the actual offering of oblations to fire was substituted a certain process of breath-control, which still retained the old phraseology of the offering of oblations in a sacrifice. If this interpretation is

accepted, it will indicate how processes of breath-control became in many cases associated with substitution-meditations of the Vedic type¹. The development of processes of breath-control in connection with substitution-meditations does not seem to be unnatural at all, and, as a matter of fact, the practice of *prāṇāyāma* in connection with such substitution-meditations is definitely indicated in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, vi. 18. The movement of inhalation and exhalation was known to be the cause of all body-heat, including the heat of digestive processes, and Kṛṣṇa is supposed to say in the *Gītā*, xv. 14, "As fire I remain in the body of living beings and in association with *prāṇa* and *apāna* I digest four kinds of food and drink." The author of the *Gītā*, however, seems to have been well aware that the *prāṇa* and *apāna* breaths passing through the nose could be properly balanced (*samau*), or that the *prāṇa vāyu* could be concentrated between the two eyebrows or in the head (*mūrdhni*)². It is difficult to say what is exactly meant by taking the *prāṇa* in the head or between the eyebrows. There seems to have been a belief in the *Atharva-śiras Upaniṣad* and also in the *Atharva-śikhā Upaniṣad* that the *prāṇa* could be driven upwards, or that such *prāṇa*, being in the head, could protect it³. Manu also speaks of the *prāṇas* of young men rushing upwards when old men approached them. But, whatever may be meant, it is certain that neither the balancing of *prāṇa* and *apāna* nor the concentrating of *prāṇa* in the head or between the eyebrows is a phrase of Patañjali, the Yoga writer.

In describing the course of a *yogin* in the sixth chapter the *Gītā* advises that the *yogin* should lead the austere life of a Brahmacārin, withdraw his mind from all mundane interests and think only of God, dedicate all his actions to Him and try to live in communion with Him (*yukta āsita*). This gives to his soul peace, through which he loses his individuality in God and abides in Him

¹ See *Hindu Mysticism*, by S. N. Dasgupta, Chicago, 1927, pp. 18-20.

² *prāṇāpānau samau kṛtvā nāsābhyantara-cāriṇau*, v. 27. The phrase *samau kṛtvā* is left unexplained here by Śaṅkara. Śrīdhara explains it as "having suspended the movement of *prāṇa* and *apāna*"—*prāṇāpānāv ūrdhwādhō-gatī-nirodhena samau kṛtvā kumbhakam kṛtvā*. It is difficult, however, to say what is exactly meant by concentrating the *prāṇa vāyu* between the two eyebrows, *bhrūvor madhye prāṇam āveśya samyak* (viii. 10). Neither Śaṅkara nor Śrīdhara gives us any assistance here. In *mūrdhny ādhāyātmanah prāṇam āsthito yoga-dhāraṇām* (viii. 12) *mūrdhni* is paraphrased by Śrīdhara as *bhrūvor madhye*, or "between the eyebrows."

³ *Atharva-śiras*, 4 and 6 and *Atharva-śikhā*, 1.

in the bliss of self-effacement¹. A *yogin* can be said to be in union (with God) when he concentrates his mind on his own higher self and is absolutely unattached to all desires. By his efforts towards such a union (*yoga-sevayā*) he restrains his mind from all other objects and, perceiving his self in himself, remains in peace and contentment. At this higher state the *yogin* enjoys absolute bliss (*sukham ātyantikam*), transcending all sense-pleasures by his pure reason, and, being thus fixed in God, he is never shaken away from Him. Such a *yogin* forsakes all his desires and controls all his senses by his mind, and, whenever the mind itself seeks to fly away to different objects, he tries to control it and fix it on his own self. Patiently holding his mind fixed in his self, he tries to desist from all kinds of thought and gradually habituates himself to shaking off attachments to sense-attractions. At this stage of union the *yogin* feels that he has attained his highest, and thus even the greatest mundane sorrows cannot affect him in the least. *Yoga* is thus sometimes defined as the negation of the possibility of all association with sorrows². One can attain such a state only by persistent and self-confident efforts and without being depressed by preliminary failures. When a *yogin* attains this union with himself or with God, he is like the motionless flame of a lamp in a still place, undisturbed by all attractions and unruffled by all passions³. The *yogin* who attains this highest state of union with himself or with God is said to be in touch with Brahman or to attain Brahmahood, and it is emphatically asserted that he is filled with ecstatic joy. Being in

¹ *śāntim nirvāṇa-paramāṃ mat-saṁsthām adhigacchati*, vi. 15. The *Gītā* uses the words *śānti* and *nirvāṇa* to indicate the bliss of the person who abides in God. Both these words, and particularly the word *nirvāṇa*, have a definite significance in Buddhism. But the *Gītā* seems to be quite unacquainted with the Buddhistic sense of the word. I have therefore ventured to translate the word *nirvāṇa* as "bliss of self-effacement." The word is primarily used in the sense of "extinguishing a light," and this directly leads to the Buddhistic sense of the absolute destruction of the *skandhas*. But the word *nirvāṇa* is also used from very early times in the sense of "relief from sufferings" and "satisfaction." Thus the *Mahā-bhārata*, with which the *Gītā* is traditionally associated, uses it in this sense in III. 10438:

*sa pītvā śitalaṃ toyam pipāsārto mahi-patiḥ;
nirvāṇam agamad dhāman susukhī cābhavat tadā.*

Again, in the *Mahā-bhārata*, XII. 7150 and 13014, *nirvāṇa* is described as being highest bliss (*paramaṃ sukham*), and it is also associated with *śānti*, or peace, as it is in the above passage—*śāntim nirvāṇa-paramāṃ*. In *Mahā-bhārata*, vi. 1079, and in another place it is called a "state of the highest Brahman" (*paramaṃ brahma—ibid.* XII. 13239).

² *taṃ vidyād duḥkha-saṃyoga-viyogaṃ yoga-saṃjñitam*, vi. 23.

³ *Yathā dīpo nivāta-stho neigate sopamā smṛtā*, vi. 19.

union with God, he perceives himself in all things, and all things in himself; for, being in union with God, he in one way identifies himself with God, and perceives God in all things and all things in God. Yet it is no mere abstract pantheism that is indicated here; for such a view is directly in opposition to the main tenets of the *Gītā*, so often repeated in diverse contexts. It is a mystical state, in which, on the one hand, the *yogin* finds himself identified with God and in communion with Him, and, on the other hand, does not cease to have relations with the beings of the world, to whom he gives the same consideration as to himself. He does not prefer his own happiness to the happiness of others, nor does he consider his own misery and suffering as greater or more important or more worthy of prevention than those of others. Being in communion with God, he still regards Him as the master whom he adores, as the supreme Lord who pervades all things and holds them in Himself. By his communion with God the *yogin* transcends his lower and smaller self and discovers his greater self in God, not only as the supreme ideal of his highest efforts, but also as the highest of all realities. As soon as the *yogin* can detach himself from his lower self of passions and desires, he uplifts himself to a higher universe, where the distinction of *meum* and *teum*, mine and thine, ceases and the interest of the individual loses its personal limitations and becomes enlarged and universalized and identified with the interests of all living beings. Looked at from this point of view, *yoga* is sometimes defined in the *Gītā* as the outlook of equality (*śamatva*)¹.

In the *Gītā* the word *yoga* has not attained any definite technical sense, as it did in Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra*, and, in consequence, there is not one definition of *yoga*, but many. Thus *yoga* is used in the sense of *karma-yoga*, or the duty of performance of actions, in v. 1, and it is distinguished from the *sāṃkhya* path, or the path of knowledge, in II. 39. The word *karma-yoga* is mentioned in III. 3 as the path of the *yogins*, and it is referred to in III. 7, v. 2 and XIII. 24. The word *buddhi-yoga* is also used at least three times, in II. 49, x. 10 and XVIII. 57, and the *bhakti-yoga* also is used at least once, in XIV. 26. The one meaning of *yoga* that suits all these different contexts seems to be "association." It has already been said that this primary meaning of the word is the central idea of *yoga* in the *Gītā*. One of the main teachings of

¹ *śamatvaṃ yoga ucyate*, II. 48.

the *Gītā* is that duties should be performed, and it is this obligatoriness of the performance of duties that in the *Gītā* is understood by *karma-yoga*. But, if such duties are performed from motives of self-interest or gain or pleasure, the performance could not lead to any higher end. It is advised, therefore, that they should be performed without any motive of gain or pleasure. So the proper way in which a man should perform his duties, and at the same time keep himself clean and untarnished by the good and bad results, the pleasures and sorrows, the praise and blame proceeding out of his own deeds, is to make himself detached from all desires for the fruits of actions. To keep oneself detached from the desires for the fruits of actions is therefore the real art (*kauśala*) of performing one's duties; for it is only in this way that a man can make himself fit for the higher union with God or his own higher self. Here, then, we have a definition of *yoga* as the art of performing one's duties (*yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam*—II. 50). The art of performing one's duties, e.g. the art of keeping oneself unattached, cannot however be called *yoga* on its own account; it is probably so-called only because it is the indispensable step towards the attainment of the real *yoga*, or union with God. It is clear, therefore, that the word *yoga* has a gradual evolution to a higher and higher meaning, based no doubt on the primary root-meaning of "association."

It is important to note in this connection that the process of *prāṇāyāma*, regarded as indispensable in Patañjali's *Yoga*, is not considered so necessary either for *karma-yoga*, *buddhi-yoga*, or for the higher kind of *yoga*, e.g. communion with God. It has already been mentioned that the reference to *prāṇāyāma* is found only in connection with some kinds of substitution-meditations which have nothing to do with the main concept of *yoga* in the *Gītā*. The expression *samādhi* is used thrice in the noun form in the *Gītā*, in II. 44, 53 and 54, and three times in the verb form, in VI. 7, XII. 9 and XVII. 11; but the verb forms are not used in the technical sense of Patañjali, but in the simple root-meaning of *sam* + *ā* + $\sqrt{\text{dhā}}$, "to give" or "to place" (*arpaṇa* or *sthāpana*). In two cases (II. 44 and 53) where the word *samādhi* is used as a noun it has been interpreted by both Śaṅkara and Śrīdhara as meaning the object in which the mind is placed or to which it is directed for communion, viz. God¹. The author of the *Gītā* is well aware of

¹ In II. 44, however, Śaṅkara considers this object of mind to be *antaḥkaraṇa*

the moral conflict in man and thinks that it is only by our efforts to come into touch with our higher self that the littleness of passions and desires for fruits of actions and the preference of our smaller self-interests can be transcended. For, once man is in touch with his highest, he is in touch with God. He has then a broader and higher vision of man and his place in nature, and so he identifies himself with God and finds that he has no special interest of his own to serve. The low and the high, the sinful and the virtuous, are the same in his eyes; he perceives God in all things and all things in God, and it is this state of communion that is the real *yoga* of the *Gītā*; and it is because in this state all inequalities of race, creed, position, virtue and vice, high and low vanish, that this superior realization of universal equality is also called *yoga*. Not only is this union with God called *yoga*, but God Himself is called *Yogeśvara*, or the Lord of communion. As a result of this union, the *yogin* enjoys supreme bliss and ecstatic joy, and is free from the least touch of sorrow or pain; and this absolute freedom from pain or the state of bliss, being itself a result of *yoga*, is also called *yoga*. From the above survey it is clear that the *yoga* of the *Gītā* is quite different from the *yoga* of Patañjali, and it does not seem at all probable that the *Gītā* was aware of Patañjali's *yoga* or the technical terms used by him¹.

The treatment of *yoga* in the *Gītā* is also entirely different from its treatment in almost all the Upaniṣads. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* speaks of sense-control as being *yoga*; but sense-control in the *Gītā* is only a preliminary to *yoga* and not itself *yoga*. Most of the *yoga* processes described in the other Upaniṣads either speak of *yoga* with six accessories (*ṣaḍ-aṅga yoga*) or of *yoga* with eight accessories (*aṣṭāṅga-yoga*), more or less after the manner of Patañjali. They introduce elaborate details not only of breath-control or *prāṇāyāma*, but also of the nervous system of the body, *iḍā*, *piṅgulā* and *suṣumṇā*, the nerve plexus, *mūlādhāra* and other similar objects, after the manner of the later works on the *Śaṭ-*

or *buddhi*. But Śrīdhara considers this object to be God, and in II. 53 Śāṅkara and Śrīdhara are unanimous that the object, or the support of the union or communion of the mind, is God.

¹ *paśya me yogam aiśvaram*, IX. 5, *etām vibhūtim yogam ca*, X. 7. In the above two passages the word *yoga* seems to have a different meaning, as it is used there in the sense of miraculous powers; but even there the commentators Śāṅkara and Śrīdhara take it to mean "association" (*yukti*) and interpret *aiśvaram yogam* as "association of miraculous powers."

cakra system. Thus the *Amṛta-nāda* enumerates after the manner of Patañjali the six accessories of *yoga* as restraint (*pratyāhāra*), concentration (*dhyāna*), breath-control (*prāṇāyāma*), fixation (*dhāraṇā*), reasoning (*tarka*) and meditative absorption (*samādhi*), and describes the final object of *yoga* as ultimate loneliness of the self (*kaivalya*). The *Amṛta-bindu* believes in an all-pervading Brahman as the only reality, and thinks that, since mind is the cause of all bondage and liberation, the best course for a *yogin* to adopt is to deprive the mind of all its objects and thus to stop the activity of the mind, and thereby to destroy it, and bring about Brahmanhood. Brahman is described here as being absolutely indeterminate, uninferable, infinite and beginningless. The *Kṣurika* merely describes *prāṇāyāma*, *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇā* and *samādhi* in association with the nerves, *suṣumnā*, *piṅgalā*, etc. and the nerve plexuses. The *Tejo-bindu* is a Vedāntic Upaniṣad of the ultra-monistic type, and what it calls *yoga* is only the way of realizing the nature of Brahman as one and as pure consciousness and the falsity of everything else. It speaks of this *yoga* as being of fifteen accessories (*pañca-daśāṅga yoga*). These are *yama* (sense-control through the knowledge that all is Brahman), *niyama* (repetition of the same kinds of thoughts and the avoidance of dissimilar ones), *tyāga* (giving up of the world-appearance through the realization of Brahman), silence, a solitary place, the proper posture, steadiness of mind, making the body straight and erect, perceiving the world as Brahman (*dṛk-sthiti*), cessation of all states and breath-control (*prāṇa-samyamana*), perceiving all objects of the mind as Brahman (*pratyāhāra*), fixing the mind always on Brahman (*dhāraṇā*), self-meditation and the realization of oneself as Brahman. This is, however, a scheme of *yoga* quite different from that of Patañjali, as well as from that of the *Gītā*. The *Trīśikha-brāhmaṇa* speaks of a *yoga* with eight accessories (*aṣṭāṅga-yoga*), where the eight accessories, though the same in name as the eight accessories of Patañjali, are in reality different therefrom. Thus *yama* here means want of attachment (*vairāgya*), *niyama* means attachment to the ultimate reality (*anuraktiḥ pare tattve*), *āsana* means indifference to all things, *prāṇa-samyamana* means the realization of the falsity of the world, *pratyāhāra* means the inwardness of the mind, *dhāraṇā* means the motionlessness of the mind, *dhyāna* means thinking of oneself as pure consciousness, and *samādhi* means forgetfulness of *dhyānas*. Yet it again includes

within its *yama* and *niyama* almost all the virtues referred to by Patañjali. It also speaks of a number of postures after the *haṭha-yoga* fashion, and of the movement of *prāṇa* in the nerve plexuses, the ways of purifying the nerves and the processes of breath-control. The object of *yoga* is here also the destruction of mind and the attainment of *kaivalya*. The *Darśana* gives an *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* with *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyaṇa* and *samādhi* more or less after the fashion of Patañjali, with a supplementary treatment of nerves (*nāḍi*) and the movement of the *prāṇa* and other *vāyus* in them. The final object of *yoga* here is the attainment of Brahmahood and the comprehension of the world as *māyā* and unreal. The *Dhyāna-bindu* describes the self as the essential link of all things, like the fragrance in flowers or the thread in a garland or the oil in sesamum. It describes a *ṣaḍ-aṅga yoga* with *āsana*, *prāṇa-saṃrodha*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyaṇa* and *samādhi*. It also describes the four *cakras* or nerve plexuses, and speaks of the awakening of the serpent power (*kuṇḍalinī*) and the practice of the *mudrās*. It speaks further of the balancing or unifying of *prāṇa* and *apāna* as leading to *yoga*¹. The object of this *yoga* is the attainment of the transcendent state of liberation or the realization of the *paramātman*. It is useless to refer to other Upaniṣads; for what has already been said will be enough to show clearly that the idea of *Yoga* in the *Gītā* is entirely different from that in the *Yoga Upaniṣads*, most of which are of comparatively late date and are presumably linked up with traditions different from that of the *Gītā*.

Sāṃkhya and Yoga in the *Gītā*.

In the *Gītā* Sāṃkhya and Yoga are sometimes distinguished from each other as two different paths, and sometimes they are identified. But though the *Gītā* is generally based on the doctrines of the *guṇas*, *prakṛti* and its derivatives, yet the word *sāṃkhya* is used here in the sense of the path of knowledge or of philosophic wisdom. Thus in the *Gītā*, II. 39, the path of knowledge is distinguished from that of performance of duties. Lord Kṛṣṇa says there that he has just described the wisdom of Sāṃkhya and he is going to describe the wisdom of Yoga. This

¹ *Tadā prāṇāpānāyor aikyaṃ kṛtvā*; see *Dhyāna-bindu*, 93-5 (Adyar Library edition, 1920). This seems to be similar to *prāṇāpānau samau kṛtvā* of the *Gītā*.

seems to give us a clue to what is meant by Sāṃkhya wisdom. This wisdom, however, seems to be nothing more than elaboration of the doctrine of the immortality of soul and the associated doctrine of rebirth, and also the doctrine that, howsoever the body might be affected and suffer changes of birth, growth and destruction, the self is absolutely unaffected by all these changes; the self cannot be cut or burned; it is eternal, all-pervasive, unchangeable, indescribable and unthinkable. In another passage of the *Gītā*, XIII. 25, it is said that there are others who perceive the self in accordance with *sāṃkhya-yoga*; and Śaṅkara explains this passage to mean that *sāṃkhya-yoga* means the realization of the self as being absolutely different from the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. If this is Sāṃkhya, the meaning of the word *yoga* in this passage (*anye sāṃkhyena yogena*) is not explained. Śaṅkara does not expound the meaning of the word *yoga*, but explains the word *sāṃkhya* and says that this *sāṃkhya* is *yoga*, which seems to be an evasion. Śrīdhara follows Śaṅkara's interpretation of *sāṃkhya*, but finds it difficult to swallow his identification of *sāṃkhya* with *yoga*, and he interprets *yoga* here as the *yoga* (of Patañjali) with eight accessories, but does not explain how this *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* can be identified with *sāṃkhya*. It is, no doubt, true that in the immediately preceding verse it is said that, howsoever a man may behave, if he knows the proper nature of *puruṣa* and of the *prakṛti* and the *guṇas*, he is never born again; but there is no reason to suppose that the phrase *sāṃkhyena yogena* refers to the wisdom recommended in the preceding verse; for this verse summarizes different paths of self-realization and says that there are some who perceive the self in the self through the self, by meditation, others by *sāṃkhya-yoga* and others by *karma-yoga*. In another passage it is said that the *Sāṃkhyas* follow the path of knowledge (*jñāna-yoga*), while the *Yogins* follow the path of duties (*Gītā*, III. 3). If the word *yoga* means "association," as it does in various contexts, then *sāṃkhya* and *sāṃkhya-yoga* would mean more or less the same thing; for *sāṃkhya-yoga* would only mean association with *sāṃkhya*, and the phrase *sāṃkhyena yogena* might mean either association with *sāṃkhya* or the union of *sāṃkhya*. It has already been said that, following the indications of the *Gītā*, II. 39, *sāṃkhya* should mean the realization of the true nature of the self as immortal, all-pervasive, unchangeable and infinite. It has also been pointed out that it is such a true realization of the

self, with its corresponding moral elevation, that leads to the true communion of the self with the higher self or God. Thus this meaning of *sāṃkhya* on the one hand distinguishes the path of *sāṃkhya* from the path of *yoga* as a path of performance of duties, and at the same time identifies the path of *sāṃkhya* with the path of *yoga* as communion with God. Thus we find that the *Gītā*, v. 4, 5, says that “fools only think Sāṃkhya and Yoga to be different, not so wise men,” since, accepting either of them, one attains the fruit of them both. The goal reached by the followers of Sāṃkhya is also reached by the *Yogins*; he who perceives *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga* to be the same perceives them in the right perspective. In these passages *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* seem from the context to refer respectively to *karma-sannyāsa* and *karma-yoga*. *Sāṃkhya* here can only in a secondary way mean the renunciation of the fruits of one’s actions (*karma-sannyāsa*). The person who realizes the true nature of his self, and knows that the self is unchangeable and infinite, cannot feel himself attached to the fruits of his actions and cannot be affected by ordinary mundane desires and cravings. As in the case of the different uses of the word *yoga*, so here also the word *sāṃkhya*, which primarily means “true knowledge,” is also used to mean “renunciation”; and since *karma-yoga* means the performance of one’s duties in a spirit of renunciation, *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* mean practically the same thing and are therefore identified here; and they are both regarded as leading to the same results. This would be so, even if *yoga* were used to denote “communion”; for the idea of performance of one’s duties has almost always communion with God as its indispensable correlate. Thus in the two passages immediately following the identification of *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* we find the *Gītā* (v. 6, 7) saying that without *karma-yoga* it is hard to renounce *karma*; and the person who takes the path of *karma-yoga* speedily attains Brahman. The person who thus through *karma-yoga* comes into union (with Brahman) is pure in spirit and self-controlled, and, having identified himself with the universal spirit in all beings, he is not affected by his deeds.

One thing that emerges from the above discussion is that there is no proof that the word *sāṃkhya* in the *Gītā* means the discernment of the difference of *prakṛti* and the *guṇas* from *puruṣa*, as Śaṅkara in one place suggests (*Gītā*, XIII. 25), or that it refers to the cosmology and ontology of *prakṛti*, the *guṇas* and their

evolutes of the traditional Kapila-Sāṃkhya. The philosophy of the *guṇas* and the doctrine of *puruṣa* were, no doubt, known to the *Gītā*; but nowhere is this philosophy called *sāṃkhya*. *Sāṃkhya* in the *Gītā* means true knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*) or self-knowledge (*ātma-bodha*). Śāṅkara, commenting on the *Gītā*, XVIII. 13, interprets *sāṃkhya* to mean *vedānta*, though in verse XIII. 25 he interprets the word as meaning the discernment of the difference between the *guṇas* and the *puruṣa*, which would decidedly identify the *sāṃkhya* of the *Gītā* with the Kapila-Sāṃkhya.

The *Mahā-bhārata* also refers to *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* in several places. But in almost all places *sāṃkhya* means either the traditional school of Kapila-Sāṃkhya or some other school of Sāṃkhya, more or less similar to it: *yoga* also most often refers either to the *yoga* of Patañjali or some earlier forms of it. In one place are found passages identifying *sāṃkhya* and *yoga*, which agree almost word for word with similar passages of the *Gītā*¹. But it does not seem that the *sāṃkhya* or the *yoga* referred to in the *Mahā-bhārata* has anything to do with the idea of *Sāṃkhya* or *yoga* in the *Gītā*. As has already been pointed out, the *yoga* in the *Gītā* means the dedication to God and renunciation of the fruits of one's *karma* and being in communion with Him as the supreme Lord pervading the universe. The chapter of the *Mahā-bhārata* just referred to speaks of turning back the senses into the *manas* and of turning the *manas* into *ahaṃkāra* and *ahaṃkāra* into *buddhi* and *buddhi* into *prakṛti*, thus finishing with *prakṛti* and its evolutes and meditating upon pure *puruṣa*. It is clear that this system of *yoga* is definitely associated with the Kapila school of Sāṃkhya. In the *Mahā-bhārata*, XII. 306, the predominant feature of *yoga* is said to be *dhyāna*, and the latter is said to consist of concentration of mind (*ekāgratā ca manasaḥ*) and breath-control (*prāṇāyāma*). It is said that the *yogin* should stop the functions of his senses by his mind, and the movement of his mind by his reason (*buddhi*), and in this stage he is said to be linked up (*yukta*) and is like a motionless flame in a still place². This passage naturally reminds one of the description of *dhyāna-yoga* in the *Gītā*, VI. 11-13, 16-19 and 25, 26; but the fundamental idea of *yoga*,

¹ *yad eva yogāḥ paśyanti tat sāṃkhyair api drśyate ekaṃ sāṃkhyāṇ ca yogāṇ ca yaḥ paśyati sa tattva-vit. Mahā-bhārata*, VII. 316. 4. Compare the *Gītā*, v. 5.

² Cf. the *Gītā*, VI. 19, *yathā dīpo nivāta-sitah*, etc.

as the dedication of the fruits of actions to God and communion with Him, is absent here.

It is needless to point out here that the *yoga* of the *Gītā* is in no way connected with the *yoga* of Buddhism. In Buddhism the sage first practises *śīla*, or sense-control and mind-control, and thus prepares himself for a course of stabilization or fixation of the mind (*samādhāna*, *upadhāraṇa*, *paṭiṭṭhā*). This *samādhi* means the concentration of the mind on right endeavours and of its states upon one particular object (*ekārammaṇa*), so that they may completely cease to shift and change (*sammā ca avikkhippamānā*). The sage has first to train his mind to view with disgust the appetitive desires for food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man habituates himself to emphasizing the disgusting associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows will come. Secondly, the sage has to habituate his mind to the idea that all his members are made up of the four elements, earth, water, fire and wind, like the carcass of a cow at the butcher's shop. Thirdly, he has to habituate his mind to thinking again and again (*anussati*) about the virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the Saṅgha, the gods and the law of the Buddha, about the good effects of *śīla* and the making of gifts (*cāgānussati*), about the nature of death (*marañānussati*) and about the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena (*upāsamānussati*). He has also to pass through various purificatory processes. He has to go to the cremation grounds and notice the diverse horrifying changes of human carcasses and think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are; from this he will turn his mind to living human bodies and convince himself that they, being in essence the same as dead carcasses, are as loathsome as the latter. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the body as well as of their processes, and this will help him to enter into the first *jhāna*, or meditation, by leading his mind away from his body. As an aid to concentration the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling (*passāsa*) and the exhaling (*assāsa*) of his breath, so that, instead of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner, he may be aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to mark this definitely by counting numbers, so that by

fixing his mind on the numbers counted he may realize the whole process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. Next to this we come to *brahma-vihāra*, the fourfold meditation of *mettā* (universal friendship), *karuṇā* (universal pity), *muditā* (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and *upekkhā* (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, one's friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate himself to meditation on universal friendship, a man should start with thinking how he would himself like to root out all misery and become happy, how he would himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to thinking that his friends, his enemies and all those with whom he is not connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself to such an extent in this meditation that he should not find any difference between the happiness or safety of himself and that of others. Coming to *jhānas*, we find that the objects of concentration may be earth, water, fire, wind, colours, etc. In the first stage of concentration on an object there is comprehension of the name and form of the object; at the next stage the relational movement ceases, and the mind penetrates into the object without any quivering. In the next two stages there is a buoyant exaltation and a steady inward bliss, and, as a result of the one-pointedness which is the culminating effect of the progressive meditation, there is the final release of the mind (*ceto-vimutti*)—the *Nibbāna*.

It is easy to see that, though Patañjali's *yoga* is under a deep debt of obligation to this Buddhist *yoga*, the *yoga* of the *Gītā* is unacquainted therewith. The pessimism which fills the Buddhist *yoga* is seen to affect not only the outlook of Patañjali's *yoga*, but also most of the later Hindu modes of thought, in the form of the advisability of reflecting on the repulsive sides of things (*pratipakṣa-bhāvanā*) which are seemingly attractive¹. The ideas of universal friendship, etc. were also taken over by Patañjali and later on passed into Hindu works. The methods of concentration on various ordinary objects also seem to be quite unlike what we find in the *Gītā*. The *Gītā* is devoid of any tinge of pessimism such as we find in the Buddhist *yoga*. It does not anywhere recommend the habit of brooding over the repulsive

¹ See *Nyāya-mañjarī*, *Vairāgya-śataka*, *Śānti-śataka*.

aspects of all things, so as to fill our minds with a feeling of disgust for all worldly things. It does not rise to the ideal of regarding all beings as friends or to that of universal compassion. Its sole aim is to teach the way of reaching the state of equanimity, in which the saint has no preferences, likes and dislikes—where the difference between the sinner and the virtuous, the self and the not-self has vanished. The idea of *yoga* as self-surrendering union with God and self-surrendering performance of one's duties is the special feature which is absent in Buddhism. This self-surrender in God, however, occurs in Patañjali's *yoga*, but it is hardly in keeping with the technical meaning of the word *yoga*, as the suspension of all mental states. The idea appears only once in Patañjali's *sūtras*, and the entire method of *yoga* practices, as described in the later chapters, seems to take no notice of it. It seems highly probable, therefore, that in Patañjali's *sūtras* the idea was borrowed from the *Gītā*, where this self-surrender to God and union with Him is defined as *yoga* and is the central idea which the *Gītā* is not tired of repeating again and again.

We have thus completely failed to trace the idea of the *Gītā* to any of the different sources where the subject of *yoga* is dealt with, such as the Yoga Upaniṣads, Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtras*, Buddhist Yoga, or the *Mahā-bhārata*. It is only in the *Pañca-rātra* works that the *Gītā* meaning of *yoga* as self-surrender to God is found. Thus *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā* describes *yoga* as the worship of the heart (*hṛdayārādhana*), the offering of an oblation (*haviḥ*) of oneself to God or self-surrender to God (*bhagavate ātma-samarpaṇam*), and *yoga* is defined as the linking up (*saṃyoga*) of the lower self (*jīvātman*) with the higher self (*paramātman*)¹. It seems, therefore, safe to suggest that the idea of *yoga* in the *Gītā* has the same traditional source as in the *Pañca-rātra* works.

Sāṃkhya Philosophy in the Gītā.

It has been said before that there is no proof that the word *sāṃkhya* in the *Gītā* means the traditional Sāṃkhya philosophy; yet the old philosophy of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* forms the basis of the philosophy of the *Gītā*. This philosophy may be summarized as follows:

¹ The *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā*, of course, introduces many observations about the nerves (*nāḍī*) and the *vāyus*, which probably became associated with the *Pañca-rātra* tradition in later times.

Prakṛti is called *mahad brahma* (the great Brahma or the great multiplier as procreatress) in the *Gītā*, xiv. 3¹. It is said there that this *prakṛti* is described as being like the female part, which God charges with His energy for the creation of the universe. Wherever any living beings may be born, the great Brahman or *prakṛti* is to be considered as the female part and God as the father and fertilizer. Three types of qualities are supposed to be produced from *prakṛti* (*guṇāḥ prakṛti-sambhavāḥ*)². These are *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which bind the immortal self in its corporeal body. Of these, *sattva*, on account of its purity, is illuminating and untroubling (*anāmayam*, which Śrīdhara explains as *nirupadravam* or *śāntam*), and consequently, on account of these two qualities, binds the self with the attachment for knowledge (*jñāna-saṅgena*) and the attachment for pleasure (*sukha-saṅgena*). It is said that there are no living beings on earth, or gods in the heavens, who are not pervaded by the three *guṇas* produced from the *prakṛti*³. Since the *guṇas* are produced from the *prakṛti* through the fertilization of God's energy in *prakṛti*, they may be said to be produced by God, though God always transcends them. The quality of *sattva*, as has been said above, associates the self with the attachments for pleasure and knowledge. The quality of *rajas* moves to action and arises from desire and attachment (*trṣṇā-saṅga-samudbhavam*), through which it binds the self with egoistic attachments for action. The quality of *tamas* overcomes the illumination of knowledge and leads to many errors. *Tamas*, being a product of ignorance, blinds all living beings and binds them down with carelessness, idleness and sleep. These three qualities predominate differently at different times. Thus, sometimes the quality of *sattva* predominates over *rajas* and *tamas*, and such a time is characterized by the rise of knowledge in the mind through all the different sense-gates; when *rajas* dominates *sattva* and *tamas*, the mind is characterized by greed, efforts and endeavours for different kinds of action and the rise of passions, emotions and desires; when *tamas* predominates over *sattva* and *rajas*, there is ignorance, lethargy, errors, delusions and false beliefs.

The different categories are *avyakta*, or the undifferentiated

¹ *mama yonir mahad brahma tasmin garbhaṁ dadhāmy aham*. xiv. 3. I have interpreted *mahad brahma* as *prakṛti*, following Śrīdhara and other commentators. Śaṅkara surreptitiously introduces the word *māyā* between *mama* and *yonir* and changes the whole meaning.

² *Gītā*, xiv. 5.

³ *Ibid.* xviii. 40.

prakṛti, *buddhi* (intellect), *ahaṃkāra* (egohood), *manas* (mind-organ) and the ten senses, cognitive and conative. *Manas* is higher and subtler than the senses, and *buddhi* is higher than the *manas*, and there is that (probably self) which transcends *buddhi*. *Manas* is regarded as the superintendent of the different senses; it dominates them and through them enjoys the sense-objects. The relation between the *buddhi* and *ahaṃkāra* is nowhere definitely stated. In addition to these, there is the category of the five elements (*mahābhūta*)¹. It is difficult to say whether these categories were regarded in the *Gītā* as being the products of *prakṛti* or as separately existing categories. It is curious that they are nowhere mentioned in the *Gītā* as being products of *prakṛti*, which they are in Sāṃkhya, but on the other hand, the five elements, *manas*, *ahaṃkāra* and *buddhi* are regarded as being the eightfold nature (*prakṛti*) of God². It is also said that God has two different kinds of nature, a lower and a higher; the eightfold nature just referred to represents the lower nature of God, whereas His higher nature consists of the collective universe of life and spirit³. The *guṇas* are noticed in relation to *prakṛti* in III. 5, 27, 29, XIII. 21, XIV. 5, XVIII. 40, and in all these places the *guṇas* are described as being produced from *prakṛti*, though the categories are never said to be produced from *prakṛti*. In the *Gītā*, IX. 10, however, it is said that *prakṛti* produces all that is moving and all that is static through the superintendence of God. The word *prakṛti* is used in at least two different senses, as a primary and ultimate category and as a nature of God's being. It is quite possible that the primary meaning of *prakṛti* in the *Gītā* is God's nature; the other meaning of *prakṛti*, as an ultimate principle from which the *guṇas* are produced, is simply the hypostatization of God's nature. The whole group consisting of pleasure, pain, aversion, volition, consciousness, the eleven senses, the mind-organ, the five elements, egohood, intellect (*buddhi*), the undifferentiated (*avyakta*, meaning *prakṛti* existing, probably, as the sub-conscious mind) power of holding the senses and the power of holding together the diverse mental functions (*saṃghāta*) with their modifications and changes, is called *kṣetra*. In another place the body alone is called *kṣetra*⁴. It seems, therefore, that the word *kṣetra* signifies in its broader sense not only the body, but also the entire mental plane, involving

¹ *Gītā*, III. 42, XIII. 6 and 7, xv. 9.

³ *Ibid.* VII. 5.

² *Ibid.* VII. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.* XIII. 2.

the diverse mental functions, powers, capabilities, and also the undifferentiated sub-conscious element. In this connection it may be pointed out that *kṣetra* is a term which is specially reserved to denote the complex of body and mind, exclusive of the living principle of the self, which is called *kṣetra-jñā*, or the knower of the *kṣetra*, or *kṣetrin*, the possessor of the *kṣetra* or the body-mind complex. It is said that, just as the sun illuminates this whole world, so does the *kṣetrin* illuminate the whole *kṣetra*¹.

It will be remembered that it is said in the *Gītā* that God has two different natures, one the complex whole of the five elements, *ahamkāra*, *buddhi*, etc., and the other the collective whole of life and spirit (*jīva-bhūta*). It will also be remembered that, by the fertilization of God's power in *prakṛti*, the *guṇas*, or the characteristic qualities, which pervade all that is living, come into being. The *guṇas*, therefore, as diverse dynamic tendencies or characteristic qualities, pervade the entire psychosis-complex of *ahamkāra*, *buddhi*, the senses, consciousness, etc., which represents the mental side of the *kṣetra*. *Kṣetra-jñā*, or the *kṣetrin*, is in all probability the same as *puruṣa*, an all-pervading principle as subtle as *ākāśa* (space), which, though it is omnipresent, remains untouched by any of the qualities of the body, in which it manifests itself. It is difficult to say what, according to the *Gītā*, *prakṛti* is in itself, before the fertilization of God's energy. It does not seem that *prakṛti* can be regarded as being identical with God. It appears more to be like an ultimate principle coexistent with God and intimately connected with Him. There is, however, no passage in the *Gītā* by which the lower *prakṛti* of God, consisting of the categories, etc., can be identified with *prakṛti*; for *prakṛti* is always associated with the *guṇas* and their production. Again, it is nowhere said in the *Gītā* that the categories *ahamkāra*, senses, etc., are in any way the products of the *guṇas*; the word *guṇa* seems to imply only the enjoyable, emotional and moral or immoral qualities. It is these *guṇas* which move us to all kinds of action, produce attachments and desires, make us enjoy or suffer, and associate us with virtues and vices. *Prakṛti* is regarded as the mother-source from which all the knowable, enjoyable, and dynamic qualities of experience, referred to as being generated by the successive preponderance of the *guṇas*, are produced. The categories of the psychosis and the five elements, which form the

¹ *Gītā*, XIII. 34.

mental ground, do not, therefore, seem to be products of the *guṇas* or the *prakṛti*. They seem to constitute a group by themselves, which is referred to as being a lower nature of God, side by side with His higher nature as life and spirit. *Kṣetra* is a complex of both the *guṇa* elements of experience and the complex categories of body and mind. There seem, therefore, to be three different principles, the *aparā prakṛti* (the lower nature), *parā prakṛti* or *puruṣa*, and *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* produces the *guṇas*, which constitute experience-stuff; the *aparā prakṛti* holds within itself the material world of the five elements and their modifications as our bodies, the senses and the mind-categories. It seems very probable, therefore, that a later development of Sāṃkhya combined these two *prakṛtis* as one, and held that the *guṇas* produced not only the stuff of our experience, but also all the mind-categories, the senses, etc., and the five gross elements and their modifications. The *guṇas*, therefore, are not the products of *prakṛti*, but they themselves constitute *prakṛti*, when in a state of equilibrium. In the *Gītā* *prakṛti* can only produce the *guṇas* through the fertilizing energy of God; they do not constitute the *prakṛti*, when in a state of equilibrium. It is hard to realize the connection between the *aparā prakṛti* and the *prakṛti* and the *guṇas*. The connection, however, can be imagined to take place through the medium of God, who is the fertilizer and upholder of them both. There seems to be but one *puruṣa*, as the all-pervading fundamental life-principle which animates all bodies and enjoys and suffers by its association with its experiences, remaining at the same time unaffected and untouched by the effects of the *guṇas*. This naturally presumes that there is also a higher and a lower *puruṣa*, of which the former is always unattached to and unaffected by the *guṇas*, whereas the lower *puruṣa*, which is different in different bodies, is always associated with the *prakṛti* and its *guṇas* and is continually affected by their operations. Thus it is said that the *puruṣa*, being in *prakṛti*, enjoys the *guṇas* of *prakṛti* and this is the cause of its rebirth in good or bad bodies¹. There is also in this body the higher *puruṣa* (*puruṣaḥ paraḥ*), which is also called *paramātmān*, being the passive perceiver, thinker, upholder, enjoyer and the great lord². The word *puruṣa* is used in the *Gītā* in four distinct senses, firstly, in the

¹ *Gītā*, XIII. 21.

² *upadraṣṭānumantā ca bhartā bhoktā maheśvaraḥ paramātmēti cāpy ukto dehe 'smin puruṣaḥ paraḥ*. *Ibid.* XIII. :3.

sense of *puruṣottama*, or God¹; secondly, in the sense of a person²; and the *Gītā* distinctly speaks of the two other *puruṣas* as *kṣara* (changeable) and *akṣara* (unchangeable). The *kṣara* is all living beings, whereas the *akṣara* is changeless. It is this higher self (*uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ*), different from the other *puruṣa* and called also *paramātmān*, that pervades the three worlds and upholds them as their deathless God³. God, however, transcends both the *kṣara puruṣa* and the *akṣara puruṣa* and is therefore called *puruṣottama*⁴. Both *prakṛti* and the *paramātmān puruṣa* are beginningless. The *paramātmān puruṣa*, being changeless and beyond the sphere of the *guṇas*, is neither the agent of anything nor affected by the *guṇas*, though it resides in the body. *Prakṛti* is regarded as the ground through which all causes, effects, and their agents are determined. It is the fundamental principle of all dynamic operations, motivations and actions, whereas *puruṣa* is regarded as the principle which makes all experiences of joys and sorrows possible⁵. The *paramātmān puruṣa*, therefore, though all-pervasive, yet exists in each individual, being untouched by its experiences of joy, sorrow and attachment, as its higher self. It is only the lower self that goes through the experiences and is always under the influence of the *guṇas*. Any attempts that may be made to rise above the sphere of the *guṇas*, above attachments and desires, above pleasures and pains, mean the subordination of the lower self to the pure and deathless higher self. Every attempt in this direction implies a temporary communion (*yoga*) with the higher self. It has already been pointed out that the *Gītā* recognizes a conflict between the higher and the lower selves and advises us to raise the lower self by the higher self. In all our moral efforts there is always an upward and a downward pull by the higher *puruṣa* on the one side, and the *guṇas* on the other; yet the higher *puruṣa* does not itself make the pulls. The energy of the downward pull is derived from the *guṇas* and exerted by the lower self. In all these efforts the higher self stands as the unperturbed ideal of equanimity, steadiness, unchangeableness in good or evil, joys or sorrows. The presence of this superior self is sometimes intuited by self-meditation, sometimes through philosophic knowledge, and sometimes by our moral

¹ *sanātanas tvam puruṣo mato me. Gītā, XI. 18.*

tvam ādi-devaḥ puruṣaḥ purāṇaḥ. Ibid. XI. 38.

For *puruṣottama* see *ibid.* VIII. 1, X. 15, XI. 3, XV. 18 and XV. 19.

² *Ibid.* II. 15, II. 21, III. 60, III. 4, etc.

³ *Ibid.* XV. 16 and 17.

⁴ *Ibid.* XV. 15 and 18.

⁵ *Ibid.* XIII. 20.

efforts to perform our duties without attachment and without desires¹. Each moral effort to perform our allotted duties without attachment means also a temporary communion (*yoga*) with the higher self or with God. A true philosophic knowledge, by which all actions are known to be due to the operations of the *prakṛti* and its *guṇas* and which realizes the unattached nature of the true self, the philosophic analysis of action and the relation between God, the higher self, the lower self, and the *prakṛti*, and any devotional realization of the nature of God and dedication of all action to Him, and the experience of the supreme bliss of living in communion with Him, mean a communion with the higher self or God, and are therefore *yoga*.

It is easy to notice here the beginnings of a system of thought which in the hands of other thinkers might well be developed into the traditional school of Sāṃkhya philosophy. It has already been pointed out that the two *prakṛtis* naturally suggested the idea of unifying them into the one *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya. The higher and the lower *puruṣas*, where the latter enjoys and suffers, while the former remains unchanged and unperturbed amidst all the experiences of joy and sorrow on the part of the latter, naturally remind one of the Upaniṣadic simile of the two birds in the same tree, of whom the one eats tasteful fruits while the other remains contented without them². The *Gītā* does not seem to explain clearly the nature of the exact relation between the higher *puruṣa* and the lower *puruṣa*. It does not definitely state whether the lower *puruṣa* is one or many, or describe its exact ontological states. It is easy to see how any attempt that would aim at harmonizing these two apparently loosely-connected *puruṣas* into one self-consistent and intelligible concept might naturally end in the theory of infinite, pure, all-pervasive *puruṣas* and make the lower *puruṣa* the product of a false and illusory mutual reflection of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. The *Gītā* uses the word *māyā* in three passages (VII. 14 and 15, XVIII. 61); but it seems to be used there in the sense of an inscrutable power or ignorance, and not in that of illusory or magical creation. The idea that the world or any of the mental or spiritual categories could be merely an illusory appearance seems never to have been

¹ *dhyānenātmani paśyanti kecid ātmānam ātmānā
anye sāmṛkhyena yogena karma-yogena cāpare. Gītā, XIII. 25.*

² *Muṇḍaka, III. 1. 1 and Śvetāśvatara, 4. 6.*

contemplated in the *Gītā*. It is not, therefore, conceivable that the lower, or the *kṣara, puruṣa* might be mere illusory creation, accepted as a necessary postulate to explain the facts of our undeniable daily experience. But it is difficult to say how this *kṣetra-jña puruṣa* can have a separate existence from the *para puruṣa* (which is absolutely free from the *guṇas*), as enjoying the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, unless the former be somehow regarded as the result of the functioning of the latter. Such a view would naturally support a theory that would regard the lower *puruṣa* as being only the *para puruṣa* as imaged or reflected in the *guṇas*. The *para puruṣa*, existing by itself, free from the influence of the *guṇas*, is in its purity. But even without losing its unattached character and its lonely purity it may somehow be imaged in the *guṇas* and play the part of the phenomenal self, the *jīva* or the lower *puruṣa*, enjoying the *guṇas* of *prakṛti* and having the superior *puruṣa* as its ultimate ground. It cannot be denied that the *Gītā* theory of *puruṣa* is much looser than the later Sāṃkhya theory; but it has the advantage of being more elastic, as it serves better to explain the contact of the lower *puruṣa* with the higher and thereby charges the former with the spirit of a higher ideal.

The qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* were regarded as the universal characteristics of all kinds of mental tendencies, and all actions were held to be prompted by specific kinds of *sattva*, *rajas* or *tamas*. Mental tendencies were also designated accordingly as *sāttvika*, *rājasa* or *tāmasa*. Thus religious inclinations (*śraddhā*) are also described as being of a threefold nature. Those who are of *sāttvika* nature worship the gods, those who are of *rājasa* nature worship the *yakṣas* and the *rakṣas* and those who are of *tāmasa* nature worship ghosts and demons. Those who, prompted by vanity, desires and attachments, perform violent ascetic penances unauthorized by the scriptures and thereby starve and trouble their body and spirit, are really demoniac in their temperament. Again, *sāttvika* sacrifices are those performed solely out of reverence for the scriptural injunctions and from a pure sense of duty, without any desire or motive for any other kind of worldly or heavenly good. Again, *rājasa* sacrifices are those which are performed for the realization of some benefits or good results or for the satisfaction of some vanity or pride. *Tāmasa* sacrifices are those which are performed without proper faith, with improper ceremonials, transgressing Vedic injunctions. Again, *tapas* also is described as

being threefold, as of body (*śārīra*), of speech (*vāṇmāya*) and of mind (*mānasa*). Adoration of gods, Brahmins, teachers and wise men, sincerity and purity, sex-continence and non-injury are known as physical or bodily *tapas*. To speak in a manner that would be truthful, attractive, and conducive to good and would not be harmful in any way, and to study in the regular and proper way are regarded as the *tapas* of speech (*vāṇ-māya tapas*). Mental (*mānasa*) *tapas* consists of sincerity of mind, friendliness of spirit, thoughtfulness and mental control, self-control and purity of mind. The above threefold *tapas* performed without any attachment for a reward is called *sāttvika tapas*. But *tapas* performed out of vanity, or for the sake of higher position, respectability in society, or appreciation from people, is called *rājasa*—such a *tapas* can lead only to unsteady and transient results. Again, the *tapas* which is performed for the destruction of others by ignorant self-mortification is called *tāmasa tapas*. Gifts, again, are called *sāttvika* when they are made to proper persons (holy Brahmins) on auspicious occasions, and in holy places, merely out of sense of duty. Gifts are called *rājasa* when they are made as a return for the good done to the performer, for gaining future rewards, or made unwillingly. Again, gifts are called *tāmasa* when they are made slightly, to improper persons, in unholy places, and in ordinary places. Those who desire liberation perform sacrifices and *tapas* and make gifts without aiming at the attainment of any mundane or heavenly benefits. Knowledge also is regarded as *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. *Sāttvika* wisdom consists in looking for unity and diversity and in realizing one unchangeable reality in the apparent diversity of living beings. *Rājasa* knowledge consists in the scientific apprehension of things or living beings as diverse in kind, character and number. *Tāmasa* knowledge consists in narrow and untrue beliefs which are satisfied to consider a little thing as the whole and entire truth through sheer dogmatism, and unreasonable delusion or attachment. An action is called *sāttvika* when it is performed without any desire for a reward, without attachment and without aversion. It is called *rājasa* when it is performed with elaborate endeavours and efforts, out of pride and vanity, for the satisfaction of one's desires. It is called *tāmasa* when it is undertaken out of ignorance and without proper judgment of one's own capacities, and when it leads to waste of energy, harm and injury. An agent (*kartr*) is called *sāttvika* when he is free from attachment

and vanity and absolutely unruffled in success and failure, persevering and energetic. Again, an agent is called *rājasa* if he acts out of motives of self-interest, is impure, is filled with sorrow or joy in failure or success, and injures others. An agent is called *tāmasa* if he is careless, haughty, thoughtless, deceptive, arrogant, idle, procrastinating and melancholic. Understanding (*buddhi*) is said to be *sāttvika* when it grasps how a man has to set himself in the path of virtue, how to refrain from vice, what ought and what ought not to be done, of what one has to be afraid and how to be fearless, what is bondage, and what is liberation. *Rājasa* understanding is that by which one wrongly grasps the nature of virtue and vice, and of right and wrong conduct. *Tāmasa* understanding is that which takes vice as virtue and out of ignorance perceives all things wrongly. That mental hold (*dhṛti*) is called *sāttvika* which by unfailing communion holds together the sense-functions and bio-motor and mind activities. That happiness which in the beginning appears to be painful, but which is in the end as sweet as nectar, and which is the direct result of gaiety of mind, is called *sāttvika sukha*. The happiness arising out of sense-object contact, which in the beginning is as attractive as nectar, but in the end is as painful as poison, is *rājasa*. That happiness which arises out of sleep, idleness and errors, and blinds one in the beginning and in the end, is called *tāmasa*. So also the food which increases life, facilitates mind-function, increases powers of enjoyment, makes one healthy and strong, and is sweet, resistible and delightful is liked by the *sāttvika* people. That food is liked by *rājasa* people which is hot, sour, salt, dry and causes pain and brings on diseases. The food which is impure, tasteless, old and rotten is liked by *tāmasa* people. All this goes to show that the *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, are determinants of the tendencies of, or rather the stuff of, the moral and immoral, pleasurable and painful planes or characteristics of our experience. *Sattva* represents the moral and supermoral planes, *rajas* the ordinary mixed and normal plane, and *tamas* the inferior and immoral characteristics of our experience.

Avyakta and Brahman.

The word *avyakta* is primarily used in the *Gītā* in the sense of “the unmanifested.” Etymologically the word consists of two parts, the negative particle *a* meaning “negation,” and *vyakta* meaning “manifested,” “differentiated” or “revealed.” In this

sense the word is used as an adjective. There is another use of the word in the neuter gender (*avyaktam*), in the sense of a category. As an illustration of the first sense, one may refer to the *Gītā*, II. 25 or VIII. 21. Thus in II. 25 the self is described as the unmanifested; unthinkable and unchangeable. In the Upaniṣads, however, it is very unusual to characterize the self as *avyakta* or unmanifested; for the self there is pure consciousness and self-manifested. In all later Vedāntic works the self is described as *anubhūti-svabhāva*, or as being always immediately intuited. But in the *Gītā* the most prominent characteristic of the self is that it is changeless and deathless; next to this, it is unmanifested and unthinkable. But it does not seem that the *Gītā* describes the self as pure consciousness. Not only does it characterize the self as *avyakta* or unmanifested, but it does not seem anywhere to refer to it as a self-conscious principle. The word *cetanā*, which probably means consciousness, is described in the *Gītā* as being a part of the changeable *kṣetra*, and not the *kṣetra-jña*¹. It may naturally be asked how, if the self was not a conscious principle, could it be described as *kṣetra-jña* (that which knows the *kṣetra*)? But it may well be replied that the self here is called *kṣetra-jña* only in relation to its *kṣetra*, and the implication would be that the self becomes a conscious principle not by virtue of its own inherent principle of consciousness, but by virtue of the principle of consciousness reflected or offered to it by the complex entity of the *kṣetra*. The *kṣetra* contains within it the conscious principle known as *cetanā*, and it is by virtue of its association with the self that the self appears as *kṣetra-jña* or the knower.

It may not be out of place here to mention that the term *kṣetra* is never found in the Upaniṣads in the technical sense in which it is used in the *Gītā*. The term *kṣetra-jña*, however, appears in *Śvetāśvatara*, VI. 16 and *Maitrāyaṇa*, II. 5 in the sense of *puruṣa*, as in the *Gītā*. The term *kṣetra*, however, as used in the *Gītā*, has more or less the same sense that it has in Caraka's account of Sāṃkhya in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, III. 1. 61-63. In Caraka, however, *avyakta* is excluded from the complex constituent *kṣetra*, though in the *Gītā* it is included within the constituents of *kṣetra*. Caraka again considers *avyakta* (by which term he means both the Sāṃkhya *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*) as *kṣetra-jña*, whereas the *Gītā* takes only the *puruṣa* as *kṣetra-jña*. The *puruṣa* of the *Gītā* is further

¹ *Gītā*, XIII. 7.

characterized as the life-principle (*jīva-bhūta*, vii. 5 and xv. 7) by which the whole world is upheld. The *Gītā* does not, however, describe in what particular way the life-principle upholds the world. In Caraka's account also the *ātman* is referred to as the life-principle, and it is held there that it is the principle which holds together the *buddhi*, the senses, the mind and the objects—it is also the principle for which good, bad, pleasure, pain, bondage, liberation, and in fact the whole world-process happens. In the *Caraka-saṃhitā* *puruṣa* is regarded as *cetanā-dhātu*, or the upholder of consciousness; yet it is not regarded as conscious by itself. Consciousness only comes to it as a result of the joint operation of *manas*, the senses, the objects, etc. In the *Gītā* *puruṣa* is not regarded as the *cetanā-dhātu*, but *cetanā* or consciousness is regarded as being a constituent of the *kṣetra* over which the *puruṣa* presides. Thus knowledge can accrue to *puruṣa* as *kṣetra-jñā*, only in association with its *kṣetra*. It may well be supposed that *puruṣa* as *kṣetra-jñā* and as a life-principle upholds the constituents of the *kṣetra*, and it is probable that the *puruṣa*'s position as a cognizer or knower depends upon this intimate association between itself and the *kṣetra*.

Another relevant point is suggested along with the considerations of the nature of the *puruṣa* as the cognizer, namely, the consideration of the nature of *puruṣa* as an agent (*kartr*). It will be pointed out in another section that the fruition of actions is rendered possible by the combined operations of *adhiṣṭhāna*, *kartr*, *kāraṇa*, *ceṣṭā* and *daiva*, and this doctrine has been regarded as being a Sāṃkhya doctrine, though it has been interpreted by Śaṅkara as being a Vedāntic view. But both Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta theories are explicitly of the *sat-kārya-vāda* type. According to the *sat-kārya-vāda* of the traditional Sāṃkhya philosophy the fruition of actions is the natural result of a course of unfolding evolution, consisting in the actualization of what was already potentially present. On the Vedāntic *sat-kārya-vāda* view all operations are but mere appearances, and the cause alone is true. Neither of these doctrines would seem to approve of a theory of causation which would imply that anything could be the result of the joint operation of a number of factors. That which is not cannot be produced by the joint operation of a collocation of causes. It may be remembered, however, that the *Gītā* explicitly formulates the basic principle of *sat-kārya-vāda*, that what exists cannot be destroyed and that what does not exist cannot come into being.

This principle was applied for proving the deathless character of the self. It is bound to strike anyone as very surprising that the *Gītā* should accept the *sat-kārya-vāda* doctrine in establishing the immortality of the self and should assume the *a-sat-kārya-vāda* doctrine regarding the production of action. It is curious, however, to note that a similar view regarding the production of action is to be found in Caraka's account of Sāṃkhya, where it is said that all actions are produced as a result of a collocation of causes—that actions are the results of the collocation of other entities with the agent (*karṭṛ*)¹.

The word *avyakta* is also used in the sense of “unknowability” or “disappearance” in the *Gītā*, II. 28, where it is said that the beginnings of all beings are invisible and unknown; it is only in the middle that they are known, and in death also they disappear and become unknown. But the word *avyakta* in the neuter gender means a category which is a part of God Himself and from which all the manifested manifold world has come into being. This *avyakta* is also referred to as a *prakṛti* or nature of God, which, under His superintendence, produces the moving and the unmoved—the entire universe². But God Himself is sometimes referred to as being *avyakta* (probably because He cannot be grasped by any of our senses), as an existence superior to the *avyakta*, which is described as a part of His nature, and as a category from which all things have come into being³. This *avyakta* which is identical with God is also called *akṣara*, or the immortal, and is regarded as the last resort of all beings who attain their highest and most perfect realization. Thus there is a superior *avyakta*, which represents the highest essence of God, and an inferior *avyakta*, from which the world is produced. Side by side with these two *avyaktas* there is also the *prakṛti*, which is sometimes described as a coexistent principle and as the *māyā* or the blinding power of God, from which the *guṇas* are produced.

The word “Brahman” is used in at least two or three different senses. Thus in one sense it means *prakṛti*, from which the *guṇas* are produced. In another sense it is used as an essential nature of God. In another sense it means the Vedas. Thus in the *Gītā*,

¹ *Caraka-saṃhitā*, IV. 1. 54.

² *Gītā*, IX. 10, *mayādhyakṣeṇa prakṛtiḥ sūyate sacarācaram*.

³ *Ibid.* VIII. 20 and VIII. 21; also IX. 4, where it is said, “All the world is pervaded over by me in my form as *avyakta*; all things and all living beings are in me, but I am not exhausted in them.”

III. 15, it is said that the sacrificial duties are derived from Brahman (Vedas). Brahman is derived from the eternal; therefore the omnipresent Brahman is always established in the sacrifices¹. The idea here is that, since the Vedas have sprung from the eternal Brahman, its eternal and omnipresent character is transmitted to the sacrifices also. The word "omnipresent" (*sarva-gata*) is probably used in reference to the sacrifices on account of the diverse and manifold ways in which the sacrifices are supposed to benefit those who perform them. In the *Gītā*, iv. 32, also the word "Brahman" in *Brahmaṇo mukhe* is used to denote the Vedas. But in iv. 24 and 25, where it is said that all sacrifices are to be made with the Brahman as the object and that the sacrificial materials, sacrificial fire, etc. are to be looked upon as being Brahman, the word "Brahman" is in all probability used in the sense of God². In v. 6, 10, 19 also the word "Brahman" is used in the sense of God or Īśvara; and in most of the other cases the word is used in the sense of God. But according to the *Gītā* the personal God as Īśvara is the supreme principle, and Brahman, in the sense of a qualityless, undifferentiated ultimate principle as taught in the Upaniṣads, is a principle which, though great in itself and representing the ultimate essence of God, is nevertheless upheld by the personal God or Īśvara. Thus, though in viii. 3 and x. 12 Brahman is referred to as the differenceless ultimate principle, yet in xiv. 27 it is said that God is the support of even this ultimate principle, Brahman. In many places we also hear of the attainment of Brahmahood (*brahma-bhūta*, v. 24, vi. 27, xviii. 54, or *brahma-bhūya*, xiv. 26), and also of the attainment of the ultimate bliss of Brahman (*Brahma-nirvāṇa*, ii. 72, v. 24, 25, 26). The word *brahma-bhūta* does not in the *Gītā* mean the differenceless merging into oneness, as in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. It is wrong to think that the term "Brahman" is always used in the same sense in which Śaṅkara used it. The word "Brahman" is used in the sense of an ultimate differenceless principle in the Upaniṣads, and the Upaniṣads were apprized by all systems of Hindu thought as the repository of all sacred knowledge. Most systems regarded the attainment of a changeless eternal state as the final goal of realization. As an illustration, I may refer to the account of

¹ *Gītā*, iii. 15.

² Śrīdhara, in interpreting this verse (iv. 24), explains it by saying, *tad evam paramēśvarārādhaṇa-lakṣaṇam karṇa jñāna-hetutvena bandhakatvābhāvād akarmaiva*.

Sāṃkhya given by Caraka, in which it is said that, when a man gives up all attachment and mental and physical actions, all feelings and knowledge ultimately and absolutely cease. At this stage he is reduced to Brahmahood (*brahma-bhūta*), and the self is no longer manifested. It is a stage which is beyond all existence and which has no connotation, characteristic or mark¹. This state is almost like a state of annihilation, and yet it is described as a state of Brahmahood. The word "Brahman" was appropriated from the Upaniṣads and was used to denote an ultimate superior state of realization, the exact nature of which differed with the different systems. In the *Gītā* also we find the word "Brahman" signifying a high state of self-realization in which, through a complete detachment from all passions, a man is self-contented within himself and his mind is in a perfect state of equilibrium. In the *Gītā*, v. 19, Brahman is defined as the faultless state of equilibrium (*nir-doṣam hi samam brahma*), and in all the verses of that context the sage who is in a state of equanimity and equilibrium through detachment and passionlessness is said to be by virtue thereof in Brahman; for Brahman means a state of equanimity. In the *Gītā*, XIII. 13, Brahman is described as the ultimate object of knowledge, which is beginningless, and cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent (*na sat tan nāsad ucyate*). It is said that this Brahman has His hands and feet, eyes, head, mouth and ears everywhere in the world, and that He envelopes all. He is without senses, but He illuminates all sense-qualities; Himself unattached and the upholder of all, beyond the *guṇas*, He is also the enjoyer of the *guṇas*. He is both inside and outside of all living beings, of all that is moving and that is unmoved. He is both near and far, but unknowable on account of His subtle nature. Being one in many, yet appearing as many, the upholder of all living beings, the devourer and overpowerer of all, He is the light of all light, beyond all darkness, He is both knowledge and the object of knowledge, residing in the heart of all. It is easy to see that the whole concept of Brahman, as herein stated, is directly borrowed from the Upaniṣads. Towards the end of this chapter it is said that he who perceives the many living beings as being in one, and realizes everything as an emanation or elaboration from that, becomes Brahman. But in the next chapter Kṛṣṇa as God says,

¹ *niḥśṛtaḥ sarva-bhāvebhyaś cihnam yasya na vidyate.*

Caraka-saṃhitā, IV. 1. 153.

“I am the upholder of the immortal and imperishable Brahman of absolute bliss and of the eternal *dharma*.” In the *Gītā*, xiv. 26, it is said that “he who worships me unflinchingly through devotion, transcends all *guṇas* and becomes Brahman.” It has just been remarked that the *Gītā* recognizes two different kinds of *avyaktas*. It is the lower *avyakta* nature of God which has manifested itself as the universe; but there is a higher *avyakta*, which is beyond it as the eternal and unchangeable basis of all. It seems very probable, therefore, that Brahman is identical with this higher *avyakta*. But, though this higher *avyakta* is regarded as the highest essence of God, yet, together with the lower *avyakta* and the selves, it is upheld in the super-personality of God.

The question whether the *Gītā* is a Sāṃkhya or a Vedānta work, or originally a Sāṃkhya work which was later on revised, changed, or enlarged from a Vedānta point of view, need not be elaborately discussed here. For, if the interpretation of the *Gītā*, as given herein, be accepted, then it will be evident that the *Gītā* is neither a Sāṃkhya work nor a Vedānta work. It has been pointed out that the word *sāṃkhya*, in the *Gītā*, does not mean the traditional Sāṃkhya philosophy, as found in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Kārikā*. But there are, no doubt, here the scattered elements of an older philosophy, from which not only the Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa or the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* (of which Īśvarakṛṣṇa's work was a summary) developed, but even its earlier version, as found in Caraka's account, could be considered to have developed. There is no doubt that the *Gītā*'s account of Sāṃkhya differs materially from the Sāṃkhya of the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* or of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, from the Sāṃkhya of Caraka, from the Sāṃkhya of Pañcaśikha in the *Mahā-bhārata* and from the Sāṃkhya of Patañjali and the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*. Ordinarily the Sāṃkhya of Patañjali is described as a theistic Sāṃkhya (*seśvara-sāṃkhya*); but the Īśvara of Patañjali is but loosely attached to the system of Sāṃkhya thought as expounded in Yoga. The Īśvara there appears only as a supernormal, perfect being, who by his permanent will removes the barriers in the path of the evolution of *prakṛti* in accordance with the law of *karma*. He thus merely helps the fulfilment of the teleology of the blind *prakṛti*. But in the *Gītā* both the *puruṣas* and the root of the cosmic nature are but parts of God, the super-person (*puruṣottama*). The *prakṛti*, from which the *guṇas* which have only subjectivistic characteristics are derived, is described as the *māyā* power of God, or like a

consort to Him, who, being fertilized by His energies, produces the *guṇas*. The difference of the philosophy of the *Gītā* from the various schools of Sāṃkhya is very evident. Instead of the one *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya we have here the three *prakṛtis* of God. The *guṇas* here are subjectivistic or psychical, and not cosmical. It is because the *Gītā* admits a *prakṛti* which produces the subjectivistic *guṇas* by which the *puruṣas* are bound with ties of attachment to their experiences, that such a *prakṛti* could fitly be described as *guṇamayī māyā* (*māyā* consisting of *guṇas*). The *puruṣas*, again, though they are many, are on the whole but emanations from a specific *prakṛti* (divine nature) of God. The *puruṣas* are not stated in the *Gītā* to be of the nature of pure intelligence, as in the Sāṃkhya; but the cognizing element of consciousness (*cetanā*) is derived from another *prakṛti* of God, which is associated with the *puruṣa*. It has also been pointed out that the *Gītā* admits the *sat-kārya-vāda* doctrine with reference to immortality of the self, but not with reference to the fruition of actions or the rise of consciousness. The Sāṃkhya category of *tan-mātra* is missing in the *Gītā*, and the general teleology of the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya is replaced by the super-person of God, who by his will gives a unity and a purpose to all the different elements that are upheld within Him. Both the Sāṃkhya of Kapila and that of Patañjali aim at securing, either through knowledge or through Yoga practices, the final loneliness of the translucent *puruṣas*. The *Gītā*, however, is anxious to secure the saintly equanimity and a perfect, unperturbed nature by the practice of detachment of the mind from passions and desires. When such a saintly equanimity and self-contentedness is achieved, the sage is said to be in a state of liberation from the bondage of *guṇa*-attachments, or to be in a state of Brahmahood in God. The philosophy of the *Gītā* thus differs materially from the traditional Sāṃkhya philosophy on almost every point. On some minor points (e.g. the absence of *tan-mātras*, the nature of the production of knowledge and action, etc.) the *Gītā* philosophy has some similarities with the account of the Sāṃkhya given in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, iv. 1, as already described in the first volume of this work¹.

The question whether the *Gītā* was written under a Vedāntic influence cannot be answered, unless one understands what is exactly meant by this Vedāntic influence; if by Vedāntic influence

¹ *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, 1922, pp. 213-222.

one means the influence of the Upaniṣads, then the *Gītā* must plainly be admitted to have borrowed very freely from the Upaniṣads, which from the earliest times had been revered for their wisdom. If, however, by Vedāntic influence one means the philosophy of Vedānta as taught by Śaṅkara and his followers, then it must be said that the *Gītā* philosophy is largely different therefrom. It has already been pointed out that, though Brahman is often described in Upaniṣadic language as the highest essence of God, it is in reality a part of the super-personality of God. The *Gītā*, moreover, does not assert anywhere that Brahman is the only reality and all else that appears is false and unreal. The word *māyā* is, no doubt, used in the *Gītā* in three passages; but its meaning is not what Śaṅkara ascribes to it in his famous interpretation of Vedāntic thought. Thus in the *Gītā*, VII. 14, *māyā* is described as being of the nature of *guṇas*, and it is said that he who clings to God escapes the grip of the *māyā* or of the *guṇas*. In the *Gītā*, VII. 15, the word *māyā* is also probably used in the same sense, since it is said that it is ignorant and sinful men who, through demoniac ideas, lose their right wisdom under the influence of *māyā* and do not cling to God. In all probability, here also *māyā* means the influence of *rajas* and *tamas*; for it has been repeatedly said in the *Gītā* that demoniac tendencies are generated under the preponderating influence of *rajas* and *tamas*. In the *Gītā*, XVIII. 61, it is said that God resides in the heart of all living beings and moves them by *māyā*, like dolls on a machine. It has been pointed out that the psychical tendencies and moral or immoral propensities which move all men to action are produced under the influence of the *guṇas*, and that God is the ultimate generator of the *guṇas* from the *prakṛti*. The *māyā*, therefore, may well be taken here to mean *guṇas*, as in the *Gītā*, VII. 14. Śrīdhara takes it to mean the power of God. The *guṇas* are, no doubt, in a remote sense, powers of God. But Śaṅkara's paraphrasing of it as deception (*chadmanā*) is quite inappropriate. Thus it is evident that the *Gītā* does not know the view that the world may be regarded as a manifestation of *māyā* or illusion. It has also been pointed out that the word "Brahman" is used in the *Gītā* in the sense of the Vedas, of faultless equanimity, of supreme essence and of *prakṛti*, which shows that it had no such crystallized technical sense as in the philosophy of Śaṅkara. The word had in the *Gītā* all the looseness of Upaniṣadic

usage. In the *Gītā* the word *avidyā*, so famous in Śaṅkara's philosophy of the Vedānta, is nowhere used. The word *ajñāna* is used several times (v. 15, 16; x. 11; xiii. 11; xiv. 8, 16, 17; xvi. 4); but it has no special technical sense in any of these passages. It has the sense of "ignorance" or "misconception," which is produced by *tamas* (*ajñānam tamasaḥ phalam*, xiv. 16) and which in its turn produces *tamas* (*tamas tv ajñāna-jaṃ viddhi*, xiv. 8).

Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gītā.

The Vedic view of the obligatoriness of certain kinds of sacrifices or substitution-meditations permeated almost all forms of Hindu thought, excepting the Vedānta philosophy as interpreted by Śaṅkara. The conception of the obligatoriness of duties finds its best expression in the analysis of *vidhi* in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. *Vidhi* means the injunctions of the Vedas, such as, "Thou should'st perform such and such sacrifices"; sometimes these are conditional, such as, "Those who wish to attain Heaven should perform such and such sacrifices"; sometimes they are unconditional, such as, "Thou should'st say the three prayers." The force of this *vidhi*, or injunction, is differently interpreted in the different schools of Mīmāṃsā. Kumārila, the celebrated commentator, in interpreting Jaimini's definition of *dharma*, or virtue, as a desirable end (*artha*) or good which is enjoined by the Vedic commands (*codanā-lakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah*, *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, i. 1), says that it is the performance of the Vedic injunctions, sacrifices, etc. (*yāgādih*) that should be called our duty. The definition of virtue, then, involves the notion that only such a desired end (on account of the pain associated with it not exceeding the associated pleasure) as is enjoined by Vedic commands is called *dharma*. The sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas are called *dharma*, because these would in future produce pleasurable experiences. So one's abstention from actions prohibited by Vedic commands is also called *dharma*, as by this means one can avoid the undesirable effects and sufferings of punishments as a result of transgressing those commands. Such sacrifices, however, are ultimately regarded as *artha*, or desired ends, because they produce pleasurable experiences. The imperative of Vedic commands is supposed to operate in a twofold manner, firstly, as initiating a volitional tendency in obedience to the verbal command (*śābdi bhāvanā*), and, secondly, in releasing

the will to the actual performance of the act enjoined by the command (*ārthī bhāvanā*). The propulsion of verbal commands is not like any physical propulsion; such a propulsion only arises as a result of one's comprehension of the fact that the performance of the acts enjoined will lead to beneficial results, and it naturally moves one to perform those acts out of self-interest¹. So of the twofold propulsion (*bhāvanā*) implied in a Vedic imperative the propulsion to act, as communicated by the verbal command, is called *śabdi bhāvanā*; and this is followed by the actual efforts of the person for the performance of the act². The prescriptive of the command (*vidhi*) is comprehended directly from the imperative suffix (*lin*) of the verb, even before the meaning of the verb is realized. If this is so, it is contended that the imperative, as it is communicated by the command, is a pure contentless form of command. This contention is admitted by the Bhaṭṭa school, which thinks that, though in the first stage we have communication of the contentless pure form of the imperative, yet at the successive stages the contentless form of duty is naturally supplemented by a more direct reference to the concrete context, as denoted by the verb with which the suffix is associated. So the process of the propulsion of *bhāvanā*, though it starts at the first instance with the communication of a pure contentless form, passes, by reason of its own necessity and the incapacity of a contentless form of duty to stand by itself, gradually through more and more concrete stages to the actual comprehension of the duty implied by the concrete meaning of the associated verb³. So the communication of the contentless duty and its association with the concrete verbal meaning are not two different meanings, but are

¹ *adṛṣṭe tu viṣaye śreyah-sāadhanādhigamaḥ śabdaika-nibandhana iti tad-adhigamopāyaḥ śabda eva pravartakaḥ; ata eva śabdo 'pi na svarūpa-mātreṇa pravartako vāyu-ādi-tulyatva-prasaṅgāt;...arthapratītiṃ upajanayataḥ śabdasya pravartakatvam. Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 342. The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895.*

² *Lin-ādeḥ śabdasya na pratīti-janana-mātre vyāpārāḥ kintu puruṣa-pravṛttāv api; sa cāyam lin-ādi-vyāpārāḥ śabda-bhāvanā-nāmadheyo vidhir ity ucyate sa eva ca pravartakaḥ...yo bhavana-kriyā-karṭṛ-viṣayaḥ prayojaka-vyāpārāḥ puruṣa-stho yatra bhavana-kriyāyāḥ kartā svargādikarmatām āpadyate so 'rtha-bhāvanā-śabdena ucyate. Ibid. p. 343.*

³ *Yady apy aṁśair asaṁsprṣtām vidhiḥ sprṣati bhāvanām tathāpy aśaktito nāsau tan-mātre paryavasyati anuṣṭheye hi viṣaye vidhiḥ pūṁsām pravartakaḥ aṁśa-trayeṇa cāpūrṇām nānutiṣṭhati bhāvanām tasmāt prakṛānta-rūpo 'pi vidhiḥ tāvat pratīkṣate yāvad yogyatvam āpannā bhāvanā'nyānapেকṣiṇī.*

Ibid. p. 344.

rather the prolongation of one process of communication, just as cooking includes all the different associated acts of putting the pan on the fire, lighting the fire, and the like¹. These two *bhāvanās*, therefore, mean nothing more than the reasoning of the will and its translation into definite channels of activity, as the performance of the sacrifice, etc., and *vidhi* here means simply the prompting or the propulsion (*vyāpārah preranā-rūpah*); and it is such prompting that initiates in the performer the will, which is later on translated into concrete action.

Another Mimāṃsā view objects to this theory of dual *bhāvanā* and asserts that the suffix *līn* involves the notion of an order to work (*prerana*), as if the relation of the Vedas to us were one of master and servant, and that the Vedic *vidhi* as expressed in the *līn* suffix conveys the command (*praiśya-praiśayoḥ sambandhaḥ*). The *vidhi* goads us to work, and, being goaded by it, we turn to work. It does not physically compel us to act; but the feeling we have from it that we have been ordered to act constitutes the driving power. The knowledge of *vidhi* thus drives us to our Vedic duties. When a man hears the command, he feels that he has been commanded and then he sets to work. This setting to work is quite a different operation from the relation of the command and the commanded, and comes after it. The essence of a Vedic sentence is this command or *niyoga*. A man who has formerly tasted the benefits of certain things or the pleasures they produced naturally intends to have them again; here also there is a peculiar mental experience of eagerness, desire or intention (*ākūta*), which goads him on to obey the Vedic commands. This *ākūta* is a purely subjective experience and cannot, therefore, be experienced by others, though one can always infer its existence from the very fact that, unless it were felt in the mind, no one would feel himself goaded to work². *Niyoga*, or a prompting to work (*prerana*), is the sense of all *vidhis*, and this rouses in us the intention of working in accordance with the command. The actual performance of an action is a mere counterpart of the intention (*ākūta*), that is subjectively felt as roused by the *niyoga* or the

¹ *Yathā hi sthāly-adhiśrayaṇāt prabhṛtyā nirākāṅkṣaudana-niṣpatter ekaiveyaṃ pāka-kriyā salilāvaseka-taṇḍulāvapana-darvī-vighaṭṭanāsrāvaṇādy-aneka-kṣaṇa-samudāya-svabhāvā tathā prathama-pada-jñānāt prabhṛti ā nirākāṅkṣa-vākyārtha-paricchedād ekaiveyaṃ śābdi pramitiḥ. Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 345.*

² *Ayam api bhautika-vyāpāra-hetur ātmākūta-viśeṣo na pramāṇāntara-vedyo bhavati na ca na vedyate tat-samvedane sati ceṣṭā yadvantaṃ dṛṣtvā tasyāpi tādrk-preranaḥ vāgamo 'numīyate. Ibid. p. 348.*

driving power of the *vidhi*. This view differs from the view of Kumārila in this, that it does not suppose that the propulsion of the Vedic command takes effect in a twofold *bhāvanā*, through the whole process of the conception and the materialization of the action in accordance with the Vedic commands. The force of the command is exhausted in prompting us to action and arousing in us the inward resolution (*ākūta*) to obey the command. The actual performance of the action comes as a natural consequence (*artha*). The force of the *vidhi* has a field of application only when our ordinary inclinations do not naturally lead us to the performance of action. *Vidhi*, therefore, operates merely as a law of command which has to be obeyed for the sake of the law alone, and it is this psychological factor of inward resolution to obey the law that leads to the performance of action.

Maṇḍana, in his *Vidhi-viveka*, discusses the diverse views on the significance of *vidhi*. He interprets *vidhi* as a specific kind of prompting (*pravartanā*). He distinguishes the inner volitional intention of attaining an end and its translation into active effort leading to muscular movements of the body. *Pravartanā* here means the inner volitional direction of the mind towards the performance of the action, as well as actual nervous changes which are associated with it¹. The command of the Vedas naturally brings with it a sense of duty or of "oughtness" (*kartavyatā*), and it is this sense of *kartavyatā* that impels people to action without any reference to the advantages and benefits that may be reaped by such actions. The psychological state associated with such a feeling of "oughtness" is said to be of the nature of instincts (*pratibhā*). It is through an instinctive stimulus to work, proceeding from the sense of "oughtness," that the action is performed.

The Nyāya doctrine differs from the above view of *vidhi* as a categorically imperative order and holds that the prompting of the Vedic commands derives its force from our desire for the attainment of the benefits that we might reap if we acted in accordance with them. So the ultimate motive of the action is the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, and it is only with a view to attaining the desired ends that one is prompted to follow the Vedic

¹ *Bhāva-dharma eva kaścit samīhita-sādhana-nugūṇo vyāpāra-padārthaḥ; tad yathā ātmano buddhy-ādi-janana-pravṛttasya manaḥ-samyoga evā'yaṁ bhāva-dharmāḥ tadadv atrāpi spandas tad-itaro vā bhāva-dharmāḥ pravṛtti-janana'-nukūlatayā vyāpāra-viśeṣaḥ pravartanā*. Vācaspati's *Nyāya-kāṇikā* on *Vidhi-viveka*, pp. 243, 244.

commands and perform the sacrifices. In this view, therefore, the prompting, or *preraṇā*, has not in it that self-evident call of the pure imperative or the rousing of the volitional tendency through the influence of the imperative; the prompting felt is due only to the rise of desires for the end.

Most of the above interpretations of *vidhi* are of much later date than the *Gītā*. No systematic discussion of the nature of *vidhi* which can be regarded as contemporaneous with or prior to the date of the *Gītā* is now available. But even these latter-day explanations are useful in understanding the significance of the force of the notion of the imperative in the *Gītā*. It is clear from the above discussion that the notion of the imperative of *vidhi* cannot be called moral in our sense of the term, as has been done in a recent work on Hindu Ethics¹. For the imperative of *vidhi* is limited to the injunctions of the Vedas, which are by no means coextensive with our general notion of morality. According to the Mīmāṃsā schools just described virtue (*dharma*) consists in obedience to Vedic injunctions. Whatever may be enjoined by the Vedas is to be considered as virtue, whatever is prohibited by the Vedas is evil and sin, and all other things which are neither enjoined by the Vedas nor prohibited by them are neutral, i.e. neither virtuous nor vicious². The term *dharma* is therefore limited to actions enjoined by the Vedas, even though such actions may in some cases be associated with evil consequences leading to punishments due to the transgression of some other Vedic commands. The categorical imperative here implied is scriptural and therefore wholly external. The virtuous character of actions does not depend on their intrinsic nature, but on the external qualification of being enjoined by the Vedas.

¹ S. K. Maitra's *Hindu Ethics*, written under Dr Seal's close personal supervision and guidance.

² Kumārila holds that even those sacrifices which are performed for the killing of one's enemies are right, because they are also enjoined by the Vedas. Prabhākara, however, contends that, since these are performed only out of the natural evil propensities of men, their performance cannot be regarded as being due to a sense of duty associated with obedience to the injunctions of the Vedas. Kumārila thus contends that, though the Śyena sacrifice is attended with evil consequences, yet, since the performer is only concerned with his duty in connection with the Vedic commands, he is not concerned with the evil consequences; and it is on account of one's obedience to the Vedic injunctions that it is called right, though the injury to living beings that it may involve will bring about its punishment all the same. Sāṃkhya and some Nyāya writers, however, would condemn the Śyena sacrifice on account of the injury to living beings that it involves.

Whatever is not enjoined in the Vedas or not prohibited in them is simply neutral. It is clear, therefore, that the term *dharma* can be translated as “virtue” only in a technical sense, and the words “moral” and “immoral” in our sense have nothing to do with the concept of *dharma* or *adharma*.

The *Gītā* distinguishes between two kinds of motives for the performance of sacrifices. The first motive is that of greed and self-interest, and the second is a sense of duty. The *Gītā* is aware of that kind of motive for the performance which corresponds to the Nyāya interpretation of Vedic *vidhis* and also to the general Mīmāṃsā interpretation of *vidhi* as engendering a sense of duty. Thus it denounces those fools who follow the Vedic doctrines and do not believe in anything else; they are full of desires and eager to attain Heaven, they take to those actions which lead to rebirth and the enjoyment of mundane pleasures. People who are thus filled with greed and desires, and perform sacrifices for the attainment of earthly goods, move in an inferior plane and are not qualified for the higher scheme of life of devotion to God with right resolution¹. The Vedas are said to be under the influence of mundane hankerings and desires, and it is through passions and antipathies, through desires and aversions, that people perform the Vedic sacrifices and think that there is nothing greater than these. One should therefore transcend the sphere of Vedic sacrifices performed out of motives of self-interest. But the *Gītā* is not against the performance of Vedic sacrifices, if inspired by a sheer regard for the duty of performing sacrifices. Anyone who looks to his own personal gain and advantages in performing the sacrifices, and is only eager to attain his pleasurable ends, is an inferior type of man; the sacrifices should therefore be performed without any personal attachment, out of regard for the sacred duty of the performance. Prajāpati created sacrifices along with the creation of men and said, “The sacrifices will be for your good—you should help the gods by your sacrifices, and the gods will in their

¹ *Vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ samādhau na vidhiyate. Gītā, II. 44.* The word *samādhau* is explained by Śrīdhara as follows: *samādhiḥ cittaikāgryam, para-meśvarābhīmukhatvam iti yāvat; tasmīn niścayātmikā buddhiḥ tu na vidhiyate. Samādhi* is thus used here to mean one-pointedness of mind to God. But Śaṅkara gives a very curious interpretation of the word *samādhi*, as meaning mind (*antaḥkaraṇa* or *buddhi*), which is hardly justifiable. Thus he says, *samādhīyate 'smin puruṣopabhogāya sarvam iti samādhir antaḥkaraṇam buddhiḥ*. The word *vyavasāyātmikā* is interpreted by commentators on II. 41 and II. 44 as meaning *niścayātmikā* (involving correct decision through proper *pramāṇas* or proof). I prefer, however, to take the word to mean “right resolution.”

turn help you to grow and prosper. He who lives for himself without offering oblations to the gods and supporting them thereby is misappropriating the share that belongs to the gods."

This view of the *Gītā* is different from that of the later Mīmāṃsā, which probably had a much earlier tradition. Thus Kumārila held that the final justification of Vedic sacrifices or of *dharma* was that it satisfied our needs and produced happiness—it was *artha*. The sacrifices were, no doubt, performed out of regard for the law of Vedic commands; but that represented only the psychological side of the question. The external ground for the performance of Vedic sacrifices was that it produced happiness for the performer and satisfied his desires by securing for him the objects of desire. It was in dependence on such a view that the Nyāya sought to settle the motive of all Vedic sacrifices. The Naiyāyikas believed that the Vedic observances not only secured for us all desired objects, but that this was also the motive for which the sacrifices were performed. The *Gītā* was well aware of this view, which it denounces. The *Gītā* admitted that the sacrifices produced the good of the world, but its whole outlook was different; for the *Gītā* looked upon the sacrifices as being bonds of union between gods and men. The sacrifices improved the mutual good-will, and it was by the sacrifices that the gods were helped, and they in their turn helped men, and so both men and the gods prospered. Through sacrifices there was rain, and by rain the food-grains grew and men lived on the food-grains. So the sacrifices were looked upon as being sources not so much of individual good as of public good. He who looks to the sacrifices as leading to the satisfaction of his selfish interests is surely an inferior person. But those who do not perform the sacrifices are equally wicked. The Vedas have sprung forth from the deathless eternal, and sacrifices spring from the Vedas, and it is thus that the deathless, all-pervading Brahman is established in the sacrifices¹. The implied belief of the *Gītā* was that the prosperity of the people depended on the fertility of the soil, and that this again depended upon the falling of rains, and that the rains depended on the grace of gods, and that the gods could live prosperously only if the sacrifices were performed; the sacrifices were derived from the Vedas, the Vedas from the all-pervading Brahman, and the Brahman again forms the main content of the

¹ *Gītā*, III. 15.

Vedas. Thus there was a complete cycle from Brahman to sacrifices, from sacrifices to the good of the gods and from the good of the gods to the good and prosperity of the people. Everyone is bound to continue the process of this cycle, and he who breaks it is a sinful and selfish man, who is not worth the life he leads¹. Thus the ideal of the *Gītā* is to be distinguished from the ideal of the *Mīmāṃsā* in this, that, while the latter aimed at individual good, the former aimed at common good, and, while the latter conceived the Vedic commands to be the motives of their action, the former valued the ideal of performing the sacrifices in obedience to the law of continuing the process of the cycle of sacrifices, by which the world of gods and of men was maintained in its proper state of prosperity. When a man works for the sacrifices, such works cannot bind him to their fruits; it is only when works are performed from motives of self-interest that they can bind people to their good and bad fruits².

The word *dharma* in the *Gītā* does not mean what Jaimini understood by the term, viz. a desirable end or good enjoined by the sacrifices (*codanā-lakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah*). The word seems to be used in the *Gītā* primarily in the sense of an unalterable customary order of class-duties or caste-duties and the general approved course of conduct for the people, and also in the sense of prescribed schemes of conduct. This meaning of *dharma* as "old customary order" is probably the oldest meaning of the word, as it is also found in the *Atharva-Veda*, 18. 3. 1 (*dharmam purāṇam anupālayanti*)³. Macdonell, in referring to *Maitrāyaṇa*, IV. 1 9, *Kāṭhaka*, xxxi. 7 and *Taittiriya*, III. 2. 8. 11, points out that bodily defects (bad nails and discoloured teeth) and marrying a younger daughter while her elder sister is unmarried are coupled with murder, though not treated as equal to it, and that there is no distinction in principle between real crimes and what are now regarded as fanciful bodily defects or infringements of merely conventional practices. In the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, XIV. 4. 2. 26, also we find *dharma* for a Kṣatriya⁴ is illustrated as being the characteristic duties of a Kṣatriya. The central meaning of the word *dharma* in the *Gītā* is therefore the oldest Vedic meaning of the word, which is

¹ *Gītā*, III. 16.

² *Ibid.* III. 9.

³ *dharma*, *dharmān* are the regular words, the latter in the *R̥g-veda* and both later, for "law" or "custom." See Macdonell's *Vedic Index*, p. 390.

⁴ *tad etat kṣatrasya kṣatram yad dharmah tasmād dharmāt param nāsti*. Dr Albrecht Weber's edition, Leipzig, 1924.

a much earlier meaning than the latter-day technical meaning of the word as it is found in Mīmāṃsā. *Dharma* does not in the *Gītā* mean sacrifices (*yajña*) or external advantages, as it does in Mīmāṃsā, but the order of conventional practices involving specific caste-divisions and caste-duties. Accordingly, the performance of sacrifices is *dharma* for those whose allotted duties are sacrifices. Adultery is in the Vedas a vice, as being transgression of *dharma*, and this is also referred to as such (*dharme naṣṭe*, I. 39) in the *Gītā*. In the *Gītā*, II. 7, Arjuna is said to be puzzled and confused regarding his duty as a Kṣātriya and the sinful course of injuring the lives of his relations (*dharmasamūḍha-cetāḥ*). The confusion of *dharma* and *adharma* is also referred to in XVIII. 31 and 32. In the *Gītā*, IV. 7 and 8, the word *dharma* is used in the sense of the established order of things and conventionally accepted customs and practices. In II. 40 the way of performing one's duties without regard to pleasures or sorrows is described as a particular and specific kind of *dharma* (*asya dharmasya*), distinguished from *dharma* in general.

The *yajña* (sacrifice) is said to be of various kinds, e.g. that in which oblations are offered to the gods is called *daiva-yajña*; this is distinguished from *brahma-yajña*, in which one dedicates oneself to Brahman, where Brahman is the offerer, offering and the fire of oblations, and in which, by dedicating oneself to Brahman, one is lost in Brahman¹. Then sense-control, again, is described as a kind of *yajña*, and it is said that in the fire of the senses the sense-objects are offered as libations and the senses themselves are offered as libations in the fire of sense-control; all the sense-functions and vital functions are also offered as libations in the fire of sense-control lighted up by reason. Five kinds of sacrifices (*yajña*) are distinguished, viz. the *yajña* with actual materials of libation, called *dravya-yajña*, the *yajña* of asceticism or self-control, called *tapo-yajña*, the *yajña* of union or communion, called *yoga-yajña*, the *yajña* of scriptural studies, called *svādhyāya-yajña*, and the *yajña* of knowledge or wisdom, called *jñāna-yajña*². It is easy to see that the extension of the application of the term *yajña* from the actual material sacrifice to other widely divergent methods of self-advancement is a natural result of the extension of the concept of sacrifice to whatever tended towards self-advancement. The term *yajña* had high and holy associations, and the

¹ *Gītā*, IV. 24 and 25.

² *Ibid.* IV. 26-28; see also 29 and 30.

newly discovered systems of religious endeavours and endeavours for self-advancement came to be regarded as but a new kind of *yajña*, just as the substitution-meditations (*pratīkōpāsānā*) were also regarded as being but new forms of *yajña*. Thus, while thought advanced and newer modes of self-realization began to develop, the older term of *yajña* came to be extended to these new types of religious discipline on account of the high veneration in which the older institution was held.

But, whatever may be the different senses in which the term *yajña* is used in the *Gītā*, the word *dharma* has not here the technical sense of the Mīmāṃsā. The *Gītā* recommends the performance of sacrifices to the Brahmins and fighting to the Kṣatriyas, and thus aims at continuity of conventional practices which it regards as *dharma*. But at the same time it denounces the performance of actions from desire, or passions or any kind of selfish interest. A man should regard his customary duties as his *dharma* and should perform them without any idea of the fulfilment of any of his own desires. When a man performs *karma* from a sense of disinterested duty, his *karma* is no longer a bondage to him. The *Gītā* does not, on the one hand, follow the old *karma*-ideal, that one should perform sacrifices in order to secure earthly and heavenly advantages, nor does it follow, on the other hand, the ideal of the Vedānta or of other systems of philosophy that require us to abandon our desires and control our passions with a view to cleansing the mind entirely of impurities, so as to transcend the sphere of duties and realize the wisdom of the oneness of the spirit. The *Gītā* holds that a man should attain the true wisdom, purge his mind of all its desires, but at the same time perform his customary duties and be faithful to his own *dharma*. There should be no impelling force other than regard and reverence for his own inner law of duty with reference to his own *dharma* of conventional and customary practices or the duties prescribed by the *śāstra*.

Sense-control in the *Gītā*.

The uncontrollability of the senses was realized in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, where the senses are compared with horses. The *Gītā* says that, when the mind is led on by fleeting sense-attractions, the man loses all his wisdom, just as a boat swings to and fro in deep waters in a strong gale. Even in the case of the wise

man, in spite of his efforts to keep himself steady, the troubled senses might lead the mind astray. By continually brooding over sense-objects one becomes attached to them; out of such attachments there arise desires, out of desires there arises anger, out of anger blindness of passions, through such blindness there is lapse of memory, by such lapse of memory a man's intelligence is destroyed, and as a result of that he himself is destroyed¹. Man is naturally inclined towards the path of evil, and in spite of his efforts to restrain himself he tends towards the downward path. Each particular sense has its own specific attachments and antipathies, and attachment (*rāga*) and antipathy are the two enemies. The *Gītā* again and again proclaims the evil effects of desires and attachments (*kāma*), anger (*krodha*) and greed (*lobha*) as the three gates of Hell, being that which veils wisdom as smoke veils fire, as impurities sully a mirror or as the foetus is covered by the womb². Arjuna is made to refer to Kṛṣṇa the difficulty of controlling the senses. Thus he says, "My mind, O Kṛṣṇa, is violent, troubled and changeful; it is as difficult to control it as it is to control the winds³." True *yoga* can never be attained unless and until the senses are controlled.

The Pāli work *Dhamma-pada* is also filled with similar ideas regarding the control of attachments and anger. Thus it says, "He has abused me, beaten me, worsted me, robbed me—those who dwell not upon such thoughts are freed from hate. Never does hatred cease by hating, but hatred ceases by love; this is the ancient law....As the wind brings down a weak tree, so Māra overwhelms him who lives looking for pleasures, has his senses uncontrolled, or is immoderate in his food, slothful and effeminate. ...As rain breaks through an ill-thatched house, so passion will break through an undisciplined mind⁴." Again, speaking of mind, it says, "As an arrow-maker levels his arrow, so a wise man levels his trembling, unsteady mind, which it is difficult to guard and hold back....Let the wise man guard his mind, incomprehensible, subtle, capricious though it is. Blessed is the guarded mind⁵." Again, "Not nakedness, nor matted hair, not dirt, nor fastings, not lying on earth, nor ashes, nor ascetic postures, none of these things purify a man who is not free from desires⁶." Again, "From

¹ *Gītā*, II. 60, 62, 63.² *Ibid.* III. 34, 37-39; XVI. 21.³ VI. 34.⁴ *Dhamma-pada* (Poona, 1923), I. 4, 5, 7, 13.⁵ *Ibid.* III. 36, 38.⁶ *Ibid.* X. 141.

attachment (*piyato*) comes grief, from attachment comes fear; he who is free from attachment knows neither grief nor fear. From affection (*pemato*) come grief and fear. He who is free from affection knows neither grief nor fear. From lust (*rati*) come grief and fear. He who is free from affection knows neither grief nor fear. From lust (*kāma*) come grief and fear. He who is free from lust knows neither grief nor fear. From desire (*tanhā*) come grief and fear. He who is free from desire knows neither grief nor fear¹.”

It is clear from the above that both the *Gītā* and the *Dhamma-pada* praise sense-control and consider desires, attachments, anger and grief as great enemies. But the treatment of the *Gītā* differs from that of the *Dhamma-pada* in this, that, while in the *Dhamma-pada* there is a course of separate lessons or moral instructions on diverse subjects, the *Gītā* deals with sense-control as a means to the attainment of peace, contentment and desirelessness, which enables a man to dedicate all his actions to God and follow the conventional courses of duties without looking for anything in them for himself. The *Gītā* knows that the senses, mind and intellect are the seats of all attachments and antipathies, and that it is through the senses and the mind that these can stupefy a man and make his knowledge blind². All the sense-affections of cold and heat, pleasure and sorrow, are mere changes of our sensibility, are mere touches of feeling which are transitory and should therefore be quietly borne³. It is only by controlling the senses that the demon of desire, which distorts all ordinary and philosophic knowledge, can be destroyed. But it is very hard to stifle this demon of desire, which always appears in new forms. It is only when a man can realize within himself the great being which transcends our intellect that he can control his lower self with his higher self and uproot his desires. The self is its own friend as well as its own foe, and one should always try to uplift oneself and not allow oneself to sink down. The chief aim of all sense-control is to make a man's thoughts steady, so that he can link himself up in communion with God⁴.

The senses in the *Gītā* are regarded as drawing the mind along with them. The senses are continually changing and fleeting, and they make the mind also changeful and fleeting; and, as a result of

¹ *Dhamma-pada*, xvi. 212–216.

² *Gītā*, III. 40.

³ *Ibid.* II. 14.

⁴ *Ibid.* II. 61; III. 41, 43; VI. 5, 6.

that, the mind, like a boat at sea before a strong wind, is driven to and fro, and steadiness of thought and wisdom (*prajñā*) are destroyed. The word *prajñā* is used in the *Gītā* in the sense of thought or wisdom or mental inclinations in general. It is used in a more or less similar sense in the *Bṛhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad*, iv. 4. 21, and in a somewhat different sense in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, 7. But the sense in which Patañjali uses the word is entirely different from that in which it is used in the *Gītā* or the Upaniṣads. Patañjali uses the word in the technical sense of a specific type of mystical cognition arising out of the steady fixing of the mind on an object, and speaks of seven stages of such *prajñā* corresponding to the stages of *yoga* ascension. *Prajñā* in the *Gītā* means, as has just been said, thought or mental inclination. It does not mean *jñāna*, or ordinary cognition, or *vijñāna* as higher wisdom; it means knowledge in its volitional aspect. It is not the *kriyākhyajñāna*, as moral discipline of *yama*, *niyama*, etc., of the *Pañca-rātra* work *Āyākhyā-saṃhitā*. It means an intellectual outlook, as integrally connected with, and determining, the mental bent or inclination. When the mind follows the mad dance of the senses after their objects, the intellectual background of the mind determining its direction, the *prajñā* is also upset. Unless the *prajñā* is fixed, the mind cannot proceed undisturbed in its prescribed fixed course. So the central object of controlling the senses is the securing of the steadiness of this *prajñā* (*vaśe hi yasyendriyāṇi tasya prajñā pratiṣṭhitā*—II. 57). *Prajñā* and *dhī* are two words which seem to be in the *Gītā* synonymous, and they both mean mental inclination. This mental inclination probably involves both an intellectual outlook, and a corresponding volitional tendency. Sense-control makes this *prajñā* steady, and the *Gītā* abounds in praise of the *sthita-prajñā* and *sthita-dhī*, i.e. of one who has mental inclination or thoughts fixed and steady¹. Sense-attachments are formed by continual association with sense-objects, and attachment begets desire, desire begets anger, and so on. Thus all the vices spring from sense-attachments. And the person who indulges in sense-gratifications is rushed along by the passions. So, just as a tortoise collects within itself all its limbs, so the person who restrains his senses from the sense-objects has his mind steady and fixed. The direct result of sense-control is thus steadiness of will, and of mental inclinations or mind (*prajñā*).

¹ II. 54-56.

The person who has his *prajñā* fixed is not troubled in sorrows and is not eager to gain pleasures, he has no attachment, no fear and no anger¹. He is indifferent in prosperity and in adversity and neither desires anything nor shuns anything². He alone can obtain peace who, like the sea receiving all the rivers in it, absorbs all his desires within himself; not so the man who is always busy in satisfying his desires. The man who has given up all his desires and is unattached to anything is not bound to anything, has no vanity and attains true peace. When a man can purge his mind of attachments and antipathies and can take to sense-objects after purifying his senses and keeping them in full control, he attains contentment (*prasāda*). When such contentment is attained, all sorrows vanish and his mind becomes fixed (*buddhiḥ paryavatiṣṭhate*)³. Thus sense-control, on the one hand, makes the mind unruffled, fixed, at peace with itself and filled with contentment, and on the other hand, by making the mind steady and fixed, it makes communion with God possible. Sense-control is the indispensable precondition of communion with God; when once this has been attained, it is possible to link oneself with God by continued efforts⁴. Thus sense-control, by producing steadiness of the will and thought, results in contentment and peace on the one hand, and on the other makes the mind fit for entering into communion with God.

One thing that strikes us in reading the *Gītā* is that the object of sense-control in the *Gītā* is not the attainment of a state of emancipated oneness or the absolute cessation of all mental processes, but the more intelligible and common-sense ideal of the attainment of steadiness of mind, contentment and the power of entering into touch with God. This view of the object of self-control is therefore entirely different from that praised in the philosophic systems of Patañjali and others. The *Gītā* wants us to control our senses and mind and to approach sense-objects with such a controlled mind and senses, because it is by this means alone that we can perform our duties with a peaceful and contented mind and turn to God with a clean and unruffled heart⁵. The main emphasis of this sense-control is not on the mere external control of volitional activities and the control of motor propensities

¹ *Gītā*, II. 56.

² *Ibid.* II. 57.

³ *Ibid.* II. 65; see also II. 58, 64, 68, 70, 71.

⁴ *Ibid.* VI. 36.

⁵ *rāga-dveṣa-vimuktais tu viṣayān indriyaiś caran
ātma-vaśyair vidheyātmā prasādam adhigacchati. Ibid.* II. 64.

in accordance with the direction of passions and appetites, but on the inner control of the mind behind these active senses. When a person controls only his physical activities, and yet continues to brood over the attractions of sense, he is in reality false in his conduct (*mithyācāra*). Real self-control does not mean only the cessation of the external operations of the senses, but also the control of the mind. Not only should a man cease from committing actions out of greed and desire for sense-gratification, but his mind should be absolutely clean, absolutely clear of all impurities of sense-desires. Mere suspension of physical action without a corresponding control of mind and cessation from harbouring passions and desires is a vicious course¹.

The Ethics of the Gītā and the Buddhist Ethics.

The subject of sense-control naturally reminds one of Buddhism. In the Vedic religion performance of sacrifices was considered as the primary duty. Virtue and vice consisted in obedience or disobedience to Vedic injunctions. It has been pointed out that these injunctions implied a sort of categorical imperative and communicated a sense of *vidhi* as law, a command which must be obeyed. But this law was no inner law of the spirit within, but a mere external law, which ought not to be confused with morality in the modern sense of the term. Its sphere was almost wholly ritualistic, and, though it occasionally included such commands as "One should not injure anyone" (*mā himsyāt*), yet in certain sacrifices which were aimed at injuring one's enemies operations which would lead to such results would have the imperative of a Vedic command, though the injury to human beings would be attended with its necessary punishment. Again, though in later Sāṃkhya commentaries and compendiums it is said that all kinds of injuries to living beings bring their punishment, yet it is doubtful if the Vedic injunction "Thou shouldst not injure" really applied to all living beings, as there would be but few sacrifices where animals were not killed. The Upaniṣads, however, start an absolutely new line by the substitution of meditations and self-knowledge for sacrificial actions. In the

¹ Cf. *Dhamma-pada*, 1. 2. All phenomena have mind as their precursor, are dependent upon mind and are made up of mind. If a man speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness accompanies him, just as a shadow follows a man incessantly.

primary stage of Upaniṣadic thoughts a conviction was growing that instead of the sacrificial performances one could go through a set form of meditations, identifying in thought certain objects with certain other objects (e.g. the dawn as the horse of horse-sacrifice) or even with symbolic syllables, OM and the like. In the more developed stage of Upaniṣadic culture a new conviction arose in the search after the highest and the ultimate truth, and the knowledge of Brahman as the highest essence in man and nature is put forward as the greatest wisdom and the final realization of truth and reality, than which nothing higher could be conceived. There are but few moral precepts in the Upaniṣads, and the whole subject of moral conflict and moral efforts is almost silently dropped or passes unemphasized. In the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, I. 11, the teacher is supposed to give a course of moral instruction to his pupil after teaching him the Vedas—Tell the truth, be virtuous, do not give up the study of the Vedas; after presenting the teacher with the stipulated honorarium (at the conclusion of his studies) the pupil should (marry and) continue the line of his family. He should not deviate from truth or from virtue (*dharma*) or from good. He should not cease doing good to others, from study and teaching. He should be respectful to his parents and teachers and perform such actions as are unimpeachable. He should follow only good conduct and not bad. He should make gifts with faith (*śraddhā*), not with indifference, with dignity, from a sense of shame, through fear and through knowledge. If there should be any doubt regarding his course of duty or conduct, then he should proceed to act in the way in which the wisest Brahmins behaved. But few Upaniṣads give such moral precepts, and there is very little in the Upaniṣads in the way of describing a course of moral behaviour or of emphasizing the fact that man can attain his best only by trying to become great through moral efforts. The Upaniṣads occupy themselves almost wholly with mystic meditations and with the philosophic wisdom of self-knowledge. Yet the ideas of self-control, peace and cessation of desires, endurance and concentration are referred to in *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, IV. 4. 23, as a necessary condition for the realization of the self within us¹. In *Kaṭha*, VI. 11, the control of the senses (*indriya-dhāraṇa*) is referred to as *yoga*, and in *Muṇḍaka*, III. 2. 2,

¹ *śānto dānta uparatas titikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtvātmany eva ātmānam paśyati.* *Bṛh.* IV. 4. 23.

it is said that he who consciously desires the objects of desire is again and again born through desires; but even in this world all desires vanish for him who is self-realized in himself and is self-satisfied¹. The idea that the path of wisdom is different from the path of desires was also known, and it was felt that he who sought wisdom (*vidyābhīṣita*) was not drawn by many desires².

The point to be discussed in this connection is whether the central idea of the *Gītā*, namely, sense-control and more particularly the control of desires and attachments, is derived from the Upaniṣads or from Buddhism. It has been pointed out that the Upaniṣads do not emphasize the subject of moral conflict and moral endeavours so much as the nature of truth and reality as Brahman, the ultimate essence of man and the manifold appearance of the world. Yet the idea of the necessity of sense-control and the control of desires, the settling of the mind in peace and contentment, is the necessary precondition for fitness for Vedic knowledge. Thus Śaṅkara, the celebrated commentator on the Upaniṣads, in commenting on *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1. 1, says that a man is fit for an enquiry after Brahman only when he knows how to distinguish what is permanent from what is transitory (*nityānitya-vastu-viveka*), and when he has no attachment to the enjoyment of the fruits of his actions either as mundane pleasures or as heavenly joys (*ihāmutra-phala-bhoga-virāga*). The necessary qualifications which entitle a man to make such an enquiry are disinclination of the mind for worldly joys (*śama*), possession of proper control and command over the mind, by which it may be turned to philosophy (*dama*), power of endurance (*viśaya-titikṣā*), cessation of all kinds of duties (*uparati*), and faith in the philosophical conception of truth and reality (*tattva-śraddhā*). It may be supposed, therefore, that the Upaniṣads presuppose a high degree of moral development in the way of self-control and disinclination to worldly and heavenly joys. Detachment from sense-affections is one of the most dominant ideas of the *Gītā*, and the idea of *Muṇḍaka*, III. 2. 2, referred to above, is re-echoed in the *Gītā*, II. 70, where it is said that, just as the waters are absorbed in the calm sea (though poured in continually by the rivers), so the person in whom all desires are absorbed attains peace, and

¹ *kāmān yāḥ kāmāyate manyamānaḥ sa kāmabhir jāyate tatra tatra paryāpta-kāmasya kṛtātmanas tu ihaiva sarve pravṛtīyanti kāmāḥ. Muṇḍaka, III. 2. 2.*

² *Kaṣha, II. 4.*

not the man who indulges in desires. The *Gītā*, of course, again and again emphasizes the necessity of uprooting attachments to pleasures and antipathy to pains and of controlling desires (*kāma*); but, though the Upaniṣads do not emphasize this idea so frequently, yet the idea is there, and it seems very probable that the *Gītā* drew it from the Upaniṣads. Hindu tradition also refers to the Upaniṣads as the source of the *Gītā*. Thus the *Gītā-māhātmya* describes the Upaniṣads as the cows from which Kṛṣṇa, the cowherd boy, drew the *Gītā* as milk¹.

But the similarity of Buddhist ethical ideas to those of the *Gītā* is also immense, and, had it not been for the fact that ideas which may be regarded as peculiarly Buddhistic are almost entirely absent from the *Gītā*, it might well have been contended that the *Gītā* derived its ideas of controlling desires and uprooting attachment from Buddhism. Tachibana collects a long list of Buddhist vices as follows²:

aṅganam, impurity, lust, *Sn.* 517.
ahaṅkāro, selfishness, egoism, *A.* I. 132; *M.* III. 18, 32.
mamaṅkaro, desire, *A.* I. 132; *M.* III. 18, 32.
mamāyitam, selfishness, *S.N.* 466.
mamattam, grasping, egoism, *S.N.* 872, 951.
apekhā, desire, longing, affection, *S.N.* 38; *Dh.* 345.
icchā, wish, desire, covetousness.
ejā, desire, lust, greed, craving, *S.N.* 751; *It.* 92.
āsā, desire, longing, *S.N.* 634, 794, 864; *Dh.* 397.
pīpāsā, thirst.
esā, *esanā*, wish, desire, thirst, *Dh.* 335.
ākāṅkhā, desire, longing, *Tha.* 20.
kiñcanam, attachment, *S.N.* 949; *Dh.* 200.
gantho, bond, tie, *S.N.* 798; *Dh.* 211.
ādāna-gantho, the tied knot of attachment, *S.N.* 794.
giddhi, greed, desire, *Sn.* 328; *M.* I. 360, 362.
gedho, greed, desire, *Sn.* 65, 152.
gahanam, entanglement, *Dh.* 394.
gāho, seizing, attachment.
jālinī, snare, desire, lust, *Dh.* 180; *A.* II. 211.
pariggaho, attachment, *Mahānid.* 57.
chando, wish, desire, intention, *S.N.* 171, 203, etc.
jaṭā, desire, lust, *S.N.* I. 13; *V.M.* I.
jigīmsanatā, covetousness, desire for, *Vibhaṅga*, 353.
nijigīmsanatā, covetousness, *V.M.* I. 23.
taṇhā, *tasinā*, lust, unsatisfied desire, passion.

¹ *Sarvopaniṣado gāvo dogdhā gopāla-nandanah.*

² *The Ethics of Buddhism*, by S. Tachibana, p. 73.

- upādānam*, clinging, attachment, *Dh.* II. 58, III. 230.
paṇidhi, wish, aspiration, *Sn.* 801.
pīhā, desire, envy, *Tha.* 1218.
pemam, affection, love, *A.* III. 249.
bandho, thong, bondage, attachment, *Sn.* 623; *Dh.* 344.
bandhanam, bond, fetter, attachment, *Sn.* 522, 532; *Dh.* 345.
nibandho, binding, attachment, *S.* II. 17.
vinibandhanam, bondage, desire, *Sn.* 16.
anubandho, bondage, affection, desire, *M.* III. 170; *Jt.* 91.
upanibandho, fastening, attachment, *V.M.* I. 235.
paribandho, Com. on *Thi.* p. 242.
rāgo, human passion, evil, desire, lust, *passim.*
sāraḡo, *sārajjanā*, *sārajjitattam*, affection, passion, *Mahānid.* 242.
rati, lust, attachment, *Dh.* 27.
manoratho, desire, wish (?).
ruci, desire, inclination, *Sn.* 781.
abhiḡāso, desire, longing, wish, Com. on *Peta-vattu*, 154.
lālasā, ardent desire (?).
ālayo, longing, desire, lust, *Sn.* 535, 635; *Dh.* 411.
lobho, covetousness, desire, cupidity, *Sn.* 367; *Dh.* 248.
lobhanam, greed, *Tha.* 343.
lobhanā, *lobhitattam*, do. (?).
vanam, desire, lust, *Sn.* 1131; *Dh.* 284, 344.
vanatho, love, lust, *Dh.* 283, 284.
nivesanam, clinging to, attachment, *Sn.* 470, 801.
saṅgo, fetter, bond, attachment, *Sn.* 473, 791; *Dh.* 397.
āsatti, attachment, hanging on, clinging, *Sn.* 777; *Vin.* II. 156;
S. I. 212.
visattikā, poison, desire, *Sn.* 333; *Dh.* 180.
santhavam, friendship, attachment, *Sn.* 207, 245; *Dh.* 27.
ussado, desire (?), *Sn.* 515, 783, 785.
sneho, *sineho*, affection, lust, desire, *Sn.* 209, 943; *Dh.* 285.
āsayo, abode, intention, inclination, *V.H.* I. 140.
anusayo, inclination, desire, *A.* I. 132; *Sn.* 14, 369, 545.
sibbanī, desire (?), *Sn.* 1040.
kodho, anger, wrath, *Sn.* I. 245, 362, 868, 928; *Dh.* 221-3; *It.* 4,
12, 109.
kopo, anger, ill-will, ill-temper, *Sn.* 6.
āghāto, anger, ill-will, hatred, malice, *D.* I. 3, 31; *S.* I. 179.
patigho, wrath, hatred, *Sum.* 116.
doso, anger, hatred, *passim.*
viddeso, enmity, hatred (?).
dhūmo, anger (?), *Sn.* 460.
upanāho, enmity, *Sn.* 116.
vyāpādo, wish to injure, hatred, fury, *Sum.* 211; *It.* 111.
anabhiraddhi, anger, wrath, rage, *D.* I. 3.
veram, wrath, anger, hatred, sin, *Sn.* 150; *Dh.* 3-5, 201.
virodho, opposition, enmity (?).

roso, anger (?).

rosanam, anger (?).

vyāroṣaṇam, anger, *Sn.* 148.

aññāṇam, ignorance, *It.* 62.

moho, fainting, ignorance, folly, *passim*.

mohanam, ignorance, *S.N.* 399, 772.

avijjā, ignorance, error, passion.

It is interesting to note that three vices, covetousness, hatred and ignorance, and covetousness particularly, appear under different names and their extirpation is again and again emphasized in diverse ways. These three, ignorance, covetousness and hatred or antipathy, are the roots of all evils. There are, of course, simpler commandments, such as not to take life, not to steal, not to commit adultery, not to tell a lie, and not to take intoxicating drinks, and of these stealing gold, drinking liquors, dishonouring one's teacher's bed, and killing a Brahmin are also prohibited in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, v. 10. 9–10¹. But, while the *Chāndogya* only prohibits killing Brahmins, the Buddha prohibited taking the life of any living being. But all these vices, and others opposed to the *aṭṭhaṅga-sīla* and *dasa-kusala-kamma*, are included within covetousness, ignorance and hatred. The *Gītā* bases its ethics mainly on the necessity of getting rid of attachment and desires from which proceeds greed and frustration of which produces anger. But, while in Buddhism ignorance (*avidyā*) is considered as the source of all evil, the *Gītā* does not even mention the word. In the twelvefold chain of causality in Buddhism it is held that out of ignorance (*avijjā*) come the conformations (*saṅkhāra*), out of the conformations consciousness (*viññāna*), out of consciousness mind and body (*nāma-rūpa*), out of mind and body come the six fields of contact (*āyatana*), out of the six fields of contact comes sense-contact, out of sense-contact comes feeling, out of feeling come desires (*tanhā*), out of desires comes the holding fast to things (*upādāna*), out of the holding fast to things comes existence (*bhava*), out of existence comes birth (*jāti*), and from birth come old age, decay and death. If ignorance, or *avijjā*, is stopped,

¹ There is another list of eightfold prohibitions called *aṭṭhaṅga-sīla*; these are not to take life, not to take what is not given, to abstain from sex-relations, to abstain from falsehood, from drinking liquors, from eating at forbidden times, from dancing and music and from beautifying one's body by perfumes, garlands, etc. There is also another list called *dasa-kusala-kamma*, such as not to take life, not to take what is not given, not to commit adultery, not to tell a lie, not to slander, not to abuse or talk foolishly, not to be covetous, malicious and sceptical.

then the whole cycle stops. But, though in this causal cycle ignorance and desires are far apart, yet psychologically desires proceed immediately from ignorance, and a frustration of desires produces anger, hatred, etc. In the *Gītā* the start is taken directly from attachment and desires (*kāma*). The Buddhist word *trṣṇā* (*tanhā*) is seldom mentioned in the *Gītā*; whereas the Upaniṣadic word *kāma* takes its place as signifying desires. The *Gītā* is not a philosophical work which endeavours to search deeply into the causes of attachments, nor does it seek to give any practical course of advice as to how one should get rid of attachment. The Vedānta system of thought, as interpreted by Śaṅkara, traces the origin of the world with all its evils to ignorance or nescience (*avidyā*), as an indefinable principle; the Yoga traces all our phenomenal experience to five afflictions, ignorance, attachment, antipathy, egoism and self-love, and the last four to the first, which is the fountain-head of all evil afflictions. In the *Gītā* there is no such attempt to trace attachment, etc. to some other higher principle. The word *ajñāna* (ignorance) is used in the *Gītā* about six or eight times in the sense of ignorance; but this "ignorance" does not mean any metaphysical principle or the ultimate starting-point of a causal chain, and is used simply in the sense of false knowledge or ignorance, as opposed to true knowledge of things as they are. Thus in one place it is said that true knowledge of things is obscured by ignorance, and that this is the cause of all delusion¹. Again, it is said that to those who by true knowledge (of God) destroy their own ignorance (*ajñāna*) true knowledge reveals the highest reality (*tat param*), like the sun². In another place *jñāna* and *ajñāna* are both defined. *Jñāna* is defined as unvacillating and abiding self-knowledge and true knowledge by which truth and reality are apprehended, and all that is different from this is called *ajñāna*³. *Ajñāna* is stated elsewhere to be the result of *tamas*, and in two other places *tamas* is said to be the product of *ajñāna*⁴. In another place it is said that people are blinded by ignorance (*ajñāna*), thinking, "I am rich, I am an aristocrat, who else is there like me? I shall perform sacrifices make gifts and enjoy⁵." In another place ignorance is said to

¹ *ajñānenāvyatam jñānam tena muhyanti jantavaḥ*. v. 15.

² *jñānena tu tad-ajñānam yeṣāṃ nāśitam ātmanah*. v. 16.

³ *adhyātma-jñāna-mītyatvam tattva-jñānārtha-darśanam etaj-jñānam iti proktaṃ ajñānam yad ato 'nyathā*. *Gītā*, XIII. 12. ¶

⁴ *Ibid.* XIV. 16, 17; x. 11; XIV. 8.

⁵ *Ibid.* v. 16.

produce doubts (*saṁśaya*), and the *Gītā* lecture of Kṛṣṇa is supposed to dispel the delusion of Arjuna, produced by ignorance¹. This shows that, though the word *ajñāna* is used in a variety of contexts, either as ordinary ignorance or ignorance of true and absolute philosophic knowledge, it is never referred to as being the source of attachment or desires. This need not be interpreted to mean that the *Gītā* was opposed to the view that attachments and desires were produced from ignorance; but it seems at least to imply that the *Gītā* was not interested to trace the origin of attachments and desires and was satisfied to take their existence for granted and urged the necessity of their extirpation for peace and equanimity of mind. Buddhist Hinayāna ethics and practical discipline are constituted of moral discipline (*śīla*), concentration (*saṁādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*). The *śīla* consisted in the performance of good conduct (*caritta*) and desisting (*vāritta*) from certain other kinds of prohibited action. *Śīla* means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the right path. *Śīla* thus means (1) right volition (*cetanā*), (2) the associated mental states (*cetasika*), (3) mental control (*saṁvara*), and (4) the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind by way of the preceding three *śīlas*, called *avittikkama*. *Samvara* is spoken of as being of five kinds, viz. (1) *pātimokkha-saṁvara* (the control which saves him who abides by it), (2) *sati-saṁvara* (the control of mindfulness), (3) *ñāna-saṁvara* (the control of knowledge), (4) *khanti-saṁvara* (the control of patience) and (5) *virīya-saṁvara* (the control of active restraint). *Pātimokkha-saṁvara* means all self-control in general. *Sati-saṁvara* means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good associations, when using one's cognitive senses. Even when looking at any tempting object, a man will, by virtue of his mindfulness (*sati*), control himself from being tempted by not thinking of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may lead in the right direction. *Khanti-saṁvara* is that by which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence to *śīla* all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (*kamma*) are duly systematized, organized and stabilized (*saṁādhānam, upadhāraṇam, paṭiṭṭhā*). The practice of *śīla* is for the practice of *jhāna* (meditation). As a preparatory measure thereto, a man must train himself

¹ *Gītā*, IV. 42; XVIII. 72.

continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating and drinking (*āhāre paṭikūla-saññā*) by emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated with seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. He must habituate his mind to the idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, viz. *kṣiti* (earth), *ap* (water), etc. He should also think of the good effects of *śīla*, the making of gifts, of the nature of death and of the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena, and should practise *brahma-vihāra*, as the fourfold meditation of universal friendship, universal pity, happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all, and indifference to any kind of preferment for himself, his friend, his enemy or a third party¹.

The *Gītā* does not enter into any of these disciplinary measures. It does not make a programme of universal altruism or hold that one should live only for others, as is done in Mahāyāna ethics, or of the virtues of patience, energy for all that is good (*vīrya* as *kuśalotsāha*), meditation and true knowledge of the essencelessness of all things. The person who takes the vow of saintly life takes the vow of living for the good of others, for which he should be prepared to sacrifice all that is good for him. His vow does not limit him to doing good to his co-religionists or to any particular sects, but applies to all human beings, irrespective of caste, creed or race, and not only to human beings, but to all living beings. Mahāyāna ethical works like the *Bodhi-caryāvatāra-pañjikā* or *Śikṣā-samuccaya* do not deal merely with doctrines or theories, but largely with practical instructions for becoming a Buddhist saint. They treat of the practical difficulties in the path of a saint's career and give practical advice regarding the way in which he may avoid temptations, keep himself in the straight path of duty, and gradually elevate himself to higher and higher states.

The *Gītā* is neither a practical guide-book of moral efforts nor a philosophical treatise discussing the origin of immoral tendencies and tracing them to certain metaphysical principles as their sources; but, starting from the ordinary frailties of attachment and desires, it tries to show how one can lead a normal life of duties and responsibilities and yet be in peace and contentment in a state of equanimity and in communion with God. The *Gītā*

¹ See *A History of Indian Philosophy*, by S. N. Dasgupta, vol. 1, p. 103.

has its setting in the great battle of the *Mahā-bhārata*. Kṛṣṇa is represented as being an incarnation of God, and he is also the charioteer of his friend and relation, Arjuna, the great Pāṇḍava hero. The Pāṇḍava hero was a Kṣātriya by birth, and he had come to the great battle-field of Kurukṣetra to fight his cousin and opponent King Duryodhana, who had assembled great warriors, all of whom were relations of Arjuna, leading mighty armies. In the first chapter of the *Gītā* a description is given of the two armies which faced each other in the holy field (*dharma-kṣetra*) of Kurukṣetra. In the second chapter Arjuna is represented as feeling dejected at the idea of having to fight with his relations and of eventually killing them. He says that it was better to beg from door to door than to kill his respected relations. Kṛṣṇa strongly objects to this attitude of Arjuna and says that the soul is immortal and it is impossible to kill anyone. But, apart from this metaphysical point of view, even from the ordinary point of view a Kṣātriya ought to fight, because it is his duty to do so, and there is nothing nobler for a Kṣātriya than to fight. The fundamental idea of the *Gītā* is that a man should always follow his own caste-duties, which are his own proper duties, or *sva-dharma*. Even if his own proper duties are of an inferior type, it is much better for him to cleave to them than to turn to other people's duties which he could well perform. It is even better to die cleaving to one's caste-duties, than to turn to the duties fixed for other people, which only do him harm¹. The caste-duties of Brahmins, Kṣātriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras are fixed in accordance with their natural qualities. Thus sense-control, control over mind, power of endurance, purity, patience, sincerity, knowledge of worldly things and philosophic wisdom are the natural qualities of a Brahmin. Heroism, bravery, patience, skill, not to fly from battle, making of gifts and lordliness are the natural duties of a Kṣātriya. Agriculture, tending of cattle and trade are the natural duties of a Śūdra. A man can attain his highest only by performing the specific duties of his own caste. God pervades this world, and it is He who moves all beings to work. A man can best realize himself by adoring God and by the performance of his own specific caste-duties. No sin can come to a man who performs his own caste-duties. Even if one's caste-duties were sinful or wrong, it would not be wrong

¹ *Gītā*, III. 35.

for a man to perform them; for, as there is smoke in every fire, so there is some wrong thing or other in all our actions¹. Arjuna is thus urged to follow his caste-duty as a Kṣātriya and to fight his enemies in the battle-field. If he killed his enemies, then he would be the master of the kingdom; if he himself was killed, then since he had performed the duties of a Kṣātriya, he would go to Heaven. If he did not engage himself in that fight, which was his duty, he would not only lose his reputation, but would also transgress his own *dharma*.

Such an instruction naturally evokes the objection that war necessarily implies injury to living beings; but in reply to such an objection Kṛṣṇa says that the proper way of performing actions is to dissociate one's mind from attachment; when one can perform an action with a mind free from attachment, greed and selfishness, from a pure sense of duty, the evil effects of such action cannot affect the performer. The evil effects of any action can affect the performer when in performing an action he has a motive of his own to fulfil. But, if he does not seek anything for himself, if he is not overjoyed in pleasures, or miserable in pains, his works cannot affect him. A man should therefore surrender all his desires for selfish ends and dedicate all his actions to God and be in communion with Him, and yet continue to perform the normal duties of his caste and situation of life. So long as we have our bodies, the necessity of our own nature will drive us to work. So it is impossible for us to give up all work. To give up work can be significant only if it means the giving up of all desires for the fruits of such actions. If the fruits of actions are given up, then the actions can no longer bind us to them. That brings us in return peace and contentment, and the saint who has thus attained a perfect equanimity of mind is firm and unshaken in his true wisdom, and nothing can sway him to and fro. One may seek to attain this state either by philosophic wisdom or by devotion to God, and it is the latter path which is easier. God, by His grace, helps the devotee to purge his mind of all impurities, and so by His grace a man can dissociate his mind from all motives of greed and selfishness and be in communion with Him; he can thus perform his duties, as fixed for him by his caste or his custom, without looking forward to any reward or gain.

The *Gītā* ideal of conduct differs from the sacrificial ideal of

¹ *Gītā*, xviii. 44-48.

conduct in this, that sacrifices are not to be performed for any ulterior end of heavenly bliss or any other mundane benefits, but merely from a sense of duty, because sacrifices are enjoined in the scriptures to be performed by Brahmins; and they must therefore be performed from a pure sense of duty. The *Gītā* ideal of ethics differs from that preached in the systems of philosophy like the Vedānta or the Yoga of Patañjali in this, that, while the aim of these systems was to transcend the sphere of actions and duties, to rise to a stage in which one could give up all one's activities, mental or physical, the ideal of the *Gītā* was decidedly an ideal of work. The *Gītā*, as has already been pointed out, does not advocate a course of extremism in anything. However elevated a man may be, he must perform his normal caste-duties and duties of customary morality¹. The *Gītā* is absolutely devoid of the note of pessimism which is associated with early Buddhism. The *śīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā* of Buddhism have, no doubt, in the *Gītā* their counterparts in the training of a man to disinclination for joys and attachments, to concentration on God and the firm and steady fixation of will and intelligence; but the significance of these in the *Gītā* is entirely different from that which they have in Buddhism. The *Gītā* does not expound a course of approved conduct and prohibitions, since, so far as these are concerned, one's actions are to be guided by the code of caste-duties or duties of customary morality. What is required of a man is that he should cleanse his mind from the impurities of attachment, desires and cravings. The *samādhi* of the *Gītā* is not a mere concentration of the mind on some object, but communion with God, and the wisdom, or *prajñā*, of the *Gītā* is no realization of any philosophic truth, but a fixed and unperturbed state of the mind, where the will and intellect remain unshaken in one's course of duty, clear of all consequences and free from all attachments, and in a state of equanimity which cannot be shaken or disturbed by pleasures or sorrows.

It may naturally be asked in this connection, what is the general standpoint of Hindu Ethics? The Hindu social system is based on a system of fourfold division of castes. The *Gītā* says that God Himself created the fourfold division of castes into Brahmins, Kṣātriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras, a division based on characteristic

¹ Śaṅkara, of course, is in entire disagreement with this interpretation of the *Gītā*, as will be discussed in a later section.

qualities and specific duties. Over and above this caste division and its corresponding privileges, duties and responsibilities, there is also a division of the stages of life into that of *Brahma-cārin*—student, *grha-stha*—householder, *vāna-prastha*—retired in a forest, and *bhikṣu*—mendicant, and each of these had its own prescribed duties. The duties of Hindu ethical life consisted primarily of the prescribed caste-duties and the specific duties of the different stages of life, and this is known as *varṇāśrama-dharma*. Over and above this there were also certain duties which were common to all, called the *sādhāraṇa-dharmas*. Thus Manu mentions steadiness (*dhairya*), forgiveness (*kṣamā*), self-control (*dama*), non-stealing (*cauryābhāva*), purity (*śauca*), sense-control (*indriya-nigraha*), wisdom (*dhī*), learning (*vidyā*), truthfulness (*satya*) and control of anger (*akrodha*) as examples of *sādhāraṇa-dharma*. Prastāpāda mentions faith in religious duties (*dharma-śraddhā*), non-injury (*ahiṃsā*), doing good to living beings (*bhūta-hitatva*), truthfulness (*satya-vacana*), non-stealing (*asteya*), sex-continence (*brahmacharya*), sincerity of mind (*anupadhā*), control of anger (*krodha-varjana*), cleanliness and ablutions (*abhiṣecana*), taking of pure food (*śuci-dravya-sevana*), devotion to Vedic gods (*viśiṣṭa-devatā-bhakti*), and watchfulness in avoiding transgressions (*apramāda*). The caste-duties must be distinguished from these common duties. Thus sacrifices, study and gifts are common to all the three higher castes, Brahmins, Kṣātriyas and Vaiśyas. The specific duties of a Brahmin are acceptance of gifts, teaching, sacrifices and so forth; the specific duties of a Kṣātriya are protection of the people, punishing the wicked, not to retreat from battles and other specific tasks; the duties of a Vaiśya are buying, selling, agriculture, breeding and rearing of cattle, and the specific duties of a Vaiśya. The duties of a Śūdra are to serve the three higher castes¹.

Regarding the relation between *varṇa-dharma* and *sādhāraṇa-dharma*, a modern writer says that “the *sādhāraṇa-dharmas* constitute the foundation of the *varṇāśrama-dharmas*, the limits within which the latter are to be observed and obeyed. For

¹ The *Gītā*, however, counts self-control (*sama*), control over the mind (*dama*), purity (*śauca*), forgiving nature (*kṣānti*), sincerity (*ārjava*), knowledge (*jñāna*), wisdom (*vijñāna*) and faith (*āstikya*) as the natural qualities of Brahmins. The duties of Kṣātriyas are heroism (*śaurya*), smartness (*tejas*), power of endurance (*dhṛti*), skill (*dākṣya*), not to fly in battle (*yuddhe cāpy apalāyana*), making of gifts (*dāna*) and power of controlling others (*īśvara-bhāva*). The natural duties of Vaiśyas are agriculture, rearing of cows and trade. *Gītā*, XVIII. 42-44.

example, the Brahmin in performing religious sacrifice must not appropriate another's property, non-appropriation being one of the common and universal duties. In this way he serves his own community as well as subserves (though in a negative way) the common good of the community—and so, in an indirect way, serves the common good of humanity. Thus the individual of a specific community who observes the duties of his class does not serve his own community merely, but also and in the same process all other communities according to their deserts and needs, and in this way the whole of humanity itself. This, it will be seen, is also the view of Plato, whose virtue of justice is the common good which is to be realized by each class through its specific duties; but this is to be distinguished from the common good which constitutes the object of the *sādhāraṇa-dharmas* of the Hindu classification. The end in these common and universal duties is not the common well-being, which is being correctly realized in specific communities, but the common good as the precondition and foundation of the latter; it is not the good which is common-in-the-individual, but common-as-the-prius-of-the-individual. Hence the *sādhāraṇa* duties are obligatory equally for all individuals, irrespective of their social position or individual capacity¹.” The statement that the common good (*sādhāraṇa-dharma*) could be regarded as the precondition of the specific caste-duties implies that, if the latter came into conflict with the former, then the former should prevail. This is, however, inexact; for there is hardly any instance where, in case of a conflict, the *sādhāraṇa-dharma*, or the common duties, had a greater force. Thus, for example, non-injury to living beings was a common duty; but sacrifices implied the killing of animals, and it was the clear duty of the Brahmins to perform sacrifices. War implied the taking of an immense number of human lives; but it was the duty of a Kṣatriya not to turn away from a battle-field, and in pursuance of his obligatory duty as a Kṣatriya he had to fight. Turning to traditional accounts, we find in the *Rāmāyaṇa* that Śambūka was a Śūdra saint (*muni*) who was performing ascetic penances in a forest. This was a transgression of caste-duties; for a Śūdra could not perform *tapas*, which only the higher caste people were allowed to undertake, and hence the performance of *tapas* by the Śūdra saint Śambūka was regarded

¹ *Ethics of the Hindus*, by S. K. Maitra under Dr Seal's close personal supervision and guidance, pp. 3-4.

as *adharma* (vice); and, as a result of this *adharma*, there was a calamity in the kingdom of Rāma in the form of the death of an infant son of a Brahmin. King Rāma went out in his chariot and beheaded Śambūka for transgressing his caste-duties. Instances could be multiplied to show that, when there was a conflict between the caste-duties and the common duties, it was the former that had the greater force. The common duties had their force only when they were not in conflict with the caste-duties. The *Gītā* is itself an example of how the caste-duties had preference over common duties. In spite of the fact that Arjuna was extremely unwilling to take the lives of his near and dear kinsmen in the battle of Kurukṣetra Kṛṣṇa tried his best to dissuade him from his disinclination to fight and pointed out to him that it was his clear duty, as a Kṣātriya, to fight. It seems therefore very proper to hold that the common duties had only a general application, and that the specific caste-duties superseded them, whenever the two were in conflict.

The *Gītā* does not raise the problem of common duties, as its synthesis of *nivṛtti* (cessation from work) and *pravṛtti* (tending to work) makes it unnecessary to introduce the advocacy of the common duties; for its instruction to take to work with a mind completely detached from all feelings and motives of self-seeking, pleasure-seeking and self-interest elevates its scheme of work to a higher sphere, which would not be in need of the practice of any select scheme of virtues.

The theory of the *Gītā* that, if actions are performed with an unattached mind, then their defects cannot touch the performer, distinctly implies that the goodness or badness of an action does not depend upon the external effects of the action, but upon the inner motive of action. If there is no motive of pleasure or self-gain, then the action performed cannot bind the performer; for it is only the bond of desires and self-love that really makes an action one's own and makes one reap its good or bad fruits. Morality from this point of view becomes wholly subjective, and the special feature of the *Gītā* is that it tends to make all actions non-moral by cutting away the bonds that connect an action with its performer. In such circumstances the more logical course would be that of Śāṅkara, who would hold a man who is free from desires and attachment to be above morality, above duties and above responsibilities. The *Gītā*, however, would not advocate

the objective *nivṛtti*, or cessation of work; its whole aim is to effect subjective *nivṛtti*, or detachment from desires. It would not allow anyone to desist from his prescribed objective duties; but, whatever might be the nature of these duties, since they were performed without any motive of gain, pleasure or self-interest, they would be absolutely without fruit for the performer, who, in his perfect equanimity of mind, would transcend all his actions and their effects. If Arjuna fought and killed hundreds of his kinsmen out of a sense of his caste-duty, then, howsoever harmful his actions might be, they would not affect him. Yudhiṣṭhira, however, contemplated an expiation of the sin of killing his kinsmen by repentance, gifts, asceticism, pilgrimage, etc., which shows the other view, which was prevalent in the *Mahā-bhārata* period, that, when the performance of caste-duties led to such an injury to human lives, the sinful effects of such actions could be expiated by such means¹. Yudhiṣṭhira maintained that of asceticism (*tapas*), the giving up of all duties (*tyāga*), and the final knowledge of the ultimate truth (*avadhi*), the second is better than the first and the third is better than the second. He therefore thought that the best course was to take to an ascetic life and give up all duties and responsibilities, whereas Arjuna held that the best course for a king would be to take upon himself the normal responsibilities of a kingly life and at the same time remain unattached to the pleasures of such a life². Regarding also the practice of the virtues of non-injury, etc., Arjuna maintains that it is wrong to carry these virtues to extremes. Howsoever a man may live, whether as an ascetic or as a forester, it is impossible for him to practise non-injury to all living beings in any extreme degree. Even in the water that one drinks and the fruits that one eats, even in breathing and winking many fine and invisible insects are killed. So the virtue of non-injury, or, for the matter of that, all kinds of virtue, can be practised only in moderation, and their injunctions always imply that they can be practised only within the bounds of a commonsense view of things. Non-injury may

¹ *Mahā-bhārata*, XII. 7. 36 and 37.

² Thus Arjuna says:

*aśaktaḥ śaktavad gacchan niḥsaṅgo mukta-bandhanah
samaḥ śatrau ca mitre ca sa vai mukto mahāpate;*

to which Yudhiṣṭhira replies:

*tapas tyāgo 'vadhīr iti niscayas tv eṣa dhāmatām
parasparam jyāya eṣām yeṣām naiḥśreyasī matiḥ.*

Ibid. XII. 18. 31 and XII. 19. 9.

be good; but there are cases where non-injury would mean doing injury. If a tiger enters into a cattle-shed, not to kill the tiger would amount to killing the cows. So all religious injunctions are made from the point of view of a practical and well-ordered maintenance of society and must therefore be obeyed with an eye to the results that may follow in their practical application. Our principal object is to maintain properly the process of the social order and the well-being of the people¹. It seems clear, then, that, when the *Gītā* urges again and again that there is no meaning in giving up our normal duties, vocation and place in life and its responsibilities, and that what is expected of us is that we should make our minds unattached, it refers to the view which Yudhiṣṭhira expresses, that we must give up all our works. The *Gītā* therefore repeatedly urges that *tyāga* does not mean the giving up of all works, but the mental giving up of the fruits of all actions.

Though the practice of detachment of mind from all desires and motives of pleasure and enjoyment would necessarily involve the removal of all vices and a natural elevation of the mind to all that is high and noble, yet the *Gītā* sometimes denounces certain types of conduct in very strong terms. Thus, in the sixteenth chapter, it is said that people who hold a false philosophy and think that the world is false and, without any basis, deny the existence of God and hold that there is no other deeper cause of the origin of life than mere sex-attraction and sex-union, destroy themselves by their foolishness and indulgence in all kinds of cruel deeds, and would by their mischievous actions turn the world to the path of ruin. In their insatiable desires, filled with pride, vanity and ignorance, they take to wrong and impure courses of action. They argue too much and think that there is nothing greater than this world that we live in, and, thinking so, they indulge in all kinds of pleasures and enjoyments. Tied with bonds of desire, urged by passions and anger, they accumulate money in a wrongful manner for the gratification of their sense-desires. "I have got this to-day," they think, "and enjoy myself; I have so much hoarded money and I shall have more later on"; "that enemy has been killed by me, I shall kill other enemies also, I am

¹

*Loka-yātrārtham evedaṃ dharma-pravacanam kṛtam
ahimsā sādhu hiṃseti śreyān dharma-parigrahaḥ
nātyantaṃ guṇavat kiṃcin na cāpy atyanta-nirguṇam
ubhayaṃ sarva-kāryeṣu drśyate sādhu asādhu vā.*

Mahā-bhārati, XII. 15. 49 and 50.

a lord, I enjoy myself, I am successful, powerful and happy, I am rich, I have a noble lineage, there is no one like me, I perform sacrifices, make gifts and enjoy." They get distracted by various kinds of ideas and desires and, surrounded by nets of ignorance and delusion and full of attachment for sense-gratifications, they naturally fall into hell. Proud, arrogant and filled with the vanity of wealth, they perform improperly the so-called sacrifices, as a demonstration of their pomp and pride. In their egoism, power, pride, desires and anger they always ignore God, both in themselves and in others¹. The main vices that one should try to get rid of are thus egoism, too many desires, greed, anger, pride and vanity, and of these desire and anger are again and again mentioned as being like the gates of hell².

Among the principal virtues called the divine equipment (*daivī sampat*) the *Gītā* counts fearlessness (*abhaya*), purity of heart (*sattva-saṁśuddhi*), knowledge of things and proper action in accordance with it, giving, control of mind, sacrifice, study, *tapas*, sincerity (*ārjava*), non-injury (*ahiṁsā*), truthfulness (*satya*), control of anger (*akrodha*), renunciation (*tyāga*), peacefulness of mind (*śānti*), not to backbite (*apāiśuna*), kindness to the suffering (*bhūteṣu dayā*), not to be greedy (*alolupatva*), tenderness (*mārdava*), a feeling of shame before people in general when a wrong action is done (*hri*), steadiness (*acapaḥ*), energy (*tejas*), a forgiving spirit (*kṣānti*), patience (*dhṛti*), purity (*śauca*), not to think ill of others (*adroha*), and not to be vain. It is these virtues which liberate our spirits, whereas vanity, pride, conceit, anger, cruelty and ignorance are vices which bind and enslave us³. The man who loves God should not hurt any living beings, should be friendly and sympathetic towards them, and should yet be unattached to all things, should have no egoism, be the same in sorrows and pleasures and full of forgivingness for all. He should be firm, self-controlled and always contented. He should be pure, unattached, the same to all, should not take to actions from any personal motives, and he has nothing to fear. He is the same to friends and enemies, in appreciation and denunciation; he is the same in heat and cold, pleasure and pain; he is the same in praise and blame, homeless and always satisfied with anything and everything; he is always unperturbed and absolutely unattached to all things⁴. If one carefully goes through

¹ *Gītā*, xvi. 8-18.

² *Ibid.* xvi. 21.

³ *Ibid.* xvi. 1-5.

⁴ *Ibid.* xii. 13-19; see also *ibid.* xiii. 8-11.

the above list of virtues, it appears that the virtues are pre-eminently of a negative character—one should not be angry, hurtful to others, egoistic, proud or vain, should not do anything with selfish motives, should not be ruffled by pleasure and pain, heat and cold and should be absolutely unattached. Of the few positive virtues, sincerity and purity of heart, a forgiving spirit, tenderness, friendliness, kindness, alertness and sympathy seem to be most prominent. The terms *maitra* (friendliness) and *karuṇā* (compassion) might naturally suggest the Buddhist virtues so named, since they do not occur in the Upaniṣads¹. But in the *Gītā* also they are mentioned only once, and the general context of the passage shows that no special emphasis is put on these two virtues. They do not imply any special kind of meditation of universal friendship or universal piety or the active performance of friendly and sympathetic deeds for the good of humanity or for the good of living beings in general. They seem to imply simply the positive friendly state of the mind that must accompany all successful practice of non-injury to fellow-beings. The *Gītā* does not advocate the active performance of friendliness, but encourages a friendly spirit as a means of discouraging the tendency to do harm to others. The life that is most admired in the *Gītā* is a life of unattachedness, a life of peace, contentment and perfect equanimity and unperturbedness in joys and sorrows. The vices that are denounced are generally those that proceed from attachment and desires, such as egoism, pride, vanity, anger, greediness, etc. There is another class of virtues which are often praised, namely those which imply purity, sincerity and alertness of mind and straightness of conduct. The negative virtue of sense-control, with its positive counterpart, the acquirement of the power of directing one's mind in a right direction, forms the bed-rock of the entire superstructure of the *Gītā* code of moral and virtuous conduct.

The virtue of sameness (*samatva*), however, seems to be the great ideal which the *Gītā* is never tired of emphasizing again and again. This sameness can be attained in three different stages: subjective sameness, or equanimity of mind, or the sameness in joys and sorrows, praise and blame and in all situations of life; objective sameness, as regarding all people, good, bad or indifferent, a friend or an enemy, with equal eyes and in the same

¹ The term *maitra* occurs only once in the *Muktikopaniṣat*, II. 34, and the *Muktika* is in all probability one of the later Upaniṣads.

impartial spirit; and the final stage of the achievement of this equanimity is the self-realized state when one is absolutely unperturbed by all worldly things—a state of transcendence called *guṇātīta*. Thus in the *Gītā*, II. 15, it is said that he whom sense-affections and physical troubles cannot affect in any way, who is unperturbable and the same in joys and sorrows, attains immortality. In II. 38 Kṛṣṇa asks Arjuna to think of joys and sorrows, gain and loss, victory and defeat as being the same, and to engage himself in the fight with such a mind; for, if he did so, no sin would touch him. In II. 47 Kṛṣṇa says to Arjuna that his business is only to perform his duties and not to look for the effects of his deeds; it is wrong to look for the fruits of deeds or to desist from performing one's duties. In II. 48 this sameness in joys and sorrows is described as *yoga*, and it is again urged that one should be unperturbed whether in success or in failure. The same idea is repeated in II. 55, 56 and 57, where it is said that a true saint should not be damped in sorrow or elated in joy, and that he should not be attached to anything and should take happiness or misery indifferently, without particularly welcoming the former or regretting the latter. Such a man is absolutely limited to his own self and is self-satisfied. He is not interested in achieving anything or in not achieving anything; there is no personal object for him to attain in the world¹. To such a man gold and stones, desirables and undesirables, praise and blame, appreciation and denunciation, friends and foes are all alike². Such a man makes no distinction whether between a friend and foe, or between a sinner and a virtuous man³. Such a man knows that pleasures and pains are welcomed and hated by all and, thinking so, he desires the good of all and looks upon all as he would upon himself—on a learned Brahmin of an elevated character, on a cow, an elephant, a dog or a *caṇḍāla*; and the wise behave in the same way⁴. He sees God in all beings and knows the indestructible and the immortal in all that is destructible. He who knows that all beings are pervaded by all, and thus regards them all with an equal eye, does not hurt his own spiritual nature and thus attains his highest⁵. As the culmination of this development, there is the state in which a man transcends all the corporeal and mundane characteristics of the threefold *guṇas*, and, being freed from birth, death, old age and

¹ *Gītā*, III. 17, 18.² *Ibid.* XIV. 24, 25.³ *Ibid.* VI. 9.⁴ *Ibid.* VI. 31; also V. 18.⁵ *Ibid.* XIII. 28.

sorrow, attains immortality. He knows that the worldly qualities of things, the *guṇas*, are extraneous to his own spiritual nature, and by such thoughts he transcends the sphere of all worldly qualities and attains Brahmahood¹.

Apart from the caste-duties and other deeds that are to be performed without any attachment, the *Gītā* speaks again and again of sacrifices, *tapas* and gifts, as duties which cannot be ignored at any stage of our spiritual development. It is well worth pointing out that the *Gītā* blames the performance of sacrifices either for the attainment of selfish ends or for making a display of pomp or pride. The sacrifices are to be performed from a sense of duty and of public good, since it is only by the help of the sacrifices that the gods may be expected to bring down heavy showers, through which crops may grow in plenty. Physical *tapas* is described as the adoration of gods, Brahmins, teachers and wise men, as purity, sincerity, sex-continence and non-injury; *tapas* in speech is described as truthful and unoffending speech, which is both sweet to hear and for the good of all, and also study; mental *tapas* is described as serenity of mind (*manah-prasāda*), happy temper (*saumyatva*), thoughtfulness (*mauna*), self-control (*ātma-vinigraha*) and sincerity of mind; and the higher kind of *tapas* is to be performed without any idea of gain or the fulfilment of any ulterior end². Gifts are to be made to good Brahmins in a holy place and at an auspicious time, merely from a sense of duty. This idea that gifts are properly made only when they are made to good Brahmins at a holy time or place is very much more limited and restricted than the Mahāyāna idea of making gifts for the good of all, without the slightest restriction of any kind. Thus it is said in the *Śikṣā-samuccaya* that a Bodhisattva need not be afraid among tigers and other wild animals in a wild forest, since the Bodhisattva has given his all for the good of all beings. He has therefore to think that, if the wild animals should eat him, this would only mean the giving his body to them, which would be the fulfilment of his virtue of universal charity. The Bodhisattvas take the vow of giving away their all in universal charity³.

Thus the fundamental teaching of the *Gītā* is to follow caste-duties without any motive of self-interest or the gratification of sense-desires. The other general duties of sacrifices, *tapas* and

¹ *Gītā*, xiv. 20, 23, 26.

² *Ibid.* xvi. 11-17.

³ *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, ch. xix, p. 349.

gifts are also to be practised by all and may hence be regarded in some sense as being equivalent to the *sādhāraṇa-dharmas* of the Vaiśeṣika and Smṛti literature. But, if caste-duties or customary duties come into conflict with the special duties of non-injury (*ahiṃsā*), then the caste-duties are to be followed in preference. It does not seem that any of the other special duties or virtues which are enjoined can come into conflict with the general caste-duties; for most of these are for the inner moral development, with which probably no caste-duties can come into conflict. But, though there is no express mandate of the *Gītā* on the point, yet it may be presumed that, should a Śūdra think of performing sacrifices, *tapas* or gifts or the study of the Vedas, this would most certainly be opposed by the *Gītā*, as it would be against the prescribed caste-duties. So, though non-injury is one of the special virtues enjoined by the *Gītā*, yet, when a Kṣātriya kills his enemies in open and free fight, that fight is itself to be regarded as virtuous (*dharmya*) and there is for the Kṣātriya no sin in the killing of his enemies. If a person dedicates all his actions to Brahman and performs his duties without attachment, then sinfulness in his actions cannot cleave to him, just as water cannot cleave to the leaves of a lotus plant¹. On the one hand the *Gītā* keeps clear of the ethics of the absolutist and metaphysical systems by urging the necessity of the performance of caste and customary duties, and yet enjoins the cultivation of the great virtues of renunciation, purity, sincerity, non-injury, self-control, sense-control and want of attachment as much as the absolutist systems would desire to do; on the other hand, it does not adopt any of the extreme and rigorous forms of self-discipline, as the Yoga does, or the practice of the virtues on an unlimited and universalist scale, as the Buddhists did. It follows the middle course, strongly emphasizing the necessity of self-control, sense-control and detachment from all selfish ends and desires along with the performance of the normal duties. This detachment from sense-pleasures is to be attained either through wisdom or, preferably, through devotion to God.

¹ *Gītā*, v. 10.

Analysis of Action.

The consideration of the *Gītā* ethics naturally brings in the problem of the analysis of the nature of action, volition and agent. The principal analysis of volition in Hindu Philosophy is to be found in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works. Praśastapāda divides animal activities into two classes, firstly, those that are of a reflex nature and originate automatically from life-functions (*jīvana-pūrvaka*) and subserve useful ends (*kām api artha-kriyām*) for the organism, and, secondly, those conscious and voluntary actions that proceed out of desire or aversion, for the attainment of desirable ends and the avoidance of undesirable ones. Prabhākara holds that volitional actions depend on several factors, firstly, a general notion that something has to be done (*kāryatā-jñāna*), which Gaṅgabhaṭṭa in his *Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi* explains as meaning not merely a general notion that a particular work can be done by the agent, but also the specific notion that an action must be done by him—a sense which can proceed only from a belief that the action would be useful to him and would not be sufficiently harmful to him to dissuade him from it. Secondly, there must be the belief that the agent has the power or capacity of performing the action (*kṛti-sādhyatā-jñāna*). This belief of *kṛti-sādhyatā-jñāna* leads to desire (*cikīrṣā*). The Prabhākaras do not introduce here the important factor that an action can be desired only if it is conducive to the good of the agent. Instead of this element they suppose that actions are desired when the agent identifies himself with the action as one to be accomplished by him—an action is desired only as a kind of self-realization. The Nyāya, however, thinks that the fact that an action is conducive to good and not productive of serious mischief is an essential condition of its performance.

The *Gītā* seems to hold that everywhere actions are always being performed by the *guṇas* or characteristic qualities of *prakṛti*, the primal matter. It is through ignorance and false pride that one thinks himself to be the agent¹. In another place it is said that for the occurrence of an action there are five causes, viz. the body, the agent, the various sense-organs, the various life-functions and biomotor activities, and the unknown objective causal elements or the all-controlling power of God (*daiva*)². All actions

¹ *Gītā*, III. 27; XIII. 29.

² *adhīṣṭhānam tathā kartā karam ca prthag-vidham
vivīdhās ca prthag ceṣṭā daivam caivātra pañcamam. Ibid. XVIII. 14.*

being due to the combined operation of these five elements, it would be wrong to think the self or the agent to be the only performer of actions. Thus it is said that, this being so, he who thinks the self alone to be the agent of actions, this wicked-minded person through his misapplied intelligence does not see things properly¹. Whatever actions are performed, right or wrong, whether in body, speech or mind, have these five factors as their causes². The philosophy that underlies the ethical position of the *Gītā* consists in the fact that, in reality, actions are made to happen primarily through the movement of the characteristic qualities of *prakṛti*, and secondarily, through the collocation of the five factors mentioned, among which the self is but one factor only. It is, therefore, sheer egoism to think that one can, at his own sweet will, undertake a work or cease from doing works. For the *prakṛti*, or primal matter, through its later evolutes, the collocation of causes, would of itself move us to act, and even in spite of the opposition of our will we are led to perform the very action which we did not want to perform. So Kṛṣṇa says to Arjuna that the egoism through which you would say that you would not fight is mere false vanity, since the *prakṛti* is bound to lead you to action³. A man is bound by the active tendencies or actions which necessarily follow directly from his own nature, and there is no escape. He has to work in spite of the opposition of his will. *Prakṛti*, or the collocation of the five factors, moves us to work. That being so, no one can renounce all actions. If renouncing actions is an impossibility, and if one is bound to act, it is but proper that one should perform one's normal duties. There are no duties and no actions which are absolutely faultless, absolutely above all criticism; so the proper way in which a man should purify his actions is by purging his mind of all imperfections and impurities of desires and attachment. But a question may arise how, if all actions follow necessarily as the product of the five-fold collocation, a person can determine his actions? The general implication of the *Gītā* seems to be that, though the action follows necessarily as the product of the fivefold collocation, yet the self can give a direction to these actions; if a man wishes to dissociate himself from all attachments and desires by dedicating the fruits of all his actions to God and clings to God with such a purpose, God helps him to attain his noble aim.

¹ *Gītā*, XVIII. 16.² *Ibid.* XVIII. 15.³ *Ibid.* XVIII. 59.

Eschatology.

The *Gītā* is probably the earliest document where a definite statement is made regarding the imperishable nature of existent things and the impossibility of that which is non-existent coming into being. It says that what is non-existent cannot come into being, and that what exists cannot cease to be. In modern times we hear of the principle of the conservation of energy and also of the principle of the conservation of mass. The principle of the conservation of energy is distinctly referred to in the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on *Patañjali-sūtra*, iv. 3, but the idea of the conservation of mass does not seem to have been mentioned definitely anywhere. Both the Vedāntist and the Sāṃkhyist seem to base their philosophies on an ontological principle known as *sat-kārya-vāda*, which holds that the effect is already existent in the cause. The Vedānta holds that the effect as such is a mere appearance and has no true existence; the cause alone is truly existent. The Sāṃkhya, on the other hand, holds that the effect is but a modification of the causal substance, and, as such, is not non-existent, but has no existence separate from the cause; the effect may therefore be said to exist in the cause before the starting of the causal operation (*kāraṇa-vyāpāra*). Both these systems strongly object to the Buddhist and Nyāya view that the effect came into being out of non-existence, a doctrine known as *a-sat-kārya-vāda*. Both the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta tried to prove their theses, but neither of them seems to have realized that their doctrines are based upon an *a priori* proposition which is the basic principle underlying the principle of the conservation of energy and the conservation of mass, but which is difficult to be proved by reference to a *posteriori* illustration. Thus, the Sāṃkhya says that the effect exists in the cause, since, had it not been so, there would be no reason why certain kinds of effects, e.g. oil, can be produced only from certain kinds of causes, e.g. sesamum. That certain kinds of effects are produced only from certain kinds of causes does not really prove the doctrine of *sat-kārya-vāda*, but only implies it; for the doctrine of *sat-kārya-vāda* rests on an *a priori* principle such as that formulated in the *Gītā*—that what exists cannot perish, and that what does not exist cannot come into being¹. The *Gītā* does not try to prove this proposition, but takes it as a self-evident principle which no one could

¹ *nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhavo vidyate sataḥ. Gītā*, II. 16.

challenge. It does not, however, think of applying this principle, which underlies the ontological position of the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta, in a general way. It seems to apply the principle only to the nature of self (*ātman*). Thus it says, "O Arjuna, that principle by which everything is pervaded is to be regarded as deathless; no one can destroy this imperishable one. The bodies that perish belong to the deathless eternal and unknowable self; therefore thou shouldst fight. He who thinks the self to be destructible, and he who thinks it to be the destroyer, do not know that it can neither destroy nor be destroyed. It is neither born nor does it die, nor, being once what it is, would it ever be again.... Weapons cannot cut it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot dissolve it and air cannot dry it." The immortality of self preached in the *Gītā* seems to have been directly borrowed from the Upaniṣads, and the passages that describe it seem to breathe the spirit of the Upaniṣads not only in idea, but also in the modes and expressions. The ontological principle that what exists cannot die and that what is not cannot come into being does not seem to have been formulated in the Upaniṣads. Its formulation in the *Gītā* in support of the principle of immortality seems, therefore, to be a distinct advance on the Upaniṣadic philosophy in this direction.

The first argument urged by Kṛṣṇa to persuade Arjuna to fight was that the self was immortal and that it was the body only that could be injured or killed, and that therefore Arjuna need not feel troubled because he was going to kill his kinsmen in the battle of Kurukṣetra. Upon the death of one body the self only changed to another, in which it was reborn, just as a man changed his old clothes for new ones. The body is always changing, and even in youth, middle age and old age, does not remain the same. The change at death is also a change of body, and so there is no intrinsic difference between the changes of the body at different stages of life and the ultimate change that is effected at death, when the old body is forsaken by the spirit and a new body is accepted. Our bodies are always changing, and, though the different stages in this growth in childhood, youth and old age represent comparatively small degrees of change, yet these ought to prepare our minds to realize the fact that death is also a similar change of body only and cannot, therefore, affect the unperturbed nature of the self, which, in spite of all changes of body at successive

births and rebirths, remains unchanged in itself. When one is born one must die, and when one dies one must be reborn. Birth necessarily implies death, and death necessarily implies rebirth. There is no escape from this continually revolving cycle of birth and death. From Brahmā down to all living creatures there is a continuous rotation of birth, death and rebirth. In reply to Arjuna's questions as to what becomes of the man who, after proceeding a long way on the path of *yoga*, is somehow through his failings dislodged from it and dies, Kṛṣṇa replies that no good work can be lost and a man who has been once on the path of right cannot suffer; so, when a man who was proceeding on the path of *yoga* is snatched away by the hand of death, he is born again in a family of pure and prosperous people or in a family of wise *yogins*; and in this new birth he is associated with his achievements in his last birth and begins anew his onward course of advancement, and the old practice of the previous birth carries him onward, without any effort on his part, in his new line of progress. By his continual efforts through many lives and the cumulative effects of the right endeavours of each life the *yogin* attains his final realization. Ordinarily the life of a man in each new birth depends upon the desires and ideas that he fixes upon at the time of his death. But those that think of God, the oldest instructor, the seer, the smallest of the small, the upholder of all, shining like the sun beyond all darkness, and fix their life-forces between their eyebrows, and control all the gates of their senses and their mind in their hearts, ultimately attain their highest realization in God. From the great Lord, the great unmanifested and incomprehensible Lord, proceeds the unmanifested (*avyakta*), from which come out all manifested things (*vyaktayaḥ sarvāḥ*), and in time again return to it and again evolve out of it. Thus there are two forms of the unmanifested (*avyakta*), the unmanifested out of which all the manifested things come, and the unmanifested which is the nature of the eternal Lord from whom the former come¹. The ideas of *deva-yāna* and *pitr-yāna*, *dakṣiṇāyana* and *uttarāyana*, the black and the white courses as mentioned in the Upaniṣads, are also referred to in the *Gītā*. Those who go through smoke in the new-moon fortnight and the later six months (when the sun is on the south of the equator), and thus take the black course, return again; but those who take the white course of fire

¹ *Gītā*, VIII. 16-23.

in the full-moon fortnight and the former six months (when the sun is on the north of the equator) do not return again¹. No very significant meaning can be made out of these doctrines. They seem to be but the perpetuation of the traditional faiths regarding the future courses of the dead, as referred to in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. The *Gītā*, again, speaking of others, says that those who follow the sacrificial duties of the Vedas enjoy heavenly pleasures in heaven, and, when their merits are exhausted by the enjoyments of the good fruits of their actions, they come back to earth. Those who follow the path of desires and take to religious duties for the attainment of pleasures must always go to heaven and come back again—they cannot escape this cycle of going and coming. Again, in the *Gītā*, xvi. 19, Kṛṣṇa says, “I make cruel vicious persons again and again take birth as ferocious animals.”

The above summary of the eschatological views of the *Gītā* shows that it collects together the various traditionally accepted views regarding life after death without trying to harmonize them properly. Firstly, it may be noted that the *Gītā* believes in the doctrine of *karma*. Thus in xv. 2 and in iv. 9 it is said that the world has grown on the basis of *karma*, and the *Gītā* believes that it is the bondage of *karma* that binds us to this world. The bondage of *karma* is due to the existence of attachment, passions and desires. But what does the bondage of *karma* lead to? The reply to such a question, as given by the *Gītā*, is that it leads to rebirth. When one performs actions in accordance with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of beneficial fruits, desire for such fruits and attachment to these desirable fruits is the bondage of *karma*, which naturally leads to rebirth. The proposition definitely pronounced in the *Gītā*, that birth necessarily means death and death necessarily means birth, reminds us of the first part of the twelvefold causal chain of the Buddha—“What being, is there death? Birth being, there is death.” It has already been noticed that the attitude of the *Gītā* towards Vedic performances is merely one of toleration and not one of encouragement. These are actions which are prompted by desires and, like all other actions similarly prompted, they entail with them the bonds of *karma*; and, as soon as the happy effects produced by the merits of these actions are enjoyed and lived through, the performers of these actions come down from heaven to the earth and

¹ *Gītā*, viii. 24–26.

are reborn and have to pass through the old ordeal of life. The idea that, there being birth, there is death, and that, if there is death there is also rebirth, is the same in the *Gītā* as in Buddhism; but the *Gītā* form seems to be very much earlier than the Buddhistic form; for the Buddhistic form relates birth and death through a number of other causal links intimately connected together in an interdependent cycle, of which the *Gītā* seems to be entirely ignorant. The *Gītā* does not speak of any causal chain, such as could be conceived to be borrowed from Buddhism. It, of course, knows that attachment is the root of all vice; but it is only by implication that we can know that attachment leads to the bondage of *karma* and the bondage of *karma* to rebirth. The main purpose of the *Gītā* is not to find out how one can tear asunder the bonds of *karma* and stop rebirth, but to prescribe the true rule of the performance of one's duties. It speaks sometimes, no doubt, about cutting asunder the bonds of *karma* and attaining one's highest; but instruction as regards the attainment of liberation or a description of the evils of this worldly life does not form any part of the content of the *Gītā*. The *Gītā* has no pessimistic tendency. It speaks of the necessary connection of birth and death not in order to show that life is sorrowful and not worth living, but to show that there is no cause of regret in such universal happenings as birth and death. The principal ideas are, no doubt, those of attachment, *karma*, birth, death and rebirth; but the idea of Buddhism is more complex and more systematized, and is therefore probably a later development at a time when the *Gītā* discussions on the subject were known. The Buddhist doctrine that there is no self and no individual anywhere is just the opposite of the *Gītā* doctrine of the immortality of the self.

But the *Gītā* speaks not only of rebirth, but also of the two courses, the path of smoke and the path of light, which are referred to in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*¹. The only difference between the Upaniṣad account and that of the *Gītā* is that there are more details in the Upaniṣad than in the *Gītā*. But the ideas of *deva-yāna* and *pitr-yāna* do not seem to fit in quite consistently with the idea of rebirth on earth. The *Gītā*, however, combines the idea of rebirth on earth with the *deva-yāna-pitr-yāna* idea and also with the idea of ascent to heaven as an effect of the merits

¹ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, v. 10.

accruing from sacrificial performances. Thus the *Gītā* combines the different trains of ideas just as it finds them traditionally accepted, without trying to harmonize them properly. It does not attempt to discuss the point regarding the power of *karma* in determining the nature of rebirths, enjoyments and sufferings. From some passages (IV. 9 or VI. 40-45) it might appear that the bonds of *karma* produced their effects independently by their own powers, and that the arrangement of the world is due to the effect of *karma*. But there are other passages (XVI. 19) which indicate that *karma* does not produce its effects by itself, but that God rewards or punishes good and bad deeds by arranging good and bad births associated with joys and sorrows. In the *Gītā*, v. 15, it is said that the idea of sins and virtues is due to ignorance, whereas, if we judge rightly, God does not take cognizance either of vices or of virtues. Here again there are two contradictory views of *karma*: one view in which *karma* is regarded as the cause which brings about all inequalities in life, and another view which does not attribute any value to good or bad actions. The only way in which the two views can be reconciled in accordance with the spirit of the *Gītā* is by holding that the *Gītā* does not believe in the objective truth of virtue or vice (*punya* or *pāpa*). There is nothing good or bad in the actions themselves. It is only ignorance and foolishness that regards them as good or bad; it is only our desires and attachments which make the actions produce their bad effects with reference to us, and which render them sinful for us. Since the actions themselves are neither good nor bad, the performance of even apparently sinful actions, such as the killing of one's kinsmen on the battle-field, cannot be regarded as sinful, if they are done from a sense of duty; but the same actions would be regarded as sinful, if they were performed through attachments or desires. Looked at from this point of view, the idea of morality in the *Gītā* is essentially of a subjective character. But though morality, virtue and vice, can be regarded from this point of view as subjective, it is not wholly subjective. For morality does not depend upon mere subjective conscience or the subjective notions of good and bad. The caste-duties and other duties of customary morality are definitely fixed, and no one should transgress them. The subjectivity of virtue and vice consists in the fact that they depend entirely on our good or bad actions. If actions are performed from a sense of obedience to scriptural commands, caste-

duties or duties of customary morality, then such actions, in spite of their bad consequences, would not be regarded as bad.

Apart from these courses of rebirth and ascent to heaven, the last and best and ultimate course is described as being liberation, which transcends all that can be achieved by all kinds of merits attained by sacrifices, gifts or *tapas*. He who attains this highest achievement lives in God and is never born again¹. The highest realization thus consists in being one with God, by which one escapes all sorrows. In the *Gītā* liberation (*mokṣa*) means liberation from old age and death. This liberation can be attained by true philosophic knowledge of the nature of *kṣetra*, or the mind-body whole, and the *kṣetra-jñā*, the perceiving selves, or the nature of what is truly spiritual and what is non-spiritual, and by clinging to God as one's nearest and dearest². This liberation from old age and death also means liberation from the ties of *karma* associated with us through the bonds of attachment, desires, etc. It does not come of itself, as the natural result of philosophic knowledge or of devotion to God; but God, as the liberator, grants it to the wise and to those who cling to Him through devotion³. But whether it be achieved as the result of philosophic knowledge or as the result of devotion to God, the moral elevation, consisting of dissociation from attachment and the right performance of duties in an unattached manner, is indispensable.

God and Man.

The earliest and most recondite treatment regarding the nature and existence of God and His relation to man is to be found in the *Gītā*. The starting-point of the *Gītā* theism may be traced as far back as the *Puruṣa-sūkta*, where it is said that the one quarter of the *puruṣa* has spread out as the cosmic universe and its living beings, while its other three-quarters are in the immortal heavens⁴. This passage is repeated in *Chāndogya*, III. 12. 6 and in *Maitrāyaṇī*, VI. 4, where it is said that the three-quarter Brahman sits root upward above (*ūrdhva-mūlaṃ tripād Brahma*). This idea, in a slightly modified form, appears in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, VI. 1, where it is said that this universe is the eternal Aśvattha

¹ *Gītā*, VIII. 28; IX. 4.

² *Ibid.* VII. 29; XIII. 34.

³ *Ibid.* XVIII. 66.

⁴

*pādo 'sya viśvā bhūtāṃ
tripād asyāmṛtaṃ divi. Puruṣa-sūkta.*

tree which has its root high up and its branches downwards (*ūrdhva-mūlo 'vāk-śākhaḥ*). The *Gītā* borrows this idea and says, "This is called the eternal *Aśvattha* (*pipul* tree) with its roots high up and branches downwards, the leaves of which are the Vedas; and he who knows this, he knows the Vedas" (xv. 1). Again it is said, "Its branches spread high and low, its leaves of sense-objects are nourished by the *guṇas*, its roots are spread downwards, tied with the knots of *karma*, the human world" (xv. 2); and in the next verse, it is said, "In this world its true nature is not perceived; its beginning, its end, and the nature of its subsistence, remain unknown; it is only by cutting this firmly rooted *Aśvattha* tree with the strong axe of unattachment (*asaṅga-śastreṇa*) that one has to seek that state from which, when once achieved, no one returns." It is clear from the above three passages that the *Gītā* has elaborated here the simile of the *Aśvattha* tree of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*. The *Gītā* accepts this simile of God, but elaborates it by supposing that these branches have further leaves and other roots, which take their sap from the ground of human beings, to which they are attached by the knots of *karma*. This means a duplication of the *Aśvattha* tree, the main and the subsidiary. The subsidiary one is an overgrowth, which has proceeded out of the main one and has to be cut into pieces before one can reach that. The principal idea underlying this simile throws a flood of light on the *Gītā* conception of God, which is an elaboration of the idea of the *Puruṣa-sūkta* passage already referred to. God is not only immanent, but transcendent as well. The immanent part, which forms the cosmic universe, is no illusion or *māyā*: it is an emanation, a development, from God. The good and the evil, the moral and the immoral of this world, are all from Him and in Him. The stuff of this world and its manifestations have their basis, an essence, in Him, and are upheld by Him. The transcendent part, which may be said to be the root high up, and the basis of all that has grown in this lower world, is itself the differenceless reality—the Brahman. But, though the Brahman is again and again referred to as the highest abode and the ultimate realization, the absolute essence, yet God in His super-personality transcends even Brahman, in the sense that Brahman, however great it may be, is only a constitutive essence in the complex personality of God. The cosmic universe, the *guṇas*, the *puruṣas*, the mind-structure composed of *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, etc., and the Brahman,

are all constituents of God, having their separate functions and mental relations; but God in His super-personality transcends them all and upholds them all. There is, however, one important point in which the *Gītā* differs from the Upaniṣads—this is, its introduction of the idea that God takes birth on earth as man. Thus in the *Gītā*, iv. 6 and iv. 7, it is said that “whenever there is a disturbance of *dharma* and the rise of *adharma*, I create myself; though I am unborn, of immortal self and the lord of all beings, yet by virtue of my own nature (*prakṛti*) I take birth through my own *māyā* (blinding power of the *guṇas*).” This doctrine of the incarnation of God, though not dealt with in any of the purely speculative systems, yet forms the corner-stone of most systems of religious philosophy and religion, and the *Gītā* is probably the earliest work available to us in which this doctrine is found. The effect of its introduction and of the dialogue form of the *Gītā*, in which the man-god Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna in the philosophy of life and conduct, is that the instruction regarding the personality of God becomes concrete and living. As will be evident in the course of this section, the *Gītā* is not a treatise of systematic philosophy, but a practical course of introduction to life and conduct, conveyed by God Himself in the form of Kṛṣṇa to His devotee, Arjuna. In the *Gītā* abstract philosophy melts down to an insight into the nature of practical life and conduct, as discussed with all the intimacy of the personal relation between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, which suggests a similar personal relation between God and man. For the God in the *Gītā* is not a God of abstract philosophy or theology, but a God who could be a man and be capable of all personal relations.

The all-pervasive nature of God and the fact that He is the essence and upholder of all things in the world is again and again in various ways emphasized in the *Gītā*. Thus Kṛṣṇa says, “There is nothing greater than I, all things are held in me, like pearls in the thread of a pearl garland; I am the liquidity in water, the light of the sun and the moon, manhood (*pauruṣa*) in man; good smell in earth, the heat of the sun, intelligence in the intelligent, heroism in the heroes, strength in the strong, and I am also the desires which do not transgress the path of virtue¹.” Again, it is said that “in my unmanifested (*avyakta*) form I pervade the whole world; all beings exist completely in me, but

¹ *Gītā*, vii. 7-11.

I am not exhausted in them; yet so do I transcend them that none of the beings exist in me—I am the upholder of all beings, I do not exist in them and yet I am their procreator¹.” In both these passages the riddle of God’s relation with man, by which He exists in us and yet does not exist in us and is not limited by us, is explained by the fact of the threefold nature of God; there is a part of Him which has been manifested as inanimate nature and also as the animate world of living beings. It is with reference to this all-pervasive nature of God that it is said that “as the air in the sky pervades the whole world, so are all beings in ‘me’ (God). At the end of each cycle (*kalpa*) all beings enter into my nature (*prakṛtiṃ yānti māmikām*), and again at the beginning of a cycle I create them. I create again and again through my nature (*prakṛti*); the totality of all living beings is helplessly dependent on *prakṛti*².” The three *prakṛtis* have already been referred to in the previous sections—*prakṛti* of God as cosmic matter, *prakṛti* as the nature of God from which all life and spirit have emanated, and *prakṛti* as *māyā*, or the power of God from which the three *guṇas* have emanated. It is with reference to the operation of these *prakṛtis* that the cosmic world and the world of life and spirit may be said to be existent in God. But there is the other form of God, as the transcendent Brahman, and, so far as this form is concerned, God transcends the sphere of the universe of matter and life. But in another aspect of God, in His totality and super-personality, He remains unexhausted in all, and the creator and upholder of all, though it is out of a part of Him that the world has come into being. The aspect of God’s identity with, and the aspect of His transcendence and nature as the father, mother and supporter of the universe, are not separated in the *Gītā*, and both the aspects are described often in one and the same passage. Thus it is said, “I am the father, mother, upholder and grandfather of this world, and I am the sacred syllable OM, the three Vedas, Ṛk, Sāman and Yajus; I am the sacrifice, the oblations and the fire, and yet I am the master and the enjoyer of all sacrifices. I am the final destiny, upholder, matter, the passive illuminator, the rest, support, friend, the origin, the final dissolution, the place, the receptacle and the immortal seed. I produce heat and shower, I destroy and create, I am both death and the deathless, the good and the bad³.” With reference to His transcendent part it is

¹ *Gītā*, IX. 3-5.² *Ibid.* IX. 6-8.³ *Ibid.* IX. 16-19, 24.

said, "The sun, the moon and fire do not illuminate it—it is my final abode, from which, when once achieved, no one returns¹." And again, immediately after, it is said, "It is my part that forms the eternal soul-principle (*jīva-bhūta*) in the living, which attracts the five senses and the *manas* which lie buried in *prakṛti*, and which takes the body and goes out of it with the six senses, just as air takes out fragrance from the flowers²." And then God is said to be the controlling agent of all operations in this world. Thus it is said, "By my energy I uphold the world and all living beings and fill all crops with their specific juices; as fire in the bodies of living beings, and aided by the biomotor *prāṇa* functions, I digest the four kinds of food; I am the light in the sun, the moon and fire." Again it is said, "I reside in the hearts of all; knowledge, forgetfulness and memory all come from me; I alone am to be known by the Vedas; I alone know the Vedas, and I alone am the author of the Vedānta³." From these examples it is evident that the *Gītā* does not know that pantheism and deism and theism cannot well be jumbled up into one as a consistent philosophic creed. And it does not attempt to answer any objections that may be made against the combination of such opposite views. The *Gītā* not only asserts that all is God, but it also again and again repeats that God transcends all and is simultaneously transcendent and immanent in the world. The answer apparently implied in the *Gītā* to all objections to the apparently different views of the nature of God is that transcendentalism, immanentism and pantheism lose their distinctive and opposite characters in the melting whole of the super-personality of God. Sometimes in the same passage, and sometimes in passages of the same context, the *Gītā* talks in a pantheistic, a transcendental or a theistic vein, and this seems to imply that there is no contradiction in the different aspects of God as preserver and controller of the world, as the substance of the world, life and soul, and as the transcendent substratum underlying them all. In order to emphasize the fact that all that exists and all that is worthy of existence or all that has a superlative existence in good or bad are God's manifestation, the *Gītā* is never tired of repeating that whatever is highest, best or even worst in things is God or

¹ *Gītā*, xv. 6.

² *Ibid.* xv. 7 and 8. It is curious that here the word *Īśvara* is used as an epithet of *jīva*.

³ *Ibid.* xv. 8, 12, 13, 14, 15.

God's manifestation. Thus it is said, 'I am the gambling of dice in all deceptive operations, I am victory in all endeavours, heroism of the heroes and the moral qualities (*sattva*) of all moral men (*sattvavatām*)'; and after enumerating a number of such instances Kṛṣṇa says that, wherever there are special gifts or powers or excellence of any kind, they are to be regarded as the special manifestation of God¹. The idea that God holds within Himself the entire manifold universe is graphically emphasized in a fabulous form, when Kṛṣṇa gives Arjuna the divine eye of wisdom and Arjuna sees Kṛṣṇa in his resplendent divine form, shining as thousands of suns burning together, with thousands of eyes, faces and ornaments, pervading the heavens and the earth, with neither beginning nor end, as the great cosmic person into whose mouths all the great heroes of Kurukṣetra field had entered, like rivers into the ocean. Kṛṣṇa, after showing Arjuna his universal form, says, "I am time (*kāla*), the great destroyer of the world, and I am engaged in collecting the harvest of human lives, and all that will die in this great battle of Kurukṣetra have already been killed by me; you will be merely an instrument in this great destruction of the mighty battle of Kurukṣetra. So you can fight, destroy your enemies, attain fame and enjoy the sovereignty without any compunction that you have destroyed the lives of your kinsmen."

The main purport of the *Gītā* view of God seems to be that ultimately there is no responsibility for good or evil and that good and evil, high and low, great and small have all emerged from God and are upheld in Him. When a man understands the nature and reality of his own self and its agency, and his relation with God, both in his transcendent and cosmic nature, and the universe around him and the *guṇas* of attachment, etc., which bind him to his worldly desires, he is said to have the true knowledge. There is no opposition between the path of this true knowledge (*jñāna-yoga*) and the path of duties; for true knowledge supports and is supported by right performance of duties. The path of knowledge is praised in the *Gītā* in several passages. Thus it is said, that just as fire burns up the wood, so does knowledge reduce all actions to ashes. There is nothing so pure as knowledge. He who has true faith is attached to God, and he who has controlled his senses, attains knowledge, and having attained it, secures peace. He who

¹ *Gītā*, x. 36-41.

is foolish, an unbeliever, and full of doubts, is destroyed. He who is always doubting has neither this world, nor the other, nor does he enjoy any happiness. Even the worst sinner can hope to cross the sea of sins in the boat of knowledge¹. In the *Gītā*, iv. 42, Kṛṣṇa says to Arjuna, "Therefore, having destroyed the ignorance of your heart by the sword of knowledge, and having cut asunder all doubts, raise yourself up." But what is this knowledge? In the *Gītā*, iv. 36, in the same context, this knowledge is defined to be that view of things by which all beings are perceived in this self or God. The true knowledge of God destroys all *karma* in the sense that he who has perceived and realized the true nature of all things in God cannot be attached to his passions and desires as an ignorant man would be. In another passage, already referred to, it is said that the roots of the worldly *Aśvattha* tree are to be cut by the sword of unattachment. The confusion into which Arjuna falls in the *Gītā*, III. 1 and 2, regarding the relative excellence of the path of *karma* and the path of knowledge is wholly unfounded. Kṛṣṇa points out in the *Gītā*, III. 3, that there are two paths, the path of knowledge and the path of duties (*jñāna-yoga* and *karma-yoga*). The confusion had arisen from the fact that Kṛṣṇa had described the immortality of soul and the undesirability of Vedic actions done with a motive, and had also asked Arjuna to fight and yet remain unattached and perform his duty for the sake of duty. The purpose of the *Gītā* was to bring about a reconciliation between these two paths, and to show that the path of knowledge leads to the path of duties by liberating it from the bonds of attachment; for all attachment is due to ignorance, and ignorance is removed by true knowledge. But the true knowledge of God may be of a twofold nature. One may attain a knowledge of God in His transcendence as Brahman, and attain the philosophic wisdom of the foundation of all things in Brahman as the ultimate substance and source of all manifestation and appearance. There is another way of clinging to God as a super-person, in a personal relation of intimacy, friendship and dependence. The *Gītā* admits that both these ways may lead us to the attainment of our highest realization. But it is the latter which the *Gītā* prefers and considers easier. Thus the *Gītā* says (xii. 3-5) that those who adore the indefinable, unchangeable, omnipresent, unthinkable, and the unmanifested, controlling all their senses, with equal eyes for all

¹ *Gītā*, iv. 37-41.

and engaged in the good of all, by this course attain Him. Those who fix their mind on the unmanifested (*avyakta*) find this course very hard. But those who dedicate all their actions to God and, clinging to Him as their only support, are devoted to Him in constant communion, then He saves soon from the sea of death and rebirth¹.

The most important point in which the *Gītā* differs from the Upaniṣads is that the *Gītā* very strongly emphasizes the fact that the best course for attaining our highest realization is to dedicate all our actions to God, to cling to Him as our nearest and dearest, and always to be in communion with Him. The *Gītā* draws many of its ideas from the Upaniṣads and looks to them with respect. It accepts the idea of Brahman as a part of the essence of God, and agrees that those who fix their mind on Brahman as their ideal also attain the high ideal of realizing God. But this is only a compromise; for the *Gītā* emphasizes the necessity of a personal relation with God, whom we can love and adore. The beginning of our association with God must be made by dedicating the fruits of all our actions to God, by being a friend of all and sympathetic to all, by being self-controlled, the same in sorrow or happiness, self-contented, and in a state of perfect equanimity and equilibrium. It is through such a moral elevation that a man becomes apt in steadying his mind on God and ultimately in fixing his mind on God. In the *Gītā* Kṛṣṇa as God asks Arjuna to give up all ceremonials or religious courses and to cling to God as the only protector, and He promises that because of that God will liberate him². Again, it is said that it is by devotion that a man knows what God is in reality and, thus knowing Him truly as He is, enters into Him. It is by seeking entire protection in God that one can attain his eternal state³.

But, though in order to attain the height at which it is possible to fix one's mind on God, one should first acquire the preliminary qualification of detaching oneself from the bonds of passions and desires, yet it is sometimes possible to reverse the situation. The *Gītā* thus holds that those whose minds and souls are full of God's love, who delight in constantly talking and thinking of God and always adore God with love, are dear to Him, and God, through His great mercy and kindness, grants them the proper wisdom and destroys the darkness of their ignorance by the light of knowledge⁴.

¹ *Gītā*, XII. 6, 7.² *Ibid.* XVIII. 66.³ *Ibid.* XVIII. 55, 62.⁴ *Ibid.* X. 9-11.

In the *Gītā*, xviii. 57-58, Kṛṣṇa as God asks Arjuna to leave all fruits of actions to God and to fill his mind with God, and He assures him that He will then, by His divine grace, save him from all sorrows, troubles or difficulties. Again, in ix. 30-32 it is said that, even if a man is extremely wicked, if he adores God devotedly, he becomes a saint; for he has adopted the right course, and he soon becomes religious and attains eternal peace of mind. Even sinners, women, Vaiśyas and Śūdras who cling to God for support, are emancipated. Kṛṣṇa as God assures Arjuna that a devotee (*bhakta*) of God can never be lost¹. If a man clings to God, no matter whether he has understood Him rightly or not, no matter whether he has taken the right course of approaching Him or not, God accepts him in whichever way he clings to Him. No one can be lost. In whichever way one may be seeking God, one is always in God's path². If a man, prompted by diverse desires, takes to wrong gods, then even unto those gods God grants him true devotion, with which he follows his worship of those gods, and, even through such worship, grants him his desires³. God is the Lord of all and the friend of all beings. It is only great-souled men who with complete constancy of mind worship God, and with firm devotion repeat the name of God, and, being always in communion with Him, adore Him with devotion. God is easily accessible to those who always think of God with inalienable attachment⁴. In another passage (vii. 16, 17) it is said that there are four classes of people who adore God: those who are enquiring, those who are in trouble, those who wish to attain some desired things, and those who are wise. Of these the wise (*jñānin*), who are always in communion with Him and who are devoted to Him alone, are superior; the wise are dear to Him and He is dear to them. In this passage it has been suggested that true wisdom consists in the habit of living in communion with God and in being in constant devotion to God. The path of *bhakti*, or devotion, is thus praised in the *Gītā* as being the best. For the *Gītā* holds that, even if a man cannot proceed in the normal path of self-elevation and detach himself from passions and desires and establish himself in equanimity, he may still, simply by clinging to God and by firm devotion to Him, bring himself within the sphere of His grace, and by grace alone acquire true wisdom and

¹ *Gītā*, ix. 30-32.

³ *Ibid.* vii. 20-22.

² *Ibid.* iv. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.* iv. 13-15; v. 29; vii. 14.

achieve that moral elevation, with little or no struggle, which is attained with so much difficulty by others. The path of *bhakti* is thus introduced in the *Gītā*, for the first time, as an independent path side by side with the path of wisdom and knowledge of the Upaniṣads and with the path of austere self-discipline. Moral elevation, self-control, etc. are indeed regarded as an indispensable preliminary to any kind of true self-realization. But the advantage of the path of devotion (*bhakti*) consists in this, that, while some seekers have to work hard on the path of self-control and austere self-discipline, either by constant practice or by the aid of philosophic wisdom, the devotee makes an easy ascent to a high elevation—not because he is more energetic and better equipped than his fellow-workers in other paths, but because he has resigned himself completely to God; and God, being pleased with his devotees who cling fast to Him and know nothing else, grants them wisdom and raises them up through higher and higher stages of self-elevation, self-realization and bliss. Arjuna treated Kṛṣṇa, the incarnation of God on earth, as his friend, and Kṛṣṇa in the rôle of God exhorted him to depend entirely on Him and assured him that He would liberate him—He was asking him to give up everything else and cling to Him as his only support. The *Gītā* lays down for the first time the corner-stone of the teachings of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and of the later systems of Vaiṣṇava thought, which elaborated the theory of *bhakti* and described it as the principal method of self-elevation and self-realization.

Another important feature of the *Gītā* doctrine of devotion consists in the fact that, as, on the one hand, God is contemplated by His devotees in the intimate personal relation of a father, teacher, master and friend, with a full consciousness of His divinity and His nature as the substratum and the upholder of the entire animate and inanimate cosmic universe, so, on the other hand, the transcendent personality of God is realized not only as the culmination of spiritual greatness and the ultimate reconciliation of all relative differences, of high and low, good and bad, but as the great deity, with a physical, adorable form, whom the devotee can worship not only mentally and spiritually, but also externally, with holy offerings of flowers and leaves. The transcendent God is not only immanent in the universe, but also present before the devotee in the form of a great deity resplendent with brightness, or in the personal form of the man-god Kṛṣṇa, in whom

God incarnated Himself. The *Gītā* combines together different conceptions of God without feeling the necessity of reconciling the oppositions or contradictions involved in them. It does not seem to be aware of the philosophical difficulty of combining the concept of God as the unmanifested, differenceless entity with the notion of Him as the super-person Who incarnates Himself on earth in the human form and behaves in the human manner. It is not aware of the difficulty that, if all good and evil should have emanated from God, and if there be ultimately no moral responsibility, and if everything in the world should have the same place in God, there is no reason why God should trouble to incarnate Himself as man, when there is a disturbance of the Vedic *dharma*. If God is impartial to all, and if He is absolutely unperturbed, why should He favour the man who clings to Him, and why, for his sake, overrule the world-order of events and in his favour suspend the law of *karma*? It is only by constant endeavours and practice that one can cut asunder the bonds of *karma*. Why should it be made so easy for even a wicked man who clings to God to release himself from the bonds of attachment and *karma*, without any effort on his part? Again, the *Gītā* does not attempt to reconcile the disparate parts which constitute the complex super-personality of God. How are the unmanifested or *avyakta* part as Brahman, the *avyakta* part as the cosmic substratum of the universe, the *prakṛti* part as the producer of the *guṇas*, and the *prakṛti* part as the *jīvas* or individual selves, to be combined and melted together to form a complex personality? If the unmanifested nature is the ultimate abode (*param dhāma*) of God, how can God as a person, who cannot be regarded as a manifestation of this ultimate reality, be considered to be transcendent? How can there be a relation between God as a person and His diverse nature as the cosmic universe, *jīva* and the *guṇas*? In a system like that of Śaṅkara Brahman and Īśvara, one and the many could be combined together in one scheme, by holding Brahman as real and Īśvara and the many as unreal and illusory, produced by reflection of Brahman in the *māyā*, the principle of illusoriness. But, howsoever Śaṅkara might interpret the *Gītā*, it does not seem that it considered Īśvara or the world as in the least degree illusory. In the Upaniṣads also the notion of Īśvara and the notion of Brahman are sometimes found side by side. As regards God as Īśvara, the *Gītā* not only does not think him to be

illusory, but considers him the highest truth and reality. Thus there is no way of escaping from any of the categories of reality—the two *avyaktas*, *prakṛti*, *jīva* and the super-personality of Īśvara comprehending and transcending them all. The concepts of Brahman, *jīva*, the unmanifested category from which the world proceeds, and the *guṇas* are all found in the Upaniṣads in passages which are probably mostly unrelated. But the *Gītā* seems to take them all together, and to consider them as constituents of Īśvara, which are also upheld by Him in His superior form, in which He transcends and controls them all. In the Upaniṣads the doctrine of *bhakti* can hardly be found, though here and there faint traces of it may be perceived. If the Upaniṣads ever speak of Īśvara, it is only to show His great majesty, power and glory, as the controller and upholder of all. But the *Gītā* is steeped in the mystic consciousness of an intimate personal relation with God, not only as the majestic super-person, but as a friend who incarnates Himself for the good of man and shares his joys and sorrows with him, and to whom a man could cling for support in troubles and difficulties and even appeal for earthly goods. He is the great teacher, with whom one can associate oneself for acquisition of wisdom and the light of knowledge. But He could be more than all this. He could be the dearest of the dear and the nearest of the near, and could be felt as being so intimate, that a man could live simply for the joy of his love for Him; he could cling to Him as the one dear friend, his highest goal, and leave everything else for Him; he could consider, in his deep love for Him, all his other religious duties and works of life as being relatively unimportant; he could thus constantly talk of Him, think of Him, and live in Him. This is the path of *bhakti* or devotion, and the *Gītā* assures us that, whatever may be the hindrances and whatever may be the difficulties, the *bhakta* (devotee) of God cannot be lost. It is from the point of view of this mystic consciousness that the *Gītā* seems to reconcile the apparently philosophically irreconcilable elements. The *Gītā* was probably written at a time when philosophical views had not definitely crystallized into hard-and-fast systems of thought, and when the distinguishing philosophical niceties, scholarly disputations, the dictates of argument, had not come into fashion. The *Gītā*, therefore, is not to be looked upon as a properly schemed system of philosophy, but as a manual of right conduct and right perspective of things in the light of a mystical approach to God in self-resignation, devotion, friendship and humility.

Viṣṇu, Vāsudeva and Kṛṣṇa.

Viṣṇu, Bhagavat, Nārāyaṇa, Hari and Kṛṣṇa are often used in a large section of Indian religious literature as synonymous names of the supreme lord. Of these Viṣṇu is an important god of the *R̥g-Veda*, who is one of the *āḍityas* and who makes three strides in the sky, probably as he manifests himself in the eastern horizon, as he rises to the zenith and as he sets in the west. He is also represented in the *R̥g-Veda* as a great fighter and an ally of Indra. It is further said that he has two earthly steps and another higher step which is known only to himself. But in the *R̥g-Veda* Viṣṇu is certainly inferior to Indra, with whom he was often associated, as is evident from such names as *Indrā-viṣṇu* (R.V. iv. 55. 4; vii. 99. 5; viii. 10. 2, etc.). According to later tradition Viṣṇu was the youngest, the twelfth of the *āḍityas*, though he was superior to them all in good qualities¹. His three steps in the R̥g-Vedic allusion have been explained in the *Nirukta* as referring to the three stages of the sun's progress in the morning, at midday and at evening. One of the names of Viṣṇu in the *R̥g-Veda* is Śipiviṣṭa, which Durgācārya explains as "surrounded with the early rays" (*śīpi-saṃjñāir bāla-raśmibhir āviṣṭa*)². Again, the sage praises Viṣṇu in the *R̥g-Veda* in the following terms: "I, a master of hymns and knowing the sacred customs, to-day praise that name of thine, Śipiviṣṭa. I, who am weak, glorify thee, who art mighty and dwellest beyond this world³." All this shows that Viṣṇu was regarded as the sun, or endowed with the qualities of the sun. The fact that Viṣṇu was regarded as dwelling beyond this world is probably one of the earliest signs of his gradually increasing superiority. For the next stage one must turn to the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*. In I. 2. 4 of that work it is said that the demons (*asura*) and the gods were vying with one another; the gods were falling behind, and the demons were trying to distribute the world among themselves; the gods followed them, making Viṣṇu the sacrifice as their leader (*te yajñam eva Viṣṇum puraskṛtyeyuh*), and desired their own shares; the demons felt jealous and said that they could give only so much ground as would

¹ *Ekādaśas tathā Tvaṣṭā dvādaśo Viṣṇur ucyate jaghanyajas tu sarveṣāṃ āḍityānāṃ guṇādhikah.*

Mahā-bhārata, I. 65. 16. Calcutta, Bangavasi Press, second edition, 1908.

² *Nirukta*, v. 9. Bombay edition, 1918.

³ *R̥g-Veda*, vii. 100. 5, translated by Dr L. Sarup, quoted in *Nirukta*, v. 8.

be occupied by Viṣṇu when he lay down, Viṣṇu being a dwarf (*vāmano ha Viṣṇur āsa*). The gods felt dissatisfied at this, and they approached him with various *mantras* and in consequence attained the whole world. Again, in XIV. 1 of the same work, Kurukṣetra is referred to as being the place of the sacrificial performances of the gods, and it is said there that in industry, rigorism (*tapas*), faith, etc. Viṣṇu was the best of all gods and was regarded as being superior to them all (*tasmād āhur Viṣṇur devānāṃ śreṣṭhaḥ*), and was himself the sacrifice. Again, in *Taittirīya-saṃhitā*, I. 7. 5. 4, in *Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā*, I. 30; II. 6. 8; V. 21, in *Atharva-Veda*, v. 26. 7; VIII. 5. 10, etc., Viṣṇu is referred to as the chief of the gods (*Viṣṇu-mukhā devā*). Again, Viṣṇu as sacrifice attained unlimited fame. Once he was resting his head on the end of his bow; and, when some ants, perceiving that, said, "How should we be rewarded, if we could gnaw the strings of the bow," the gods said that they would then be rewarded with food; and so the ants gnawed away the strings, and, as the two ends of the bow sprang apart, Viṣṇu's head was torn from his body and became the sun¹. This story not only shows the connection of Viṣṇu with the sun, but also suggests that the later story of Kṛṣṇa's being shot with an arrow by an archer originated from the legend of Viṣṇu's being killed by the flying ends of his bow. The place of Viṣṇu (*Viṣṇu-pada*) means the zenith, as the highest place of the sun, and it is probable that the idea of the zenith being the place of Viṣṇu led also to the idea that Viṣṇu had a superior place transcending everything, which was, however, clearly perceived by the wise. Thus, at the beginning of the daily prayer-hymns of the Brahmans, known as *sandhyā*, it is said that the wise see always that superior place of Viṣṇu, like an open eye in the sky². The word *vaiṣṇava* is used in the literal sense of "belonging to Viṣṇu" in the *Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā*, v. 21, 23, 25, *Taittirīya-saṃhitā*, v. 6. 9. 2. 3, *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa*, III. 38, *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, I. 1. 4. 9; III. 5. 3. 2, etc.; but the use of the word in the sense of a sect of religion is not to be found anywhere in the earlier literature. Even the *Gītā* does not use the word, and it is not found in any of the earlier Upaniṣads; it can be traced only in the later parts of the *Mahā-bhārata*.

¹ *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, XIV. 1.

² *tad Viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padaṃ sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ divṛva cakṣur ātatam.*
Ācamana-mantra of the daily *sandhyā* prayer-hymn.

Again, it is well known that the supreme man, or *puruṣa*, is praised in very high terms in the man-hymn (*Puruṣa-sūkta*) of the *Rg-Veda*, x. 90, where it is said that *puruṣa* is all that we see, what is past and what is future, and that everything has come out of him; the gods performed sacrifice with him with the oblations of the seasons, and out of this sacrifice *puruṣa* was first born, and then the gods and all living beings; the various castes were born out of him; the sky, the heavens and the earth have all come out of him; he is the creator and upholder of all; it is by knowing him that one attains immortality; there is no other way of salvation. It is curious that there should be a word *nārāyaṇa*, similar in meaning (etymologically *nara* + *phak*, born in 'the race or lineage of man) to *puruṣa*, which was also used to mean the supreme being and identified with *puruṣa* and Viṣṇu. In *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, xiv. 3. 4, *puruṣa* is identified with *nārāyaṇa* (*purusaṃ ha nārāyaṇaṃ Prajāpatir uvāca*). Again, in *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, xiii. 6. 1, the idea of the *puruṣa-sūkta* is further extended, and the *puruṣa nārāyaṇa* is said to have performed the *pañca-rātra* sacrifice (*pañcarātraṃ yajña-krātum*) and thereby transcended everything and become everything. This *pañca-rātra* sacrifice involves the (spiritual) sacrifice of *puruṣa* (*puruṣa-medho yajña-kratur bhavati*, xiii. 6. 7). The five kinds of sacrifice, five kinds of animals, the year with the five kinds of seasons, the five kinds of indwelling entities (*pañca-vidham adhyātman*) can all be attained by the *pañca-rātra* sacrifices. The sacrifice was continued for five days, and the Vedic habit of figurative thinking associated each of the days of the sacrifice with various kinds of desirable things, so that the five-day sacrifice was considered to lead to many things which are fivefold in their nature. The reference to the five kinds of indwelling entities soon produced the *pañca-rātra* doctrine of the manifestation of God in various modes as the external deity of worship (*arcā*), inner controller (*antar-yāmin*), as various manifestations of His lordly power (*vibhava*), as successive deity-forms in intimate association as *vyūha* and as the highest God (*para*). This idea is also found in the later *Pāṇca-rātra* scriptures, such as *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* (I. 1) and the like, where God is described as having his highest form along with the *vyūha* forms. *Puruṣa* is thus identified with *nārāyaṇa*, who, by sacrifice of *puruṣa* (*puruṣa-medha*), became all this world. The etymological definition of *nārāyaṇa* as "one who has descended from man (*nara*)," as herein suggested in accordance

with Pāṇini, IV. 1. 99, is not, however, accepted everywhere. Thus Manu, I. 10, derives *nārāyaṇa* from *nāra*, meaning “water,” and *ayana*, meaning “abode,” and *nāra* (water), again, is explained as “that which has descended from *nara*,” or supreme man¹. The *Mahā-bhārata*, III. 12,952 and 15,819 and XII. 13,168, accepts Manu’s derivation; but in V. 2568 it says that the supreme God is called *nārāyaṇa* because he is also the refuge of men². The *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka*, X. 1. 6, identifies *nārāyaṇa* with Vāsudeva and Viṣṇu³. It may be suggested in this connection that even the Upaniṣad doctrine of the self as the supreme reality is probably a development of this type of ideas which regarded man as supreme God. The word *puruṣa* is very frequently used in the Upaniṣads in the sense of man, as well as in that of the highest being or supreme reality. In the *Mahā-bhārata* *nara* and *nārāyaṇa* are referred to as being the forms of the supreme lord. Thus it is said, “The four-faced Brahmā, capable of being understood only with the aid of the *niruktas*, joined his hands and, addressing Rudra, said, “Let good happen to the three worlds. Throw down thy weapons, O lord of the universe, from desire of benefiting the universe. That which is indestructible, immutable, supreme, the origin of the universe, uniform and the supreme actor, that which transcends all pairs of opposites and is inactive, has, choosing to be displayed, been pleased to assume this one blessed form (for, though double, the two represent but one and the same form). This *nara* and *nārāyaṇa* (the displayed forms of supreme Brahman) have taken birth in the race of *dharma*. The foremost of all deities, these two are observers of the highest vows and endued with the severest penances. Through some reason best known to Him I myself have sprung from the attribute of His Grace Eternal, as thou hast; for, though thou hast ever existed since all the pure creations, thou too hast sprung from His Wrath. With myself then, these deities and all the great Ṛṣis, do thou adore this displayed form of Brahman and let there be peace unto all

¹ *āpo nārā iti proktā āpo vai nara-sūnavah*

tā yad asyāyanam pūrvaṃ tena nārāyaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ. Manu, I. 10.

Water is called *nāra*; water is produced from man, and, since he rested in water in the beginning, he is called *nārāyaṇa*. Kullūka, in explaining this, says that *nara*, or man, here means the supreme self, or Brahman.

² *Narāṇām ayanāc cāpi tato nārāyaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ.* *Mahā-bhārata*, V. 2568.

³ *Nārāyaṇāya vidmahe vāsudevāya dhīmahi tan no Viṣṇuḥ pracodayāt.* *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, p. 700. Ānandāśrama Press, Poona, 1898.

the worlds without any delay¹." In the succeeding chapter (i.e. *Mahā-bhārata*, *Śānti-parva*, 343) *nara* and *nārāyaṇa* are described as being two foremost of sages (*ṛṣi*) and two ancient deities engaged in the practice of penances, observing high vows and depending upon their own selves and transcending the very sun in energy.

The word *bhagavat* in the sense of blissful and happy is a very old one and is used in the *R̥g-Veda*, I. 164. 40; VII. 41. 4; X. 60. 12 and in the *Atharva-Veda*, II. 10. 2; V. 31. 11, etc. But in the *Mahā-bhārata* and other such early literature it came to denote Viṣṇu or Vāsudeva, and the word *bhāgavata* denoted the religious sect which regarded Viṣṇu as Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva as their supreme god. The Pali canonical work *Niddesa* refers to various superstitious religious sects, among which it mentions the followers of Vāsudeva, Baladeva, Puṇṇabhadda, Maṇibhadda, Aggi, Nāga, Suparṇa, Yakkha, Asura, Gandhabba, Mahārāja, Canda, Suriya, Inda, Brahmā, dog, crow, cow, etc. It is easy to understand why a Buddhist work should regard the worship of Vāsudeva as being of a very low type; but at any rate it proves that the worship of Vāsudeva was prevalent during the period when the *Niddesa* was codified. Again, in commenting upon Pāṇini, IV. 3. 98 (*Vāsudevār-junābhyaṃ vun*), Patañjali points out that the word Vāsudeva here does not denote the Vāsudeva who was the son of Vasudeva of the Kṣattriya race of Vṛṣṇis, since, had it been so, the suffix *vuñ*, which is absolutely equivalent to *vun*, could well be by Pāṇini, IV. 3. 99 (*gotra-kṣattriyākhyaebhyo bahulaṃ vuñ*), by which *vuñ* is suffixed to names of Kṣattriya race. Patañjali thus holds that the word *Vāsudeva* is in this rule not used to refer to any Kṣattriya race, but is a name of the Lord (*saṃjñaiṣā tatra bhagavataḥ*). If Patañjali's interpretation is to be trusted, for which there is every reason, Vāsudeva as God is to be distinguished from the Kṣattriya Vāsudeva, the son of Vasudeva of the race of Vṛṣṇis. It was well established in Pāṇini's time that Vāsudeva was God, and that His followers were called *Vāsudevaka*, for the formation of which word by the *vun* suffix Pāṇini had to make the rule (IV. 3. 98). Again, the Ghosunḍī inscription in Rajputana, which is written in Brāhmī, an early form of about 200–150 B.C., contains a reference to the building of a wall round the temple of Vāsudeva and Saṃkarṣaṇa. In the Besnagar inscription of about 100 B.C.

¹ *Mahā-bhārata*, *Śānti-parva*, 342. 124–129. P. C. Roy's translation, *Mokṣa-dharma-parva*, p. 817. Calcutta.

Heliodorus, son of Diya, describes himself as a great devotee of Bhagavat (*parama-bhāgavata*), who had erected a pillar bearing an image of Garuḍa. In the Nānāghaṭ inscription of 100 B.C. Vāsudeva and Saṃkarṣaṇa appear together as deities to whom adorations are addressed along with other gods. If the testimony of Patañjali is accepted, the religious sect of Vāsudevas existed before Pāṇini. It is generally believed that Patañjali lived in 150 B.C., since in course of interpreting a grammatical rule which allowed the use of the past tense in reference to famous contemporary events not witnessed by the speaker he illustrates it by using a past tense in referring to the Greek invasion of the city of Sāketa (*aruṇad Yavanaḥ Sāketam*); as this event took place in 150 B.C., it is regarded as a famous contemporary event not witnessed by Patañjali. Patañjali was the second commentator of Pāṇini, the first being Kātyāyana. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar points out that Patañjali notices variant readings in Kātyāyana's *Vārttikas*, as found in the texts used by the schools of Bhāradvājīyas, Saunāgas and others, some of which might be considered as emendations of the *Vārttikas*, though Patañjali's introduction of them by the verb *paṭhanti*, "they read," is an indication that he regarded them as different readings¹. From this Sir R. G. Bhandarkar argues that between Kātyāyana and Patañjali a considerable time must have elapsed, which alone can explain the existence of the variant readings of Kātyāyana's text in Patañjali's time. He therefore agrees with the popular tradition in regarding Pāṇini as a contemporary of the Nandas, who preceded the Mauryas. Kātyāyana thus flourished in the first half of the 5th century B.C. But, as both Goldstücker and Sir R. G. Bhandarkar have pointed out, the *Vārttika* of Kātyāyana notices many grammatical forms which are not noticed by Pāṇini, and this, considering the great accuracy of Pāṇini as a grammarian, naturally leads to the supposition that those forms did not exist in his time. Goldstücker gives a list of words admitted into Pāṇini's *sūtras* which had gone out of use by Kātyāyana's time, and he also shows that some words which probably did not exist in Pāṇini's time had come to be used later and are referred to by Kātyāyana. All this implies that Pāṇini must have flourished at least two or three hundred years before Kātyāyana. The reference to the Vāsudeva sect in Pāṇini's *sūtras* naturally suggests its existence before his time. The allusions

¹ Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's *Early History of the Deccan*, p. 7.

to Vāsudeva in the inscriptions referred to above can be regarded as corroborative evidence pointing to the early existence of the Vāsudeva sect, who worshipped Vāsudeva or Bhagavat as the supreme Lord.

Turning to literary references to Vāsudeva and Kṛṣṇa, we find the story of Vāsudeva, who is also called by his family name Kanha and Keśava (probably on account of his bunch of hair), in the *Ghaṭa-jātaka*. The story agrees in some important details with the usual accounts of Kṛṣṇa, though there are some new deviations. A reference to the Vṛṣṇi race of Kṣattriyas is found in Pāṇini, IV. 1. 114 (*rṣy-andhaka-vṛṣṇi-kurubhyaś ca*). The word is formed by an *uṇādi* suffix, and it literally means "powerful" or "a great leader¹." It also means "heretic" (*pāṣaṇḍa*) and one who is passionately angry (*caṇḍa*). It is further used to denote the Yādava race, and Kṛṣṇa is often addressed as Vārṣṇeya, and in the *Gītā*, x. 37, Kṛṣṇa says, "Of the Vṛṣṇis I am Vāsudeva." The Vṛṣṇis are referred to in Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra*, where the group of Vṛṣṇis (*vṛṣṇi-saṅgha*) is said to have attacked Dvaipāyana. The *Ghaṭa-jātaka* also has the story of the curse of Kanha Dvaipāyana as the cause of the destruction of the Vṛṣṇis. But the *Mahā-bhārata* (xvi. 1) holds that the curse was pronounced by Viśvāmitra, Kaṇva and Nārada upon Śāmba, the son of Kṛṣṇa. Two Vāsudevas are mentioned in the *Mahā-bhārata*: Vāsudeva, the king of the Pauṇḍras, and Vāsudeva or Kṛṣṇa, the brother of Saṃkarṣaṇa, and both of them are mentioned as being present in the great assemblage of kings at the house of King Drupada for the marriage of Draupadī; it is the latter Vāsudeva who is regarded as God. It is very probable that Vāsudeva originally was a name of the sun and thus became associated with Viṣṇu, who with his three steps traversed the heavens; and a similarity of Kṛṣṇa or Vāsudeva to the sun is actually suggested in the *Mahā-bhārata*, xii. 341. 41, where Nārāyaṇa says, "Being like the sun, I cover the whole world with my rays, and I am also the sustainer of all beings and am hence called Vāsudeva."

Again, the word *Sātvata* also is used as a synonym of Vāsudeva or Bhāgavata. The word *Sātvata* in the plural form is a name of a tribe of the Yādavas, and in the *Mahā-bhārata*, vii. 7662, the phrase *Satvatām varaḥ* is used to denote Sātyaki, a member of the Yādava race, though this appellation is applied to Kṛṣṇa in a

¹ *Yūthena vṛṣṇir ejati, Rg-Veda*, I. 10. 2.

large number of places in the *Mahā-bhārata*¹. In the later *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (IX. 9. 50) it is said that the Sātvatas worship Brahman as Bhagavān and as Vāsudeva. In the *Mahā-bhārata*, VI. 66. 41, Saṃkarṣaṇa is said to have introduced the *sātvata* rites in worshipping Vāsudeva. If Sātvata was the name of a race, it is easy to imagine that the persons may have had special rites in worshipping Vāsudeva. Yāmuna-cārya, the great teacher of Rāmānuja in the tenth century A.D., says that those who adore God (*bhagavat*), the supreme person, with purity (*sattva*), are called *bhāgavata* and *sātvata*². Yāmuna strongly urges that Sātvatas are Brāhmaṇas by caste, but are attached to Bhagavat as the supreme lord. Yāmuna, however, seems to urge this in strong opposition to the current view that Sātvatas were a low-caste people, who had not the initiation with the holy thread and were an outcast people originated from the Vaiśyas³. The Sātvatas are said to be the fifth low-caste people, who worship in the temples of Viṣṇu by the orders of the king, and are also called Bhāgavatas⁴. The Sātvatas and Bhāgavatas are those who make their living by worshipping images and are hence low and disreputable. Yāmuna urges that this popular view about the Bhāgavatas and the Sātvatas is all incorrect; for, though there are many Sātvatas who make a living by worshipping images, not all Sātvatas and Bhāgavatas do so; and there are many among them who worship Bhagavat, as the supreme person, solely by personal devotion and attachment.

From Patañjali's remarks in commenting on Pāṇini, IV. 3. 98, it is seen that he believed in the existence of two Vāsudevas, one a leader of the Vṛṣṇi race and the other God as Bhagavat. It has already been pointed out that the name Vāsudeva occurs also in the *Ghaṭa-jātaka*. It may therefore be argued that the name Vāsudeva was an old name, and the evidence of the passage of the *Niddesa*, as well as that of Patañjali, shows that it was a name of God or Bhagavat. The later explanation of Vāsudeva as "the son of Vasudeva" may therefore be regarded as an

¹ *Mahā-bhārata*, v. 2581, 3041, 3334, 3360, 4370; IX. 2532, 3502; X. 726; XII. 1502, 1614, 7533.

² *tataś ca sattvād bhagavān bhajyate yaiḥ paraḥ pumān
te sātvatā bhāgavatā ity ucyante dvijottamāḥ.*

Yāmuna's *Āgama-prāmānya*, p. 7. 6.

³ Thus Manu (X. 23) says:

*vaiśyāt tu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvācārya eva ca
kāruṣaś ca vijānmā ca maitras sātvatā eva ca.*

⁴ *pañcamāḥ sātvalo nāma Viṣṇor āyatanam hi saḥ
pūjayed ājñayā rājñāṃ sa tu bhāgavataḥ smṛtaḥ.*

Ibid. p. 8.

unauthorized surmise. It is very probable that Vāsudeva was worshipped by the race of Yādavas as a tribal hero according to their own tribal rites and that he was believed to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu, who was in his turn associated with the sun. Megasthenes, in his account of India as he saw it, speaks of the Sourasenoī—an Indian nation in whose land are two great cities, Methora and Kleisobora, through which flows the navigable river Jobares—as worshipping Heracles. “Methora” in all probability means Mathura and “Jobares” Jumna. It is probable that Heracles is Hari, which again is a name of Vāsudeva. Again in the *Mahā-bhārata*, vi. 65, Bhīṣma says that he was told by the ancient sages that formerly the great supreme person appeared before the assembly of gods and sages, and Brahmā began to adore Him with folded hands. This great Being, who is there adored as Vāsudeva, had first created out of Himself Saṃkarṣaṇa, and then Pradyumna, and from Pradyumna Aniruddha, and it was from Aniruddha that Brahmā was created. This great Being, Vāsudeva, incarnated Himself as the two sages, Nara and Nārāyaṇa. He Himself says in the *Mahā-bhārata*, vi. 66, that “as Vāsudeva I should be adored by all and no one should ignore me in my human body”; in both these chapters Kṛṣṇa and Vāsudeva are identical, and in the *Gītā* Kṛṣṇa says that “of the Vṛṣṇis I am Vāsudeva.” It has also been pointed out that Vāsudeva belonged to the Kanhāyana *gotra*. As Sir R. G. Bhandarkar says, “It is very probable that the identification of Kṛṣṇa with Vāsudeva was due to the similarity of the *gotra* name with the name of Kṛṣṇa¹.” From the frequent allusions to Vāsudeva in Patañjali’s commentary and in the *Mahā-bhārata*, where he is referred to as the supreme person, it is very reasonable to suppose that the word is a proper noun, as the name of a person worshipped as God, and not a mere patronymic name indicating an origin from a father Vasudeva. Kṛṣṇa, Janārdana, Keśava, Hari, etc. are not Vṛṣṇi names, but were used as personal appellations of Vāsudeva. Patañjali in his commentary on Pāṇini, iv. 3. 98, notes that Vāsudeva, as the name of a Kṣattriya king of the race of Vṛṣṇis, is to be distinguished from Vāsudeva as the name of God. This God, worshipped by the Sātvatas according to their family rites, probably came to be identified with a Vṛṣṇi king Vāsudeva, and some of the personal characteristics of this king became also personal

¹ Sir R. G. Bhandarkar’s *Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism*, pp. 11–12.

characteristics of the god Vāsudeva. The word Kṛṣṇa occurs several times in the older literature. Thus Kṛṣṇa appears as a Vedic ṛṣi, as the composer of *R̥g-Veda*, VIII. 74. In the *Mahā-bhārata Anukramaṇī* Kṛṣṇa is said to have descended from Aṅgiras. Kṛṣṇa appears in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (III. 17) as the son of Devakī, as in the *Ghaṭa-jātaka*. It is therefore probable that Vāsudeva came to be identified with Kṛṣṇa, the son of Devakī. The older conception of Kṛṣṇa's being a *ṛtvij* is found in the *Mahā-bhārata*, and Bhīṣma in the *Sabhā-parva* speaks of him as being a *ṛtvij* and well-versed in the accessory literature of the Vedas (*vedāṅga*). It is very probable, as Dr Ray Chaudhury points out, that Kṛṣṇa, the son of Devakī, was the same as Vāsudeva, the founder of the Bhāgavata system; for he is referred to in the *Ghaṭa-jātaka* as being Kanhāyana, or Kanha, which is the same as Kṛṣṇa, and as Devakī-putra, and in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. 17. 6, also he is referred to as being Devakī-putra. In the *Ghaṭa-jātaka* Kṛṣṇa is spoken of as being a warrior, whereas in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* he is a pupil of Ghora Aṅgirasa, who taught him a symbolic sacrifice, in which penances (*tapas*), gifts (*dāna*), sincerity (*ārjava*), non-injury (*ahimsā*) and truthfulness (*satya-vacana*) may be regarded as sacrificial fees (*dakṣiṇā*). The *Mahā-bhārata*, II. 317, describes Kṛṣṇa both as a sage who performed long courses of asceticism in Gandhamādana, Puṣkara and Badarī, and as a great warrior. He is also described in the *Mahā-bhārata* as Vāsudeva, Devakī-putra and as the chief of the Sātvatas, and his divinity is everywhere acknowledged there.. But it is not possible to assert definitely that Vāsudeva, Kṛṣṇa the warrior and Kṛṣṇa the sage were not three different persons, who in the *Mahā-bhārata* were unified and identified, though it is quite probable that all the different strands of legends refer to one identical person.

If the three Kṛṣṇas refer to one individual Kṛṣṇa, he must have lived long before Buddha, as he is alluded to in the *Chāndogya*, and his *guru* Ghora Aṅgirasa is also alluded to in the *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa*, xxx. 6 and the *Kāṭhaka-saṃhitā*, I. 1, which are pre-Buddhistic works. Jaina tradition refers to Kṛṣṇa as being anterior to Pārśvanātha (817 B.C.), and on this evidence Dr Ray Chaudhury thinks that he must have lived long before the closing years of the ninth century B.C.¹

¹ *Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Sect*, p. 39.

Bhāgavata and the Bhagavad-gītā.

The *Mahā-bhārata* (xii. 348) associates the *Bhagavad-gītā* with the doctrines of the Ekānti-Vaiṣṇavas. It is said there that the God Hari (*bhagavān Hari*) always blesses those that are devoted to God without any idea of gain (*ekāntin*) and accepts their adorations, offered in accordance with proper rites (*vidhi-prayukta*)¹. This *ekānta* religion (*ekānta-dharma*) is dear to Nārāyaṇa, and those who adhere to it attain to Hari, as Nilakaṇṭha, the commentator on the *Mahā-bhārata*, points out, without passing through the three stages of Aniruddha, Pradyumna and Saṁkarṣaṇa. The *ekāntin* faith leads to much higher goals than the paths of those that know the Vedas and lead the lives of ascetics. The principles of this *ekāntin* faith were enunciated by the Bhagavat himself in the battle of the Pāṇḍavas and the Kurus, when Arjuna felt disinclined to fight. This faith can be traced originally to the *Sāma-veda*. It is said that, when Nārāyaṇa created Brahmā, he gave him this *sātvata* faith, and from that time forth, as the *Mahā-bhārata* states, there has been a host of persons who were instructed in this faith and followed it. It was at a much later stage briefly described in the *Hari-gītā*². This faith is very obscure and very difficult to be practised, and its chief feature is cessation from all kinds of injury. In some places it is said to recognize one *vyūha*: in other places two, and in others three, *vyūhas* are mentioned. Hari, however, is the final and absolute reality; he is both the agent, the action and the cause, as well as the absolute beyond action (*akartā*). There are, however, but few *ekāntins* in the world: had the world been filled with *ekāntins*, who never injured anyone, were always engaged in doing good to others and attained self-know-

¹ *Ekāntino niṣkāma-bhaktāḥ*, Nilakaṇṭha's commentary on the *Mahā-bhārata*, xii. 348. 3.

² *kathito hari-gītāsu samāsa-vidhi-kalpitaḥ, Hari-gītā*. 53. The traditional teaching of the *Gītā* doctrines is represented as ancient in the *Gītā* itself (iv. 1-3), where it is said that Bhagavān declared it to Vivasvān, and he related it to Manu, and Manu to Ikṣvāku, and so on, until after a long time it was lost; it was again revived by Kṛṣṇa in the form of the *Bhagavad-gītā*. In the *Mahā-bhārata*, xii. 348, it is said that Sanat Kumāra learned this doctrine from Nārāyaṇa, from him Prajāpati, from him Raibhya and from him Kuṁkṣi. It was then lost. Then again Brahmā learned it from Nārāyaṇa, and from him the Barhiṣada sages learned it, and from them Jyeṣṭha. Then again it was lost; then again Brahmā learned it from Nārāyaṇa, and from him Dakṣa learned it, and from him Vivasvān, and from Vivasvān Manu, and from Manu Ikṣvāku. Thus the tradition of the *Bhagavad-gītā*, as given in the poem itself, tallies with the *Mahā-bhārata* account.

ledge, then the golden age, *kṛta yuga*, would have come again. This *ekānta* religion is a faith parallel to that of the Sāṃkhya-yoga, and the devotee who follows it attains Nārāyaṇa as his ultimate state of liberation. From this description in the *Mahā-bhārata* it seems that the doctrine of the *Gītā* was believed to be the *ekāntin* doctrine originally taught by Nārāyaṇa to Brahmā, Nārada and others long before the recital of the *Gītā* by Kṛṣṇa in the *Mahā-bhārata* battle. It is further known that it had at least four or five different schools or variant forms, viz. *eka-vyūha*, *dvi-vyūha*, *tri-vyūha*, *catur-vyūha* and *ekānta*, and that it was known as the Sātvata religion.

Yāmūnācārya in his *Āgama-prāmāṇya* tries to combat a number of views in which the Bhāgavatas were regarded as being inferior to Brahmins, not being allowed to sit and dine with them. The Sātvatas, again, are counted by Manu as a low-caste people, born from outcast Vaiśyas and not entitled to the holy thread¹. The Sātvatas were, of course, regarded as the same as Bhāgavatas, and their chief duties consisted in worshipping for their living in Viṣṇu temples by the order of the king². They also repaired or constructed temples and images for their living, and were therefore regarded as outcasts. That the Bhāgavatas did in later times worship images and build images and temples is also evident from the fact that most of the available *Pañca-rātra* works are full of details about image-building and image-worship. The *Gītā* (IX. 26) also speaks of adoration with water, flowers and leaves, which undoubtedly refers to image-worship. Saṃkarṣaṇa, as the brother or companion of Kṛṣṇa, is mentioned in Patañjali's *Mahā-bhāṣya* (II. 2. 24) in a verse quoted by him, and in II. 2. 34 he seems to quote another passage, in which it is related that different kinds of musical instruments were played in the temple of Dhana-pati, Rāma and Keśava, meaning Balarāma, Saṃkarṣaṇa and Kṛṣṇa³.

As Yāmuna points out, the opponents of the Bhāgavata school urge that, since the ordinary Brahminic initiation is not deemed

¹ *vaiśyāt tu jāyate vrātyāt sudhamvācārya eva ca kārūṣaś ca vijānāmā ca maitraḥ saśvata eva ca. Āgama-prāmāṇya*, p. 8.

² *pañcamah saṭvato nāma Viṣṇor āyatanām hi sa pūjayed ājñayā rājñām sa tu bhāgavataḥ smṛtaḥ. Ibid.*

³ *Saṃkarṣaṇa-dvityasya balaṃ Kṛṣṇasya ardhitam.*

Mahā-bhāṣya, II. 2. 27.

mṛdaṅga-śaṅkha-pañavāḥ pṛthañ nadanti saṃsadi prāsāde dhana-pati-rāma-keśavānām.

Ibid. II. 2. 34.

a sufficient qualification for undertaking the worship of Viṣṇu, and since special and peculiar forms of initiation and ceremonial performances are necessary, it is clear that the Bhāgavata forms of worship are not Vedic in their origin. The fourteen Hindu sciences, viz. the six *vedāṅgas* on Vedic pronunciation (*śikṣā*), ritual (*kalpa*), grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), metre (*chandas*), astronomy (*jyotiṣa*), lexicography (*nirukta*), the four Vedas, Mīmāṃsā, argumentative works or philosophy (*nyāya-vistara*), the mythologies (*purāṇa*) and rules of conduct (*dharma-śāstra*), do not refer to the *Pañca-rātra* scriptures as being counted in their number. So the Bhāgavata or the *Pañca-rātra* scriptures are of non-Vedic origin. But Yāmuna contends that, since Nārāyaṇa is the supreme god, the Bhāgavata literature, which deals with his worship, must be regarded as having the same sources as the Vedas; the Bhāgavatas also have the same kind of outer dress as the Brahmins and the same kinds of lineage. He further contends that, though *sātvata* means an outcast, yet *sātvata* is a different word from *sātvata*, which means a devotee of Viṣṇu. Moreover, not all Bhāgavatas take to professional priestly duties and the worshipping of images for their livelihood; for there are many who worship the images through pure devotion. It is very easy to see that the above defence of the Bhāgavatas, as put forward by one of their best advocates, Yāmunācārya, is very tame and tends to suggest very strongly that the Bhāgavata sect was non-Vedic in its origin and that image-worship, image-making, image-repairing and temple-building had their origin in that particular sect. Yet throughout the entire scriptures of the *Pañca-rātra* school there is the universal and uncontested tradition that it is based on the Vedas. But its difference from the Vedic path is well known. Yāmuna himself refers to a passage (*Āgama-prāmāṇya*, p. 51) where it is said that Śaṇḍilya, not being able to find his desired end (*puruṣārtha*) in all the four Vedas, produced this scripture. The *Gītā* itself often describes the selfish aims of sacrifices, and Kṛṣṇa urges Arjuna to rise above the level of the Vedas. It seems, therefore, that the real connection of the *Pañca-rātra* literature is to be found in the fact that it originated from Vāsudeva or Viṣṇu, who is the supreme God from whom the Vedas themselves were produced. Thus the *Īśvara-saṃhitā* (I. 24-26) explains the matter, and states that the Bhāgavata literature is the great root of the Veda tree, and the Vedas themselves are but trunks of it, and the followers of Yoga are but its branches. Its

main purpose is to propound the superiority of Vāsudeva, who is the root of the universe and identical with the Vedas¹.

The affinity of this school of thought to the Upaniṣad school becomes apparent when it is considered that Vāsudeva was regarded in this system as the highest Brahman². The three other *vyūhas* were but subordinate manifestations of him, after the analogy of *prajñā*, *virāṭ*, *viśva* and *taijasa* in monistic Vedānta. Patañjali's *Mahā-bhāṣya* does not seem to know of the four *vyūhas*, as it mentions only Vāsudeva and Saṃkarṣaṇa; and the *Gītā* knows only Vāsudeva. It seems, therefore, that the *vyūha* doctrine did not exist at the time of the *Gītā* and that it evolved gradually in later times. It is seen from a passage of the *Mahā-bhārata*, already referred to, that there were different variations of the doctrine and that some accepted one *vyūha*, others two, others three and others four. It is very improbable that, if the *vyūha* doctrine was known at the time of the *Gītā*, it should not have been mentioned therein. For the *Gītā* was in all probability the earliest work of the *ekāntin* school of the Bhāgavatas³. It is also interesting in this connection to note that the name Nārāyaṇa is never mentioned in the *Gītā*, and Vāsudeva is only identified with Viṣṇu, the chief of the *ādityas*. Thus Sir R. G. Bhandarkar says, "It will be seen that the date of the *Bhagavad-gītā*, which contains

¹ *mahato veda-vyākṣasya mūla-bhūto mahān ayaṃ skandha-bhūtā ṛg-ādyaś te śākhā-bhūtāś ca yoginaḥ jagat-mūlasya vedasya Vāsudevasya mukhyataḥ pratipādakatā siddhā mūla-vedākhyatā devajāḥ.*

Īśvara-saṃhitā, 1. 24-26.

² *yasmāt samyak paraṃ brahma Vāsudevākhyam avyayam asmād avāpyate śāstrāṃ jñāna-pūrveṇa karmaṇā.*

Paṇḍikāgama, as quoted in *Rāmānuja-bhāṣya*, 11. 2. 42.

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VII. 1. 2) refers also to the study of *ekāyana*, as in the passage *vāko-vākyam ekāyanam*; *ekāyana* is also described as being itself a Veda in *Śrīpraśna-saṃhitā*, 11. 38, 39:

vedam ekāyanam nāma vedānām śirasi sthitam tad-arthakam pañca-rātram mokṣa-daṃ tat-kriyāvatām yasminn eko mokṣa-mārgo vede proktaḥ sanātanaḥ mad-ārādhana-rūpeṇa tasmād ekāyanam bhavet.

See also the article "The Pañca-rātras or Bhāgavata-śāstra," by Govindācārya Svāmin, *J.R.A.S.* 1911.

³ That the *ekāntin* faith is the same as the Sātvata or the *Pañca-rātra* faith is evident from the following quotation from the *Pādma-tantra*, IV. 2. 88:

sūris suhyd bhāgavatas sātvataḥ pañca-kāla-vit ekāntikas tan-mayaś ca pañca-rātriḥ ity api.

This faith is also called *ekāyana*, or the path of the One, as is seen from the following passage from the *Īśvara-saṃhitā*, 1. 18:

mokṣāyanāya vai panthā etad-anyo na vidyate tasmād ekāyanam nāma pravādanti manīṣiṇaḥ.

no mention of the *vyūhas* or personified forms, is much earlier than those of the inscriptions, the *Niddesa* and *Patañjali*, i.e. it was composed not later than the beginning of the fourth century before the Christian era; how much earlier it is difficult to say. At the time when the *Gītā* was conceived and composed the identification of Vāsudeva with Nārāyaṇa had not yet taken place, nor had the fact of his being an incarnation of Viṣṇu come to be acknowledged, as appears from the work itself.... Viṣṇu is alluded to as the chief of the Ādityas and not as the supreme being, and Vāsudeva was Viṣṇu in this sense, as mentioned in chapter x, because the best thing of a group or class is represented to be his *vibhūti* or special manifestation¹."

The date of the *Gītā* has been the subject of long discussions among scholars, and it is inconvenient for our present purposes to enter into an elaborate controversy. One of the most extreme views on the subject is that of Dr Lorinser, who holds that it was composed after Buddha, and several centuries after the commencement of the Christian era, under the influence of the *New Testament*. Mr Telang in the introduction to his translation of the *Bhagavad-gītā* points out—as has been shown above—that the *Bhagavad-gītā* does not know anything that is peculiarly Buddhistic. Attempt has also been made to prove that the *Gītā* not only does not know anything Buddhistic, but that it also knows neither the accepted Sāṃkhya philosophy nor the Yoga of Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra*. This, together with some other secondary considerations noted above, such as the non-identification of Vāsudeva with Nārāyaṇa and the non-appearance of the *vyūha* doctrine, seems to be a very strong reason for holding the *Gītā* to be in its general structure pre-Buddhistic. The looseness of its composition, however, always made it easy to interpolate occasional verses. Since there is no other consideration which might lead us to think that the *Gītā* was written after the *Brahma-sūtras*, the verse *Brahma-sūtra-padais caiva hetumadbhir viniścitaḥ* has to be either treated as an interpolation or interpreted differently. Śaṅkara also thought that the *Brahma-sūtra* referred to the *Gītā* as an old sacred writing (*smṛti*), and this tallies with our other considerations regarding the antiquity of the *Gītā*. The view of Dr Lorinser, that the *Bhagavad-gītā* must have borrowed at least some of its materials from Christianity, has been pretty successfully refuted by

¹ *Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism*, p. 13.

Mr Telang in the introduction to his translation, and it therefore need not be here again combated. Dr Ray Chaudhury also has discussed the problem of the relation of Bhāgavatism to Christianity, and in the discussion nothing has come out which can definitely make it seem probable that the Bhāgavata cult was indebted to Christianity at any stage of its development; the possibility of the *Gītā* being indebted to Christianity may be held to be a mere fancy. It is not necessary here to enter into any long discussion in refuting Garbe's view that the *Gītā* was originally a work on Sāṃkhya lines (written in the first half of the second century B.C.), which was revised on Vedāntic lines and brought to its present form in the second century A.D.; for I suppose it has been amply proved that, in the light of the uncontradicted tradition of the *Mahā-bhārata* and the *Pañca-rātra* literature, the *Gītā* is to be regarded as a work of the Bhāgavata school, and an internal analysis of the work also shows that the *Gītā* is neither an ordinary Sāṃkhya nor a Vedānta work, but represents some older system wherein the views of an earlier school of Sāṃkhya are mixed up with Vedāntic ideas different from the Vedānta as interpreted by Śaṅkara. The arbitrary and dogmatic assertion of Garbe, that he could clearly separate the original part of the *Gītā* from the later additions, need not, to my mind, be taken seriously. The antiquity of the Bhāgavata religion is, as pointed out by Tilak, acknowledged by Senart (*The Indian Interpreter*, October 1909 and January 1910) and Bühler (*Indian Antiquary*, 1894), and the latter says, "The ancient Bhāgavata, Sātvata or *Pañca-rātra* sect, devoted to the worship of Nārāyaṇa and his deified teacher Kṛṣṇa Devakī-putra, dates from a period long anterior to the rise of the Jainas in the eighth century B.C." And assuredly the *Gītā* is the earliest available literature of this school. As regards external evidence, it may be pointed out that the *Gītā* is alluded to not only by Kālidāsa and Bāṇa, but also by Bhāsa in his play *Karṇa-bhāra*¹. Tilak also refers to an article by T. G. Kale in the *Vedic Magazine*, VII. pp. 528-532, where he points out that the *Bodhāyana-Gṛhya-śeṣa-sūtra*, II. 22. 9, quotes the *Gītā*, IX. 26,

¹ Tilak quotes this passage on page 574 of his *Bhagavad-gītā-rahasya* (Bengali translation of his Marathi work) as follows:

*hato 'pi labhate svargaṃ jītvā tu labhate yaśaḥ
ubhe bahumate loke nāsti niṣphalatā raṇe,*

which repeats the first two lines of the *Gītā*, II. 37.

and the *Bodhāyana-Pitr-medha-sūtra*, at the beginning of the third *prāśna*, quotes another passage of the *Gītā*¹. Incidentally it may also be mentioned that the style of the *Gītā* is very archaic; it is itself called an Upaniṣad, and there are many passages in it which are found in the *Īśa* (*Īśa*, 5, cf. the *Bhagavad-gītā*, XIII. 15 and VI. 29), *Muṇḍaka* (*Muṇḍ.* II. 1. 2, cf. the *Gītā*, XIII. 15), *Kāṭhaka* (II. 15, II. 18 and 19 and II. 7, cf. the *Gītā*, VIII. 11; II. 20 and 29) and other Upaniṣads. We are thus led to assign to the *Gītā* a very early date, and, since there is no definite evidence to show that it was post-Buddhistic, and since also the *Gītā* does not contain the slightest reference to anything Buddhistic, I venture to suggest that it is pre-Buddhistic, however unfashionable such a view may appear. An examination of the *Gītā* from the point of view of language also shows that it is archaic and largely un-Pāṇinian. Thus from the root *yudh* we have *yudhya* (VIII. 7) for *yudhyasva*; *yat*, which is *ātmane-pada* in Pāṇinian Sanskrit, is used in *parasmai-pada* also, as in VI. 36, VII. 3, IX. 14 and XV. 11; *ram* is also used in *parasmai-pada* in X. 9. The roots *kāṅkṣ*, *vraj*, *viś* and *iṅ* are used in Pāṇinian Sanskrit in *parasmai-pada*, but in the *Gītā* they are all used in *ātmane-pada* as well—*kāṅkṣ* in I. 31, *vraj* in II. 54, *viś* in XXIII. 55 and *iṅ* in VI. 19 and XIV. 23. Again, the verb *ud-vij*, which is generally used in *ātmane-pada*, is used in *parasmai-pada* in V. 20; *nivasiṣyasi* is used in XII. 8 for *nivatsyasi*, *mā śucaḥ* for *mā śociḥ* in XVI. 5; and the usage of *prasaviṣyadhvam* in III. 10 is quite ungrammatical. So *yamaḥ saṃyamatām* in X. 29 should be *yamaḥ saṃyacchatām*, *he sakheti* in XI. 41 is an instance of wrong *sandhi*, *priyāyārhasi* in XI. 44 is used for *priyāyāḥ arhasi*, *senānīnām* in X. 24 is used for *senānyām*². These linguistic irregularities, though they may not themselves be regarded as determining anything definitely, may yet be regarded

¹ *Bodhāyana-Grhya-śeṣa-sūtra*:

*tad āha bhagavān,
patram puṣpam phalam toyam yo me bhaktyā prayacchati
tad aham bhakty-upahṛtam aśnāmi prayatātmanah.*

Also *Bodhāyana-Pitr-medha-sūtra*: *yatasya vai manuṣyasya dhruvam maraṇam
iti vijāntiyāt tasmā jāte na prahr̥ṣyen mr̥te ca na viśideta.*

Compare the *Gītā*, *jātasya hi dhruvo mr̥tyuḥ*, etc.

N.B. These references are all taken from Tilak's *Bhagavad-gītā-rahasya* pp. 574, etc.

² For enumeration of more errors of this character see Mr V. K. Rajwade's article in the Bhandarkar commemoration volume, from which these have been collected.

as contributory evidence in favour of the high antiquity of the *Gītā*. The *Gītā* may have been a work of the Bhāgavata school written long before the composition of the *Mahā-bhārata*, and may have been written on the basis of the Bhārata legend, on which the *Mahā-bhārata* was based. It is not improbable that the *Gītā*, which summarized the older teachings of the Bhāgavata school, was incorporated into the *Mahā-bhārata*, during one of its revisions, by reason of the sacredness that it had attained at the time.

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¹ The words are arranged in the order of the English alphabet. Sanskrit and Pāli technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books are in italics with a capital. English words and other names are in Roman with a capital. Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones.

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A HISTORY
OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY
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To the

HON. SRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

who went through great sufferings and hardships all his life in the cause of the liberation of his countrymen, and who is still labouring with almost superhuman effort for the unification of the subcontinent of India, and who is working with steady devotion and faith for the establishment of peace at home and among the nations of the world, the foremost Indian who is piloting the progress of the country through troubled waters in the most hazardous period of India's history, this work is
most respectfully dedicated as a tribute of
personal gratefulness

PREFACE

The second volume of this work was published as long ago as 1932. Among the many reasons which delayed the publication of this volume, one must count the excessive administrative and teaching work with which the writer is saddled; his continued illness; the regrettable failure of one eye through strenuous work, which often makes him depend on the assistance of others; and the long distance between the place of publication and Calcutta. The manuscript of the fourth volume is happily ready.

In writing the present volume the author has taken great trouble to secure manuscripts which would present a connected account of the development of theistic philosophy in the South. The texts that have been published are but few in number and the entire story cannot be told without constant reference to rare manuscripts from which alone the data can be collected. So far, no work has been written which could throw any light on the discovery and interpretation of a connected history of Vaiṣṇava thought. It would have been well if the Tamil and Telegu works could have been fruitfully utilized in tracing the history of Vaiṣṇavism, not only as it appeared in Sanskrit but also as it appeared in the vernaculars of the South. But the author limited himself as far as possible to Sanskrit data. This limitation was necessary for three reasons: first, the author was not master of the various vernaculars of South India; secondly, the inclusion and utilization of such data would have made the present book greatly exceed its intended scope; and thirdly, the inclusion of the data from the vernacular literature would not have contributed materially to the philosophical problems underlying the theistic speculations dealt with in this work. Looked at from the strictly philosophical point of view, some of the materials of the present book may be regarded as somewhat out of place. But, both in the present volume and the volume that will follow it, it will be impossible to ignore the religious pathology that is associated with the devotional philosophy which is so predominant in the South and which so much influenced the minds of the people not only in the Middle Ages but also in the recent past and is even now the most important element of Indian religions.

Philosophy in India includes not only morality but religion also. The most characteristic feature of religion is emotion or sentiment associated with a system of beliefs, and as such in the treatment of the dominant schools of philosophy that originated in South India one cannot help emphasizing the important pathological developments of the sentiment of devotion. The writer hopes, therefore, that he may be excused both by those who would not look for any emphasis on the aspect of *bhakti* or religious sentiment and also by those who demand an over-emphasis on the emotional aspect which forms the essence of the Vaiṣṇava religion. He has tried to steer a middle course in the interest of philosophy, which, however, in the schools of thought treated herein is so intimately interwoven with religious sentiment.

The writer has probably exceeded the scope of his treatment in dealing with the Āṛvārs, whose writings are in Tamil, but there also he felt that without referring to the nature of the devotional philosophy of the Āṛvārs the treatment of the philosophy of Rāmānuja and his followers would be historically defective. But though the original materials for a study of the Āṛvārs are in Tamil, yet fortunately Sanskrit translations of these writings either in manuscript or in published form are available, on which are almost wholly based the accounts given here of these Tamil writers.

The treatment of the Pañcarātra literature offered some difficulty, as most of these works are still unpublished; but fortunately a large volume of this literature was secured by the present writer in manuscript. Excepting Schrader's work, nothing of any importance has been written on the Pañcarātra School. Though there are translations of the *bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja, there has been no treatment of his philosophy as a whole in relation to other great philosophers of his School. Practically nothing has appeared regarding the philosophy of the great thinkers of the Rāmānuja School, such as Veṅkata, Meghanādāri and others, most of whose works are still unpublished. Nothing has also been written regarding Vijñānabhikṣu's philosophy, and though Nimbārka's *bhāṣya* has been translated, no systematic account has yet appeared of Nimbārka in relation to his followers. The writer had thus to depend almost wholly on a very large mass of published and unpublished manuscript literature in his interpretation and chronological investigations, which are largely based upon internal evidence;

though, of course, he has always tried to utilize whatever articles and papers appeared on the subject. The subjects treated are vast and it is for the scholarly reader to judge whether any success has been attained in spite of the imperfections which may have crept in.

Though the monotheistic speculations and the importance of the doctrine of devotion can be traced even to some of the Ṛg-veda hymns and the earlier religious literature such as the *Gītā* and the *Mahābhārata* and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, yet it is in the traditional songs of the Ārvārs and the later South Indian philosophical writers, beginning from Yāmuna and Rāmānuja, that we find a special emphasis on our emotional relation with God. This emotional relation of devotion or *bhakti* differentiated itself in many forms in the experiences and the writings of various Vaiṣṇava authors and saints. It is mainly to the study of these forms as associated with their philosophical perspectives that the present and the succeeding volumes have been devoted. From this point of view, the present and the fourth volumes may be regarded as the philosophy of theism in India, and this will be partly continued in the treatment of Śaiva and Śākta theism of various forms. The fourth volume will deal with the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in their bitter relation with the monistic thought of Śaṅkara and his followers. It will also deal with the theistic philosophy of the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and the theistic philosophy of Vallabha and the followers of Śrī Caitanya. Among the theistic philosophers the followers of Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha occupied a great place as subtle thinkers and dialecticians. In the fifth volume, apart from the different schools of Śaiva and Śākta thinkers, the Tantras, the philosophy, of grammar, of Hindu Aesthetics, and of Hindu Law will be dealt with. It is thus expected that with the completion of the fifth volume the writer will have completed his survey of Hindu thought so far as it appeared in the Sanskrit language and thus finish what was begun more than twenty years ago.

A chapter on the *Cārvāka* materialists has been added as an appendix, since their treatment in the first volume was practically neglected.

The writer has a deep debt of gratitude to discharge to Dr F. W. Thomas—the late Boden Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford, and a highly esteemed friend of his who, in spite of his various activities,

pressure of work and old age, has been a true *jñānabandhu* to the author, helping him with the manuscript and the proofs, and offering him valuable suggestions as regards orthography, punctuation and idiomatic usage. Without this continued assistance the imperfections of the present work would have been much more numerous. The author is specially grateful to his wife, Dr Mrs Surama Dasgupta, Śāstri, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.) for the continued assistance that he received from her in the writing of this book and also in reading a large mass of manuscripts for the preparation of the work. Considering the author's great handicap in having only one sound eye it would have been impossible for him to complete the book without this assistance. He is also grateful to Dr Satindra Kumar Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., for the help that he received from him from time to time.

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

June 1939

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CHAPTER XV

THE BHĀSKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

Date of Bhāskara.

UDAYANA, in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, speaks of Bhāskara as a commentator on the Vedānta in accordance with the traditions of the *tridaṇḍa* school of Vedānta and as holding the view that Brahman suffers evolutionary changes¹. Bhaṭṭojī Dikṣita also, in his *Tattva-viveka-ṭīkā-vivaraṇa*, speaks of Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara as holding the doctrine of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*)². It is certain, however, that he flourished after Śaṅkara, for, though he does not mention him by name, yet the way in which he refers to him makes it almost certain that he wrote his commentary with the express purpose of refuting some of the cardinal doctrines of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Thus, at the very beginning of his commentary, he says that it aims at refuting those who, hiding the real sense of the *sūtra*, have only expressed their own opinions, and in other places also he speaks in very strong terms against the commentator who holds the *māyā* doctrine and is a Buddhist in his views³. But, though he was opposed to Śaṅkara, it was only so far as Śaṅkara had introduced the *māyā* doctrine, and only so far as he thought the world had sprung forth not as a real modification of Brahman, but only through *māyā*. For

¹ *Tridaṇḍa* means "three sticks." According to Manu it was customary among some Brahmins to use one stick, and among others, three sticks.

Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvari Prasāda Dvivedin, in his Sanskrit introduction to Bhāskara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, says that the Vaiṣṇava commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra* prior to Rāmānuja, Tāṇka, Guhadeva, Bhāruci and Yāmunācārya, the teacher of Rāmānuja, were all *tridaṇḍins*. Such a statement is indeed very interesting, but unfortunately he does not give us the authority from which he drew this information.

² "Bhaṭṭabhāskaras tu bhedā-bheda-vedānta-siddhānta-vādī"; Bhaṭṭojī Dikṣita's *Vedānta-tattva-ṭīkā-vivaraṇa*, as quoted by Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvari Prasāda in his Introduction to Bhāskara's commentary.

³ *sūtrā-bhīprāya-samvṛtyā svābhīprāyā-prakāśanāt
vyākhyātāṃ yair idam śāstraṃ vyākhyeyam tan-nivṛttaye.*

Bhāskara's Commentary, p. 1.

Also "ye tu buddha-matāvalambino māyā-vādinā te' pi anena nyāyena sūtra-kāreṇai' va nirastāḥ." *Ibid.* 11. 2. 29.

In another place Śaṅkara is referred to as explaining views which were really propounded by the Mahāyāna Buddhists—*vigītaṃ vicchinna-mūlaṃ mādhyānikā-buddha-gāthitaṃ māyā-vādaṃ vyāvāṇayanto lokān vyāmohayanti.* *Ibid.* 1. 4. 25.

both Śaṅkara and Bhāskara would agree in holding that the Brahman was both the material cause and the instrumental cause (*upādāna* and *nimitta*). Śaṅkara would maintain that this was so only because there was no other real category which existed; but he would strongly urge, as has been explained before, that *māyā*, the category of the indefinite and the unreal, was associated with Brahman in such a transformation, and that, though the Brahman was substantially the same identical entity as the world, yet the world as it appears was a *māyā* transformation with Brahman inside as the kernel of truth. But Bhāskara maintained that there was no *māyā*, and that it was the Brahman which, by its own powers, underwent a real modification; and, as the Pañcarātras also held the same doctrine in so far as they believed that Vāsudeva was both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, he was in agreement with the Bhāgavatas, and he says that he does not find anything to be refuted in the Pañcarātra doctrine¹. But he differs from them in regard to their doctrine of the individual souls having been produced from Brahman².

Again, though one cannot assert anything very positively, it is possible that Bhāskara himself belonged to that particular sect of Brahmins who used three sticks as their Brahminic insignia in preference to one stick, used more generally by other Brahmins; and so his explanation of the *Īedānta-sūtra* may rightly be taken as the view of the *tridaṇḍī* Brahmins. For in discussing the point that fitness for Brahma-knowledge does not mean the giving up of the religious stages of life (*āśrama*), with their customs and rituals, he speaks of the maintenance of three sticks as being enjoined by the Vedas³.

Mādhavācārya, in his *Śaṅkara-vijaya*, speaks of a meeting of Śaṅkara with Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, but it is difficult to say how far this statement is reliable⁴. From the fact that Bhāskara refuted Śaṅkara and was himself referred to by Udayana, it is certain that he flourished some time between the eighth and the tenth centuries. Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda refers to a copper-plate found by the

¹ *Vāsudeva eva upādāna-kāraṇaṃ jagato nimitta-kāraṇaṃ ceti te manyante. . . tad etat sarvaṃ śruti-prasiddham eva tasmān nātra nirākaraṇīyaṃ paśyāmaḥ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, II. 2. 41.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* III. 4. 26, p. 208; see also Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī's Introduction.

⁴ *Śaṅkara-vijaya*, xv. 80.

late Dr Bhāwdājī in the Mārāṭhā country, near Nasik, in which it is stated that one Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa of the lineage (*gotra*) of Śāṇḍilya, son of Kavicakravartī Trivikrama, who was given the title of Vidyāpati, was the sixth ancestor of Bhāskarācārya of Śāṇḍilya lineage, the astronomer and writer of the Siddhānta-śiromaṇi; and he maintains that this senior Vidyāpati Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa was the commentator on the *Brahma-sūtra*¹. But, though this may be possible, yet we have no evidence that it is certain; for, apart from the similarity of names², it is not definitely known whether this Vidyāpati Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa ever wrote any commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. All that we can say, therefore, with any degree of definiteness, is that Bhāskara flourished at some period between the middle of the eighth century and the middle of the tenth century, and most probably in the ninth century, since he does not know Rāmānuja³.

Bhāskara and Śaṅkara.

There is a text of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. 1. 1, which is treated from two different points of view by Śaṅkara and Bhāskara in connection with the interpretation of *Brahma-sūtra*, II. 1. 14⁴. Śaṅkara's interpretation of this, as Vācaspati explains it, is that, when clay is known, all clay-materials are known, not because the clay-materials are really clay, for they are indeed different. But, if so, how can we, by knowing one, know the other? Because the clay-materials do not really exist; they are all, and so indeed are all that pass as modifications (*vikāra*), but mere expressions of speech (*vācārambhaṇam*), mere names (*nāmadheyam*) having no real

¹ Paṇḍita Vindhyesvarī Prasāda's Introduction.

² We hear of several Bhāskaras in Sanskrit literature, such as Lokabhāskara, Śrāntabhāskara, Haribhāskara, Bhadantabhāskara, Bhāskaramiśra, Bhāskara-śāstri, Bhāskaradikṣita, Bhaṭṭabhāskara, Paṇḍita Bhāskarācārya, Bhaṭṭabhāskaramiśra, Trikaṇḍamaṇḍana, Laugākṣibhāskara, Śāṇḍilyabhāskara, Vatsabhāskara, Bhāskaradeva, Bhāskaraṇṣimha, Bhāskarāraṇya, Bhāskarānandanātha, Bhāskarasena.

³ He makes very scanty references to other writers. He speaks of Śāṇḍilya as a great author of the Bhāgavata school. He refers to the four classes of Māheśvaras, Pāsupata, Śaiva, Kāpālika and Kāthaka-siddhāntin, and their principal work *Pañcādhyāyi-śāstra*; he also refers to the *Pāñcarātrikas*, with whom he is often largely in agreement.

⁴ *tad-ananyatvaṃ ārambhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ. Brahma-sūtra*, II. 1. 14. *yathā saumya ekena mṛt-piṇḍen asarvaṃ mṛtmayam vijñātaṃ syādvācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttike'ty'eva satyaṃ* (Ch. VI. 1. 1).

entities or objects to which they refer, having in fact no existence at all¹.

Bhāskara says that the passage means that clay alone is real, and the purport of speech depends on two things, the objects and the facts implied and the names which imply them. The effects (*kārya*) are indeed the basis of all our practical behaviour and conduct, involving the objects and facts implied and the expressions and names which imply them. How can the cause and effect be identical? The answer to this is that it is true that it is to the effects that our speech applies and that these make all practical behaviour possible, but the effects are in reality but stages of manifestation, modification and existence of the cause itself. So, from the point of view that the effects come and go, appear and disappear, whereas the cause remains permanently the same, as the ground of all its real manifestations, it is said that the cause alone is true—the clay alone is true. The effect, therefore, is only a state of the cause, and is hence both identical with it and different from it². The effect, the name (*nāma-dheya*), is real, and the scriptures also assert this³.

Bhāskara argues against Śaṅkara as follows: the arguments that the upholder of *māyā* (*māyāvādin*) could adduce against those who believed in the reality of the many, the world, might be adduced against him also, in so far as he believes in monism (*advaita*). A person who hears the scriptures and philosophizes is at first under the veil of ignorance (*avidyā*); and, if on account of this ignorance his knowledge of duality was false, his knowledge of monism might equally for the same reason be considered as false. All Brahma-knowledge is false, because it is knowledge, like the knowledge of the world. It is argued that, just as from the false knowledge of a dream and of letters there can be true acquisition

¹ *Bhāmati*, *Brahma-sūtra*, II. 1. 14. Rāhu is a demon which is merely a living head with no body, its sole body being its head; but still we use, for convenience of language, the expression "Rāhu's head" (*Rāhoḥ śīraḥ*); similarly clay alone is real, and what we call clay-materials, jugs, plates, etc., are mere expressions of speech having no real objects or entities to which they can apply—they simply do not exist at all—but are mere *vikalpa*; *vācā kevalam ārabhyate vikāra-jātam na tu tattvato'sti yato nāmadheya-mātram etat; . . . yathā rāhoḥ śīraḥ . . . śabda-jñānā-nupāti vastu-śūnyo vikalpa iti; tathā cā'vastutayā anṛtam vikāra-jātam.*

² *vāg-indriyasya ubhayam ārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam . . . ubhayam ālambya vāg-vyavahārah pravartate ghaṭeṇa udakam āhare' ti mṛṇmayam ity asya idaṃ vyākhyānam . . . kāraṇam eva kāryā-tmanā ghaṭavad avatiṣṭhate . . . kāraṇasya'vasthā-mātram kāryaṃ vyatiriktā'vyatiriktam śukti-rajatavadvagāmapāyadharmitvāc ca anṛtam anityam iti ca vyapadiśyate. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, II. 1. 14.*

³ *atha nāma-dheyaṃ satyasya satyamiti, etc. Ibid.*

of good and evil or of certain meanings, so from the false knowledge of words and their meanings, as involved in the knowledge of monistic texts of the Upaniṣads, there may arise right knowledge. But such an argument is based on false analogy. When from certain kinds of dreams someone judges that good or evil will come to him, it is not from nothing that he judges, since he judges from particular dream experiences; and these dream experiences are facts having particular characters and features; they are not mere nothing, like the hare's horn; no one can judge of anything from the hare's horn. The letters also have certain shapes and forms and are definitely by common consent and agreement associated with particular sounds; it is well known that different letters in different countries may be used to denote one kind of sound. Again, if from a mistake someone experiences fear and dies, it is not from nothing or from something false that he dies; for he had a real fear, and the fear was the cause of death and was roused by the memory of a real thing, and the only unreality about it was that the thing was not present there at that time. So no example could be given to show that from false knowledge, or falsehood as such, there could come right knowledge or the truth. Again, how can the scriptures demonstrate the falsehood of the world? If all auditory knowledge were false, all language would be false, and even the scriptural texts would be non-existent.

Further, what is this "*avidyā*," if it cannot be described? How can one make anyone understand it? What nonsense it is to say that that which manifests itself as all the visible and tangible world of practical conduct and behaviour cannot itself be described¹. If it is beginningless, it must be eternal, and there can be no liberation. It cannot be both existent and non-existent; for that would be contradictory. It cannot be mere negation; for, being non-existent, it could not bring bondage. If it brings bondage, it must be an entity, and that means a dual existence with Brahman. So the proposition of the upholder of *māyā* is false.

What is true, however, is that, just as milk gets curdled, so it is God Himself who by His own will and knowledge and omnipotence transforms Himself into this world. There is no inconsistency in God's transforming Himself into the world, though He is partless;

¹ *yasyāḥ kāryam idaṃ kṛtsnam vyavahārāya kalpate
nirvaktum sā na śakye' ti vacanam vacanār-thakam. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.*

for He can do so by various kinds of powers, modifying them according to His own will. He possesses two powers; by one He has become the world of enjoyables (*bhogyā-śakti*), and by the other the individual souls, the enjoyers (*bhoktr*); but in spite of this modification of Himself He remains unchanged in His own purity; for it is by the manifestation and modification of His powers that the modification of the world as the enjoyable and the enjoyer takes place. It is just as the sun sends out his rays and collects them back into himself, but yet remains in himself the same¹.

The Philosophy of Bhāskara's Bhāṣya.

From what has been said above it is clear that according to Bhāskara the world of matter and the selves consists only in real modifications or transformations (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman's own nature through His diverse powers. This naturally brings in the question whether the world and the souls are different from Brahman or identical with him. Bhāskara's answer to such a question is that "difference" (*bheda*) has in it the characteristic of identity (*abheda-dharmaś ca*)—the waves are different from the sea, but are also identical with it. The waves are manifestations of the sea's own powers, and so the same identical sea appears to be different when viewed with reference to the manifestations of its powers, though it is in reality identical with its powers. So the same identical fire is different in its powers as it burns or illuminates. So all that is one is also many, and the one is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference².

The individual souls are in reality not different from God; they are but His parts, as the sparks of fire are the parts of fire; but it is the peculiarity of these parts of God, the souls, that though one with Him, they have been under the influence of ignorance, desires and deeds from beginningless time³. Just as the *ākāśa*, which is all the same everywhere; and yet the *ākāśa* inside a vessel or a house is not just the same *ākāśa* as the boundless space, but may in some

¹ *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 27, also I. 4. 25.

² *abheda-dharmaś ca bheda yathā mahodadher abhedah sa eva taraṅgādy-ātmanā vartamāno bheda ity ucyate, na hi taraṅgā-dayaḥ pāṣāṇā-diṣu dṛśyante tasyaiva tāḥ śaktayaḥ śakti-śaktimatoś ca ananyatvaṃ anyatvaṃ co-palakṣyate yathā'gner dahana-prakāśanā-di-śaktayaḥ... tasmāt sarvaṃ ekā-nekā-tmakam nā'tyantam abhinnaṃ bhinnaṃ vā. Ibid.* II. 1. 18.

³ *Ibid.* I. 4. 21.

sense be regarded as a part of it; or just as the same air is seen to serve different life-functions, as the five *prāṇas*, so the individual souls also may in some sense be regarded as parts of God. It is just and proper that the scriptures should command the individual souls to seek knowledge so as to attain liberation; for it is the desire for the highest soul (*paramātmān*) or God or Brahman that is the cause of liberation, and it is the desire for objects of the world that is the cause of bondage¹. This soul, in so far as it exists in association with ignorance, desires and deeds, is atomic in nature; and, just as a drop of sandal paste may perfume all the place about it, so does the atomic soul, remaining in one place, animate the whole body. It is by nature endowed with consciousness, and it is only with reference to the knowledge of other objects that it has to depend on the presence of those objects². Its seat is in the heart, and through the skin of the heart it is in touch with the whole body. But, though in a state of bondage, under the influence of ignorance, etc., it is atomic, yet it is not ultimately atomic in nature; for it is one with Brahman. Under the influence of *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, the five senses and the five *vāyus* it undergoes the cycle of rebirths. But though this atomic form and the association with the *buddhi*, etc., is not essential to the nature of the soul, yet so long as such a relation exists, the agency of the soul is in every sense real; but the ultimate source of this agency is God Himself; for it is God who makes us perform all actions, and He makes us perform good actions, and it is He who, remaining within us, controls all our actions.

In all stages of life a man must perform the deeds enjoined by the scriptures, and he cannot rise at any stage so high that he is beyond the sphere of the duties of work imposed on him by the scriptures³. It is not true, as Śaṅkara says, that those who are fit to

¹ *rāgo hi paramātmā-viṣayo yaḥ sa mukti-hetuḥ viṣaya-viṣayo yaḥ sa bandha-hetuḥ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.*

² *Ibid.* II. 3. 18, 22, 23.

³ *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, I. 1. 1. In holding the view that the *Brahma-sūtra* is in a sense continuous with the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, which the former must follow—for it is after the performance of the ritualistic duties that the knowledge of Brahman can arise, and the latter therefore cannot in any stage dispense with the need for the former—and that the *Brahma-sūtras* are not intended for any superior and different class of persons, Bhāskara seems to have followed Upa-varṣa or Upavarṣācārya, to whose commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* he refers and whom he calls the founder of the school (*śāstra-sampradāya-pravartaka*). *Ibid.* I. 1. 1, and II. 2. 27. See also I. 1. 4: *ātma-jñāna-dhikṛtasya karmabhīr vinā apavargā-nūpāpatter jñānena karma samuccīyate.*

have the highest knowledge are beyond the duties of life and courses of ritualistic and other actions enjoined by the scriptures, or that those for whom these are intended are not fit to have the highest knowledge; in other words, the statement of Śaṅkara that there cannot be any combination (*samuccaya*) of knowledge (*jñāna*) and necessary ritualistic duties of life (*karma*) is false. Bhāskara admits that pure *karma* (ritualistic duties) cannot lead us to the highest perception of the truth, the Brahman; yet knowledge (*jñāna*) combined with the regular duties, i.e. *jñāna-samuccita-karma*, can lead us to our highest good, the realization of Brahman. That it is our duty to attain the knowledge of Brahman is also to be accepted, by reason of the injunction of the scriptures; for that also is one of the imperative duties imposed on us by the scriptures—a *vidhi*—the self is to be known (*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyah*, etc.). It is therefore not true, as Śaṅkara asserted, that what the ritualistic and other duties imposed on us by the scriptures can do for us is only to make us fit for the study of Vedānta by purifying us and making us as far as possible sinless; Bhāskara urges that performance of the duties imposed on us by the scriptures is as necessary as the attainment of knowledge for our final liberation.

Bhāskara draws a distinction between cognition (*jñāna*) and consciousness (*caitanya*), more particularly, self-consciousness (*ātma-caitanya*). Cognition with him means the knowledge of objective things, and this is a direct experience (*anubhava*) arising out of the contact of the sense organ, *manas*, and the object, the presence of light and the internal action of the memory and the sub-conscious impressions (*saṃskāra*). Cognition is not an active operation by itself, but is rather the result of the active operation of the senses in association with other accessories, such that whenever there is a collocation of those accessories involving the operation of the senses there is cognition¹. Bhāskara is therefore positively against the contention of Kumārila that knowledge is an entity which is not directly perceived but only inferred as the agent which induces the intellectual operation, but which is not directly known by itself. If an unperceived entity is to be inferred to explain the cause of the per-

¹ *jñāna-kriyā-kalpanāyām pramāṇā-bhāvāt . . . ālokaendriya-manah-saṃskāreṣu hi satsu samvedanam utpadyate iti tad-abhāve notpadyate, yadi punar aparam jñānam kalpyate tasyāpy anyat tasyāpy anyad ity anavasthā; na ca jñāna-kriyānumāne liṅgam asti, samvedanam iti cen na, agrhita-sambandhatvāt. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.1.*

ceived intellectual operation, then another entity might be inferred as the cause of that unperceived entity, and another to explain that and so on, and we have a vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). Moreover, no unperceived entity can be inferred as the cause of the perceived intellectual operation; for, if it is unperceived, then its relation with intellectual operation is also unperceived, and how can there be any inference at all? Thus, cognition is what we directly experience (*anubhava*) and there is no unperceived entity which causes it, but it is the direct result of the joint operation of many accessories. This objective cognition is entirely different from the subjective consciousness or self-consciousness; for the latter is eternal and always present, whereas the former is only occasioned by the collocating circumstances. It is easy to see that Bhāskara has a very distinct epistemological position, which, though similar to Nyāya so far as the objective cognition is concerned, is yet different therefrom on account of his admission of the ever-present self-consciousness of the soul. It is at the same time different from the Śāṅkarite epistemology, for objective cognition is considered by him not as mere limitation of self-consciousness, but as entirely different therefrom¹. It may also be noted that, unlike Dharmarājadhvarindra, the writer of the Sanskrit epistemological work, *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Bhāskara considers *manas* as a sense-organ². On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge Bhāskara thinks that the knowledge of truth is always self-valid (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*), whereas the knowledge of the false is always attested from outside (*parataḥ pramāṇa*)³.

As has already been said, Bhāskara does not think that liberation can be attained through knowledge alone; the duties imposed by the scriptures must always be done along with our attempts to know Brahman; for there is no contradiction or opposition between knowledge and performance of the duties enjoined by the scriptures. There will be no liberation if the duties are forsaken⁴. The state of salvation is one in which there is a continuous and unbroken consciousness of happiness⁵. A liberated soul may associate or not associate itself with any body or sense as it likes⁶. It is as omniscient,

¹ *kecid āhuḥ ātmā pramāyām indriya-dvāropādhi-nirgama-viṣayeṣu vartate... tad idam asamyag darśanam;... ālokendriyādibhyo jñānam utpadyamānam... cānyad iti yuktaṁ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.*

² *Ibid.* I. 4. 21.

³ *Ibid.* IV. 4. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.* II. 4. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.* III. 4. 26.

⁶ *Ibid.* IV. 4. 12.

omnipotent and as one with all souls as God Himself¹. The attachment (*rāga*) to Brahman, which is said to be an essential condition for attaining liberation, is further defined to be worship (*samārādhana*) or devotion (*bhakti*), while *bhakti* is said to be attendance on God by meditation (*dhyānādīnā paricaryā*). *Bhakti* is conceived, not as any feeling, affection or love of God, as in later Vaiṣṇava literature, but as *dhyāna* or meditation². A question may arise as to what, if Brahman has transformed Himself into the world, is meant by meditation on Brahman? Does it mean that we are to meditate on the world? To this Bhāskara's answer is that Brahman is not exhausted by His transformation into the world, and that what is really meant by Brahman's being transformed into the world is that the nature of the world is spiritual. The world is a spiritual manifestation and a spiritual transformation, and what passes as matter is in reality spiritual. Apart from Brahman as manifested in the world, the Brahman with diverse forms, there is also the formless Brahman (*niṣprapañca brahman*), the Brahman which is transcendent and beyond its own immanent forms, and it is this Brahman which is to be worshipped. The world with its diverse forms also will, in the end, return to its spiritual source, the formless Brahman, and nothing of it will be left as the remainder. The material world is dissolved in the spirit and lost therein, just as a lump of salt is lost in water³. This transcendent Brahman that is to be worshipped is of the nature of pure being and intelligence (*sal-lakṣaṇa* and *bodha-lakṣaṇa*)⁴. He is also infinite and unlimited. But, though He is thus characterized as being, intelligence, and infinite, yet these terms do not refer to three distinct entities; they are the qualities of Brahman, the substance, and, like all qualities, they cannot remain different from their substance; for neither can any substance remain without its qualities, nor can any qualities remain without their substance. A substance does not become different by virtue of its qualities⁵.

Bhāskara denies the possibility of liberation during lifetime (*jīvan-mukti*); for so long as the body remains as a result of the

¹ *muktaḥ kāraṇā-tmānam prāptaḥ tad vadeva sarva-jñāḥ sarva-śaktiḥ*. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, IV. 4. 7.

² *Ibid.* III. 2. 24.

³ *Ibid.* II. 2. 11, 13, 17.

⁴ *Ibid.* III. 2. 23.

⁵ *na dharmā-dharmī-bhedaṇa svārūpa-bheda iti; na hi guṇa-rahitaṁ dravyam asti na dravya-rahito guṇaḥ*. *Ibid.* III. 2. 23.

previous *karmas*, the duties assigned to the particular stage of life (*āśrama*) to which the man belongs have to be performed; but his difference from the ordinary man is that, while the ordinary man thinks himself to be the agent or the doer of all actions, the wise man never thinks himself to be so. If a man could attain liberation during lifetime, then he might even know the minds of other people. Whether in *mukti* one becomes absolutely relationless (*niḥsam-bandhaḥ*), or whether one becomes omniscient and omnipotent (as Bhāskara himself urges), it is not possible for one to attain *mukti* during one's lifetime, so it is certain that so long as a man lives he must perform his duties and try to comprehend the nature of God and attend on Him through meditation, since these only can lead to liberation after death¹.

¹ *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, III. 4. 26.

CHAPTER XVI

THE PAÑCARĀTRA.

Antiquity of the Pañcarātra.

THE Pañcarātra doctrines are indeed very old and are associated with the *puruṣa-sūkta* of the Ṛg-veda, which is, as it were, the foundation stone of all future Vaiṣṇava philosophy. It is said in the *Śata-patha Brāhmaṇa* that Nārāyaṇa, the great being, wishing to transcend all other beings and becoming one with them all, saw the form of sacrifice known as pañcarātra, and by performing that sacrifice attained his purpose¹. It is probable that the epithets “*puruṣo ha nārāyaṇaḥ*” became transformed in later times into the two ṛṣis Nara and Nārāyaṇa. The passage also implies that Nārāyaṇa was probably a human being who became a transcending divinity by performing the Pañcarātra sacrifice. In the later literature *Nārāyaṇa* became the highest divinity. Thus Veṅkaṭa Sudhī wrote a *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* in about 19,000 lines to prove by a reference to scriptural texts that Nārāyaṇa is the highest god and that all other gods, Śiva, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc., are subordinate to him². The word *Brahman* in the Upaniṣads is also supposed in the fourth or the last chapter of the *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* to refer to Nārāyaṇa. In the *Mahābhārata* (*Śānti-parvan*, 334th chapter) we hear of Nara and Nārāyaṇa themselves worshipping the unchanging Brahman which is the self in all beings; and yet Nārāyaṇa is there spoken of as being the greatest of all. In the succeeding chapter it is said that there was a king who was entirely devoted to Nārāyaṇa, and who worshipped him according to the *sātvata* rites³. He was so devoted to Nārāyaṇa that he considered all that belonged to him, riches, kingdom, etc., as belonging to Nārāyaṇa. He harboured in his house great saints versed in the Pañcarātra system. When under the patronage of this king great saints performed sacrifices, they were unable to have a vision of the great Lord Nārāyaṇa, and Bṛhaspati became angry.

¹ *Śata-patha Brāhmaṇa* XIII. 6. 1.

² The *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* exists only as a MS. which has not yet been published.

³ We have an old *Pañcarātra-saṃhitā* called the *Sātvata-saṃhitā*, the contents of which will presently be described.

Other sages then related the story that, though after long penance they could not perceive God, there was a message from Heaven that the great Nārāyaṇa was visible only to the inhabitants of Śveta-dvīpa, who were devoid of sense-organs, did not require any food, and were infused with a monotheistic devotion. The saints were dazzled by the radiant beauty of these beings, and could not see them. They then began to practise asceticism and, as a result, these holy beings became perceivable to them. These beings adored the ultimate deity by mental *japa* (muttering God's name in mind) and made offerings to God. Then there was again a message from Heaven that, since the saints had perceived the beings of Śveta-dvīpa, they should feel satisfied with that and return home because the great God could not be perceived except through all-absorbing devotion. Nārada also is said to have seen from a great distance Śveta-dvīpa and its extraordinary inhabitants. Nārada then went to Śveta-dvīpa and had a vision of Nārāyaṇa, whom he adored. Nārāyaṇa said to him that Vāsudeva was the highest changeless God, from whom came out Saṅkarṣaṇa, the lord of all life; from him came Pradyumna, called *manas*, and from Pradyumna came Aniruddha, the Ego. From Aniruddha came Brahmā, who created the universe. After the *pralaya*, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are successively created from Vāsudeva.

There are some Upaniṣads which are generally known as Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣads, and of much later origin than the older Pañcarātra texts. To this group of Upaniṣads belong the *Avyakto-paniṣad* or *Avyakta-nṛsiṃho-paniṣad*, with a commentary of Upaniṣad-brahmayogin, the pupil of Vāsudevendra, *Kali-santaraṇo-paniṣad*, *Kṛṣṇo-paniṣad*, *Garudō-paniṣad*, *Gopālatāpini Upaniṣad*, *Gopālottara-tāpini Upaniṣad*, *Tārāsaro-paniṣad*, *Tripād-vibhūti-mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, *Dattātreyo-paniṣad*, *Nārāyaṇo-paniṣad*, *Nṛsiṃha-tāpini Upaniṣad*, *Nṛsiṃhottara-tāpini Upaniṣad*, *Rāmatāpini Upaniṣad*, *Rāmottarottara-tāpini Upaniṣad*, *Rāma-rahasya Upaniṣad*, *Vāsudevō-paniṣad*, with the commentaries of Upaniṣad-brahmayogin. But these Upaniṣads are mostly full of inessential descriptions, ritualistic practices and the muttering of particular *mantras*. They have very little connection with the Pañcarātra texts and their contents. Some of them—like the *Nṛsiṃha-tāpini*, *Gopālatāpini*, etc.—have been utilized in the Gauḍiṇya school of Vaiṣṇavism.

The Position of the Pañcarātra Literature.

Yāmuna, in his *Āgama-prāmānya*, discusses the position of the Pañcarātras as follows. It is said that any instruction conveyed through language can be valid either by itself or through the strength of the validity of some other proofs. No instruction of any ordinary person can be valid by itself. The special ritualistic processes associated with the Pañcarātra cannot be known by perception or by inference. Only God, whose powers of perception extend to all objects of the world and which are without any limitation, can instil the special injunctions of the Pañcarātra. The opponents, however, hold that a perception which has all things within its sphere can hardly be called perception. Moreover, the fact that some things may be bigger than other things does not prove that anything which is liable to be greater and less could necessarily be conceived to extend to a limitless extent¹. Even if it be conceived that there is a person whose perception is limitless, there is nothing to suggest that he should be able to instruct infallibly about the rituals, such as those enjoined in the Pañcarātra. There are also no *āgamas* which prescribe the Pañcarātra rites. It cannot be ascertained whether the authors of the Pañcarātra works based them on the teachings of the Vedas or gave their own views and passed them on as being founded on the Vedas. If it is argued that the fact that the Pañcarātra, like other texts of *Smṛti* of Manu, etc., exist proves that they must have a common origin in the Vedas, that is contradicted by the fact that the Pañcarātra doctrines are repudiated in the *smṛti* texts founded on the Vedas. If it is said that those who follow the Pañcarātra rites are as good Brahmins as other Brahmins, and follow the Vedic rites, the opponents assert that this is not so, since the Pañcarātrins may have all the external marks and appearance of Brahmins, but yet they are not so regarded in society. At a social dinner the Brahmins do not sit in the same line with the *Bhāgavatas* or the followers of the Pañcarātra.

¹ *atha ekasmin sātīṣaṣṭ kenāpyanyena niratīṣaṣṭa bhavīṭavyam iti āhoṣit samāna-jāṭīyenaṇyena nir-atīṣaṣṭa-dasām adhirūḍha na bhavīṭavyam iti :*

*na tāvad agrimaḥ kalpaḥ kalpyate nupalambhataḥ
na hi dṛṣṭam śārāvādi vyomeva prāpta-vaibhavam.*

Āgama-prāmānya, p. 3.

The very word *sātvata* indicates a lower caste¹, and the words *bhāgavata* and *sātvata* are interchangeable. It is said that a *sātvata* of the *pañcama* caste who by the king's order worships in temples is called a *bhāgavata*. As a means of livelihood the *sātvatas* worship images and live upon offerings for initiation and those made to temple gods; they do not perform the Vedic duties, and have no relationship with the Brahmins, and so they cannot be regarded as Brahmins. It is also said that even by the sight of a man who takes to worship as a means of livelihood one is polluted and should be purified by proper purificatory ceremonies. The Pañcarātra texts are adopted by the degraded *sātvatas* or the *bhāgavatas*, and these must therefore be regarded as invalid and non-Vedic. Moreover, if this literature were founded on the Vedas, there would be no meaning in their recommendation of special kinds of rituals. It is for this reason that Bādarāyaṇa also refutes the philosophical theory of the Pañcarātra in the *Brahma-sūtra*.

It may, however, be urged that, though the Pañcarātra injunctions may not tally with the injunctions of Brahminic *Smṛti* literature, yet such contradictions are not important, as both are based upon the Vedic texts. Since the validity of the Brahminic *Smṛti* also is based upon the Vedas, the Pañcarātra has no more necessity to reconcile its injunctions with that than they have to reconcile themselves with the Pañcarātra.

The question arises as to whether the Vedas are the utterances of a person or not. The argument in favour of production by a person is that, since the Vedas are a piece of literary composition, they must have been uttered by a person. The divine person who directly perceives the sources of merit or demerit enjoins the same through his grace by composing the Vedas for the benefit of human beings. It is admitted, even by the Mīmāṃsakas, that all worldly affairs are consequent upon the influence of merit and demerit. So the divine being who has created the world knows directly the sources of merit and demerit. The world cannot be produced directly through the effects of our deeds, and it has to be admitted that there must be some being who utilizes the effects of our deeds, producing the world in consonance with them. All the scriptural

¹ Thus Manu says:

*vaiś'yāt tu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvācārya eva ca
bhāruṣaś ca nijaṅghaś ca maitra-sātvata eva ca.*

Āgama-prāmāṇya, p. 8.

texts also support the admission of such an omnipotent and omniscient God. It is this God who, on the one hand, created the Vedas, directing the people to the performance of such actions as lead them to mundane and heavenly happiness, and on the other hand created the Pañcarātra literature for the attainment of the highest bliss by the worship of God and the realization of His nature. There are some who deny the legitimate inference of a creator from the creation, and regard the Vedas as an eternally existent composition, uncreated by any divine being. Even in such a view the reason why the Vedas and the consonant *Smṛtis* are regarded as valid attests also the validity of the Pañcarātra literature. But, as a matter of fact, from the Vedas themselves we can know the supreme being as their composer. The supreme God referred to in the Upaniṣads is none other than *Vāsudeva*, and it is He who is the composer of the Pañcarātra. Further, arguments are adduced to show that the object of the Vedas is not only to command us to do certain actions or to prohibit us from doing certain other actions, but also to describe the nature of the ultimate reality as the divine person. The validity of the Pañcarātra has therefore to be admitted, as it claims for its source the divine person Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva. Yāmuna then refers to many texts from the *Varāha*, *Līṅga* and *Matsya Purāṇas* and from the *Manu-saṁhitā* and other *smṛti* texts. In his *Puruṣa-ninṇaya* also, Yāmuna elaborately discusses the scriptural arguments by which he tries to show that the highest divine person referred to in the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas is Nārāyaṇa. This divine being cannot be the Śiva of the Śaivas, because the three classes of the Śaivas, the Kāpālikas, Kālamukhas and Pāśupatas, all prescribe courses of conduct contradictory to one another, and it is impossible that they should be recommended by the scriptural texts. Their ritualistic rites also are manifestly non-Vedic. The view that they are all derived from Rudra does not prove that it is the same Rudra who is referred to in the Vedic texts. The Rudra referred to by them may be an entirely different person. He refers also to the various Purāṇas which decry the Śaivas. Against the argument that, if the Pañcarātra doctrines were in consonance with the Vedas, then one would certainly have discovered the relevant Vedic texts from which they were derived, Yāmuna says that the Pañcarātra texts were produced by God for the benefit of devotees who were impatient of following elaborate details described in the

Vedic literature. It is therefore quite intelligible that the relevant Vedic texts supporting the *Pañcarātra* texts should not be discovered. Again, when it is said that Śāṇḍilya turned to the doctrine of *bhakti* because he found nothing in the four Vedas suitable for the attainment of his desired end, this should not be interpreted as implying a lowering of the Vedas; for it simply means that the desired end as recommended in the *Pañcarātras* is different from that prescribed in the Vedas. The fact that *Pañcarātras* recommend special ritual ceremonies in addition to the Vedic ones does not imply that they are non-Vedic; for, unless it is proved that the *Pañcarātras* are non-Vedic, it cannot be proved that the additional ceremonies are non-Vedic without implying argument in a circle. It is also wrong to suppose that the *Pañcarātra* ceremonies are really antagonistic to all Vedic ceremonies. It is also wrong to suppose that Bādarāyaṇa refuted the *Pañcarātra* doctrines; for, had he done so, he would not have recommended them in the *Mahābhārata*. The view of the *Pañcarātras* admitting the four *vyūhas* should not be interpreted as the admission of many gods; for these are manifestations of Vāsudeva, the one divine person. A proper interpretation of Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtras* would also show that they are in support of the *Pañcarātras* and not against them.

Even the most respected persons of society follow all the *Pañcarātra* instructions in connection with all rituals relating to image-worship. The arguments of the opponents that the Bhāgavatas are not Brahmins are all fallacious, since the Bhāgavatas have the same marks of Brahmahood as all Brahmins. The fact that Manu describes the *pañcama* caste as *sātvata* does not prove that all *sātvatas* are *pañcamas*. Moreover, the interpretation of the word *sātvata* as *pañcama* by the opponents would be contradictory to many scriptural texts, where *sātvatas* are praised. That some *sātvatas* live by image-building or temple-building and such other works relating to the temple does not imply that this is the duty of all the Bhāgavatas. Thus Yāmuna, in his *Āgama-prāmāṇya* and *Kāśmīrāgama-prāmāṇya*, tried to prove that the *Pañcarātras* are as valid as the Vedas, since they are derived from the same source, viz. the divine Person, *Nārāyaṇa*¹.

¹ The *Kāśmīrāgama* is referred to in the *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, p. 85, as another work of Yāmuna dealing more or less with the same subject as the *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, of which no MS. has been available to the present writer.

From the tenth to the seventeenth century the Śaivas and the Śrīvaiṣṇavas lived together in the south, where kings professing Śaivism harassed the Śrīvaiṣṇavas and maltreated their temple-gods, and kings professing Śrīvaiṣṇavism did the same to the Śaivas and their temple-gods. It is therefore easy to imagine how the sectarian authors of the two schools were often anxious to repudiate one another. One of the most important and comprehensive of such works is the *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī*, written by Veṅkaṭa Sudhī. Veṅkaṭa Sudhī was the disciple of Veṅkaṭanātha. He was the son of Śrīśaila Tātayārya, and was the brother of Śrī Śaila Śrīnivāsa. The *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* is a work of four chapters, containing over 300,000 letters. He lived in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, and wrote at least two other works, *Rahasya traya-sāra* and *Siddhānta-vaijayantī*.

Many treatises were written in which the Pañcarātra doctrines were summarized. Of these Gopālasūri's *Pañcarātra-rakṣā-saṃgraha* seems to be the most important. Gopālasūri was the son of Kṛṣṇadeśika and pupil of Vedāntarāmānuja, who was himself the pupil of Kṛṣṇadeśika. His *Pañcarātra-rakṣā* deals with the various kinds of rituals described in some of the most important Pañcarātra works.

It thus seems that the Pañcarātra literature was by many writers not actually regarded as of Vedic origin, though among the Śrīvaiṣṇavas it was regarded as being as authoritative as the Vedas. It was regarded, along with the Sāṃkhya and Yoga, as an accessory literature to the Vedas¹. Yāmuna also speaks of it as containing a brief summary of the teachings of the Vedas for the easy and immediate use of those devotees who cannot afford to study the vast Vedic literature. The main subjects of the Pañcarātra literature are directions regarding the constructions of temples and images,

¹ Thus Veṅkaṭanātha, quoting Vyāsa, says:

*idaṃmaho-paniṣadam catur-veda-saṃ-anvitaṃ
sāṃkhya-yoga-kṛtāntena pañca-rātrā-nu-śabditaṃ.*

Seṣvara-Mīmāṃsā, p. 19.

Sometimes the Pañcarātra is regarded as the root of the Vedas, and sometimes the Vedas are regarded as the root of the Pañcarātras. Thus Veṅkaṭanātha in the above context quotes a passage from Vyāsa in which Pañcarātra is regarded as the root of the Vedas—"mahato veda-rkṣasya mula-bhūto mahān ayam." He quotes also another passage in which the Vedas are regarded as the root of the Pañcarātras—"śrutimūlam idaṃ tantraṃ pramāṇa-kalpa-sūtravat." In another passage he speaks of the Pañcarātras as the alternative to the Vedas—"alābhe veda-mantrāṇāṃ pañca-rātro-dītena vā."

descriptions of the various rituals associated with image-worship, and the rituals, dealing elaborately with the duties of the Śrī-vaiṣṇavas and their religious practices, such as initiation, baptism, and the holding of religious marks. The practice of image-worship is manifestly non-Vedic, though there is ample evidence to show that it was current even in the sixth century B.C. It is difficult for us to say how this practice originated and which section of Indians was responsible for it. The conflict between the Vedic people and the image-worshippers seems to have been a long one; yet we know that even in the second century B.C. the Bhāgavata cult was in a very living state, not only in South India, but also in Upper India. The testimony of the Besnagar Column shows how even Greeks were converted to the Bhāgavata religion. The *Mahābhārata* also speaks of the *sātvata* rites, according to which Viṣṇu was worshipped, and it also makes references to the *Vyūha* doctrine of the Pañcarātras. In the *Nārāyaṇīya* section it is suggested that the home of the Pañcarātra worship is Śveta-dvīpa, from which it may have migrated to India; but efforts of scholars to determine the geographical position of Śveta-dvīpa have so far failed.

In the *Purāṇas* and the *smṛti* literature also the conflict with the various Brahminic authorities is manifest. Thus, in the *Kūrma purāṇa*, chapter fifteen, it is said that the great sinners, the Pañcarātrins, were produced as a result of killing cows in some other birth, that they are absolutely non-Vedic, and that the literatures of the Śāktas, Śaivas and the Pañcarātras are for the delusion of mankind¹. That Pañcarātrins were a cursed people is also noticed in the *Parāśara purāṇa*². They are also strongly denounced in the *Vaśiṣṭha-saṃhitā*, the *Śāmba-purāṇa* and the *Sūta-saṃhitā* as great sinners and as absolutely non-Vedic. Another cause of denouncement was that the Pañcarātrins initiated and admitted within their

¹ *kāpōlum gāruḍam śāktam, bhairavam pūrva-pāścimam,
pañca-rātram, pāsupatam tathānyāni sahasraśaḥ.*

Kūrma-purāṇa, Ch. 15.

(As quoted in the *Tattva-kaustubha* of Dikṣita but in the printed edition of the B.J. series it occurs in the sixteenth chapter with slight variations.)

The *Skanda-purāṇa* also says:

*pañcarātre ca kāpāle, tathā kālamukeḥ'pi ca.
śakte ca dikṣitā yūyam bhaveta brāhmaṇādhamāḥ.*

² *dvitīyam pañcarātre ca tantre bhāgavate tathā
dikṣitāś ca dvijā nityam bhaveyur garhitā hareḥ.*

(As quoted by Bhaṭṭojī Dikṣita in his *Tattva-kaustubha*, MS. p. 4.)

sect even women and Śūdras. According to the *Aśvalāyana-smṛti*, no one but an outcast would therefore accept the marks recommended by the Pañcarātras. In the fourth chapter of the *Vṛhan-nāradya-purāṇa* it is said that even for conversing with the Pañcarātrins one would have to go to the Raurava hell. The same prohibition of conversing with the Pañcarātrins is found in the *Kūrma-purāṇa*, and it is there held that they should not be invited on occasions of funeral ceremonies. Hemādri, quoting from the *Vāyu purāṇa*, says that, if a Brahman is converted into the Pañcarātra religion, he thereby loses all his Vedic rites. The *Linga-purāṇa* also regards them as being excommunicated from all religion (*sarva-dharma-vahiṣkṛta*). The *Āditya* and the *Agni-purāṇas* are also extremely strong against those who associate themselves in any way with the Pañcarātrins. The *Viṣṇu*, *Śātātapa*, *Hārīta*, *Bodhāyana* and the *Yama saṃhitās* also are equally strong against the Pañcarātrins and those who associate with them in any way. The Pañcarātrins, however, seem to be more conciliatory to the members of the orthodox Vedic sects. They therefore appear to be a minority sect, which had always to be on the defensive and did not dare revile the orthodox Vedic people. There are some Purāṇas, however, like the *Mahābhārata*, *Bhāgavata* and the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, which are strongly in favour of the Pañcarātrins. It is curious, however, to notice that, while some sections of the Purāṇas approve of them, others are fanatically against them. The Purāṇas that are specially favourable to the Pañcarātrins are the *Viṣṇu*, *Nāradya*, *Bhāgavata*, *Gāruḍa*, *Padma* and *Varāha*, which are called the *Sāttvika purāṇas*¹. So among the *smṛtis*, the *Vāsiṣṭha*, *Hārīta*, *Vyāsa*, *Pārāśara* and *Kāśyapa* are regarded as the best². The *Pramāṇa-saṃgraha* takes up some of the most important doctrines of the Pañcarātrins and tries to prove their authoritativeness by a reference to the above *Purāṇas* and *smṛtis*, and also to the *Mahābhārata*, the *Gītā*, *Viṣṇudharmottara*, *Prajāpatya-smṛti*, *Itihāsasamuccaya*, *Harivaṃśa*, *Vṛddha-manu*, *Śāṇḍilya-smṛti*, and the *Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa*.

¹ Thus the *Pramāṇa-saṃgraha* says:

*vaiṣṇavaṃ nāradyaṃ ca tathā bhāgavatam śubhaṃ
gāruḍaṃ ca tathā pādmaṃ varāhaṃ śubha-darśane
sāttvikāni purāṇāni vijñeyāni ca śatprthak.*

² *Ibid.* p. 14.

Tattva-kaustubha, MS. p. 13.

The Pañcarātra Literature.

The Pañcarātra literature is somewhat large and only a few works have been printed. The present writer, however, had the opportunity of collecting a large number of manuscripts, and an attempt will here be made to give a brief account of this literature, which, however, has no philosophical importance. One of the most important of these *saṃhitās* is the *Sātvata-saṃhitā*. The *Sātvata* is referred to in the *Mahābhārata*, the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā*, the *Īśvara-saṃhitā* and other *saṃhitās*. In the *Sātvata-saṃhitā* we find that the Lord (*Bhagavān*) promulgates the *Pañcarātra-Śāstra* at the request of Saṃkarṣaṇa on behalf of the sages¹. It consists of twenty-five chapters which describe the forms of worshipping Nārāyaṇa in all His four *Vyūha* manifestations (*vibhava-devatā*), dress and ornaments, other special kinds of worship, the installation of images and the like. The *Īśvara-saṃhitā* says that the *Ekāyana Veda*, the source of all Vedas, originated with *Vāsudeva* and existed in the earliest age as the root of all the other Vedas, which were introduced at a later age and are therefore called the *Vikāra-veda*. When these *Vikāra-vedas* sprang up and people became more and more worldly-minded, Vāsudeva withdrew the *Ekāyana Veda* and revealed it only to some selected persons, such as Sana, Sanatsujāti, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana, who were all called *ekāntins*. Other sages, Marīci, Atri, Āṅgīrasa, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Vasiṣṭha and Svayambhuva, learnt this *Ekāyana* from Nārāyaṇa, and on the basis of it the Pañcarātra literature on the one hand was written, in verse, and the various *Dharma-śāstras* on the other hand were written by Manu and other *ṛṣis*. The Pañcarātra works, such as *Sātvata*, *Pauṣkara*, and *Jayākhya* and other similar texts, were written at the instance of Saṃkarṣaṇa in accordance with the fundamental tenets of the *Ekāyana Veda*, which was almost lost in the later stage. Śaṇḍilya also learnt the principles of the *Ekāyana Veda* from Saṃkarṣaṇa and taught them to the *ṛṣis*. The contents of the *Ekāyana Veda*, as taught by Nārāyaṇa, are called the *Sātvika-śāstra*; those *Śāstras* which are partly based on the *Ekāyana Veda* and partly due to the contribution of the sages themselves are called the *Rājasa-Śāstra*; those which are merely the contribution of

¹ Published at Conjeeveram, 1902.

human beings are called the *Tāmasa Śāstra*. The *Rājasa Śāstra* is of two kinds, the *Pañcarātra* and the *Vaikhānasa*. *Sātvata*, *Pauṣkara* and *Jayākhyā* were probably the earliest Pañcarātra works written by the sages, and of these again the *Sātvata* is considered the best, as it consists of a dialogue between the Lord and Saṃkarṣaṇa.

The *Īśvara-saṃhitā* consists of twenty-four chapters, of which sixteen are devoted to ritualistic worship, one to the description of images, one to initiation, one to meditation, one to *mantras*, one to expiation, one to methods of self-control, and one to a description of the holiness of the Yādava hill¹. The chapter on worship is interspersed with philosophical doctrines which form the basis of the Śrīvaiṣṇava philosophy and religion.

The *Hayasīrṣa-saṃhitā* consists of four parts; the first part, called the *Pratiṣṭhā-kāṇḍa*, consists of forty-two chapters; the second, the Saṃkarṣaṇa, of thirty-seven chapters; the third, the *Līṅga*, of twenty chapters; and the fourth, the *Saura-kāṇḍa*, of forty-five chapters². All the chapters deal with rituals concerning the installation of images of various minor gods, the methods of making images and various other kinds of rituals. The *Viṣṇu-tattva-saṃhitā* consists of thirty-nine chapters, and deals entirely with rituals of image-worship, ablutions, the holding of Vaiṣṇava marks, purificatory rites, etc.³ The *Parama-saṃhitā* consists of thirty-one chapters, dealing mainly with a description of the process of creation, rituals of initiation, and other kinds of worship³. In the tenth chapter, however, it deals with *yoga*. In this chapter we hear of *jñāna-yoga* and *karma-yoga*. *Jñāna-yoga* is regarded as superior to *karma-yoga*, though it may co-exist therewith. *Jñāna-yoga* means partly practical philosophy and the effort to control all sense-inclinations by that means. It also includes *samādhi*, or deep concentration, and the practice of *prāṇāyāma*. The word *yoga* is here used in the sense of "joining or attaching oneself to." The man who practises *yoga* fixes his mind on God and by deep meditation detaches himself from all worldly bonds. The idea of *karma-yoga* does not appear to be very clear; but in all probability it means worship of Viṣṇu. The *Parāśara saṃhitā*, which was also available

¹ Published at Conjeeveram, 1921.

² It has been available to the present writer only in MS.

³ This *saṃhitā* has also been available to the present writer only in MS.

only in manuscript, consists of eight chapters dealing with the methods of muttering the name of God.

The *Padma-saṃhitā*, consisting of thirty-one chapters, deals with various kinds of rituals and the chanting of *mantras*, offerings, religious festivities and the like¹. The *Parameśvara-saṃhitā*, consisting of fifteen chapters, deals with the meditation on *mantras*, sacrifices and methods of ritual and expiation². The *Pauṣkara-saṃhitā*, which is one of the earliest, consists of forty-three chapters, and deals with various kinds of image-worship, funeral sacrifices and also with some philosophical topics². It contains also a special chapter called *Tattva-saṃkhyāna*, in which certain philosophical views are discussed. These, however, are not of any special importance and may well be passed over. The *Prakāśa-saṃhitā* consists of two parts. The first part is called *Parama-tattva-nirṇaya*, and consists of fifteen chapters; the second, called *Para-tattva-prakāśa*, consists of twelve chapters only². The *Mahā-sanatkumāra-saṃhitā*, consisting of four chapters and forty sections in all, deals entirely with rituals of worship². It is a big work, containing ten thousand verses. Its four chapters are called *Brahma-rātra*, *Śiva-rātra*, *Indra-rātra* and *Ṛṣi-rātra*. The *Aniruddha-saṃhitā-mahopaniṣad* contains thirty-four chapters and deals entirely with descriptions of various rituals, methods of initiation, expiation, installation of images, the rules regarding the construction of images, etc.² The *Kāśyapa-saṃhitā*, consisting of twelve chapters, deals mainly with poisons and methods of remedy by incantations². The *Vihagendra-saṃhitā* deals largely with meditation on *mantras* and sacrificial oblations and consists of twenty-four chapters. In the twelfth chapter it deals extensively with *prāṇāyāma*, or breath-control, as a part of the process of worship². The *Sudarśana-saṃhitā* consists of forty-one chapters and deals with meditation on *mantras* and expiation of sins. *Agastya-saṃhitā* consists of thirty-two chapters. The *Vasiṣṭha* contains twenty-four chapters, the *Viśvāmitra* twenty-six chapters and the *Viṣṇu-saṃhitā* thirty chapters. They are all in manuscripts and deal more or less with the same subject, namely, ritualistic worship. The *Viṣṇu-saṃhitā* is, however, very much under the influence of Sāṃkhya and holds *Puruṣa* to be all-pervasive. It also invests *Puruṣa* with dynamic

¹ It has been available to the present writer only in MS.

² These works also were available to the present writer only in MS.

activity by reason of which the *prakṛti* passes through evolutionary changes. The five powers of the five senses are regarded as the power of Viṣṇu. The power of Viṣṇu has both a gross and a transcendental form. In its transcendental form it is power as consciousness, power as world-force, power as cause, power by which consciousness grasps its objects and power as omniscience and omnipotence. These five powers in their transcendental forms constitute the subtle body of God. In the thirtieth chapter the *Viṣṇu-saṃhitā* deals with *yoga* and its six accessories (*ṣaḍ-aṅga-yoga*), and shows how the *yoga* method can be applied for the attainment of devotion, and calls it *Bhāgavata-yoga*. It may be noticed that the description of human souls as all-pervasive is against the Śrīvaiṣṇava position. The *aṣṭāṅga yoga* (*yoga* with eight accessories) is often recommended and was often practised by the early adherents of the Śrīvaiṣṇava faith, as has already been explained. The *Mārkaṇḍeya-saṃhitā* consists of thirty-two chapters, speaks of 108 *saṃhitās*, and gives a list of ninety-one *saṃhitās*¹. The *Viṣvakṣena-saṃhitā* consists of thirty-one chapters. It is a very old work and has often been utilized by Rāmānuja, Saumya Jāmātṛ muni and others. The *Hiranya-garbha-saṃhitā* consists of four chapters.

Philosophy of the Jayākhyā and other Saṃhitās.

The Pañcarātra literature is, indeed, vast, but it has been shown that most of this literature is full of ritualistic details and that there is very little of philosophy in it. The only *saṃhitās* (so far as they are available to us) which have some philosophical elements in them are the *Jayākhyā-saṃhitā*, *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā*, *Viṣṇu-saṃhitā*, *Vihagendra-saṃhitā*, *Parama-saṃhitā* and *Pauṣkara-saṃhitā*; of these the *Ahīrbudhnyā* and the *Jayākhyā* are the most important.

The *Jaya* starts with the view that merely by performance of the sacrifices, making of gifts, study of the Vedas, and expiatory penances, one cannot attain eternal Heaven or liberation from bondage. Until we can know the ultimate reality (*para-tattva*) which is all-pervasive, eternal, self-realized, pure consciousness, but which through its own will can take forms, there is no hope of salvation. This ultimate reality resides in our hearts and is in itself

¹ These are also in MS. Schrader enumerates them in his *Introduction to Pañcarātra*.

devoid of any qualities (*nir-guṇa*), though it lies hidden by the qualities (*guṇa-guhyā*) and is without any name (*a-nāmaka*).

A number of sages approached Śāṇḍilya in the mountain of Gandhamādana with inquiry concerning the manner in which this ultimate reality may be known. Śāṇḍilya in reply said that this science was very secret and very ancient, and that it could be given only to true believers who were ardently devoted to their preceptors. It was originally given to Nārada by Viṣṇu. The Lord Viṣṇu is the object of our approach, but He can be approached only through the scriptures (*Śāstra*); the *Śāstra* can be taught only by a teacher. The teacher therefore is the first and primary means to the attainment of the ultimate reality through the instructions of the scriptures.

The *Jayākhya-saṃhitā* then describes the three kinds of creation, of which the first is called *Brahma-sarga*, which is of a mythological character; it is stated that in the beginning Brahmā was created by Viṣṇu and that he, by his own egoism, polluted the creation which he made and that two demons, Madhu and Kaiṭabha, produced from two drops of sweat, stole away the Vedas and thus created great confusion. Viṣṇu fought with them by His physical energies, but was unsuccessful. He then fought with them by His “*mantra*” energy and thus ultimately destroyed them.

The second creation is that of the evolution of the Sāṃkhya categories. It is said in the *Jayākhya-saṃhitā* that in the *pradhāna* the three *guṇas* exist together in mutual unity. Just as in a lamp the wick, the oil and the fire act together to form the unity of the lamp, so the three *guṇas* also exist together and form the *pradhāna*. Though these *guṇas* are separate, yet in the *pradhāna* they form an inseparable unity (*bhīnam ekātma-lakṣaṇam*). These *guṇas*, however, are separated out from this state of union, and in this order of separation *sattva* comes first, then *rajas* and then *tamas*. From the threefold unity of the *guṇas* the *buddhi-tattva* is evolved, and from this are produced the three kinds of *ahaṃkāra*, *prakāśātmā*, *vikṛtyātmā* and *bhūtātmā*. From the first kind of *ahaṃkāra*, as *taijasa* or as *prakāśātmā*, the five cognitive senses and the *manas* are produced. From the second kind of *ahaṃkāra* the five conative senses are evolved. From the *ahaṃkāra* as *bhūtātmā* the five *bhūta-yoni* or sources of elements (otherwise called the five *tan-mātra*) are produced, and from these are derived the five gross elements. The *prakṛti* is unintelligent and material in nature, and

so, as may well be expected, the evolution from *prakṛti* is also material in nature. The natural question in this connection is: how can matter begin to produce other material entities? The answer given to this question is that, though both a paddy seed and a piece of rice are material by nature, yet there is productivity in the former, but not in the latter; so, though the *prakṛti* and its evolutes are both material in nature, yet one is produced out of the other. The products of the unintelligent *prakṛti*, being suffused with the glow of the self as pure consciousness, one with Brahman, appear as being endowed with consciousness¹. Just as a piece of iron becomes endowed with magnetic powers, so the *prakṛti* also becomes endowed with intelligence through its association with the intelligent self in unity with Brahman. The question, however, arises how, since matter and intelligence are as different from each other as light from darkness, there can be any association between the unconscious *prakṛti* and the pure intelligence. To this the reply is that the individual soul (*jīva*) is a product of a beginningless association of *vāsanā* with pure consciousness. For the removal of this *vāsanā* a certain power emanates from Brahman and, impelled by His will, so works within the inner microcosm of man that the pure consciousness in the *jīva* is ultimately freed from the *vāsanā* through the destruction of his *karma*, and he becomes ultimately one with Brahman. The *karma* can bear fruits only when they are associated with their receptacle, the *vāsanā*. The self, or the soul, is brought into association with the *guṇas* by the energy of God, and it can thereby come to know its own *vāsanā*, which are non-intelligent by nature and a product of the *guṇa*². So long as the self is in association with the covering of *māyā* it experiences good and evil. The association of consciousness with matter is thus effected through the manifestation of a special energy of God by which the self is made to undergo the various experiences through its association with *māyā*. As soon as the bond is broken, the self as pure consciousness becomes one with Brahman.

¹ *cid-rūpaṃ ātma-tattvaṃ yad abhinnam brahmaṇi sthitaṃ
tenaitac churitaṃ bhāti acic cinnamayavad devija.*

Jayākhya-saṃhitā (MS.), III. 14.

When this section was written the *Jayākhya-saṃhitā* was not published. It has since been published in the Gaekwad's oriental series.

² *māyāmāye devīā-dhāre guṇā-dhāre tato jaḍe
śaktyā saṃyojito hy ātmā vetty ātmīyās ca vāsanāḥ.* *Ibid.* III. 24.

The third creation is the pure creation (*śuddha-sarga*), in which God, otherwise called Vāsudeva, evolved from out of Himself three subsidiary agents, Acyuta, Satya and Puruṣa, which are in reality but one with Him and have no different existence. In His form as Puruṣa God behaves as the inner controller of all ordinary gods, whom He goads and leads to work. And it is in this form that God works in all human beings bound with the ties of *vāsanā*, and directs them to such courses as may ultimately lead them to the cessation of their bondage.

God is pure bliss and self-conscious in Himself. He is the highest and the ultimate reality beyond all, which is, however, self-existent and the support of all other things. He is beginningless and infinite and cannot be designated either as existent or as non-existent (*na sat tan nāsad ucyate*). He is devoid of all *guṇas*, but enjoys the various products of the *guṇas*, and exists both inside and outside us. He is omniscient, all-perceiving, the Lord of all and all are in Him. He combines in Him all energies, and is spontaneous in Himself with all His activities. He pervades all things, but is yet called non-existent because He cannot be perceived by the senses. But, just as the fragrance of flowers can be intuited directly, so God also can be intuited directly¹. All things are included in His existence and He is not limited either in time or in space. Just as fire exists in a red-hot iron-ball as if it were one therewith, so does God pervade the whole world. Just as things that are imaged on a mirror may in one sense be said to be in it and in another sense to be outside it, so God is in one sense associated with all sensible qualities and in another sense is unassociated therewith. God pervades all the conscious and the unconscious entities, just as the watery juice pervades the whole of the plant². God cannot be known by arguments or proof. His all-pervading existence is as unspeakable and undemonstrable as the existence of fire in wood and butter in milk. He is perceivable only through direct intuition. Just as logs of wood enter into the fire and are lost in it, just as rivers lose themselves in the ocean, so do the Yogins enter into the essence of God. In such circumstances there is difference between the rivers and the ocean into which they fall, yet the dif-

¹ *sva-saṃvedyaṃ tu tad viddhi gandhaḥ puṣpādiko yathā.*

Jayākhya-saṃhitā, iv. 76.

² *cetanā-cetanāḥ sarve bhūtāḥ sthāvara-jaṅgamāḥ
pūritāḥ paramēśena rasenaṣadhayo yathā.*

Ibid. iv. 93.

ference cannot be perceived¹. There is thus both a difference between the waters of the rivers and the ocean and an absence of difference, even as between the devotees of God and God. The doctrine here preached is thus a theory of *bhedābheda* or unity-in-difference.

Brahman is here described as being identical with consciousness, and all objects of knowledge (*jñeya*) are regarded as existing inside the mind². The true knowledge is unassociated with any qualifications, and it can rise only through the process of Yogic practice by those who have learnt to be in union with God³.

When through the grace of God one begins to realize that all the fruits of actions and all that one does are of the nature of the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, there dawns the spiritual inquiry within one, as to one's own nature, and as to the nature of the essence of sorrow, and one approaches the true preceptor. When the devotee continues to think of the never-ending cycle of rebirths and the consequent miseries of such transitoriness and other afflictions associated with it, and also undergoes the various bodily disciplines as dictated by his Gurus, and is initiated into the "*mantras*," his mind becomes disinclined to worldly joys and pure like the water in the autumn, or the sea without any ripple, or like a steady lamp unfluttered by the wind. When the pure consciousness dawns in the mind, all possible objects of knowledge, including the ultimate object of knowledge, arise in the mind, and the thought and the object become held together as one, and gradually the Supreme knowledge and cessation that brings "*Nirvāṇa*" are secured. All that is known is in reality one with the thought itself, though it may appear different therefrom. This ultimate state is indescribable through language. It can only be felt and realized intuitively without the application of logical faculty or of the sense-organs. It can be referred to only by means of images. It is transcendental by nature, ultimate and absolutely without any support. It is the mere being which reveals itself in the joy of the soul. Of the two ways of

¹ *sarīṭ-saṃghād yathā toyam saṃpravṛṣṭam maho-dadhau
alakṣyaś co' dake bhedah paraśmin yoginām tathā.*

Jayākhyā-saṃhitā, IV. 123.

² *brahmā-bhinnaṃ vibhor jñānaṃ śrotum icchāmi tattvataḥ
yena saṃprāpyate jñeyam antaḥ-karaṇa-saṃsthitam.* *Ibid.* IV. 1.

³ *sarvo'-pādhi-vinirmuktaṃ jñānam ekānta-nirmalam
utpadyate hi yuktasya yogābhyāsāt krameṇa tat.* *Ibid.* v. 2.

Samādhi which proceed through absorptive emotions (*bhāva-jā*) and the way of the practice of *mantras* it is the latter that is the more efficacious. The practice of *mantras* removes all obstacles to self-realization produced by *māyā* and its products.

In describing the emanation of Acyuta, Satya and Puruṣa from Vāsudeva, the *Jayākhya-saṃhitā* holds that such an emanation occurs only naturally and not as a result of a purposive will; and the three entities, Acyuta, Satya and Puruṣa, which evolve out of Vāsudeva, behave as one through mutual reflections, and in this subtle form they exist in the heart of men as the operative energy of God, gradually leading them to their ultimate destination of emancipation and also to the enjoyment of experiences.

The *Jayākhya-saṃhitā* describes knowledge as two-fold, as *sattākhya* (static) and as *kriyākhya* (dynamic). The *kriyākhya-jñāna* involves the moral disciplines of *yama* and *niyama*, and it is by the continual habit and practice of the *kriyākhya-jñāna* of *yama* and *niyama* that the *sattākhya-jñāna*, or wisdom, may attain its final fulfilment. The *yama* and the *niyama* here consist of the following virtues: purity, sacrifice, penance, study of the Vedas, absence of cruelty, and ever-present forgiveness, truthfulness, doing good to all creatures including one's enemies, respect for the property of others, control of mind, disinclination of mind to all things of sensual enjoyment, bestowing gifts upon others according to one's own power, speaking true and kind words, constancy of mind to friends and enemies, straightforwardness, sincerity and mercifulness to all creatures. The equilibrium of the three *guṇas* is called *Avidyā*, which may be regarded as the cause of attachment, antipathy and other defects. *Ātman* is the term used to denote the pure consciousness, as tinged with *guṇas*, *avidyā* and *māyā*.

The position described above leads to the view that God emanates from Himself as His tripartite energy, which forms the inner microcosm of man. It is by virtue of this energy that the pure consciousness in man comes into association with his root-instincts and psychosis in general, by virtue of which the psychical elements, which are themselves unconscious and material, begin to behave as intelligent. It is by virtue of such an association that experience becomes possible. Ultimately, however, the same indwelling energy separates the conscious principle from the unconscious elements and thereby produces emancipation, in which the conscious element

of the individual becomes merged in Brahman. The association of the conscious element with the unconscious psychosis, which has evolved from *prakṛti*, is not due to a false imaging of the one or the other, or to an illusion, but to the operative power of the indwelling energy of God, which exists in us. The individual, called also the *Ātman*, is the product of this forced association. When the complex element is disassociated from the psychosis and the root-instincts, it becomes merged in Brahman, of which it is a part and with which it exists in a state of unity-in-difference. The difference between this view and that of the *Sāṃkhya* is that, though it admits in general the *Sāṃkhya* view of evolution of the categories from *prakṛti*, yet it does not admit the theory of *Puruṣa* and the transcendental illusion of *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, which is to be found in the classical *Sāṃkhya* of Īśvara kṛṣṇa. There is no reference here to the teleology in *prakṛti* which causes its evolution, or to the view that the *prakṛti* is roused to activity by God or by *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* is supposed here to possess a natural productive power of evolving the categories from out of itself.

The *Jayākhya-saṃhitā* speaks of the devotee as a *yogin* and holds that there are two ways of arriving at the ultimate goal, one through absorptive trance, and the other through the practice of concentration on the *mantras*. In describing the process of *Yoga*, it holds that the *yogin* must be a man who has his senses within his absolute control and who is devoid of antipathy to all beings. Full of humility, he should take his seat in a lonely place and continue the practice of *prāṇāyāma* for the control of mind. The three processes of *prāṇāyāma*, viz. *pratyāhāra*, *dhyāna*, and *dhāraṇā*, are described. Then, *Yoga* is stated to be of three kinds, *prākṛta*, *pañcāyama* and *aiśvarya*, the meaning of which is not very clear. It may, however, be the meditation on *prakṛti*'s ultimate principle, or on *Puruṣa*, or the *Yoga* which is intended for the attainment of miraculous power. Four kinds of *āsana*s are described, namely, that of *Paryāṅka*, *Kamala*, *Bhadra* and *Svastika*. The *Yogic* posture is also described. The control of the mind, which again is regarded as the chief aim of *yoga*, may be of two kinds, namely, of those tendencies of mind which are due to environments and of those that are constitutional to the mind. It is by increasing the *sattva* quality of the mind that it can be made to fix itself upon an object. In another classification we hear of three kinds of *yoga*, *sakala*

niṣkala and *Viṣṇu*, or *sabda*, *vyoma* and *sa-vigraha*. In the *sakala* or the *sa-vigraha* type of *yoga* the *yogin* concentrates his mind on the gross idol of the deity; and then gradually, as he becomes habituated, he concentrates his mind on the notion of a glowing circular disc; then on the dimension of a pea; then on the dimension of a horse-hair; then on a human hair of the head; then on the human hair of the body; and as a consequence of the perfection of this practice the path of the *brahma-randhra* opens up for him. In the *niṣkala* type of *yoga* the *yogin* meditates upon the ultimate reality, with the result that his own essence as Brahman is revealed to him. The third form consists in the meditation on the *mantras*, by which course also the ultimate reality is revealed to the *yogin*. Through the process of the *yoga* the *yogin* ultimately passes out by the channel of his *brahma-randhra* and leaves his body, after which he attains unity with the ultimate reality, Vāsudeva¹.

In the fourth chapter of the *Viṣṇu-Saṃhitā* (Manuscript) the three *guṇas* are supposed to belong to *Prakṛti*, which, with its evolutes, is called *Kṣetra*, God being called *Kṣetrajña*². The *prakṛti* and God exist together as it were in union³. The *prakṛti* produces all existences and withdraws them within it in accordance with the direction or the superintendence of the *Puruṣa*⁴, though it seems to behave as an independent agent. *Puruṣa* is described as an all-pervading conscious principle.

The *Viṣṇu-saṃhitā*, after describing the three kinds of egoism as *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*, speaks of the *rājasa ahaṃkāra* not only as evolving the conative senses but also as being the active principle directing all our cognitive and conative energies. As the cognitive energy, it behaves both as attention directed to sense-perception and also to reflection involving synthetic and analytic activities. The *Viṣṇu-saṃhitā* speaks further of the five powers of God, by which the Lord, though absolutely qualityless in Himself, reveals Himself through all the sensible qualities. It is probably in this way that all the powers of *prakṛti* exist in God, and it is in this

¹ *Jayākhya-saṃhitā*, Ch. 33. In Ch. 34 the process of *yoga* by which the *yogin* gradually approaches the stage of the final destruction of his body is described.

² *kṣetrākhyā prakṛtir jñeyā tad-vit kṣetra-jña īśvaraḥ.*

Viṣṇu-saṃhitā, iv.

³ *ubhayaṃ cedam atyantam abhinnaṃ iva tiṣṭhati.* *Ibid.*

⁴ *tan-niyogāt svatantreṇa sūte bhāvān haraty api.* *Ibid.*

sense that the *kṣetra* or the *prakṛti* is supposed to be *abhinna*, or one with God. These powers are (1) *cic-chakti*¹, that is, power of consciousness, which is the unchangeable ground of all works. Second is His power as the enjoyer, or *puruṣa*. The third power is the causal power, manifested as the manifold universe. The fourth power is the power by which sense-objects are grasped and comprehended in knowledge. The fifth power is that which resolves knowledge into action. The sixth power is the power that reveals itself as the activity of thought and action². It seems, therefore, that what has been described above as *puruṣa*, or enjoyer, is not a separate principle, but the power of God; just as *prakṛti* itself is not a separate principle, but a manifestation of the power of God.

The process of *Bhāgavata-yoga* described in *Viṣṇu-saṁhitā* consists primarily of a system of bodily and moral control, involving control of the passions of greed, anger, etc., the habit of meditation in solitary places, the development of a spirit of dependence on God, and self-criticism. When, as a result of this, the mind becomes pure and disinclined to worldly things, there arises an intellectual and moral apprehension of the distinction of what is bad and impure from what is good and pure, whence attachment, or *bhakti*, is produced. Through this attachment one becomes self-contented and loyal to one's highest goal and ultimately attains true knowledge. The process of *prāṇāyāma*, in which various kinds of meditations are prescribed, is also recommended for attainment of the ultimate union with God, which is a state of emancipation. The view here taken of *bhakti*, or devotion, shows that *bhakti* is used here in the simple sense of inclination to worship, and the means to the fruition of this worship is *yoga*. The so-called *bhakti*-school of the *Bhāgavatas* was so much under the influence of the *yoga*-system that a *bhakta* was required to be a *yogin*, since *bhakti* by itself was not regarded as a sufficient means to the attainment of salvation. In the tenth chapter of the *Parama-saṁhitā* the process of *yoga* is described in a conversation between *Brahmā* and *Parama*. It is said there that the knowledge attained by *yoga* is better than any other

¹ *cic-chaktiḥ sarva-kāryābdhīḥ kūtasthaḥ parameṣṭhy asau
dvitīyā tasya yā śaktiḥ puruṣākhyādi-vikriyā
viśvā'-khyā vīvidhā-bhāsā tṛtīyā karuṇā'-tmikā
caturthī viśayaṁ prāpya nīrtty-ākhyā tathā punaḥ. Viṣṇu-saṁhitā.*

² *pūrvā-jñāna-kriyā-śaktiḥ sarvākhyā tasya pañcamī. Ibid.*

³ *tasmāt sarva-prayatnena bhākto yogī bhavet sadā. Ibid. Ch. 30.*

kind of knowledge. When deeds are performed without *yoga* wisdom, they can hardly bring about the desired fruition. *Yoga* means the peaceful union of the mind with any particular object¹. When the mind is firmly fixed on the performance of the deed, it is called *karma-yoga*². When the mind is unflinchingly fixed on knowledge, it is called *jñāna-yoga*³. He, however, who clings to the Lord Viṣṇu in both these ways attains ultimately supreme union with the highest Lord. Both the *jñāna-yoga* and the *karma-yoga*, as the moral discipline of *yama* and *niyama* on the one hand and *vairāgya* (disinclination) and *saṃādhi* on the other, are ultimately supported in Brahman. It may be remembered that in the *Gītā*, *karma-yoga* means the performance of the scriptural caste-duties without any desire for their fruits. Here, however, the *karma-yoga* means *yama* and *niyama*, involving *vrata*, fasting (*upavāsa*) and gifts (*dāna*), and probably also some of the virtues of diverse kinds of self-control. The term *vairāgya* means the wisdom by which the senses are made to desist from their respective objects; and the term *saṃādhi* means the wisdom by which the mind stays unflinchingly in the Supreme Lord. When the senses are through *vairāgya* restrained from their respective objects, the mind has to be fixed firmly on the Supreme Lord, and this is called *yoga*. Through continual practice, as the *vairāgya* grows firm, the *vāsanās*, or the root-instincts and desires, gradually fall off. It is advised that the *yogin* should not make any violent attempt at self-control, but should proceed slowly and gently, so that he may, through a long course of time, be able to bring his mind under complete control. He should take proper hygienic care of himself as regards food and other necessities for keeping the body sound and should choose a lonely place, free from all kinds of distractions, for his *yoga* practice. He should not on any account indulge in any kind of practice which may be painful to his body. He should further continue to think that he is dependent on God and that birth, existence and destruction are things which do not belong to him. In this way the pure *bhakti* will rise in his mind,

¹ *yat karoti saṃādhānam cittasya viṣaye kvacit
anukūlam a-saṃkṣobham saṃyoga itī kīrtiyate.*
Parama-saṃhitā, Ch. 10 (MS.).

² *yadi karmāṇi badhnanti cittam askhalitaṃ naram
karma-yogo bhavaty eṣaḥ sarva-pāpa-praṇāśanaḥ.* *Ibid.*

³ *yadi tu jñāna evārthe cittam badhnāti nirvyathāḥ
jñāna-yogaḥ sa vijñeyāḥ sarva-siddhi-karaḥ śubhaḥ.* *Ibid.*

through which he will gradually be able to extract the root of attachment. He should also train himself to think of the evils of alluring experiences which have not yet been enjoyed, and he should thus desist from attaching himself to such experiences.

As regards the preference of *karma-yoga* to *jñāna-yoga* and *vice versa*, the view maintained here is that there can be no rule as regards the preference. There are some who are temperamentally fitted for *karma-yoga* and others for *jñāna-yoga*. Those who are of a special calibre should unite both courses, *karma-yoga* and *jñāna-yoga*.

Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā.

In the *Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā* Ahirbudhnya says that after undergoing a long course of penance he received from Saṃkarṣaṇa true knowledge and that this true knowledge was the science of Sudarśana, which is the support of all things in the world¹. The ultimate reality is the beginningless, endless and eternal reality, which is devoid of all names and forms, beyond all speech and mind, the omnipotent whole which is absolutely changeless. From this eternal and unchangeable reality there springs a spontaneous idea or desire (*saṃkalpa*). This Idea is not limited by time, space or substance. Brahman is of the nature of intuition, of pure and infinite bliss (*niḥśīma-sukhānubhava-lakṣaṇa*), and He resides everywhere and in all beings. He is like the waveless sea. He has none of the worldly qualities which we find in mundane things. He is absolutely self-realized and complete in Himself, and cannot be defined by any expressions such as "this" or "such." He is devoid of all that is evil or bad and the abode of all that is blissful and good. The Brahman is known by many names, such as "*paramātmān*," "*ātman*," "*bhagavān*," "*vāsudeva*," "*avyakta*," "*prakṛti*," "*pradhāna*," etc. When by true knowledge the virtues and sins accumulated during many lives are destroyed, when the root-instincts or tendencies called *ṛāsanā* are torn asunder and the three *guṇas* and their products cease to bind a person, he directly realizes the nature of Brahman or the absolute reality, which can neither be described

¹ *sudarśana-svarūpaṃ tat procyamānaṃ mayā śṛṇu
śrute yatrā khilādhāre saṃśayās te na santi vai.*

Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā, III. 2. 5.

nor defined by language as “this” or as “such.” The Brahman intuitively perceives all things and is the soul of all, and therefore, the past, present and the future have all vanished away from Him. Brahman does not exist therefore in time, as He is beyond time. Similarly He is beyond all primary and secondary qualities, and yet he possesses the six qualities. Of the qualities knowledge is regarded as the first and the foremost. It is spiritual and self-illuminating; it enters into all things and reflects them, and is eternal. The essence of Brahman is pure consciousness, and yet He is regarded as possessing knowledge as a quality¹. The power (*śakti*) of Brahman is regarded as that by which He has originated the world². The spontaneous agency (*karṭṛtva*) of God is called His majesty (*aiśvarya*). His strength (*bala*) is that by virtue of which He is never fatigued in His untiring exertion. His energy (*vīrya*) is that by virtue of which, being the material cause of the world, He yet remains unchanged in Himself. His self-sufficiency (*tejas*) is that by virtue of which He creates the world by His own unaided efforts. These five qualities are, however, all regarded as qualities of knowledge, and knowledge alone is regarded as the essence of God. When such a Brahman, which is of the nature of knowledge and is endowed with all qualities, resolves Himself into the idea of splitting Himself into the many, it is called Sudarśana.

The powers of all things are in themselves of an unspeakable nature and cannot exist separately (*a-prthak-sthita*) from the substances in which they inhere. They are the potential or subtle states of the substance itself, which are not perceived separately in themselves and cannot be defined as “this” or “not this” in any way, but can only be known from their effects³. So God has in Him the power (*śakti*) which exists as undifferentiated from Him, as the moonbeam from the moon. It is spontaneous, and the universe is but a manifestation of this power. It is called bliss (*ānanda*), be-

¹ *ajaḍaṃ svā-tma-saṃbodhi nityaṃ sarvā-vagāhanam
jñānam nāma guṇaṃ prāhuḥ prathamam guṇa-cintakāḥ
svarūpaṃ brahmaṇas tac ca guṇaś ca parigīyate.*

Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā, III. 2. 53.

² *jagat-prakṛti-bhāvo yaḥ sā śaktiḥ parikīrtitā. Ibid. 2. 57.*

³ *śaktayaḥ sarva-bhāvānām acintyā a-prthak-sthitāḥ
svarūpe naiva dṛśyante dṛśyante kāryatas tu tāḥ
sūkṣmāvasthā hi sā teṣāṃ sarva-bhāvā-nugāmīnī
īdantayā vidhātum sā na niṣeddhum ca śakyate. Ibid. 2, 3.*

cause it does not depend on anything (*nirapekṣatayānanda*); it is eternal (*nitya*), because it is not limited in time; it is complete (*pūrṇa*), because it is not limited by any form; it manifests itself as the world and is therefore called *Lakṣmī*¹. It contracts itself into the form of the world and is therefore called *Kuṇḍalinī*; and it is called *Viṣṇu-śakti* because it is the supreme power of God. The power is in reality different from Brahman; but yet it appears as one therewith. With this power He is always engaged in an eternal act of creation, untired, unfatigued, and unaided by any other agent (*satataṃ kurvato jagat*)². The power of God manifests itself in two ways, as static entities such as *avyakta*, *kāla* and *puruṣa* and as activity. *Śakti*, or power of God as activity (*kriyā*), is spontaneous and of the nature of will and thought resulting in action³. This is also called *saṃkalpa*, or the Idea, which is irresistible in its movement whereby it produces all material objects and spiritual entities, such as *avyakta*, *kāla* and *puruṣa*⁴. It is this power, which is otherwise designated as *lakṣmī* or *viṣṇu-śakti*, that impels the *avyakta* into the course of evolution, and the *puruṣa* to confront the products of *prakṛti* and run through the experiences. When it withdraws these functions from these entities, there is *pralaya* or dissolution. It is by the force of this power that at the time of creation the *prakṛti* as the composite of the three *guṇas* is urged into creative evolution. The association of the *puruṣa* with the *prakṛti* also is brought about by the same power. This Idea is vibratory by nature and assumes diverse forms, and thus by its various transformations produces various categories⁵.

In the original state all the manifold world of creation was asleep, as it were, in an equilibrium in which all the qualities of God were completely suspended, like the sea when there are no waves ruffling its breast. This power, which exists in an absolutely static or suspended state, is pure vacuity or nothingness (*śūnyatva-rūpiṇī*); for it has no manifestation of any kind. It is self-dependent

¹ *jagattayā lakṣyamāṇā sā lakṣmīr iti gīyate. Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā*, III. 9.

² *Ibid.* II. 59.

³ *svātantrya-mūla icchā-tmā prekṣā-rūpaḥ kriyā-phalaḥ.*

Ibid. III. 30.

⁴ *unmeṣo yaḥ saṃkalpaḥ sarvatrāvyāhataḥ kṛtau avyakta-kāla-puṃ-rūpāṃ cetanācetanātmikām. Ibid.* III. 30, 31.

⁵ *so'yaṃ sudarśanaṃ nāma saṃkalpaḥ spandanā-tmakāḥ vibhajya bahudhā rūpaṃ bhāve bhāve'vatiṣṭhate. Ibid.* III. 39.

and no reason can be assigned as to why it suddenly changes itself from a potential to an actual state¹. It is one and exists in identity with the Brahman, or the ultimate reality. It is this power which creates as its own transformation all categories pure and impure and all material forms as emanations from out of itself. It manifests itself as the *kriyā*, the *vīrya*, *tejas* and the *bala* of God, mere forms of its own expression and in all forms of duality as subject and object, as matter and consciousness, pure and impure, the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the experiencer and the experienced, and so on. When it moves in the progressive order, there is the evolutionary creation; and, when it moves in the inverse order, there is involution.

From a pair of two different functions of this power the different forms of pure creation come into being. Thus from knowledge (*jñāna*) and the capacity for unceasing work of never-ending creation (*bala*) we have the spiritual form of Saṃkarṣaṇa. From the function of spontaneous agency (*aiśvarya*) and the unaffectedness in spite of change (*vīrya*) is generated the spiritual form of Pradyumna; and from the power that transforms itself into the world-forms (*śakti*) and the non-dependence on accessories (*tejas*) is produced the form as Aniruddha. These three spiritual forms are called *vyūha* (conglomeration) because each of them is the resultant of the conglomeration of a pair of *guṇas*. Though the two *guṇas* predominate in each *vyūha*, yet each *vyūha* possesses the six qualities (*ṣaḍ-guṇa*) of the Lord; for these are all but manifestations of Viṣṇu². Each of these forms existed for 1600 years before the next form emanated from it, and at the time of the involution also it took 1600 years for each lower form to pass into the higher form. Schrader, alluding to the *Mahā-Sanatkumāra-Saṃhitā*, says: "Vāsudeva creates from His mind the white goddess Śānti and together with her Saṃkarṣaṇa or Śiva; then from the left side of the latter is born the red goddess Śrī, whose son is Pradyumna or Brahman; the latter, again, creates the yellow Sarasvatī and to-

¹ *tasya staimitya-rūpā yā śaktiḥ śūnyatva-rūpiṇī
svātantryād eva kasmāc cit kvacit sonmeṣam ṛcchati
ātma-bhūtā hi yā śaktiḥ parasya brahmaṇo hareḥ.*

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, v. 3 and 4.

² *vyāpti-mātraṃ guṇo' nmeṣo mūrṭti-kāra iti tridhā
cātur-ātmya-sṭhitiḥ viṣṇor guṇa-vyatikaro-dbhavā. Ibid. v. 21.*

gether with her Aniruddha or Puruṣottama, whose Śakti becomes the black Rati, who is the threefold *Māyā-kośa*.”¹ Schrader further draws attention to the fact that these couples are all outside the *brahmāṇḍa* and are therefore different in nature from the mundane gods, such as Śiva, etc. The *vyūhas* are regarded as fulfilling three different functions, (1) the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world; (2) the protection of the mundane beings; and (3) lending assistance to those devotees who seek to attain the ultimate emancipation. Saṃkarṣaṇa exists as the deity superintending all the individual souls and separates them from the *prakṛti*². The second spiritual form superintends the minds (*manas*) of all beings and gives specific instruction regarding all kinds of religious performances. He is also responsible for the creation of all human beings and from among them such beings as have from the beginning dedicated their all to God and become absolutely attached to Him³. As Aniruddha, he protects the world and leads men to the ultimate attainment of wisdom. He is also responsible for the creation of the world, which is an admixture of good and evil (*miśra-varga-sṛṣṭim ca karoti*)⁴. These three forms are in reality but one with Vāsudeva. These *avatāras* are thus the pure *avatāras* of Viṣṇu.

In addition to these there are two other forms of manifestation, called *āveśāvatāra* and *sākṣād-avatāra*. The former is of two kinds, *svarūpāveśa* (as in the case of *avatāras* like Paraśurāma, Rāma, etc.) and *śakty-āveśa* (as the influx of certain special functions or powers of God, e.g. in the case of Brahmā or Śiva, who are on special occasions endowed with certain special powers of God). These secondary *āveśāvatāras* are by the will of God produced in the form of human beings, as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, in the form of animals, as the Boar, the Fish and the Man-lion, or even as a tree (the crooked mango tree in the Daṇḍaka forest). These forms are not the original transcendental forms of God, but manifest divine functions

¹ Introduction to the *Pañcarātra* by Schrader, p. 36.

² *so'yaṃ samasta-jīvānām adhiṣṭhātrtayā sthitaḥ
saṃkarṣaṇas tu deveśo jagat sṛṣṭi-manās tataḥ
jīva-tattvam adhiṣṭhāya prakṛtes tu vivicīya tat.*

Quoted from *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā* from Varavara's commentary on Lokācārya's *Tattva-traya*, p. 125.

³ See quotations from *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā* in *Tattva-traya*, pp. 126, 127.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 128.

through the will of God¹. The primary forms (*sākṣād-avatāra*) of incarnation are derived directly from the part of the Lord just as a lamp is lighted from another, and they are thus of a transcendent and non-mundane nature. Those who seek to attain liberation should worship these transcendent forms, but not the others². The *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā* quoted in the *Tattva-traya* considers Brahman, Śiva, Buddha, Vyāsa, Arjuna, Pāvaka and Kuvera as inspired persons or *āveśāvatāras* who should not be worshipped by those who seek liberation. Another *saṃhitā* quoted there includes Rāma, Ātreya and Kapila in the list.

Again, from each *vyūha* three subsidiary *vyūhas* are said to appear. Thus from Vāsudeva we have, Keśava, Nārāyaṇa, and Mādhava; from Saṃkarṣaṇa arise Govinda, Viṣṇu and Madhusūdana; from Pradyumna arise Trivikrama, Vāmana and Śrīdhara, and from Aniruddha arise Hṛṣīkeśa, Padmanābha and Dāmodara. These are regarded as the deities superintending each month, representing the twelve suns in each of the *rāśis*. These gods are conceived for purposes of meditation. In addition to these, thirty-nine *vibhava* (manifesting) *avatāras* (incarnations) also are counted in the *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā*³. The objects for which these incarnations are made are described by Varavara as, firstly, for giving com-

¹ *mad-icchayā hi gauṇatvaṃ manuṣyatvaṃ ive'cchayā. . . a-prākṛta-svā-sādhārāṇa-vigraheṇa saha nāgatam. . . gauṇasya manuṣyatvā-dīvad aprākṛta-dīvyasamsthānam itara-jāṭīyaṃ kṛtvā avatāra-rūpatvā-bhāvāt sva-rūpeṇa nā' gatam iti siddham. Tattva-traya, p. 130.*

² *prādurbhāvās tu mukhyā ye mad-aṃśatvād viśeṣataḥ ajahat-svabhāvā vibhavā divyā-prākṛta-vigrahāḥ dipād dipā ivotpannā jagato rakṣaṇāya te arcyā eva hi seneśa saṃsṛty-uttaraṇāya te mukhyā upāśyāḥ seneśa anarcyān itarān viduḥ.*

Ibid. p. 131.

³ *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā, p. 46.* According to the *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā* all the *avatāras* have come straight from Aniruddha or through other *avatāras*. Thus Brahman comes from Aniruddha and from him Maheśvara; Hayaśirṣa comes from Matsya, a manifestation of Kṛṣṇa. According to the *Padma-tantra*, Matsya, Kūrma and Varāha come from Vāsudeva, Nṛsiṃha, Vāmana, Śrīrāma, and Paraśurāma from Saṃkarṣaṇa, Balarāma from Pradyumna and Kṛṣṇa and Kalki from Aniruddha (*Padma-tantra*, 1. 2. 31, etc.). But according to the *Lakṣmī-tantra* (11. 55) all the *vibhavas* come from Aniruddha. There is another kind of *avatāra*, called *arcāvatāra*. The image of Kṛṣṇa, Nṛsiṃha, etc., when duly consecrated according to the *Vaiṣṇava* rites, becomes possessed with the power of Viṣṇu and attains powers and influences which can be experienced by the devotee (*Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā*, quoted in *Tattva-traya*). In the aspect in which Aniruddha controls all beings as their inner controller, he is regarded as the *antaryāmy-avatāra*. There are thus four kinds of *avatāras*, *vibhava*, *āveśa*, *arcā* and *antaryāmin*. The thirty-nine *vibhava avatāras* are Padmanābha, Dhruva, Ananta,

panionship in mundane forms to those saints who cannot live without it, and this is the interpretation of the word *paritrāṇa* (protection) in the *Gītā*; secondly, for destroying those who are opposed to the saints; thirdly, for establishing the Vedic religion, the essence of which is devotion to God¹.

In the form as *antaryāmin*, or the inner controller, the Lord resides in us as the inner controller of the self, and it is through His impulsion that we commit evil deeds and go to Hell or perform good deeds and go to Heaven. Thus we cannot in any way escape

Śaktyātman, Madhusūdana, Vidyāhideva, Kapila, Viśvarūpa, Vihaṅgama, Kroḍātman, Vaḍavāvakra, Dharma, Vāgiśvara, Ekārṇavaśāyin, Kamaṭheśvara, Varāha, Narasiṃha, Piyūṣaharaṇa, Śrīpati, Kāntātman, Rāhuji, Kālanemighna, Pārijāhara, Lokanātha, Śāntātman, Dattātreyā, Nyagrodhaśāyin, Ekaśṛṅgatanu, Vāmanadeva, Trivikrama, Nara, Nārāyaṇa, Hari, Kṛṣṇa, Paraśurāma, Rāma, Vedavid, Kalkin, Pātālaśayana. They are of the nature of *tejas* and are objects of worship and meditation in their specific forms, as described in the *Sātvata-saṃhitā* (xii), or in the *Ahīrbudhya-saṃhitā* (lxvi). In the Nārāyaṇīya section of the *Mahābhārata* Vihaṅgama or Haṃsa, Kamaṭheśvara or Kūrma, Ekaśṛṅgatanu or Matsya, Varāha, Nṛsiṃha, Vāmana, Paraśurāma, Rāma, Vedavid and Kalkin are mentioned as the ten *avatāras*. The *avatāra* Kroḍātman, Lokanātha and Kāntātman are sometimes spoken of as Yajña Varāha, Manu Vaivasvata and Kāma respectively. The latter is sometimes spoken of probably as Dhanvantari (see Schrader's *Pañcarātra*, p. 45). The twenty-three *avatāras* spoken of in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (1. 3) are all included in the above list. It is, however, doubtful whether Vāgiśvara is the same as Hayaśīrṣa, and Śāntātman as Sanaka or Nārada, as Schrader says. The *vibhava-avatāras* mentioned in Rūpa's *Laghu-bhāgavatāmṛta* are mostly included in the above list, though some names appear in slightly different form. Following the *Brahma-saṃhitā*, Rūpa, however, regards Kṛṣṇa as the real form (*svayam-rūpa*) of God. According to him, being one with God, He may have His manifestations in diverse forms. This is called *avatāra* as *ekātma-rūpa*. This *ekātma-rūpa-avatāra* may again be of two kinds, *sva-vilāsa* and *svā-ṁśa*. When the *avatāra* is of the same nature as the Lord in powers and other qualities, He is called a *svāṁśa-avatāra*. Thus, Vāsudeva is called a *sva-vilāsa-avatāra*. But when the *avatāra* has inferior powers, He is called a *svā-ṁśa-avatāra*. Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, Matsya, Kūrma, etc., are thus called *svā-ṁśa-avatāra*. When God, however, infuses one only with parts of His qualities, he is called an *āveśa-avatāra*. Nārada, Sanaka, etc., are called *āveśa-avatāras*. The manifestation of the Lord in the above forms for the good of the world is called *avatāra*.

*pūrho-cta-viśva-kāryā-rthām a-pūrvā iva cet svayam
dvārā-ntareṇa vā' viḥ-syur avatārās tadā smyātā*

Laghu-bhāgavatāmṛta, p. 22.

The *aṁśavatāra* is sometimes called *puruṣavatāra*, while the manifestation of special qualities as in Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, etc., is called *guṇavatāras*. The *vibhāvavatāras* are generally regarded as *līlavatāras*; vide also *Sātvata-saṃhitā*, Ch. ix (77-84) and Ch. xii.

¹ *Tattva-traya*, p. 138. The word *sādhū* is here defined as “*nirmatsarāḥ mat-samāśrayaṇe pravṛttāḥ man-nāma-karma-svarūpāṇāṃ vān-manasā-gocaratayā mad-darśanena vinā ātma-dhāraṇa-poṣanādikam alabhamānāḥ kṣaṇa-mātra-kālām kalpa-sahasraṃ manvānāḥ praśīthīla-sarva-gātrā bhaveyuh.*”

from this inner controller. In another of His forms He stays within our heart as the object of our meditation¹. Again, when certain images are made of earth, stone, or metals, and they are properly installed with proper ceremonials, these are inspired with the presence of God and with His special powers. These are called *arcāvatāras*, or image-incarnations, for purposes of worship by which all desirable ends may be achieved. There are thus five kinds of existence for the Lord: firstly as his absolute state (*para*), secondly as *vyūha*, thirdly as *vibhavāvatāra* (primary and secondary), fourthly as *antaryāmin*, and fifthly as *arcāvatāra*².

In the *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā* we hear also that by the power of *sudarśana*, or the divine Idea (by the activity of which the *vyūha* forms are produced), a divine location is produced which is of the nature of knowledge and bliss radiant with its (*sudarśana*'s) glow. All the experiences that are enjoyed here are blissful in their nature, and the denizens of this transcendent spiritual world who experience them are also blissful in their nature, and their bodies are constituted of knowledge and bliss³. The denizens of this world are souls emancipated in the last cycle. They remain attached, however, to the form of the deity to which they were attached in the mundane life⁴.

The Lord in the highest form is always associated with His power (*Śakti*) Lakṣmī or Śrī⁵. In the *Tattva-traya* and its commentary by Varavara we hear of three consort deities, Lakṣmī, Bhūmī and Nīlā. Schrader points out that these deities are identified (in the *Vihagendra-saṃhitā* and in the *Sītā-upaniṣad*) with will (*icchā*), action (*Kriyā*), and the direct manifesting power (*sākṣāt-śakti*). In the *Sītā-upaniṣad*, to which Schrader refers, *Sītā* is described as the Mahālakṣmī which exists in the three forms, *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*. *Sītā* is there regarded as the power which exists different from, and as one with, the supreme Lord, constituting within herself all the conscious and unconscious entities of the universe. It exists also in three forms as Lakṣmī, Bhūmī and

¹ *Tattva-traya*, 139, 140.

² See quotation from *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā* quoted in *Tattva-traya*, p. 122.

³ *suddhā pūrvoditā sṛṣṭir yā sā vyūhā-dī-bhedinī*
sudarśanā-khyāt saṃkalpāt tasya eva prabho-jjvalā.
jñānānandamayī styanā deśa-bhāvaṃ vrajaty' uta
sa deśaḥ paramaṃ vyoma nirmalaṃ puruṣāt param, etc.

Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā, vi. 21-22.

⁴ *Ibid.* vi. 29.

⁵ *Ibid.* vi. 25.

Nilā, as benediction, power, and as the Sun, the Moon and Fire. The third form is responsible for the development of all kinds of vegetation and all temporal determinations¹.

In the sixth chapter of the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā* the intermediate creation is described. It is said there that the power of God as the supreme ego is at once one and different from Him. The Lord cannot exist without His power nor can the power exist without Him. These two are regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. The manifestations that are revealed as the *vyūhas* and the *vibhavas* are regarded as pure, for through their meditations the *yogins* attain their desired end². From the *vyūha* and the *vibhava* proceed the impure creation (*śuddhetarā-sṛṣṭi*)². Power is of two kinds, i.e. power as activity, and power as determinants of being or existence (*bhūti-śakti*). This *bhūti-śakti* may be regarded as a moving Idea (*saṃkalpamayī mūrti*). The process of activity inherent in it may be regarded as manifesting itself in the form of ideas or concepts actualizing themselves as modes of reality. The impure creation is of a threefold nature as *puruṣa*, *guṇa* and *kāla* (time). *Puruṣa* is regarded as a unity or colony of pairs of males and females of the four castes, and these four pairs emanate from the mouth, breast, thighs and legs of Pradyumna. From the forehead, eyebrows, and ears of Pradyumna also emanate the subtle causal state of time and the *guṇas* (*sūkṣma-kāla-guṇā-vasthā*). After the emanation of these entities the work of their growth and development was left to Aniruddha, who by the fervour of his Yoga evolved the original element of time in its twofold form as *kāla* and *niyati*. He also evolved the original energy as *guṇa* into the three forms of *sattva*,

¹ Certain peculiar interpretations of the *icchā-śakti*, *kriyā-śakti* and *sākṣāt-śakti* are to be found in the *Sitā-upaniṣad*. The *Sātvata-saṃhitā* (IX. 85) describes twelve other energies such as

*lakṣmīḥ, puṣṭir, dayā nidrā, kṣamā, kāntiḥ sarasvatī,
dhṛtīr maitrī ratiḥ tuṣṭir matir dvādaśānāṃ smṛtā.*

See also Schrader's Introduction to Pañcarātra, p. 55. The theory of these energies is associated with the *avatāra* theory.

² Schrader, on the evidence of *Padma-tantra*, says that god as *para* or ultimate is sometimes identified with and sometimes distinguished from the *vyūha* Vāsudeva. The *para* Vāsudeva becomes *vyūha* Vāsudeva with His one half and remains as Nārāyaṇa, the creator of the primeval water (*māyā*). Pañcarātra, p. 53.

³ *bhūtiḥ śuddhetarā viṣṇoḥ puruṣo dvi-caturmayah
sa manūnām samāhāro brahma-kṣattrādi-bhedinām.*

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, VI. 8-9.

rajas and *tamas* in succession, i.e. the original primeval energy as *guṇa* (called sometimes *prakṛti* in cognate literature) was first evolved into *sattva guṇa*; from it evolved the *rajas*, and from the *rajas* evolved the *tamas*. This original undeveloped *guṇa* produced from Pradyumna (which, in other words, may be termed *prakṛti*) receives impregnation from the fervour of Aniruddha, and thereby evolves itself first into *sattva*, then into *rajas*, and then into *tamas*. This doctrine can therefore be regarded as *sat-kārya-vāda* only in a limited sense; for without this further impregnation from the fervour of Aniruddha, it could not by itself have produced the different *guṇas* of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*¹.

Aniruddha, however, was directed by Pradyumna not only to develop the unconscious power (*śakti*) but also the *puruṣa* which exists as it were inside that power, which shows itself as *niyati* (destiny) and *kāla* (time). From the unconscious power as destiny and time evolves first the *sattva* and from it the *rajas* and from the *rajas* the *tamas*. According to the *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā*, Aniruddha created Brahmā and Brahmā created all the men and women of the four castes².

Buddhi evolves from *tamas* and from that *ahaṃkāra* and from that evolve the five *tan-mātras*, and also the eleven senses. From the five *tan-mātras* the five gross elements are produced, and from these, all things, which are the modifications of the gross elements.

The word *puruṣa* is used here in a special sense, and not in the ordinary Sāṃkhya sense. *Puruṣa* here signifies a colony of selves, like cells in a honeycomb³. These selves are associated with the beginningless *vāsanās* or root-impressions. They are but the special

¹ *antaḥstha-puruṣaṃ śaktiṃ tām ādāya sva-mūrti-gaṇ
samvardhayati yogena hy anirudhaḥ sva-tejasā.*

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, vi. 14.

² The *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā* criticizes in this connection the Vedic people, who did not believe in the monotheistic God but depended on the Vedic sacrificial rituals and work for the attainment of Heaven and ultimately fell down to the course of mundane life (*saṃsāra*):

*trayī-mārgeṣu niṣṭātāḥ phala-vāde ramanti te
devādīn eva marvānā na ca mām menire param
tamaḥ-prāyās tv ime kecīn mama nindāṃ prakurvate
saṃlāpoṃ kurvate vyagraṃ veda-vādeṣu niṣṭhitāḥ
mām na jānanti mohena mayi bhakti-parāṇmukhāḥ
svargā-diṣu ramanty ete avasāne patanti te.*

Tattva-traya, p. 128.

sarvātmanāṃ samaṣṭir yā kośo madhu-kṛtūm iva.

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, vi. 33.

manifestations (*bhūti-bhedāḥ*) of God and are in themselves omniscient; but they are permeated by *avidyā* (ignorance) and the afflictions which are involved in its very nature, through the power of God acting in consonance with His thought-movement¹. These selves thus rendered impure and finite are called *jīvas*, and it is they who thus suffer bondage and strive for salvation, which they afterwards attain. The *puruṣa*, being made up of these selves (*jīvas*), which are impure, is also partly impure, and is therefore regarded as both pure and impure (*suddhy-aśuddhimaya*, VI. 34). This *puruṣa* contains within it the germs of all human beings, which are called *manus*. They are in themselves untouched by afflictions (*kleśa*) and the root-impression (*āśaya*), and are omniscient and impregnated through and through by God. Their association with *avidyā* through the will of God is therefore external. The germ of the caste-distinction and distinction as male and female is regarded as primordial and transcendent (compare *puruṣa-sūkta*), and the distinction is said to exist even in these *manus* which are said to be divided in four pairs. The *avidyā* imitates the spiritual movement of thought, and through it the individual selves, though pure in themselves, are besmeared with the impurities of root-impressions. These selves remain in the stage of conglomeration or association through the desire of Viṣṇu, the Lord, and this stage is called *puruṣa* (*puruṣa-pada*)². They are made to appear and disappear from the nature of God. Being a manifestation of His own nature, they are uncreated, eternally existing, entities which are the parts of the very existence (*bhūty-aśaḥ*) of God.

Through the impulse or motivation of the thought-activity of God, an energy (*śakti*) is generated from Aniruddha. Moved again by the desire of God, the aforesaid *manus* descend into this energy and remain there as a developing foetus (*tiṣṭhanti kalālībhūtāḥ*, VI. 45). The energy of Viṣṇu is of a twofold nature, as dynamic activity (*kriyākhyā*) and as determining being (*bhūti*), the latter being the result of the former³. This dynamic activity is different

¹ *ātmano bhūti-bhedās te sarva-jñāḥ sarvato-mukhāḥ
bhagavac-chakti-mayaivam manda-tīvrāṇi-bhāvayā
tat-tat-sudarśano-nmeṣa-nimeṣa-nukṛtā-tmanā
sarvato-vidyayā viddhāḥ kleśamayā vaśīkṛtāḥ.*

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, VI. 35, 36.

² *viṣṇoḥ saṃkalpa-rūpeṇa sthītvāsmiṇ pauraṣe pade.* *Ibid.* VI. 41.

³ *kriyākhyo yo'yaṃ unmeṣaḥ sa bhūti-parivartakaḥ.* *Ibid.* VI. 29.

from God, the possessor of this energy. It is designated variously *Lakṣmī* and desire (*saṃkalpa*) or free will (*svātantrya-mūla icchātmā*). This will operates as an intellectual visualization (*prekṣā-rūpaḥ kriyā-phalaḥ*), which again produces the other manifestations of God as *avyakta*, *kāla* and *puruṣa*. At the time of each creation He associates the *avyakta* with the evolutionary tendencies, the *kāla* with its operative movement (*kalana*) and the *puruṣa* with all kinds of experiences. At the time of dissolution these powers are withdrawn.

In the foetus-like condition of the *manus* in the energy (*śakti*) of God there exist the entities of *guṇa* and *kāla*. Through the operation of the supreme energy or will of God (*Viṣṇu-saṃkalpa-coditāḥ*) there springs up from time-energy (*kāla-śakti*) the subtle Destiny (*niyati*), which represents the universal ordering element (*sarva-niyāmakāḥ*). The time and *guṇa* exist in the womb of the *śakti*. The conception of this *śakti* is thus different from that of *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala in that the *guṇas* are the only root-elements, and time is conceived as somehow included in the operation of the *guṇas*. As the *niyati* is produced from the time-energy, the *manus* descend into this category. Later on there springs from *niyati*, time (*kāla*) through the will of God, and then the *manus* descend again into this category¹. It has already been said that the *kāla* energy and *guṇa* are co-existing elements in the primordial *śakti* of God. Now this *guṇa*-potential manifests itself in a course of gradual emergence through time. As the *sattva-guṇa* first manifests itself through time, the *manus* descend into that category and later on, with the emergence of *rajas* from *sattva* and of *tamas* from *rajas*, they descend into the *rajas* and the *tamas*. The emergence of *rajas* from *sattva* and of *tamas* from *rajas* is due to the operation of the will-activity of God (*viṣṇu-saṃkalpa-coditāt*). Though the will-dynamic of Viṣṇu is both immanent and transcendent throughout the process of succeeding emergents, yet Viṣṇu is regarded as specially presiding over *sattva*, Brahmā over *rajas*, and Rudra over *tamas*. *Tamas* is regarded as heavy (*guru*), agglutinative (*viṣṭam-*

¹ In describing the process of dissolution it is said that at one stage the universe exists only as time (*kāla*). The energy manifested in time (*kāla-gata-śaktiḥ*) is called *kāla*, and it is this energy that moves all things or behaves as the transformer of all things (*aśeṣa-prakālīnī*). *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā*, iv. 48. Time is described also as the agent that breaks up all things, just as the violence of a river breaks its banks: *Kalayaty akhilaṃ kālyāṇaṃ nadī-kūlaṃ yathā rayaḥ*. *Ibid.* vi. 51.

bhāna), delusive (*mohana*) and statical (*apravṛttimat*); *rajas* is always moving and sorrowful; *sattva* is described as light, transparent and devoid of impurities or defects and pleasurable¹. With the development of the three *guṇas* through the will of God, a part of these *guṇas* attains sameness of character, and this part is the unity of the three *guṇas* (*traiguṇya*), the equilibrium of *guṇas* (*guṇa-sāmya*), ignorance (*avidyā*), nature (*svabhāva*), cause (*yoni*), the unchangeable (*akṣara*), the causeless (*ayoni*), and the cause as *guṇa* (*guṇa-yoni*)².

This participation in equal proportions (*anyūnānatirikta*) of the *guṇas* in a state of equilibrium (*guṇa-sāmya*), which is essentially of the nature of *tamas* (*tamomaya*), is called the root (*mūla*) and the *prakṛti* by the Sāṃkhyaists, and the *manus* descending into that category by gradual stages are known by the names conglomeration (*samaṣṭi*), *puruṣa*, the cause (*yoni*), and the unchangeable (*kūṭastha*). The category of time, which is the transforming activity of the world (*jagataḥ samprakalanam*), associates and dissociates the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* for the production of the effects. The thought power of God, however, works through the tripartite union of time, *prakṛti* and the *manus*, behaving as the material cause, like a lump of clay, and produces all the categories beginning with *mahat* to the gross elements of earth, water, etc. Like water or clay, the *prakṛti* is the evolutionary or material cause, the *puruṣa* is the unchangeable category that contributes to the causal operation merely by its contiguity³. The category of time is the internal dynamic pervading the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*. The trinity of *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* and *kāla* is the basis for the development of all the succeeding categories. In this

¹ *sattvaṃ tatra laghu svaccham guṇa-rūpam anāmayam. Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā*, vi. 52; *tad etat pracalam duḥkham rajaḥ śaśvat pravṛttimat. Ibid.* vi. 57; *guru viṣṭambhanam śaśvan mohanaṃ cāpravṛttimat. Ibid.* vi. 60.

² *sudarśanamayenai'va saṃkalpenā'tra vai hareḥ
codyamāne'pi sṛṣṭy-arthaṃ pūrṇam guṇa-yugaṃ tadā
amśataḥ sāmyam āyāti viṣṇu-saṃkalpa-coditam. Ibid.* vi. 61-62.

The passage is somewhat obscure, in so far as it is difficult to understand how the *guṇas* become partially (*amśataḥ*) similar. The idea probably is that, when the *guṇas* are moved forward for creative purposes, some parts of these *guṇas* fail to show their distinctive features, and show themselves as similar to one another. In this stage the specific characters of only these evolving *guṇas* are annulled, and they appear as one with *tamas*. The proportion of *sattva* that appears to be similar to *tamas* is also the proportion in which *tamas* becomes similar to *rajas*.

³ *payo-mrd-ādivat tatra prakṛtiḥ pariṇāminī
pumān upariṇāmī san samīdhānena kāraṇam
kālaḥ pacati tattve dve prakṛtiṃ puruṣam ca ha. Ibid.* vii. 5, 6.

trinity *prakṛti* is the evolutionary cause that undergoes the transformation, *puruṣa*, though unmoved in itself, is that which by its very presence gives the occasion for the transformation, and time is the inner dynamic that behaves as the inner synthetic or structural cause. But these causes in themselves are not sufficient to produce the development of the trinity. The trinity is moved to develop on the evolutionary line by the spiritual activity of God. *Puruṣa* is regarded as the *adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa*, *kāla* as the principle of inner activity, and the spiritual activity of God as the transcendent and immanent agent in which the causal trinity finds its fundamental active principle. As the first stage of such a development there emerges the category of *mahat*, which is called by different names, e.g. *vidyā*, *gauḥ*, *yavanī*, *brāhmī*, *vadhū*, *vr̥ddhi*, *matī*, *madhu*, *akhyāti*, *īśvara*, and *prajñā*. According to the prominence of *tamas*, *sattva* and *rajas*, the category of *mahat* is known by three different names, *kāla*, *buddhi* and *prāṇa*, in accordance with the moments in which there are special manifestations of *tamas*, *sattva* and *rajas*¹. Gross time as moments, instants or the like, the intelligizing activity of thought (*buddhi*) and the volitional activity (*prāṇa*) may also be regarded as the tripartite distinction of *mahat*². There seems to be a tacit implication here that the activity implied in both thought and volition is schematized, as it were, through time. The unity of thought and volition is effected through the element of time; for time has been regarded as the *kalana-kāraṇa*, or the structural cause. The *sattva* side of the *mahat* manifests itself as virtue (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), disinclination (*vairāgya*), and all mental powers (*aiśvarya*). The opposite of these is associated with that moment of *mahat* which is associated with the manifestation of *tamas*.

With the evolution of the *mahat* the *manus* descend into it. From the *mahat* and in the *mahat* there spring the senses by which the objects are perceived as existent or non-existent³. Again, from and in the *mahat* there springs the *ahaṃkāra* through the influence

¹ *kālo buddhis tathā prāṇa iti tredhā sa gīyate
tamaḥ-sattva-rajo-bhedāt tat-tad-unmeṣa-saṃjñayā.*

Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā, VII. 9.

² *kālas truṭi-lavādy ātmā buddhir adhyavasāyini
prāṇaḥ prayatanākāra ity' etā mahato bhīdāḥ.* *Ibid.* VII. 11.

³ *bodhanaṃ nāma vaidyaṃ tadindriyaṃ teṣu jāyate
yenārthān adhyavasyeyuḥ sad-asat-pravibhāgināḥ.* *Ibid.* VII. 14.

of the spiritual energy of God¹. This *ahaṃkāra* is also called by the names of *abhimāna*, *prajāpati*, *abhimantā* and *boddhā*. The *ahaṃkāra* is of three kinds, *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi*, in accordance with the predominance of *sattva*, *rajas* or *tamas*. The *ahaṃkāra* manifests itself as will, anger, greed, mind (*manas*), and desire (*trṣṇā*). When the *ahaṃkāra* is produced, the *manus* descend into it. From *ahaṃkāra* there is then produced the organ of thinking (*cintanātmakam indriyam*) of the *manus* called *manas*. It is at this stage that the *manus* first become thinking entities. From the *tamas* side of *ahaṃkāra* as *bhūtādi* there is produced the *śabda-tan-mātra*, from which the *ākāśa* is produced. *Ākāśa* is associated with the quality of *śabda* and gives room for all things. *Ākāśa* is thus to be regarded as unoccupied space, which is supposed to be associated with the quality of sound². With the emergence of *ākāśa* the *manus* descend into that category. From the *vaikārika ahaṃkāra* there spring the organs of hearing and of speech³. The *manus* at this stage become associated with these senses. Then from the *bhūtādi*, by the spiritual desire of God, the touch-potential is produced, and from this is produced the air (*vāyu*). By the spiritual desire of God the sense-organ of touch and the active organ of the hand are produced from the *vaikārika ahaṃkāra*. At this stage the *manus* become associated with these two receptive and active senses. From the *bhūtādi* there is then produced the light-heat potential from which is produced the gross light-heat. Again, from the *vaikārika ahaṃkāra* the visual organ and the active organ of the feet are produced, and the *manus* are associated with them. From the *bhūtādi* the taste-potential is produced, and from it is produced water. Further, from the *vaikārika ahaṃkāra* there is produced the taste-organ and the sex-organ, and the *manus* are associated with them. From the *bhūtādi* there is produced the odour-potential and from it the earth. Also, from the *vaikārika ahaṃkāra* there arises the cognitive sense of smelling and the active sense of secretion. The *manus* at this stage descend into this category through the spiritual creative desire of God⁴.

¹ *vidyayā udare tatrāhaṃkṛtir nāma jāyate. Ahirbudhnyā-saṃhitā*, VII. 15.

² *śabdai'-ka-guṇam ākāśam avakāśapradāyī ca. Ibid.* VII. 22.

³ *tadā vaikārikāt punaḥ śrotṛam vāg iti vijñāna-karme-ndriya-yugam mune. Ibid.* VII. 23-24.

⁴ *Ibid.* VII. 39, 40.

The process of development herein sketched shows that one active sense and one cognitive sense arise together with the development of each category of matter, and with the final development of all the categories of matter there develop all the ten senses (cognitive and conative) in pairs. In the chapter on the gradual dissolution of the categories we see that with the dissolution of each category of matter a pair of senses also is dissolved. The implication of this seems to be that there is at each stage a co-operation of the material categories and the cognitive and conative senses. The selves descend into the different categories as they develop in the progressive order of evolution, and the implication of this probability is that the selves, having been associated from the beginning with the evolution of the categories, may easily associate themselves with the senses and the object of the senses. When all the categories of matter and the ten senses are developed, there are produced the function of imagination, energy of will (*saṃrambha*), and the five *prāṇas* from *manas*, *ahaṃkāra* and *buddhi*; and through their development are produced all the elements that may co-operate together to form the concrete personality¹. The order followed in the process of development in evolution was maintained in an inverse manner at the time of dissolution.

The above-mentioned *manus* produce in their wives many children, who are called *mānavas*. They in their turn produce many other children who are called the new *mānavas*, or the new men, in all the four castes. Those among them who perform their work for a hundred years with true discriminative knowledge enter into the supreme person of Hari. Those, however, who perform their *karmas* with motives of reaping their effects pass through rebirths in consonance with their actions. As has been said before, the *manus* may be regarded as the individuated forms of the original *kūṭastha puruṣa*. All the *jīvas* are thus but parts of Viṣṇu's own self-realizing being (*bhūty-aṃśa*). Now the *prakṛti*, which is also called *vidyā*,

¹ *saṃkalpaś caiva saṃrambhaḥ prāṇāḥ pañcavidhās tathā
manaso'haṃkṛter buddher jāyante pūrvam eva tu
evaṃ saṃpūrṇa-sarvaṅgāḥ prāṇāpānādi-saṃyutāḥ
sarve-ndriya-yutās tatra dehino manavo mune.*

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, VII. 42, 43.

Thus from *bhūtādi*, acting in association with *taijasa ahaṃkāra*, are produced successively the five *tan-mātras* of *śabda*, *spṛśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha*, from each of which in the same order are produced the five *bhūtas* of *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, *tejas*, *ap* and *prthivī*. Again, from the associated work of *taijasa* and *vaikārika ahaṃkāra* there are produced the five cognitive and conative senses.

and which at the time of the creative process showers itself as rain and produces the food-grains, and which at the beginning of the dissolution shows itself as a drying force, begins to manifest itself as showering clouds and produces the food-grains. By consuming the food thus produced by nature men fall from their original state of perfect knowledge (*jñāna-bhramśaṃ prapadyante*). At such a stage the original *manus* produce the scriptures for the guidance of those men who have fallen from their original omniscience. Thence men can only attain their highest goal by following the guidance of the scriptures¹. It thus appears that the power of Viṣṇu as consciousness, bliss and action splits itself into twofold form as the realizing activity and the object, called respectively the *bhāvaka* and the *bhāvya*. The former is the thought-activity of the Lord and the latter is that part of Him which manifests itself as the object of this activity. This leads to the pure and the impure creation. The *kūṭastha puruṣa* of the four *manus* stands intermediate between the pure and the impure creation². There is nothing whatsoever outside the sphere of the *Sudarśana śakti* of the Lord.

On the central question of the relation of God with the *jīvas* the general view of the Pañcarātra, as well as that of the *Ahīrbudhmya*, seems to be that at the time of dissolution they return to God and remain in a potential form in Him, but again separate out at the time of the new creation. At the time of emancipation, however, they enter into God, never to come out of Him. But though they enter into Him, they do not become one with Him, but have an independent existence in Him or enter into the abode of Viṣṇu, the *Vaikunṭha*, which is often regarded as identical with Him. This is probably a state of what is found in many places described as the *sālokya-mukti*. In the fourteenth chapter of the *Ahīrbudhmya-saṃhitā mukti* is described as the attainment of Godhood (*bhagavattā-mayī mukti*, or *vaiṣṇavaṃ tad viśet padam*)³. The means by

¹ *tat tu vaidyaṃ payaḥ prāśya sarve mānava-manavāḥ
jñāna-bhramśaṃ prapadyante sarva-jñāḥ svata eva te.*

Ahīrbudhmya-saṃhitā, VII. 61, 62.

Compare this with the Jewish Christian doctrine of the fall of man, as suggested by Schrader's introduction to the Pañcarātra, p. 78.

² *aṃśayoḥ puruṣo madhye yaḥ sthitaḥ sa catur-yugaḥ
śuddhe-tara-mayaṃ viddhī kūṭasthaṃ taṃ mahā-mune.* *Ibid.* VII. 70.

Compare the view of the Gauḍīya school, which regards the *jīva* as the *taṭasthā śakti* of God, which is between the *antaraṅgā* and the *vahiraṅgā śakti*.

³ *Ibid.* XIV. 3, 4 and 41.

which *mukti* can be attained is said to be a virtuous course of action without seeking any selfish ends¹. The *jīvas* are described as beginningless, infinite, and as pure consciousness and bliss, and as being largely of the nature of God (*bhagavanmaya*); but still they are described as owing their existence to the spiritual energy of God (*bhagavad-bhāvitāḥ sadā*)². This idea is further clarified when it is said that side by side with the *bhāvya* and the *bhāvaka* powers of God we have a third power called the *pum-śakti*, of which we hear in the *Gītā* as *Kṣetrajña-śakti* and in the Gauḍīya school as *taṭastha śakti*³. Apart from the three powers of God as creation, maintenance and destruction, He has a fourth and a fifth power called favour (*anugraha*) and disfavour (*nigraha*). The Lord is, of course, self-realized and has no unachieved end, and has absolutely unimpeachable independence; but still in His playful activity He acts like a king just as He wishes⁴. This idea of *kṛīḍā* is repeated in the Gauḍīya school as *līlā*. All these activities of His are but the different manifestations of His thought-activity called *sudarśana*. In His own playful activity as disfavour He covers up the natural condition of the *jīva*, so that in place of His infinitude, he appears as atomic, in place of His omnipotence, he can do but little, in place of His omniscience, He becomes largely ignorant and possesses but little knowledge. These are the three impurities and the three types of bondage. Through this covering activity the *jīva* is afflicted with ignorance, egoism, attachment, antipathy, etc. Being afflicted by ignorance and the passions, and being goaded by the tendency towards achieving the desirable and avoiding the undesirable, He performs actions leading to beneficial and harmful results. He thus undergoes the cycle of birth and rebirth, and is infested with different kinds of root-instincts (*vāsanā*). It is through the power of this bondage and its requirements that the powers of creation, maintenance and destruction are roused and made active to arrange for rewards and punishments in accordance with the *karmas* of the *jīvas*. As proceeding from the very playful nature of God, which precedes time (*kāla*), and is beginningless, the bondage also is said to be beginningless. The above description of bondage as happening

¹ *sādhanaṃ tasya ca prokto dharmo nirabhisandhikah.*

Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā, XIV, 4.

² *Ibid.* ³ *pum-śaktiḥ kalamāy anyā pumān so'yaṃ udīritah.* *Ibid.* XIV. 10.

⁴ *sarvair an-anuyojyaṃ tat svātantryaṃ divyaṃ īśitūḥ avāpta-viśva-kāmo'pi kṛīḍate rājavad vaśi.* *Ibid.* XIV. 13.

at some time through a process of fall from original nature is by way of analysis of the situation. Through the power of God as *anugraha*, or grace, God stops the course of *karma* for a *jīva* on whose condition of sorrow and suffering He happens to take pity. With the cessation of the good and bad deeds and their beneficent and harmful results through the grace of God the *jīva* looks forward to emancipation and is moved by a feeling of disinclination and begins to have discriminative knowledge. He then turns to scriptures and to teachers, follows the course of action dictated by Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and attains the Vedāntic knowledge, finally to enter the ultimate abode of Viṣṇu.

Lakṣmī is regarded as the ultimate eternal power of Viṣṇu, and she is also called by the names Gaurī, Sarasvatī and Dhenu. It is this supreme power that manifests itself as Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Thus, these separate powers are observable only when they manifest themselves, but even when they do not manifest themselves they exist in God as His great supreme power Lakṣmī. It is this Lakṣmī that is called Brahmā, Viṣṇu, or Śiva. The *vyakti*, *avyakti*, *puruṣa* and *kāla* or *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* are all represented in the Lakṣmī. Lakṣmī is the ultimate supreme power into which all the others resolve themselves. As distinct from the other manifested powers it is often called the fifth power. The emancipated person enters into this Lakṣmī, which is regarded as the highest abode of Viṣṇu (*paraṃ dhāma* or *paramaṃ padam*), or the highest Brahman. This power (*śakti*) is also regarded as having an inner feeling of bliss; and yet it is of the nature of bliss, and is designated as the *bhāva* form of Viṣṇu and also as the *ujjvala* (shining). This *śakti* is also regarded as discharging the five functions (*pañca-kṛtya-karī*) of creation, maintenance, destruction, grace and disfavour mentioned above. Brahman, as associated with this *śakti*, is called the highest Viṣṇu as distinguished from the lower Viṣṇu, the god of maintenance. This *śakti* is always in a state of internal agitation though it may not be observed as such from outward appearance. This internal agitation and movement are so subtle that they may appear to be in a state of absolute calmness like that of the ocean¹. Thus *śakti* is also called the *māyā* of Viṣṇu².

¹ *sadā pratāyamānā'pi sūkṣmair bhāvairalakṣaṇaiḥ.*
nirvyāpāreva sā bhāti staimityam iva co'dadheh.
tayai vo'pahiṭam Brahma nirvikalpaṃ nirañjanaṃ.

Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā, I. I. 49.

² *māyā'ścarya-karatvena pañca-kṛtya-karī sadā.* *Ibid.* I. I. 58.

It is a part of this power that transforms itself as the *bhāvya* and the *bhāvaka śakti*, of which the latter is also known by the name *sudarśana*. The *bhāvya* shows itself as the world, and its objective import is the world.

The thought-activity by which the concept shows itself in the ideal and in the objective world as thought and its significance, the object, is the epitome of the power of Sudarśana. When all the external movement of the objective is ideally grasped in the word, we have also in it the manifestation of the power of Sudarśana, or the supreme thought-activity of God. All the causality of the objective world is but a mode of the manifestation of the Sudarśana power. Thus not only all the movements of the external world of nature and the movement implied in speech, but the subjective-objective movement by which the world is held together in thought and in speech are the manifestation of the Sudarśana power. All expressions or manifestations are either in the way of qualities or actions, and both are manifestations of the Sudarśana power of God. Our words can signify only these two ways of being. For this reason they refer only to the Sudarśana, which is attributive to God, but cannot express the nature of God. Words, therefore, cannot reveal the nature of God. The word may hold the universe within it as its mystic symbol and may represent within it all its energies, but, in any case, though it may engulf within it the whole universe and secure the merging of the universe in itself and can identify itself with God, such identification can only be with the Sudarśana power of God, and the entrance into God, or the realization of Him through the word or thought, can only be through the Sudarśana power, which is a part of Lakṣmī. Thus unity with God can only mean union with Sudarśana, or entrance into Lakṣmī¹.

Adoration (*namah*) means the spontaneous acceptance of the highest Lord as the master on the part of a man who has achieved it through a wise enlightenment². Superiority (*jyāyān*) consists of greatness of qualities and existence in earlier time³. God alone is superior, and everything else is inferior. The relation between the latter and the former is that the latter exists for the former or is dependent on the former. This relation is called (*śeṣa-śeṣitā*). The

¹ *Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā*, LI. 69–78.

² *prekṣāvataḥ pravṛttir yā prahvī-bhāvā-tmikā svataḥ ukr̥ṣṭam param uddiśya taṁ namaḥ pariṣṭyate. Ibid.* LII. 2.

³ *kālato guṇaiś caiva prakarṣo yatra tiṣṭhati śabdas taṁ mukhyayā vṛtṭyā jyāyān ity avalambate. Ibid.* LII. 4.

relation between the two is that one should be the adorer and the other the adored (*nanṭṛ-nantaṛya-bhāva*). True adoration is when such an adoration proceeds naturally as a result of such a relation, without any other motive or end of any kind—the only idea being that God is supremely superior to me and I am absolutely inferior to Him¹. This process of adoration not only takes the adorer to God, but also brings God to him. The presence of any motive of any kind spoils the effectuation of the adoration. This adoration is the first part of the process of *prapatti*, or seeking the protection of God². Now on account of the presence of beginningless root-impressions (*vāsanā*), and of natural insignificance of power and association with impurity, man's power of knowledge or wisdom becomes obstructed; and when a man becomes fully conscious of such weakness, he acquires the quality of *kārpanya* or lowliness. A feeling or consciousness of one's independence obstructs this quality of lowliness. The great faith that the supreme God is always merciful is called the quality of *mahā-viśvāsa*. The idea that God is neutral and bestows His gifts only in proportion to one's deeds obstructs this quality. The idea that, since He is all-merciful and all-powerful, He would certainly protect us, produces the quality of faith in God's protective power. The notion that God, being qualityless, is indifferent to any appeal for protection obstructs this quality. Acceptance of the Lord as the supreme master whose commands should on no account be disobeyed produces the quality of docility (*prātikūlya-vivarjana*). Service of God in a manner not prescribed in the scriptures obstructs this quality. The strong resolve of the mind to work in accordance with God's wishes, with the full conviction that the sentient and the non-sentient of the world are but parts of His nature, produces the quality of submission. An inimical disposition towards the beings of the world obstructs this quality. A true adoration (*namah*) to God must be associated with all the aforesaid qualities. True adoration must carry with it the conviction that the sense of possession that we have in all things, due to beginningless instinctive passions and desires, is all false, and the adorer should feel that he has neither independence nor anything that he may call his own. "My body, my

¹ *upādhi-rahitenā' yaṁ yena bhāvena cetanaḥ
namati jñāyase tasmāi tad vā namanam ucyate.*

Ahīrbudhnyā-saṁhitā, LII. 9.

² *phalepsā tad-virodhinī. Ibid.* LII. 15.

riches, my relations do not belong to me, they all belong to God"; such is the conviction that should generate the spirit with which the adoration should be offered. The adorer should feel that the process of adoration is the only way through which he can obtain his highest realization, by offering himself to God and by drawing God to himself at the same time. The purpose of adoration is thus the supreme self-abnegation and self-offering to God, leaving nothing for oneself. The world comes out of God and yet exists in a relation of inherence, so that He is both the agent and the material cause of the world, and the adorer must always be fully conscious of the greatness of God in all its aspects.

The above doctrine of *prapatti*, or *nyāsa*, or *śaraṇā-gati*, as the means of winning God's grace, has also been described in Chapter xxvii and it virtually means the qualities just described¹. *śaraṇā-gati* is here defined as prayer for God's help in association with the conviction of one's being merged in sin and guilt, together with a belief in one's absolute helplessness and a sense of being totally lost without the protecting grace of God². The person who takes to the path of this *prapatti* achieves the fruits of all *tapas*, sacrifices, pilgrimages and gifts, and attains salvation easily without resorting to any other methods³. It is further said that on the part of the devotee following the path of *prapatti* all that is necessary is to stick firmly to the attitude of absolute dependence on God, associated with a sense of absolute helplessness. He has no efforts to make other than to keep himself in the prayerful spirit; all the rest is done by God. *Prapatti* is thus a *upāya-jñāna* and not a *upāya*; for it is a mental attitude and does not presuppose any action. It is like a boat on which the passenger merely sits, while it is the business of the boatman to do the rest⁴.

¹ *ṣoḍhā hi veda-viduṣo vadanty enaṃ mahā-mune
ānukūlyasya saṃkalpaḥ prātikūlyasya varjanam
rakṣiṣyati ti viśvāso goptṛva-varanam tathā.
ātma-nikṣepa-kārpaṇye ṣaḍ-vidhā śaraṇā-gatiḥ.
Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā, xxxvii. 27, 28.*

² *aḥam asmy aparādhānām ālayo'kiñcano' gatiḥ
tvam evo 'pāyabhūto me bhaveti prārthanā-matiḥ.
śaraṇāgatir ity-ukīā sā deve'smin prayujyatām.*

Ibid. xxxvii. 30, 31.

³ *Ibid. xxxvii. 34 and 35.*

⁴ *atra nāvi' ti dṛṣṭāntād upāya-jñānam eva tu
nareṇa kṛtyam anyat tu nāvīkasye'va taddhareḥ.
Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā.*

Describing the process of pure creation, it is said that at the time of *pralaya* all effects are reduced to a dormant state, and there is no movement of any kind. All the six qualities of the Lord, namely *jñāna*, *śakti*, *bala*, *aiśvarya*, *vīrya* and *tejas* described above, are in a state of absolute calmness like the sky without a puff of air in it¹. This assemblage of powers in a state of calmness is Lakṣmī, which exists as it were like the very void. From its own spontaneity it seems to wish to burst forth and turn itself into active operations. This power of God, though differentiated from Him, may be regarded as being His very nature. It is only when it thus comes out in active forms that it can be recognized as power, or *śakti*. When embedded in the potential form, it is indistinguishable from the Lord Himself. These *guṇas* of God should not, however, be confused with the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, which evolve at a much lower stage in the course of the process of impure creation.

As regards the *vyūhas*, it is said that Saṃkarṣaṇa carries in him the whole universe, as if it were a spot at the parting of the hairs (*tīlakālaka*). The universe as it exists in Saṃkarṣaṇa is still in an unmanifested form. He is the support of the universe (*aśeṣa-bhuvana-dhara*)². The *manus*, time and *prakṛti* came out of Pradyumna³. It is through the influence of Pradyumna that men are actuated to perform their work in accordance with the *śāstras*⁴. Aniruddha, also called Mahā-viṣṇu, is the god of power and energy, and it is through his efforts that the creation and the maintenance of the world are possible. It is he who makes the world grow⁵. It is through him that the world lives without fear and ultimate salvation is possible. According to Śaṅkara's account Saṃkarṣaṇa stands for the individual soul, Pradyumna for *manas* and Aniruddha for the Ego (*ahaṃkāra*)⁶. Such a view is rather rare in the existing Pañcarātra literature. In the *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā*, as quoted in the *Tattva-traya*, it is said that Saṃkarṣaṇa acts as the superintendent

¹ *pūrṇa-stimīta-ṣaḍ-guṇyam asaṃtrā-mvaro-pamam.*

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, v. 3.

² All the *śāstras* are said to have been produced by Saṃkarṣaṇa, and it is in him that they disappear at the time of *pralaya*. *Ahīrbudhnya*, LV. 16.

³ *Ibid.* VI. 9-12.

⁴ *Ibid.* LV. 18. Pradyumna is also called Vira.

⁵ There are, however, many conflicting views about these functions of the different *vyūhas*. See *Lakṣmī-tantra*, IV. 11-20, also *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā*, as quoted in the *Tattva-traya*.

⁶ *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. 2. 42, Śaṅkara's commentary.

of the souls, and Pradyumna is described as *manomaya* or the mind, but nothing is said about Aniruddha. In the *Lakṣmī-tantra*, vi. 9-14, it is said that Saṃkarṣaṇa was like the soul, *buddhi* and *manas* and Vāsudeva, the playful creative activity. In the *Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā* Aniruddha is regarded as the creator of the *miśra-varga* (pure-impure creation, such as *niyati*), etc., and Saṃkarṣaṇa is regarded as the being who separated the principle of life from nature and became Pradyumna. But in the *Ahīrbudhnyā* the difference between the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* starts in the Pradyumna stage, and not in the Saṃkarṣaṇa stage, and Aniruddha is regarded in the *Ahīrbudhnyā* as the superintendent of the *sattva* and therethrough of all that come from it and the *manus*¹. According to the *Ahīrbudhnyā* Lakṣmī is described as the power of God, but according to *Uttara-nārāyaṇa* we have Lakṣmī and Bhūmi, and according to the *Tattva-traya* Lakṣmī, Bhūmi and Nīlā. In the *Vihagendra-saṃhitā*, II. 8, these three are regarded as *icchā*, *kriyā* and *sākṣāt-śakti* of the Devī. In the *Sītā-upaniṣad* also we have the same interpretation, and this is also associated there with *Vaiṣṇānasa* tradition. The *Vihagendra* speaks of the eight śaktis of Sudarśana, *kīrti*, *śrī*, *vijayā*, *śraddhā*, *smṛti*, *medhā*, *dhṛti* and *kṣamā*, and in the *Sātrata-saṃhitā* (IX. 85) we hear of the twelve śaktis emanating from the Śrīvatsa of Viṣṇu: these are *lakṣmī*, *puṣṭi*, *dayā*, *nīdrā*, *kṣamā*, *kānti*, *sarasvatī*, *dhṛti*, *maitrī*, *rati*, *tuṣṭi* and *matī*.

The Pañcarātra is based partly on the Vedic and partly on the Tāntric system². It therefore believes in the esoteric nature of the *mantras*. It has already been said that the world has come into being from the Sudarśana power; so all the natural, physical and other kinds of energies and powers of all things in the world are but manifestation of the Sudarśana. The power of the Sudarśana also manifests itself in the form of all living beings and of all that is inanimate, of the course of bondage and also of emancipation. Whatever is able to produce is to be regarded as the manifestation of Sudarśana³. The *mantras* are also regarded as the energy of

¹ *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā*, vi. 57.

² *veda-tantramayo-dbhūta-nānā-prasavaśālinī*. *Ibid.* vi. 9.

³ *sudarśanāhvayā devī sarva-kṛtya-karī vibhoḥ
tan-mayaṃ viddhī sāmāthyam sarvaṃ sarva-padārthajam
dharmasyārthasya kāmasya mukter bandha-trayasya ca
yad yat sva-kārya-sāmāthyam tat-tat-saudarśanam vapuḥ.*

Ibid. xvi. 4 and 6.

Viṣṇu as pure consciousness¹. The first manifestation of this power, like a long-drawn sound of a bell, is called *nāda*, and it can only be perceived by the great *yogins*. The next stage, like a bubble on the ocean, is called *bindu*, which is the identity of a name and the objective power denoted by it. The next stage is the evolution of the objective power (*nāmy-udaya*), which is also called *Śabda-brahman*. Thus, with the evolution of every alphabetic sound there is also the evolution of the objective power of which it is the counterpart. *Ahīrbudhnyā* then goes on to explain the evolution of the different vowel and consonant sounds from the *bindu*-power. By fourteen efforts there come the fourteen vowels emanating through the dancing of the serpent power (*Kuṇḍalī-śakti*) of Viṣṇu². By its two-fold subtle power it behaves as the cause of creation and destruction. This power rises in the original locus (*mūlā-dhāra*) and, when it comes to the stage of the navel, it is called *paśyantī* and is perceived by the *yogins*. It then proceeds to the lotus of the heart and then passes through the throat as the audible sound. The energy of the vowel sounds passes through the *suṣumnā nāḍī*. In this way the different consonant sounds are regarded as the prototypes of different manifestations of world-energy, and these again are regarded as the symbols of different kinds of gods or superintendents of energy³. An assemblage of some of these alphabets in different orders and groups, called also the lotus or the wheel (*cakra*), would stand for the assemblage of different types of complex powers. The meditation and worship of these *cakras* would thus be expected to bring the objective powers typified by them under control. The different gods are thus associated with the different *cakras* of *mantras*; and by far the largest portion of the Pañcarātra literature is dedicated to the description of the rituals associated with these, the building of corresponding images, and the temples for these subsidiary deities. The meditation of these *mantras* is also regarded as playing diverse protective functions.

In consonance with the ordinary method of the Tāntric works

¹ *sākṣād viṣṇoḥ kriyā-śaktiḥ suddha-samvīnmyā parā.*

Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā, XVI. 10.

This *kriyā-śakti* is also called *sāmarthyā* or *yoga* or *pārameṣṭhyā* or *mahātejas* or *māyā-yoga*. *Ibid.* XVI. 32.

² *naṭī'va kuṇḍalī-śaktir ādyā viṣṇor vijrmbhate.* *Ibid.* XVI. 55.

³ *viṣṇu-śaktimayā varṇā viṣṇu-saṃkalpa-jrmbhitāḥ adhiṣṭhitā yathā bhāvaḥ tathā tan me nīśamaya.* *Ibid.* XVII. 3.

the *Ahīrbudhnyā* describes the nervous system of the body. The root (*kāṇḍa*) of all the nerves is said to be at about nine inches above the penis. It is an egg-shaped place four inches in length and breadth and made up of fat, flesh, bone and blood. Just two inches below the penis and about two inches from the anus we have a place which is called the middle of the body (*śarīra-madhyā*), or simply the middle (*madhyā*). It is like a quadrilateral figure, which is also called the *āgneya-maṇḍala*. The place of the root of the *nāḍīs* is also called the navel-wheel (*nābhi-cakra*), which has twelve spokes. Round the *nābhi-cakra* there exists the serpent (*kuṇḍalī*) with eight mouths, stopping the aperture called *brahma-randhra* of the *suṣumnā* by its body¹. In the centre of the *cakra* there are the two *nāḍīs* called the *alambuṣa* and *suṣumnā*. On the different sides of the *suṣumnā* there are the following *nāḍīs*: *Kuhu*, *Varuṇa*, *Yasasvinī*, *Piṅgalā*, *Pūṣā*, *Payasvinī*, *Sarasvatī*, *Śaṅkhinī*, *Gāndhārī*, *Idā*, *Hastī-jihvā*, *Viśvodarā*. But there are on the whole 72,000 *nāḍīs* in the body. Of these, *Idā*, *Piṅgalā* and *suṣumnā* are the most important. Of these, again, *suṣumnā*, which goes to the centre of the brain, is the most important. As a spider remains inside the meshes of its thread, so the soul, as associated with *prāṇa* or life-force, exists inside this navel-wheel. The *suṣumnā* has five openings, of which four carry blood, while the central aperture is closed by the body of the *Kuṇḍalī*. Other *nāḍīs* are shorter in size and are connected with the different parts of the body. The *Idā* and the *Piṅgalā* are regarded as being like the sun and the moon of the body.

There are ten *vāyus*, or bio-motor forces of the body, called *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna*, *vyāna*, *nāga*, *kūrma*, *kṛkara*, *deva-datta* and *dhanañjaya*. The *prāṇa vāyu* remains in the navel-wheel, but it manifests itself in the regions of the heart, mouth and the nose. The *apāna vāyu* works in the anus, penis, thighs, the legs, the belly, the testes, the lumbar region, the intestines, and in fact performs the functions of all the lower region. The *vyāna* exists between the eyes and the ears, the toes, nose, throat and the spine. The *udāna* works in the hands and the *samāna* through the body as a whole, probably discharging the general circulation². The func-

¹ *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā*, xxxii. 11. This is indeed different from the description found in the *Śākta Tantras*, according to which the *Kuṇḍalī* exists in the place down below described as the *śarīra-madhyā*.

² *Ibid.* xxxii. 33-37. These locations and functions are different from what we find in the *Āyur-Veda* or the *Śākta Tantras*.

tion of the *prāṇa* is to discharge the work of respiration; that of the *vyāna*, to discharge the work of turning about towards a thing or away from it. The function of the *udāna* is to raise or lower the body, that of the *samāna*, to feed and develop it. The function of eructation or vomiting is performed by the *nāga vāyu*, and *devadatta* produces sleep and so on. These *nāḍīs* are to be purified by inhaling air by the *idā* for as long as is required to count from 1 to 16. This breath is to be held long enough to count from 1 to 32, and in the interval some forms of meditation are to be carried on. Then the yogin should inhale air in the same manner through the *piṅgalā* and hold that also in the same way. He should then exhale the breath through the *Idā*. He should practise this for three months thrice a day, three times on each occasion, and thus his *nāḍīs* will be purified and he will be able to concentrate his mind on the *vāyus* all over his body. In the process of the *prāṇāyāma* he should inhale air through the *Idā* long enough to count from 1 to 16. Then the breath is to be retained as long as possible, and the specific *mantra* is to be meditated upon; and then the breath is to be exhaled out by the *piṅgalā* for the time necessary to count from 1 to 16. Again, he has to inhale through the *Piṅgalā*, retain the breath and exhale through the *Idā*. Gradually the period of retention of the breath called *kumbhaka* is to be increased. He has to practise the *prāṇāyāma* sixteen times in course of the day. This is called the process of *prāṇāyāma*. As a result of this, he may enter the stage of *samādhi*, by which he may attain all sorts of miraculous powers, just as one may by the meditation of the wheel of *mantras*.

But before one begins the purification of the *nāḍīs* described above one should practise the various postures (*āsanas*) of which *cakra*, *padma*, *kūrma*, *mayūra*, *kukkuṭa*, *vīra*, *śvastika*, *bhadra*, *siṃha*, *mukta* and *gomukha* are described in the *Ahīrbudhnya*. The practice of these postures contributes to the good health of the *yogins*. But these physical practices are of no avail unless one turns to the spiritual side of *yoga*. *Yoga* is defined as the union of the lower and the higher soul¹. Two ways for the attainment of the highest reality are described in the *Ahīrbudhnya*—one is that of self-offering or self-abnegation (*ātma-samarpaṇa* or *hrd-yāga*) through the meditation on the highest in the form of some of His powers, as this

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*samyogo yoga ity ukto jivātm-paramā-tmanoh.**Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā*, xxxi. 15.

and that specific deity, by the practice of the *mantras*; and the other is that of the *yoga*¹. *Ahīrbudhnya*, however, concentrates its teachings on the former, and mentions the latter in only one of its chapters. There are two types of soul, one within the influence of the *prakṛti* and the other beyond it. The union with the highest is possible through *karma* and *yoga*. *Karma* is again of two kinds, that which is prompted by desires (*pravartaka*) and that which is prompted by cessation of desires (*nivartaka*). Of these only the latter can lead to emancipation, while the former leads to the attainment of the fruits of desires. The highest soul is described as the subtle (*sūkṣma*), all-pervading (*sarva-ga*), maintaining all (*sarva-bhṛt*), pure consciousness (*jñāna-rūpa*), without beginning and end (*anādy-ananta*), changeless (*a-vikārin*), devoid of all cognitive or conative senses, devoid of names and class-notions, without colour and quality, yet knowing all and pervading all, self-luminous and yet approachable through intuitive wisdom, and the protector of all². The *yoga* by which a union of our lower souls with this highest reality can be effected has the well-known eight accessories, *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇa*, *dhyāna* and *saṃādhi*.

Of these, *yama* is said to consist of beneficial and yet truthful utterance (*satya*), suffering at the sufferings of all beings (*dayā*), remaining fixed in one's path of duty even in the face of dangers (*dhṛti*), inclination of all the senses to adhere to the path of right conduct (*śauca*), absence of lust (*brahma-carya*), remaining unruffled even when there is a real cause of anger or excitement (*kṣamā*), uniformity of thoughts, deeds and words (*ārjava*), taking of unprohibited food (*mitāhāra*), absence of greed for the property of others (*asteya*), cessation from doing injury to others by word, deed or thought (*ahiṃsā*)³. *Niyama* is described as listening to Vedāntic texts (*siddhānta-śravaṇa*), gifts of things duly earned to proper persons (*dāna*), faith in scriptural duties (*matī*), worship of Viṣṇu through devotion (*īśvara-pūjana*), natural contentment with

¹ *yad vā bhagavate tasmai svakiyātma-samarpaṇam
viśiṣṭa-daivatāyā' smai cakra-rūpāya mantrataḥ
vīryuktaṃ prakṛteḥ śuddhaṃ dadyād ātma-haviḥ svayam.*

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, xxx. 4, 5.

² *Ibid.* xxxi. 7-10.

³ *Ibid.* 18-23. The list here given is different from that of Patañjali, who counts *ahiṃsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahma-carya* and *aparigraha* as *yamas*. See *Yoga-sūtra*, II. 30.

whatever one may have (*santoṣa*), asceticism (*tapah*), faith in the ultimate truth being attainable only through the Vedas (*āstikya*), shame in committing prohibited actions (*hṛī*), muttering of *mantras* (*japa*), acceptance of the path dictated by the good teacher (*vrata*)¹. Though the *Yoga* is here described as the union of the lower and the higher soul, the author of the *Ahīrbudhnya* was aware of the *yogānuśāsana* of Patañjali and his doctrine of *Yoga* as the repression of mental states (*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*)².

The *Ahīrbudhnya* defines *pramā* as the definite knowledge of a thing as it really exists (*yathārthā-vadhāraṇam*), and the means by which it is attained is called *pramāṇa*. That which is sought to be discovered by the *pramāṇas* as being beneficial to man is called *pramāṇārtha*. This is of two kinds, that which is supremely and absolutely beneficial, and that which indirectly leads thereto, and as such is called *hita* and *sādhana*. Oneness with God, which is supremely blissful, is what is called supremely beneficial (*hita*). Two ways that lead to it are those of *dharma* and *jñāna*. This knowledge is of two kinds, as direct intuition (*sākṣātkāra*) and as indirect or inferential (*parokṣa*). *Dharma* is the cause of knowledge, and is of two kinds, one which leads directly, and the other indirectly, to worship of God. Self-offering or self-abnegation with reference to God is called indirect *dharma*, while the way in which the *Yogin* directly realizes God is called the direct *dharma*, such as is taught in the Pañcarātra literature, called the *sātvata-śāsana*. By the Sāṃkhya path one can have only the indirect knowledge of God, but through *Yoga* and Vedānta one can have a direct intuition of God. Emancipation (*mokṣa*) is as much an object of attainment through efforts (*sādhya*) as *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*, though the last three are also mutually helpful to one another³.

¹ *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā*, pp. 23-30. This list is also different from that of Patañjali, who counts *śauca*, *santoṣa*, *tapah*, *svādhyāya* and *īśvara-praṇidhāna* only as *niyamas*. See *Yoga-sūtra*, II, 32.

² *Ibid.* XIII, 27, 28.

³ *Ibid.* XIII.

CHAPTER XVII

THE ĀRVĀRS.

The Chronology of the Ārvārs.

IN the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, XI. 5. 38-40, it is said that the great devotees of Viṣṇu will appear in the south on the banks of Tāmraparṇī, Kṛtamālā (Vaigai), Payasvinī (Palar), Kāverī and Mahānadī (Periyar)¹. It is interesting to note that the Ārvārs, Nāmm'-ārvār and Madhura-kaviy-ārvār, were born in the Tāmraparṇī country, Periy-ārvār and his adopted daughter Āṇḍāl in the Kṛtamālā, Poygaiy-ārvār, Bhūtatt'-ārvār, Pēy-ārvār and Tiru-mariṣai Pirān in the Payasvinī, Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍiy-ārvār, Tiru-pāṇ-ārvār and Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār in the Kāverī, and Periy-ārvār and Kula-śekhara Perumāl in the Mahānada countries. In the *Bhāgavata-māhātmya* we find a parable in which Bhakti is described as a distressed woman who was born in the Drāviḍa country, had attained her womanhood in the Carnatik and Mahārāṣṭra, and had travelled in great misery through Guzerat and North India with her two sons *Ĵñāna* and *Vairāgya* to Brindaban, and that owing to the hard conditions through which she had to pass her two sons had died. This shows that at least according to the traditions of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* Southern India was regarded as a great stronghold of the *Bhakti* cult.

The Ārvārs are the most ancient Vaiṣṇava saints of the south, of whom Saroyogin or Poygaiy-ārvār, Pūtayogin or Bhūtatt'-ārvār, Mahadyogin or Pēy-ārvār, and Bhaktisāra or Tiru-mariṣai Pirān are the earliest; Nāmm'-ārvār or Śaṭhakopa, Madhura-kaviy-ārvār, Kula-śekhara Perumāl, Viṣṇucittan (or Periy-ārvār) and Goḍa (Āṇḍāl) came after them and Bhaktāṅghireṇu (Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍiy-ārvār), Yogivāha (Tiru-pāṇ-ārvār) and Parakāla (Tiru-maṅgaiy-

¹ This implies that the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* in its present form was probably written after the Ārvārs had flourished. The verse here referred to has been quoted by Veṅkaṭanātha in his *Rahasya-traya-sāra*. The *Prapannā-mṛta* (Ch. 77) however refers to three other Vaiṣṇava saints who preceded the Ārvārs. They were (i) Kāsārayogin, born in Kāñci, (ii) Bhūtayogindra, born in Mallipura, (iii) Bhrānta-yogindra called also Mahat and Mahārya who was the incarnation of Viṣvakṣena. It was these sages who advised the five *saṃskāras* of Vaiṣṇavism (*tāpaḥ paundras tathā nāma mantrō yāgaś ca pañcamah*). They preached the emotional Vaiṣṇavism in which *Bhakti* is realized as maddening intoxication associated with tears, etc. They described their feelings of ecstasy in three works, comprising three hundred verses written in Tamil. They were also known by the names of Mādhava, Dāsārya and Saroyogin.

ārvār) were the last to come. The traditional date ascribed to the earliest Ārvār is 4203 B.C., and the date of the latest Ārvār is 2706 B.C.¹, though modern researches on the subject bring down their dates to a period not earlier than the seventh or the eighth century A.D. Traditional information about the Ārvārs can be had from the different "*Guru-paramparā*" works. According to the *Guru-paramparā*, Bhūtatt-, Poygaiy- and Pēy-ārvārs were incarnations of Viṣṇu's *Gadā*, *Śaṅkha* and *Nandaka*, and so also Kadamalai and Mayilai, while Tiru-mariṣai Pirān was regarded as the incarnation of the *cakra* (wheel) of Viṣṇu. Nāmm'-ārvār was incarnation of Viṣvaksena and Kula-śekhara Peru-māl of the *Kaustubha* of Viṣṇu. So Periy-ārvār, Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍiy-ārvār and Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār were respectively incarnations of *Garuḍa*, *Vanamālā* and *Śārṅga* of Viṣṇu. The last Ārvār was Tiru-pāṇ-ārvār. Āṇḍāl, the adopted daughter of Periy-ārvār, and Madhura-kaviy-ārvār, the disciple of Nāmm'-ārvār, were also regarded as Ārvārs. They came from all parts of the Madras Presidency. Of these seven were Brahmins, one was a *Kṣattriya*, two were *śūdras* and one was of the low Panar caste. The *Guru-paramparās* give incidents of the lives of the Ārvārs and also fanciful dates B.C. when they are said to have flourished. Apart from the *Guru-paramparās* there are also monographs on individual Ārvārs, of which the following are the most important: (1) *Divya-sūri-carita* by Garuḍa-vāhana Paṇḍita, who was a contemporary of Rāmānuja; (2) *Guru-paramparā-prabhāvam* of Pinb'-aragiya Peru-māl Jīyar, based on the *Divya-sūri-carita* and written in *maṇi-pravāḷa* style, i.e. a mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil; (3) *Periya-tiru-muḍiy-aḍaivu* of Āṇbillai Kaṇḍāḍai-yappan, written in Tamil; (4) *Upadeśa-ratna-mālai* of Maṇavāḷa Mā-muni, written in Tamil, contains the list of Ārvārs; (5) *Yatindra-pravaṇa-prabhāvam* of Pillai Lokācāryar. The other source of information regarding the Ārvārs is the well-known collection of the works of Ārvārs known as *Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham*. Among these are the commentaries on the *Divya-prabandham* and the *Tiru-vāy-moṟi* of Nāmm'-ārvār. In addition to these we have the epigraphical evidence in inscriptions scattered over the Madras Presidency².

¹ *Early History of Vaiṣṇavism in South India*, by S. K. Aiyangar, pp. 4-13; also Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Sects*, pp. 68, 69.

² Sir Subrahmanya Ayyar Lectures, by the late T. A. Gopi-nātha Rāu, 1923.

Maṇavāḷa Mā-muni, in his *Yatindra-pravaṇa-prabhāvam*, says that the earliest of the Āṛvārs, Pēy-āṛvār, Bhūtatt'-āṛvār, Poygaiy-āṛvār, and Tiru-maṛiṣai Pirān, flourished at the time of the Pallavas, who came to Kāñcī about the fourth century A.D. Again, Professor Dubreuil says that Mamallai, the native town of Bhūtatt'-āṛvār, did not exist before Narasiṃhavarman I, who founded the city by the middle of the seventh century. Further, Tiru-maṅgaiy-āṛvār praised the Vaiṣṇava temple of Kāñcī built by Parameśvarvarman II. It seems, therefore, that the Āṛvārs flourished in the eighth century A.D., which was the period of a great Vaiṣṇava movement in the Cola and the Pāṇḍya countries, and also of the Advaitic movement of Śaṅkara¹.

According to the traditional accounts, Nāmm'-āṛvār was the son of Kāṛi, holding a high post under the Pāṇḍyas, and himself bore the names of Kāṛimāṇan, Parāṅkuśa and Śaṭhakopa, that his disciple was Madhura-kaviy-āṛvār, and that he was born at Tirukkurgur. Two stone inscriptions have been found in Madura of which one is dated at Kali 3871, in the reign of King Parāntaka, whose *uttara-mantrin* was the son of Māra, who was also known as Madhura-kaviy-āṛvār. The other is dated in the reign of Mārañ-jadaiyan. The Kali year 3871 corresponds to A.D. 770. This was about the year when Parāntaka Pāṇḍya ascended the throne. His father Parāṅkuśa died about the year A.D. 770. Māraṅkāri continued as *uttara-mantrin*. Nāmm'-āṛvār's name Kāṛimāṇan shows that Kāṛi the *uttara-mantrin* was his father. This is quite in accordance with the accounts found in *Guru-paramparā*. These and many other evidences collected by Gopi-nātha Rāu show that Nāmm'-āṛvār and Madhura-kaviy-āṛvār flourished at the end of the eighth century A.D. or in the first half of the ninth century. Kulaśēkhara Peru-māl also flourished probably about the first half of the ninth century. Periy-āṛvār and his adopted daughter Āṇḍāl were probably contemporaries of Śrīvallabhadeva, who flourished about the middle of the ninth century A.D. Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍiy-āṛvār was a contemporary of Tiru-maṅgaiy-āṛvār and Tiru-pān-āṛvār. Tiru-maṅgaiy-āṛvār referred to the war drum of Pallavamalla, who reigned between A.D. 717 and A.D. 779, and these Āṛvārs could not have flourished before that time. But Tiru-maṅgaiy-āṛvār, in his praise

¹ Sir Subrahmanya Ayyar Lectures, by the late T. A. Gopi-nātha Rāu, 1923, p. 17.

of Viṣṇu at Kāñcī, refers to Vairamegha Pallava, who probably flourished in the ninth century. It may therefore be supposed that Tiru-maṅgaiy lived about that time. According to Mr S. K. Aiyangar the last of the Āṛvārs flourished in the earlier half of the eighth century A.D.¹ Sir R. G. Bhandarkar holds that Kula-śekhara Peru-māl flourished about the middle of the twelfth century. He was a king of Travancore and in his *Mukunda-mālā* he quotes a verse from the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (xi. 2. 36). On the basis of the inscriptional evidence that Permaḍi of the Senḍa dynasty, who flourished between 1138-1150, conquered Kula-śekharaṅka, and identifying Kula-śekhara Peru-māl with Kula-śekharaṅka, Bhandarkar comes to the conclusion that Kula-śekhara Peru-māl lived in the middle of the twelfth century A.D., though, as we have already seen, Mr Rāu attempts to place him in the first half of the ninth century. He, however, does not take any notice of the views of Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, who further thinks that the earliest Āṛvārs flourished about the fifth or the sixth century A.D. and that the order of the priority of the Āṛvārs as found in the *Guru-paramparā* lists is not reliable. One of the main points of criticism used by Aiyangar against Bhandarkar is the latter's identification of Kula-śekhara Peru-māl with Kula-śekharaṅka. The works of the Āṛvārs were written in Tamil, and those that survive were collected in their present form in Rāmānuja's time or in the time of Nāthamuni; this collection, containing 4000 hymns, is called *Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham*. But at least one part of it was composed by Kuruttalvan or Kuruttama, who was a prominent disciple of Rāmānuja, and in a passage thereof a reference is made to Rāmānuja also². The order of the Āṛvārs given in this work is somewhat different from that given in the *Guru-paramparā* referred to above, and it does not contain the name of Nāmm'-āṛvār, who is treated separately. Again, Pillān, the disciple and apostolic successor of Rāmānuja, who commented on the *Tiru-vāy-mōṟi* of Nāmm'-āṛvār, gives in a verse all the names of the Āṛvārs, omitting only

¹ *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. xxxv, pp. 228, etc.

² This part is called *Rāmānuja-nurrundādi*. The order of the Āṛvārs given here is as follows: Poygaiy-āṛvār, Bhūtatt'-āṛvār, Pey-āṛvār, Tiru-pān-āṛvār, Tiru-maṇṣai Pirān, Tonḍar-adi-podiy-āṛvār, Kula-śekhara, Periy-āṛvār, Āṇḍāl, Tiru-maṅgaiy-āṛvār. Venkaṭanātha, however, in his *Prabandha-sāram* records the Āṛvārs in the following order: Poygaiy-āṛvār, Bhūtatt'-āṛvār, Pey-āṛvār, Tiru-maṇṣai Pirān, Nāmm'-āṛvār, Madhura-kaviy-āṛvār, Kula-śekhara, Periy-āṛvār, Āṇḍāl, Tonḍar-adi-podiy-āṛvār, Tiru-pān-āṛvār, Tiru-maṅgaiy-āṛvār.

Āṇḍāl¹. Thus it appears that Kula-śēkhara was accepted as an Ārvār in Rāmānuja's time. In Veṅkaṭanātha's (fourteenth-century) list, contained in one of his Tamil *Prabandhams*, all the Ārvārs excepting Āṇḍāl and Madhura-kaviy-ārvār are mentioned. The *Prabandham* contains also a succession list of teachers according to the Vaḍakalai sect, beginning with Rāmānuja².

Kula-śēkhara, in his *Mukunda-mālā*, says that he was the ruler of Kolli (Uraiyyūr, the Cola capital), Kudal (Mādurā) and Koṅgu. Being a native of Travancore (Vaṅjikulam), he became the ruler of the Pāṇḍya and Cola capitals, Mādurā and Uraiyyūr. After A.D. 900, when the Cola king Parāntaka became supreme and the Cola capital was at Tanjore instead of at Uraiyyūr, the ascendancy of the Travancore country (Kerala) over the Cola and the Pāṇḍya kingdoms would have been impossible. It could only have happened either before the rise of the great Pallava dynasty with Narasiṃhavarman I (A.D. 600) or after the fall of that dynasty with Nandivarman (A.D. 800). If Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār, the contemporary of Vairamegha, be accepted as the last Ārvār, then Kula-śēkhara must be placed in the sixth century A.D. But Gopi-nātha Rāu interprets a passage of Kula-śēkhara as alluding to the defeat and death of a Pallava king at his hands. He identifies this king with the Pallava king Dantivarman, about A.D. 825, and is of the opinion that he flourished in the first half of the ninth century A.D. In any case Bhandarkar's identification of Kula-śēkhara with Kula-śekharaṅka (A.D. 1150) is very improbable, as an inscription dated A.D. 1088 makes a provision for the recital of Kula-śēkhara's "*Tettarumtiral*."³ Aiyangar further states that in several editions of the *Mukunda-mālā* the quotation from the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* referred to by Bhandarkar cannot be traced. We may thus definitely reject the view of Bhandarkar that Kula-śēkhara flourished in the middle of the twelfth century A.D.

There is a great controversy among the South Indian historians and epigraphists not only about the chronological order of the

¹ *Bhūtaṃ Saraś ca Mahad-anvaya-Bhaṭṭanātha-
Śrī-Bhaktisāra-Kulaśekhara-Yogivāhān
Bhaktāṅghrīreṇu-Parakāla-Yatīndramiśrān
Śrī-mat-Parāṅkuśa-murṛi prapato'smi nityam.*

Verse quoted from Aiyangar's *Early History of Vaiṣṇavism*.

² Rāmānuja's preceptor was Periya Nambi, then come Alavandar, Manakkal Nambi, Uyyakkondar, Nāthamuni, Śaṭhakopa, Viśvakṣena (Senai Nathan), Mahālakṣmī and Viṣṇu. Aiyangar, *Early History of Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 21.

³ *Ibid.* p. 33.

different Ārvārs, but also regarding the dates of the first and the last, and of those who came between them. Thus, while Aiyangar wished to place the first four Ārvārs about the second century A.D., Gopi-nātha Rāu regards them as having flourished in the middle of the seventh century A.D.¹ Again, Nāmm'-ārvār is placed by Aiyangar in the middle of the sixth century, while Gopi-nātha Rāu would place him during the first half of the ninth century. While Aiyangar would close the history of the Ārvārs by the middle of the seventh century, Gopi-nātha Rāu would place Kula-śekhara in A.D. 825, Periy-ārvār in about the same date or a few years later, and Toṇḍar-ādi-poḍiy-ārvār, Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār and Tiru-pān-ārvār (contemporaries) about A.D. 830. From comparing the various matters of controversy, the details of which cannot well be described here, I feel it wise to follow Gopi-nātha Rāu, and am inclined to think that the order of the Ārvārs, except so far as the first group of four is concerned, is not a chronological one, as many of them were close contemporaries, and their history is within a period of only 200 years, from the middle of the seventh century to the middle of the ninth century.

The word Ārvār means one who has a deep intuitive knowledge of God and one who is immersed in the contemplation of Him. The works of the Ārvārs are full of intense and devoted love for Viṣṇu. This love is the foundation of the later systematic doctrine of *prapatti*. The difference between the Ārvārs and the Aragiyas, of whom we shall speak later on, is that, while the former had realized Brahman and had personal enjoyment of His grace, the latter were learned propounders who elaborated the philosophy contained in the works of the Ārvārs. Poygaiy, Bhūtatt' and Pēy composed the three sections of one hundred stanzas each of *Tiru-vantādi*². Tiru-maṇṣai Pirān spent much of his life in Triplicane, Conjeevaram and Kumbakonam. His hymns are the *Nan-mukham Tiru-vantādi*, containing ninety-six stanzas, and *Tiru-chaṇḍa-vṛuttam*. Nāmm'-ārvār was born of a Śūdra family at Kurukur, now Ālvārtirunagari in the Tinnevely district. He was the most voluminous writer

¹ These are Pēy-ārvār, Bhūtatt'-ārvār, Poygaiy-ārvār and Tiru-maṇṣai Pirān, the first three being known as Mudal-ārvārs among the Śrīvaiṣṇavas.

² As a specimen of *Tiru-vantādi* one may quote the following passage: "With love as lamp-bowl, desire as oil, mind melting with bliss as wick, with melting soul I have kindled the bright light of wisdom in the learned Tāmil which I have wrought for Nārāyaṇa."—Bhūtam, quotation from Hooper's *Hymns of the Ārvārs*, p. 12, n.

among the Ārvārs and a great mass of his poetry is preserved in the *Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham*. His works are the *Tiru-vṛttam*, containing one hundred stanzas, *Tiru-vāṣiriyam*, containing seven stanzas, the *Periya tiru-vantādi* of eighty-seven stanzas, and the *Tiru-vāy-moṛi*, containing 1102 stanzas. Nāmm'-ārvār's whole life was given to meditation. His disciple Madhura-kavi considers him an incarnation of Viṣṇu. Kula-śekhara was a great devotee of Rāma. His chief work is the *Peru-māl-tiru-moṛi*. Periy-ārvār, known as Viṣṇucitta, was born at Śrībittiputtūr. His chief works are *Tiru-pall'-āṇḍu* and *Tiru-moṛi*. Āṇḍāl, adopted daughter of Periy-ārvār, was passionately devoted to Kṛṣṇa and considered herself as one of the Gopis, seeking for union with Kṛṣṇa. She was married to the God Raṅganātha of Śrīraṅgam. Her chief works are *Tiru-pāvai* and *Nacchiyār*. Tirumoṛi Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍiy-ārvār was born at Mandagudi. He was once under the seduction of a courtesan called Devādevī, but was saved by the grace of Raṅganātha. His chief works are *Tiru-mālai*, and the *Tiru-palliy-eṛuchi*. Tiru-pāṇ-ārvār was brought up by a low-caste childless *panar*. His chief work was *Amalan-ādibirān* in ten stanzas. Tiru-maṅgaiy was born in the thief-caste. His chief works are *Periya-tiru-moṛi*, *Tirukuṟun-dāṇḍakam*, *Tiru-neḍun-dāṇḍakam*, *Tiru-verugūtt-irukkai*, *Śīriya-tiru-maḍal* and *Periya-tiru-maḍal*. Tiru-maṅgaiy was driven to brigandage, and gained his divine wisdom through the grace of Raṅganātha. The *Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham*, which contains the works of the Ārvārs, is regarded in the Tamil country as the most sacred book and is placed side by side with the Vedas. It is carried in procession into the temple, when verses from it are recited and they are recited also on special occasions of marriage, death, etc. Verses from it are also sung and recited in the hall in front of the temple, and it is used in the rituals along with Vedic *mantras*.

The Philosophy of the Ārvārs.

As the hymns of the Ārvārs have only a literary and devotional form, it is difficult to utilize them for philosophical purposes. As an illustration of the general subject-matter of their works, I shall try to give a brief summary of the main contents of Nāmm'-ārvār's (Śaṭhakopa) work, following Abhirāmavarācārya's *Draṁḍopaniṣat-tātparya*¹. The feeling of devotion to God felt by Śaṭhakopa

¹ MS. from Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras.

could not be contained within him, and, thus overflowing, was expressed in verses which soothed all sufferers; this shows that his affection for suffering humanity was even greater than that of their own parents. Śaṭhakopa's main ideal was to subdue our so-called manhood by reference to God (*puruṣottama*), the greatest of all beings, and to regard all beings as but women dependent on Him; and so it was that Śaṭhakopa conceived himself as a woman longing for her lover and entirely dependent on him. In the first of his four works he prayed for the cessation of rebirth; in the second he described his experiences of God's great and noble qualities; in the third he expressed his longings to enjoy God; and in the fourth he described how all his experiences of God's communion with him fell far short of his great longings. In the first ten stanzas of his first centum he is infused with a spirit of service (*dāśya*) to God and describes his experiences of God's essential qualities. In the next ten stanzas he describes the mercy of God and recommends every one to give up attachment to all other things, which are of a trifling and temporary nature. Then he prays to God for his incarnation on earth with Lakṣmī, His consort, and pays adoration to Him. He continues with a description of his mental agonies in not attaining communion with God, confessing his own guilt to Him. He then embraces God and realizes that all his failings are his own fault. He explains that the spirit of service (*dāśya*) does not depend for its manifestation and realization on any elaborate rituals involving articles of worship, but on one's own zeal. What is necessary is true devotion (*bhakti*). Such a devotion, he says, must proceed through an intense enjoyment of the nature of the noble qualities of God, so that the devotee may feel that there is nothing in anything else that is greater than them. With a yielding heart he says that God accepts the service of those who, instead of employing all the various means of subduing a crooked enemy, adopt only the means of friendliness to them¹. God is pleased with those who are disposed to realize the sincerity of their own spirit, and it is through this that they can realize God in themselves. God's favour does not depend on anything but His own grace, manifesting itself in an all-embracing devotion. He says, in the second *śataka*, that the devotee, having,

1

*kautilyavatsu karaṇa-tritaye'pi jantusv
 ātmīyam eva karaṇa-tritayaika-rūpyam
 sandarśya tānapi hariḥ sva-vaśīkarotīty
 ācaṣṭa sāndra-karuṇo munir aṣṭamena.*

Dramiḍopaniṣat-tātparyā. MS.

on the one hand, felt the great and noble qualities of God, and yet being attached to other things, is pierced through with pangs of sorrow in not realizing God in communion, and feels a bond of sympathy with all humanity sharing the same grief. Through the stories of God related in the Purāṇas, e.g. in the *Bhāgavata*, Śaṭhakopa feels the association of God which removes his sorrow and so increases his contact with God. He then describes how the great saints of the past had within their heart of hearts enjoyed an immersion in the ocean of God's bliss, which is the depository of all blissful emotion; and he goes on to express his longings for the enjoyment of that bliss. Through his longings for Him there arose in Śaṭhakopa great grief of separation, devoid of any interest in furthering unworthy ends; he communicated to Him his great sorrow at his incapacity to realize Him, and in so doing he lost consciousness through intensity of grief. As a result God Kṛṣṇa appeared before him, and he describes accordingly the joy of the vision of God. But he fears to lose God, who is too mighty for him, and takes refuge in his great attachment to Him. Next he says that they only realize God who have a sense of possession in Him. He describes God's noble qualities, and shows that the realization of the proximity of God is much more desirable than the attainment of emancipation. He says that the true definition of *mokṣa* is to attain the position of God's servant¹.

In the beginning of the third centum he describes the beauty of God. Then he bemoans the fact that, on account of the limitations of his senses and his mind, he is unable to enjoy the fullness of His beauty. Next he describes the infinitude of God's glory and his own spirit of service to Him. Then he envisages the whole world and the words that denote the things of the world as being the body of God². Then he expresses the pleasure and bliss he feels in the service of God, and says that even those who cannot come into contact with God in His own essence can find solace in directing their minds to His image and to the stories of Kṛṣṇa related in the

¹ *mokṣādaram sphuṭam avekṣya munir mukunde
mokṣam pradātuṃ sadṛkṣa-phalaṃ pravṛtte
ātme-ṣṭam aya pada-kīṅkarataika-rūpaṃ
mokṣā-khya-vastu navame niraṇāyi tena.*

Dramīdopaniṣat-tātparya. MS.

² *sarvaṃ jagat samavalokya vibhoś śarīraṃ
tad-vācinaś ca sakalān api śabda-rāśin
taṃ bhūta-bhautika-mukhān kathayan padārthān
dāsyam cakāra vacasaiva muniś caturthe. Ibid.*

Purāṇas. He then absorbs himself in the grief of his separation from God and hopes that by arresting all the inner senses he may see God with his own eyes. He also regrets the condition of other men who are wasting their time in devotion to gods other than Kṛṣṇa. He goes on to describe the vision of God and his great joy therein.

In the fourth centum he describes the transitoriness of all things considered as enjoyable, and the absolute superiority of the bliss of pleasing God. He goes on to explain how, through cessation of all inclination to other things and the increase of longing for God in a timeless and spaceless manner, and through the pangs of separation in not realizing Him constantly, he considers himself as a woman, and through the pangs of love loses his consciousness¹. Then he describes how Hari is pleased with his amour and satisfies his longings by making Him enjoyable through the actions of mind, words and body by His blissful embraces². Next he shows how, when he attempted to realize Kṛṣṇa by his spiritual zeal, Kṛṣṇa vanished from his sight and he was then once more filled with the grief of separation. Again he receives a vision of God and feels with joy His overwhelming superiority. He further describes how his vision of God was like a dream, and how, when the dream ceased, he lost consciousness. To fill up the emptiness of these occasional separations, he sorrowfully chanted the name of God, and earnestly prayed to Him. He wept for Him and felt that without Him everything was nothing. Yet at intervals he could not help feeling deep sympathy for erring humanity which had turned its mind away from God. According to him the real bondage consists in the preference man gives to things other than God. When one can feel God as all-in-all, every bond is loosened.

In the fifth centum he feels that God's grace alone can save man. He again describes himself as the wife of God, constantly longing for His embrace. In his grief and lamentation and his anxiety to meet God, he was overcome by a swoon which, like the night, dimmed all his senses. At the end of this state he saw the orna-

¹ *taṁ puruṣā-rtham itarā-rtha-rucer nivr̥tṭyā
sāndra-spr̥haḥ samaya-deśa-vidūragam ca
īpsuḥ śucā tad-an-avāpti-bhuvā dvitīye
strī-bhāvanām samadhigamya munir mumoha.*

Dramiḍopaniṣat-tātparya. MS.

² *pr̥tīh param harir amuṣya tadā svabhāvād
etan-mano-vacana-deha-kṛta-kriyābhīḥ
srak-candana-pramukha-sarva-vidha-svabhogyah
saṁśliṣṭavān idam uvāca munis tyāye. Ibid.*

ments of God, but could not see Him directly, and was thus filled both with grief and happiness. As a relief from the pangs of separation he found enjoyment in identifying himself in his mind with God and in imitating His ways, thinking that the world was created by him¹. In a number of verses (seventy or eighty) he describes how he was attached to the image of the God Kṛṣṇa at Kumbhakonam and how he suffered through God's apathy towards him in not satisfying him, His lover, with embraces and other tokens of love, and how he became angry with His indifference to his amorous approaches and was ultimately appeased by God, who satisfied him with loving embraces and the like. Thus God, who was divine lord of the universe, felt sympathy and love for him and appeased his sorrows in the fashion of a human lover². He describes his great bliss in receiving the embrace of God. Through this rapturous divine love and divine embrace he lost all mundane interest in life.

In the ninth centum the sage, finding he could not look at the ordinary things of life, nor easily gain satisfaction in the divine presence of God in the whole world, fixed his mind on His transcendental form (*aprākṛta-vapuḥ*) and became full of wailing and lamentation as a means of direct access to it. A great part of this centum is devoted to laments due to his feeling of separation from God. He describes how through constant lamentation and brooding he received the vision of God, but was unhappy because he could not touch Him; and how later on God took human form in response to his prayers and made him forget his sufferings³. In many other verses he again describes the emotions of his distress at his separation and temporary union with God; how he sent messages to God through birds; how he felt miserable because He delayed to meet him; how he expected to meet Him at appointed times, and how his future actions in Heaven should be repeated in

¹ śokaṃ ca taṃ pari-jihṛṣur ivākhilānām
sargā-dī-kartur anukāra-rasena śaureh
tasya pravṛttir akhilā racitā maye' ti
tad-bhāva-bhāvita-manā munir āha śaṣṭhe.

Dramāḍopaniṣat-tātparya. MS.

² kopaṃ mama praṇaya-jaṃ praśamayya kṛṣṇa
svā-dhātām ātanute' ti sa-vismayaḥ sah
svyātāṃ viruddha-jagad-ākṛtītāṃ ca tena
sandarśitām anubabhūva munis tṛtīye. *Ibid.*

³ saṅgaṃ nivarttya mama saṃśṛti-maṇḍale mām
saṃsthāpayan katham aśi' ty anucoditena
āścaryya-loka-tanūtām api darśayitvā
vismāritaḥ kila śucaṃ hariṇā' ṣṭame' sau. *Ibid.*

earth and how his behaviour to God was like that of the Gopīs, full of ardent love and eagerness. In the concluding verses, however, he says that the real vision of God can come only to a deeply devoted mind and not to external eyes.

Hooper gives some interesting translations from the *Tiruvruttam* of Nāmm'-ārvār, a few of which may be quoted here to illustrate the nature of his songs of love for God¹:

Long may she love, this girl with luring locks,
Who loves the feet that heavenly ones adore,
The feet of Kaṇṇan, dark as rainy clouds:
Her red eyes all abrim with tears of grief,
Like darting *Kayal* fish in a deep pool².
Hot in this village now doth blow the breeze
Whose nature coolness is. Hath he, this once,
The rain-cloud hued, his sceptre turned aside
To steal the love-glow from my lady, lorn
For tuḷasī, with wide eyes raining tears?³

In separation from the lord the Ārvār finds delight in looking at darkness, which resembles Kṛṣṇa's colour:

Thou, fair as Kaṇṇan's heaven, when he's away
What ages long it is! He here, a span!
Whether friends stay for many days, or go,
We grieve. Yet, be this spreading darkness blest
In spite of many a cunning trick it has⁴.
What will befall my girl with bracelets fair,
With tearful eyes like gleaming *Kayal* big,
Who wanders with a secret pain at heart
For blooms of tuḷasī fresh from the Bird's Lord
Who with that hill protected flocks in storm?⁵

The Ārvār then laments and pleads with swans and herons to take his message:

The flying swans and herons I did beg,
Cringing: "Forget not, ye, who first arrive,
If ye behold my heart with Kaṇṇan there
Oh, speak of me and ask it 'Sir not yet
Hast thou returned to her? And is it right?'"

¹ *Hymns of the Ālvārs*, by J. S. M. Hooper, pp. 61-88.

² The maid who is represented as speaking here stands for Ārvār's disciple, and the lady in love is the mistress, and Kaṇṇan is Kṛṣṇa, the Lord.

³ This is also a speech from the maid, and *tuḷasī* stands for Kṛṣṇa.

⁴ The time of separation is felt to be too long, and the time of union is felt to be too short.

⁵ Lamentation of the mother for the girl, the Ārvār.

The Ārvār then laments that the clouds will not take his message. He speaks of the resemblance between the clouds and the Lord:

Tell me, ye clouds, how have ye won the means
That we are thus like Tirumāl's blest form?
Bearing good water for protecting life,
Ye range through all the sky. Such penance, sure,
As makes your bodies ache, has won this grace!

The friend speaks of the callousness of the lord:

E'en in this age-long time of so-called night
When men must grope, he pities not that she
Stands in her deep immitigable grief...
The jungle traversed by the fawn-eyed girl
With fragile waist, whom sinful I brought forth
After long praise of Kaṇṇan's lotus feet....

The Ārvār sees a likeness of his lord in the blue water-lily, and sees the lord's form everywhere:

All places, shining like great lotus pools
On a blue mountain broad, to me are but
The beauties of his eye—the lord of earth
Girt by the roaring sea, heaven's lord, the lord
Of other good souls, black-hued lord—and mine!

The Ārvār speaks of the greatness of the lord:

Sages with wisdom won by virtuous toil
Assert "His colour, glorious beauty, name,
His form—are such and such." But all their toil
Has measured not the greatness of my lord:
Their wisdom's light is but a wretched lamp.

The foster-mother pities the mistress unable to endure the length of the night:

This child of sinful me, with well-formed teeth,
Round breasts and rosy mouth, keeps saying, "These
Fair nights eternal are as my desire
For tuḷasi!"...

Again the foster-mother pities the girl as too young for such ardent love:

Breasts not yet full, and short her tresses soft;
Skirt loose about the waist; with prattling tongue
And innocent eyes...

Again the lord replies to a friend's criticism of his infatuation for his mistress:

Those lilies red, which are the life of me—
The eyes of her who's like the heaven of him...

The mistress is unable to endure the darkness and is yet further vexed by the appearance of the moon:

Oh, let the crescent moon which cleaves the dark
Encompassing of night, cleave me as well!
Ah, does it issue forth in brightness now,
That happy bloom may come to desolate me
Who only long for flowers of *tuḷasī*?

The mistress's friend despairs at the sight of her languishing:

... Ah! as she sobs and lisps
The cloud-hued's names, I know not if she'll live
Or if her frame and spirit mild must pass!

Again in Kula-śekhara's *Tirumal-Tiru-mōi*, C. 5:

Though red fire comes itself and makes fierce heat,
The lotus red blooms not
Save for the fierce-rayed one
Who in the lofty heavens has his seat.
Vitruvakōḍu's Lord, Thou wilt not remove
My woe, my heart melts not save at Thy boundless love...

With gathered waters all the streams ashine
Must spread abroad and run
And enter the deep sea
And cannot stand outside. So refuge mine,
Save in the shining bliss of entering Thee, is none,
Vitruvakōḍu's Lord, thick cloud-hued, virtuous one!¹

Again from the same book²:

No kinship with the world have I
Which takes for true the life that is not true.
"For thee alone my passion burns," I cry,
"Raṅgan, my Lord!"
No kinship with this world have I—
With throngs of maidens slim of waist:
With joy and love I rise for one alone, and cry
"Raṅgan, my Lord!"

¹ Hooper, *op. cit.* p. 48.

² *Ibid.* p. 44.

Again in the *Tiru-pāvai*, a well-known section of the *Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham*, the poetess Āṇḍāl conceives herself as a Gopī, requesting her friends to go with her to wake the sleeping Kṛṣṇa,

After the cows we to the jungle go
And eat there—cowherds knowing nought are we,
And yet how great the boon we have, that thou
Wast born among us! Thou who lackest nought,
Gōvinda, kinship that we have with thee
Here in this place can never cease!—If through
Our love we call thee baby names, in grace
Do not be wroth, for we—like children—we
Know nought—O Lord, wilt thou not grant to us
The drum we ask? Ah, Ēlōrembāvāy!¹

Again Periy-ārvār conceives himself as Yaśodā and describes the infant Kṛṣṇa as lying in the dust and calling for the moon!

(1) He rolls round in the dust, so that the jewel on his brow keeps swinging, and his waist-bells tinkle! Oh, look at my son Gōvinda's play, big Moon, if thou hast eyes in thy face—and then, be gone!

(2) My little one, precious to me as nectar, my blessing, is calling thee, pointing, pointing, with his little hands! O big Moon, if thou wishest to play with this little black one, hide not thyself in the clouds, but come rejoicing!²

Again, Tiru-maṅgaiy says:

Or ever age creep on us, and we need
The staff's support; ere we are double bent
With eyes fix'd on the ground in front, and feet
That totter, sitting down to rest, all spent:
We would worship Vadari
Home of him who mightily
Suck'd his feignéd mother's breast
Till she died, ogress confest.

Again Āṇḍāl says:

Daughter of Nandagōpāl, who is like
A lusty elephant, who fleeth not,
With shoulders strong: Nappinnāi, thou with hair
Diffusing fragrance, open thou the door!
Come see how everywhere the cocks are crowing,
And in the *māthavi* bower the Kuyil sweet
Repeats its song.—Thou with a ball in hand,
Come, gaily open, with thy lotus hands
And tinkling bangles fair, that we may sing
Thy cousin's name! Ah, Ēlōrembāvāy!

¹ Hooper, *op. cit.* p. 57.

Ibid. p. 37.

Thou who art strong to make them brave in fight,
 Going before the three and thirty gods,
 Awake from out thy sleep! Thou who art just,
 Thou who art mighty, thou, O faultless one,
 Who burnest up thy foes, awake from sleep!
 O Lady Nappinnāi, with tender breasts
 Like unto little cups, with lips of red
 And slender waist, Lakshmi, awake from sleep!
 Proffer thy bridegroom fans and mirrors now,
 And let us bathe! Ah, Elōrembāvāy!¹

In describing the essential feature of the devotion of an Ārvār like Nāmm'-ārvār, called also Parāṅkuṣa or Śaṭhakopa, Gōvindāchāryar, the author of *The Divine Wisdom of the Drāviḍa Saints* and *The Holy Lives of the Āzhvārs*, says that according to Nāmm'-ārvār, when one is overcome by *bhakti*-exultation and self-surrendering devotion to God he easily attains truth². Nāmm'-ārvār said that God's grace is the only means of securing our salvation, and no effort is required on our part but to surrender ourselves to Him. In the following words Nāmm'-ārvār says that God is constantly trying to woo us to love Him:

Blissful Lord, heard I; anon my eyes in floods did run,
 Oh what is this? I asked. What marvel this? the Perfect one,
 Through friendly days and nights, elects with me to e'er remain,
 To union wooing me, His own to make; nor let me "lone."

Nāmm'-ārvār again writes that God's freedom is fettered by His mercy. Thus he says: "O mercy, thou hast deprived God of the freedom of His just will. Safe under the winds of mercy, no more can God Himself even of His will tear Himself away from me; for, if He can do so, I shall still exclaim, I am Victor, for He must purchase the freedom of His will by denying to Himself mercy." Illustrating the position, he refers to the case of a devout lady who clasped the feet of the Lord in Varadarāja's shrine at Kāñci and said: "God I have now clasped thy feet firmly; try if thou canst, spurn me and shake thyself off from me."

Nāmm'-ārvār used the term *Tuvaliḷ* or *Ninṇu kumiṇume*, a Tamil expression of love, which has been interpreted as signifying a continuous whirling emotion of love boring deeper and deeper, but never scattering and passing away. This circling and boring of

¹ Hooper, *op. cit.* p. 55.

² *Bhagavad-vishayam*, Bk. I, p. 571, as quoted in Gōvindāchāryar's *Divine Wisdom of the Drāviḍa Saints*.

love in the heart is mute, silent and incapable of expression; like the cow, whose teats filled with milk tingle, cannot withal express by mouth her painful longing to reach her calf who is tethered away from her. Thus, true love of God is perpetual and ever growing¹. The difference between the love of Nāmm'-ārvār and of Tirumaṅgaiy-ārvār is said to have been described by Yāmuna, as reported in the *Bhagavad-vishayam*, as of two different kinds. Tirumaṅgaiy-ārvār's love expresses the experience of a constant companionship with God in a state of delirious, rapturous reciprocation of ravishing love. He was immersed in the fathomless depth of love, and was in the greatest danger of becoming unconscious and falling into a stupor like one under the influence of a narcotic. Nāmm'-ārvār, however, was in a state of urgent pursuit after God. He was thus overcome with a sense of loneliness and unconscious of his individual self. He was not utterly intoxicated. The energy flowing from a mind full and strong with the ardent expectation of meeting his bridegroom and beloved companion still sustained him and kept him alive². This state is described in *Tiru-vāy-mōṛi* in the following manner:

Day and night she knows not sleep,
In floods of tears her eyes do swim.
Lotus-like eyes! She weeps and reels,
Ah! how without thee can I bear;
She pants and feels all earth for Him.

This love of God is often described as having three stages: recollection, trance and rallying. The first means the reminiscence of all the past ravishment of soul vouchsafed by God. The second means fainting and desolation at such reminiscences and a consciousness of the present absence of such ravishing enjoyments. The third is a sudden lucidity whilst in the state of trance, which being of a delirious nature may often lead to death through the rapid introduction of death-coma³.

The Ārvārs were not given to any philosophical speculation but only to ecstatic experiences of the emotion of love for God; yet we sometimes find passages in Nāmm'-ārvār's works wherein he reveals his experience of the nature of soul. Thus he says: "It is not possible to give a description of that wonderful entity, the soul

¹ *Divine Wisdom of the Drāviḍa Saints*, pp. 127-128.

² See the *Bhagavad-vishayam*, Bk. vi, p. 2865; also *Divine Wisdom*, pp. 130, 131.

³ *Bhagavad-vishayam*, Bk. vii, p. 3194; also *Divine Wisdom*, p. 151.

(*ātmā*)—the soul which is eternal, and is essentially characterized by intelligence (*jñāna*)—the soul which the Lord has condescended to exhibit to me as His mode, or I related to Him as the predicate is to the subject, or attribute is to substance (or consonants to the vowel A)—the soul, the nature of which is beyond the comprehension of even the enlightened—the soul, which cannot be classed under any category as this or that—the soul whose apperception by the strenuous mental effort called *yoga* (psychic meditation) is even then not comparable to such perception or direct proof as arises from the senses conveying knowledge of the external world—the soul (as revealed to me by my Lord) transcending all other categories of things, which could be grouped as ‘body’ or as ‘the senses,’ or as ‘the vital spirit’ (*prāṇa*), or as ‘the mind’ (*manas*), or as ‘the will’ (*buddhi*), being destitute of the modifications and corruptions to which all these are subject;—the soul, which is very subtle and distinct from any of these;—neither coming under the description ‘good,’ nor ‘bad.’ The soul is, briefly, an entity which does not fall under the cognizance of sense-knowledge¹.”

Soul is here described as a pure subtle essence unassociated with impurities of any kind and not knowable in the manner in which all ordinary things are known. Such philosophical descriptions or discussions concerning the nature of reality, or an investigation into the logical or epistemological position of the religion preached by them, are not within the scope and province of the Āṛvārs. They sang songs in an inspired manner and often believed that they themselves had no hand in their composition, but that it was God who spoke through them. These songs were often sung to the accompaniment of cymbals, and the intoxicating melody of the music was peculiar to the Āṛvārs and entirely different from the traditional music then current in South India. A study of the works of the Āṛvārs, which were collected together by the disciples of Rāmānuja at his special request, and from which Rāmānuja himself drew much inspiration and food for his system of thought, reveals an intimate knowledge of the Purāṇic legends of Kṛṣṇa, as found in the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* and the *Bhāgavata*². There is at least one passage, already referred to, which may well be interpreted as

¹ *Divine Wisdom*, p. 169; also *Tiru-vāy-mōṇi*, VIII. 5-8.

² Sir R. G. Bhandarkar notes that the Āṛvār Kula-śekhara, in his work *Mukunda-mālā*, quotes a passage from the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (XI. 2. 36) (*The*

alluding to Rādhā (Nappinnāi), who is described as the consort of Kṛṣṇa. The Ārvārs refer to the legends of Kṛṣṇa's early life in Brindavan and many of them play the role either of Yośodā, the friends of Kṛṣṇa, or of the Gopīs. The spiritual love which finds expression in their songs is sometimes an earnest appeal of direct longing for union with Kṛṣṇa, or an expression of the pangs of separation, or a feeling of satisfaction, and enjoyment from union with Kṛṣṇa in a direct manner or sometimes through an emotional identification with the legendary personages associated with Kṛṣṇa's life. Even in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (XI, XII) we hear of devotional intoxication through intense emotion, but we do not hear of any devotees identifying themselves with the legendary personages associated with the life of Kṛṣṇa and expressing their sentiment of love as proceeding out of such imaginary identification. We hear of the Gopī's love for Kṛṣṇa, but we do not hear of any person identifying himself with Gopī and expressing his sorrow of separation. In the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and the *Harivaṃśa*, the legendary love tales are only episodes in the life of Kṛṣṇa. But they do not make their devotees who identified themselves with the legendary lovers of Kṛṣṇa realize their devotion through such an imaginary identification. All that is therein expressed is that the legendary life of Kṛṣṇa would intensify the devotion of those who were already attached to Him. But the idea that the legend of Kṛṣṇa should have so much influence on the devotees as to infuse them with the characteristic spirits of the legendary personages in such a manner as to transform their lives after their pattern is probably a new thing in the history of devotional development in any religion. It is also probably absent in the cults of other devotional faiths of India. With the Ārvārs we notice for the first time the coming into prominence of an idea which achieved its culmination in the lives and literature of the devotees of the Gauḍīya school of Bengal, and particularly in the life of Caitanya, which will be dealt with in the fourth volume of the present work. The trans-

Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems, p. 70). This has been challenged by S. K. Aiyangar, in his *Early History of Vaiṣṇavism in South India*, who says that this passage is absent from all the three editions (a Kannaḍa, a Grantha, and a Devanāgarī Edition) which were accessible to him (p. 28). It is further suggested there that the allusion in the passage is doubtful, because it generally occurs at the end of most South Indian books by way of an apology for the faults committed at the time of the recitation of holy verses or the performance of religious observances.

fusion of the spirits of the legendary personages in the life-history of Kṛṣṇa naturally involved the transfusion of their special emotional attitudes towards Kṛṣṇa into the devotees, who were thus led to imagine themselves as being one with those legendary personalities and to pass through the emotional history of those persons as conceived through imagination. It is for this reason that we find that, when this spirit was emphasized in the Gauḍīya school and the analysis of erotic emotions made by the rhetorical school of thinkers from the tenth to the fourteenth century received recognition, the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas accepted the emotional analysis of the advancing stages of love and regarded them as indicating the stages in the development of the sentiment of devotion. As is well illustrated in Rūpa Gosvāmī's *Ujjvala-nīla-maṇi*, the transition from ordinary devotion to deep amorous sentiment, as represented in the legendary lives of Gopīs and Rādhā, was secured by sympathetic imitation akin to the sympathetic interest displayed in the appreciation of dramatic actions. The thinkers of the rhetorical school declare that a spectator of a dramatic action has his emotions aroused in such a manner that in their excess the individual limitations of time and space and the history of individual experiences which constitute his ordinary personality vanish for the time being. The disappearance of the ordinary individual personality and the overflow of emotion in one direction identify the person in an imaginary manner not only with the actors who display the emotion of the stage, but also with the actual personalities of those dramatic figures whose emotions are represented or imitated on the stage. A devotee, may, by over-brooding, rouse himself through auto-intoxication to such an emotional stage that upon the slightest suggestion he may transport himself to the imaginary sphere of a Gopī or Rādhā, and may continue to feel all the earnest affections that the most excited and passionate lover may ever feel.

It seems fairly certain that the Ārvārs were the earliest devotees who moved forward in the direction of such emotional transformation. Thus King Kula-śekhara, who was an Ārvār and devotee of Rāma, used to listen rapturously to the *Rāmāyaṇa* being recited to him. As he listened he became so excited that, when he heard of Rāma's venturing forth against Rāvaṇa, his demon opponent, he used to give orders to mobilize his whole army to march forward towards Laṅkā as an ally of Rāma.

The devotional songs of the Ārvārs show an intense familiarity with the various parts of the legendary life of Kṛṣṇa. The emotions that stirred them were primarily of the types of parental affection (as of a mother to her son), of friends and companions, servants to their masters, sons to their father and creator, as also that of a female lover to her beloved. In the case of some Ārvārs, as that of Nāmm'-ārvār and Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār, the last-mentioned type assumes an overwhelming importance. In the spiritual experiences of these Ārvārs we find a passionate yearning after God, the Lord and Lover; and in the expressions of their love we may trace most of the pathological symptoms of amorous longings which have been so intensely emphasized in the writings of the Vaiṣṇavas of the Gauḍīya school. In the case of the latter, the human analogy involving description of the bodily charms of the female lover is often carried too far. In the case of the Ārvārs, however, the emphasis is mostly on the transcendent beauty and charm of God, and on the ardent longings of the devotee who plays the part of a female lover, for Kṛṣṇa, the God. The ardent longing is sometimes expressed in terms of the pitiable pathological symptoms due to love-sickness, sometimes by sending messengers, spending the whole night in expectation of the Lord, and sometimes in the expressions of ravishing joy felt by the seemingly actual embrace of the Lord. We hear also of the reciprocation of love on the part of the Lord, who is described as being infatuated with the beauty and charms of the beloved, the Ārvār. In the course of these expressions, the personages in the legendary account of Kṛṣṇa's life are freely introduced, and references are made to the glorious episodes of His life, as showing points that heighten the love of the lady-lover, the Ārvār. The rapturous passions are like a whirlpool that eddies through the very eternity of the individual soul, and expresses itself sometimes in the pangs of separation and sometimes in the exhilaration of union. The Ārvār, in his ecstatic delight, visualizes God everywhere, and in the very profundity of his attainment pines for more. He also experiences states of supreme intoxication, when he becomes semi-conscious, or unconscious with occasional breaks into the consciousness of a yearning. But, though yearning after God is often delineated on the analogy of sex-love, this analogy is seldom carried to excess by studied attempts at following all the pathological symptoms of erotic love. It therefore represents a very

chaste form of the expressions of divine love in terms of human love. The Ārvārs were probably the pioneers in showing how love for God may be on terms of tender equality, softening down to the rapturous emotion of conjugal love. The Śaivism of South India flourished more or less at the same time. The hymns of the Śaivas are full of deep and noble sentiments of devotion which can hardly be excelled in any literature; but their main emphasis is on the majesty and the greatness of God and the feeling of submission, self-abnegation and self-surrender to God. The spirit of self-surrender and a feeling of clinging to God as one's all is equally dominant among the Ārvārs; but among them it melts down into the sweetness of passionate love. The Śaiva hymns are indeed pregnant with the divine fire of devotion, but more in the spirit of submissive service. Thus, Māṇikka-vāchakar, in his *Tiru-vācha kam*, speaking of Śiva, says¹:

And am I not Thy *slave*? and did'st Thou not make me Thine own,
I pray?

All those Thy servants have approached Thy Foot; this body full of sin
I may not quit, and see Thy face—Thou Lord of Ćiva-world!—I fear,
And *see not how to gain the sight!*

All *false* am I; *false* is my heart; and *false* my love; yet, if he weep,
May not Thy sinful servant Thee, Thou Soul's Ambrosial sweetness,
gain?

Lord of all honied gladness pure, in grace unto Thy servant teach
The way that he may come to Thee!

.

There was no love in me towards Thy Foot,
O Half of Her with beauteous fragrant locks!
By magic power that stones to mellow fruit
converts, Thou mad'st me lover of Thy Feet.
Our Lord, Thy tender love no limit knows.
Whatever sways me now, whate'er my deed,
Thou can'st even yet Thy Foot again to me
display and save, O Spotless Heavenly One!

The devotee also felt the sweetness of God's love and the fact that it is through Divine Grace that one can be attracted towards Him and can love Him:

¹ Pope's translation of the *Tiru vācha-kam*, p. 77.

Honey from any flower sip not, though small
 as tiniest grain of millet seed!
 Whene'er we think of Him, whene'er we see,
 whene'er of Him our lips converse,
 Then sweetest rapture's honey ever flows,
 till all our frame in bliss dissolves!
 To Him alone, the mystic Dancer, go;
 and breathe His praise, thou humming-bee!

Ārvārs and Śrī-vaiṣṇavas on certain points of controversy in religious dogmas.

The Aṛagiyas Nāthamuni, Yāmuna, Rāmānuja and their adherents largely followed the inspirational teachings of the Ārvārs, yet there were some differences of opinion among them regarding some of the cardinal points of religious faith. These have been collected in separate treatises, of which two may be regarded as most important. One of them is called *Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārthavivaraṇa*, by Rāmānuja himself, and the other is called *Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya*¹. Veṅkaṭanātha and others also wrote important treatises on the subject. Some of these points of difference may be enumerated below.

The first point is regarding the grace of God (*svāmi-kṛpā*). It is suggested by the Ārvārs that the grace of God is spontaneous and does not depend on any effort or merit on the part of the devotee. If God had to depend on anything else for the exercise of His divine prerogative grace, it would be limited to that extent. Others, however, say that God's grace depends on the virtuous actions of the devotees. If that were not so, all people would in time be emancipated, and there would be no need of any effort on their part. If it was supposed that God in His own spontaneity extended His grace to some in preference to others, He would have to be regarded as partial. It is therefore to be admitted that, though God is free in extending His mercy, yet in practice He extends it only as a reward to the virtuous or meritorious actions of the devotee. God, though all-merciful and free to extend His mercy to all without effort on their part, does not actually do so except on the occasion of the meritorious actions of His devotees. The extension of God's mercy is thus both without cause (*nirhetuka*) and with cause (*saHetuka*)².

¹ Both these are MSS.

² *kṛpā-sva-rūpato nir-hetukah, rakṣaṇa-samaye cetanā-kṛta-sukṛtena sa-hetuko bhūtvā rakṣati*. (*Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya*, MS. p. 2.)

Here the latter view is that of Rāmānuja and his followers. It must, however, be pointed out in this connection that the so-called differences between the Ārvārs and the Rāmānujists on the cardinal points of religious faith are a discovery of later research, when the writings of the Ārvārs had developed a huge commentary literature and Rāmānuja's own writings had inspired many scholars to make commentaries on his works or to write independent treatises elucidating his doctrines. The later scholars who compared the results of the Ārvār and the Rāmānuja literatures came to the conclusion that there are some differences of view between the two regarding the cardinal faith of religion. This marks a sharp anti-thesis between the Ārvāric Teṅgalai school and the Vaḍagalai school, of which latter Veṅkaṭa was the leader. These differences are briefly narrated in the *Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya*. The cardinal faith of religion according to Rāmānuja has been narrated in the *Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-vivaraṇa*. The main principle of religious approach to God is self-surrender or *prapatti*. *Prapatti* is defined as a state of prayerfulness of mind to God, associated with the deep conviction that He alone is the saviour, and that there is no way of attaining His grace except by such self-surrender¹. The devotee is extremely loyal to Nārāyaṇa and prays to Him and no one else, and all his prayers are actuated by deep affection and no other motive. The virtue of *prapatti* involves within it universal charity, sympathy and friendliness even to the most determined enemy². Such a devotee feels that the Lord (*svāmī*), being the very nature of his own self, is to be depended on under all circumstances. This is called the state of supreme resignation (*nirbharatva*) in all one's affairs³. The feeling of the devotee that none of the assigned scriptural duties can be helpful to him in attaining the highest goal

¹ *an-anya-sādhye svābhīṣṭe mahā-viśvāsa-pūrvakam
tad-eko' pāyatā yācñā prapattiḥ śaraṇā-gatiḥ.*

Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-vivaraṇa, p. 3.

Rāmānuja, in his *Gadya-trayam*, says that such a state of prayerfulness of mind is also associated with confessions of one's sins and shortcomings and derelictions, and with a feeling that the devotee is a helpless servant of God extremely anxious to get himself saved by the grace of the Saviour. See the *Gadya-trayam*, *Śaraṇā-gati-gadyam*, pp. 52-54.

² This is technically known as *Prapatti-naiṣṭhikam* (*Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-vivaraṇa*, pp. 3-7). Cf. the parables of the pigeon and the monkey in the above section.

³ The interpretation is forced out of the conception of the word "svāmin," which etymologically involves the word "svam" meaning "one's own."

is technically called "*upāya-śūnyatā*," i.e. the realization of the uselessness of all other means. The devotee always smiles at all the calamities that may befall him. Considering himself to be a servant of God, he cheerfully bears all the miseries that may be inflicted on him by God's own people. This is technically called "*pāra-tantrya*," or supreme subordination. The devotee conceives his soul as a spiritual essence which has no independence by itself and is in every respect dependent on God and exists for God¹. The Vaiṣṇavas are often called *ekāntins*, and have sometimes been wrongly considered as monotheists; but the quality of *ekāntitva* is the definite characteristic of self-surrender and clinging to God in an unshaken manner—the fullest trustfulness in Him under all adverse circumstances. The devotee's mind is always exhilarated with the divine presence of the Lord who animates all his senses—his inclinations, emotions and experiences. The fullness with which he realizes God in all his own activities and thoughts, and in everything else in the universe, naturally transports him to a sphere of being in which all mundane passions—antipathy, greed, jealousy, hatred—become impossible. With the divine presence of God he becomes infused with the spirit of friendship and charity towards all beings on earth². The devotee has to take proper initiation from the preceptor, to whom he must confess all that is in his mind, and by abnegating all that is in him to his preceptor, he finds an easy way to conceive himself as the servant of Viṣṇu³. He must also have a philosophical conception of the entirely dependent relation of the human soul and all the universe to God⁴. Such a conception naturally involves realization of the presence of God in all our sense activities, which

¹ *jñāna-mayo hi ātmā śeṣo hi paramā-tmanah iti jñānā-nandamayo jñānā-nanda-guṇakah san sva-rūpaṁ bhagavad-adhīnaṁ sa tad-artham eva tiṣṭhati* ti jñātvā vatiṣṭhate iti yad etat tad-a-prākṛtatvam.

Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-vivaraṇam, p. 11.

² This virtue is technically called *nitya-rāgītva*.

³ The five *saṁskāras* that a *paramaikāntin* must pass through are as follows:
*tāpāḥ paundras tathā nāma mantrō yāgaś ca pañcamah
amī te pañca saṁskārāḥ paramaikānti-hetavaḥ.* *Ibid.* p. 15.

⁴ This is technically called *sambandha-jñānitvam*. The conception that everything exists for God is technically called *śeṣa-bhūtatvam*. *Ibid.* p. 18.

This naturally implies that the devotee must work and feel himself a servant of God and of His chosen men. The service to humanity and to God then naturally follow from the philosophical conception of the dependence of the human souls, and of the universe, on God as a part of Him and to be controlled by Him in every way. This is again technically called *śeṣa-vṛtti-paratva*. *Ibid.* pp. 19-20.

presence in its fullness must easily lead to the complete control of all our senses. Through the realization of God's presence in them, the devotees play the part of moral heroes, far above the influences of the temptation of the senses¹. The normal religious duties, as prescribed in the Vedas and the *smṛtis*, are only for the lower order of the people; those who are given entirely to God with the right spirit of devotion need not follow the ordinary code of duties which is generally binding for all. Such a person is released by the spontaneous grace of God, and without performing any of the scriptural duties enjoys the fruits of all². He is always conscious of his own faults, but takes no notice of the faults of others, to which he behaves almost as a blind man; he is always infused with the consciousness that all his actions are under the complete sway of the Lord. He has no enjoyment for himself, for he always feels that it is the Lord who would enjoy Himself through all his senses³.

In the *Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya* it is said that according to the Ārvārs, since emancipation means the discovery of a lost soul to God or the unlimited servitude of God, emancipation is for the interest of God and not of the devotee. The service of the servant is for the servitude of God alone. It has therefore no personal interest for the devotee⁴. According to the Aṛāgiyas, however, emancipation, though primarily for the interest of the Lord, is also

¹ This is technically called the *nitya-sūratva*.

² *jñāna-niṣṭho virakto vā mad-bhaktō hy a-napekṣakah
sa līṅgān āśramān tyaktvā cared a-vidhi-gocarah*

*ity evam iṣaṇa-traya-vinirmuktas san bhagavan-nir-hetuka-kaṭākṣa eva
mokṣo-pāyah iti tiṣṭhati khalu so'dhikārī sakala-dharmānām avāśyo bhavati.
Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-vivaraṇa, p. 23*

This spirit of following God, leaving all other scriptural duties, is technically called *a-vidhi-gocaratva*. In another section of this work Rāmānuja describes *mokṣa* or salvation as the conviction that the nature of God transcends, in bliss, power and knowledge, all other conceivable things of this or any other universe. A desire to cling to God as a true means of salvation is technically called *mumukṣutva*. The doctrine of *a-vidhi-gocaratva* herein described seems to be in conflict with Rāmānuja's view on the subject explained in the *bhāṣya* as interpreted by his many followers. This may indicate that his views underwent some change, and these are probably his earlier views when he was under the influence of the Ārvārs.

³ This is technically called *parā-kāśatva* (*Ibid.* pp. 23-24). The attitude of worshipping the image as the visible manifestation of God is technically called *upāya-svarūpa-jñāna*. The cessation of attachment to all mundane things and the flowing superabundance of love towards God, and the feeling that God is the supreme abode of life, is technically called *ātmā-rāmatva*.

⁴ *phalaṃ mokṣa-rūpam, tad bhagavata eva na svārthaṃ yathā pranaṣṭa-dṛṣṭa-
dravya-lābho dravyavata eva na dravyasya; tathā mokṣa-phalaṃ ca svāmīna eva*

at the same time for the interest of the devotee, because of the intense delight he enjoys by being a servant of God. The illustration of lost objects discovered by the master does not hold good, because human beings are conscious entities who suffer immeasurable sorrow which is removed by realizing themselves as servants of God. Though the devotee abnegates all the fruits of his actions in a self-surrender, yet he enjoys his position in the servitude of God and also the bliss of the realization of Brahman. Thus, those who take the path of knowledge (*upāsaka*) attain Brahma knowledge and the servitude of God, and those who take the path of self-surrender (*prapatti*) also attain Brahma knowledge and the servitude of God. In the state of salvation (*mukti*) there is no difference of realization corresponding to the variation of paths which the seekers after God may take¹. Again, in the Ārvār school of thought, besides the four ways of scriptural duties, philosophic wisdom, devotion to God and devotion to teachers, there was a fifth way, viz. that of intense self-surrender to God, i.e. *prapatti*. But the Aṛagiya thought that apart from *prapatti* there was only one other way of approaching God, namely devotion, *bhakti-yoga*. Rāmānuja and his followers maintain that *karma-yoga* and *jñāna-yoga* only help to purify the mind, as a preparation for *bhakti-yoga*. The devotion to the preceptor is regarded only as a form of *prapatti*; so there are only two ways of approach to God, viz. *bhakti-yoga* and *prapatti*².

Further, Śrī occupies an important position in Śrī-vaiṣṇavism. But as there are only three categories in the Śrī-vaiṣṇava system, a question may naturally arise regarding the position of Śrī in the threefold categories of *cit*, *acit* and *parameśvara*. On this point the view of the older school, as described in Ramya-jāmāṭṛ muni's *Tattva-dīpa*, is that Śrī is to be identified with human souls and is therefore to be regarded as atomic in nature³. Others, however, think that Śrī is as all-pervasive as Viṣṇu. Filial affection (*vātsalya*)

na muktasya; yad vā phalaṃ kainkaryam tat parā-rtham eva na svā-rtham; para-tantra-daśā-kṛtam kainkaryam sva-tantra-svāmy-artham eva. Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya, p. 2.

¹ *Ibid.* p. 3.

² *ataḥ prapatti-vyতিরিক্তো bhakti-yoga eka eve' ti. Ibid.* p. 4.

³ *Ibid.* In the next section it is urged that, according to some, Nārāyaṇa and not Śrī is the only agent who removes our sins, but others hold that sins may be removed also by Śrī in a remote manner, or, because Śrī is identical with Nārāyaṇa; as the fragrance is with the flower, she has also a hand in removing the sins. *Ibid.* p. 5.

lakṣmī upāyatam bhagavata iva sākṣāt abhyupagantavyam. Ibid.

for God is interpreted by the older schools as involving an attitude in which the faults of the beloved devotee are points of endearment to Him¹. In the later view, however, filial affection is supposed to involve an indifference or a positive blindness towards the faults of the devotee. God's mercy is interpreted by the older school as meaning God's affliction or suffering in noticing that of others. Later schools, however, interpret it as an active sympathy on His part, as manifested in His desire to remove the sufferings of others on account of His inability to bear such miseries².

Prapatti, otherwise called *nyāsa*, is defined by the older school as a mere passivity on the part of the Lord in accepting those who seek Him or as a mental state on the part of the seeker in which he is conscious of himself only as a spirit; but such a consciousness is unassociated with any other complex feeling, of egoism and the like, which invests one with so-called individuality. It may also mean the mental state in which the seeker conceives himself as a subsidiary accessory to God as his ultimate end, to Whom he must cling unburdened by any idea of scriptural duties³; or he may concentrate himself absolutely on the supreme interest and delight that he feels in the idea that God is the sole end of his being. Such a person naturally cannot be entitled without self-contradiction to any scriptural duty. Just as a guilty wife may return to her husband, and may passively lie in a state of surrender to him and resign herself, so the seeker may be conscious of his own true position with reference to God leading to a passive state of surrender⁴. Others think that it involves five elements: (i) that God is the only saviour;

¹ *yathā kāmukaḥ kāmīnyā mālinyaṃ bhogyatayā svīkaroti tathā bhagavān āśrita-doṣaṃ svīkaroti itare tu vātsalyaṇi nāma doṣadārśitam. Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya*, p. 6.

It is further suggested that, if a devotee takes the path of *prapatti*, he has not to suffer for his faults as much as others would have to suffer.

² The first alternative is defined as *para-duḥkha-duḥkhītvam dayā*. The second alternative is *svārtha-nirapekṣa-para-duḥkha-sahiṣṇutā dayā*; *sa ca tan nirākaraṇecchā*. In the first alternative *dayā* is a painful emotion; in the second it is a state of desire, stirred up by a feeling of repugnance, which is midway between feeling and volition. *Ibid.* p. 6.

³ *prapattir nāma a-nivāraṇa-mātram a-cid-vyāvrtti-mātram vā a-vidheyam śeṣātva-jñāna-mātram vā para-śeṣatui-ka-rati-rūpa-parisuddha-yāthātmya-jñāna-mātram vā. Ibid.* p. 6.

According to some, any of these conditions would define *prapatti* "ato'prati-śedhādy-anyaṭamai' va iti kecit kathayanti." *Ibid.*

⁴ *atyanta-para-tantrasya virodhatvena amuṣṭhānā-nupapatteḥ, pratyuta anuṣṭatur ānarthakya-muktam Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa, ciraṃ anya-parayā bhāryayā kadācid bharty-sakāṣam āgatayā mām angikuru iti vākyaavat cetana-kṛta-prapattir iti. Ibid.* p. 6.

(ii) that He is the only end to be attained; (iii) that He alone is the supreme object of our desires; (iv) that we absolutely surrender and resign ourselves to Him¹; and (v) supreme prayerfulness—all associated with absolute trustfulness in Him.

There are some who define the *prapanna*, or seeker of God, as one who has read the Ārvār literature of *prabandhas* (*adhīta-prabandhaḥ prapannaḥ*). Others, however, think that the mere study of the *prabandhas* cannot invest a man with the qualities of *prapatti*. They think that he alone is entitled to the path of *prapatti* who cannot afford to adopt the dilatory courses of *karma-yoga*, *jñāna-yoga* and *bhakti-yoga*, and therefore does not think much of these courses. Again, the older school thinks that the person who adopts the path of *prapatti* should give up all scriptural duties and duties assigned to the different stages of life (*āśrama*); for it is well evidenced in the *Gītā* text that one should give up all one's religious duties and surrender oneself to God. Others, again, think that the scriptural duties are to be performed even by those who have taken the path of *prapatti*. Further, the older school thinks that the path of knowledge is naturally against the path of *prapatti*; for *prapatti* implies the negation of all knowledge, excepting one's self-surrendering association with God. The paths of duties and of knowledge assume an egoism which contradicts *prapatti*. Others, however, think that even active self-surrender to God implies an element of egoism, and it is therefore wrong to suppose that the paths of duties and of knowledge are reconcilable with *prapatti* on account of its association with an element of egoism. The so-called egoism is but a reference to our own nature as self, and not to *ahaṅkāra*, an evolute². Again, some think that even a man who has

¹ In the second alternative it is defined as follows:

*an-anya-sādhye svā-bhāṣte mahā-viśvāsa-pūrvakam
tad-eko'pāyatā yācā prapattiś śaraṇa-gatiḥ.*

These are the five *aṅgas* of *prapatti*, otherwise called *nikṣepa*, *tyāga*, *nyāsa* or *śaraṇa-gati* (*Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya*, pp. 6, 7). The difference between the first and second alternative is that, according to the former, *prapatti* is a state of mind limited to the consciousness of its true nature in relation to God; on the part of God also it indicates merely a passive toleration of the seekers flocking unto Him (*a-nivāraṇa-mātram*). In the second alternative, however, *prapatti* is defined as positive self-surrendering activity on the part of the seekers and unconditional protection to them all on the part of God. It is, therefore, that on the first alternative the consciousness of one's own true nature is defined in three ways, any one of which would be regarded on that alternative as a sufficient definition of *prapatti*. The first one is merely in the cognitive state, while the second involves an additional element of voluntary effort.

² *Ibid.* pp. 8, 9.

adopted the path of *prapatti* may perform the current scriptural duties only with a view to not lending any support to a reference to their cases as pretexts for neglect of normal duties by the unenlightened and the ignorant, i.e. those that have adopted the path of *prapatti* should also perform their duties for the purpose of *loka-saṃgraha*. Others, however, think that the scriptural duties, being the commandments of God, should be performed for the satisfaction of God (*bhagavat-prīty-artham*), even by those who have taken the path of *prapatti*. Otherwise they would have to suffer punishment for that.

The accessories of *prapatti* are counted as follows: (i) A positive mental attitude to keep oneself always in consonance with the Lord's will (*ānukūlyasya saṃkalpaḥ*); (ii) a negative mental attitude (*prātikūlyasya varjanam*), as opposing anything that may be conceived as against His will; (iii) a supreme trustfulness that the Lord will protect the devotee (*rakṣiṣyatīti viśvāsaḥ*); (iv) prayer to Him as a protector (*goptrtva-varaṇam*); (v) complete self-surrender (*ātma-nikṣepaḥ*); (vi) a sense of complete poverty and helplessness (*kārpaṇyam*). The older school thinks that the man who adopts the path of *prapatti* has no desires to fulfil, and thus he may adopt any of these accessories which may be possible for him according to the conditions and inclinations of his mind. Others, however, think that even those who follow the path of *prapatti* are not absolutely free from any desire, since they wish to feel themselves the eternal servants of God. Though they do not crave for the fulfilment of any other kind of need, it is obligatory upon them to perform all the six accessories of *prapatti* described above.

The older school thinks that God is the only cause of emancipation and that the adoption of the path of *prapatti* is not so; the later school, however, thinks that *prapatti* is also recognized as the cause of salvation in a secondary manner, since it is only through *prapatti* that God extends His grace to His devotees¹. Again, the older schools think that there is no necessity for expiation (*prāyaścitta*) for those who adopt the path of *prapatti*; for with them God's grace is sufficient to remove all sins. The later schools, however, think that, if the follower of the path of *prapatti* is physically fit to perform the courses of expiation, then it is obligatory on him. According to the older school a man possessing the eight kinds of devo-

¹ *Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya*, p. 10.

tion (*bhakti*), even if he be a *mleccha*, is preferred to a Brahman and may be revered as such. According to the later schools, however, a devotee of a lower caste may be shown proper respect, but he cannot be revered as a Brahman. Again, on the subject of the possibility of pervasion of the atomic individual souls by God, the older schools are of opinion that God by His infinite power may enter into the atomic individuals; the later schools, however, think that such a pervasion must be of an external nature, i.e. from outside. It is not possible for God to penetrate into individual souls¹. As regards *Kaivalya* the older schools say that it means only self-apperception. He who attains this state attains the highest stage of eternity or immortality. The later school, however, thinks that he who has merely this self-apperception cannot attain immortality through that means only; for this self-apperception may not necessarily mean a true revelation of his nature with reference to God. He can realize that only as he passes through higher spheres and ultimately reaches Vaikunṭha—the abode of God, where he is accepted as the servant of the Lord. It is such a state that can be regarded as eternal².

¹ *Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya*, p. 12. The view is supported by a reference to Varadācārya's *Adhikaraṇa-cintāmaṇi*.

² The eighteen points of dispute as herein explained have been collected in the *Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya*, according to the ancients in a verse quoted from them as follows:

*bhedaḥ svāmi-kṛpā-phalā-nya-gatiṣu śrī-vyāpty-upāyatvayos
tad-vātsalya-dayā-nirukti-vacasornyāse ca tat kartari
dharma-tyāga-virodhayos sva-vihite nyāsā-ṅga-hetutvayoh
prāyaścitta-vidhau tadya-bhajane' nvyāpti-kaivalyayoh.* *Ibid.* p. 1.

CHAPTER XVIII

AN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY SURVEY OF THE VIŚIṢṬĀ-DVAITA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

The Aṛagiyas from Nāthamuni to Rāmānuja.

A. GÖVINDĀCHĀRYAR has written a book, *The Holy Lives of the Āzhvārs*, based upon a number of old works¹. The writings of the Ārvārs may be sub-divided generally into three *rahasyas* (or mystical accounts) called *Tiru-mantra-churukku*, *Dvaya-churukku*, *Carama-śloka-churukku*. These three *rahasyas* have also been dealt with in later times by very prominent persons, such as Venkaṭanātha, Rāghavācārya and others. Some account of these, in the manner of these later writers, will be briefly given in the proper place, since the scope of this work does not permit us to go into the details of the lives of the Ārvārs. The hagiologists make a distinction between the Ārvārs and the Aṛagiyas in this, that, while the former were only inspired men, the latter had their inspirations modified by learning and scholarship. The list of Aṛagiyas begins with Nāthamuni. There is some difficulty in fixing his age. The *Guru-paramparā*, the *Divya-sūri-carita* and the *Prapannāmṛta*, are of opinion that he was in direct contact with Nāmm'-ārvār, otherwise called Śaṭhakopa, or Kaṛimāraṇ, or rather with his disciple Madhura-kaviy-ārvār. Thus, the *Prapannāmṛta* says that Nāthamuni was born in the village called Vīranārāyaṇa, near the Cola country. His father's name was Īśvara Bhaṭṭa, and his son was Īśvaramuni². He went on a long pilgrimage, in the course of which he visited the northern countries, including Mathurā, Vṛndāvana and Haridvāra, and also Bengal and Purī. After returning to his own place he found that some of the

¹ (1) *Divya-sūri-carita* (a. earlier work than the *Prapannāmṛta*, which often alludes to it) by Garuḍa-vāhana Paṇḍita, contemporary and disciple of Rāmānuja; (2) *Prapannāmṛta*, by Ananta-sūri, disciple of Śaila-raṅgeśa guru; (3) *Prabandha-sūtra*, by Venkaṭanātha; (4) *Upadeśa-ratna-mālai* by Rāmyajāmātr-mahā-muni, otherwise called Varavara-muni or Periya-jīyar or Maṇavāla Mā-muni; (5) *Guru-paramparā-prabhāvam* by Pinb'-aṛagiya Peru-māl Jīyar; and (6) *Pazhanadai-vilakkan*.

² It is said that he belonged to the lineage of Śaṭhakopa or Śaṭha-marṣaṇa. His other name was Śrī-raṅga-nātha. (See introduction to *Caruḥ-śloka*, Ananda Press, Madras, p. 3.)

Śrīvaiṣṇavas, who came from the Western countries to the temple of Rājagopāla, recited there ten verses by Kaṛimāra. Nāthamuni, who heard those hymns, realized that they were parts of a much bigger work and decided to collect them. He went to Kumbhakoṇa, and under the inspiration of God proceeded to the city of Kurakā, on the banks of Tāmraparṇī, and there met Madhura-kaviy-āṟvār, the disciple of Nāmm'-āṟvār, and asked him if the hymns of Nāmm'-āṟvār were available. Madhura-kaviy-āṟvār told him that after composing a big book of hymns in Tamil and instructing Madhura-kaviy-āṟvār the same, Nāmm'-āṟvār had attained salvation. The work could not, therefore, obtain currency among the people. The people of the locality had the misconception that the study of the work would be detrimental to the Vedic religion. So they threw it into the river Tāmraparṇī. Only one page of the book, containing ten verses, was picked up by a man who appreciated the verses and recited them. Thus only these ten verses have been saved. Nāthamuni recited twelve thousand times a verse composed by Madhura-kaviy-āṟvār in adoration of Nāmm'-āṟvār, and, as a result of that, Nāmm'-āṟvār revealed the purport of the whole work to him. But when Nāthamuni wanted to know all the verses in detail he was advised to approach an artisan of the place who was inspired by Nāmm'-āṟvār to reveal all the verses to him. So Nāthamuni received the entire work of Nāmm'-āṟvār from the artisan. He then gave it to his pupil Puṇḍarikākṣa, and Puṇḍarikākṣa gave it to his disciple Rāma Miśra, and Rāma Miśra gave it to Yāmuna, and Yāmuna gave it to Goṣṭhīpūrṇa, and Goṣṭhīpūrṇa gave it to his daughter Devakī Śrī. Nāthamuni brought the hymns together, and, through his two nephews, Melaiyagattāṟvār and Kilaiyagattāṟvār, set them to music in the Vedic manner; from that time forward these hymns were sung in the temples and were regarded as the Tamil Veda¹. The oldest *Guru-paramparā* and *Divya-sūri-carita*, however, say that Nāthamuni obtained the works of Nāmm'-āṟvār directly from him. The later Śrīvaiṣṇavas found that the above statements did not very well suit the traditional antiquity of the Āṟvārs, and held that Madhura-kaviy-āṟvār was not the direct disciple of Nāmm'-āṟvār and that Nāthamuni attained the high age of three hundred years. But, if, as we found before, Nāmm'-āṟvār's date be fixed in the ninth century, no such supposition

¹ *Prapannāmṛta*, Chs. 106 and 107.

becomes necessary. Gopīnātha Rāu refers also to a Sanskrit inscription in the middle of the tenth century, in which it is stated that the author of the verses was a disciple of Śrīnātha. If this Śrīnātha is the same as Nāthamuni, then the computation of Nāthamuni's date as falling in the tenth century is quite correct. He had eleven disciples, of whom Puṇḍarikākṣa, Karukānātha and Śrīkṛṣṇa Lakṣmīnātha were the most prominent. He wrote three works, *Nyāya-tattva*, *Puruṣa-niṇṇaya* and *Yoga-rahasya*¹. Nāthamuni is also described as a great yogin who practised the *yoga* of eight accessories (*aṣṭāṅga-yoga*)². The *Prapannāmṛta* says that he died by entering into *yoga* in the city of Āgaṅgā (probably Gaṅgaikoṇḍaṣoḍapuram). Gopī-nātha, however, thinks that he could not have died in that city, for it was not founded by Rajendra-*dracola*, otherwise called Gaṅgaikoṇḍasola, before 1024, which must be later than the date of Nāthamuni. Nāthamuni lived probably in the reign of Parāntaka Cola I, and died before or in the reign of Parāntaka Cola II, i.e. he lived eighty or ninety years in the middle of the tenth century. He had made an extensive tour in Northern India as far as Mathurā and Badarī-nātha and also to Dvārakā and Purī. Śrīkṛṣṇa Lakṣmīnātha, disciple of Nāthamuni, wrote an extensive work on the doctrine of *prapatti*. He was born at a place called Kṛṣṇamaṅgala. He was well-versed in the Vedas, and was a specialist in Vedānta and also a great devotee, who constantly employed himself in chanting the name of Viṣṇu (*nāma-saṅkīrtana-rataḥ*). He used often to go about naked and live on food that was thrown to him. The hagiologists say that he entered into the image of the temple and became one with God. Puṇḍa-

¹ The *Nyāya-tattva* is referred to by Venkaṭanātha in his *Nyāya-parīśuddhi* (p. 13) as a work in which Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtras* were criticized and refuted:

*bhagavan-nātha-munibhir nyāya-tattva-samāhwayā
avadhīrā kṣapādādin nyabandhi nyāya-paddhatih*

Nyāya-parīśuddhi, p. 13.

² The practice of *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* was not a new thing with Nāthamuni. In giving an account of Tiru-māṇḍai Pirān, also called Bhaktisāra, the *Prapannāmṛta* says that he first became attached to the god Śiva and wrote many Tamil works on Śaiva doctrines; but later on the saint Mahārya initiated him into Vaiṣṇavism and taught him *aṣṭāṅga-yoga*, through which he realized the great truths of Vaiṣṇavism. He then wrote many works in Tamil on Vaiṣṇavism. Bhakti-sāra also wrote a scholarly work, refuting the views of other opponents, which is known as *Tattvārtha-sāra*. Bhakti-sāra also used to practise *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* and was learned in all the branches of Indian philosophy. Bhakti-sāra had a disciple named Kanikṛṣṇa, who wrote many extremely poetical verses or hymns in adoration of Viṣṇu. Kula-śekhara Peru-māl is also said to have practised *yoga*.

rikākṣa Uyyakoṇḍār is supposed to have very much influenced the character of Kurukānātha, who in the end entered into *yoga* and died. Rāma Miśra was born in the city of Saugandhakulya, in a Brahmin family, and was a pupil of Puṇḍarikākṣa. The name of Puṇḍarikākṣa's wife was Āṇḍāl. Puṇḍarikākṣa asked Rāma Miśra (Manakkal-lambej) to teach Yāmuna all that he was taught. Yāmuna, however, was not born during the life of Puṇḍarikākṣa, and Puṇḍarikākṣa only prophesied his birth in accordance with the old prophecy of Nāthamuni. Rāma Miśra had four disciples, excluding Yāmuna, of whom Lakṣmī was the most prominent¹. He used to stay in Śrīraṅgam and expound the doctrines of the Vedānta.

Yāmunācārya, otherwise called Ālavandār, son of Īśvaramuni and grandson of Nāthamuni, was born probably in A.D. 918 and is said to have died in A.D. 1038. He learned the Vedas from Rāma Miśra, and was reputed to be a great debater². Becoming a king, he was duly married and had two sons named Vararaṅga and Śoṭṭha-pūrṇa. He lived happily for a long time, enjoying his riches, and took no notice of Rāma Miśra. But Rāma Miśra with some difficulty obtained access to him and availed himself of the opportunity to teach him the *Bhagavad-gītā*, which aroused the spirit of detachment in him, and he followed Rāma Miśra to Śrīraṅgam and, renouncing everything, became a great devotee³. One of the last

¹ (1) Taivattuk-k-arasu-Nambi; (2) Gomathattut-tiruvinnagar-appan; (3) Sirup-pullur-udaya-Pillai; (4) Vangi-puratt-acchi. (See *The Life of Rāmānuja*, by Govindāchāryar, p. 14.)

² The *Prapannāmṛta* relates a story of Yāmuna's debating power at the age of twelve. The king of the place had a priest of the name of Akkaialvan, who was a great debater. Yāmuna challenged him and defeated him in an open debate held in the court of the king. He was given half the kingdom as a reward. He seems to have been very arrogant in his earlier days, if the wording of his challenge found in the *Prapannāmṛta* can be believed. The words of challenge run as follows:

*ā śailād adri-kanyā-caraṇa-kisalaya-nyāsa-dhanyopakanthād
ā rakṣo-nīta-sītā-mukha-kamala-samullāsa-hetoḥ ca setoh
ā ca prācya-praticya-kṣīti-dhara-yuga tadarkacandrāvataṁsān
mīmāṁsā-śāstra-yugma-śrama-vimala-manā mṛgyatām mādrśo'nyah*

Ch. III.

³ A story is told in the *Prapannāmṛta* that, when Yāmuna became a king and inaccessible to him, Rāma Miśra was concerned how he could carry out the commands of his teachers and initiate Yāmuna to the path of devotion. He got in touch with Yāmuna's cook, and for six months presented some green vegetables (*aiarka-śāka*) which Yāmuna very much liked. When, after the six months, the king asked how the rare vegetables found their way into the kitchen, Rāma Miśra stayed away for four days praying to Raṅganātha, the deity, to tell him how he could approach Yāmuna. In the meanwhile the king missed the green vegetables and asked his cook to present Rāma Miśra when next he should come to the kitchen. Rāma Miśra was thus presented to Yāmuna.

instructions of Rāma Mīśra was to direct him to go to Kurukānātha (Kurugai-kkaval-appan) and learn from him the *aṣṭāṅga-yoga*, which had been left with him (*Kurukā*) by Nāthamuni for Yāmuna. Yāmuna had many disciples, of whom twenty-one are regarded as prominent. Of these disciples, Mahāpūrṇa belonged to the Bhāradvāja *gotra*, and had a son named Puṇḍarikākṣa and a daughter named Attutayi. Another disciple, called Śrīśailapūrṇa, was known also by the name Tātācārya¹. Another of his disciples, Goṣṭhīpūrṇa, was born in the Pāṇḍya country, where also, in the city of Śrīmadhurā, was born another of Yāmuna's disciples, Mālādhara. In the city of Maraner in the Pāṇḍya country was born another disciple, Maraner Nambi, a *śūdra* by caste; a further disciple, Kāñcīpūrṇa, who was also of the *śūdra* caste, was born in the city of Punamallī. Yāmuna used to invest all his disciples with the five Vaiṣṇava *saṃskāras*, and he also converted the Cola king and queen to the same faith and made over the kingdom he had hitherto enjoyed to the service of the deity Raṅganātha of Śrīraṅgam. Śrīśailapūrṇa, or Bhūri Śrīśailapūrṇa, or Mahāpūrṇa had two sons, two sisters and two daughters. The elder sister, Kāntimatī, was married to Keśava Yajvan, also called Āsuri Keśava, Rāmānuja's father, and the second sister, Dyutimatī, was married to Kanalakṣa Bhaṭṭa, and a son was born to them called Govinda. Kureśa, who was long in association with Rāmānuja, was born of Ananta Bhaṭṭa and Mahādevī, and this Kureśa was the father of Anantācārya, writer of the *Prapannāmyta*². Dāsarathi was born of Ananta Dīkṣita, of Vādhūla *gotra*, and Lakṣmī. Dāsarathi had a son called Kaṇḍaṇātha, who was also called Rāmānujadāsa. They are all associates of Rāmānuja, who had seventy-four prominent disciples.

Yāmuna was very fond of Nāmm'-āṟvār's works, the doctrines of which were often explained to the people. Yāmuna wrote six works: (i) *Stotra-ratnam*, in adoration to the deity Varada; (ii) *Catuḥ-śloki*; (iii) *Āgama-prāmāṇya*; (iv) *Siddhi-traya*; (v) *Gītārtha-saṃgraha*; (vi) *Mahā-puruṣa-nirṇaya*³. Of these the *Siddhi-traya* is the most important, and the section on Yāmuna in this volume has been based almost entirely on it. The *Āgama-prāmāṇya* is a work in which he tries to establish the high antiquity and undisputed

¹ *Prapannāmyta*, Ch. 113, p. 440.

² *Ibid.* Ch. 150, p. 450. Anantācārya, called also Ananta Sūri, was the pupil of Śailaraṅgeśa-guru. He reveres also Rāmyajāmātr-mahā-muni.

³ See Venkaṭanātha's introduction to the *Gītārtha-saṃgraha-rakṣā*.

authority of the Pañcarātra literature, which is supposed to be the canon of the Śrīvaiṣṇavas. The *Stotra-ratnam*, *Catuḥ-śloki* and *Gītārtha-saṃgraha* were all commented upon by various persons, but the most important of the commentaries is that of Veṅkaṭanātha¹. The *Stotra-ratnam* consists of sixty-five verses in which Yāmuna describes the beauty of the Lord Kṛṣṇa, as set forth in the Purāṇas, and confesses to Him the deep affliction of all his sins and guilt, frailties and vices, and asks for forgiveness of them. He also describes the greatness of the Lord as transcendent and surpassing the greatness of all other deities, as the supreme controller and upholder of the universe. He narrates his own complete surrender to Him and entire dependence on His mercy. If the mercy and grace of the Lord be so great, there is none so deserving of mercy in his wretchedness as a sinner. If the sinner is not saved, the mercy of the Lord becomes meaningless. The Lord requires the sinner in order to realize Himself as the all-merciful. Yāmuna further describes how his mind, forsaking everything else, is deeply attracted to the Lord; and the sense of his supreme helplessness and absolute abnegation². The devotee cannot bear any delay in his communion with God, and is extremely impatient to meet Him; it is galling to him that God should heap happiness after happiness on him and thus keep him away. The fundamental burden of the hymns is an expression of the doctrine of *prapatti*; this has been very clearly brought out in the commentary of Veṅkaṭanātha. It is said that it was after reading these hymns that Rāmānuja became so deeply attracted to Yāmuna. The *Catuḥ-śloki* consists of only four verses in praise of Śrī or Lakṣmī³.

In the *Gītārtha-saṃgraha* Yāmuna says that the means to the

¹ The commentary on the *Catuḥ-śloki* by Veṅkaṭanātha is called *Rahasya-rakṣā*, and the commentary on the *Stotra-ratnam* goes also by the same name. The commentary on the *Gītārtha-saṃgraha*, by Veṅkaṭanātha, is called *Gītārtha-saṃgraha-rakṣā*.

² Two specimen verses may be quoted from the *Stotra-ratnam*:

*na dharmā-niṣtho'smī na cā' tma-vedī na bhaktimāms tvac-caraṇā-ravinde
a-kiñcano nā'nya-gatis śaraṇya tvat-pāda-mūlaṃ śaraṇaṃ prapadye.* Śl. 22.

*na ninditaṃ karma tad asti loke
sahasraśo yan na mayā vyadhāyi
so'ham vipākā-vasare mukunda
krandāmi sampraty a-gatis tavāgre.* Śl. 23.

³ Veṅkaṭanātha, in his commentary on the *Catuḥ-śloki*, discusses the position of Lakṣmī according to the Vaiṣṇava tradition. Lakṣmī is regarded as a being

attainment of the ultimate goal of life is devotion, which is produced as a result of the performance of scriptural duties and the emergence of self-knowledge¹. According to Yāmuna, *yoga* in the *Gītā* means *bhakti-yoga*. So the ultimate object of the *Gītā* is the propounding of the supreme importance of *bhakti* (devotion) as the ultimate object, which requires as a precedent condition the performance of the scriptural duties and the dawning of the true spiritual nature of the self as entirely dependent on God.

It is related in the *Prapannāmṛta* that Yāmuna was anxious to meet Rāmānuja, but died immediately before Rāmānuja came to meet him. So Rāmānuja could only render the last homage to his dead body.

Rāmānuja².

It has already been said that Mahāpūrṇa (Nambi), disciple of Yāmuna, had two sisters, Kāntimatī and Dyutimatī, of whom the former was married to Keśava Yajvan or Āsuri Keśava of Bhūtapuri and the latter to Kamalākṣa Bhaṭṭa. Rāmānuja (Ilaya Perumal), son of Keśava Yajvan, was born in A.D. 1017. He received his training, together with his mother's sister's son Govinda Bhaṭṭa, from Yādavaprakāśa, a teacher of Vedānta of great reputation. The details of Yādavaprakāśa's views are not known, but it is very probable that he was a monist³. Before going to study with

different from Nārāyaṇa, but always associated with Him. He thus tries to refute all the views that suppose Lakṣmī to be a part of Nārāyaṇa. Lakṣmī should also not be identified with *māyā*. She is also conceived as existing in intimate association with Nārāyaṇa and, like a mother, exerting helpful influence to bring the devotees into the sphere of the grace of the Lord. Thus Lakṣmī is conceived to have a separate personality of her own, though that personality is merged, as it were, in the personality of Nārāyaṇa and all His efforts, and all her efforts are in consonance with the efforts of Nārāyaṇa (*parasparā-nukūlatayā sarvatra sāmāśyam*). On the controversial point whether Lakṣmī is to be considered a *jīva* and therefore atomic in nature, the problem how she can then be all-pervasive, and the view that she is a part of Nārāyaṇa, Veṅkaṭanātha says that Lakṣmī is neither Jīva nor Nārāyaṇa, but a separate person having her being entirely dependent on God. Her relation to Nārāyaṇa can be understood on the analogy of the relation of the rays to the sun or the fragrance to the flower.

¹ *śva-dharma-jñāna-vairāgya-sādhya-bhakti-eka-gocarah*
nārāyaṇaḥ paraṁ brahma gītā-śāstre samuditah

Gītārtha-saṁgraha, verse 1.

² Most of the details of Rāmānuja's life are collected from the account given in the *Prapannāmṛta* by Anantācārya, a junior contemporary of Rāmānuja.

³ Yādava held that Brahman, though by its nature possessing infinite qualities, yet transforms itself into all types of living beings and also into all kinds of inanimate things. Its true nature is understood when it is realized that it is one

Yādavaprakāśa, Rāmānuja was married at the age of sixteen, by his father, who died shortly afterwards. His teacher Yādavaprakāśa lived in Kāñcī. So Rāmānuja left Bhūtapurī his native place with his family and went to Kāñcī. In the early days of his association with Yādavaprakāśa, it is said that Yādavaprakāśa became annoyed with him, because he had cured the daughter of a certain chief of the place from possession by a spirit, which his teacher Yādavaprakāśa had failed to do. Shortly after this there was a difference of opinion between Yādava and Rāmānuja on the interpretation of certain Upaniṣad texts, which Yādava interpreted in the monistic manner, but Rāmānuja on the principle of modified dualism. Yādava became very much annoyed with Rāmānuja and arranged a plot, according to which Rāmānuja was to be thrown into the Ganges while on a pilgrimage to Allahabad. Govinda divulged the plot to Rāmānuja, who was thus able to wander away from the company and retire to Kāñcī, after suffering much trouble on the way. While at Kāñcī he became associated with a devout person of the *śūdra* caste, called Kāñcīpūrṇa. Later Rāmānuja was reconciled to his teacher and studied with him. When Yāmuna once came to Kāñcī he saw Rāmānuja at a distance among the students of Yādava marching in procession, but had no further contact with him, and from that time forward was greatly anxious to have Rāmānuja as one of his pupils. Rāmānuja again fell out with his teacher on the meaning of the text *kapyāsam puṇḍarikam* (*Chāndogya*, p. 167). As a result of this quarrel, Rāmānuja was driven out by Yādava. Thenceforth he became attached to the worship of Nārāyaṇa on Hastiśaila in Kāñcī, where he first heard the chanting of the *Stotra-ratnam* of Yāmuna by Mahāpūrṇa, his maternal uncle and pupil of Yāmuna. From Mahāpūrṇa Rāmānuja learnt much of Yāmuna and started for Śrīraṅgam with him. But before he could reach Śrīraṅgam Yāmuna died. It is said that after his death three fingers of Yāmuna were found to be twisted and Rāmānuja thought that this signified three unfulfilled desires: (1) to convert the people to the *prapatti* doctrine of Vaiṣṇavism, making them well versed in

in spite of its transformation into diverse forms of animate and inanimate entities —*anye punar atkyāvabodha-yāthātmyaṃ varṇayantaḥ svābhāvika-nīratīśaya-porimitodāra-guṇa-sāgarāṃ brahmaiva sura-nara-tīryak-sthāvara-nūraki-svargy-āpavargi-caitanyaika-svabhāvaṃ* *sva-bhāvato vilakṣaṇam avilakṣaṇam ca viyad-ādi-nānā-vidhā-mala-rūpa-pariṇāmā-spadaṃ ceti pratyavatiṣṭhante*. Rāmānuja, *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, p. 15, printed at the Medical Hall Press, 1894.

the works of the Ārvārs; (2) to write a commentary to the *Brahma-sūtra* according to the Śrīvaiṣṇava school; (3) to write many works on Śrīvaiṣṇavism. Rāmānuja, therefore, agreed to execute all these three wishes¹. He returned to Kāñcī and became attached to Kāñcīpūrṇa, the disciple of Yāmuna, as his teacher. Later he set out for Śrīraṅgam and on the way was met by Mahāpūrṇa, who was going to Kāñcī to bring him to Śrīraṅgam. He was then initiated by Mahāpūrṇa (the *ācārya*), according to the fivefold Vaiṣṇava rites (*pañca-saṃskāra*). Rāmānuja, being annoyed with his wife's discourteous treatment with Mahāpūrṇa's wife, and also with people who came to beg alms, sent her by a ruse to her father's house, and renounced domestic life when he was about 30 or 32 years of age. After establishing himself as a *sannyāsin*, his teaching in the Śāstras began with Dāśarathi, son of his sister², and Kuranātha, son of Anantabhaṭṭa. Yādavaprakāśa also became a disciple of Rāmānuja³. Eventually Rāmānuja left for Śrīraṅgam and dedicated himself to the worship of Raṅgeśa. He learnt certain esoteric doctrines and *mantras* from Goṣṭhīpūrṇa who had been initiated into them by his teacher. Later on Rāmānuja defeated in discussion a Śaṅkarite named Yajñamūrti, who later became his disciple and wrote two works in Tamil called *Ṟñāna-sāra* and *Prameya-sāra*⁴. He now had a number of well reputed disciples such as Bhaktagrāma-pūrṇa, Marudha-grāma-pūrṇa, Anantārya, Varadācārya and Yajñeśa. Rāmānuja first wrote his *Gadya-traya*. He then proceeded to the Śāradā-maṭha with Kureśa, otherwise called Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra or Kuruttālvan, procured the manuscript of the *Bodhāyana-vṛtti*, and started towards Śrīraṅgam. The keepers of the temple, however, finding the book missing, ran after him and

¹ *Prapaṇāmṛta*, IX, p. 26. The interpretation of this passage by Govindācārya and Ghoṣa seems to me to be erroneous; for there is no reference to Śaṭhakopa here. Kureśa, or Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra, had two sons; one of them was baptized by Rāmānuja as Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya and the other as Rāmadeśika. Rāmānuja's maternal cousin, Govinda, had a younger brother, called Bāla Govinda, and his son was baptized as Parāṅkuśa-pūrṇārya.

² The name of Dāśarathi's father is Anantadīkṣita.

³ His baptismal name was Govindadāsa. After his conversion he wrote a book entitled *Yati-dharma-samuccaya*. This Govindadāsa must be distinguished from Govinda, son of the aunt of Rāmānuja, who had been converted to Śaivism by Yādavaprakāśa and was reconverted to Śrīvaiṣṇavism by his maternal uncle Śrīśailapūrṇa, pupil of Yāmuna. Govinda had married, but became so attached to Rāmānuja that he renounced the world. Śrīśailapūrṇa wrote a commentary on the *Sahasra-gīti*. Rāmānuja had another disciple in Puṇḍarikākṣa, Mahāpūrṇa's son.

⁴ His baptismal names were Devarāṭ and Devamānnātha.

took it away. Fortunately, however, Kureśa had read the book during the several nights on the way, had remembered its purport and so was able to repeat it. Rāmānuja thus dictated his commentary of *Śrī-bhāṣya*, which was written down by Kureśa¹. He also wrote *Vedānta-dīpa*, *Vedānta-sāra* and *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*. The *Śrī-bhāṣya* was written probably after Rāmānuja had made extensive tours to Tirukkovalur, Tirupati, Tirupputkuli, Kumbha-koṇam, Aḷagārkoil, Tiruppullani, Ārvār-Tirunagari, Tirukkurungudi, Tiruvaṇpariśāram, Tiruvaṭṭar, Tiruvanandapuram, Tiruvallikeṇi, Tirunirmalai, Madhurantakam and Tiruvaigundipuram². Later on he made extensive tours in Northern India to Ajmir, Mathurā, Brindāvan, Ayodhyā and Badarī, defeating many heretics. He also went to Benares and Purī and at the latter place established a *maṭha*. He forcibly tried to introduce the Pañcarātra rites into the temple of Jagannātha, but failed. According to the *Rāmānujārya-divya-charitai*, the *Śrī-bhāṣya* was completed in 1077 śaka or A.D. 1155, though two-thirds of the work were finished before the Cola persecution began. But this date must be a mistake; for Rāmānuja died in 1059 śaka or A.D. 1137³. The eyes of Mahāpūrṇa (Periyalnāmbi) and Kureśa were put out by the Cola king Koluttuṅga I, probably in the year 1078–1079, and this must be the date when Rāmānuja was forced to take refuge in the Hoysala country. It was in A.D. 1117, on the death of Koluttuṅga I, that Rāmānuja again returned to Śrīraṅgam, where he met Kureśa and finished the *Śrī-bhāṣya*⁴. In a *Madhva* work called *Chalāri-smṛti* it is said that in 1049 śaka, that is A.D. 1127, it was already an established work⁵. It is therefore very probable that the *Śrī-bhāṣya* was completed between A.D. 1117 and 1127. Gopī-nātha Rāu thinks that it was completed in A.D. 1125.

Rāmānuja fled in the garb of an ordinary householder from

¹ Rāmānuja had asked Kureśa to check him if he were not correctly representing the *Bodhāyana-vṛtti*, and in one place at least there was a difference of opinion and Rāmānuja was in the wrong.

² See Gopī-nātha Rāu's Lectures, p. 34, footnote.

³ See *Ibid.*

⁴ *Rāmānujārya-divya-charitai* (a Tamil work), p. 243, quoted in Gopī-nātha Rāu's Lectures.

⁵ *kalau pravṛtta-bauddhā'-di-matam rāmānujam tathā śake hy eko-na-pañcāśad-adhikā-bde sahasrake nirākartum mukhya-vāyūḥ san-mata-sthāpanāya ca ekā-daśa-śate śake viṃśaty-aṣṭa-yuge gate avatīrṇam madhva-gurum sadā vande mahā-guṇam.*

Chalāri-smṛti, quoted in Gopī-nātha Rāu's Lectures, p. 35.

Śrīraṅgam to Toṇḍāṇur, to escape from the persecution of Koluttuṅga I or Rājendracola, otherwise called Kṛmikanṭha, a Śaiva king. He was successful in converting the Jain king Bittideva of the Hoysala country, who was renamed Viṣṇuvardhanadeva after the *Vaiṣṇava* fashion. Mr Rāu says that this conversion took place some time before A.D. 1099¹. With the help of this king he constructed the temple Tīrunarayanapperumāl at Melukot (Yāda-vādrī), where Rāmānuja lived for about twelve years². According to the *Rāmānujārya-dīvyā-charitai* Rāmānuja lived for eleven years after his return to Śrīraṅgam (some time after the death of Koluttuṅga I in 1118) and died in A.D. 1137. He thus enjoyed an extraordinary long life of one hundred and twenty years, which was spread over the reigns of three Cola kings, Koluttuṅga I (A.D. 1070–1118), Vikrama Cola (A.D. 1118–1135), and Koluttuṅga II (A.D. 1123–1146)³. He had built many temples and *mathas* in his lifetime, and by converting the temple superintendent of Śrīraṅgam got possession of the whole temple.

Rāmānuja's successor was Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya, son of Kureśa, who wrote a commentary on the *Sahasra-gīti*. Rāmānuja had succeeded in securing a number of devoted scholars as his disciples, and they carried on his philosophy and forms of worship through the centuries. His religion was catholic, and, though he followed the rituals regarding initiation and worship, he admitted Jains and Buddhists, Śūdras and even untouchables into his fold. He himself was the pupil of a Śūdra and used to spend a long time after his bath in the hut of an untouchable friend of his. It is said that he ruled over 74 episcopal thrones, and counted among his followers 700 ascetics, 12,000 monks and 300 nuns (Keṭṭi ammais). Many kings and rich men were among his disciples. Kureśa, Daśarathi, Naḍāḍur Ārvān and the Bhaṭṭāra were dedicated to scholarly discourses. Yajñamūrti performed the function of the priest; one disciple was in charge of the kitchen; Vaṭapūrṇa or Andhrapūrṇa and Gomāṭham Siṭiyārvān were in charge of various kinds of personal service; Dhanurdāsa was trea-

¹ Mr Rice, however, says in the *Mysore Gazetteer*, vol. 1, that the conversion took place in 1039 śaka or A.D. 1117. But Rāu points out that in the *Epigraphia Carnatica* we have inscriptions of Bittideva as early as śaka 1023 (No. 34 Arsiker), which call him *Viṣṇu-vardhana*.

² The general tradition is that Rāmānuja kept away from Śrīraṅgam for a total period of twelve years only; but Rāu holds that this period must be about twenty years, of which twelve years were spent in Yādavādrī.

³ *Śrī Rāmānujācārya*, by S. K. Aiyangar, M.A. Natesan and Co., Madras.

surer; Ammaṅgi of boiled milk; Ukkal Ārvān served meals; Ukkal-ammal fanned, and so on¹. Rāmānuja converted many Śaivas to Vaiṣṇavism, and in the conflict between the Śaivas and the Vaiṣṇavas in his time; though he suffered much at the hands of the Cola king Kṛmikanṭha who was a Śaiva, yet Kṛmikanṭha's successor became a Vaiṣṇava and his disciple, and this to a great extent helped the cause of the spread of Śrīvaiṣṇavism.

The sources from which the details of Rāmānuja's life can be collected are as follows: (1) *Divya-sūri-charitai*, written in Tamil by Garuḍavāha, a contemporary of Rāmānuja; (2) *Gurū-paramparā-prabhāvam*, written in *maṇḍipravāla* in the early part of the fourteenth century by Pinb'-aṟagiya Perū-māl Jiyar; (3) Pillai Lokam-jīyar's *Rāmānujārya-divya-charitai*, written in Tamil; (4) Āṇbillai Kaṇḍāḍaiyappan's brief handbook of Ārvārs and Aṟagiyas called *Periya-tiru-muḍiy-aḍaiva*, written in Tamil; (5) *Prappannāmṛta*, by Anantācārya, a descendant of Andhrapūrṇa, and pupil of Śailaraṅgeśa-guru; (6) the commentaries on the *Tiru-vāy-mōri* which contain many personal reminiscences of the Aṟagiyas; (7) other epigraphical records.

The Precursors of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy and the contemporaries and pupils of Rāmānuja.

The *bhedābheda* interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtras* is in all probability earlier than the monistic interpretation introduced by Śaṅkara. The *Bhagavad-gītā*, which is regarded as the essence of the Upaniṣads, the older *Purāṇas*, and the *Pañcarātra*, dealt with in this volume, are more or less on the lines of *bhedābheda*. In fact the origin of this theory may be traced to the *Puruṣa-sūkta*. Apart from this, Dramiḍācārya, as Yāmuna says in his *Siddhī-traya*, explained the *Brahma-sūtra*, and that it was further commented upon by Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra. Bodhāyana, referred to by Rāmānuja as *Vṛtti-kāra* and by Śaṅkara as Upavarṣa, wrote on the *Brahma-sūtras* a very elaborate and extensive *vṛtti*, which formed the basis of Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya*². Ānandagiri also refers

¹ *The Life of Rāmānuja*, by Govindāchāryar, p. 218.

² Veṅkaṭanātha in his *Tattva-ṭikā* says "*Vṛtti-kāraṣya Bodhāyanasyai'va hi Upavarṣa iti syān nāma.*" In his *Sesvara-nūmāṃsā*, however, he refutes the view of Upavarṣa, for in the *Vaijayanṭī* lexicon Kṛtakotī and Halabhūti are said to be names of Upavarṣa.

See also the second volume of the present work, p. 43 n.

to *Drāviḍa-bhāṣya* as being a commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, written in a simple style (*ṛju-vivaraṇa*) previous to Śaṅkara's attempt. In the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* (III. 217-27) a writer is referred to as Ātreya and *Vākya-kāra*, and the commentator Rāmatīrtha identifies him with Brahmanandin. Rāmānuja, in his *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, quotes a passage from the *Vākya-kāra* and also its commentary by Dramiḍācārya¹. While the *Vākya-kāra* and Dramiḍācārya, referred to by Rāmānuja, held that Brahman was qualified, the Dramiḍācārya who wrote a commentary on Brahmanandin's work was a monist and is probably the same person as the Draviḍācārya referred to by Ānandagiri in his commentary on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣyopodghāta* on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. But the point is not so easily settled. Sarvajñātma muni, in his *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, refers to the *Vākya-kāra* as a monist. It is apparent, however, from his remarks that this *Vākya-kāra* devoted the greater part of his commentary to upholding the *pariṇāma* view (akin to that of Bhāskara), and introduced the well known example of the sea and its waves with reference to the relation of Brahman to the world, and that it was only in the commentary on the sixth *prapāṭhaka* of the *Chāndogya* that he expounded a purely monistic view to the effect that the world was neither existent nor non-existent. Curiously enough, the passage referred to Sarvajñātma muni as proving decidedly the monistic conclusion of Ātreya *Vākya-kāra*, and his commentator the Dramiḍācārya is referred to by Rāmānuja in his *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, as being favourable to his own view. Rāmānuja, however, does not cite him as Brahmanandin, but as *Vākya-kāra*. The commentator of the *Vākya-kāra* is referred to by Rāmānuja also as Dramiḍācārya. But though Sarvajñātma muni also cites him as *Vākya-kāra*, his commentator, Rāmatīrtha, refers to him as Brahmanandin and the *Vākya-kāra*'s commentator as Draviḍācārya, and interprets the term "*Vākya-kāra*" merely as "author." Sarvajñātma muni, how-

¹ *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, p. 138. The *Vākya-kāra*'s passage is "yuktam tad-guṇopāsanād," and Dramiḍācārya's commentary on it is "yady-api sac-citto na nirbhugna-dāvatam guṇa-gaṇam manasā mudhāret tathā'py antar-guṇām eva devatām bhajata iti tatvā'pi sa-guṇa'eva devatā prāpyata iti." The main idea of these passages is that, even if God be adored as a pure qualityless being, when the final release comes it is by way of the realization of God as qualified.

MM.S. Kuppusvāmī Śāstrī, M.A., identifies Dramiḍācārya with Tirumariṣai Pirān, who lived probably in the eighth century A.D. But the reasons adduced by him in support of his views are unconvincing. See *Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference*, Madras, 1924, pp. 468-473.

ever, never refers to Brahmanandin by name. Since the passage quoted in the *Samkṣepa-sārīraka* by Sarvajñātma muni agrees with that quoted by Rāmānuja in his *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, it is certain that the *Vākya-kāra* referred to by Sarvajñātma muni and Rāmānuja, and the Dramiḍācārya referred to by Sarvajñātma, Rāmānuja and Ānandagiri are one and the same person. It seems, therefore, that the *Vākya-kāra*'s style of writing, as well as that of his commentator Dramiḍācārya, was such that, while the monists thought that it supported their view, the Śrīvaiṣṇavas also thought that it favoured them. From Sarvajñātma muni's statement we understand that the *Vākya-kāra* was also called Ātreya, and that he devoted a large part of his work in propounding the *bhedābheda* view. Upavarṣa is also referred to by Śaṅkara as a reputed exponent of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy and the *Brahma-sūtra*; and as having been the author of one *tantra* on Mīmāṃsā and another on the *Brahma-sūtra*¹. Our conclusion, therefore, is that we have one *Vākya-kāra* who wrote a commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, and that he had a commentator who wrote in a clear and simple style and who was known as Dramiḍācārya, though he wrote in Sanskrit and not in Tamil. If we believe in Rāmatīrtha's identification, we may also believe that his name was Brahmanandin. But, whoever he may be, he was a very revered person in the old circle, as the epithet "*bhagavān*" has been applied to him by Sarvajñātma muni. Regarding Upavarṣa we may say that he also was a very revered person, since Śaṅkara applies the epithet "*bhagavat*" to him, and quotes him as an ancient authority in his support. He seems to have flourished sometime before Śabara Svāmin, the great Mīmāṃsā commentator². Ānandagiri and Veṅkaṭanātha, in the fourteenth century, identify Upavarṣa with the *Vṛtti-kāra*, and Veṅkaṭanātha further identifies

¹ *ata eva ca bhagavato' pavarṣeṇa prathame tantre ātmā-stitvā-bhidhāna-prasaktau sārīrake vyakṣyāma ity uddhāraḥ kṛtaḥ*. Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra*, III. 3. 53.

Govindānanda, in his *Ratna-prabhā*, identifies Upavarṣa with the *Vṛtti-kāra*. Ānandagiri also agrees with this identification. In the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I. 1. 19 and I. 2. 23, Śaṅkara refutes views which are referred to as being those of the *Vṛtti-kāra*. What can be gathered of the *Vṛtti-kāra*'s views from the last two passages, which have been regarded by the commentator Govindānanda as referring to the *Vṛtti-kāra*, is that the world is a transformation of God. But we can never be certain that these views refuted by Śaṅkara were really held by the *Vṛtti-kāra*, as we have no other authority on the point except Govindānanda, a man of the thirteenth or fourteenth century.

² Śabara, in his *bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 1. 5, refers to Upavarṣa with the epithet "*bhagavān*" on the subject of *sphoṭa*.

him in a conjectural manner with Bodhāyana. Even if Upavaṛṣa was the *Vṛtti-kāra*, it is doubtful whether he was Bodhāyana. On this point we have only the conjectural statement of Veṅkaṭanātha referred to above. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1. 3. 28, refers again to Upavaṛṣa in support of his refutation of the *sphoṭa* theory¹. But this point is also indecisive, since neither Śaṅkara nor the Śrīvaiṣṇavas admit the *sphoṭa* theory. There seems, however, to be little evidence. We are therefore not in a position to say anything about Upavaṛṣa, the *Vṛtti-kāra* and Bodhāyana². If the testimony of the *Prapaṇnāmṛta* is to be trusted, Bodhāyana's *Iṛtti* on the *Brahma-sūtra* must have been a very elaborate work, and Dramiḍācārya's work on the *Brahma-sūtra* must have been a very brief one. This was the reason why Rāmānuja attempted to write a commentary which should be neither too brief nor too elaborate.

Now we have in MS. a small work called *Brahma-sūtrārhasaṃgraha* by Śaṭhakopa, and we do not know whether this is the Dramiḍa commentary referred to in the *Prapaṇnāmṛta*. Yāmuna, in his *Siddhi-traya*, refers to a *bhāṣya-kāra* and qualifies him as "*parimita-gambhīra-bhāṣiṇā*," which signifies that it was a brief treatise pregnant with deep sense. He further says that this *bhāṣya* was elaborated by Śrīvatsāṅka-Miśra. The views of these two writers were probably consonant with the views of the Śrīvaiṣṇava school. But Yāmuna mentions the name of Taṅka, Bhartṛ-prapañca, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari, Brahmadatta, Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. An account of Bhartṛprapañca's interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* has been given in the second volume of the present work. An account of Bhāskara's view has been given in the present volume. Nothing is definitely known about the interpretations of Taṅka, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari and Brahmadatta, except that they were against the views of the Śrīvaiṣṇavas.

Rāmānuja, in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, says that Bodhāyana wrote a very elaborate work on the *Brahma-sūtra* and that

¹ *varṇā eva tu śabdāḥ itī bhagavān upavaṛṣaḥ*. Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1. 3. 28.

Deussen's remark that the entire discussion of *sphoṭa* is derived from Upavaṛṣa is quite unfounded. According to *Kathā-sarit-sāgara* Upavaṛṣa was the teacher of Pāṇini.

² Śavara, also, in his commentary on the 5th sūtra of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, 1. 1. 5, refers to a *Vṛtti-kāra*, a Mīmāṃsā writer prior to Śavara. The fact that in the *bhāṣya* on the same sūtra Śavara refers to bhagavān Upavaṛṣa by name makes it very probable that the *Vṛtti-kāra* and Upavaṛṣa were not the same person.

this was summarized very briefly by the older teachers. He says, further, that in making his *bhāṣya* he has closely followed the interpretation of the *Sūtra*, as made by Bodhāyana¹. Rāmānuja also owes a great debt of gratitude to Yāmuna's *Siddhi-traya*, though he does not distinctly mention it in his *bhāṣya*. It is said that Yāmuna had a large number of disciples. Of these, however, Mahāpūrṇa, Goṣṭhīpūrṇa, Mālādharma, Kāñcīpūrṇa, Śrīśailapūrṇa, also called Tātācārya (Rāmānuja's maternal uncle), and Śrīraṅganātha-gāyaka were the most important. Śrīśailapūrṇa's son Govinda, the cousin and fellow-student of Rāmānuja with Yādavaprakāśa, became later in life a disciple of Rāmānuja². Of the seventy-four prominent disciples of Rāmānuja, Praṇatārtihara of Ātreya *gotra*, Kureśa or Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra, Dāśarathi, Andhrapūrṇa or Vaṭapūrṇa, Varadaviṣṇu, Yatiśekhara-bhārata, Yādava-prakāśa or Govinda and Yajñamūrti are the most important³. Of these Dāśarathi of Vādhūla *gotra* and Varadaviṣṇu or Varadaviṣṇu Miśra were the sister's sons of Rāmānuja. Varadaviṣṇu was better known as Vātsya Varadaguru. Kureśa or Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra had a son by Āṇḍāl, called Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya, who defeated the Vedāntin Mādhavadāsa and afterwards became the successor of Rāmānuja⁴. Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya had a son called Madhya Pratoli Bhaṭṭārya or Madhya-vīthi Bhaṭṭārya. Kureśa had another son named Padmanetra; Padmanetra's son was called Kurukeśvara⁵. Kurukeśvara's son was Puṇḍarikākṣa, and his son was Śrīnivāsa. Śrīnivāsa had a son Nṛsiṃhārya. They belonged to the Śrīśaila lineage, probably from the name of Bhūri Śrī Śailapūrṇa, Kureśa's father. Nṛsiṃhārya had a son called Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja had two sons,

¹ Sudarśana Sūri, in his commentary on the *bhāṣya* called the *Śruta-prakāśikā*, explains the word "*pūrvācārya*" in Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* as *Dramiḍa-bhāṣya-kārādayah*. On the phrase *bodhāyana-matā'nusāreṇa sūtrā-kṣārāṇi vyākhyāyante*, he says "*na tu svo-tprekṣitamatā-ntareṇa sūtrā-kṣārāṇi sūtra-padānāṃ prakṛti-pratayaya-vibhāgā-nugūṇaṃ vadāmaḥ na tu svot-prekṣitā-rtheṣu sūtrāṇi yathā-kathāṇi cit dyotayitavyāni*."

² It is interesting to note that Yāmuna's son Vararaṅga later on gave instruction to Rāmānuja and had his younger brother Sottanambi initiated as a disciple of Rāmānuja. Vararaṅga had no son. He had set the *Sahasra-gīti* to music. *Prapannāmṛta*, 23. 45.

³ Rāja Gopalacariyar also mentions the name of Tirukurugaipiran Pillai as a prominent disciple of Rāmānuja. He wrote a commentary on Nāmm-āyṡār's *Tiru-vāymōṛi*.

⁴ Kureśa had another son named Śrī Rama Pillai or Vyāsa Bhaṭṭār.

⁵ It is rather common in South India to give one's son the name of his grandfather.

Nṛsiṃhārya and Raṅgācārya, who lived probably in the fifteenth century. Rāmānuja's disciple, Yajñamūrti, was an exceedingly learned man. When Rāmānuja accepted him as a disciple, he changed his name to Devarāṭ or Devamannātha or Devarāja and had a separate maṭha established in Śrīraṅgam for him. Yajñamūrti had written two very learned works in Tamil, called *Ṣṇāna-sāra* and *Prameya-sāra*. Rāmānuja had four of his disciples, Bhaktagrāma-pūrṇa, Marudha-grāma-pūrṇa, Anantārya and Yajñeśa, initiated into Vaiṣṇavism by Yajñamūrti¹. Another pupil of Rāmānuja, Tirukurugai-piran Pillai, wrote a commentary of Nāmmārṇvār's *Tiruvāy-mōṛi*. Praṇatārtihara Pillan, another pupil of Rāmānuja, of Ātreya *gotra*, had a son Rāmānuja, a disciple of Naḍaḍur Ammal of the lineage of Vātsya Varada². This Rāmānuja, alias Padmanābha, had a son called Śrī Rāmānuja Pillan, a disciple of Kidāmbi Rāmānuja Pillan. This Padmanābha had a son called Rāmānuja Pillan and a daughter Totārambā, who was married to Anantasūri, the father of Venkātānātha. Rāmānuja's other disciple and nephew, Dāśarathi, of Vādhūla *gotra*, had a son called Rāmānuja, who had a son called Toḍappā or Vāraṇādrīśa or Lokārya or Lokācārya. After Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya the Vedānti Mādhavadāsa, called also Nanjiar, became his successor. Mādhavadāsa's successor was Nambilla or Namburi Varadārya or Lokācārya. He had two wives Āṇḍal and Śrīraṅganāyākī and a son called Rāmānuja³. Nambilla's other name was Kalijit or Kalivairi. Now Vāraṇādrīśa became a disciple of Nambilla or the senior Lokācārya. Vāraṇādrīśa was known as Pillai Lokācārya. Namburi Varada had a pupil called Mādhava. Varada had a son called Padmanābha who had a disciple called Rāmānujadāsa. Rāmānujadāsa had a son called Devarāja, who had a son called Śrīśailanātha, and Śrīśailanātha had a pupil called Saumya Jāmāṭṭ muni or Ramyajāmāṭṭ muni, also called Varavara muni or Yatīndrapravaṇa or Manavalamahāmuni or Periya-jiyar. It is said that he was the grandson of Kattur-āraḡiya-vanavalapillai. All these people were influenced by the *Sahasra-gīti-vyākhyā* of Kureśa. Namburi Varadārya, otherwise called Kalijit, had two other pupils called Udak-pratoḷi-kṛṣṇa, and Kṛṣṇa-samāhbhaya, also called Kṛṣṇapāda. Kṛṣṇapāda's son Lokācārya was a pupil of

¹ See *Praṇannāmṛta*, Ch. 26.

² See Govindāchāryar's *Life of Rāmānuja*.

³ He wrote two works called *Sārā-rtha-saṃgraha* and *Rahasya-traya*. *Praṇannāmṛta*, 119/3.

Kalijit, and Kṛṣṇapāda himself. Kṛṣṇapāda's second son was Abhirāma-Varādhīśa.

Rāmānuja's brother-in-law Devarāja, of Vātsya *gotra*, had a son called Varadaviṣṇu Mīśra or Vātsya Varada, who was a pupil of Viṣṇucitta, a pupil of Kureśa. This Vātsya Varada was a great writer on Vedāntic subjects. Kureśa had a son called Śrī Rama Pillai, or Vedavyāsa Bhaṭṭa, who had a son called Vādivijaya, who wrote *Kṣamā-śodaśī-stava*. Vādivijaya had a son called Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa, who was a pupil of Vātsya Varada, a contemporary of Varadaviṣṇu. Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa was the famous author of the *Śruta-prakāśikā*. The celebrated Aṇṇayācārya also was a pupil of Pillai Lokācārya, the pupil of Kalijit. Śrīśaila Śrīnivāsa, or Śrīśailanātha, was the son of Aṇṇayācārya. Ramyajāmāṭṛ muni had a number of disciples, such as Rāmānuja, Paravastu Prativādibhayāṅkara Aṇṇayācārya, Vanamamalai-jīyar, Periya-jīyar, Koyilkaṇḍaiaṇṇan, etc.¹ Of Venkatanātha's pupils two are of most importance: his son Nainārācārya, otherwise called Kumāra-Vēdānta-deśika, Varadanātha or Varadaguru, who wrote many Vedāntic works, and Brahmatantra-jīyar. Parakāladāsa and Śrīraṅgācārya were probably pupils of Kṛṣṇapāda, or Kṛṣṇasūri, the pupil of Kalijit or Namburi Varadārya. Abhirāma Varādhīśa was a pupil of Rāmānuja, son of Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni. The pontifical position of Śrīvaiṣṇavism was always occupied in succession by eminent men in different important *maṭhas* or temples, and there arose many great preachers and teachers of Vedānta, some of whom wrote important works while others satisfied themselves with oral teachings. The works of some of these have come down to us, but others have been lost. It seems, however, that the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* philosophy was not a source of perennial inspiration for the development of ever newer shades of thought, and that the logical and dialectical thinkers of this school were decidedly inferior to the prominent thinkers of the Śāṅkara and the Madhva school. There is hardly any one in the whole history of the development of the school of Rāmānuja whose logical acuteness can be compared with that of Śrīharṣa or Citsukha, or with that of Jayatīrtha or Vyāsātīrtha. Venkatanātha, Meghanādāri or Rāmānujācārya, called also Vādihaṃsa, were some of the most prominent writers of this school; but even with them philosophic

¹ The Tamil names of some of the disciples have been collected from the *Life of Rāmānujācārya* by Govindāchāryar.

criticism does not always reach the highest level. It was customary for the thinkers of the Śāṅkara and the Madhva schools in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to accept the concepts of the new School of Logic of Mithilā and Bengal and introduce keen dialectical analysis and criticism. But for some reason or other this method was not adopted to any large extent by the thinkers of the Śrīvaiṣṇava school. Yet this was the principal way in which philosophical concepts developed in later times.

In dealing with the names of teachers of the Rāmānuja school, one *Guru-paramparā* mentions the name of Paravādibhayaṅkara, who was a pupil of Ramyajāmātr muni and belonged to the Vātsya *gotra*. Prativādibhayaṅkara was the teacher of Śaṭhakopa Yati. The treatise speaks also of another Ramyajāmātr muni, son of Anantārya, grandson of Prativādibhayaṅkara and pupil of Śrīveṅkaṭeśa. It also mentions Vedāntaguru; of the Vātsya *gotra*, a pupil of Ramyajāmātr muni and Varadārya; Sundaradeśika, of the Vātsya *gotra*, son of Prativādibhayaṅkara; Aparyātmāmṛtācārya, son of Śrīveṅkaṭaguru and grandson of Prativādibhayaṅkara. This Veṅkaṭācārya had a son called Prativādibhayaṅkara. Ramyajāmātr muni had a son called Śrīkṛṣṇa-deśika. Puruṣottamārya, of the Vātsya *gotra*, was the son of Śrīveṅkaṭācārya. Śrīkṛṣṇa-deśika had a son called Ramyajāmātr muni, who had a son called Kṛṣṇa Sūri. Anantaguru had a son called Veṅkaṭa-deśika. Śrīnivāśaguru was pupil of Veṅkaṭārya and Vātsya Śrīnivāśa, who had a son called Anantārya. It is unnecessary to continue with the list, as it is not very useful from the point of view of the development of the Śrīvaiṣṇava school of philosophy or literature. The fact that the names of earlier teachers are reverently passed on to many of those who succeeded them makes it difficult to differentiate them one from the other. But the history of the school is unimportant after the sixteenth or the early part of the seventeenth century, as it lost much of its force as an intellectual movement. In the days of the Āryvārs the Śrīvaiṣṇava movement was primarily a religious movement of mystic and intoxicating love of God and self-surrender to Him. In the days of Rāmānuja it became intellectualized for some time, but it slowly relapsed into the religious position. As with Śāṅkara, and not as with Madhva, the emphasis of the school has always been on the interpretations of Vedic texts, and the intellectual appeal has always been subordinated to the appeal to the Upaniṣadic texts and their

interpretations. The chief opponents of the Rāmānuja school were the Śāṅkarites, and we may read many works in which copious references are made by writers of the Śāṅkara school who attempted to refute the principal points of the *bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja, both from the point of view of logical argument and from that of interpretations of the Upaniṣadic texts. But unfortunately, except in the case of a few later works of little value, no work of scholarly refutation of the views of Rāmānuja by a Śāṅkarite is available. The followers of Rāmānuja also offered slight refutation of some of the doctrines of Bhāskara, Jāḍava-prakāśa, and Madhva and the Śaivas. But their efforts were directed mainly against Śāṅkara.

It has already been noted that Rāmānuja wrote a *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, *Vedānta-sāra* and *Vedānta-dīpa*, a commentary on the *Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā*, *Gadya-traya*, and *Bhagavad-ārādhana-krama*¹. According to traditional accounts, Rāmānuja was born in A.D. 1017 and died in 1137. The approximate dates of the chief events of his life have been worked out as follows: study with Yādavaprakāśa, 1033; first entry into Śrīraṅgam to see Yāmuna, 1043; taking holy orders, 1049; flight to Mysore for fear of the Cola king's persecution, 1096; conversion of Biṭṭi-deva, the Jain king of Mysore, the Hoysala country, 1098; installing the temple God at Melukot, 1100; stay in Melukot, up to 1116; return to Śrīraṅgam, 1118; death, 1137². His nephew and disciple Dāśarathi and his disciple Kureśa were about fifteen or sixteen years junior to him³. Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya*, called also *Śrī-bhāṣya*, was commented on by Sudarśana Sūri. His work is called *Śruta prakāśikā*, and is regarded as the most important commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*.

¹ *viṣṇu'arcā-kṛtam avanotsukojñānam śrīgītā-vivaraṇa-bhāṣya-dīpa-sārāṇ tad gadya-trayam akṛta prapanna-nityā-nuṣṭhāna-kramam api yogi-rāṭ pravandhān. Divya-sūri-Caritai.*

Reference to the *Vedārtha-saṃgraha* of Rāmānuja is also found in the same work.

*ity uktvā nigama-śikhā'rtha-saṃgrahā-khyam
bhinnas tām kṛtim urarīkriyā-rtham asya.*

² Govindāchāryar's *Life of Rāmānuja*. Yāmuna, according to the above view, would thus have died in 1042, corresponding with the first visit of Rāmānuja to Śrīraṅgam; but Gopī-nātha Rāu thinks that this event took place in 1038. The date of the Cola persecution is also regarded by Gopī-nātha Rāu as having occurred in 1078-79, which would correspond to Rāmānuja's flight to Mysore; and his return to Śrīraṅgam must have taken place after 1117, the death of the Cola king Koluttuṅga. Thus there is some divergence between Govindācārya and Gopī-nātha Rāu regarding the date of Rāmānuja's first visit to Śrīraṅgam and the date of his flight to Mysore. Gopī-nātha Rāu's views seem to be more authentic.

³ Apart from the *Sahasra-gītī-bhāṣya*, Kureśa wrote a work called *Kureśa-vijaya*.

Rāmānuja Literature.

As already noted, the principal commentary on Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya*, was the *Śruta-prakāśikā* by Sudarśana Sūri. Even before this *Śruta-prakāśikā* was written, another commentary, called *Śrī-bhāṣya-vivṛti*, was written by Rāma-miśra-deśika, a disciple of Rāmānuja, under his own direction. This work was written in six chapters and was not a commentary in the ordinary sense, but a study of the principal contents of Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya*. This Rāma Miśra was a different man from Rāma Miśra, the teacher of Yāmuna. The *Śruta-prakāśikā* had a further study, entitled *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, by Vīrarāghavadāsa. Criticisms of this work were replied to in a work called *Bhāṣya-prakāśikā-dūṣaṇoddhāra* by Śaṭhakopācārya, a writer of the sixteenth century. The *Śruta-prakāśikā* had another commentary, called *Tūlikā*, by Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa, a writer who probably belonged to the fifteenth century. The contents of the *Śruta-prakāśikā* were summarized in a work called *Śruta-prakāśikā-sāra-saṃgraha*. The *bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja was further commented on in the *Tattva-sāra*, by Vātsya Varada, a nephew of Rāmānuja. The name of the commentator's father was Devarāja, and his mother was Kamalā, a sister of Rāmānuja. He was a pupil of Śrīviṣṇucitta, a disciple of Kureśa. This *Tattva-sāra* provoked a further criticism, called *Ratna-sārīṇī*, by Vīra-rāghava-dāsa, son of Vādhūla Nara-siṃha-guru and pupil of Vādhūla Varadaguru, son of Vādhūla Veṅkaṭācārya. He also himself wrote a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Tātparyā-dīpikā*. Vīra-rāghava-dāsa lived probably in the later half of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century. Rāmānuja's views were also collected together in a scholarly manner in a work called *Naya-mukha-mālikā*, by Apyaya-dīkṣita, who was born in the middle of the sixteenth century. Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* is also dealt with by the famous Veṅkaṭanātha, in his work *Tattva-ṭīkā*. The *Śrī-bhāṣya* had another commentary called *Naya-prakāśikā*, by Meghanādāri, a contemporary of Veṅkaṭanātha of the fourteenth century¹. A further commentary is

¹ Meghanādāri's great work, *Naya-dyu-maṇi*, has been treated in detail in a later section. He was the son of Ātreyanātha and his mother's name was Adhvaranāyikā. He had three brothers, Hastyadrinātha or Vāraṇādrīśa, Varadarāt, and Rāma Miśra. This Vāraṇādrīśa should not be confused with Dāśarathī's grandson, who was of Vādhūla gotra. Meghanādāri's other works are *Bhāva-prabodha* and *Mumukṣu-pāya-saṃgraha*.

called *Mita-prakāśikā*, by Parakāla Yati, probably of the fifteenth century. Parakāla Yati had a disciple called Raṅga Rāmānuja, who wrote a study of the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Mūla-bhāva-prakāśikā*. One Śrīnivāsācārya also criticized the *Śrī-bhāṣya* in *Brahma-vidyā-kaumudī*. It is difficult to guess which Śrīnivāsa was the author of the work, there being so many Śrīnivāsas among the teachers of the Rāmānuja school. Campakeśa, disciple of Veṅkaṭanātha, also dealt with the *Śrī-bhāṣya*. Śuddhasattva Lakṣmaṇācārya also wrote on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, a work entitled *Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā* which was based upon the *Guru-tattva-prakāśikā* of Campakeśa. This work was in reality a commentary on the *Śrūti-prakāśikā*. The author was the son of Śuddhasattva Yogīndra. He descends from the line of Rāmānuja's mother's sister, in which there were born eighteen teachers of Vedānta; he was the pupil of Saumya Jāmātṛ muni and flourished probably in the latter half of the sixteenth century. This *Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā* was commented on in the *Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā-vyākhyā*. Sudarśana Sūri also seems to have written a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Śruti-dīpikā*. Śrīnivāsa, the son of Tāta-yārya and Lakṣmī-devi, of Śrīśaila lineage and pupil of Aṇṇayārya and Koṇḍinna Śrīnivāsa-dīkṣita, wrote another digest on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Tattva-mārtaṇḍa*. He probably lived in the latter half of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. The name of his grandfather was Aṇṇa-guru. He wrote *Ṇatva-darpaṇa*, *Bheda-darpaṇa*, *Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi*, *Sāra-darpaṇa*, and *Virodha-nirodha*¹. He is also known as Śrīśaila Śrīnivāsa, and he wrote other books, e.g. *Jijñāsā-darpaṇa*, *Naya-dyu-maṇi-dīpikā*, and *Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha*. The *Naya-dyu-maṇi* of *Naya-dyu-maṇi-dīpikā* is not to be confused with the *Naya-dyu-maṇi* of Megha-nādāri; for it is a summary in verse of Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* with a commentary in prose. The *Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha* is a work in

¹ In his *Virodha-nirodha* he makes reference to a *Mukti-darpaṇa* (MS. p. 82), *Jñāna-ratna-darpaṇa* (MS. p. 87), and in his *Bheda-darpaṇa* (MS. p. 96) he refers to his *Guṇa-darpaṇa*. In his *Virodha-nirodha* he makes further reference to his other works, *Advaita-vana-kuthāra* and *Bheda-maṇi* (MS. p. 37), to his *Bheda-darpaṇa* (MS. p. 68), and to his *Sāra-darpaṇa* (MS. p. 66) and *Tattva-mārtaṇḍa* (MS. p. 87). His *Sāra-darpaṇa* gives the principal contents of Rāmānuja's philosophy. In his *Virodha-nirodha* (MS. p. 37) he refers to a *Virodha-bhañjana*, by his elder brother Aṇṇayārya and to his own *Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi* (MS. p. 12). In referring to his elder brother he says that his *Virodha-nirodha* is largely a rearrangement of the arguments adduced by him in his *Virodha-bhañjana*, some of which had been elaborated and others condensed and rearranged in his *Virodha-nirodha*. The *Virodha-nirodha* is thus admitted by the author to have been based materially on *Virodha-bhañjana* by Aṇṇayārya, his elder brother.

prose on the *bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja, and the first four *sūtras* intended to refute the criticisms made by his opponents. The *Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha* is a much smaller work than the *Naya-dyu-maṇi*, which is often referred to by the author for details. It makes constant reference to objections against Rāmānuja without mentioning the name of the critic. In the *Naya-dyu-maṇi* the author has made detailed discussions which are summarized by him in this work¹. Thus Śrīnivāsa wrote three works *Naya-dyu-maṇi*, *Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha*, and *Naya-dyu-maṇi-dīpikā*. In his *Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi* Śrīnivāsa tries mainly to uphold the theory that Brahman is the only cause of all creation, animate and inanimate. In this work he tries to refute at every point the theory of Brahma-causality, as held by Śaṅkara.

Again, Deśikācārya wrote a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Prayoga-ratna-mālā*. Nārāyaṇamuni wrote his *Bhāva-pradīpikā*, and Puruṣottama his *Subodhinī* also as commentaries on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*. These writers probably lived some time about the seventeenth century. Vīra-rāghava-dāsa also criticized the *Śrī-bhāṣya* in the *Tātparyā-dīpikā*. His name has already been mentioned in connection with his study, *Ratna-sāriṇī*, on Vātsyā Varada's *Tattva-sāra*. Śrīnivāsa Tātācārya wrote his *Laghu-prakāśikā*, Śrīvatsāṅka Śrīnivāsa his *Śrī-bhāṣya-sārārtha-saṃgraha*, and Śaṭhakopa his *Brahma-sūtrārtha-saṃgraha* as commentaries on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*. These writers seem to have flourished late in the sixteenth century. Śrīvatsāṅka Śrīnivāsa's work was further summarized by Raṅgācārya in his *Śrīvatsa-siddhānta-sāra*. Appaya-dikṣita, of the middle of the seventeenth century, wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, called *Naya-mukha-mālikā*, closely following the ideas of Rāmānuja². Raṅga Rāmānuja also wrote a commentary, called

¹ *bhāṣyā-rṇavam avatīrṇo vistīrṇaṃ yad avadam Naya-dyumaṇau saṃkṣīpya tat paroktīr vīkṣīpya karomi toṣaṇaṃ viduṣām.*

Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha, MS.

The general method of treatment followed in the book is to indulge in long discussions in refutation of the views of opponents and to formulate, as conclusion, the positive contentions of the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* theory on the special points of interest. Thus at the end of a long discussion on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1. 1. 2, he says: *rāddhāntas tu na jannā'dinām viśeṣaṇatve viśeṣya-bheda-prasaṅgaḥ, avirud-dhaviśeṣaṇānām āśraya-bhedakatvāt na caivaṃ viśeṣaṇatvā-acchedena na vyāvar-takata-bhaṅgaḥ tad-an-āśraya-jivādi-vyāvartakatvenaitā tad-asiddheḥ.* (*Naya-dyu-maṇi*, MS. p. 126.)

² *Lakṣmaṇārya-hṛdayā'nusārīṇī likhyate Naya-mālikā.*

Naya-mukha-mālikā, printed in Kumbakonam, 1915, p. 3.

Śārīraka-śāstrārtha-dīpikā, on the *Brahma-sūtra*, following the interpretations of Rāmānuja. His *Mūla-bhāva-prakāśikā*, a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, has already been referred to in this section. He wrote also a commentary on the *Nyāya-siddhāntjāna* of Veṅkaṭanātha, called *Nyāya-siddhāntjāna-vyākhyā*. He was a pupil of Parakāla Yati and probably lived in the sixteenth century. He wrote also three other works, called *Viśaya-ṛākya-dīpikā*, *Chāṇḍa-gyopaniṣad-bhāṣya*, and *Rāmānuja-siddhānta-sāra*. Rāmānujadāsa, called also Mahācārya, lived probably early in the fifteenth century, and was a pupil of Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa. This Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa, author of the *Adhikaraṇa-sārārtha-dīpikā*, must be an earlier person than Śrīnivāsādāsa, author of the *Yatīndra-mata-dīpikā*, who was a pupil of Mahācārya. Mahācārya wrote a work called *Pārāśarya-vijaya*, which is a thesis on the general position of the Rāmānuja Vedānta. He wrote also another work on the *Śrī-bhāṣya* called *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣyopanyāsa*. Mahācārya's other works are *Brahma-vidyā-vijaya*, *Vedānta-vijaya*, *Rahasya-traya-mīmāṃsā*, *Rāmānuja-carita-culuka*, *Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-nirṇaya*, and *Caṇḍa-māruta*, a commentary on the *Śata-dūṣaṇi* of Veṅkaṭanātha. He should be distinguished from Rāmānujācārya, called also Vādihaṃsāmbuvāha, uncle of Veṅkaṭanātha.

There is a work called *Śrī-bhāṣya-vārttika*, which, unlike most of those above, has already been printed; but the author does not mention his name in the book, which is composed in verse. Senānātha, or Bhagavat Senāpati Miśra, who is an author of later date, wrote *Śārīraka-nyāya-kalāpa*. Vijayīndra Bhikṣu was the author of *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-vṛtti*, and Raghunāthārya of *Śārīraka-śāstra-saṃgati-sāra*. Sundararāja-deśika, an author of the sixteenth century, wrote a simple commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya* called *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā*. Veṅkaṭācārya, probably an author of the sixteenth century, wrote *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-pūrva-pakṣa-saṃgraha-kārikā* in verse. This Veṅkaṭācārya was also known as "Prativādiabhakeśari." He also composed *Ācārya-pañcāśat*. Campakeśa, who has already been referred to, wrote a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Śrī-bhāṣya-vyākhyā*. Veṅkaṭanāthārya wrote a work called *Śrī-bhāṣya-sāra*. Śrīvatsāṅka Śrīnivāsācārya was the author of *Śrī-bhāṣya-sārārtha-saṃgraha*. Śrīraṅgācārya composed *Śrī-bhāṣya-siddhānta-sāra* and Śrīnivāsācārya wrote a work called *Śrī-bhāṣyopanyāsa*. There are two other commentaries, called

Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-saṃgraha-vivaraṇa and *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣyā-rambha-prayoyana-samarthana*; but the names of the authors are missing in the manuscripts. Veṅkaṭanātha, of the thirteenth century, wrote *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvalī*, and Maṅgācārya Śrīnivāsa, *Adhikaraṇa-sārārtha-dīpikā*. Varadārya or Varadanātha, son of Veṅkaṭanātha, wrote a commentary on the *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvalī* called *Adhikāra-cintāmaṇi*. There is another work on similar subjects called *Adhikaraṇa-yukti-vilāsa*; but, though the author offers an adoration to Śrīnivāsa, he does not mention his name and it is difficult to discover who this Śrīnivāsa was. Jagannātha Yati wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* on the lines of Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya*, and it was called *Brahma-sūtra-dīpikā*. It will thus be seen that Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* inspired many scholars and thinkers and a great literature sprang up on its basis. But it must be noted with regret that this huge critical literature on Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya*, is not in general of much philosophical importance. Rāmānuja's *Vedārtha-saṃgraha* was commented on by Sudarśana Sūri of the fourteenth century, in *Tūtparya-dīpikā*. He was the son of Vāgvijaya, or Viśvajaya, and pupil of Vātsya Varada. In addition to his study of Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* already referred to, he wrote a *Sandhyā-vandana-bhāṣya*. Rāmānuja's *Vedānta-dīpa* (a brief commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*) was dealt with by Ahobila Raṅganātha Yati, of the sixteenth century. Rāmānuja's *Gadya-traya* was criticized by Veṅkaṭanātha, and Sudarśanācārya also wrote a commentary; Kṛṣṇapada, a later author, also wrote another commentary. Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Gītā* also was commented on by Veṅkaṭanātha. The *Vedānta-sāra* was a brief commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* by Rāmānuja himself, based on his *Śrī-bhāṣya*.

Rāmānujācārya, called also Vādihaṃsāmbuvāhācārya of Ātreya *gotra*, son of Padmanābha and maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭanātha, lived in the thirteenth or fourteenth century; he wrote an important work, called *Naya-kulīśa* or *Nyāya-kulīśa*, which has been noticed before. He composed also *Dīrya-sūri-prabhāva-dīpikā*, *Sarva-darśana-śiromaṇi*, and *Mokṣa-siddhi*, to which he himself refers in his *Nyāya-kulīśa*¹. It might seem that the *Nyāya-kulīśa* was one of the earliest logical or ontological treatises of the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* school; but we find that there were other treatises of this type

¹ I have not been able to procure a MS. of the *Mokṣa-siddhi*, and, so far as I can guess, the book is probably lost.

written during this period and even earlier than Rāmānuja. Thus Nāthamuni wrote a *Nyāya-tattva*, in which he refuted the logical views of Gautama and founded a new system of Logic. Viṣṇucitta, a junior contemporary of Rāmānuja, wrote two works, *Prameya-samgraha* and *Samgati-mālā*. Varada Viṣṇu Miśra, who flourished probably in the latter half of the twelfth century, or the beginning of the thirteenth century, wrote a *Māna-yāthātmya-nirṇaya*. Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka, who flourished before Veṅkaṭanātha, also wrote a *Prajñā-paritrāṇa*¹. Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, who also probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote a *Tattva-ratnākara*². These works have been referred to by Veṅkaṭanātha in his *Nyāya-parisuddhi*; but the manuscripts were not available to the present writer. Vātsya Varada's works have been mentioned in a separate section.

Veṅkaṭanātha, called also Vedānta-deśika, Vedāntācārya, and Kavitārkikasimha, was one of the most towering figures of the school of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. He was born at Tupple in Kanjivaram in A.D. 1268. His father was Ananta Sūri, his grandfather's name was Puṇḍarikākṣa, and he belonged to the Viśvāmītra *gotra*; his mother was Totārambā, sister of Ātreya Rāmānuja, otherwise called Vādikalahamsāmbuvāhācārya. He studied with his uncle Ātreya Rāmānuja, and it is said that he accompanied him to Vātsya Varadācārya's place, when he was five years old. The story goes that even at such an early age he showed so much precocity that it was predicted by Vātsya Varada that in time he would be a great pillar of strength for the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita-vāda* school and that he would repudiate all false systems of philosophy³. It appears that he also studied with Varadārya himself⁴. It is said that he used to live by *uñcha-vṛtti*, receiving alms in the streets, and spent all his life in

¹ He is said to have written another work, called *Nyāya-sudarśana*, mentioned in the introduction to the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* (Mysore, 1933).

² He also wrote another work, called *Bhagavad-guṇa-darpaṇa*.

³ *utprekṣyate budha-janair upapatti-bhūmnyā
ghanṭā hareḥ samajaniṣṭa jadātmanī ti
pratiṣṭhāpita-vedāntaḥ pratikṣipta-bahir-mataḥ
bhūyās traividya-mānyas tvam bhūri-kalyāṇa-bhājanam.*

It is said that he was blessed by Varadācārya in the aforesaid verse, in which he describes Veṅkaṭanātha as an incarnation of the bell of God. *Vaiṣṇavite Reformers of India*, by T. Rajagopalachariar.

⁴ *śrutvā rāmānujāryāt sad-asad-api tatas tattva-muktā kalāpaṃ
vyūtānīd veṅkaṭeśo varada-guru-kṛpā-lambhito-ddāna-bhūmā.
Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, śl. 2.*

writing philosophical and religious works. In the *saṃkalpa-sūryodaya* he says that at the time when he was writing that work he had finished the *Śrī-bhāṣya* for the thirtieth time. While he lived in Kāñcī and Śrīraṅgam, he had to work in the midst of various rival sects, and Pillai Lokācārya, who was very much senior to him in age and was the supporter of the Teṅgalai school, against which Veṅkaṭanātha fought, wrote a verse praising him. Scholars are in general agreement that Veṅkaṭanātha died in 1369, though there is also a view that he died in 1371. He enjoyed a long life and spent much of his time in pilgrimage to various northern countries such as Vijayanagara, Mathurā, Brindāban, Ayodhyā, and Purī. The story of Vidyāraṇya's friendship with Veṅkaṭanātha may be true or false; but we know that Vidyāraṇya was acquainted with the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, and he quotes from it in his account of the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* view in *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*. When Veṅkaṭanātha was middle-aged, Sudarśana Sūri, writer of the *Śruta-prakāśikā*, was already an old man, and it is said that he called Veṅkaṭanātha to Śrīraṅgam and handed over to him his commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, so that it might get a greater publicity. Veṅkaṭanātha himself also wrote a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called the *Tattva-tīkā*. Though an extremely kind man of exemplary and saintly character, he had many enemies who tried to harass and insult him in countless ways. A great difference in interpretation of the nature of *prapatti*, or self-surrender to God, was manifested at this time in the writings of different Śrīvaiṣṇava scholars. Two distinct sects were formed, based mainly on the different interpretation of the nature of *prapatti*, though there were minor differences of a ritualistic nature, such as the marks on the forehead, etc. Of these two sects, the leader of the Vaḍakalai was Veṅkaṭanātha, and that of the Teṅgalai was Pillai Lokācārya. Later on Saumya Jāmātrī muni became the accepted leader of the Teṅgalai school. Though the leaders themselves were actuated by a spirit of sympathy with one another, yet their followers made much of these little differences in their views and constantly quarrelled with one another, and it is a well known fact that these sectarian quarrels exist even now.

It was during Veṅkaṭanātha's life that Malik Kāfur, a general of 'Alā-ud-dīn, invaded the Deccan in 1310. He easily conquered the countries of Warangal and Dvārasamudra and pushed to the extreme south, spreading devastation and plundering everywhere.

In 1326 the Mahomedans invaded Śrīraṅgam and pillaged the city and the temple. About 1351 the Hindu Kingdom in Vijayanagar was established by King Bukka I. When the Mahomedans pillaged the temple of Śrīraṅgam, the temple-keepers had fled away to Madurā with the God Raṅganātha, who was established in Tīrupati and was worshipped there. Bukka's son Kampana began to make conquest in the south and eventually Gopana, a general of Kampana, succeeded in restoring Raṅganātha to Śrīraṅgam. This affair has been immortalized by a verse composed by Venkaṭanātha, which is still written on the walls of the temple of Śrīraṅgam, though certain authorities think that the verse was not by him, but is only attributed to him. This story is found in a Tamil work, called *Kavilologu*, and is also recorded in the *Vaḍakalai Guru-paramparā* of the fifteenth century. During the general massacre at Śrīraṅgam, Venkaṭanātha hid himself among the dead bodies and fled ultimately to Mysore. After having spent some years there he went to Coimbatore, and there he wrote his *Abhīti-stava*, in which he makes references to the invasion of the Mahomedans and the tragic condition at Śrīraṅgam. When he heard that by Gopana's endeavours Raṅganātha was restored to Śrīraṅgam he went there and wrote a verse applauding his efforts¹.

Venkaṭanātha was a prolific writer on various subjects and also a gifted poet. In the field of poetry his most important works are the *Yādavābhyudaya*, *Haṃsa-saṃdeśa*, *Subhāṣita-nīvi*, and *Samkalpa-sūryodaya*, an allegorical drama in ten acts. The *Yādavābhyudaya* was a work on the life of Kṛṣṇa, which was commented upon by no less a person than Appaya-dīkṣita. The *Subhāṣita-nīvi*, a didactic poem, was commented upon by Śrīnivāsa Sūri of the

¹ āriyā'nīla-śṛṅga-dyuti-racita-jagad-rañjanād aṅjanā'dreś
ceṅcyām ārādhya kañ cit samayam atha nihatyod'dhanuṣkāns tuluṣkān
lakṣmī-bhūmyāv'ubhābhyāṃ saha nija-nagare sthāpayan raṅganāthaṃ
samyag-varyāṃ saparyāṃ punar akṛta yaśo-darpaṇaṃ goppanā-ryaḥ.

The verse appears in *Epigraphica Indica*, vol. vi, p. 330.

This fact has also been recorded in Doddācārya's *Vedānta-deśika-vaibhava-prakāśikā* and *Yatindra-pravaṇa* in the following verse:

jītvā tuluṣkān bhuvi goppanendro
raṅgā-dhīpaṃ sthāpītavān sva-deśe
ity'evam ākarṇya guruḥ kavīndro
dhṛṣṭavad yas tam ahaṃ prapadye.

According to the commentary, the aforesaid *Vaibhava-prakāśikā*, Venkaṭanātha was born in 1269 and died in 1369. Goppanārya's reinstallation of Śrīraṅganātha took place in 1371.

Śrīśaila lineage, son of Veṅkaṭanātha. He lived in all probability in the fifteenth century. Veṅkaṭanātha's other poem was *Haṃsa-sandeśa*. In his *Samkalpa-sūryodaya* he dramatically describes, after the pattern of the *Prabodha-candro-daya*, the troubles and difficulties of the human soul in attaining its final perfection. He wrote about thirty-two adoration hymns such as the *Haya-grīva-stotra*, and *Devanāyaka-pañcāśāt* and *Pādukā-sahasra-nāma*. He also wrote many devotional and ritualistic pieces, such as the *Yajñopavīta-pratiṣṭhā*, *Ārādhana-krama*, *Hari-dīna-tilaka*, *Vaiṣṇaveśa-kārikā*, *Śrī-pañcarātra-rakṣā*, *Sac-caritra-rakṣā* and *Nikṣepa-rakṣā*. He also collected from various sources the verses regarding the doctrine of *prapatti*, and wrote the *Nyāsa-viṃśati* and a further work based on it, called the *Nyāsa-tilaka*, which was commented upon by his son Kumāra-Vēdānta-deśika in a work called *Nyāsa-tilaka-ṭyākhyā*. Due notice of his *Pañcarātra-rakṣā* has been taken in the section on *Pañcarātra* of the present volume. He wrote also a work called *Śilpārtha-sāra*, two works on medicine called *Rasa-bhaumāmṛta* and *Vṛkṣa-bhaumāmṛta*, a Purāṇika geography called *Bhū-gola-nirṇaya*, and a philosophical work called *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* in verse with his own commentary on it called *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, which have been noticed in some detail in the special section on Veṅkaṭanātha. This work has two commentaries, called *Ananda-dāyini* or *Ananda-ṭallārī* (in some manuscripts) or *Nṛsimha-rājīya* and *Bhāva-prakāśa*, of which the latter is of an annotative character. The commentary called *Ananda-dāyini* was written by Vātsya Nṛsimhadeva, son of Narasimha-sūri, and Totārambā and Devarāja Sūri. Nṛsimhadeva's maternal grandfather was Kauśika-Śrībhāṣya-Śrīnivāsa, who was also his teacher. He had another teacher, named Appayācārya. This Devarāja Sūri was probably the author of the *Viṃśa-tattva-prakāśikā* and *Caramopāya-tātparya*. Nṛsimhadeva's other works were *Para-tattva-dīpikā*, *Bheda-dhikkāra-nyakkāra*, *Maṇi-sāradhikkāra*, *Siddhānta-nirṇaya*, a commentary on Veṅkaṭanātha's *Nikṣepa-rakṣā*, called *Nṛsimha-rājīya*, and a commentary on the *Sata-dūṣaṇī*. This Nṛsimhadeva lived probably in the sixteenth century. The commentary called *Bhāva-prakāśa* was written by Navyaraṅgeśa. He describes himself as a disciple of Kalijit; but this must have been a different Kalijit from the well-known Lokācārya; for the *Bhāva-prakāśikā* commentary, as it refers to the topics of the *Ananda-dāyini*, is a later one. It must have been

written late in the sixteenth or at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Veṅkaṭanātha also wrote the *Nyāya-parisuddhi*, a comprehensive logical work of the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* school. It was criticized by Śrinivāsadāsa, son of Devarājācārya, who was a disciple of Veṅkaṭanātha. He may have been an uncle and teacher of Nṛsiṃha-deva, author of the *Ānanda-dāyini*. His commentary was called *Nyāya-sāra*. The *Nyāya-parisuddhi* had two other commentaries, *Nikāśa*, by Śaṭhakopa Yati, a disciple of Ahovila and *Nyāya-parisuddhi-vyākhyā*, written by Kṛṣṇatātācārya.

Veṅkaṭanātha wrote a work supplementary to the *Nyāya-parisuddhi*, called *Nyāya-siddhā-ñjana*, the contents of which have been noted in the separate sections on Veṅkaṭanātha. He also wrote another work called *Para-mata-bhaṅga*, and a polemical work called *Śata-dūṣaṇi*. The name *Śata-dūṣaṇi* signifies that it contains a hundred refutations; but actually, in the printed text available to me, I can trace only forty. The best-known commentary, by Rāmānujadāsa, pupil of Vādhūla Śrinivāsa, is called *Caṇḍa-māruta*. All important discussions contained in the *Śata-dūṣaṇi*, which are directed mainly against the Śāṅkara school, have been duly noticed in a different section. It had another commentary, by Nṛsiṃharāja, which is also called *Caṇḍa-māruta*, and another, by Śrinivāsācārya, called *Sahasra-kiraṇi*.

Veṅkaṭanātha, in addition to his *Tattva-ṭikā* commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, wrote a summary of the general topics of the *Śrī-bhāṣya* discussion, called *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvali*, which was commented upon by his son Kumāra Vedantācārya or Varadanātha, in a work called *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvali-vyākhyā* or *Adhikaraṇa-cintāmaṇi*. He also wrote two small pamphlets, called *Cakāra-samarthana* and *Adhikaraṇa-darpaṇa*; a commentary on the *Īsopaniṣat*; one on Yāmuna's *Gītārtha-saṃgraha*, called *Gītārtha-saṃgraha-rakṣā*, and a commentary on Rāmānuja's *Gītā-bhāṣya*, called *Tātparya-candrikā*. He also criticized Rāmānuja's *Gadya-traya*, in a work called *Tātparya-dīpikā*, and wrote commentaries on Yāmuna's *Catuḥ-śloki* and *Stotra-ratnākara*, which are called *Rahasya-rakṣā*. In addition he composed thirty-two works in the *maṇi-pravāla* style, some of which have been translated into Sanskrit. These works are *Sampradāya-parisuddhi*, *Tattva-padaṇī*, *Rahasya-padaṇī*, *Tattva-navanītam*, *Rahasya-navanītam*, *Tattva-*

mātrkā, *Rahasya-mātrkā*, *Tattva-sandeśa*, *Rahasya-sandeśa*, *Rahasya-sandeśa-vivaraṇa*, *Tattva-ratnāvali*, *Tattva-ratnāvali-saṃgraha*, *Rahasya-ratnāvali*, *Rahasya-ratnāvali-hṛdaya*, *Tattva-traya-culuka*, *Rahasya-traya-culuka*, *Sāra-dīpa*, *Rahasya-traya-sāra*, *Sāra-sāra*, *Abhaya-pradāna-sāra*, *Tattva-śikhā-maṇi*, *Rahasya-śikhā-maṇi*, *Añjali-vaibhava*, *Pradhānā-śataka*, *Upakāra-saṃgraha*, *Sāra-saṃgraha*, *Virodha-parihāra*, *Muni-vāhana-bhoga*, *Madhura-kavi-hṛdaya*, *Parama-pāda-sopāna*, *Para-mata-bhaṅga*, *Hastigiri-māhātmya*, *Draviḍopaniṣat-sāra*, *Draviḍopaniṣat-tātparyāvali* and *Nigama-parimala*. The last three are works summarizing the instructions of the Ārvārs. He was the author of twenty-four poems in the Tamil language¹.

Veṅkaṭanātha also wrote a small pamphlet called *Vādi-traya-khaṇḍana*, in which he tried to refute the views of Śaṅkara, Yādava-prakāśa, and Bhāskara. Most of the arguments are directed against Śaṅkara, whereas the views of Yādavaprakāśa and Bhāskara were but slightly touched. He also wrote two works on Mīmāṃsā, called *Mīmāṃsā-pādukā* and *Seśvara-mīmāṃsā*. In the last work Veṅkaṭanātha tries to interpret the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* of Jaimini in a manner different from that of Śābara. His main intention was to interpret the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* in such a manner that it might not be in conflict with the *Brahma-sūtra*, but might be regarded as a complementary accessory to the teachings of the *Brahma-sūtra*. Thus, in interpreting the first *sūtra* of Jaimini, he says that the injunction of reading the Vedas is satisfied with the mere study of the Vedas. The injunction does not include an enquiry into the meaning of the texts and a study of the Mīmāṃsā, which comes out of the natural desire for knowing the meanings of the texts and their applications. The study of the Mīmāṃsā may therefore be undertaken even after the final bath of the *brahma-cārīn*. Thus, a man may, after finishing his obligatory studies as a *brahma-cārīn* in the house of his teacher, still continue to live there for the study of Mīmāṃsā, but the latter is no part of his obligatory duty. Again, in defining the nature of *dharma*, Veṅkaṭanātha says that *dharma* is that which contributes to our good and is also in accordance with the injunctions². Though

¹ The list of these Tamil works, which were not accessible to the present writer, has been collected from the introduction to the Mysore edition of the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*.

² *Codanā-lakṣaṇatva-viśeṣitam evārthe sādhanatvaṃ dhurma-lakṣaṇam. Īśvara-mīmāṃsā*, p. 18.

the word *dharma* may be otherwise used by some persons, yet its accepted meaning, as defined above, remains unaltered. The instructions of the *Smṛtis*, *Purāṇas*, *Pañcarātras*, *Brahma-sūtras*, etc., are to be regarded as *dharma*, as being based upon the Vedas, which are their source. The validity of the nature of *dharma* cannot be determined by a reference to any other *pramāṇa* than the scriptural texts. In all matters of doubt and dispute the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* should be interpreted in such a manner that it does not come in conflict with the views of Bādarāyaṇa, who was the teacher of Jaimini.

Veṅkaṭanātha's son was also a great writer on Vedānta. He was called Kumāra Vedāntācārya, Varadārya or Varadānātha or Varada Deśikācārya or Varadarāja Sūri or Varadanāyaka Sūri or Varadaguru. He wrote a *Tattva-traya-culuka-saṃgraha*, a work in Sanskrit prose, in which he summarizes the contents of the Tamil *Tattva-traya-culuka* of Veṅkaṭanātha, describing the fundamental Śrīvaiṣṇava doctrines regarding soul, matter and God¹. His other works are *Vyavahāraika-satyatva-khaṇḍana*, *Prapatti-kārikā*, *Rahasya-traya-culuka*, *Carama-guru-nirṇaya*, *Phala-bheda-khaṇḍana*, *Ārādhana-saṃgraha*, *Adhikaraṇa-cintāmaṇi*, *Nyāsa-tilaka-vyākhyā*, *Rahasya-traya-sārārtha-saṃgraha*. The last three works are commentaries on Veṅkaṭanātha's *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvali*, *Nyāsa-tilaka*, and *Rahasya-traya-sāra*. Varadārya lived till the end of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century.

Meghanādāri lived probably in the twelfth and the early thirteenth centuries. He was closely associated with his elder brother Rāma Miśra, a pupil of Rāmānuja. He wrote a *Naya-prakāśikā*, a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, *Bhāva-prabodha*, *Mumukṣū-pāya-saṃgraha*, and *Naya-dyu-maṇi*. The last work is one of the most recondite works on the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* school of thought, and its main contents have been noted in a separate section. He was the son of Ātreyanātha and Adhvara-nāyikā. He had three brothers, Hastyadrinātha, Varadarāj, and Rāma Miśra.

Rāmānujadāsa or Mahācārya wrote a *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣyopanyāsa*, a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*. He wrote also a *Pārāśarya*, in which he tried to show that the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Madhva and others were not in consonance with the *Sūtras* of

¹ It is also called *cid-acid-śvara-tattva-nirūpaṇa*, or *Tattva-traya*.

Bādarāyaṇa. Some account of this will be found in the fourth volume of the present work. He also wrote a *Rāmānuja-carita-culuka*, *Rahasya-traya-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya*, and *Caṇḍa-māruta*, a learned commentary on the *Śata-dūṣaṇī* of Veṅkaṭanātha. Sudarśanaguru wrote a commentary on his *Vedānta-vijaya*, called *Maṅgala-dīpikā*. He wrote a big treatise called *Vedānta-vijaya*, which was divided into several more or less independent, though inter-related parts. The first part is *Gurūpasatti-vijaya*, in which the methods of approaching the teacher are discussed. The manuscript is fairly voluminous, containing 273 pages, and the modes of discussion are on the basis of Upaniṣadic texts. The second part is called *Brahma-vidyā-vijaya* (a MS. containing 221 pages), in which he tries to prove, on the basis of Upaniṣadic texts, that Brahman means Nārāyaṇa and no other deity. The third part, called *Sad-vidyā-vijaya*, contains seven chapters and is philosophical and polemical in spirit. I have in a later section given an account of its principal contents. The last part is called *Vijayollāsa* (a MS. of 158 pages), in which he seeks to prove that the Upaniṣads refer to Nārāyaṇa alone. I have not been able to trace the fourth part. Sudarśanaguru wrote a commentary on this *Vedānta-vijaya*. This Sudarśana is different from Sudarśanācārya. He wrote also an *Advaita-vidyā-vijaya*, a work in three chapters, based principally on Upaniṣadic texts. The three chapters are *Prapañca-mithyātva-bhaṅga*, *Jīveśvaraikya-bhaṅga*, and *Akhaṇḍārthatva-bhaṅga*. He also composed another work, called *Upaniṣad-maṅgala-dīpikā*, which was not accessible to the present writer. He describes himself sometimes as a pupil of Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa and sometimes as a pupil of his son Prajñānidhi. He lived probably in the fifteenth century. He was the disciple of Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa, who wrote the *Tūlikā* commentary on the *Śruta-prakāśikā*.

Raṅga Rāmānuja Muni lived probably in the fifteenth century. He was the disciple of Vātsya Anantārya, Tātayārya, and Parakāla Yati or Kumbha-koṇa Tātayārya. He wrote a commentary on the *Śribhāṣya*, called *Mūla-bhāva-prakāśikā*, and one on the *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, called *Nyāya-siddhāntajana-vyākhyā*. He also wrote a *Dramiḍopaniṣad-bhāṣya*, *Viśaya-vākya-dīpikā*, *Rāmānuja-siddhānta-sāra*, a commentary on the *Chāndogyo-paniṣad*, called *Chandogyo-paniṣad-prakāśikā*, and one on the *Bṛhad-āranyako-paniṣat-prakāśikā*. He wrote an independent commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*,

called *Śārīraka-Śāstrārtha-dīpikā*. Aufrecht reports, in his *Catalogus Catalogorum*, that he wrote also the following works (which, however, are not accessible to the present writer): *Upaniṣad-vākya-vivaraṇa*, *Upaniṣat-prakāśikā*, *Upaniṣad-bhāṣya*, *Draviḍopaniṣat-sāra-ratnāvalī-vyākhyā*, *Kaṭhavalī-upaniṣat-prakāśikā*, *Kauṣīta-kopaniṣat-prakāśikā*, *Taittirīyopaniṣat-prakāśikā*, *Prasnopaniṣat-prakāśikā*, *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣat-prakāśikā*, *Muṇḍakopaniṣat-prakāśikā*, *Śvetāśvataropaniṣat-prakāśikā*, *Śrūta-bhāva-prakāśikā*, *Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā*¹.

Raṅga Rāmānuja's teacher, Parakāla Yati, otherwise called Kumbha-koṇa Tātayārya, wrote the following works: *Draviḍa-śruti-tattvārtha-prakāśikā*, *Tiruppalāṇḍu-vyākhyāna*, *Tiruppalavai-vyākhyāna*, *Kaṇṇinṇuṇ-śirattāmbu-vyākhyāna*, *Adhikāra-saṃgraha-vyākhyā*. He wrote also a *Vijayīndra-parāḷaya* in refutation of the *Para-tattva-prakāśikā* of Vijayīndra.

Śrinivāsadāsa, of the lineage of Mādhava, son of Devarājācārya and a pupil of Veṅkaṭanātha, wrote a *Nyāya-sāra*, a commentary on the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, and also a commentary called *Śata-dūṣaṇī-vyākhyā-sahasra-kiraṇī*. It is possible that the Śrinivāsadāsa who wrote the *Viśiṣṭa-dvaita-siddhānta*, *Kaivalya-śata-dūṣaṇī*, *Durupadeśa-dhikkāra*, *Nyāsa-vidyā-vijaya*, *Mukti-śabda-vicāra*, *Siddhy-upāya-sudarśana*, *Sāra-niṣkarṣa-ṭippanī* and *Vādādri-kuliśa* is the same as the author of the *Nyāya-sāra*. He lived late in the fourteenth and in the fifteenth century. This Śrinivāsa must be distinguished from Śrīśaila Śrinivāsa, whose works have been treated in a separate section. Śrīśaila Śrinivāsa also lived probably in the fifteenth century.

We have another Śrinivāsa, who wrote an *Adhikaraṇa-sārārtha-dīpikā*. On some interpretations of the colophon he may probably be styled as Vādhūla Śrinivāsa, in which case he would be the teacher of Mahācārya².

There is another Śrinivāsa, who was the pupil of Mahācārya, alias Rāmānujadāsa, and son of Govindārya. He wrote a commentary on the *Śrūta-prakāśikā* and also the *Yatīndra-mata-dīpikā*, or *Yatipati-mata-dīpikā*. The author says that in writing this elementary treatise on the fundamental principle and doctrines of Śrīvaiṣ-

¹ See Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum*, pp. 488-9.

² On the other interpretation the adjective Vādhūla-kula-tilaka applies to his teacher *Samara-puṅgavācārya*. This Śrinivāsa was known also as Maṅgācārya Śrinivāsa.

navism he collected his materials from a large number of ancient treatises.¹

The book *Yatindra-mata-dīpikā* contains ten chapters. The first chapter enumerates the different categories, gives the definition of perception and shows how other sources of knowledge, such as memory, recognition, and non-perception, can all be included within this definition. It then gives a refutation of the various theories and establishes the theory of *sat-khyāti*. It denies the claim of verbal cognition to be regarded as a case of perception, refutes the definition of indeterminate cognition, and does not admit the possibility of any inference regarding God.

In the second chapter the writer defines "inference," classifies it and enumerates the rules regarding the validity of it and also gives a list of fallacies that may arise out of the violation of these rules. He includes analogy (*upamiti*) and proof by implication (*arthāpatti*) in the definition of inference and names the different modes of controversy.

In the third chapter we get the definition of "verbal testimony." The authority of the scriptures is established, and an attempt has been made to show that all words convey the sense of Nārāyaṇa the Lord.

The fourth chapter is longer than all the others. The author here refutes the categories of the *Nyāya* school of thought such as the universals, the relation of inherence, the causality of the atoms, and gives his own view about the genesis of the different categories, the mind-stuff, the body, the senses, the five primordial elements of earth, air, heat, water, sky, and so on.

The fifth chapter gives an account of time and establishes its all-pervasive and eternal nature. The sixth chapter enumerates the eternal, transcendental attributes of pure *sattva*, which belongs both to *īśvara* and *jīva*.

The seventh chapter is more philosophical. It contains a de-

¹ *evam Drāviḍa-bhāṣya—Nyāya-tattva—Siddhi-traya—Śrī-bhāṣya—Dīpa-sāra—Vedārtha-saṃgraha—Bhāṣya-vivaraṇa—Saṃgīta-mālā—Sudārtha-saṃkṣepa—Śrūta-prakāśika—Tattva-ratnākara—Prajñā-paritrāṇa—Prameya-saṃgraha—Nyāya-kulīśa—Nyāya-sudarśana—Māna-yāthātmya-nirṇaya—Nyāya-sāra—Tattva-dīpena—Tattva-nirṇaya—Sarvārtha-siddhi—Nyāya-pariśuddhi—Nyāya-siddhānta—Paramata-bhaṅga—Tattva-traya-cūluka—Tattva-traya-nirūpaṇa—Tattva-traya-praśaṇḍa-māruta—Vedānta-vijaya—Pārāśarya-vijaya—dīpikā—cārya-prabandhā-nusāreṇa jñātavyārthān saṃgrhya bālābuddhārtham Yatindra-mata-dīpikā-khya-śārīraka-paribhāṣyām te pratipādītāḥ. Yatindra-mata-dīpikā, p. 101.*

tailed discussion as to how knowledge may be both an attribute and a substance, so that it may be a quality of the self and also constitute its essence. Attempts are here made to show that all mental states, including that of feeling, can be reduced to that of knowledge. Devotion and the attitude of self-surrender are discussed and the three courses, knowledge, action, and devotion, are elaborated. The writer also brings out the futility of the means of salvation prescribed by other systems of thought.

In the eighth chapter the author enumerates the attributes common to both *jīva* and *īśvara*, and deals at great length with the true nature of the individual self, refuting the theory of the Buddhists on this point. He gives also a description of the devotees and their twofold classification, and enumerates the attributes of the emancipated *jīvas*.

The ninth chapter is devoted to the definition of God, and establishes Him as the instrumental, material and the accessory cause of the world. It refutes the theory of *māyā* of the monists (*advaitins*) and gives an account of the fivefold aspects of God such as *vibhavas*, *avatāras*, etc. The tenth chapter enumerates and defines ten categories other than substance, such as the *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, *śabda*, *śparsa*, and the relation of contact, etc.

There was another Śrīnivāsadāsa, of the Āṇḍān lineage, who was author of a *Ātma-tattva-paritrāṇa*. He tried to prove that the word Nārāyaṇa is not an ordinary compound word, but a special word which stands by itself indicative of the name of the highest God. There was yet another Śrīnivāsa, called Śrīnivāsa Rāghavādāsa and Caṇḍa-māruta, who wrote a *Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṃgraha*.

This Śrīnivāsa again must be distinguished from another Śrīnivāsa of the lineage of Śaṭhamarṣana, who wrote at least one work known to the present writer, *Ānanda-tāratamya-khaṇḍana*. In this small treatise he tries to refute, by a reference to scriptural passages, the view that there are differences in the state of salvation.

A few other Śrīnivāsas and their works are also known to the present writer, and it is possible that they flourished in the fifteenth or the sixteenth century. These are Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra, who wrote a small work called *Śrī-bhāṣya-sārārtha-saṃgraha*; Śrīnivāsa Tātārya, who wrote *Laghu-bhāva-prakāśikā*; Śrīśaila Yogendra,

who wrote a work called *Tyāga-śabdārtha-ṭippanī*; Śrīśaila Rāghavārya, grandson of Veṅkaṭanātha, who wrote a *Vedānta-kaustubha*; Śrīśailadāsa, son of Raṅgadāsa, who wrote *Siddhānta-saṃgraha*; Sundararājadeśika, author of *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā* (an elementary commentary). These minor writers flourished probably in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Śrīnivāsa-dikṣita, son of Śrīśaila Śrīnivāsa Tātayārya, grandson of Aṇṇayārya, and a pupil of Ācārya-dikṣita, wrote a work called *Virodha-varūthinī-pramāthinī*. This must be distinguished from the *Virodha-varūthinī-pramāthinī* of Raṅgācārya dealt with in a different section. Śrīnivāsa-sudhī also wrote *Brahma-jñāna-nirāsa*, which records the controversy which the author had with Tryambaka Paṇḍita, a follower of Śaṅkara. It generally follows a line of argument adapted in the *Śata-dūṣaṇī* in refuting the monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkara. It is difficult to say whether the works *Naya-maṇi-kalikā*, *Lakṣmaṇārya-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, and *Hari-guṇa-maṇimālā* should be attributed to this author or to the Śrīnivāsa who wrote the *Virodha-nirodha*.

Sudarśana Sūri, who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, of the lineage of Hārīta, son of Vāgvijaya and pupil of Vātsya Varada, has been already mentioned. He wrote a treatise on the commentary of Rāmānuja from whose works all succeeding writers drew their inspiration. The title of his commentary is *Śruta-prakāśikā*, which incorporates, often word for word, what he heard from his teacher Vātsya Varada¹. He also wrote a *Sandhyā-vandana-bhāṣya*, *Vedānta-saṃgraha-tātparyā-dīpikā*, a commentary on the *Vedārtha-saṃgraha* of Rāmānuja, and another work, called *Śruta-pradīpikā*. He was often called Vedavyāsa Bhaṭṭārya. This Sudarśana must be distinguished from Sudarśanaguru who wrote a commentary on the *Vedānta-vijaya* of Mahācārya. Śaṭhakopa muni, who was a pupil of Śaṭhāri Sūri and often known as Śaṭhakopa Yati, lived probably towards the end of the sixteenth century. He wrote the following works: *Brahma-lakṣaṇa-vākyārtha-saṃgraha*, *Brahma-śabdārtha-vicāra*, *Vākyārtha-saṃgraha*, *Brahma-sūtrārtha-saṃgraha*, *Brahma-lakṣaṇa-vākyārtha*, *Dirya-prabandha* and *Bhāva-prakāśikā-dūṣaṇoddhāra*. The last work is an attempt at

¹ *gurubhyo' rītaḥ śrutaḥ śabdais tat-prayuktaiś ca yojitāḥ
saukaryāya bubhūtsūnām saṃkalayya prakāśyate.*

Introductory verses to the *Śruta-prakāśikā*.

refutation of the criticism of the *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, a commentary on *Śrūta-prakāśikā*, by Varada Viṣṇu Sūri.

Ahobila Raṅganātha Yati, who flourished at the beginning of the fifteenth century, wrote a *Nyāsa-vivṛti*, in which he deals with the topics of *nyāsa* as expounded in Veṅkaṭanātha's *Nyāsa-tilaka*. Ādivarāha Vedāntācārya wrote a *Nyāya-ratnāvali*. Kṛṣṇatātācārya, who flourished in the fifteenth century and belonged to the Śrīśaila lineage, wrote a commentary on the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, called *Nyāya-pariśuddhi-vyākhyā* and some small treatises called *Dūrārtha-dūrikaraṇa*, *Brahma-sabdārtha-vicāra* and *Ṇatva-candrikā*. Kṛṣṇa-pāda-lokaguru, probably of the same century, wrote a *Rahasya-traya-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya*, *Dīvyā-prabandha-vyākhyā*, *Catuḥ-śloki-vyākhyā*, and a number of Tamil works. Campakeśa, of the fifteenth century, wrote a *Guru-tattva-prakāśikā*, and a *Vedānta-kaṇṭako-ddhāra*. In the last work he tried to refute the criticisms of the Śrī-bhāṣya¹. He was a pupil of Veṅkaṭanātha. Another Tātācārya, who was grandfather of Veṅkaṭādhvārī, the author of the *Viśva-guṇādarśa*, wrote a *Tātācārya-dina-caryā*. He was the maternal uncle of Appaya-dīkṣita. Again, Deśikācārya, who wrote the *Prayoga-ratna-mālā* as a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, also wrote a book on the commentary on Veṅkaṭanātha's *Pañyikā* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣat*, which was called the "*Asti-brahmeti-śruty-arthavicāra*." Doḍḍayācārya, who lived probably in the fifteenth century, wrote a *Parikara-vijaya*, often referred to in Mahācārya's works, and a life of Veṅkaṭanātha, called *Vedānta-deśika-vaibhava-prakāśikā*. Nārāyaṇa muni wrote a *Bhāva-pradīpikā*, *Gītārtha-saṃgraha*, *Gītā-sāra-rakṣā*, *Gītā-saṃgraha-vibhāga*, *Rahasya-traya-jīvātu*. He was the son of Śrīśaila Tātayārya, grandson of Anantārya and pupil of Rāmānujācārya, probably Mahācārya. He lived perhaps late in the fifteenth century. Nṛsiṃharāja, who wrote a commentary on the *Śata-dūṣaṇī*, called *Śata-dūṣaṇī-vyākhyā*, was probably the same person who wrote an *Ānanda-dāyini* on the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*. Nṛsiṃhasūri, a much later writer, wrote a *Śarīra-bhāvādhikaraṇa-vicāra* and *Tat-kratu-nyāya-vicāra*. Para-

¹ Śuddhasattvalakṣaṇārya wrote a work called *Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā* as a commentary on the *Śrūta-prakāśikā*, which he based upon the *Guru-tattva-prakāśikā* of Campakeśa. He was the disciple of Śuddhasattvācārya, son of Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni. In his commentary he constantly refers to the *Tūlikā* commentary of Vādhula Śrīnivāsa. He lived probably in the sixteenth century, and may have been a contemporary of Mahācārya.

vastu Vedāntācārya, son of Ādivarāhācārya, composed a *Vedānta-kaustubha*. Puruṣottama wrote a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya* called *Subodhinī*, and Bhagavat Senāpati Miśra wrote a *Sārīraka-nyāya-kalā*.

Pela Puradeśika wrote a work called *Tattva-bhāskara*. It is divided into two parts, in the first of which he tries to ascertain the meaning of *māyā* and elucidates the nature of God on the basis of Dravidian and Sanskrit texts. The second part is of a ritualistic nature. Raṅgarāja, who lived probably in the sixteenth century, was the author of *Advaita-valiṣkāra*. Raṅganāthācārya wrote an *Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-vicāra*, *Puruṣārtha-ratnākara*, *Viśvādūrtha-saṃgraha*, *Kāryādhikaraṇa-veda* and *Kāryādhikaraṇa-tattva*. The contents of the last two works have been dealt with in a different section. He lived perhaps in the sixteenth century, and was a pupil of Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni. A Rāmānuja called Vedānta Rāmānuja wrote a *Dīṇya-sūri-prabhāva-dīpikā* and a *Sarva-darśana-śiromaṇi*. Rāmānujadāśabhikṣu wrote *Sauri-rāja-caraṇāravinda-śaraṇa-gatisāra*, and Rāma Subrahmaṇyasāstrī *Viṣṇu-tattva-rahasya*. These two writers flourished probably in the seventeenth or late in the sixteenth century.

Ātreya Varada wrote a *Rahasya-traya-sāra-tyākhyā*, a commentary on Veṅkaṭanātha's *Rahasya-traya-sāra*. Varadadāsa wrote *Nyāsa-vidyā-bhūṣaṇa* and Vādi Keśarī Miśra the following: *Adhyātma-cintā*, *Tattva-dīpa-saṃgraha-kārikā*, *Tattva-dīpa* and *Rahasya-traya-kārikā*. These small works are of little value. Only the *Tattva-dīpa* contains some philosophical materials inspired by the *Śrūta-prakāśikā* of Sudarśana. Vīra-rāghava-dāsa, son of Vādhūla Narasiṃha and pupil of Vādhūla Varadaguru, produced a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Tātparya-dīpikā*, and one on Vātsyā Varada's *Tattva-sāra*, called *Ratna-sārīṇī*. Veṅkaṭa Sudhī wrote a voluminous work in four chapters, called *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī*, in which he tried to prove that Nārāyaṇa and not Śiva is the supreme Lord and the cause of the world, and dealt with many sectarian doctrines which are of no philosophical value. He was the pupil of Veṅkaṭanātha and son of Tātācārya of Śaṭhamarṣaṇa lineage. Some notice of the work will be taken in the section on *Pañcarātra*. Veṅkaṭadāsa, called also Vucci Veṅkaṭācārya, the third son of Aṇṇayārya, of Śaṭhamarṣaṇa lineage, composed a work called *Vedāntakārikāvalī*. Veṅkaṭādhvārī wrote a work called *Yati-*

prativandana-khaṇḍana, Ayyaṇṇa wrote *Vyāsa-tātparya-nirṇaya* and Aṇṇavāyyaṅgācārya, *Tṛṃśa-praśno-ttara*, *Kesara-bhūṣaṇa* and *Śrī-tattva-darpaṇa*. Gopālatāta wrote *Śatakoṭi-dūṣaṇa-parihāra*, Govindācārya *Pramāṇa-sāra* and Jagannātha Yati *Brahma-sūtra-dīpikā*. Devanātha wrote *Tattva-nirṇaya*, Dharmakureśa *Rāmānuja-nava-ratna-mālikā*, Nilameghatātācārya *Nyāsa-vidyārtha-vicāra*, Raṅgācārya *Śrīvatsa-siddhānta-sūra*, Raghunāthācārya *Būla-sarasvatī* and *Sanḡati-sāra*. Rāghavācārya wrote *Rahasya-traya-sāra-saṃgraha*, Rāmanātha Yogī *Sadā-cāra-bodha*, Rāmānuja *Gāyatrī-sata-dūṣaṇi* and Tirumalācārya of Bharadvāja lineage *Ṇattvopapatti-bhaṅga*.

Aṇṇayārya, brother of Śrīśaila Śrīnivaśa, wrote *Saptati-ratna-mālikā*, *Vyavahārikatva-khaṇḍana-sāra*, *Mithyātva-khaṇḍana*, *Ācārya-vimśati*, *Ānanda-tāratamya-khaṇḍana*. Appaya-dikṣita of the sixteenth century commented on the *Brahma-sūtra* in accordance with the views of Rāmānuja, in a work called *Naya-mukha-mālikā*. Anantārya of the nineteenth century wrote a number of works of which the following have been published: *Ṇattva-tattva-vibhūṣaṇa*, *Śatakoṭi-khaṇḍana*, *Nyāya-bhāskara*, *Ācāra-locana* (a refutation of widow-remarriage), *Śāstrārambha-samarthana*, *Samāsa-vāda*, *Viśayatā-vāda*, *Brahma-śakti-vāda*, *Śāstraikya-vāda*, *Mokṣa-kāraṇatā-vāda*, *Nirviśeṣa-pramāṇa-vyudāsa*, *Samvīn-nān-ātva-samarthana*, *Jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda*, *Brahma-lakṣaṇa-vāda*, *Īkṣaty-adhikaraṇa-vicāra*, *Pratijñā-vāda*, *Ākāśādhikaraṇa-vicāra*, *Śrībhāṣya-bhāvāṅkura*, *Laghu-sāmānādhikaraṇya-vāda*, *Guru-sāmānādhikaraṇya-vāda*, *Śārīra-vāda*, *Siddhānta-siddhāṅjana*, *Vidhisudhākara*, *Sudarśana-sura-druma*, *Bheda-vāda*, *Tat-kratu-nyāya-vicāra*, *Drśyatvā-numāna-nirāsa*. These treatises are mostly short papers, though a few are more elaborate. The *Nyāya-bhāskara* is a refutation of the *Gauḍa-brahmānandī* commentary on the *Advaita-siddhi*, in refutation of the *Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī*. It consists of twelve topics, and the refutations are mostly of a scholastic nature following the style of the new school of logic in Bengal which found fault with the definitions of their opponents. Some of the most important works of this writer have been referred to in the relevant places of this work.

The Influence of the Āṛvārs on the followers of Rāmānuja.

We have already referred to the *Divya-prabandhas*, written by the Āṛvārs in Tamil, which exerted a profound influence on all teachers of the Śrīvaiṣṇava school¹. Kureśa (Tirukkurukaippiran Pillai) wrote a commentary of 6000 verses on a selection of Nāmm'-āṛvār's one thousand verses called the *Sahasra-gīti*. Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya wrote a commentary of 9000 verses. Under the directions of Kalijit (Lokācārya) Abhaya-prada-rāja wrote a commentary of 24,000 verses. Kṛṣṇapāda, pupil of Kalijit, wrote another commentary of 3600 verses. Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni wrote 12,000 verses interpreting the views of Nāmm'-āṛvār. The commentaries of Abhaya-prada-rāja on the *Divya-prabandhas* helped the later teachers to understand the esoteric doctrine of the later works. The commentaries on the *Divya-prabandhas* written by Saumyajāmāṭṛ muni, the younger brother of Pillai Lokācārya, had already become rare in the time of Abhirāma Varācārya, the translator of the *Upadeśa-ratna-mālā* and the grandson of Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni.

It is thus seen that Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya, the successor of Rāmānuja in the pontifical chair, and his successor Vedānti Mādhava, called also Nanjiyar, and his successor Namburi Varadarāja, called also Kalijit or Lokācārya I, and his successor Pillai Lokācārya, all wrote works dealing not so much with the interpretation of Rāmānuja's philosophy, as with the interpretation of devotion as dealt with in the *Sahasra-gīti* and the *Divya-prabandhas*. Their writings are mostly in Tamil, only a few have been translated into Sanskrit,

¹ These *Divya-prabandhas* are four thousand in number. Thus Poygaiy-āṛvār wrote *Muḍal-tiru-vantādi* of 100 stanzas; Bhūtatt'-āṛvār, *Iraṇḍam-tiru-vantādi* of 100 stanzas; Pēy-āṛvār, *Munṇām-tiru-vantādi* of 100 stanzas; Tīru-māiṣai Pirān, *Nān-mukam Tīru-vantādi* and *Tīru-chaṇḍa-vruttam* of 96 and 120 stanzas respectively; Madhura-kaviy-āṛvār wrote *Kaṇṇinuṅ-ṣiruttāmbu* of 11 stanzas; Nāmm'-āṛvār wrote *Tīru-vruttam* of 100 stanzas, *Tīru-vāṣīyam*, *Periya-tīru-vantādi* of 87 stanzas and *Tīru-vāy-mōri* of 1102 verses; Kula-śekhara Perumāl wrote *Perumāl-tirumōli* of 105 stanzas, *Periy-āṛvār-tiruppālāṇḍu* and *Periy-āṛvār-tirumōri* of 12 and 461 stanzas, *Āṇḍal, Tiruppāvai* and *Nācchiyār-tirumōli* of 30 and 143 stanzas; Toṇḍar-āḍi-poḍiy-āṛvār, *Tīru-palliy-eruchi* and *Tīru-mālai* of 10 and 45 stanzas respectively; Tīru-pān-āṛvār, *Amalanādi-piṇān* of 10 stanzas; Tīru-maṅgaiy-āṛvār wrote *Periya-tirumōli* of 1084 verses, *Tīru-kkurundāṇḍakam* of 20 stanzas, *Tīruneḍundāṇḍakam* of 30 stanzas, *Tīruvelukkū-tirukkai* of 1 stanza, *Śīriya-tirumaḍal* of 77 stanzas and *Periya-tirumaḍal* of 148 stanzas, thus making a total of 4000 verses in all. They are referred to in the *Upadeśa-ratna-mālā* of Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni (junior) and in its introduction by M. T. Narasimhiengar.

and in the present work notice is taken only of the Sanskrit works of these writers (mostly in the manuscript form) which have been available to the present writer. Both Pillai Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni, called also Vādikeśari, were sons of Kṛṣṇapāda, but this Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni must be distinguished from a later Saumyajāmāṭṛ muni, called also Yatindrapraṇācārya, who was a much more distinguished man. Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya was probably born before A.D. 1078 and he died in A.D. 1165. He was succeeded by Vedānti Mādhava or Nanjiyar, who was succeeded by Namburi Varadarāja or Lokācārya I. He was succeeded by Pillai Lokācārya, a contemporary of Veṅkaṭanātha, and Śruta-prakāśikācārya or Sudarśana Sūri. It was in his time that the Mahomedans attacked Śrīraṅgam. as has already been mentioned in connection with our account of Veṅkaṭanātha. The Mahomedans were expelled from Śrīraṅgam by Goppanārya, and the image of Raṅganātha was re-installed in A.D. 1293. It was at this time that the famous Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni (junior) was born. The senior Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni, younger brother of Pillai Lokācārya, called also Vādikesari, wrote some commentaries on the *Divya-prabandhas*, a work called *Dīpa-prakāśa*, and *Piyaruli-ceyalare-rahasya*. He is referred to by the junior Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni, called also Varavara muni, in his *Upadeśa-ratna-mālā*, *Tattva-traya-bhāṣya* and *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa-vyākhyā*. We cannot be sure whether the *Adhyātma-cintāmaṇi*, in which Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa is adored as his teacher, was written by Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni. Mahācārya also described himself as a pupil of Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa, and, if the senior Saumya Jāmāṭṛ and Mahācārya were pupils of the same teacher, Mahācārya must have lived in the fourteenth century. If, however, the junior Saumya Jāmāṭṛ wrote the *Adhyātma-cintāmaṇi*, Mahācārya will have to be placed at a later date.

The present writer has been able to trace only three books in Sanskrit by Pillai Lokācārya: *Tattva-traya*, *Tattva-śekhara*, and *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa*¹. The *Tattva-traya* is a very useful compendium of the Śrīvaiṣṇava school of thought, in which the nature of the inanimate (*acit*), the souls, God and their mutual relations are dealt

¹ Some of his other works are *Mumukṣu-ppaḍi*, *Prameya-śekhara*, *Nava-ratna-mālā*, *Tani-praṇava*, *Prapanna-paritrāṇa*, *Yādycchika-ppaḍi*, *Dvayam*, *Artha-pañcaka*, *Sāra-saṃgraha*, *Paranda-paḍi*, *Saṃsāra-sāmrājyam*, *Śrīyaḥ-pati-ppaḍi*, *Caramam*, *Arcir-ādi*, *Nava-vidha-sambandha*. Vide footnote in *Tattva-śekhara*, p. 70.

with. There is an excellent commentary by Varavara muni. The *Tattva-śekhara* is a work in four chapters. The first chapter quotes scriptural evidences in support of the view that Nārāyaṇa is the highest God and the ultimate cause; in the second chapter he describes the nature of self by reference to scriptural testimony. The same description of the nature of self is continued in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter he deals with the ultimate goal of all souls, self-surrender to God. He says that the ultimate *summum bonum* (*puruṣārtha*) consists in the servitude (*kainkarya*) to God roused by love of Him (*prīti-kārita*), due to the knowledge of one's own nature and the nature of God in all His divine beauty, majesty, power and supreme excellence. Not all servitude is undesirable. We know in our ordinary experience that servitude through love is always pleasurable. In the ordinary idea of emancipation, a man emphasizes his own self and his own end. This is therefore inferior to the *summum bonum* in which he forgets his own self and regards the servitude of God as his ultimate end. Lokācārya then refutes the various other conceptions of the ultimate goal in other schools of philosophy. He also refutes the conception of the *summum bonum* as the realization of one's own nature with a sense of supreme subordination (*para-tantratvena svā-nubhava-mātram na puruṣārthah*). This is also technically called *kaivalya* in the Śrīvaiṣṇava system. Our ultimate end is not cessation of pain, but enjoyment of bliss. Positive bliss is our final aim. It is held that in the emancipation as described above the individual realizes himself in close association with God and enjoys supreme bliss thereby; but he can never be equal to Him. Bondage (*bandha*) is true and the removal of bondage is also true. *Prapatti*, or self-surrender to God, is regarded as a means to cessation of bondage. This *prapatti* may be direct (*a-vyavahita*) and indirect (*vyavahita*). In the first case the self-surrender is complete and absolute and done once for all¹. The in-

¹ *Prapatti* is defined as follows:

bhagavad-āñātivartana-nivṛtti-bhagavad-ānukūlya-sarva-śaktitvā-musandhāna-prabhṛti-sahitaḥ yacñā-garbho vijṛmbha-rūpa-jñāna-viśeṣaḥ; tatra jñeyākāra īśvarasya nirapekṣa-sādhanaṭvam jñānākaro vyavasāyā-imakatvam; etac ca śāstrā-rthatvāt sakṛt kartavyam. Tattva-śekhara, p. 64.

Just as the Śāṅkarites hold that, once the knowledge regarding the unity of the individual with Brahman dawns through the realization of the meaning of such texts, there remains nothing to be done. So here also the complete self-surrender to God is the dawning of the nature of one's relation to God, and, when this is once accomplished, there is nothing else to be done. The rest remains with God in His adoption of the devotee as His own.

direct *prapatti* is the continual meditation on God through love of Him, along with the performance of the obligatory duties and the non-commission of prohibited actions. This is decidedly the lower stage; the more deserving ones naturally follow the first method.

The main contents of Pillai Lokācārya's *Śrī-vacana-bhūṣaṇa* follow in a separate section in connection with the account of the commentary on it and sub-commentary by Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni (junior) and Raghūttama. The *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* consists of 484 small sentences longer than the *Sūtra*-phrases, but often shorter than ordinary philosophical sentences. Lokācārya followed this style in his other works also, such as his *Tattva-traya* and *Tattva-śekhara*.

Ramya-jāmāṭṛ muni or Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni, called also Maṇavālama muni or Periya-jīyar, was the son of Tikalakkidāndāntirunāvīruḍaiyāpiṇān-Tātar-aṇṇar, a disciple of Pillai Lokācārya and grandson of Kollikavaladasar, who was also a disciple of Pillai Lokācārya. He was born in the Tinnevely district in A.D. 1370 and lived for seventy-three years, that is till A.D. 1443. He first obtained training from Śrīśaileśa, called also Tiru-maṇai Ārvār, in Tiruvāy-moṛi. One of the first works of his early youth was a poem called *Yati-rāja-vimśati*, in honour of Rāmānuja, which is incorporated and published in Varavara muni's *Dina-caryā*. On account of his deep devotion for Rāmānuja he was also known as Yatindra-pravaṇa, and wrote a commentary on a short life of Rāmānuja called *Prapanna-sāvitṛi* or *Rāmānuja-nuṇḍādī* of *Tiruvarangattamudanār*. After completing his studies under Śrīśaileśa he remained at Śrīraṅgam and studied the commentaries on the *Divya-prabandhas*, the *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* and other *Drāviḍa Vedānta* works. In his study of the *Divya-prabandhas* and the *Gītā-bhāṣya* he was helped by his father Tatar-aṇṇar. He also studied with Kidāmbi-Tirumalai-Nayinār, called also Kṛṣṇadeśika, the *Śrī-bhāṣya* and *Śruta-prakāśikā*. He also studied the *Ācārya-hṛdaya* with Aṇṇayācārya, called also Devarājaguru, of Yādavādri. He renounced the world, became a *sannyāsin*, and attached himself to the Pallava-maṭha at Śrīraṅgam, where he built a *vyākhyāna-maṇḍapa*, in which he used to deliver his religious lectures. He was very proficient in the *Drāviḍa Vedānta*, produced many works in the *maṇi-pravāla* style (mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil), and had hundreds of followers. He had a son, called Rāmānujārya, and a grandson, called Viṣṇucitta. Of his pupils eight were very famous: Bhaṭṭa-

nātha, Śrīnivāsa-yati, Devarājaguru, Vādhūla Varada Nārāyaṇa-guru, Prativādibhayaṅkara, Rāmānujaguru, Sūtākhyā, and Śrīvānācala Yogīndra. These eight disciples were great teachers of *Vedānta*¹. He taught the *Bhāṣya* to Raṅgarāja. There were many ruling chiefs in South India who were his disciples. Among his works the following are noteworthy, *Yati-rāja-vimśati*, *Gītā-tātparya-dīpa*, a Sanskrit commentary on the *Gīta*, *Śrī-bhāṣyā-ratha*, *Taittirīyo-paniṣad-bhāṣya*, *Para-tattva-nirṇaya*. He wrote also commentaries on the *Rahasya-traya*, *Tattva-traya* and *Śrī-vacana-bhūṣaṇa* of Pillai Lokācārya and the *Ācārya-hṛdaya* of the senior Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni, called also Vādikeśārī, brother of Pillai Lokācārya; commentaries on *Priyālvār-tiru-moṛi*, *Jñāna-sāra* and *Prameya-sāra* of Devarāja, and the *Sapta-gāthā* of Viṛāmsolai-ppillai; glosses on the authorities quoted in the *Tattva-traya*, *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa*, and commentaries on the *Divya-prabandha* called the *Idu*; many Tamil verses, such as *Tiruvāymōṛi-nūṛundādi*, *Artti-prabandha*, *Tiruvārūdhana-krama*, and many Sanskrit verses. He occupied a position like that of Rāmānuja, and his images are worshipped in most Vaiṣṇava temples in South India. Many works were written about him, e.g. *Varavara-muni-dinacaryā*, *Varavara-muni-śataka*, *Varavara-muni-kāvyā*, *Varavara-muni-campu*, *Yatindra-pravaṇa-prabhāva*, *Yatindra-pravaṇa-bhadra-campu*, etc. His *Upadeśa-ratna-mālā* is recited by Śrivaishnavas after the recital of the *Divya-prabandha*. In his *Upadeśa-ratna-mālā* he gives an account of the early Āṛvārs and the Āṛagiyas. It was translated into Sanskrit verse by his grandson Abhirama-varācārya, whose *Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya* has already been noted in the present work. He also wrote another book called *Nakṣatra-mālikā* in praise of Śaṭhakopa².

Though Mr Narasimhiengar says that a commentary on the *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* was written by Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni (junior) in the *maṇipravāla* style, yet the manuscript of the commentary, with a sub-commentary on it by Raghūttama, which was available to the present writer, was a stupendous volume of about 750 pages, all written in Sanskrit. The main contents of this work will appear in a separate section.

¹ See *Prapannāmṛta*, Ch. 122.

² The present writer is indebted for some of his information regarding the works of Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni to M. T. Narasimhiengar's Introduction to the English translation of the *Upadeśa-ratna-mālā*.

CHAPTER XIX

THE PHILOSOPHY OF YĀMUNĀCĀRYA

THOUGH in later days Bodhāyana is regarded as the founder of the Vaiṣṇava systems, yet, as his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* is not now available, we may look upon Yāmuna as being the earliest of the latter-day Vaiṣṇava philosophers. We hear that many other people, such as Taṅka, Dramiḍa and Bharuchi, wrote in accordance with the teachings contained in the commentary of Bodhāyana, endeavouring to refute the views of other systems of thought. Dramiḍa wrote a *Bhāṣya* which was elaborated by Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra and is frequently referred to by Yāmuna. The sage Vakulābharaṇa, called Śaṭhakopācārya, also wrote an elaborate treatise in the Tamil language on the *bhakti* creed, but this also is hardly available now. Thus the history of modern Vaiṣṇavism should, for all practical purposes, begin with Yāmunācārya, who flourished during the latter part of the tenth and the earlier part of the eleventh century. Yāmunācārya was said to be the preceptor of Mahāpurṇa from whom the great Rāmānuja had his initiation. So far as I am aware, Yāmuna wrote four books, namely, *Siddhi-traya*, *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, *Puruṣa-ninṇaya*, and *Kāśmīrāgama*. Of these only the first two have been printed.

Yāmuna's doctrine of Soul contrasted with those of others.

We have seen that from the Cārvākas to the Vedāntists there had been many schools of philosophy and each of them had its own theory of soul. We made but a scanty reference to Cārvākism in the first volume, and we have generally omitted the discussions against Cārvākism in which other systems usually indulged. The most important of the doctrines held by the Cārvākas is that there is no self other than the body; some of them, however, regarded the senses as the self, and others as *Manas*. They held that there were only four elements and that out of them life and consciousness sprang forth. Our notion of self also referred to the body, and there was no separate soul, apart from the body. The Cārvāka literature

has, however, vanished from India, and we can know only from references in other works that their original writings were also in the form of *sūtras*¹.

Yāmuna's philosophy was directly opposed to the doctrine of the Cārvākas. It is best therefore that we should deal here with Yāmuna's theory of soul in connection with the pretensions of the Cārvākas. Yāmuna takes his stand on the notion of self-consciousness. He says that our preception "I know" distinctly points to the self as the subject, as distinguished from the perception of the body as "this is my body," which is closely akin to other objective perceptions such as "this is a jug," "this is a piece of cloth." When I restrain my senses from external objects and concentrate myself on myself, I have still the notion of my self as "I," which arises in me without the least association of my hands or feet or any other parts of the body. The body as a whole cannot be said to be indicated by my perception, when none of the parts of the body shine forth in it. Even when I say "I am fat," "I am lean," the notion of "I" does not refer to the external fat or lean body, but to some mysterious entity within me with which the body is wrongly associated. We should not forget that we also say "this is my body" as we should say "this is my house," where the body is spoken of as being different from the self as any external object. But it may be objected that we also say "my self" (*mamātmā*); but this is only a linguistic usage which expresses that difference, whereas the entity perceived is just the same and identical. The confusion which is felt in the fact that the notion of "I" refers to the body is due to this, that the self has no perceivable shape or form as have ordinary external objects (such as jug, cloth, etc.), by virtue of which they are distinguished from one another. Those who are not sufficiently discriminating cannot rest content with the formless self, and consequently confuse the soul with the body, more particularly because they find that corresponding to any and every desire of the soul there is a corresponding change of the body. They think that, since, corresponding to any mental change, such as new feeling, thought, or desire, there is a corresponding physical or physiological change of the body, there is no other soul different from the body. But, if

¹ The first *sūtra* of Bṛhaspati is *atha tattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ*; the second is *prithivy-ap-tejo-vāyur iti tattvāni* and the third is *tebhyas caitanyaṃ kṛtvādibhyo mada-śaktivat*.

we try to find out by a deeper self-introspection what we mean by "I," we find that it is an entity, as the subject, as the "I," as distinct from the objects which are not self and which are indicated as this or that. Had the notion "I know" referred to the body, the bodily parts would surely have been manifested in the notion, as external objects shine forth in all external perception as this or that. But it is not so; on the contrary, by introspection I find that the self is an entity which is independent in itself, and all other things of the world are for the sake of my self; I am the enjoyer; whereas everything else is the object of my enjoyment; I am not for the sake of any body; I am an end in myself and never a means for anything else (*a-parārtha*). All combinations and collocations are for the sake of another, whom they serve; the self is neither the result of any collocation nor does it exist for the sake of serving another.

Moreover, consciousness cannot be regarded as being a product of the body. Consciousness cannot be thought to be like an intoxicating property, the product of the four elements; for the combination of the four elements cannot produce any and every sort of power. There is a limit to the effects that a certain cause can produce; in the production of the intoxicating property it is the atoms which happen to possess that property; intoxication is not to be compared with consciousness; nor has it any similarity to any physical effect; nor can it be thought that there are atoms in which the property of consciousness is generated. Had consciousness been the result of any chemical change, such as we find in the production of the red colour by the combination of lime with catechu, there would have been particles of consciousness (*caitanya*) produced, and our consciousness would then have been the sum total of those particles of consciousness, as in the case of any material chemical product; the red colour produced by the combination of lime with catechu belongs to an object every particle of which is red; so, if consciousness had been a chemical product of the material of this body, there would have been generated some particles of consciousness, and thus there would have been perceptions of many selves in accordance with each particle of consciousness, and there would be no identity of consciousness and experience. Thus it must be admitted that consciousness belongs to an entity, the soul, which is different from the body.

Nor can consciousness belong to the senses; for, if it belonged

to each of the senses, then that which was perceived by one sense (e.g. the eye) could not be perceived by another sense (e.g. the touch), and there would not rise the consciousness "I touch that which I had seen before." If all the senses together produced consciousness, then we could not perceive anything with one sense (e.g. the eye), nor could we have any consciousness, or the memory of the object of any particular sense after that sense was lost; when a man was blinded, he would lose all consciousness, or would never remember the objects which he had seen before with his eyes.

Nor can the *manas* be regarded as *ātman*; for it is only an organ accepted as accounting for the fact that knowledge is produced in succession and not in simultaneity. If it is said that the *manas* may be regarded as being a separate organ by which it can know in succession, then practically the self, or *ātman*, is admitted; the only difference being this, that the Cārvākas call *manas* what we (Yāmuna and his followers) call *ātman*.

The *Vijñānavādin* Buddhists held that knowledge, while self-manifesting, also manifested the objects and so knowledge should be regarded as the self (*ātman*). Against these Buddhists Yāmuna held that, if any permanent seat of knowledge was not admitted, then the phenomenon of personal identity and recognition could not be explained by the transitory states of self-manifesting knowledge; if each knowledge came and passed, how could one identify one's present experiences with the past, if there were only flowing states of knowledge and no persons? Since there was no permanence, it could not be held that any knowledge persisted as an abiding factor on the basis of which the phenomenon of self-identity or recognition could be explained. Each knowledge being absent while others came, there was no chance of even an illusion of sameness on grounds of similarity.

The doctrine of the Śāṅkara school, that there is one qualityless permanent pure consciousness, is regarded by Yāmuna as being against all experience. Thus, consciousness is always felt as belonging to a person and as generated, sustained for a time, and then lost. At the time of deep sleep we all cease to possess knowledge, and this is demonstrated by our impression on waking that we have slept for so long, without consciousness. If the *antaḥkaraṇa*, which the Advaitins regard as the substratum of the notion of "I," had been submerged during the sleep, then there could not have been

on waking the notion that "I slept so long." Nobody has ever experienced any pure knowledge. Knowledge as such must belong to somebody. The Śāṅkarites say that the rise of knowledge means the identity of the knowledge with the objects at the time. But this is not so; for the truth of the knowledge of an object is always with reference to its limitations of time and space and not to the intrinsic quality of the thing or the knowledge. The assertion also that knowledge is permanent is without any foundation; for whenever any knowledge arises it always does so in time and under the limitations of time. Nobody has ever experienced any knowledge divested of all forms. Knowledge must come to us either as perception or as inference, etc.; but there cannot be any knowledge which is absolutely devoid of any forms or modifications and absolutely qualityless. The Śāṅkarites regard the self as pure consciousness or *anubhūti*, but it is apparent that the self is the agent of *anubhūti*, or the knower, and not knowledge or pure consciousness. Again, as in Buddhism, so in Śāṅkarism, the question of recognition remains unsolved; for recognition or personal continuity of experience means that the knower existed in the past and is existing even now—as when we say, "I have experienced this"—but, if the self is pure consciousness only, then there cannot be any perceiver persisting in the past as well as in the present, and the notion "I have experienced this" is not explained, but only discarded as being illusory. The consciousness of things, however, is never generated in us as "I am consciousness," but as "I have the consciousness of this"; if all forms were impure impositions on pure consciousness, then the changes would have taken place in the consciousness, and instead of the form "I have consciousness" the proper form of knowledge ought to have been "I am consciousness." The Śāṅkarites also hold that the notion of the knower is an illusory imposition on the pure consciousness. If that be so, the consciousness itself may be regarded as an illusory imposition; if it is said that the pure consciousness is not an imposition, since it lasts till the end—the stage of emancipation—then, since the result of right knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*) is this, that the self ceases to be a knower, false knowledge should be welcomed rather than such a right knowledge. The notion "I know" proves the self to be a knower and apart from a knower so manifested no pure consciousness can be experienced. The notion "I" at once distinguishes the knower from the body,

the senses, the *manas*, or even the knowledge. Such a self is also called a *sākṣī* (perceiver), as all objects are directly perceived by it.

The *Sāṃkhya* view is that it is the *ahaṅkāra* or *buddhi* which may be regarded as the knower; for these are but products of *prakṛti*, and thus non-intelligent in themselves. The light of pure consciousness cannot be regarded as falling on them and thereby making them knowers by the reflection of its light; for reflection can only happen with reference to visible objects. Sometimes it is held by the Śāṅkarites that true consciousness is permanent and unchangeable, that the ego (*ahaṅkāra*) derives its manifestation from that and yet reveals that in association with itself, just as a mirror or the surface of water reflects the sun; and, when these limitations of *ahaṅkāra*, etc., are merged during deep sleep, the self shines forth in its own natural light and bliss. This also is unintelligible; for if the *ahaṅkāra*, etc., had all been manifested by the pure consciousness, how can they again in their turn manifest the consciousness itself? Actually it cannot be imagined what is the nature of that manifestation which pure consciousness is made to have by the *ahaṅkāra*, since all ordinary analogies fail. Ordinarily things are said to be manifested when obstructions which veil them are removed, or when a lamp destroys darkness, or when a mirror reflects an object; but none of these analogies is of any use in understanding how consciousness could be manifested by *ahaṅkāra*. If, again, consciousness requires something else to manifest it, then it ceases to be self-manifesting and becomes the same as other objects. It is said that the process of knowledge runs on by successive removals of *ajñāna* from the consciousness. *Ajñāna* (*na-jñāna*—not knowledge) may be understood as absence of knowledge or as the moment when some knowledge is going to rise, but such an *ajñāna* cannot obstruct consciousness; the Śāṅkarites hold, therefore, that there is an indefinable positive *ajñāna* which forms the stuff of the world. But all this is sheer nonsense. That which manifests anything cannot make that thing appear as a part of itself, or as its own manifestation. The ego, or *ahaṅkāra*, cannot also manifest another consciousness (which is different from it) in such a way that that consciousness shall appear as its own manifestation. So it has to be admitted that the self is not pure consciousness, but the self-conscious ego which appears in all our experience. The state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*) is often put forward as an example of pure

consciousness being found unassociated with other limitations of ego, etc. But this is not possible, as we have already seen. Moreover, when the later experience of the waking moment testifies that "I did not know anything," it can well be urged that there was no pure consciousness during deep sleep; but that the ego existed is proved by the fact that at the waking moment the perception which identifies the ego (*ahankāra*) as the self, also testifies that the ego as the self had persisted during deep sleep. The self which shines forth in us as the ego therefore remains the same during deep sleep; but it has no knowledge at that time. After rising from deep sleep we feel "I did not know anything, I did not know even myself." The Śāṅkarites assert the experience that during deep sleep there is no knowledge even of the ego. This, however, is hardly true; for the perception "I did not know even myself" means that during deep sleep all the personal associations (e.g. as belonging to a particular family, as occupying a particular position, etc.) were absent, and not that the ego itself was absent. When the self is conscious of itself, there is the notion of the "I," as in "I am conscious of myself." During deep sleep also, when no other objects are manifested, there is the self which is conscious of itself as the ego or the "I." If during emancipation there was no consciousness as the self, the ego, the "I," then it is the same almost as the absolute nihilism of the Buddhists. The sense of "I," the ego, is not a mere quality extraneously imposed on the self, but the very nature of the self. Even knowledge shines forth as a quality of this ego or "I," as when we say "I know it." It is the "I" who possesses the knowledge. Knowledge thus appears to be a quality of the "I." But no experience of ours ever demonstrates that "I" is a quality of pure knowledge. We say "I have this knowledge" and not that the knowledge has the "I." If there is no "I," no one who experiences, no subject who is existent during emancipation, who would strive to attain emancipation? If even the "I" is annihilated after emancipation, who would care to take all the trouble, or suffer the religious restraints, etc., for such an undesirable state? If even "I" should cease to exist, why should I care for such a nihilistic state? What am I to do with pure consciousness, when "I" ceases to exist? To say that "I" is such an object as "you" or "he" or "this" or "that," and that this "I" is illuminated by pure consciousness, is preposterously against all experience. The "I" manifests of itself

without the help of any other manifesting agency, now as well as during emancipation; for the manifestation of the self has always the sole form of "I"; and, if during emancipation the self manifests, it must do so as "I." From the sacred texts also we find that the emancipated sages, Vāmadeva and Manu, thought of their own selves as the "I." Even God is not devoid of this notion of His personality as "I," as is attested by the Upaniṣad sayings, in which He declares: "I have created this world." The notion of "I" is false when it is identified with the body and other extraneous associations of birth, social rank, etc., and when it gives rise to pride and boastfulness. It is this kind of *ahaṅkāra* which has been regarded as false in the scriptures. The notion "I," when it refers to the self, is, indeed, the most accurate notion that we can have.

All our perceptions of pleasure and pain also are manifested as qualities of the "I," the self. The "I" manifests itself to itself and hence must be regarded as being of non-material stuff (*ajāda*). The argument, that since the notion of "I" is taken along with knowledge (*sahopalambha*), knowledge alone exists, and that "I" is not different from it, may well be repudiated by turning the table and with the same argument declaring that "I" alone exists and that there is no knowledge. All persons experience that knowledge is felt to be as distinct from the "I," the knower, as the known object. To say that self is self-manifesting by nature is not the same thing as to say that the self is knowledge by nature; for the self is independent of knowledge; knowledge is produced as a result of the perceptual process involving sense-contact, etc.; the self is the knower, the "I," which knows things and thereby possesses knowledge.

The "I," the knower, the self, manifests itself directly by self-consciousness; and hence those who have attempted to demonstrate the self by inference have failed to do so. Thus, the Naiyāyikas think that the self is proved as that in which qualities such as knowledge, desire, pleasure, pain, etc., inhere. But, even though by such an inference we may know that there is something in which the qualities inhere, it cannot be inferred therefrom that this thing is the self in us. Since nothing else is found in which knowledge, willing, etc., might inhere, it may as well be argued that knowledge, etc., are not qualities at all, or that there is no law that qualities must necessarily inhere in a thing. They are regarded as *guṇas* (qualities) only by their technical definition; and the Naiyāyikas can accept these

as *guṇas*, and on that ground infer that there must be some other entity, self (which is not testified by any other proof), as the basis in which the aforesaid *guṇas* may inhere. It is hardly justifiable to accept a new substance, soul (which cannot be obtained by any other proof), simply on the ground that there must be some basis in which *guṇas* must inhere; it is the maxim of the opponents that *guṇas* must exist in some substance and that there are knowledge, willing, etc., which they are pleased to call *guṇas*; one cannot take further advantage in holding thereby that, since there is no other substance in which these so-called *guṇas* (knowledge, willing, etc.) might inhere, the existence of some other substance as the self must be inferred.

The Sāṃkhyaists also make the same mistake, when they hold that all the movements of this non-intelligent *prakṛti* must be for the sake of the *puruṣa*, for whom the *prakṛti* is working. The objection to such a view is this, that even though such entities for which the *prakṛti* is working may be inferred, yet that cannot prove that those entities are not themselves also combinations of many things and objects requiring further superintendents for themselves; or that the *puruṣas* should be the same pure intelligence as they are required to be. Moreover, that alone can be the end of a certain combination of events or things, which can be in some way benefited, moved or affected by those combinations. But the *puruṣas*, as the passive pure intelligence, cannot in any way be affected by the *prakṛti*. How then can they be regarded as the end for which the *prakṛti* works? The mere illusion, the mere semblance on the part of the *puruṣa* of being affected or benefited cannot be regarded as a reality, so that by it the purposes of the movements of the *prakṛti* might be realized. Moreover, these so-called affections, or illusions of affection, themselves belong to *prakṛti* and not to the *puruṣas*; for the *puruṣas*, as pure intelligences, are without the slightest touch of modifications of the *guṇas*. All mental modifications are, according to the *Sāṃkhya*, but modifications of the *buddhi*, which, being unintelligent, cannot be subject to illusion, error, or mistake. Moreover, no explanation can be found in the supposition that the reflection of the *puruṣas* falls upon the *buddhi*; for, as the *puruṣa* is not a visible object, it cannot be reflected in the *buddhi*. If it is said that there is no real reflection, but the *buddhi* becomes like the pure intelligence, the *puruṣa*, then that also is not possible; for, if the *buddhi* is to become as qualityless as the *puruṣas*, then all

mental states have to be abrogated. If it is said that the *buddhi* does not become like pure intelligence, but as if it was as intelligent as the *puruṣa*, then that also is not possible; for *puruṣa* is according to the *Sāṃkhya* pure intelligence, not intelligent. There is no intelligent knower in the *Sāṃkhya*, and that is its trouble. If it is said that what is meant by the belief that *puruṣa* is the end of all *guṇa*-movements is simply this, that, though it is absolutely incapable of any change or transformation, yet by its very presence it sets the *guṇas* in motion and is thus the end for which all the *guṇa* modifications take place, just as if the *puruṣa* were a king for whom the whole dominion works and fights. But since the *puruṣa*, unaffected by them, is only the seer of them all, this also is not possible; for the analogy does not hold, since the king is really benefited by the movements of the people of his dominions but the *puruṣa*, which merely implies seeing, cannot be regarded as a seer.

The nature of the self, as we have described it, is also attested by the verdict of the *Upaniṣads*. This self is directly revealed in its own notion as "I," and pleasure, pain, attachment, antipathy are but its states, which are also revealed along with the revelation of its own self as the "I." This self is not, however, perceived by any of the senses or even by the organ *manas*, as Kumārila supposed. For the question arises as to when, if the self is believed to be perceived by the *manas*, that takes place? It cannot take place precisely at the moment when the knowledge of an object arises; for then the notions of the self and the objects, as they occur at the same moment, could not so appear that one (the self) was the cognizer or determiner, and the others (the objects) were the cognized or the determined. If the knowledge of the objects and the self arose at two different moments as separate acts, it would be difficult to conceive how they could be related as cognizer and cognized. So it cannot be held that the self, though it always manifests itself to us in self-consciousness, could yet be perceived by any of the senses or the *manas*. Again, Kumārila held that knowledge was a new product, and that when, as a result of certain sense activities, knowledge or the *jñāna* movement was generated in us, there was also produced an illumination (*jñātatā* or *prākāṣya*) in objects in association with the self, and that from such an illumination the *jñāna-kriyā* or knowledge movement could be inferred, and the self, as being the possessor of this knowledge, could be perceived by the *manas*. But such

a theory that the self is conscious not by itself, but by an extraneous introduction of knowledge, is hardly acceptable; for no one imagines that there exists in him such a difference when he perceives a thing which he had not before that perception. Moreover, since the act of knowledge did not directly reveal the self, there might also be doubts as to whether the self knew things or not, and the self would not shine forth directly in all conscious experience, as it is found to do.

Again, some hold that the self is known from the objective consciousness and not directly by itself. It is easy to see that this can hardly be accepted as true; for how can objective consciousness, which refers to the objects, in any way produce the consciousness of the self? According to this view it is difficult to prove even the existence of knowledge; for this, since it 'is not self-manifested, requires something else to manifest it; if it is thought that it is self-manifesting, then we should expect it to be manifested to all persons and at all times. It may be said that, though knowledge is self-manifesting, yet it can be manifested only in connection with the person in whom it inheres, and not in connection with all persons. If that be so, it really comes to this, that knowledge can become manifested only through its connection with a someone who knows. If, in answer to this, it is said that knowledge does not require its connection with a person for its own existence, but only for its specific illumination as occurring with reference to a certain subject and object, then that cannot be proved. We could have accepted it if we had known any case in which pure consciousness or knowledge had been found apart from its specific references of subject and object. If it is still asserted that consciousness cannot be separated from its self-manifesting capacities, then it may also be pointed out that consciousness is never found separated from the person, the subject, or the knower who possesses it. Instead of conceding the self-manifesting power to the infinite number of states of consciousness, is it not better to say that the self-manifestation of consciousness proceeds from the self-conscious agent, the subject and determiner of all conscious experiences? Even if the states of consciousness had been admitted as self-manifesting, that would not explain how the self could be self-manifesting on that account. If, however, the self, the knower of all experiences, be admitted as self-manifesting, then the manifestation of the con-

scious experiences becomes easily explained; for the self is the perceiver of all experiences. All things require for their manifestation another category which does not belong to their class; but since also there is nothing on which the self can depend for its consciousness, it has to be admitted that the self is a self-manifesting intelligent entity. Thus the jug does not require for its manifestation another jug, but a light, which belongs to an altogether different class. The light also does not require for its manifestation another light, or the jug which it manifests, but the senses; the senses again depend on consciousness for the manifestation of their powers. Consciousness, in its turn, depends upon the self; without inhering in the self it cannot get itself manifested. The self, however, has nothing else to depend upon; its self-manifestation, therefore, does not depend on anything else.

The states of consciousness have thus to be regarded as being states of the self, which by its connection with different objects manifests them as this or that consciousness. Knowledge of this or that object is thus but different states of consciousness, which itself again is a characteristic of the self.

If consciousness had not been an inseparable quality or essential characteristic of the self, then there might have been a time when the self could have been experienced as being devoid of consciousness; a thing which is so related with another thing that it never exists without it must necessarily be an essential and inseparable characteristic thereof. It cannot be said that this generalization does not hold, since we are conscious of our self in connection with the body, which is not an essential characteristic of the self; for the consciousness of the self as "I," or as "I know," is not necessarily connected with a reference to, or association with, the body. Again, it cannot be said that, if consciousness were an essential and inseparable characteristic of the self, then the states of unconsciousness in deep sleep and swoon could not be explained; for there is nothing to prove that there is no consciousness of the knowing self during those so-called stages of unconsciousness. We feel on waking that we had no consciousness at the time because we cease to have any memory of it. The reason therefore why states of unconsciousness are felt in the waking stage to be so is this, that we have no memory of those states. Memory is only possible when certain objects are apprehended and the impression of these ob-

jects of consciousness is left in the mind, so that through them the object of memory may be remembered. During deep sleep no objects are perceived, and no impressions are left, and, as a result, we cease to have any memory of those states. The self then remains with its characteristic self-consciousness, but without the consciousness of anything else. The self-conscious self does not leave any impression on the organs of the psychosis, the *manas*, etc., as they all then cease to act. It is easy to understand that no impression can be made upon the self; for, if it could and if impressions had been continually heaped on the self, then such a self could never manage to get rid of them and could never attain emancipation. Moreover, it is the characteristic of the phenomenon of memory that, when a perception has once been perceived, but is not being perceived continually, it can be remembered now, when those past impressions are revived by association of similar perceptions. But the self-conscious self has always been the same and hence there cannot be any memory of it. The fact that on waking from deep sleep one feels that one has slept happily does not prove that there was actually any consciousness of happiness during deep sleep; it is only a happy organic feeling of the body resulting from sound sleep which is interpreted or rather spoken of as being the enjoyment of happiness during deep sleep. We say, "I am the same as I was yesterday," but it is not the self that is remembered, but the particular time association that forms the content of memory.

Perception of objects is generated in us when consciousness comes in contact with the physical objects in association with this or that sense of perception. It is on that account that, though the self is always possessed of its self-consciousness, yet it is only when the consciousness of the self is in touch with an external object in association with a sense-organ that we get that particular sense-perception. This self is not all-pervading, but of an atomic size; when it comes in association with any particular sense, we acquire that particular sense-perception. This explains the fact that no two perceptions can be acquired simultaneously: where there is an appearance of simultaneity, there is only a succession of acquirement so rapid that changes cannot be noticed. Had the soul been all-pervading, we should have had the knowledge of all things at once, since the soul was in touch with all things. Thus it is proved that the self has consciousness as its essential characteristic; knowledge

or consciousness is never produced in it, but when the obstructions are removed and the self comes into touch with the objects, the consciousness of these objects shines forth.

God and the World.

As we have already noted, the Mīmāṃsists do not admit the existence of *Īśvara*. Their antitheistic arguments, which we have not considered, can be dealt with here in contrast to Yāmuna's doctrine of *Īśvara*. They say that an omniscient *Īśvara* cannot be admitted, since such an assumption cannot be proved, and there are, indeed, many objections to the hypothesis. For how can such a perception of omniscience be acquired? Surely it cannot be acquired by the ordinary means of perception; for ordinary perception cannot give one the knowledge of all things present and past, before and far beyond the limits of one's senses. Also the perception of *Īśvara* generally ascribed to the Yogins cannot be admitted; for it is impossible that the Yogin should perceive past things and things beyond the limits of his senses, by means of his sense-organs. If mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*) be such that it can perceive all sense-objects without the aid of the senses, then what is the use at all of the senses? Of course it is true that by great concentration one can perceive things more clearly and distinctly; but no amount of concentration or any other process can enable a man to hear by the eye or to perceive things without the help of the senses. Omniscience is therefore not possible, and we have not by our senses seen any such omniscient person as *Īśvara*. His existence cannot be proved by inference; for, since He is beyond all perceptible things, there cannot be any reason (*hetu*) which we could perceive as being associated with Him and by reason of which we could make Him the subject of inference. It is urged by the Naiyāyikas that this world, formed by collocation of parts, must be an effect in itself, and it is argued that, like all other effects, this also must have taken place under the superintendence of an intelligent person who had a direct experience of world materials. But this is not necessary; for it may very well be conceived that the atoms, etc., have all been collocated in their present form by the destinies of men (*adr̥ṣṭa*)—according to the *karma*, of all the men in the world. The *karmas* of merit and demerit exist in us all, and they are moulding the world-

process, though these cannot be perceived by us. The world may thus be regarded as a product of the *karmas* of men and not of *Īśvara*, whom no one has ever perceived. Moreover, why should *Īśvara*, who has no desire to satisfy, create this world? This world, with all the mountains, rivers and oceans, etc., cannot be regarded as an effect produced by any one.

Yāmuna follows the method of the *Nyāya* and tries to prove that the world is an effect, and, as such, must have been produced by an intelligent person who had a direct knowledge of the materials. He also has a direct knowledge of the *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) of men, in accordance with which He creates the whole world and establishes an order by which every man may have only such experiences as he deserves. He, by His mere desire, sets all the world in motion. He has no body, but still He carries on the functioning of His desire by His *manas*. He has to be admitted as a person of infinite knowledge and power; for otherwise how could He create this world and establish its order?

The Śāṅkarites had held that, when the Upaniṣads say that nothing exists but one Brahman, it means that Brahman alone exists and the world is false; but that is not the sense. It means simply that there is no other *Īśvara* but *Īśvara*, and that there is none else like Him. When the Upaniṣads declare that Brahman is all that we see and that He is the sole material of the world, it does not mean that everything else does not exist and that the qualityless Brahman is the only reality. If I say there is one sun, it does not mean that He has no rays; if I say there are the seven oceans, it does not mean that the oceans have no ripples, etc. The only meaning that such passages can have is that the world has come out of Him, like sparks from fire, and that in Him the world finds its ultimate rest and support; from Him all things of the world—the fire, the wind, the earth—have drawn their powers and capacities, and without His power they would have been impotent to do anything. If, on the contrary, it is held that the whole world is false, then the whole experience has to be sacrificed, and, as the knowledge of Brahman also forms a part of this experience, that also has to be sacrificed as false. All the Vedānta dialectic employed to prove that the perception of difference is false is of very little use to us; for our experience shows that we perceive differences as well as relations. We perceive the blue colour, the lotus, and also that the lotus has

the blue colour; so the world and the individuals may also be conceived in accordance with the teaching of the Upaniṣads as being inseparably related to Him. This meaning is, indeed, more legitimate than the conception which would abolish all the world manifestation, and the personality of all individual persons, and would remain content only to indicate the identity of their pure intelligence with the pure intelligence of Brahman. There is not any pure, all-absorbing, qualityless intelligence, as the Śāṅkarites assert; for to each of us different and separate ideas are being directly manifested, e.g. our feelings of individual pleasures and pains. If there were only one intelligence, then everything should have shone forth simultaneously for all times. Again, this intelligence is said to be both Being (*sat*), intelligence (*cit*), and bliss (*ānanda*). If this tripartite form be accepted, it will naturally destroy the monistic doctrine which the Śāṅkarites try to protect so zealously. If, however, they assert that these are not separate forms or qualities, but all three represent one identical truth, the Brahman, then that also is not possible; for how can bliss be the same as intelligence? Pleasure and intelligence are experienced by all of us to be entirely different. Thus, in whichever way we try to scrutinize the Śāṅkarite doctrines, we find that they are against all experiences and hardly stand the strain of a logical criticism. It has, therefore, to be admitted that our notions about the external world are correct and give us a true representation of the external world. The manifold world of infinite variety is therefore not merely an illusory appearance, but true, as attested by our sense-experience.

Thus the ultimate conclusion of Yāmuna's philosophy demonstrates that there are, on the one side, the self-conscious souls, and, on the other, the omniscient and all powerful Īśvara and the manifold external world. These three categories are real. He hints in some places that the world may be regarded as being like sparks coming out of Īśvara; but he does not elaborate this thought, and it is contradicted by other passages, in which Īśvara is spoken of as the fashioner of the world system, in accordance with the Nyāya doctrine. From the manner in which he supports the Nyāya position with regard to the relation of Īśvara and the world, both in the *Siddhi-traya* and in the *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, it is almost certain that his own attitude did not differ much from the Nyāya attitude, which left the duality of the world and Īśvara absolutely unre-

solved. It appears, therefore, that (so far as we can judge from his *Siddhi-traya*) Yāmuna's main contribution consists in establishing the self-consciousness of the soul. The reality of the external world and the existence of *Īśvara* had been accepted in previous systems also. Yāmuna thus gives us hardly any new ideas about *Īśvara* and His relation to the souls and the world. He does not make inquiry into the nature of the reality of the world, and rests content with proving that the world-appearance is not false, as the Śāṅkarites supposed. He says in one place that he does not believe in the existence of the partless atoms of the Naiyāyikas. The smallest particle of matter is the *trasareṇu*, the specks of dust that are found to move in the air when the sun's rays come in through a chink or hole. But he does not say anything more than this about the ultimate nature of the reality of the manifold world or how it has come to be what it is. He is also silent about the methods which a person should adopt for procuring his salvation, and the nature and characteristics of that state.

Yāmuna, in his *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, tried to establish that the *Pañca-rātra-saṃhitā* had the same validity as the Vedas, since it was uttered by *Īśvara* himself. Viṣṇu, or Vāsudeva, has been praised in the *Purusa-sūkta* and in other places of the Vedas as the supreme Lord. The *Pāśupata-tantra* of the Śaivas is never supported by the Vedas, and thus the validity of the *Pāśupata-tantra* cannot be compared with that of the *Pañcarātra-saṃhitā*.

God according to Rāmānuja, Veṅkaṭanātha and Lokācārya.

Bhāskara had said that, though *Īśvara* is possessed of all good qualities and is in Himself beyond all impurities, yet by His *Śakti* (power) He transformed Himself into this world, and, as all conditions and limitations, all matter and phenomena are but His power, it is He who by His power appears as an ordinary soul and at last obtains emancipation as well. Rāmānuja holds that on this view there is no essential form of Brahman which transcends the limits of all bonds, the power (*Śakti*) which manifests itself as all phenomena. Brahman, being always associated with the power which exists as the world-phenomena, becomes necessarily subject to all the defects of the phenomenal world. Moreover, when a *Śakti*, or power of Brahman, is admitted, how can Brahman be said

to suffer any transformation? Even if the *Śakti* (power) be regarded as its transformation, even then it cannot be accepted that it (*Brahman*) should combine with its *Śakti* to undergo a worldly transformation.

Another Vedāntist (probably Yādavaprakāśa, the Preceptor of Rāmānuja in his early days) held that Brahman, in its own essence, transformed itself into the world; this theory also is open to the objection that the Brahman, being transformed into the world, becomes subject to all the impurities and defects of the world. Even if it is held that in one part it is transcendent and possesses innumerable good qualities and in another suffers from the impurities associated with its transformation into the world, then also that which is so impure in one part cannot have its impurity so counter-balanced by the purity of its other half that it can be called *Īśvara*.

Rāmānuja, therefore, holds that all the changes and transformations take place in the body of the *Īśvara* and not in His essence. So *Īśvara*, in His pure essence, is ever free from all impurities, and the possessor of all the best qualities, untouched by the phenomenal disturbances with which His body alone is associated. The matter which forms the stuff of the external world is not what the *Sāṃkhya* calls the *guṇa* substances, but simply the *prakṛti* or the primeval causal entity, possessing diverse qualities which may be classified under three different types—the *sattva*, the *rajas* and the *tamas*. This *prakṛti*, however, in its fine essence, forms the body of *Īśvara* and is moved into all its transformations by *Īśvara* Himself. When He withholds *prakṛti* from all its transformations and annuls all its movement, we have the state of *pralaya*, in which *Īśvara* exists in the *kāraṇa* or causal state, holding within Him the *prakṛti* in its subtle state as His body. *Prakṛti* is a body as well as a mode (*prakāra*) of *Īśvara*, and, when it is in a manifested condition, we have the state of creation. *Prakṛti* undergoes its transformations into *tan-mātra*, *akaṅkāra*, etc.; but these are yet the subtle substance forming parts of *Īśvara*'s body. The transformations through which *prakṛti* passes in the origination of *tan-mātra*, *akaṅkāra*, etc., are not the results of the collocation of the *guṇa* reals, as we saw in the case of the *Sāṃkhya*, but may be regarded as the passing of *prakṛti* through different stages, each stage being marked out by the special character of the *prakṛti* while passing through that stage. The word *guṇa* here has then its ordinary meaning of quality; and it is supposed that the *prakṛti*, as it is moved by *Īśvara*, continues to ac-

quire new qualities. The present state of the world also represents *prakṛti* in a particular state wherein it has acquired the qualities which we note in the phenomenal world of ours.

We have seen before that the existence of *Īśvara* was inferred by Yāmuna on Nyāya lines. But Rāmānuja thinks that there is as much to be said in favour of the existence as against it. Thus he says that, even supposing that the hills, etc., are effects, it cannot be said that they were all created by one person; for even all jugs are not made by the same person; *Īśvara* may also be denied, after the *Sāṃkhya* mode, and it may be imagined that in accordance with the *Karma* of men the world arose out of a combination of the original *guṇas*. There is thus as much to be said against the existence of *Īśvara* as in favour of it. Rāmānuja holds that *Īśvara* cannot be proved by inference, but is to be admitted on the authority of the sacred texts¹. The Nyāya and Yoga, moreover, conceived *Īśvara* to be only the *nimitta-kāraṇa*, or instrumental cause; but according to Rāmānuja *Īśvara* is all-pervading in all space and in all time. This all-pervasiveness of God does not mean that His reality is the only reality everywhere, or that He is identical with the world-reality, and all else is false. It means, as Sudarśanācārya has said in his *Śruta-prakāśikā* on the *Rāmānuja-bhāṣya*, 2nd *sūtra*, that there is no measure with which He may be limited by any spatial relation. Varada and Nārāyaṇa, however, and Veṅkaṭanātha, agree in interpreting all-pervasiveness as the absence of any limit to His good qualities (*īyad-guṇaka iti pariccheda-rahitaḥ*)². There is nothing else than *Īśvara*'s body, so by His body also he may be conceived as pervading the whole world. Thus, *Īśvara* is not only *nimitta-kāraṇa* but also *upādāna-kāraṇa*, or material cause as well. Veṅkaṭa establishes in some detail that the highest *Īśvara* is called Nārāyaṇa and His power, as presiding over matter and souls, is called *Lakṣmī*. *Īśvara* has His *manas*, and His eternal senses do not require any body or organs for their manifestation. Veṅkaṭa also mentions three modified forms of manifestation of Lord Vāsudeva, namely Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. This *vyūha* doctrine of the *Pañcarātra* has been briefly discussed in Varavara's *bhāṣya* on the *Tattva-traya* of Lokācārya. These three, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha,

¹ See Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya*, 3rd *sūtra*.

² See *Nyāya-siddhāntajana* of Veṅkaṭanātha.

are said to be the three different forms of Vāsudeva, by which He controls the individual souls (*jīva*), the *manas* and the external world. That form of activity by which the *jīvas* were separated from the *prakṛti* at the beginning of the creation is associated with a form of *Īśvara* called Saṁkarṣaṇa. When this separating activity passes and dominates over men as their *manas* and ultimately brings them to the path of virtue and good, it is said to be associated with a form of *Īśvara* called Pradyumna. Aniruddha is that form of *Īśvara* by which the external world is generated and kept in order, and in which our experiences and attempts to attain right knowledge are fulfilled. These forms are not different *Īśvara*, but are imagined according to the diversity of His function. *Īśvara*'s full existence is everywhere; He and His forms are identical. These forms are but manifestations of the power of Vāsudeva and are therefore called *Vibhava*. Such manifestations of His power are also to be found in great religious heroes such as Vyāsa, Arjuna, etc. Lokācārya, in describing Him further, says that in His real essence *Īśvara* is not only omniscient, but this omniscience is also associated with complete and eternal joy. His knowledge and powers do not suffer any variation or comparison, as they are always the very highest and the most inconceivable by any one else. He moves us all to action and fulfils our desires according to our *karmas*. He gives knowledge to those who are ignorant, power to those who are weak, pardon to those who are guilty, mercy to the sufferers, paternal affection and overlooking of guilt to those who are guilty, goodness to those who are wicked, sincerity to the crooked, and goodness of heart to those who are wicked at heart. He cannot bear to remain separated from those who do not want to be separated from Him, and puts Himself within easy reach of those who want to see Him. When he sees people afflicted, He has mercy on them and helps them. Thus all His qualities are for the sake of others and not for Himself. His affection for us is of a maternal nature, and out of this affection He neglects our defects and tries to help us towards the ideal of good. He has created this world in Himself, not in order to satisfy any wants but in a playful manner, as it were through mere spontaneity (*līlā*). As in creation, so in keeping the created world in order, and in dissolution, His playful spontaneity upholds everything and brings about everything. Dissolution is as much of His play as creation. All this is created in Himself and out of Himself.

**Viśiṣṭā-dvaita doctrine of Soul according to
Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha.**

The existence of souls as separate self-conscious entities, in contradistinction to the doctrines of other systems, had been established by Yāmuna, as we have shown in some detail in our section on his doctrine of soul. The soul is atomic in its size, as we have already found stated by Yāmuna. Barada, Viṣṇu Miśra and Veṅkaṭanātha held that in the ordinary phenomenal state its knowledge expands and contracts. At the time of emancipation it has its highest expansion in which it pervades the whole world. The cause of its contraction and expansion is its *karma*, which is also called *avidyā*. Rāmānuja, in his *Vedānta-dīpa*, indulged in the simile of the ray of a lamp in explaining the rise of knowledge in different parts of the body, despite the atomic soul being located in only one part. The soul exists in one part of the body and spreads out its knowledge over all other parts of the body, like the rays of a lamp. Rāmānuja says that *Īśvara* allows the individual self-conscious souls to perform whichever action they have a desire to attempt. Movement is possible only through the approval by *Īśvara* of the desires of individual souls. The self-conscious souls desire things according to their own free will, and in this they are not hampered by *Īśvara*; *Īśvara* always allows the individual souls to act, i.e. to move their limbs according to their desires. This is a sort of occasionalism, which holds that, in every action which I am performing, I am dependent on *Īśvara*'s will. I can move my limbs because He wishes it. Apart from this general law that *Īśvara* is a supporter of all actions, there are some exceptions of particular favour and disfavour. To those who are particularly attached to Him He is more favourably disposed, and by His grace generates in them such desires that they adopt actions by which they may easily win Him. Into those who are particularly opposed to Him He imports such desires that they are led farther away from Him¹. *Īśvara* exists in us all as the inner controller. This inner controller is represented by our individual soul. This individual soul is free in all its desires, knowledge, and attempts². This freedom of will, knowledge, etc., is given to us all by *Īśvara*, and He also arranges that the movements in the material world may take place in ac-

¹ See Varavara's commentary on the *Tattva-traya*.

² See Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya*, II. 3. 40, 41.

cordance with our desires. Thus He not only gives us freedom of will, but also helps the realization of that will in the external world, and ultimately grants good and evil fruits according to our good and evil deeds¹. Thus *Īśvara*'s control over us does not rob us of our freedom of will. Even His favour and disfavour consist in the fulfilment of a devotee's eager desire to be associated with Him, and His disfavour consists in fulfilling the desire of a confirmed sinner, leading him away into worldly pleasures farther from Him. The self is often called *jñāna*, or consciousness, because of the fact that it is as self-revealing as consciousness². It reveals all objects, when it comes in touch with them through its senses. The souls are, however, all held in *Īśvara*. Rāmānuja had spoken of the souls only as being the body of *Īśvara*; but Lokācārya and Varavara further hold that, as the external material objects exist for the sake of the souls, so the souls exist for the *Īśvara*; as Man is the end for which the external objects of enjoyment exist, so *Īśvara* is the end (*śeṣa*) for which Man exists as the object of His control and support (*śeṣī*).

The self, though pure in itself, becomes associated with ignorance and worldly desires through coming into touch with matter (*acit*). *Avidyā*, or ignorance, here means want of knowledge, misapplication of characteristics, false knowledge, etc. This ignorance, or *avidyā*, which is the cause of many worldly desires and impure instincts, is generated by the association of the souls with matter; when this association is cut away, the self becomes divested of the *avidyā* and emancipated³.

Rāmānuja says in his *Vedārtha-saṃgraha* that *Īśvara* grants emancipation from worldly bonds to a person, when he, after acquiring true knowledge from the *śāstras* according to the instruction of good teachers, engages himself every day in self-control, penance, purity; practises forgivingness, sincerity, charity, non-injury; performs all the obligatory and ceremonial duties; refrains from prohibited actions, and afterwards surrenders himself completely to the Lord; praises Him, continually thinks of Him, adores Him, counts His names, hears of His greatness and goodness, speaks of it, worships Him, and has all the darkness of his soul removed

¹ See Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya*, XI. 3. 40, 41.

² See Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya*, II. 111. 29, 30.

³ See Varavara's commentary on the *Tattva-traya*, *Cit-prakaraṇa*.

by His grace. The ordinary obligatory and ceremonial duties have to be performed; all the highest ethical virtues have to be practised and a true knowledge attained from the *śāstras*. It is only when a man has thus qualified himself that he can ultimately attain emancipation from all worldly bonds by supreme self-surrender and *bhakti* to the Lord. *Bhakti*, or devotion, with Rāmānuja means continual thinking of Him. Without it pure knowledge cannot give us emancipation. The special feature of *bhakti* is this, that by it a man loses all interest in everything else than that which is done for the sake of the dearest. Finally *bhakti* is not with Rāmānuja feeling, but a special kind of knowledge (*jñāna-viśeṣa*) which seeks to ignore everything that is not done for the sake of *Īśvara*, the dearest to us all¹.

Veṅkaṭanātha says that the performance of *karmas* makes a man fit to inquire into true knowledge, and the acquirement of true knowledge makes a man fit to attain devotion, or *bhakti*. When a man is fit to inquire after true knowledge, he may give up the *karmas*. *Bhakti* is, according to Veṅkaṭanātha, the feeling of joy (*prīti*) in the adorable, and not mere knowledge. Emancipation as *sāyujya* (sameness of quality) with *Īśvara* is the result of such *bhakti*. In this state of *sāyujya*, the human soul participates in the qualities of omniscience, bliss, etc., of *Īśvara*. The human soul cannot, of course, wholly participate with *Īśvara*, and such of His qualities as the power of creating and controlling the world, or of granting emancipation to human souls, remain ever with *Īśvara* alone. Human souls can participate only in His knowledge and bliss and can be as omniscient and as blissful as He. In this state of emancipation Man remains in an eternal and infinite blissful servitude to *Īśvara*. This servitude to *Īśvara* is not painful in the least, like other services. When a man forgoes all his personal vanity and merges all his independence in His service, and considers himself as His servant whose only work is to serve Him, this is indeed the state of bright joy. Veṅkaṭanātha, however, further differentiates this *Vaiṣṇava* emancipation, as the thinking of the *Īśvara* as the most supreme, and thereby deriving infinite joy, from the other type of *kaivalya*, in which Man thinks of himself the Brahman and attains *kaivalya*. There also the association with *avidyā* and the world is indeed destroyed, and the man is reduced to oneness; but

¹ See *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, p. 146.

this is hardly a desirable state, since there is not here the infinite joy which the *Vaiṣṇava* emancipation can bring. Rāmānuja has written of *mukti* as a state which a man can acquire when he is divested of all *avidyā*, and has the natural intuition of the Supreme Soul and his relations with Him. He had distinguished this state from that *mukti* in which a man is divested of all *karmas* and realizes himself in himself, as obstructing the qualities of *Īśvara* from him. This *kaivalya*, or realization of one's own self as the highest, is thus distinctly a lower emancipation. It is not out of place to say that Veṅkaṭanātha had pushed *bhakti* and the human goal of *mukti* distinctly further on to the side of feeling, by defining *bhakti* as a feeling of joy and *mukti* as servitude to *Īśvara*.

Acit or Primeval Matter: the *Prakṛti* and its modifications.

Proceeding to describe the nature of matter, Veṅkaṭanātha tries to disprove the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of atoms. The smallest particle of matter is that which is visible in the sun's rays coming in through a chink or hole. The imagination of still finer particles, which may be called dyads or atoms, is not attested by experience; for these cannot be perceived. They cannot be compared to the small invisible pollen of flowers which makes the air carrying it fragrant; for these small particles possess the quality of smell, whereas atoms are subtle particles which do not possess any perceivable characteristic. Even inference cannot establish these atoms; for, if we suppose that particles when divided could be further divided until we could arrive at the limit of division, beyond which no division was possible, and that these subtlest particles could be called atoms, this would be impossible, for the atoms of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are not only the smallest particles but they are considered to have a special kind of measure (*pārimāṇḍalya*) as their characteristic, and this we have no data for inferring. If only the smallness is the criterion, we may better stop at the *trasa-reṇu* (the dust particles in the air). There are also other objections against the atomic theory, such as have been propounded by Śaṅkarācārya, that the partless atoms cannot come into touch with other atoms or form together into one whole, or that the *pārimaṇḍalya* measure of the *paramāṇu* should not generate a different kind of measure in the dyad (*devy-aṇuka*), or that the dyad ought not to

generate quite another kind of measure in the *trasa-reṇu*. The world cannot thus be accepted as due to the conglomeration of atoms or *trasa-reṇus*. *Prakṛti* containing the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* has thus to be admitted as the primal matter. The state of it just preceding *ahaṅkāra* and just following its state as *prakṛti* (the state in which, all its three qualities being the same, there is no manifestation of any particular quality) is called *mahat*. The next state, which follows *mahat* and precedes the senses, is called *ahaṅkāra*. The *mahat* and *ahaṅkāra* are not subjective states of *buddhi* or ego, as some Sāṃkhyists would think, but are two successive cosmic stages of the *prakṛti*, the primeval cosmic matter. The *ahaṅkāra* is of three kinds, *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. The senses are not products of elements, as the Vaiśeṣika supposed, but represent the functional cognitional powers in association with the eye, nose, skin, etc. It is *manas* whose states are variously called imagination, determination, etc. Lokācārya describes *prakṛti* as being of three kinds, namely (1) that which contains the purest *sattva* characters and forms the material of the abode of *Īśvara*; (2) that which contains the threefold characters of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* and forms the ordinary world for us. This is the field of *Īśvara*'s play. It is called *prakṛti* because it produces all transformations, *avidyā* because it is opposed to all true knowledge, and *māyā* because it is the cause of all diverse creations. As we have mentioned before, the *guṇas* of *prakṛti* are its qualities, and not the Sāṃkhya reals. Creation is produced by the rise of opposite qualities in the *prakṛti*. The *tan-mātras* are those states of matter in which the specific elemental qualities are not manifested. The order of the genesis of the *tan-mātras* is described by some as follows: first the *bhūtādi*, from it *śabda-tan-matra*, and from that the *ākāśa*; again, from *ākāśa* comes *sparsa-tan-mātra* (vibration-potential), followed by *vāyu*; from *vāyu* comes the *rūpa-tan-mātra* (light-potential) and from that *tejas* (light and heat); from *tejas* comes *rasa-tan-mātra* (taste-potential), and thence water; from water comes *gandha-tan-mātra* (smell-potential), and from that earth. Other theories of the genesis of the *bhūtas* are also described, but we omit them here, as they are not of much value. Varavara says that time is regarded as the *prakṛti* without its *sattva* quality, but Veṅkaṭa-nātha speaks of time as existing in the nature of *Īśvara* as a special form of His manifestation. Space (*dik*) is not an entity different

from *ākāśa*, which offers room for the movement of things. *Ākāśa* is not a mere vacuity or non-occupiedness, but a positive entity.

Thus it is seen that the indeterminate matter of *prakṛti*, with its three qualities, passes through many stages and at last exhibits the phenomenal world, which produces happiness and misery in accordance with a man's destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*) and good or bad deeds. The force of *adr̥ṣṭa* is not a separate entity, but the favour and disfavour of *Īśvara*, which works in accordance with the good or bad deeds of men.

CHAPTER XX

PHILOSOPHY OF THE RĀMĀNUJA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on the nature of Reality as qualified or unqualified.

ŚAṆKARA says that Brahman, as pure intelligence (*cin-mātram*) entirely divested of any kind of forms, is the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*), and that all differences of the knower, the known, and the diverse forms of cognition are all imposed on it and are false. Falsehood with him is an appearance which ceases to exist as soon as the reality is known, and this is caused by the defect (*doṣa*), which hides the true nature of reality and manifests various forms. The defect which produces the false world appearance is ignorance or nescience (*avidyā* or *māyā*), which can neither be said to be existent nor non-existent (*sad-asad-anirvacanīyā*), and this ceases (*nivṛtta*) when the Brahman is known. It is, indeed, true that in our ordinary experience we perceive difference and multiplicity; but this must be considered as faulty, because the faultless scriptures speak of the one truth as Brahman, and, though there are the other parts of the Vedas which impose on us the performance of the Vedic duties and therefore imply the existence of plurality, yet those texts which refer to the nature of Brahman as one must be considered to have greater validity; for they refer to the ultimate, whereas the Vedic injunctions are valid only with reference to the world of appearance or only so long as the ultimate reality is not known. Again, the scriptures describe the Brahman as the reality, the pure consciousness, the infinite (*satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma*); these are not qualities which belong to Brahman, but they are all identical in meaning, referring to the same differenceless identical entity, absolutely qualityless—the Brahman.

Rāmānuja, in refuting the above position, takes up first the view of Śaṅkara that the Brahman as the ultimate reality is absolutely unqualified (*nirviśeṣa*). He says that those who assert that reality can be unqualified have really no means of proving it; for all proofs are based on the assumption of some qualified character. This unqualifiedness could not be directly experienced, as they believe;

for there can be no experience without the assumption of some qualified character, since an experience, being my own unique experience, is necessarily qualified. Even if you tried to prove that one's own experience, which is really qualified in nature, is unqualified, you would have to pick up some special trait in it, in virtue of which you would maintain it was unqualified; and by that very fact your attempt is defeated, for that special trait would make it qualified. Intelligence is itself self-revealing, and by it the knower knows all objects. It may also be shown that even during sleep, or swoon, the experience is not characterless. Even when the Brahman is said to be real, pure consciousness, and infinite, it means that these are the characters of Brahman and it is meaningless to say that they do not indicate some character. The scriptures cannot testify to the existence of any characterless reality; for they are a collection of words arranged in order and relation, and each word is a whole, comprising a stem and a suffix, and the scriptures therefore are by nature unable to yield any meaning which signifies anything that is characterless. As regards perception, it is well established that all determinate perception (*sa-vikalpa-pratyakṣa*) manifests an entity with its characters; but even indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*) manifests some character for its indeterminateness means only the exclusion of some particular character; and there can be no perception which is absolutely negative regarding the manifestation of characters. All experiences are embodied in a proposition—"This is so"—and thus involve the manifestation of some characters. When a thing is perceived for the first time, some specific characters are discerned; but, when it is perceived again, the characters discerned before are revived in the mind, and by comparison the specific characters are properly assimilated. This is what we call determinate perception, involving the manifestation of common characters or class characters as distinguished from the perception of the first moment which is called indeterminate perception. But it does not mean that indeterminate perception is not the perception of some specific characters. Inference is based on perception and as such must necessarily reveal a thing with certain characteristics; and so not one of the three sources of our knowledge, perception, scriptures and inference, can reveal to us any entity devoid of characteristics.

It is urged by Śaṅkara and his followers that perception refers

to pure being and pure being alone (*san-mātra-grāhī*); but this can never be true, since perception refers to class-characters and thus necessarily involves the notion of difference; even at that one particular moment of perception it grasps all the essential characteristic differences of a thing which distinguish it from all other objects. If perception had reference only to pure being, then why should it manifest to us that "here is a jug," "here is a piece of cloth"; and, if the characteristic differences of a thing are not grasped by perception, why are we not contented with a buffalo when we need a horse? As pure being they are all the same, and it is being only which, it is urged, is revealed by perception. Memory would not then distinguish one from the other, and the cognition of one thing would suffice for the cognition of everything else. If any distinctive differences between one cognition and another is admitted, then that itself would baffle the contention of the characterlessness of perception. Moreover, the senses can grasp only their characteristic special feature, e.g. the eye, colour, the ear, sound, and so on, and not differencelessness. Again, Brahman is said to be of the nature of pure being, and, if the same pure being could be experienced by all the senses, then that would mean that Brahman itself is experienced by the senses. If this were so, the Brahman would be as changeable and destructible as any other objects experienced by the senses, and this no one would be willing to admit. So it has to be granted that perception reveals difference and not pure characterlessness.

Again, it has been argued that, since the experience of a jug, etc., varies differently with different space and time, i.e. we perceive here a jug, there a piece of cloth, and then again at another moment here a toy and there a horse, and we have not the one continuous experience of one entity in all space and time, these objects are false. But why should it be so? There is no contradiction in the fact that two objects remain at the same place at two different points of time, or that two objects remain at two different places at one and the same point of time. Thus there is nothing to prove that the objects we perceive are all false, and the objects are by nature pure being only.

Again, it has been urged that experience or intuition (e.g. as involved in perception) is self-revealing (*svayaṁ-prakāśa*); but this is true only with reference to a perceiver at the particular time of

his perception. No intuition is absolutely self-revealing. The experience of another man does not reveal anything to me, nor does a past experience of mine reveal anything to me now; for with reference to a past experience of mine I only say "I knew it so before," not "I know it now." It is also not true that no experience can be further experienced; for I can remember my own past experience or can be aware of it, as I can be aware of the awareness of other persons; and, if the fact that one awareness can be the object of another would make it cease from being an experience or intuition (*saṁvid* or *anubhūti*), then there would be no *anubhūti* or experience at all. If a man could not be aware of the experiences of others, he could use no speech to express himself or understand the speech of other people, and all speech and language would be useless. That jug, etc., are not regarded as intuition or experience is simply because their nature is altogether different therefrom and not because they can be objects of cognition or experience; for that would be no criterion at all.

It is again urged that this intuition or experience (*anubhūti* or *saṁvid*) is never produced, since we do not know any stage when it was not in existence (*prāg-abhāvādy-abhāvād utpattir nirasate*). It is also urged that any experience or awareness cannot reveal any state in which it did not exist; for how can a thing reveal its own absence, since it cannot exist at the time of its absence? Rāmānuja, in reply to such a contention on Śāṅkara's side, debates why it should be considered necessary that an experience should reveal only that which existed at the same time with it; for, had it been so, there would be no communication of the past and the future. It is only sense-knowledge which reveals the objects which are existing at the time when the senses are operating and the sense-knowledge is existing; but this is not true with regard to all knowledge. Memory, inference, scriptures, and intuitive mystic cognition (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) of sages can always communicate events which happened in the past or will happen in the future. Arguing in the same way, one could say that even in the case of the experience of ordinary objects such as jug, etc., it can be said that the perception which reveals their presence at any particular time does not reveal their existence at all times. That they are not so revealed means that the revelation of knowledge (*saṁvid* or *anubhūti*) is limited by time. If revelation of knowledge were not itself limited in time, then the objects re-

vealed by it would also not be limited in time, which would be the same thing as to say that these objects, such as jug, etc., are all eternal in nature; but they are not. This sort of argument may also be applied to the revelation of knowledge in inference; and it may well be argued that, since the objects must be of the same type as the knowledge which reveals them, then, if the knowledge is not limited in time and is eternal, the objects also will be eternal. For there can be no knowledge without an object. It cannot be said that at the time of sleep, drunkenness, or swoon, the pure experience is experienced as such without there being an object. If the pure experience were at that time experienced as such, one would remember this on waking; for except in the case of experiences at the time of universal destruction (*pralaya*), and in the period when one's body is not in existence, all that is experienced is remembered. No one, however, remembers having experienced an experience at the time of sleep or swoon, so that no such pure revelation of knowledge exists at that time. What Rāmānuja maintains here, as will be shown later on, is that during sleep or swoon we have a direct experience of the self and not the pure formless experience of the revelation of pure consciousness. Thus there cannot be any state in which knowledge is pure revelation without an object. Hence it cannot be argued that, because knowledge does not reveal the state in which it did not exist, it must always be in existence and never be produced; for as each cognition is inseparably associated with its object, and as all objects are in time, knowledge must also be in time.

Again, the argument that, since knowledge is unproduced, it cannot suffer any further modification or change, is false. Granting for the sake of argument that knowledge is unproduced, why should it on that account be necessarily changeless? The negation preceding a particular production (*prāga-bhāva*) is beginningless, but it is destroyed. So is the *avidyā* of the Śāṅkarites, which is supposed to be beginningless and yet to be suffering all kinds of changes and modifications, as evidenced by its false creations of the world-appearance. Even the self, which is beginningless and destructionless, is supposed to be associated with a body and the senses, from which it is different. This apprehension of a difference of the self from *avidyā* means a specific character or a modification, and if this difference is not acknowledged, the self would have to be considered

identical with *avidyā*. Again, it is meaningless to say that pure intelligence, consciousness, experience or intuition (*anubhūti* or *saṁvid*), is pure self-revelation; for, were it so, why should it be called even self-revelation, or eternal, or one? These are different characters, and they imply a qualified character of the entity to which they belong. It is meaningless to say that pure consciousness is characterless; for at least it has negative characters, since it is distinguished from all kinds of material, non-spiritual or dependent objects which are considered to be different from this pure consciousness. Again, if this pure consciousness is admitted to be proved as existing, that must itself be a character. But to whom is it proved? It must be to the self who knows, and in that case its specific character is felt by the self who is aware of it. If it is argued that the very nature of the self-revelation of consciousness is the self, then that would be impossible; for knowledge implies a knower who is different from the knowledge which reveals certain objects. The knower must be permanent in all his acts of knowledge, and that alone can explain the fact of memory and recognition. The consciousness of pleasure, pain and of this or that object comes and goes, whereas the knower remains the same in all his experiences. How then can the experience be identified with the person who experiences? "I know it," "just now I have forgotten it"—it is in this way that we all experience that our knowledge comes and goes and that the phases are different from ourselves. How can knowledge or consciousness be the same as the knower or the self?

It is held that the self and ego or the entity referred to by "I" are different. The entity referred to by "I" contains two parts, a self-revealing independent part as pure consciousness, and an objective, dependent non-self-revealed part as "myself," and it is the former part alone that is the self, whereas the latter part, though it is associated with the former, is entirely different from it and is only expressed, felt, or manifested by virtue of its association with the former. But this can hardly be admitted. It is the entity referred to by "I" which is the subjective and individual self and it is this which differentiates my experience from those of others. Even in liberation I am interested in emancipating this my individual self, for which I try and work and not in a so-called subject-object-less consciousness. If "I" is lost, then who is interested in a mere consciousness, whether that is liberated or not? If there is

no relation with this ego, the self, the "I," no knowledge is possible. We all say "I know," "I am the knower"; and, if this individual and subjective element were unsubstantial and false, what significance would any experience have? It is this ego, the "I," which is self-luminous and does not stand in need of being revealed by anything else. It is like the light, which reveals itself and in so doing reveals others as well. It is one whole and its intelligent nature is its self-revealing character. So the self-luminous self is the knower and not a mere revelation. Revelation, cognition or knowledge means that something is revealed to someone, and so it would be meaningless to say that the self and the knowledge are identical. Again, it has been maintained that self is pure consciousness; for this pure consciousness alone is what is non-material (*ajāda*) and therefore the spirit. But what does this non-materiality mean? It means with the Śāṅkarites an entity whose nature is such that its very existence is its revelation, so that it does not depend on anything else for its revelation. Therefore, pleasures, pain, etc., are also self-revealing. There cannot be a toothache which is present and yet is not known; but it is held that pleasures and pains cannot be revealed, unless there is a knower who knows them. Well the same would be true for knowledge even. Can consciousness reveal itself to itself? Certainly not; consciousness is revealed always to a knower, the ego or the self. As we say "I am happy," so we say "I know." If non-materiality (*ajādatva*) is defined as revealing-to-itself in the above sense, such non-materiality does not belong to consciousness even. It is the ego, the "I," that is always self-revealed to itself by its very existence, and it must therefore be the self, and not the pure consciousness, which stands as much in need of self-revelation as do the pains and pleasures. Again, it is said that, though pure consciousness (*anubhūti*) is in itself without any object, yet by mistake it appears as the knower, just as the conch-shell appears by illusion as silver. But Rāmānuja contends that this cannot be so; for, had there been such an illusion, people would have felt "I am consciousness" as "this is silver." No one makes such a mistake; for we never feel that the knowledge is the knower; but, as a matter of fact, we always distinguish the two and feel ourselves different from the knowledge—as "I know" (*aḥam anubhavāmi*).

It is argued that the self as changeless by nature cannot be the

agent of the act of cognition and be a knower, and therefore it is only the changeful modifications of *prakṛti*, the category of *ahaṅkāra*, to which can be ascribed the capacity of being a knower. This *ahaṅkāra* is the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) or mind, and this alone can be called a knower; for the agency of an act of cognition is an objective and dependent characteristic, and, as such, cannot belong to the self. If the agency and the possibility of being characterized by the notion of ego could be ascribed to the self, such a self would have only a dependent existence and be non-spiritual, like the body, since it would be non-self-revealing. Rāmānuja, in answer to such an objection, says that, if the word *ahaṅkāra* is used in the sense of *antaḥkaraṇa*, or the mind, as an inner organ, then it has all the non-spiritual characteristics of the body and it can never be considered as the knower. The capacity of being a knower (*jñātṛtva*) is not a changeful characteristic (*vikriyātma*), since it simply means the possession of the quality of consciousness (*jñāna-guṇāśraya*), and knowledge, being the natural quality of the eternal self, is also eternal. Though the self is itself of the nature of consciousness (*jñāna-svarūpa*), yet, just as one entity of light exists both as the light and as the rays emanating from it, so can it be regarded both as consciousness and as the possessor of consciousness (*maṇi-prabhṛtīnām prabhāśrayatvam iva jñanāśrayatvam api aviruddham*). Consciousness, though unlimited of itself (*śvayam aparicchinnam eva jñānam*), can contract as well as expand (*saṅkoca-vikāśārham*). In an embodied self it is in a contracted state (*saṅkucita-svarūpam*) through the influence of actions (*karmanā*), and is possessed of varying degrees of expansion. To the individual it is spoken of as having more or less knowledge¹, according as it is determined by the sense-organs. Thus one can speak of the rise of knowledge or its cessation. When there is the rise of knowledge, one can certainly designate it as the knower. So it is admitted that this capacity as knower is not natural to the self, but due to *karma*, and therefore, though the self is knower in itself, it is changeless in its aspect as consciousness. But it can never be admitted that the non-spiritual *ahaṅkāra* could be the knower by virtue of its being in contact with consciousness (*cit*); for consciousness as such can never be regarded as a knower. The *ahaṅkāra* also is not the knower, and therefore the notion of the knower could not be explained on such a

¹ *Śrī-bhāṣya*, p. 45.

view. It is meaningless to say that the light of consciousness falls on the non-spiritual *ahaṅkāra* through contiguity; for how can the invisible consciousness transmit its light to the non-spiritual *ahaṅkāra*?

Even in sleep one feels the self as "I"; for on waking one feels "I have slept happily." This also shows that during sleep it is the "I" that both knew and felt happy. It has to be admitted that there is a continuity between the "I" before its sleep, the "I" during its sleep, and the "I" after its sleep; for after waking the "I" remembers all that it had experienced before its sleep. The fact that one also feels "I did not know anything all this time" does not mean that the "I" had no knowledge at all; it means only that the "I" had no knowledge of objects and things which it knows on waking. There can be no doubt that the "I" knew during the sleep, since even a Śāṅkarite would say that during dreamless sleep the self (*ātman*) has the direct intuitive perception (*sākṣi*) of ignorance (*ajñāna*), and no one can have any direct intuitive perception without also being a knower. Thus, when after sleep a man says "I did not know even myself, I slept so well," what he means is that he did not know himself with all the particulars of his name, caste, parentage, etc., as he knows when he is awake. It does not mean that he had absolutely no knowledge at all. Even on liberation the entity denoted by "I" (*aham-artha*) remains; for it is the self that is denoted. If there is no one to feel or to know in the state of liberation, who is it that is liberated, and who is to strive for such a liberation? To be revealed to itself is self-consciousness and implies necessarily the knower as the "I" that knows, and therefore the notion of "I" denotes the self in its own nature as that which knows and feels. But the entity denoted by the notion of "I" (*aham-artha*) should be distinguished from the non-spiritual category of mind or the *antaḥkaraṇa*, which is but a modification of *prakṛti* or the false feeling of conceit, which is always regarded as bad and is the cause of the implication of insult towards superior persons and this is clearly due to ignorance (*avidyā*).

The next point of discussion raised by Rāmānuja in this connection, to prove his point that there is no reality which can be regarded as characterless and unqualified in any absolute sense, is in the attempt that he makes to refute Śāṅkara's contention that the scriptures give us sufficient ground for acknowledging such a

reality, and their authority is to be considered as the highest and as absolutely irrefutable. Śaṅkara had urged that the testimony of the scriptures was superior to that of perception. But the scriptures are based on the assumption of plurality, without which no language is possible. These are for that reason false. For the superiority that is ascribed to the scriptures was due to their teaching of the doctrine that all plurality and difference are false, and that the reality is absolutely differenceless; but yet since the meaning and the expressions of the scriptures are themselves based on the assumption of difference, how can the teaching of the scriptures be anything but false? Again, since they are as faulty as perception on account of their assumption of plurality, why should they be regarded as having an authority superior to perception? When the scriptures are based on error, what is communicated by them must likewise be erroneous, though it may not be directly contradicted by experience. If a man who is absolutely out of touch with all men has an eye-disease which makes him see things at a great distance double, then his vision of two moons in the sky, though it may not be contradicted by his or any one else's experience, is yet false. So, when there is defect, the knowledge produced by it must be false, whether it is contradicted or not. Hence, *avidyā* being false, the Brahman communicated by it through its manifested forms, the scriptures, must also be false. And one may well argue, that, since Brahman is the object of knowledge produced by means tainted by *avidyā*, it is false, just as the world is false (*Brahma mithyā avidyādy-utpanna-jñāna-viśayatvāt prapañcavat*). In anticipation of such objections Śaṅkara urges that even false dreams can portend real good or bad happenings, or an illusory sight of a snake may cause real death. Rāmānuja's answer to this is that what is meant by saying that dreams are false is that there is some knowledge, corresponding to which there are no objects; so there is knowledge in illusion and real fear due to such knowledge, but the corresponding external object does not exist. So in these cases also the communication of truth, or a real thing, or a real fact, is not by falsehood, but real knowledge; for no one doubts that he had knowledge in his dream or in his illusion. So far as the fact that there was knowledge in dream is concerned, dreams are true, so that it is useless to say that in dreams falsehood portends real fact.

Thus, from whatever point of view it may be argued, it is im-

possible to prove that the reality is characterless and differenceless, whether such a reality be pure being, or a unity of being, intelligence and bliss, or pure intuitional experience, and such a contention will so much cripple the strength of the scriptures that nothing can be proved on their authority and their right to supersede the authority of perception can hardly be established. But the scriptures also do not speak of any characterless and unqualified reality. For the texts referring to Brahman as pure being (*Ch.*, vi. 2. 1), or as transcendent (*Mund.*, i. 1. 5), or where the Brahman is apparently identified with truth and knowledge (*Tait.*, ii. 1. 1), can actually be proved to refer to Brahman not as qualityless, but as possessing diverse excellent qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, all-pervasiveness, eternity and the like. The denial of qualities is but a denial of undesirable qualities (*heya-guṇān pratiṣidhya*). When Brahman is referred to in the scriptures as one, that only means that there is no second cause of the world to rival him; but that does not mean that His unity is so absolute that He has no qualities at all. Even where Brahman is referred to as being of the essence of knowledge, that does not mean that such an essence of knowledge is qualityless and characterless; for even the knower is of the essence of knowledge, and, being of the essence of knowledge, may as well be considered as the possessor of knowledge, just as a lamp, which is of the nature of light, may well be regarded as possessing rays of light¹.

Refutation of Śaṅkara's *avidyā*.

It is urged by Śaṅkara that the self-luminous differenceless one reality appears as the manifold world through the influence of defect (*doṣa*). This defect, called *avidyā*, hides its own nature and produces various appearances and can neither be described as being nor as non-being: for it cannot be being, since then the illusion and the realization of its being an error would be inexplicable, and it cannot be non-being since then the world-appearance, as well as its realization as being wrong, would be inexplicable.

¹ *jñāna-svarūpasyaiva tasya jñānā-śrayatvaṃ maṇi-dyumaṇi-pradīpā-divad ity uktam eva. Śrī-bhāṣya*, p. 61.

The above is based on the discussions in the *Śrī-bhāṣya* known as *mahā-pūrva-pakṣa* and *mahā-siddhānta. Śrī-bhāṣya*, p. 10 et seq.

Rāmānuja, in refuting *avidyā*, says that this *avidyā* is impossible since it must lean on some other thing for its support (*āśraya*), and it is clear that individual souls cannot be its support, since they themselves are regarded as being the products of *avidyā*. The Brahman also cannot be its support; for it is self-luminous consciousness and is hence opposed to *avidyā*, which is regarded as being liable to be recognized as illusory as soon as the true knowledge dawns. It cannot be argued that it is only the knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of pure knowledge, and not pure knowledge forming the essence of Brahman, that destroys *avidyā*; for there is no difference between these two, between knowledge as the essence of Brahman and knowledge as removing *avidyā*. The nature of Brahman that is revealed by the knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of pure knowledge is already present in His pure self-luminous nature, which must necessarily on that account destroy *avidyā*¹. Moreover, in accordance with Śaṅkara's view, Brahman, being of the nature of pure intuition, cannot further be the object of any other knowledge, and hence the nature of Brahman should not be further the object of any other concept. So, if knowledge is to be opposed to ignorance or *avidyā*, it must be in its own essence as it is, in itself, and so Brahman, as pure knowledge, ought to be opposed to *avidyā*. Moreover, to say that Brahman, which is of the nature of pure self-illumination, is hidden by *avidyā* is to say that the very nature of Brahman is destroyed (*svārūpa-nāśa*); for, since pure self-illumination is never produced, its concealment can only mean that it is destroyed, since it has no other nature than pure self-illumination. Again, if the contentless pure self-luminous intuition is said to assume diverse forms on account of the defect of *avidyā*, which is supported by it, then the question may be asked, whether this defect is real or unreal. If it is real, then the monism fails, and, if it is unreal, then the question arises, how is this unreal defect brought about? If it is brought about by some other defect, then, that also being unreal, the same question will again arise, and hence there will be a vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). If it is held that even without any real basis one unreal defect may be the cause of another unreal defect and so on in a beginningless series, then we

¹ Sudarśana Sūri says here that, if there is such a difference between Brahman as essence and Brahman as destroying *avidyā*, that would mean that one form of Brahman is different from its other form, or, in other words, that it is qualified. *Śruta-prakāśikā*, Pandit edition, Benares, vol. IX, p. 658.

virtually have nihilism (*Mādhyaṃika-pakṣa* or *Śūnya-vāda*)¹. If, to escape these criticisms, it is held that the defect is the very essence of intuition (*anubhūti*) or Brahman, then, Brahman being eternal, the defect also will be eternal, and emancipation, or the cessation of the world-appearance, will never take place. Again, this *avidyā* is said to be indefinable, being different from both the existent and the non-existent (*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*). But how can this be? A thing must be either existing or not existing; how can there be anything which is neither existing nor not-existing?

Referring to the arguments of the Śaṅkarites in favour of the existence of *ajñāna* (nescience) as a positive entity and as directly perceived in such perceptions as "I am ignorant," "I do not know myself or any others," Rāmānuja says that such perceptions refer only to the non-existence of the knowledge of an object prior to its apprehension (*prāga-bhāva*). Rāmānuja argues that the ignorance perceived cannot refer to its specific and determinate object; for, if it did, then the object would be known and there would be no ignorance at all; and if the *ajñāna* does not refer to any specific object, how can the *ajñāna* or ignorance, standing by itself, be perceived or realized? If it is urged that *ajñāna* refers to indistinct (*a-viśada-svarūpa*) knowledge, then also it may be said that this

¹ Sudarśana Sūri here points out that the Śaṅkarites try to evade the vicious infinite in three ways: firstly, those who think that ignorance (*avidyā*) is associated with *jīva* (*jīva-jñāna-vādi*) explain it by affirming it so as to involve an infinite series like the seed-and-the-shoot (*vijāṅkura*), but not a vicious infinite; since on their view *jīva* is produced by *avidyā* and *avidyā* is again produced by *jīva* (*avidyāyām jīvaḥ jīvāda vidyā*). Those again who think that *avidyā* belongs to Brahman (*Brahmā-jñāna-vādi*) hold that *avidyā* is by nature beginningless and the irrationality or unreasonableness of its nature is nothing surprising. As regards the beginninglessness of *avidyā* in an infinite series (*pravāha-nāditva*) of *jīva* and *avidyā* and *avidyā* and *jīva* as propounded in the first view of the *jīva-jñāna-vādins*, the refutation of it by those who hold that the *ajñāna* belongs to Brahman is enough. For they have pointed out that such a view goes against the universally accepted doctrine of the eternity of souls, since it held that the souls came out through *avidyā* and *avidyā* through souls. The other view, that the illusory series is by itself beginningless, is no better; for, if one illusion were the basis of another illusion in a beginningless series, this would be practically identical with the nihilistic philosophy. Moreover, even if the illusion is admitted to be beginningless in nature, then also that must await some other root primary cause (*mūla-doṣāpekṣā*) from which this successive series of illusions springs, and from that another, and so there will arise the vicious infinite. If no such root cause is awaited, the world-appearance may itself be regarded as *avidyā*, and there will be no need to suppose the existence of any root cause as *avidyā*. Again, if *avidyā* is held to be irrational in nature, why should it not affect the emancipated souls and also Brahman? If it is answered that it does not do so because the emancipated souls and Brahman are pure, then that means that this *avidyā* is rational and wise and not irrational. *Śrūta-prakāśikā*, in Pandit, vol. IX, pp. 636-665.

may be regarded as the absence of the rise of distinct knowledge. Thus, even if a positive ignorance is admitted, it must somehow be related to something else to which it refers. In whatever way one may attempt to explain *ajñāna* (ignorance), either as want of knowledge, or as other than knowledge, or as opposed to knowledge, it can be made possible only by a knowledge of the very fact of which it will be the opposite. Even darkness has to be conceived as being opposed to light; and hence one must have knowledge of light in order to understand darkness, as being opposed to it. But the *ajñāna* (ignorance) of the Śāṅkarites cannot stand by itself, and so must show its content by a reference to the object or entity of which there is ignorance. Therefore, in the aforesaid experiences, "I am ignorant," "I do not know myself or any one else," it should be admitted that what is felt is this want of rise of knowledge and not any positive ignorance, as the latter is equally found to be relative to the object and the subject and has no advantage over the former. Moreover, the Brahman, which is ever free and ever the same pure self-luminous intelligence, cannot at any time feel this ignorance or *avidyā*. It cannot hide Brahman; for Brahman is pure intelligence, and that alone. If it is hidden, that amounts to the destruction of Brahman. Again, if Brahman can perceive *ajñāna*, it can as well perceive the world appearance; if by hiding Brahman the *ajñāna* makes itself perceived by Brahman, then such *ajñāna* cannot be removed by true knowledge, since it has the power of concealing knowledge and of making itself felt by it. Further, it cannot be said that *avidyā* hides the Brahman only partially; for Brahman has no part. So the above experience of "I did not know anything," as remembered in the awakened state and referring to experiences of deep sleep, is not the memory of *ajñāna* or ignorance directly experienced in deep sleep (*suṣupti*), but an inference during the awakened state of not having any knowledge during deep sleep on account of there being no memory¹. Inference also is unavailing for proving the existence of any *ajñāna*; for not only would such premises of inference involve a faulty reason, but no proper example could be found which could satisfy the claim of reason by a reference to any known case where a similar thing happens. More-

¹ *ato na kiñcid avidiṣam iti jñānam na smaraṇam kintu asmaraṇa-līṅgakaṃ jñānā-bhāva-viśayam anumiti-rūpam. Śrūta-prakāśikā*, p. 178. (Nirṇayasāgar ed. (916).)

over, it is quite easy to formulate other series of inferences to disprove the possibility of such *ajñāna* as is accepted by the Śāṅkarites¹.

Rāmānuja's theory of Illusion—All knowledge is Real.

Rāmānuja says that all illusion may briefly be described as perception in which a thing appears to be different from what it is (*anyasya anyathāvabhāsaḥ*). It is unreasonable to imagine that the illusory content of perception must be due to no cause, or is something wholly unperceived or wholly unknown (*atyantā-paridṛṣṭā-kāraṇaka-vastu-kalpanā-yogāt*). If such a wholly chimerical thing is imagined to be the content of illusory perception, then it must be inexpressible or indescribable (*anirvacanīya*); but no illusory object appears as indescribable; it appears as real. If it appeared as an inexpressible entity, there would be neither illusion nor its correction. So it has to be admitted that in all illusions (e.g. in conch-shell-silver illusion) one thing (e.g. the conch-shell) appears in another form (e.g. silver). In all theories of illusion, whatever may be the extent of their error, they have ultimately to admit that in all illusions one thing appears in the form of another. Speaking against the Śāṅkarites, it may be asked, he urges, how is their inexpressible (*anirvacanīya*) silver produced? The illusory perception cannot be the cause; for the perception follows only the production of the indescribable silver and cannot precede it to be its cause. It cannot be due to the defects in our sense-organs; for such defects are subjective and therefore cannot affect the nature of objective reality or object. Moreover, if it is inexpressible and indescribable, why should it appear under certain circumstances in the specific form of a particular kind of appearance, silver? If it is urged that this is due to the fact of there being a similarity between silver and conch-shell, it may again be asked whether this similarity is real or unreal. It cannot be real, since the content is illusory; it cannot be unreal since it has reference to real objects (e.g. the real silver in a shop). So such a theory of illusion is open to many criticisms.

Rāmānuja seems to have himself favoured the *anyathā-khyāti* theory of illusion, and says that there will be no explanations of contradiction of knowledge involved in illusory knowledge, or of consequent failure of behaviour as suggested by such knowledge,

¹ *Śruti-prakāśikā*, pp. 178-180.

unless error is ultimately explained as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another. He also says that all the other theories of illusion (except possibly the *yathārtha-khyāti* view, as suggested in the *Śrūta-prakāśikā* commentary—*yathārtha-khyāti-vyatirikta-pakṣeṣu anyathā-khyāti-pakṣaḥ prabalaḥ*) would ultimately have to accept the analysis of error as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another (*khyāty-antarāṇām tu sudūram api gatvā anyathāva-bhāsaḥ āśrayanīyaḥ—Rāmānujabhāṣya*). Rāmānuja further points out that even the *akhyāti* theory of illusion (i.e. illusion considered as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the presentation of the “this” of the conch-shell and the memory of silver) is a form of *anyathā-khyāti*; for ultimately here also one has to accept the false identification of two characters or two ideas. Veṅkaṭanātha, commenting on this point in his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, says that the appearance of one thing as another is the indispensable condition of all errors, but the non-apprehension of difference must always be granted as an indispensable condition which must exist in all cases of false identification and has therefore the advantage of a superior simplicity (*lāghava*); yet the *anyathā-khyāti* theory gives the proper and true representation of the nature of illusion, and no theory of illusion can do away with the need of admitting it as a correct representation of the phenomenon of illusion. So Veṅkaṭanātha says that Rāmānuja, while he agrees with the *anyathā-khyāti* view as a theory of illusion, yet appreciates the superior simplicity of the *akhyāti* view as giving us the indispensable condition of all forms of illusion.

But, though Rāmānuja himself prefers the *anyathā-khyāti* view of illusion, he could not very well pass over the *yathārtha-khyāti* view, as advocated by the senior adherents and founders of the school of thought which he interpreted, viz. Bodhāyana, Nāthamuni and Varada Viṣṇu Miśra. Rāmānuja is thus faced with two different theories, one that he himself advocated and the other that was advocated by his seniors. Fortunately for him, while his own theory of *anyathā-khyāti* was psychological in character, the other theory of *yathārtha-khyāti* was of an ontological character, so that it was possible for one to hold the one view psychologically and the other view ontologically. Rāmānuja, therefore, offers the *yathārtha-khyāti* view as an alternative. Veṅkaṭanātha says that this *yathārtha-khyāti* view can only be put forward as a theory based on scriptural

evidence, but cannot be supported as a philosophical theory which can be experienced and therefore as a scientific theory of illusion. We have to make up our minds between the two plausible alternative theories of *anyathā-khyāti* and *akhyāti*.

Rāmānuja, to distinguish the *yāthārtha-khyāti* theory of his seniors, whom he refers to by the term "Vedic school" (*veda-vidām matam*), develops this view in a number of verses and says that he understands on the strength of the scriptural texts that the material world was created by the intermingling of the three elements, fire, water and earth, so that in each object there are all the three elements. When a particular element predominates in any material object, it is found to possess more qualities of that element and is designated by its character, though it still holds the qualities of other elements in it. Thus it may in some sense be said that all things are in all things. A conch-shell possesses also the qualities of *tejas*, or silver, and it is on that account that it may be said to resemble silver in some sense. What happens in the case of illusion is that through defects of organs, etc., the qualities or characters in a conch-shell representing other elements are not noticed and hence the perception can only grasp the qualities or characters of silver existing in the conch-shell, and the conch-shell is perceived as silver. So the knowledge of silver in a conch-shell is neither false, nor unreal, but is real, and refers to a real object, the silver element existing in the conch-shell¹. In this view of illusion all knowledge is regarded as referring to a real object (*yāthārtha-khyāti*)². The difference between this view and that of Prabhākara is this, that, while Prabhākara was content with the negative condition of non-apprehension of the difference between the present perception of a glittering conch-shell and the memory of silver in the shop as the cause of the illusion, and urges that knowledge is real either as perception or as the memory, and that illusion has been the result of non-apprehension of the distinction of the two, Rāmānuja is more radical, since he points out that the perception of silver in a

¹ See *Śrūta-prakāśikā*, pp. 183-6.

² According to Sudarśana Sūri this view is the traditional view (*sāmpṛadāyika*) accepted by Bodhāyana, Nāthamuni, Rāma Miśra and others, which Rāmānuja, as a faithful follower of that school, had himself followed. Thus, Rāmānuja says:

*yathā-rtham sarva-vijñānam iti veda-vidām matam
śruti-smṛtibhyaḥ sarvasya sarvā-tmatva-pratītiḥ.*

Bhāṣya and *Śrūta-prakāśikā*, p. 183.

conch-shell is due to the real perception of the element of silver in a conch-shell and the non-apprehension owing to defects (*doṣa*) of the other elements present in it which would have shown its difference from silver. So what is called the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell has a real objective basis to which it refers.

Dreams are explained by Rāmānuja as being creations of God, intended to produce corresponding perceptions in the minds of the dreamers. The case of the appearance of a conch-shell as yellow to a person with jaundiced eyes is explained by him as due to the fact that yellow colour emanates from the bile of his eyes, and is carried to the conch-shell through the rays of the eyes which turn the white shell yellow. The appearance of the conch-shell as yellow is therefore a real transformation of the conch-shell, noticed by the eye of a jaundiced person, though this transformation can be noticed only by him and not by other persons, the yellow being very near his eyes¹.

The *akhyāti* and the *yathārtha-khyāti* views agree in holding that the imposed idea has a real basis as its object. But, while the former holds that this real basis is a past presentation, the latter holds that it is given as a presentation along with the object, i.e. the silver element, being mixed up with the conch-shell element, is also presented to the senses, but owing to some defects of circumstances, organs of sight, etc., the conch-shell, which ought to be the main part, is not perceived. Thus, it is only the silver part that forms the presentation, and hence the error. So non-perception of the conch-shell part is common to both the views; but, while the *akhyāti* view holds that the silver part is only a reproduced image of past experience, the *yathārtha-khyāti* view grounds itself on the *trivṛt-karaṇa* texts of the Upaniṣads and holds that the silver part is perceived at the time. But Sudarśana Sūri refers to the views of other teachers (*kecid ācāryāḥ*) and says that the *trivṛt-karaṇa* view may well explain the misapprehension of one element (*bhūta*) for another; but in the cases of misapprehension due to similarity *trivṛt-karaṇa* is not of much use, for *trivṛt-karaṇa* and *pañci-karaṇa*

¹ Other types of errors or illusions are similarly explained by Rāmānuja as having a real objective existence, the error being due to the non-apprehension of other elements which are objectively existent and associated with the entity which is the object of illusory perception, but which owing to defects are not perceived. See *ibid.* pp. 187, 188.

can explain the intermixture of *bhūtas*, but not of the *bhautikas*, or the later modifications of the five elements into the varied substances such as conch-shell and silver, which are mutually misapprehended for each other on account of their similarity. It has, therefore, to be maintained that in these *bhūta*-modifications also the *trivṛt-karaṇa* principle applies to a certain extent; for here also the molecules or atoms of things or substances are made up of large parts of some *bhūta*-modification and smaller parts of one or more of other *bhūta*-modifications. The conch-shell molecules are thus made up of large parts of conch-shell material and smaller parts of the silver material, and this explains the similarity of the one element to the other. The similarity is due to the real presence of one element in the other, and is called the *pratidinidh-nyāya*, or the maxim of determining similarity by real representation. So in all cases of misapprehension of one thing as another through similarity there is no misapprehension in the strict sense, but a right apprehension of a counterpart in the other object constituting the basis of the similarity, and the non-apprehension of the bigger and the larger part which held the counterpart coeval with it. It is because the conch-shell contains a major part of conch-shell element (*śukty-amśa*) and only a minor part of silver that it passes as conch-shell and not as silver. Conch-shell cannot serve the purpose of silver, despite the silver element in it, on account of the obstruction of the major part of the conch-shell element; and it is also on account of this that under normal circumstances the silver element in it is hidden by the conch-shell element, and we say that we perceive conch-shell and not silver. When it is said that this is conch-shell and not silver (*nedaṃ rajataṃ*), the "not silver" has no other meaning than that of the conch-shell, the apprehension of which dispelled the idea of silver. It is the conch-shell that is designated in its negative aspect as "not silver" and in its positive aspect as conch-shell.

Rāmānujācārya, alias Vādihaṃsāmbuvāhācārya, the maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭanātha, seems to support the Rāmānuja method of *sat-khyāti* by showing that all the other three rival theories of illusion, such as that of *anyathā-khyāti*, *akhyāti*, and the *anirvacanīya-khyāti*, cross each other and are therefore incompatible. But he takes great pains to show that the *sat-khyāti* theory may be supported on the basis of the logical implications involved in both the

anyathā-khyāti and the *akhyāti* types of realism. He starts the discussion by taking for granted the *akhyāti* type of realism and its logical implications. He holds that it also would ultimately lead to *anyathā-khyāti*, and that therefore (excepting the *sat-khyāti*), of all the *khyātis*, *anyathā-khyāti* is perhaps the best. He says in his *Nyāya-kulīśa* that, since the way of knowledge requires that the sense-organs should reach their objects, even in illusory perception there must be some objects which they reach; for they could not convey any knowledge about an object with which they were not in contact¹. The defect (*doṣa*) cannot account for the production of new knowledge, for it only serves to obstruct anything from being perceived or known. Defects only obstruct the course of the natural sequence of cause and effect², just as fire would destroy the natural shooting powers of seeds¹. Moreover, taking the old example of the conch-shell-silver, it may be asked how, if there was no silver at all objectively present, there could be any knowledge of such an absolutely non-existing thing? Since our awareness cannot refer to non-existing entities, all forms of awareness must guarantee the existence of corresponding objects. What happens in the case of the illusion of conch-shell-silver is that there is memory of silver previously experienced and the “this,” which is experienced at the time of the illusion; and it is on account of the defects (*doṣa*) that it is not grasped that the silver is only a memory of past experience, while it is only the “this” in front of us that is experienced at the time (*doṣāt pramuṣita-tadavamarśaḥ*)³.

Vādihaṃsāmbuvāha, weighing the various arguments of the rival theories of *anyathā-khyāti* and *akhyāti*, deals with the arguments of the *anyathā-khyāti* view which holds that it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. As against the objections raised by such a view in opposition to the *akhyāti* view, viz., if each thing is different from every other thing, how can an illusion be explained as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the silver remembered and the “this” perceived directly in experience? Arguing in its favour, he says that the difference which is not

¹ *indriyānām prāpya-kāritvena aprāptā-rtha-prakāśana nuṣapatteḥ. Nyāya-kulīśa*, Madras Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

² *doṣānām kārya-viṣhāta-mūtra-hetutvena kāryā-ntaro-pājanakatvā-yogāt, na hy agni-saṃspṛṣṭasya kalama-vijasya āṅkuro-tpādane sāmāthyam asti. Ibid.*

³ *idam iti puro-vastuṇi anubhavaḥ rajatam iti ca pūrā-nubhūta-rajata-viśayā smṛtiḥ. Ibid.*

apprehended here consists of that characteristic which exists in things by virtue of which one thing is not confused with or misapprehended as another thing, and it is the non-apprehension of this differentiating characteristic that causes the misapprehension of the conch-shell as silver (*saṃsarga-virodhi-vaidharmya-viśeṣa-rūpa-bhedā-grahaḥ pravṛtti-hetuḥ*)¹. But the real objections to holding this *akhyāti* view of illusion to be ultimately sufficient consists in the fact that it cannot do away with the necessity of the synthetic operation (*saṃsarga-vyāpāra*) consisting of a thing being regarded as such-and-such, as found in all discussions of disputants, in all our behaviours and concepts of error and illusion. This forces us to accept the *anyathā-khyāti* view as an unavoidable and ultimate explanation². Vādihaṃsāmbuvāha urges that, since the silver is felt to be in that which is only a piece of conch-shell, this must imply the imposition of the one on the other (which is the essential part of *anyathā-khyāti*). Just as in the real perception of a piece of silver the object before us is experienced as silver, so in the conch-shell-silver illusion, the object before us is experienced as silver,

¹ Madras Govt. MS. No. 4910.

² Like the seniors referred to by Rāmānuja, Prabhākara also considers all knowledge to be valid (*yathārthaṃ sarvaṃ eve'ha vijñānam iti, Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, p. 32), though the former does so on ontological grounds and the latter on psychological and experiential grounds. Śālikanātha, representing Prabhākara's view, says that, whatever is the content of awareness, that alone is known, and at the time of the conch-shell-silver illusion, what is known is "this is silver," but there is no knowledge of conch-shell, since it is not the content of awareness at the time. Thus it cannot be said that the illusory knowledge consists of knowing the conch-shell as silver, but of the "this" as silver; for, when there is the knowledge of illusory silver, there is no knowledge of conch-shell. What happens in illusory perception is that through defects the differentiating characteristics of the conch-shell are not apprehended and the conch-shell is perceived only in its general character as an object. Then there is memory of silver, and through a defect in the mental process (*mano-doṣāt*) the silver is not remembered with its original association of time and place as that silver which was perceived there, but is simply remembered as an image of silver (*tad-ity-amśa-parāmarśa-vivarjitaṃ*). Though there is no such definite experience that I remember silver, yet the idea of silver has to be admitted to be due to memory; for it cannot be due either to perception or to inference or to any other source of knowledge. Thus, through the elimination of all other sources of knowledge, silver has to be admitted to be due to memory (*ananya-gatitāḥ smṛtir atrā'vagamya*). On account of the absence of a feeling that I remember a past experience, the memory of silver cannot be distinguished from a percept; for it is only these facts that distinguish a present percept from a reproduced image; and so we fail to differentiate between this memory and the actual perception of some object before us (the differentiating characteristics of which are entirely lost to us through defects of sense-organs or the like). On account of the non-apprehension of the distinction, these two different kinds of awareness themselves produce the illusion of a direct and immediate perception of silver which is not there at the time, and even tempt us to

and here also it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. When the illusion is dispelled, we say that “this is not silver”; this cannot mean the mere presence of the conch-shell, but it must mean the denial of the imposition that was made previously. For, if negations could be treated as positive entities, then there would be no difference between positives and negatives (*bādhyasya vidhirūpatve vidhi-niṣedha-vyatyāsaṃ ca niṣedhe bādha iti tulyārthatvāt*)¹. The *akhyāti* view speaks of non-apprehension of absence of association (e.g. of conch-shell-silver, *asamsargāgraha*) to be the cause of illusion. It may well be asked, What is this absence of association? It cannot be the mere thing itself; for, had it been so, we should expect that the thing itself (say the conch-shell) is not perceived and this alone constitutes error, which is impossible. Moreover, the silver is felt to be in front of us as the object we perceive and not as something which we remember. We know that, when we perceive illusorily that “this is silver,” there is the perception of a false association (*bādhaka-samsarga-grahaṇam*); but the concept of non-apprehension of difference (*bhedāgraha*) never seems to be practically realized in experience. If we inquire into the nature of what constitutes falsity or contradiction (e.g. in conch-shell-silver), we find that it is not the fact that a conch-shell when burnt becomes ash while silver, when burnt, may be made into a finger-ring that constitutes error, but the fact that what was believed to be capable of being rendered into a finger-ring by being put into fire cannot be so done (*yadi tv-aṅgulīyakādi-hetutayābhīmatasya vyavahārasya bhasma-hetutvako hy atra viśeṣaḥ*). If this is what is really meant by falsehood, it is nothing but the apprehension of the cause of one kind of action as being another cause (*anya-hetu-vyavahāro 'nya-hetutayāvagataḥ*). This will be *anyathā-khyāti*; for, if even here it is urged to be non-apprehension of difference, then

stretch our hands to pick it up, as if there were a real piece of silver before us. (See *Prakarāṇa-pāñcikā*, Ch. iv, *Naya-vīthi*.)

Sudarśana Sūri, commenting on the *akhyāti* view in his *Śruta-prakāśikā* in connection with his commentary on the *yathārtha-khyāti* view of Rāmānuja's seniors, says that the *akhyāti* view has the advantage of superior simplicity or the minimum assumption, viz. that in illusion only an indefinite object is seen, and the distinction between this and the image roused in memory by it is not apprehended. This has to be admitted in all theories of illusion, and in addition other assumptions have to be made.

¹ *Nyāya-kulīśa* of Vādihaṃsāmbuvāha Rāmānujācārya, Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

the experience in such cases of the belief of one thing as another is not explained¹. In all such cases the final appeal must be made to experience, which attests all cases of illusion as being the appearance of one thing as another².

But though Vādihaṃsāmbuvāhacārya thus tries to support the *anyathā-khyāti* view of illusion, yet he does not dismiss the *akhyāti* view of error curtly, but admits that it may also properly explain facts of illusion, when looked at from another point of view. For, if there was not the non-apprehension of difference between silver and conch-shell, the conch-shell could not be mistaken as silver. So, even in *anyathā-khyāti*, there is one element of *akhyāti* involved; for in order that one may behave towards a piece of conch-shell in the same way as one would do to a piece of silver, it is necessary that one should not be able to distinguish between what one sees before one and what one remembers. But, though the negative fact of *akhyāti*, i.e., non-apprehension of difference, may be regarded in many cases as a necessary stage, yet the positive fact of association (*saṃsarga*) or synthesis has to be admitted as an indispensable process, connecting the different elements constituting a concrete perception. The root-cause of all our behaviour and action, being of the nature of synthetic association, it would be wrong to suppose that non-apprehension of difference could by itself be made a real cause of our actions (*na ca mūla-bhūte saṃsarga-jñāne pravṛtti-kāraṇe siddhe tad-upajīvino niranantara-jñānasya pravṛttihetutvam iti yuktaṃ vaktum*)³. Although Vādihaṃsāmbuvāha spends all his discussions on the relative strength of *akhyāti* and *anyathā-khyāti* as probable theories of illusion, yet he refers to the view of illusion mentioned by Rāmānuja that all things are present in all things and that therefore no knowledge is illusory. He considers this view as the real and ultimately correct view. But, if this were so, all his discussions on the *akhyāti* and *anyathā-khyāti* theories of illusion would be futile. Vādihaṃsāmbuvāha does not, however, attempt to show how, if this theory be admitted, the other theories of *akhyāti* or *anyathā-khyāti* could be sup-

¹ *yadi cā'trā'pi bheda-grahaḥ śaraṇam syāt tato'bhīmāna-viśeṣa-kṛta-bādha-vyavasthā na sidhyet.* Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

² *katham ayaṃ loka-vyavahāro vṛtta iti, na hi kañcid upādhiṃ anālambya loke śabda-prayogo'vakalpyate, tasmād bādhya-bādhaka-bhāvā-nyathā-nupapattyā anyathā-khyāti-siddhiḥ.* *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

ported¹. He further criticizes the *anirvacanīya-khyāti* (illusion as the indescribable creation of, say, the appearance of silver in the conch-shell-silver illusion), a view of illusion as held by the Śaṅkarites, in the stereotyped form with which we are already familiar.

Anantācārya, a writer of the nineteenth century, laid stress on the view of illusion which held that all things were contained in all things, and hence the perception of conch-shell as silver was neither false knowledge nor non-apprehension of the difference between what is perceived and what is remembered; for the perception “this is silver” is a complex of two perceptions, “this” and “silver.” Had not this been a case of actual perception, we should not have felt as if we perceived the “this” before us as “silver.” The function of *doṣa* (defect) was only to hide the conch-shell part (mixed up with the silver part) from perception. To say that all perceptions have objective entities corresponding to them (*yathārtha*) does not mean that things are as they are perceived, but it means that it is not true that what is perceived has not an objective basis corresponding to it². That sort of *tejas*-substance which forms the material cause of silver certainly exists in the elemental *tejas*, and, the earth-particles forming the material cause of conch-shells being present in the elemental earth-substances, these substances get mixed in the primitive stage of compounding by *trivṛt-karaṇa*, and this explains the presence of the objective substratum of silver in the illusory perception of silver³. It is evident, argues Anantācārya, that conch-shell cannot appear as silver; for, since conch-shell is not silver, how can it appear as silver? In order properly to account for the perceptual experience “this is silver,” it is necessary to assume that the two constituents, “this” and “silver,” of the complex “this is silver” are both perceptually determined; for it is only in this way that one can justify the perception “I perceive this silver.”

¹ *yady api bhūtānām pañcīkaraṇa-labdha-paraspara-vyāptyā śūktikāyām api sādṛśyāt rajatui-kadeśo vidyata eva iti siddhāntaḥ tathāpi na vidyata iti kṛtvā cintyate vādy-udāharaṇa-prasiddhy-anurodhāya.* Govt. Oriental MSS. No. 4910.

² *tad-viśayaka-jñāna-sāmānyam viśeṣyāvṛtti-dharma-prakāra-katvā-bhāva-avad iti yathārtham sarva-vijñānam.* Jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda, MSS. No. 4884.

³ *yādṛśa-dharmā-vacchinnāt tejo'ṁśād rajatā-rambhah tādṛśa-dharmā-vacchinnānām apy aṁśānām mahā-bhūtātmake tejasi sattvena śukty-ārambhakatā-vaccheduka-dharmā-vacchinnānām pāṛthiva-bhāgānām api mahā-pṛthivyām sattvena tayoḥ mahā-bhūta-trivṛt-karaṇa-daśāyām eva melanā-sambhavācchukty-ādau rajatā-sad-bhāvo-papatteḥ.* Ibid.

This is an answer to the already noted objection raised by the *Śruta-prakāśikā*.

Failure of theistic proofs.

The existence of God can be known by the testimony of the scriptures (*śāstra-pramāṇaka*), and by that alone. All other proofs which seem to demonstrate the existence of God ultimately fail to do so, since suitable counter-arguments may always be successfully arrayed to destroy the efficacy of such arguments.

God cannot be perceived either by any of the sense-organs or by the mind; for the former can make known only those objects with which they have come in contact, and the latter (excepting in the direct communication of feelings like pleasure, pain, etc.) cannot make external objects known to us without depending on the sense-organs. Further, God cannot be perceived by the special perception of saints (*yogi-pratyakṣa*); for these are of the nature of memory, and do not convey any facts previously unknown through the senses. The saints can perceive only what has been already perceived, though these may not be present to the senses at the time. Objects too small for the senses cannot be perceived; for there cannot be any sense-contact with them. No reason can be perceived by means of which a necessary inference could be drawn regarding the existence of a supreme person who has a direct acquaintance with all things and the power of making them all. The ordinary argument that is offered is from effect to cause—since the world is “effect” (*kārya*), it must have a cause, a maker, who has direct acquaintance with all its materials and their utility and enjoys them. The world is “effect” because, like all effects, it is made up of parts (*sāvayava*); like a healthy human body, therefore, it is under the guidance and superintendence of one person and one alone. But the point is that the two cases are not analogous. The human body is neither produced nor maintained in existence by its superintendent, the soul. The production of the body of a person is due to the *adrṣṭa* (unseen effects of deeds) not only of that person, but also of beings who are benefited or in some way connected with it. Its existence as connected parts is due to the union of its parts, and does not depend for that on the living person who superintends it. Its existence as living is wholly unique and cannot be found in the case of the world as a whole. The superintendence of one person need not be considered as the invariable cause of all movements; for it is well known that many persons unite their

efforts to move some heavy object which could not otherwise be moved.

Moreover, if such a maker of the universe is to be admitted, could not the making of the world be better ascribed to one or more individual souls? They have a direct acquaintance with the materials of the world. It is not necessary that the maker should be acquainted with the inner efficiencies or power of things; for it is enough if the objects containing those powers are directly known. We see also that in all examples of making, such as the making of a jug, a cloth, or the like, the maker is an ordinary human being. Since the inference of the existence of a cause of the world is inspired by these examples, it will be only fair to assume that the maker of the universe belongs to the same class of beings as the makers of the ordinary mundane effects, such as a jug or a cloth. Thus, instead of assuming a supreme being to be the maker of the universe, we might as well assume an individual soul to be the maker of the universe. Hence it is difficult to prove the existence of God by inference. Ordinarily inferences are applied for the knowing of an object which may also be known in other ways, and in all such cases the validity of any inference is tested by these. But in the case of the application of inference for the knowing of God this is not possible; for God cannot be known by any other direct or indirect method. So the application of inference is not of any use here, since there is nothing which can test the validity of the inference or can determine that inference in a particular way and in that way alone. Therefore, since all sorts of inferences can be made from diverse propositions, it is not possible to determine that any particular kind of inference would be more acceptable than any other.

There are some who would still want to support the cosmological argument on the ground that no less than a supreme person, entirely different from the individual persons, could be regarded as the maker of this vast universe; for the individuals cannot have the power of perceiving subtle things, or things which are obstructed from our view, or things which are far away. Thus it is necessary to hold that the maker of the universe must be a being of unlimited powers. From the effect we infer its cause; and again from the nature of the effect we infer the nature of the cause. So, if the cause of the universe is to be inferred, then only such a cause

can be inferred as really has the unlimited powers required for producing such an effect. It is irrelevant to infer such a cause as cannot produce it. Also the unessential conditions of ordinary causes need not be imported by suggesting that, just as in the case of ordinary human beings there must be a body and also instruments by which they can operate and produce the effect, so also in the case of the supreme cause it might be expected that He should have a body and should have instruments by which He could operate. This cannot be; for we know that many effects are wrought by sheer force of will and desire (*saṅkalpa*) and neither will nor desire needs a body for its existence, since these are generated not by body, but by mind (*manas*). The existence of *manas* also is independent of the existence of body; for the mind continues to exist even when it is dissociated from body. Since limited beings, who are under the sway of virtue and vice, are unable to produce this manifold universe of such wonderful and diverse construction, it has to be admitted that there exists a supreme person who has done it. Moreover, since the material cause is seen in all known examples to be entirely different from the cause as agent or doer, there cannot be a Brahman which is both the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) and the cause as agent (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of this universe.

To this, however, it may be replied that it is admitted that the world is effect and that it is vast, but it is not known that all parts of this vast world originated at one time and from one person. Not all jugs are made at one time and by one person. How can any room be made for an unknown supreme person and the possibility be ruled out that different individual souls, by virtue of special merit and special powers, should at different times create the different parts of the world, which now appear as one unified whole created by one person at one time? It is quite possible that the different parts of the world were created at different times and will similarly be destroyed at different times. To imagine the existence of one such supreme person who could create all this manifold may well be regarded as almost chimerical. From the fact that the world is effect all that can be argued is that it must have been produced by an intelligent being, but there is nothing to infer that it is necessarily the creation of *one* intelligent being. This infinite universe could not have sprung into being at any one moment, and there is no proof that it did so. And, if it came into being gradually, it may

well be supposed that there were many intelligent beings who brought it into being gradually. Moreover, God, being absolutely complete in Himself, could not be conceived as having any need to effect such a creation, and He has neither body nor hands with which He could create. It is true that mind does not die with the body, but it is not found in any active state when it is not associated with the body. If it is admitted that God has a body, then He cannot be eternal. If His body could be eternal, though having parts, then on the same grounds the world too might be regarded as eternal. If the world is admitted to have come into being by His mere wish, that would be so strange as to be entirely dissimilar to all known cases of cause and effect. So, if one has to argue the existence of God as cause of the world on the basis of the analogy of known causes and effects as experienced by us, and if such a God is endowed with all the attributes with which He is generally associated, and with strange ways of creating this world, He must be such a cause as could never be inferred on the basis of the similarity of known causes and their modes of creating the effect. Thus, God can never be proved by inference. His existence has to be admitted on the testimony of scriptural texts and of that alone.

Bhāskara and Rāmānuja.

Every careful reader of Bhāskara and Rāmānuja must have noticed that Rāmānuja was largely indebted for his philosophical opinions and views to Bhāskara, and on most topics their doctrines are more or less the same. It is possible that Rāmānuja was indebted for his views to Bodhāyana or other Vaiṣṇava writers, but, however that may be, his indebtedness to Bhāskara also was very great, as a comparative study of the two systems would show. However, the two systems are not identical, and there is an important point on which they disagree. Bhāskara believed that there is Brahman as pure being and intelligence, absolutely formless, and the causal principle, and Brahman as the manifested effect, the world. According to Bhāskara there is no contradiction or difficulty in such a conception, since all things have such a dual form as the one and the many or as unity and difference. "Unity in difference" is the nature of all things. Rāmānuja, however, holds that difference and unity cannot both be affirmed of the same thing. Thus, when we affirm "this is like this," it is not true that the same

entity is both the subject and the predicate. For example, when "this" in the above proposition stands for a cow, the predicate "like this" stands for its particular and unique description of bodily appearance. The latter is only the attribute of the former and determines its nature and character. There is no meaning in asserting the identity of the subject and the predicate or in asserting that it is the same entity that in one form as unity is "subject" and in another form as difference is the predicate. Bhāskara argues that the conditions and the conditioned (*avasthā-taadvasthas' ca*) are not wholly different; nor are the substance and its attributes, the cloth and the whiteness, entirely different. There are no qualities without substance and no substance without qualities. All difference is also unity as well. The powers or attributes of a thing are not different from it; the fire is the same as its power of burning and illuminating. So everything is both unity and difference, and neither of them may be said to be wholly reducible to the other. But Rāmānuja maintains that all propositions are such that the predicate is an attribute of the subject. The same attributive view is applicable to all cases of genus and species, cause and effect, and universals and individuals. The "difference" and the "unity" are not two independent forms of things which are both real; but the "difference" modifies or qualifies the nature and character of the "unity," and this is certified by all our experience of complex or compound existence¹. According to Rāmānuja the affirmation of both unity and difference of the same entity is self-contradictory. The truth of "difference" standing by itself is not attested by experience; for the difference of quality, quantity, etc., always modifies the nature and character of the subject as "unity," and it is this alone that is experienced by us.

Bhāskara urges that, though there is the twofold Brahman as the manifested many and as the unmanifested formless identity of pure being and intelligence, it is only the latter that is the object of our highest knowledge and worship. Rāmānuja, however, denies this formless and differenceless Brahman and believes in the qualified complex Brahman as the transcendent and immanent God holding within Him as His body the individual souls and the world of matter. Regarding the relation of Brahman and the individual souls (*jīva*) Bhāskara says that a *jīva* is nothing but Brahman

¹ *Vādi-traya-khaṇḍana.*

narrowed by the limitations of the mind substance (*antaḥkaraṇopādhy-avacchinna*). When it is said that *jīva* is a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman, it is neither in the sense of part or of cause that the word “*aṁśa*” is used, but in the technical sense of being limited by the limitation of mind. This limitation is not false or unreal, and it is on account of it that the individual souls are atomic. According to Rāmānuja “difference” is felt as a result of ignorance and the difference is therefore unreal. With Rāmānuja the identity of Brahman with the individual souls is the last word. The apparent difference of imperfection, finiteness, etc., between the individual souls and the perfection and infiniteness of Brahman is due to ignorance (*avidyā*), and is found to be false as soon as the souls realize themselves to be forming the body of Brahman itself. “Difference” as such has no reality according to Rāmānuja, but only modifies and determines the character of the identical subject to which it refers. The subject and its character are identical. Bhāskara considers identity and difference as two modes, both of which are alike independently true, though they are correlated to each other. In criticism of Bhāskara it is said that, if the limitations of Brahman were also true, then they would wholly limit Brahman, since it has no parts, and thus it would be polluted in its entirety. This objection to Bhāskara’s view in some of its subtle aspects is made with dialectical skill by Rāmānuja¹. But it does not appear that it has much force against Bhāskara, if we admit his logical claim that unity and plurality, cause and effect, are two modes of existence of the same reality and that both these forms are equally real. It does not seem that the logical position of Bhāskara has been sufficiently refuted.

Rāmānuja also speaks of Brahman as being identical with individual souls or the material world and yet different therefrom, but only in the sense in which a character or a part may be said to be at once identical with and different from the substance possessing the character or the whole to which the part is said to belong. The individual souls and the inanimate creation cannot stand by themselves independently, but only as parts of Brahman. So from the fact that they are parts of Brahman their identity (*abheda*) with Brahman becomes as primary as their difference (*bheda*), inasmuch

¹ Rāmānuja’s *Bhāṣya*, pp. 265, 266, with the *Śrūta-prakāśikā*, Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay, 1916.

as the substance may be considered to be different from its attributes¹. The main difference that remains on this point between Bhāskara and Rāmānuja is this, that Bhāskara does not think it necessary to introduce the conception of body and parts, or substance and attributes. According to his doctrine Brahman is immanent and transcendent at the same time, identity and difference can be affirmed of a thing at one and the same time; and this can be illustrated from the cases of cause and effect, or substance and attributes, etc.

Ontological position of Rāmānuja's Philosophy.

The entire universe of wondrous construction, regulated throughout by wonderful order and method, has sprung into being from Brahman, is maintained by Him in existence, and will also ultimately return to Him. Brahman is that to the greatness of which there is no limitation. Though the creation, maintenance and absorption of the world signify three different traits, yet they do not refer to different substances, but to one substance in which they inhere. His real nature is, however, His changeless being and His eternal omniscience and His unlimitedness in time, space and character. Referring to Śaṅkara's interpretation of this *sūtra* (I. 1. 2), Rāmānuja says that those who believe in Brahman as characterless (*nirviśeṣa*) cannot do justice to the interpretation of this attribute of Brahman as affirmed in *Brahma-sūtra* I. 1. 2; for instead of stating that the creation, maintenance and absorption of the world are from Brahman, the passage ought rather to say that the illusion of creation, maintenance, and absorption is from Brahman. But even that would not establish a characterless Brahman; for the illusion would be due to *ajñāna*, and Brahman would be the manifest of all *ajñāna*. This it can do by virtue of the fact that it is of the nature of pure illumination, which is different from the concept of materiality, and, if there is this difference, it is neither characterless nor without any difference².

This raises an important question as regards the real meaning

¹ *jīva-vat-prthak-siddhy-anarha-viśeṣaṇatvena acid-vastuno brahmnā-mśatvam; viśiṣṭa-vastu-eka-deśatvena abheda-vyavahāro mukhyaḥ, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣayayoḥ svarūpa-svabhāva-bhedena bheda-vyavahāro'pi mukhyaḥ. Śrī-bhāṣya, III. 2. 28.*

² *jagaj-janmādi-bhramo yatas tad brahme' ti svot-prekṣā-pakṣe'pi na nirviśeṣa-vastu-siddhiḥ, etc. Ibid. I. 1. 2.*

of Śaṅkara's interpretation of the above *sūtra*. Did he really mean, as he is apparently stated by Rāmānuja to have said, that that from which there is the illusion of creation, etc., of the world is Brahman? Or did he really mean Brahman and Brahman by itself alone is the cause of a real creation, etc., of the world? Śaṅkara, as is well known, was a commentator on the *Brahma-sūtras* and the Upaniṣads, and it can hardly be denied that there are many passages in these which would directly yield a theistic sense and the sense of a real creation of a real world by a real God. Śaṅkara had to explain these passages, and he did not always use strictly absolutist phrases; for, as he admitted three kinds of existence, he could talk in all kinds of phraseology, but one needed to be warned of the phraseology that Śaṅkara had in view at the time, and this was not always done. The result has been that there are at least some passages which appear by themselves to be realistically theistic, others which are ambiguous and may be interpreted in both ways, and others again which are professedly absolutist. But, if the testimony of the great commentators and independent writers of the Śaṅkara school be taken, Śaṅkara's doctrine should be explained in the purely monistic sense, and in that alone. Brahman is indeed the unchangeable infinite and absolute ground of the emergence, maintenance and dissolution of all world-appearance and the ultimate truth underlying it. But there are two elements in the appearance of the world-phenomena—the ultimate ground, the Brahman, the only being and truth in them, and the element of change and diversity, the *māyā*—by the evolution or transformation of which the appearance of “the many” is possible. But from passages like those found in Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1. 2, it might appear as if the world-phenomena are no mere appearance, but are real, inasmuch as they are not merely grounded in the real, but are emanations from the real: the Brahman. But, strictly speaking, Brahman is not alone the *upādāna* or the material cause of the world, but with *avidyā* is the material cause of the world, and such a world is grounded in Brahman and is absorbed in Him. Vācaspati, in his *Bhāmātī* on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the same *sūtra* (*Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1. 2), makes the same remark¹. Prakāśātman, in his *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, says that the creative functions here spoken of do

¹ *avidyā-sahita-brahmo'pādānaṃ jagat brahmaṇy evāsti tatraiva ca līyate. Bhāmātī*, I. 1. 2.

not essentially appertain to Brahman and an inquiry into the nature of Brahman does not mean that he is to be known as being associated with these qualities¹. Bhāskara had asserted that Brahman had transformed Himself into the world-order, and that this was a real transformation—*pariṇāma*—a transformation of His energies into the manifold universe. But Prakāśātman, in rejecting the view of *pariṇāma*, says that, even though the world-appearance be of the stuff of *māyā*, since this *māyā* is associated with Brahman, the world-appearance as such is never found to be contradicted or negated or to be non-existing—it is only found that it is not ultimately real². *Māyā* is supported in Brahman; and the world-appearance, being transformations of *māyā*, is real only as such transformations. It is grounded also in Brahman, but its ultimate reality is only so far as this ground or Brahman is concerned. So far as the world-appearances are concerned, they are only relatively real as *māyā* transformations. The conception of the joint causality of Brahman and *māyā* may be made in three ways; that *māyā* and Brahman are like two threads twisted together into one thread; or that Brahman, with *māyā* as its power or *śakti*, is the cause of the world; or that Brahman, being the support of *māyā*, is indirectly the cause of the world³. On the latter two views *māyā* being dependent on Brahman, the work of *māyā*—the world—is also dependent on Brahman; and on these two views, by an interpretation like this, pure Brahman (*śuddha-brahma*) is the cause of the world. Sarvajñātma muni, who also thinks that pure Brahman is the material cause, conceives the function of *māyā* not as being joint material cause with Brahman, but as the instrument or the means through which the causality of pure Brahman appears as the manifold and diversity of the universe. But even on this view the stuff of the diversity is the *māyā*, though such a manifestation of *māyā* would have been impossible if the ground-cause, the Brahman, had been absent⁴. In discerning the nature of the causality of Brahman, Prakāśātman says that the monistic doctrine of Vedānta is upheld by the fact that apart from

¹ *na hi nānā-vidha-kārya-kriyāveśātmakatvaṃ tat-prasava-śakty-ātmakatvaṃ vā jñānasya-viśuddha-brahmāntargataṃ bhavītum arhati. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 205.

² *sṛṣṭeś ca svopādhanā abhāva-vyāvṛttatvāt sarve ca sopādhanika-dharmāḥ svāśrayopādhanā abādhyatayā satyā bhavanti sṛṣṭir api svarūpeṇa na bādhyate kintu paramā-rthā-satyatvā-ṃśena. Ibid.* p. 206.

³ *Ibid.* p. 212.

⁴ *Saṅkṣepa-śārīra*, I. 332, 334, and the commentary *Anvayārtha-prakāśikā* by Rāmātīrtha.

the cause there is nothing in the effect which can be expressed or described (*upādāna-vyatirekeṇa kāryasya anirūpaṇād advitīyatā*)¹. Thus, in all these various ways in which Śaṅkara's philosophy has been interpreted, it has been universally held by almost all the followers of Śaṅkara that, though Brahman was at bottom the ground-cause yet the stuff of the world was not of real Brahman material, but of *māyā*; and, though all the diversity of the world has a relative existence, it has no reality in the true sense of the term in which Brahman is real². Śaṅkara himself says that the omniscience of Brahman consists in its eternal power of universal illumination or manifestation (*yasya hi sarva-viśayāvabhāsa-kṣamaṃ jñānam nityam asti*). Though there is no action or agency involved in this universal consciousness, it is spoken of as being a knowing agent, just as the sun is spoken of as burning and illuminating, though the sun itself is nothing but an identity of heat and light (*pratatauṣṇya-prakāśepi savitari dahati prakāśayati svātantrya-vyapadeśa-darśanāt...evam asaty api jñāna-karmaṇi Brahmanas tad aikṣata iti kartṛtva-vyapadeśa-darśanāt*). Before the creation of the world what becomes the object of this universal consciousness is the indefinable name and form which cannot be ascertained as "this" or "that"³. The omniscience of Brahman is therefore this universal manifestation, by which all the creations of *māyā* become the knowable contents of thought. But this manifestation is not an act of knowledge, but a permanent steady light of consciousness by which the unreal appearance of *māyā* flash into being and are made known.

Rāmānuja's view is altogether different. He discards the view of Śaṅkara, that the cause alone is true and that all effects are false.

¹ *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 221.

² Prakāśātman refers to several ways in which the relation of Brahman and *māyā* has been conceived, e.g. Brahman has *māyā* as His power, and the individual souls are all associated with *avidyā*; Brahman as reflected in *māyā* and *avidyā* is the cause of the world (*māyā-vidyā-pratibimbam brahma jagat-kāraṇam*); pure Brahman is immortal, and individual souls are associated with *avidyā*; individual souls have their own illusions of the world, and these through similarity appear to be one permanent world; Brahman undergoes an apparent transformation through His own *avidyā*. But in none of these views is the world regarded as a real emanation from Brahman. *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 232.

Regarding the question as to how Brahman could be the cause of beginningless Vedas, Prakāśātman explains it by supposing that Brahman was the underlying reality by which all the Vedas imposed on it were manifested. *Ibid.* pp. 203, 231.

³ *kim punas tat-karma? yat prāg-utpatter īśvara-jñānasya viśayo bhavattī. tattvānyatvābhyāṃ anirvacanīye nāma-rūpe avyākṛte vyācikṛṣite iti brūmah. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya*, 1. 1. 5.

One of the reasons adduced for the falsity of the world of effects is that the effects do not last. This does not prove their falsehood, but only their destructible or non-eternal nature (*anityatva*). When a thing apparently existing in a particular time and space is found to be non-existing at that time or in that space, then it is said to be false; but, if it is found to be non-existing at a different place and at a different time, it cannot be called false, it is only destructible or non-eternal. It is wrong to suppose that a cause cannot suffer transformation; for the associations of time, space, etc., are new elements which bring in new factors which would naturally cause such transformation. The effect-thing is neither non-existent nor an illusion; for it is perceived as existing in a definite time and place after its production from the cause until it is destroyed. There is nothing to show that such a perception of ours is wrong. All the scriptural texts that speak of the world's being identical with Brahman are true in the sense that Brahman alone is the cause of the world and that the effect is not ultimately different from the cause. When it is said that a jug is nothing but clay, what is meant is that it is the clay that, in a specific and particular form or shape, is called a jug and performs the work of carrying water or the like; but, though it does so, it is not a different substance from clay. The jug is thus a state of clay itself, and, when this particular state is changed, we say that the effect-jug has been destroyed, though the cause, the clay, remains the same. Production (*utpatti*) means the destruction of a previous state and the formation of a new state. The substance remains constant through all its states, and it is for this reason that the causal doctrine, that the effect exists even before the operation of causal instruments, can be said to be true. Of course, states or forms which were non-existent come into being; but, as the states have no existence independently from the substance in which they appear, their new appearance does not affect the causal doctrine that the effects are already in existence in the cause. So the one Brahman has transformed Himself into the world, and the many souls, being particular states of Him, are at once one with Him and yet have a real existence as His parts or states.

The whole or the Absolute here is Brahman, and it is He who has for His body the individual souls and the material world. When Brahman exists with its body, the individual souls and the material world in a subtler and finer form, it is called the "cause" or Brah-

man in the causal state (*kāraṇāvasthā*). When it exists with its body, the world and souls in the ordinary manifested form, it is called Brahman in the effect state (*kāryāvasthā*)¹. Those who think that the effect is false cannot say that the effect is identical with the cause; for with them the world which is false cannot be identical with Brahman which is real². Rāmānuja emphatically denies the suggestion that there is something like pure being (*san-mātra*), more ultimately real than God the controller with His body as the material world and individual souls in a subtler or finer state as cause, as he also denies that God could be regarded as pure being (*san-mātra*); for God is always possessed of His infinite good qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, etc. Rāmānuja thus sticks to his doctrine of the twofold division of matter and the individual souls as forming parts of God, the constant inner controller (*antar-yāmin*) of them both. He is no doubt a *sat-kārya-vādin*, but his *sat-kārya-vāda* is more on the Sāṃkhya line than on that of the Vedānta as interpreted by Śaṅkara. The effect is only a changed state of the cause, and so the manifested world of matter and souls forming the body of God is regarded as effect only because previous to such a manifestation of these as effect they existed in a subtler and finer form. But the differentiation of the parts of God as matter and soul always existed, and there is no part of Him which is truer or more ultimate than this. Here Rāmānuja completely parts company with Bhāskara. For according to Bhāskara, though God as effect existed as the manifested world of matter and souls, there was also God as cause, Who was absolutely unmanifested and undifferentiated as pure being (*san-mātra*). God, therefore, always existed in this His tripartite form as matter, soul and their controller, and the primitive or causal state and the state of dissolution meant only the existence of matter and souls in a subtler or finer state than their present manifest form. But Rāmānuja maintains that, as there is difference between the soul and the body of a person, and as the defects or deficiencies of the body do not affect the soul, so there is a marked difference between God, the Absolute controller, and His body, the individual souls and the world of matter, and the defects

¹ *Śrī-bhāṣya*, pp. 444, 454, Bombay ed., 1914.

² This objection of Rāmānuja, however, is not valid; for according to it the underlying reality in the effect is identical with the cause. But there is thus truth in the criticism, that the doctrine of the "identity of cause and effect" has to be given a special and twisted meaning for Śaṅkara's view.

of the latter cannot therefore affect the nature of Brahman. Thus, though Brahman has a body, He is partless (*niravayava*) and absolutely devoid of any *karma*; for in all His determining efforts He has no purpose to serve. He is, therefore, wholly unaffected by all faults and remains pure and perfect in Himself, possessing endless beneficent qualities.

In his *Vedārtha-saṃgraha* and *Vedānta-dīpa*, Rāmānuja tried to show how, avoiding Śaṅkara's absolute monism, he had also to keep clear of the systems of Bhāskara and of his own former teacher Yādavaprakāśa. He could not side with Bhāskara, because Bhāskara held that the Brahman was associated with various conditions or limitations by which it suffered bondage and with the removal of which it was liberated. He could also not agree with Yādavaprakāśa, who held that Brahman was on the one hand pure and on the other hand had actually transformed itself into the manifold world. Both these views would be irreconcilable with the Upaniṣadic texts.

Veṅkaṭanātha's treatment of *pramāṇa*.

As the nihilistic Buddhists (*śūnya-vādī* or *mādhyamika*) are supposed to deny the valid existence of any fact or proposition, so the Śaṅkarites also may be supposed to suspend their judgment on all such questions. In the preliminary portions of his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, in answer to the question whether all discussions (*kathā*) must presuppose the previous admission of validity and invalidity as really referring to facts and propositions, Śrīharṣa says that no such admission is indispensable; for a discussion can be conducted by the mutual agreement of the contending persons to respect certain principles of reality or unreality as decided by the referee (*madhyastha*) of the debate, without entering into the question of their ultimate validity. Even if validity or invalidity of certain principles, facts, or propositions, were admitted, then also the mutual agreement of the contending persons to these or other principles, as ruled by the referee, would be an indispensable preliminary to all discussions¹. As against these views Veṅkaṭanātha,

¹ *na ca pramāṇādinām sattā'pi ittham eva tābhyām aṅgikartum ucitā; tādyśa-vyavahāra-niyama-mātreṇaiva kathā-pravyṛtti-upapattēh. pramāṇādi-sattām abhyupetyā'pi tathā-vyavahāra-niyama-vyatireke kathā-pravyṛttiṃ vinā tattva-nirṇayasya jayasya vā abhilaṣitasya kathakayor aparyavasānāt, etc. Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya, p. 35.*

the best-reputed philosopher of the Rāmānuja school, seeks to determine the necessity of the admission of validity (*prāmānya*) or invalidity (*a-prāmānya*) as naturally belonging to certain proportions or facts, as a preliminary to our quest of truth or objective and knowable facts. If the distinction of valid and invalid propositions is not admitted, then neither can any thesis be established, nor can practical affairs run on. But, though in this way the distinction between valid and invalid propositions has to be admitted on the basis of its general acceptance by people at large, yet their real nature has still to be examined. Those who deny such a distinction can have four alternative views, viz. that all propositions are valid, that all propositions are invalid, that all propositions mutually contradict one another, or that all propositions are doubtful. If all propositions are valid, then the negation of such a proposition is also valid, which is self-contradictory; if they are all invalid, then even such a proposition is invalid and hence no invalidity can be asserted. As to the third alternative, it may be pointed out that invalid propositions can never contradict the valid ones. If one valid proposition restricts the sphere of another valid proposition, this does not mean contradiction. A valid proposition has not to depend on other propositions for making its validity realized; for a valid proposition guarantees its own validity. Lastly, if you doubt everything, at least you do not doubt that you doubt; so then you are not consistent in saying that you doubt everything; for at least in one point you are certain, viz. that you doubt everything¹. Thus it has to be admitted that there are two classes of propositions, valid and invalid. But, though the general distinction between valid and invalid propositions be admitted, yet proper inquiry, investigation, or examination, is justified in attempting to determine whether any particular proposition is valid or invalid. That only is called a *pramāṇa* which leads to valid knowledge.² In the case of perception, for example, those which would lead to valid knowledge would be defectless eyes, mind-contact as attention, proper proximity of the object, etc., and these would jointly constitute *pramāṇa*. But in the

¹ This remark naturally reminds one of Descartes—*sarvaṃ sandigdham iti te nipuṇasyāsti niścayaḥ, saṃśayaś ca na sandigdhaḥ sandigdhadvāita-vādinah. Nyāya-pariśuddhi. p. 34. Chowkhamba s.s.*

² A distinction is here made between *karāṇa-prāmānya* and *āśraya-prāmānya* (*pramāśrayasya īśvarasya prāmānyam aṅgīkṛtam*). *Nyāya-sāra* commentary on *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* by Śrīnivāsa, p. 35.

case of testimony it is the faultlessness of the speaker that constitutes the validity of the knowledge. The scriptures are valid because they have been uttered by God, Who has the right knowledge of things. The validity of the Vedas is not guaranteed by absence of defect in our instruments of knowledge. Whatever that may be, the ultimate determination of *pramāṇa* is through *pramā*, or right knowledge. That by which one can have right knowledge is *pramāṇa*. Vedas are valid, because they are uttered by God, Who has right knowledge. So it is the rightness of knowledge that ultimately determines the validity of *pramāṇa*¹.

Vātsya Śrīnivāsa, a successor of Veṅkaṭanātha of the Rāmānuja school, defines *pramāṇa* as the most efficient instrument amongst a collocation of causes forming the immediate, invariable and unconditional antecedents of any right knowledge (*pramā*). Thus, in the case of perception, for example, the visual organ is a *pramāṇa* which leads to right visual knowledge, through its intermediary active operation (*avāntara-vyāpāra*)—the sense-contact of the eye with its objects². Jayanta, the celebrated Nyāya writer, had, however, expressed a different view on the point in his *Nyāya-mañjarī*. He held that no member in a collocation of causes producing the effect could be considered to be more efficient or important than the other members. The efficiency (*atiśaya*) of the causal instruments means their power of producing the effect, and that power belongs to all the members jointly in the collocation of causes; so it is the entire collocation of causes producing right knowledge that is to be admitted as its instrument or *pramāṇa*³. Even subject and object cannot be regarded as more important; for they manifest themselves only through the collocating causes producing the desired relation between the subject and the object⁴. With Nyāya this

¹ *kāraṇa-prāmāṇyasya āśraya-prāmāṇyasya ca jñāna-prāmāṇyā-dhātva-jñānavat tad ubhaya-prāmāṇya-siddhy-artham api jñāna-prāmāṇyam eva vicāranīyam. Nyāya-sāra*, p. 35.

² *pramā-kāraṇam pramāṇam ity uktam ācāryaiḥ siddhānta-sāre pramo-tpādaka-sāmagrī-madhye yad atiśayena pramā-guṇakam tat tasyāḥ kāraṇam; atiśayaś ca vyāpārah, yad dhi yad janayitvaiva yad janayet tat tatra tasyāvāntara-vyāpārah. sāksātkāri-pramāṇyā indriyaṁ kāraṇam indriyā-rtha-samyogo 'vāntara-vyāpārah. Rāmānuja, Siddhānta-saṁgraha. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4988.*

³ *sa ca sāmagry-antar-gatasya na kasyacid ekasya kāraṇasya kathayitum pāryate, sāmagryāś tu so'tiśayaḥ svacāḥ sannihitā cet sāmagrī sampannam eva phalam iti. Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 13.

⁴ *sākalya-prasāda-labdha-pramiti-sambandha-nibandhanah pramāṭṛ-prameyayor mukhya-svarūpa-lābhah. Ibid.* p. 14.

collocation of causes consists of ideational and non-ideational (*bodhābodha-svabhāva*) factors¹.

If the view of the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* is to be accepted, then the Śāṅkarite view also is very much like the Rāmānuja view on this point; for both Dharmarājādhvarindra and Rāmakṛṣṇa agree in defining *pramāṇa* as the instrument of right knowledge. In the case of visual perception or the like the visual or the other sense organs are regarded as *pramāṇa*; and the sense-contact is regarded as the operation of this instrument.

The difference between the Nyāya view and the Rāmānuja view consists in this, that, while the Nyāya gives equal importance to all members of the collocation, the Rāmānuja view distinguishes that only as the instrumental cause which is directly associated with the active operation (*vyāpāra*). Even the Śāṅkarites agree with such a productive view of knowledge; for, though they believe consciousness to be eternal and unproduced, yet they also believe the states of consciousness (*vyṛtti-jñāna*) to be capable of being produced. Both the Rāmānuja and the Śāṅkara beliefs accept the productive view of knowledge in common with the Nyāya view, because with both of them there is the objective world standing outside the subject, and perceptual knowledge is produced by the sense-organs when they are in operative contact with the external objects. A distinction, however, is made in the Rāmānuja school between *kāraṇa* (cause) and *kaṛaṇa* (important instrument), and that cause which is directly and intimately associated with certain operations leading to the production of the effect is called a *kaṛaṇa*². It is for this reason that, though the Rāmānuja view may agree regarding the *sāmagrī*, or collocation as causes, in some sense it regards only the sense-organ as the chief instrument; the others are accessories or otherwise helpful to production.

There are Buddhists also who believe that it is the joint collocation of mental and extra-mental factors of the preceding moment which produce knowledge and external events of the later moment; but they consider the mental factors to be directly producing knowledge, whereas the extra-mental or external objects are mere accessories or exciting agents. Knowledge on this view is determined

¹ *bodhā-bodha-svabhāva sāmagrī pramāṇam*. Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 15.

² *tat-kāraṇānām madhye yad atīṣayena kāryotpādayakam tat kaṛaṇam*. Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṃgraha. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4988.

a priori from within, though the influence of the external objects is not denied. With reference to the operation of causality in the external world, they believe that, though the mental elements of the present moment influence them as accessories, immediate causal operation is to be sought among the external objects themselves. The mental and extra-mental elements of the preceding moment jointly determine every phenomenon of the later moment in the world, whether mental or physical; but in the determination of the occurrence of knowledge, the mental factors predominate, and the external factors are accessories. In the determination of external phenomena mental elements are accessories and the external causes are immediate instruments. Thus, in the production of knowledge, though the specific external objects may be regarded as accessory causes, their direct and immediate determinants are mental elements¹.

The idealistic Buddhists, the *viññāna-vādins*, who do not distinguish between ideas and their objects, consider that it is the formless ideas that assume different forms as "blue," "red," etc.; for they do not believe in any external objects other than these ideas, and so it is these ideas in diverse forms and not the sense-organs or other collocations which are called *pramāṇas*. No distinction is here made between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* or the result of the process of *pramāṇa*². They, however, fail to explain the difference that exists between the awareness and its object.

The *Mīmāṃsaka* school of Kumārila thinks that, following the soul-sense-mind-object contact, there is a process or an act (*jñāna-vyāpāra*) which, though not directly perceived, has to be accepted as an operation which immediately leads to the manifestation of objects of knowledge (*artha-dṛṣṭatā* or *viśaya-prakāśatā*). It is this unperceived, but logically inferred, act of knowledge or *jñāna-*

¹ *jñāna-janmani jñānam upādāna-kāraṇam arthaḥ sahakāri-kāraṇam artha-janmani ca artha upādāna-kāraṇam jñānam sahakāri-kāraṇam. Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 15.*

The objection against this view as raised by Jayanta is this, that, if both mental and physical entities and events are determined by the joint operation of mental-physical entities of the preceding moments, we ask what determines the fact that one is mental and the other physical, that one is perceiver and the other perceived.

² *nirākārasya bodha-rūpasya nīla-pītādy-aneke-viśaya-sādhāranatvād jana-katvasya ca cakṣur-ādāv api bhāvenā'tiprasaṅgāt tad-ākāratva-kṛtam eva jñāna-karma-niyamam avagacchantāḥ sākāra-viññānam pramāṇam... arthas tu sākāra-jñāna-vādinō na samasty eva. Ibid. p. 16.*

vyāpāra that is called *pramāṇa*¹. Jayanta, of course, would not tolerate such an unperceived operation or act of knowledge; for, according to Nyāya, the only kind of action that is accepted is the molecular motion or vibration (*parispanda* or *calana*) produced by a collocation of causes (*kāraka-cakra*)².

The Jains, however, repudiate the idea of the combined causality of the collocation, or of any particular individual cause such as any sense-organ, or any kind of sense-contact with reference to sense-knowledge, or of any other kind of knowledge. Thus Prabhācandra contends in his *Prameya-kamala-mūrtanḍa* that none of the so-called individual causes or collocations of causes can lead to the production of knowledge. For knowledge is wholly independent and self-determined in leading us to our desired objects or keeping us away from undesirable objects, and in no sense can we attribute it to the causal operation of the sense-organs or collocations of sense-organs and other entities. Thus knowledge (*jñāna*) should itself be regarded as *pramāṇa*, leading us to our desired objects³.

The whole point in these divergent views regarding *pramāṇas* consists in the determination of the nature of the relation of the sense-organs, the objects and other accessory circumstances to the rise of knowledge. As we have seen, knowledge is in the Rāmānuja view regarded as the product of the operation of diverse causal entities, among which in the case of sense-perception the sense-organs play the most important, direct and immediate part. Both the Jains and the idealistic Buddhists (though they have important and most radical differences among themselves) agree in holding the view of self-determination of knowledge independent of the sense-organs or the operation of objective entities which become the objects of knowledge and are revealed by it.

¹ *nānyathā hy artha-sadbhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ sann upapadyate
jñānaṃ cennetyataḥ paścāt pramāṇam upajāyate.*

Śloka-vārttika, Sūnya-vāda, 178.

Jayanta also says *phalānumeyo jñāna-vyāpāro jñānādi-sabda-vācyah pramāṇam. Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 17.*

² *tasmat kāraka-cakreṇa calatā janyate phalam,
na punaś calanād anyo vyāpāra upalabhyate. Ibid. p. 20.*

³ *tato'nya-nirapekṣatayā svārtha-paricchinnam sādhakatamatvāt jñānam eva
pramāṇam. Prameya-kamala-mūrtanḍa, p. 5.*

Veṅkaṭanātha's treatment of Doubt.

Veṅkaṭanātha defines doubt as the appearance of two or more alternatives (which are in themselves incompatible) owing to the non-perception of their specific contradictory qualities and the perception of some general characteristics common to them both; e.g. when a tall thing only is seen, which may be either a man or a stump, both of which it could not be, they being entirely different from one another. So the two alternatives are not to be entirely different, and from what is seen of the object it cannot be known that it must be the one and not the other, and this causes the doubt. Veṅkaṭanātha tries to justify this analysis of doubt by referring to other earlier authorities who regarded doubt as an oscillating apprehension in which the mind goes from one alternative to another (*dolā-vegavad atra sphuraṇa-kramah*), since it would be contradictory that the same object should be two different things at the same time. The author of the *Ātma-siddhi* has therefore described it as the loose contact of the mind with two or more things in quick succession (*bahubhir-yugapad a-dṛḍha-saṃyogah*). Doubt may arise either from the apprehension of common characteristics—such as from tallness, whether the object perceived be a tree-stump or a man—or from not having been able to decide between the relative strength of the various opposite and different possibilities suggested by what is perceived or otherwise known (*a-grhyamāna-bala-tāratamya-viruddhā-neka-jñāpako-pasthāpanam iha-vipratipattiḥ*). So, whenever there are two or more possibilities, none of which can be ruled out without further verification, there is doubt¹.

¹ The Nyāya analysis of doubt, as found in *Vātsyāyana's bhāṣya*, 1. 11. 23, is as follows: When the common characteristics of two possible things are noticed, but not the specific quality which would decide for the one or the other, the anguish of the mind in determining or deciding in favour of the one or the other is called doubt. Doubt may also arise from conflicting opinions (*vipratipatteḥ*), e.g., some say that there is a soul, while others hold that there is no soul. Doubt may also arise from the perception of determining qualities (production through division, *vibhāgaśatva*) which a thing (e.g. sound) has in common with other things (e.g. substance, attributes, and actions). Doubt may arise from perception of things which may be illusorily perceived even when non-existent (e.g. water in mirage), out of a desire for certainty and also from a non-perception of things (which may yet be there, though non-evident), out of a desire to discover some traits by which one could be certain whether the thing was there or not. The special contribution of Veṅkaṭanātha consists in giving a general analysis of doubt as a state of the mind instead of the specification of the five specific forms of doubt. Veṅkaṭanātha points out that doubt need not be of five kinds only but

Thus, doubt arises between a true and a false perception as when I perceive a face in the mirror, but do not know whether it is a real face or not until it is decided by an attempt to feel it by touch. So, between valid and invalid inference, when I judge from smoke that the hill is on fire, and yet through not perceiving any light doubt that it is on fire; between opposition of scriptural texts, “*jīva* has been said to be different from Brahman and to be one with it,” whether then the *jīva* is different from Brahman or one with it; between conflicting authorities (e.g. the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophers and the Upaniṣadic doctrines) such as “are the senses material or are they the products of the ego?” Between perception and inference (e.g. in the case of the illusory perception of yellow conch-shell, the perceiving of it as yellow and the inferring that it could not be yellow because it is a conch-shell and hence the doubt, whether the conch-shell is white or yellow, and so forth).

In referring to the view of Varadanārāyaṇa in his *Prajñā-paritrāṇa*, Veṅkaṭanātha says that the threefold division of doubt that he made, due to perception of common characteristics, apprehension of different alternatives, and the opposition of scholars and authorities, is in imitation of the Nyāya ways of looking at doubt¹, for the last two forms were essentially the same. Veṅkaṭanātha further refutes the Nyāya view of doubt in which Vātsyāyana, in explaining *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 11. 23, says that there can be doubt even from special distinguishing qualities. Thus, earth has smell as a distinctive characteristic which is not possessed either by eternal substances, such as self, or by non-eternal substances, such as water, etc.; and there can naturally be a doubt whether earth, being different from eternal substances, is non-eternal, or whether, being different from non-eternal substances, it is eternal. Veṅkaṭanātha points out that here doubt does not take place owing to the fact that earth possesses this distinguishing quality. It is simply because the possession of smell is quite irrelevant to the determination of eternity or non-eternity, as it is shared by both eternal and non-

can be of many kinds which, however, all agree in this, that in all states of doubt there is an oscillation of the mind from one alternative to another, due to the indetermination of the relative strength of the different possible alternatives on account of the perception of merely certain common characteristics without their specific determining and decisive features.

¹

*sādhāraṇā-kṛter dṛṣṭyā'nekā-kāra-grahāt tathā
vipāścitiṃ vivādāc ca tridhā saṁśaya īsyate.*

Prajñā-paritrāṇa, quoted in *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, p. 62.

eternal substances. Doubt would continue until a distinguishing characteristic, such as is possessed by eternal or non-eternal substances alone, is found in earth (*vyatireki-nirūpaṇa-vilambāt*), on the strength of which it could be determined whether it is eternal or not. Venkaṭanātha, in various illustrations, shows that doubt consists essentially of an oscillation of the mind, due to indecision between two possible alternatives. He would admit even such inquiries as "What may be the name of this tree?" as doubt, and not mere indecision or want of knowledge (*an-adhyavasāya*). Such inquiries can rightly be admitted as doubts; for they involve doubt regarding two or more alternative names, which are vaguely wavering in the mind and which are followed by a desire to settle or decide in favour of one or the other. So here also there is a want of settlement between two alternatives, due to a failure to find the determining factor (*avacchedakā-darśanāt an-avacchinna-koṭi-viśeṣaḥ*). Such a state of oscillation might naturally end in a mental reckoning in favour of or against the possible or probable alternatives, which is called *ūha* (but which must be distinguished from *ūha* as *tarka* in connection with inference), which leads to the resolution of doubt into probability¹. However, Anantārya, a later writer of the Rāmānuja school, further described doubt as being a state of mind in which one perceived only that something lay before him, but did not notice any of its specific features, qualities or characters (*puro-vṛtti-mātram a-grhīta-viśeṣaṇam anubhūyate*). Only the two alternatives (e.g. "a tree stump or a man"—*sthāṇu-puruṣau*) are remembered. According to the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, the imperfect observation of something before us rouses its corresponding subconscious impression (*saṃskāra*), which, in its turn, rouses the subconscious impressions leading to the simultaneous revival in one sweep of memory of the two possible alternatives of which neither could be decided upon². The point disputed in this connection is between a minority party of interpreters, who think that the perception of something in front of us rouses an impression which in its turn rouses two different subconscious impressions leading to

¹ *ūhas tu prāyaḥ puruṣeṇā'nena bhavitavyam ity-ādi-rūpa eka-koṭi-saha-carita-bhūyo-dharma-darśanād anudbhūtā-nya-koṭikaḥ sa eva.*

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 68. Chowkhamba.

² *puro-vṛtṭi-anubhava-janita-saṃskāreṇa koṭi-dvayo-pasthūti-hetu-saṃskārā-bhyāṃ ca yugapad-eka-smaraṇam saṃśaya-sthale svikriyate iti sarvā-rtha-siddhau uktam.* Anantārya's *Jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda*. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4884.

one memory joining up the two alternative entities (e.g. tree-stump and man), and a majority party, who think that the perception of something in front of us leads directly to the memory of two different alternatives, which is interpreted as doubt. The former view, by linking up the two memories in one act of knowledge, supposes the oscillating movement to be one act of judgment and so holds the opinion that in doubt also there is the false substitution of one judgment for another, which is in accordance with the *anyathā-khyāti* (illegitimate substitution of judgments) theory of illusion. The latter view, which holds that there are two separate memories of the two possible alternatives, interprets Rāmānuja as an upholder of realism of knowledge (*jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda*), or the view that whatever is known or perceived has an objective and a real basis.

Error and Doubt according to Veṅkaṭanātha.

Error is defined by Veṅkaṭanātha as occurring when one or more incompatible characters are predicted of an entity without any notion of their incompatibility or contradictions. It is generally due to a wrong psychological tendency in association with other vicious perceptual data, as in the case of the perception of the conch-shell as yellow, the perception of one big moon as small and two, the relativistic (*anekānta*) assertion of contradictory predicates with reference to one thing or the predication of both reality and unreality in regard to world-appearance by the Śāṅkarites¹. Doubt, on the other hand, occurs when a perceived characteristic is not incompatible in predication with regard to two or more entities which are felt to be exclusive and opposed to one another, and which therefore cannot both at the same time be affirmed. This state is therefore described by some as an oscillatory movement of the mind from one pole to another. Decision results from a uni-polar and firm direction of mind to one object; doubt results from a multipolar oscillation, as has been set forth in the *Ātma-siddhi*. Absence of firmness of the direction of the mind is due to the natural constitution of mind, which has necessarily to reject a particular alternative before it can settle down in its opposite. Bhaṭṭārakaguru repeats the same idea in his *Tattva-ratnākara*, when he defines

¹ See *Nyāya-parisuddhi*, pp. 54-5.

doubt as the association of two contrary or contradictory qualities with any particular entity. Doubt, according to Veṅkaṭanātha, is of two kinds: from *samāna-dharma* and from *vipratipatti*, i.e. when different indications point to two or more conclusions and the relative strength of these indications cannot be conclusively decided. The condition of doubt in the first case is the uncertainty caused by the fact that two contrary possibilities, the relative strength of which cannot be determined on account of certain similar traits (*samāna-dharma-vipratipattibhyām*), claim affirmation. Thus, when we see something tall before us, two possibilities may arise—the tall object may be a man or a post, since both these are tall. When the relative strength of the different sources of knowledge, e.g. perception, illusion, inference, testimony, etc., leading to different conclusions (*a-grhyamāṇa-bala-tāratamya*) cannot be determined, both claim affirmation with regard to the same object or conclusion, and doubt arises as to which is to be accepted. Thus, when one sees in the mirror the image of one's face, which is not corroborated by touch, there arises the doubt as to the reality of the reflection. Again, there may be a doubt arising from two possible inferences regarding the existence of fire in the hill from smoke, and its possible non-existence from the existence of light. Again, as there are texts in the Upaniṣads some of which are monistic and others dualistic, a doubt may arise as to which is the right view of the Upaniṣads, and so forth. Doubt may also arise from two opposing contentions, such as those of the atomists and the Upaniṣadists regarding the question as to whether the senses have sprung from matter or from the ego. It may also arise regarding the opposing assertions of two ordinary individuals; between perception (e.g. illusory perception of conch-shell as yellow) and inference which indicates that the conch-shell cannot be yellow; between perception of the self as an embodied being and the scriptural testimony concerning the self as atomic.

Doubt may also arise between inferential knowledge of the world as atomic and the scriptural knowledge of the world as having Brahman as its substance. The Naiyāyikas, however, think that doubt can also arise regarding the two different contentions of opposing parties¹. Veṅkaṭanātha points out that both the *Nyāya*-

¹ *samānā-neka-dharmo-pāpatter vipratipatter upalabdhya-anupalabdhya-avyavasthātāś ca viśeṣā-pekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ. Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 1. 23. The in-

sūtra and the *Prajñā-paritrāṇa* are wrong in giving the perception of similar traits (*samāna-dharma*) and of special characteristics (*aneka-dharma*) as two independent reasons for the origin of doubt¹. The explanation given with regard to the doubt arising from a special characteristic such as odorousness is that, as this characteristic is not possessed by non-eternal substances, one may be led to think of including earth under eternal substances; and, again, as this characteristic is not to be found in any of the eternal substances, one may be led to include earth under non-eternal substances. But the doubt here is due not to the perception of a special characteristic, but to the delay of the mind in determining the ultimate differentia (*vyatireki-nirupana-vilambāt*) which may justify one in including it under either of them. Odorousness as such is not an indispensable condition of either eternity, or non-eternity; so naturally an inquiry arises regarding such common features in eternal or non-eternal substances as may be possessed by the odorous earth and may lead to a classification. The doubt here is due not to the fact that odorousness is a special characteristic of earth, but to the fact that earth possesses such characteristics as are possessed by eternal things on the one hand and by non-eternal things on the other. Even when it is urged that the odorous character distinguishes earth from eternal and non-eternal

interpretation given by Uddyotakara is that in all cases of doubt there are three factors, viz. knowledge of the (1) common or (2) special features, (3) opposite assertions and contending persons associated with a non-determinate state of mind due to the want of definite realization of any of the contrary possibilities, and a hankering to know the differentia. Uddyotakara thinks that doubt can arise not only from a conflict of knowledge, but also from a conflict of opinions of contending persons, *vipratipattiḥ* being interpreted by him as *vādi-vipratipattiḥ*. This view is also held by the *Prajñā-paritrāṇa* by Varadaviṣṇu Miśra, as is evident from the following śloka:

*sādhāraṇā-kṛter dṛṣṭyā-nekā-kāra-grahāt tathā,
vipāścītām vivādāc ca tridhā saṁśaya īsyate.*

Prajñā-paritrāṇa, quoted in the *Nyāya-parisuddhi*, p. 61.

This view is criticized by Veṅkaṭanātha as a blind acceptance of the *Nyāya* view.

¹ As an example of doubt arising from perception of similar traits, Vātsyāyana gives the example of man and post, in which the common traits (viz. height, etc.) are visible, but the differentia remains unnoticed. The example given by him of doubt arising from perception of special characteristics is that odorousness, the special character of earth, is not characteristic of *dravya* (substance), *karma* (action), and *guṇa* (quality), and this may rouse a legitimate doubt as to whether earth is to be classed as substance, quality, or action. Similarly, from the special characteristic of odorousness of earth a doubt may arise as to whether earth is eternal or non-eternal, since no other eternal or non-eternal thing has this characteristic.

substances and that this is the cause of doubt, it may be pointed out that doubt is due not to this distinguishing characteristic, but to the fact that earth possesses qualities common to both eternal and non-eternal substances. There are some who think that doubt through *vipratipatti* (i.e. through uncertainty arising from reasoned assertions of contending persons) may also be regarded as a case of doubt from *samāna-dharma* (i.e. perception of similar traits), because the opposed assertions have this similarity amongst themselves that they are all held as true by the respective contending persons. Venkaṭanātha, however, does not agree with this. He holds that doubt here does not arise merely on the strength of the fact that the opposed assertions are held as true by the contending persons, but because of our remembering the diverse reasons in support of such assertions when the relative strength of such reasons or possibilities of validity cannot be definitely ascertained. Thus, *vipratipatti* has to be accepted as an independent source of doubt. Doubt arises generally between two possible alternatives; but there may be cases in which two doubts merge together and appear as one complex doubt. Thus, when it is known that one or other of two persons is a thief, but not which of them, there may be a doubt—"this man or that man is a thief". In such a case there are two doubts: "this man may or may not be a thief" and "that man may or may not be a thief," and these merge together to form the complex doubt (*saṁśaya-dvaya-samāhāra*). The need of admitting a complex doubt may, however, vanish, if it is interpreted as a case where the quality of being a thief is doubted between two individuals. Doubt, however, involves in it also an assertory aspect, in so far as it implies that, if one of the alternatives is ruled out, the other must be affirmed. But, since it cannot be ascertained which of them is ruled out, there arises the doubt. There is, however, no opposition between doubt and the assertory attitude; for all doubts imply that the doubtful property must belong to one or other of the alternatives¹.

But there may be cases in which the two alternatives may be such that the doubtful property is not in reality affirmable of either of them, and this is different from those cases in which the alternatives are such that, if the doubtful property is negated of the one,

¹ *sarvasmim api saṁśaye dharmy-aṁśādaḥ nirṇayasya dustyajatvāt. Nyāya-parisuddhi*, p. 66.

it is in reality affirmable of the other. From these two points of view we have further twofold divisions of doubt. Thus, when a volume of smoke arising from a heap of grass on fire is subject of doubt as being either an elephant or a hill, in this case negation of one alternative does not imply the actual affirmation of the other. Uncertainty (*an-adhyavasāya*, e.g. "what may be the name of this tree?") cannot be regarded as an independent state of mind; for this also may be regarded as a case of doubt in which there is uncertainty between a number of possible alternative names with which the tree may be associated. It seems, however, that Vēṅkaṭanātha has not been able to repudiate satisfactorily the view of those who regard uncertainty or inquiry as a separate state of mind. *Ūha* (in the sense of probability such as "that must be a man") does not involve any oscillation of the mind between two poles, but sets forth an attitude of mind in which the possibility of one side, being far stronger, renders that alternative an object of the most probable affirmation and so cannot be classed as doubt. Where such a probable affirmation is brought about through perception, it is included under perception, and when through inference it is included under inference.

Vēṅkaṭanātha, following Rāmānuja, admits only three *pramāṇas*, viz. perception, inference, and scriptural testimony. Rāmānuja, however, in his commentary on the *Gītā*¹, includes intuitive yogic knowledge as a separate source of knowledge; but Vēṅkaṭanātha holds that intuitive yogic knowledge should be included under perception, and its separate inclusion is due to the fact that the yogic perception reveals a special aspect of perception². Correct memory is to be regarded as a valid *pramāṇa*. It should not be classed as an independent source of knowledge, but is to be included within the *pramāṇa* which is responsible for memory (e.g. perception)³.

Meghanādāri, in discussing the claim of memory to be regarded as *pramāṇa*, says that memory satisfies the indispensable condition of *pramāṇa* that it must not depend upon anything else for its self-manifestation; for memory, being spontaneous, does not depend

¹ *jñānam indriya-līṅgā-gama-yogajo vastu-niścayaḥ. Gītā-bhāṣya*, 15. 15.

² Viṣṇucitta also, in his *Prameya-saṃgraha*, holds that Rāmānuja admitted only three *pramāṇas*.

³ This view has been supported by Bhaṭṭārakaguru in his *Tattva-ratnākara*. Varadaviṣṇu Miśra, in his *Prajñā-paritrāṇa*, includes *divya* (i.e. intuitive knowledge through the grace of God) and *svayam-siddha* (natural omniscience) as separate sources of knowledge, but they are also but modes of perception.

upon anything else for its manifestation. It is true, no doubt, that the revelation of objects in memory depends upon the fact of their having been perceived before, but the functioning of memory is undoubtedly spontaneous¹. But it may be argued that, since the objects revealed in memory can never be manifested if they were not perceived before, memory, though partly valid in so far as its own functioning is concerned, is also invalid so far as the revelation of the object is concerned, since this depends on previous perception and cannot, therefore, be regarded as spontaneous manifestation, which is the indispensable condition of a *pramāṇa*. To this Meghanādāri's reply is that the criticism is not sound; for the spontaneous manifestation is also at the same time revelation of the object remembered, and hence the revelation of the remembered object does not depend on any other condition. Memory, therefore, is valid both in its own manifestation and in the revelation of its object. It may be pointed out in this connection that the revelation of knowledge necessarily implies the revelation of the object also. The revelation of the object should not, therefore, be regarded as depending on any other condition, it being spontaneously given with the revelations of knowledge².

In many other systems of philosophy the definition of a *pramāṇa* involves the condition that the object apprehended should be such that it was not known before (*an-adhigatā-rtha-gaṇṭṛ*), since in these systems memory is excluded from the status of *pramāṇa*. Meghanādāri objects to this. He says that the condition imposed does not state clearly whether the apprehension of the object which is intended to be ruled out should be of the perceiver or of other persons. In the case of permanent objects such as the self or the sky these have all been perceived by many persons, and yet the validity of the perception or inference of the present knower is not denied³. It also cannot be said that the object of valid perception or inference should be such that it has not been perceived before by the present perceiver; for when a person seeks to find out an object which he knew before and perceives it, such a perception would be invalid; and similarly, when an object perceived by the eye is re-perceived

¹ *sva-sphuraṇe pramāṇā-ntara-sā-peksatvā-bhāvāt viśaya-sphuraṇa eva hi smṛteḥ pūrvā-nubhūta-bhāvā-peksā*. Meghanādāri's *Naya-dyu-maṇi*.

² *jñāna-sphūrtivād viśayasāpi sphūrtiḥ*. *Ibid*.

³ *sthāyitvenā-bhimatā-kāśā-deḥ pūrvair avagatatva-sambhavāt tad-viśayā-numānāder aprāmānya-prasaṅgāt*. *Ibid*.

by touch, the tactile perception will be invalid¹. The reply is often given (e.g. Dharmarājādhvarindra in his *Vedānta-pari-bhāṣā*) that, when an object known before is again perceived, it has a new temporal character, and so the object may be regarded as new and thus its later perception may be regarded as valid. Meghanādārī's criticism against this is that, if the new temporal character can constitute the newness of the object, then all objects will be new, including memory. Hence there will be nothing which would be ruled out by the condition that the object must be new (*an-adhigatārtha-gaṇṭr*).

There are others who hold that the validity of a *pramāṇa* of any particular sense-knowledge, or of inference, is conditioned by the fact of its being attested by the evidence of other senses, as in the case where a visual perception is corroborated by the tactile. These philosophers regard corroboration (*a-viśaṃvāditva*) as an indispensable condition of the validity of *pramāṇa*. Meghanādārī criticizes this by pointing out that on such a view the validity of each *pramāṇa* would have to depend upon others, and thus there would be a vicious circle². Moreover, the determinate knowledge of the Buddhists, which is corroborative, would, under the supposition, have to be regarded as a *pramāṇa*.

Unlike Veṅkaṭanātha, Meghanādārī holds that Rāmānuja admitted five *pramāṇas*, viz. perception, inference, analogy, scripture and implication.

Perception is defined by Veṅkaṭanātha as direct intuitive knowledge (*sākṣātkāri-pramā*). This may be regarded either as a special class of cognition (*jāti-rūpa*) or knowledge under special conditions (*upādhi-rūpa*). It is indefinable in its own nature, which can only be felt by special self-consciousness as perception (*jñāna-svabhāva-viśeṣaḥ svātma-śākṣikaḥ*). It may be negatively defined as knowledge which is not generated by other cognitions, as in the case of inference or verbal knowledge and memory³. Varadaviṣṇu also, in his *Māna-yāthātmya-nirṇaya*, has defined perception as clear and

¹ *sva-viditasyā'rthasya sattvā-nveṣaṇe pratyakṣā-der a-prāmāṇya-prasaṅgāc cakṣuṣā dṛṣṭa-viśaye dravye sparsanasyā'prāmāṇya-prasaṅgāt*. Meghanādārī's *Nāya-dyu-maṇi*.

² *pramāṇā-ntarasyā-pyavisamvā'dā-rthaṃ pramāṇā-ntarā-nveṣaṇenā-navasthā*. *Ibid*.

³ *jñāna-karaṇaja-jñāna-smṛti-rahitā matir aparokṣam*. Veṅkaṭanātha's *Nyāya-parisuddhi*, pp. 70-71. This view has also been supported in the *Prameya-saṃgraha* and *Tattva-ratnākara*.

vivid impression (*pramāyā āparokṣyaṃ nāma viśadā-vabhāsatvam*). Clearness and vividness with him mean the illumination of the special and unique features of the object, as different from the appearance of generic features as in the case of inference or verbal knowledge.

Meghanādāri also defines perception as direct knowledge of objects (*artha-paricchedaka-sākṣāj-jñānam*). The directness (*sākṣāttva*) consists in the fact that the production of this knowledge does not depend on any other *pramāṇas*. It is, no doubt, true that sense-perception depends upon the functioning of the senses, but this is no objection; for the senses are common causes, which are operative as means in the perception of the *hetu*, even in inference¹. The directness of perceptual knowledge, as distinguished from inference, is evident from the fact that the latter is produced through the mediacy of other cognitions². Meghanādāri criticizes the definition of perception as vivid impression (*viśadā-vabhāsa*), as given by Varadaviṣṇu Miśra, on the ground that vividness is a relative term, and even in inference there are different stages of vividness. Clearness of awareness, "*dhī-sphuṭatā*," also cannot be regarded as defining perception; for all awarenesses are clear so far as they are known. The definition of perception as sense-knowledge is also open to criticism; for in that case it would only apply to indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) knowledge, in which certain specific characters of the object are imprinted through the functioning of the senses, but which it did not carry further for the production of determinate knowledge (*savikalpa*).

Both Veṅkaṭanātha and Meghanādāri hold that the pure objective substance without any character or universals is never apprehended by sense-perception. Following Rāmānuja, they hold that objects are always apprehended with certain characters at the very first instance when they are grasped by the visual sense; otherwise it is difficult to explain how in the later instance they are apprehended in diverse characters. If they were not apprehended in the first instance, they could not have been known in the later

¹ *indriyāṇām sattā-kāraṇatvena kāraṇatvā-bhāvāt. Naya-dyu-maṇi.*

² The word *sākṣāttva* is explained by some as *svatūpa-dhī* (its own awareness). But such an explanation is exposed to criticism; for even inferential knowledge reveals some features of the object. If *svatūpa* is taken to mean "nothing but the nature of the object," then the definition would not be applicable even to perception; for perception reveals not merely the object, but also its relation to other objects, and thereby transcends the limit of the object merely as it is.

instance in their fullness in a related manner. So it has to be admitted that they were all grasped in the first instance, but could not manifest themselves in their fullness in the short span of the first moment. In the *Īedārtha-saṃgraha* of Rāmānuja the determinateness of all perceptions has been illustrated by the case of their apprehension of universals at the first moment of perception. This has led some interpreters to think that the apprehension of determinate characters in the first moment of perception applies only to the universals on account of the fact that it involves the assimilation of many individuals in one sweep which must be started at the very first moment in order that it may be manifested in its full form in the second moment. But Meghanādāri holds that the apprehension of other characters also, such as colours, etc., has specific differences when the object is near or at a distance. This involves the grasping of diverse shades of colour in one colour-perception, and thus they also are apprehended at the first moment of perception, on the same grounds which led to the affirmation of the apprehension of universals at the first moment of perception.

It is objected that the concept of determinateness or relatedness (*viśiṣṭatva*) of all knowledge is incomprehensible and indefinable. What exist are the two relata and the relation. The relatedness cannot be identical with them or different; for we do not know "relatedness" as an entity different from the two relata and the relation. Also relatedness cannot be defined either as the manifestation of two entities in one cognition or the appearance of two cognitions without any break or interval; for in a concrete specific illustration, as in such awareness as "jug-and-pot," though two different cognitions have appeared without any break, they have not lost their unique separateness, as may well be judged by the duality implied in such awareness. Thus, there is no way in which the concept of determinateness, as distinguished from that of the relata and the relation, can be arrived at.

To this Meghanādāri's reply is that, in such a sentence as "bring a white cow," the verb refers to a qualified being, the "white cow," and not to the separate elements, "the whiteness" and "the cow." Both the relation and the relata are involved in the determinate conception, the "white cow." In contactual perception, such as "a man with a stick," the contactual relation is directly perceived. The conception of a determinate being is not thus dif-

ferent from the relation and the relata, but implies them. The relations and the relata thus jointly yield the conception of a determinate being¹. The unifying trait that constitutes determinateness is not an extraneous entity, but is involved in the fact that all entities in this world await one another for their self-manifestation through relations, and it is this mutual awaitedness that constitutes their bond of unity, through which they appear connectedly in a determinate conception². It is this mutual awaitedness of entities that contributes to their apprehension, as connected in experience, which is simultaneous with it, there being no mediation or arresting of thought of any kind between the two³. The fact that all our perceptions, thoughts and ideas always appear as related and connected is realized in universal experience. All linguistic expressions always manifest the purport of the speech in a connected and related form. Had it not been so, communication of ideas through our speech would have been impossible.

Nirvikalpa knowledge is a cognition in which only some fundamental characters of the object are noted, while the details of many other characters remain unelaborated⁴. *Savikalpa* knowledge, on the other hand, is a cognition of a number of qualities and characters of the object, together with those of its distinctive features by which its differentiation from other objects is clearly affirmed⁵.

On the analogy of visual perception, the perception of other senses may be explained. The relation of *samavāya* admitted by the Naiyāyikas is discarded by the Rāmānuja view on account of the difficulty of defining it or admitting it as a separate category. Various relations, such as container and contained, contact and the like, are revealed in experience in accordance with the different directions in which things await one another to be related; and

¹ *na ca pratyekaṃ viśiṣṭatā-pātaḥ militānām eva viśiṣṭatvāt. Naya-dyu-maṇi.*

² *eka-buddhi-viśayatā-rhāṇām padā-rthānām anyo-nya-sāpekṣa-svarūpatvaṃ militatvaṃ. Ibid.*

³ *viśiṣṭatva-dhī-viśayatve ca teṣāṃ sāpekṣatvaṃ ca yaugapadyāt tatra virāmā-pratīteḥ sāpekṣatā siddhā ca. Ibid.*

⁴ *nirvikalpakaṃ ca ghaṭā-der anullekhītā-nūrtti-dharma-ghaṭatvā-di-katipaya-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatayā-rthā-vacchedakaṃ jñānam. Ibid.*

⁵ *ullekhītā-nūrtty-ādi-dharmakā-neka-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatayā sākṣād-vastu-vya-vacchedakaṃ jñānam savikalpakam. Ibid.*

Veṅkaṭanātha however defines *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa* knowledge as “*sa pratyavamarśa-pratyakṣam savikalpakam*” and “*tad-rahitam pratyakṣam nirvikalpakaṃ.*” *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, p. 77.

these determine the nature of various relations which are perceived in sense-experience¹. Veṅkaṭanātha also points out that the very same collocations (*sāmagrī*) that manifest the awareness of substance and attribute also manifest the awareness of relations; for, if the relations were not grasped at the first moment of perception, they could not originate out of nothing at the later moment. The relatedness being a character of entities, the awareness of entities necessarily means the awareness of relations.

Perception in the light of elucidation by the later members of the Rāmānuja School.

Rāmānuja and his followers admitted only three kinds of *pramāṇas*: perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Knowledge, directly and immediately experienced, is perception (*sākṣāt-kāriṇī pramā pratyakṣam*). The special distinguishing feature of perception is that it is not knowledge mediated by other knowledge (*jñānā-karaṇaka-jñānatvam*). Perception is of three kinds: God's perception, perception of yogins, and perception of ordinary persons. This perception of yogins includes intuitive perception of the mind (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) or perception of sages (*ārṣu-pratyakṣa*), and the *yogi-pratyakṣa* is due to the special enlightenment of *yoga* practice. Ordinary perception is said to be of two kinds, *savikalpa*, or determinate, and *nirvikalpa*, or indeterminate. *Savikalpa pratyakṣa* is the determinate perception which involves a spatial and temporal reference to past time and different places where the object was experienced before. Thus, when we see a jug, we think of it as having been seen at other times and in other places, and it is this reference of the jug to other times and other places, and the

¹ *atas tat-smbandhād vastuta upādrito vā'dhārā-dheya-bhāva-vastu-antaram eva. evaṃ ca kalpanā-lāghavam. sa ca guṇā-di-bhedād anekah na ca tat-sambandha-smbadhiṇos sambandhā-ntara-kalpanāyām anavasthā. anyo-nya-sāpekṣa-svarūpatva-rūpo-pādhi-vyatirekenā'rthā-ntarā-bhāvāt. Naya-dyu-maṇi MS.*

The *nirvikalpaka* is the knowledge involving the notion of certain positive features and rousing the subconscious memory resulting in the first moment of perception through the direct operation of the sense. *Savikalpaka* knowledge involves the noting of differences consequent upon the operation of memory. They are thus defined by Viṣṇucitta:

saṃskāro-dbodha-sahakṛte-ndriya-janyam jñānam savikalpakam iti ekajātiyeṣu prathama-piṇḍa-grahanam dvitīyā-di-piṇḍa-grahaneṣu prathamā-kṣa-sannipātajam jñānam nirvikalpakam iti.

And in the *Tattva-ratnākara*:

*viśeṣaṇānām svā-yoga-vyāvṛttir avikalpake
savikalpe'nya-yogasya vyāvṛttiḥ samjñānā tathā.*

Nyāya-parisuddhi, p. 82.

associations connected with it as involved in such reference, that constitutes the determinate character of such perceptions, by virtue of which they are called *savikalpa*¹. A perception, however, which reveals the specific character of its object, say a jug as a jug, without involving any direct references to its past associations, is called indeterminate perception or *nirvikalpa jñāna*². This definition of *nirvikalpa* perception distinguishes the Rāmānuja conception of *nirvikalpa* knowledge from the types formulated by many other systems of Indian philosophy.

It is now obvious that according to Rāmānuja philosophy both the *savikalpa* and the *nirvikalpa* knowledges are differentiated and qualified in their nature, referring to objects which are qualified in their nature (*ubhaya-vidham api etad viśiṣṭa-viśayam eva*)³. Veṅkaṭa says that there is no evidence whatsoever of the existence of indeterminate and unqualified knowledge, at even its first stage of appearance, as is held by the Naiyāyikas; for our experience is entirely against them, and even the knowledge of infants, dumb persons, and the lower animals, though it is devoid of concepts and names, is somehow determinate since the objects stand as signs of things liked or disliked, things which they desire, or of which they are afraid⁴. For if these so-called indeterminate perceptions of these animals, etc., were really absolutely devoid of qualitative colouring, how could they indicate the suitable attractive or repulsive behaviour? The Naiyāyikas urge that all attribute-substance-complex or determinate knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) must first be preceded by the knowledge of the simpler element of the attribute; but this is true only to a limited extent, as in the case of acquired perception. I see a piece of sandal to be fragrant; fragrance cannot be seen, but the sight of the colour, etc., of a piece of sandal and its recognition as such suggest and rouse the nasal impressions of fragrance, which is then directly associated with

¹ *tatrā'nuvṛtti-viśayakam jñānam savikalpakam anuvṛttiś ca saṁsthāna-rūpa-jāty-āder aneka-vyakti-vṛttiṭā, sā ca kālato deśataś ca bhavati. Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṁgraha, MS. No. 4988.*

² *ekasyām vyaktāu ghaṭatva-prakāraṁ ayam ghaṭa iti yaj jñānam janyate tan nirvikalpakam. Ibid.*

³ *Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 77.*

⁴ *bāla-mūka - tiryag - ādi - jñānānām anna - kaṇṭaka - vahni - vyāghrā - di - śabda - vaiśiṣṭyā - navagāhite'pi iṣṭa - dvaiṣyatā - vacchedakā - nmatvā - hitva - kaṇṭakatvā - di - prakāra - vagāhitvam asti. Nyāya-sāra commentary on Nyāya-pariśuddhi by Śrīnivāsa, p. 78.*

vision. Here there must first be the perception of the attributes of the sandal as perceived by the visual organ, as rousing sub-conscious impressions of fragrance associated with the nasal organ and giving rise to its memory, and finally associating it with the attributes perceived by the visual organ. But in the perception of attribute and substance there is no necessity of assuming such a succession of the elements constituting a complex; for the data which give rise to the perception of the attribute and those which give rise to the perception of substance are presented to the senses simultaneously and are identically the same (*eka-sāmagrī-vedya-viśeṣaṇeṣu tan-nirapekṣatvāt*)¹. The main point of this discussion consists in our consideration of the question whether relations are directly perceived or not. If relations are regarded as being the very nature of the things and attributes that are perceived (*svarūpa-sambandha*), then, of course, the relations must necessarily be perceived with the perceived things and attributes at the first moment of sight. If the relation of attributes to things be called an inherent inseparable relation (*samavāya*), then this, being an entity, may be admitted to be capable of being grasped by the eye; and, since it constitutes the essence of the linking of the attributes and the thing, the fact that it is grasped by the eye along with the thing and the attribute ought to convince us that the relatedness of attribute and thing is also grasped by the eye. For, if it is admitted that *samavāya* is grasped, then that itself makes it unexceptionable that the attribute and things are grasped, as the former qualifying the latter. Like the attribute and the thing, their relation as constituting their relatedness is also grasped by the senses (*dharmavād dharmīvac ca tat-sambandhasyā'py aindriyakatvā-viśeṣeṇa grahaṇa-sambhavāt*)². For, if the relation could not be grasped by the senses at the time of the perception of the thing and the object, it could not be grasped by any other way at any other time.

In the *saṁkalpa* perception, the internal impressions are roused in association with the visual and other senses, and they co-operate with the data supplied by the sense-organs in producing the inner act of analysis and synthesis, assimilation and differentiation, and

¹ *Nyāya-parīśuddhi*, p. 78: *surabhi-candanam so'yaṁ ghaṭa ity-ādi-jñāneṣu saurabhatā-mīse cakṣuṣaḥ sva-vijñāna-saṁskāra-jānyāyāḥ smṛter viśeṣaṇa-praty-āśattitayā apekṣane'pi cakṣur-mātra-janye ghaṭa-jñāne tad-apekṣāyā abhāvāt. Nyāya-sāra*, p. 78.

² *Ibid.* p. 79.

mutual comparison of similar concepts, as involved in the process of *savikalpa* perception. What distinguishes it from memory is the fact that memory is produced only by the rousing of the sub-conscious impressions of the mind, whereas *savikalpa* perception is produced by the subconscious impressions (*saṃskāra*) working in association with the sense-organs¹. Though the roused sub-conscious impressions co-operate with sense-impressions in *savikalpa* perception, yet the *savikalpa* can properly be described as genuine sense-perception.

It may be pointed out in this connection that difference is considered in this system not as a separate and independent category, but as apprehended only through the mutual reference to the two things between which difference is realized. It is such a mutual reference, in which the affirmation of one makes the affirmation of the other impossible, that constitutes the essence of "difference" (*bheda*)².

Veṅkaṭanātha strongly controverts the Śāṅkarite view of *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* in the case where a perception, the materials of which are already there, is made on the strength of auditory sensation in the way of scriptural instructions. Thus, when each of ten persons was counting upon leaving himself out of consideration, and counting nine persons instead of ten, another observer from outside pointed out to the counting person that he himself was the tenth. The Śāṅkarites urge that the statement or affirmation "thou art the tenth" is a case of direct *nirvikalpa* perception. But Veṅkaṭanātha points out that, though the entity indicated by "thou" is directly perceived, the proposition itself cannot be directly perceived, but can only be cogitated as being heard; for, if whatever is heard can be perceived, then one can also perceive or be directly acquainted with the import of such propositions as "thou art virtuous"—*dharmavāms tvam*. So the mental realization of the import of any proposition does not mean direct acquaintance by perception. It is easy to see how this view controverts the Śāṅkarite position, which holds that the realization of the import of the proposition "thou art that"—*tat tvam asi*—constitutes direct ac-

¹ *smṛtāv iva savikalpake saṃskārasya na svātantryeṇa kāraṇatvaṃ yena pratyakṣatvaṃ na syāt kintu indriya-sahakāritayā tathā ce'ndriya-janyatvena pratyakṣam eva savikalpakam. Nyāya-sāra* p. 80.

² *yad-graho yatra yad-āropa-virodhī sa hi tasya tasmād bhedaḥ. Nyāya-parīśuddhi*, p. 86.

quaintance with the identity of self and Brahman by perception (*pratyakṣa*)¹.

It has already been pointed out that *nirvikalpa* perception means a determinate knowledge which does not involve a reference to past associations of similar things (*anuvṛtti-aviśayaka-jñāna*), and *savikalpa* perception means a determinate knowledge which involves a reference to past association (*anuvṛtti-viśayaka*). This *anuvṛtti*, or reference to past association, does not mean a mere determinateness (e.g. the perception of a jug as endowed with the specific characteristics of a jug—*ghaṭatva-prakāraṇam ayam ghaṭaḥ*), but a conscious reference to other similar objects (e.g. jugs) experienced before. In *savikalpa* knowledge there is a direct perception by the visual organ of the determinate characters constituting a complex of the related qualities, the thing and the relatedness; but that does not mean the comprehension or realization of any universals or class concepts involving a reference to other similar concepts or things. Thus, the visual organs are operative equally in *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa*, but in the former there is a conscious reference to other similar entities experienced before.

The universals or class concepts are not, however, to be regarded as a separate independent category, which is comprehended in *savikalpa* perception, but a reference or assimilation of similar characteristics. Thus, when we refer to two or more cows as possessing common characteristics, it is these common characteristics existing in all individual cows that justify us in calling all these animals cows. So, apart from these common characteristics which persist in all these individual animals, there is no other separate entity which may be called *jāti* or universal. The commonness (*anuvṛtti*) consists in similarity (*susadṛśatvam eva gotvā-dīnām anuvṛttih*)². Similarity is again defined as the special cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) which justifies our regarding two things as similar which exist separately in these things and are determined by each other. The application of a common name is but a short way of signifying the fact that two things are regarded as similar. This similarity is of two kinds: similarity of attributes (*dharma-sādṛśya*) as in substances, and similarity of essence (*svarūpa-sādṛśya*)

¹ *ata eva tat tvam-asy-ādi-śabdaḥ sva-viśaya-gocara-pratyakṣa-jñāna-janakah ... ity-ādy-anumānāni nirastāni. Nyāya-pravīṇaśūddhi, p. 89.*

² *ayam sāsānādīmān ayam api sāsānādīmān iti sāsānādir eva anuvṛtta-vyavahāra-viśayo dṛśyate. Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṃgraha, MS. No. 4988.*

as in all other categories of qualities which are not substance (*a-dravya*)¹.

In perception two kinds of sense-contact are admitted: sense-contact with the object (*saṃyoga*) and sense-contact with the qualities associated with the object (*saṃyuktā-śraya*). Thus, the perception of a jug is by the former kind of contact, and the perception of its qualities is by the latter².

Venkaṭanātha's treatment of Inference.

Inference according to the Rāmānuja school is very much the same as inference according to the Naiyāyikas. Inference is the direct result of *parāmarśa*, or knowledge of the existence of reason (associated with the knowledge of its unblemished and full concomitance with the probandum) in the object denoted by the minor term³. Inference is a process by which, from a universal proposition which includes within it all the particular cases, we can make an affirmation regarding a particular case.⁴ Inference must therefore be always limited to those cases in which the general proposition has been enunciated on the basis of experience derived from sensible objects and not to the affirmation of ultra-sensual objects—a reason which precludes Rāmānuja and his followers from inferring the existence of Īśvara (God), who is admitted to be ultra-sensual (*atīndriya*) (*ata eva ca vāyam atyantā-tīndriya-vastv-anumānaṃ necchāmaḥ*)⁵.

As formulated by the traditional view of the school, the principle of concomitance (*vyāpti*) holds that what in the range of time or space is either equal or less than another is called the "per-vaded" (*vyāpya*) or the *hetu*, while that which in the range of time or space is either equal or greater than it, is called *vyāpaka* or the probandum⁶. But this view does not cover all cases of valid con-

¹ MSS. No. 4988.

² The sense-contact with remote objects can take place in the case of the visual and the auditory organs by means of a mysterious process called *vytti*. It is supposed that these senses are lengthened as it were (*āpyāyamāna*) by means of their objects. *Ibid*.

³ *parāmarśa-janyā pramītir anumitiḥ. Ibid.*

⁴ *parāmarśa* means *vyāpti-viśiṣṭa-pakṣa-dharmatā-jñānaṃ sarva-viśeṣa-saṃgrāhi-sāmānya-vyāpti-dhūr api viśeṣā-numiti-hetuḥ. Nyāya-parīśuddhi*, p. 97.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ *deśataḥ kālato vā'pi samo nyūno'pi vā bhavet
sva-vyāpyo vyāpakastasya samo vā'py adhiko'pi vā.*

Ibid. p. 100.

comitance. The example given for spatial and temporal co-existence is that between date-juice (*rasa*) and sweetness (*guḍa*), or between the shadow thrown by our bodies and the specific position of the Sun. But such spatio-temporal co-existences do not exhaust all cases, as, for example, the sunset and the surging of the sea. This led the later Rāmānujas to adopt a stricter definition of concomitance as unconditional and invariable association (*nirupādhikatayā niyataḥ sambandho vyāptih*)¹.

Regarding the formation of this inductive generalization or concomitance, we find in *Tattva-ratnākara*, an older authority, that a single observation of concomitance leading to a belief is sufficient to establish a general proposition². But Veṅkaṭanātha urges that this cannot be so and that a wide experience of concomitance is indispensable for the affirmation of a general proposition of concomitance.

One of the important points in which Rāmānuja logic differs from the Nyāya logic is the refusal on the part of the former to accept *kevala-vyatireki* (impossible-positive) forms of inference, which are admitted by the latter. Thus, in the *kevala-vyatireki* forms of inference (e.g. earth is different from other elements on account of its possession of smell) it is argued by the Nyāya logic that this difference of earth with other elements, by virtue of its possession of the specific property of smell not possessed by any other element, cannot be proved by a reference to any proposition which embodies the principle of agreement in presence *anvaya*. This view apparently seems to have got the support of the earlier Rāmānuja logicians such as Varadaviṣṇu Mīśra and Bhaṭṭārakaguru (in his *Tattva-ratnākara*); but both Veṅkaṭanātha (in his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*) and the author of the *Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṃgraha* point

¹ *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*.

² *sambandho'yaṃ sakṛd grāhyaḥ pratīti-sva-rasāt tathā
pratītayo hi sva-rasād dharma-dharmy-avadhān viduḥ.*

Tattva-ratnākara MS.

The author of the *Tattva-ratnākara* urges that, since the class-concept (e.g. of *dhūma-dhūmatva*) is associated with any particular instance (e.g. of smoke), the experience of any concomitance of smoke and fire would mean the comprehension of the concomitance of the class-concept of smoke with the class-concept of fire. So through the experience of any individual and its class-concept as associated with it we are in touch with other individuals included within that class-concept — *samniḥita-dhūmādi-vyakti-saṃyuktasya indriyasya tad-āśrita-dhūmatvādiḥ saṃyuktā-śritah, tad-āśrayatvena vyakty-antarāṇi saṃyuktāni*, etc. *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, p. 105. (Chowkhamba.)

out that, since Yāmuna rejects the *kevala-vyatireki* form of argument in his lecture on *Ātma-siddhi*, it is better to suppose that, when the previous authors referred to spoke of *kevala-vyatireki* as a form of inference, it was not admission of their acceptance of it, but only that they counted it as being accepted by the Nyāya logicians¹. The author of the *Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṃgraha* points out that it may very well be brought under *anvaya-vyatireki*. Thus we may argue "body is earthly by virtue of its possession of smell; for whatever possesses smell is earthly and whatever does not possess smell is not earthly." So in this form it may be put forward as a *anvaya-vyatireki* form of argument. The possession of smell (*gandhavattva*) may very well be put forth as "reason" or *hetu*, the presence of which determines earthiness and the absence of which determines non-earthiness or difference from non-earthiness.

Rāmānuja logic admits the necessity of "*tarka*" (cogitation regarding the relative possibilities of the alternative conclusions by a dialectic of contradictions) as an indispensable means of inferential conclusions. Regarding the number of propositions, Veṅkaṭanātha says that there is no necessity of admitting the indispensable character of five propositions. Thus it must depend on the way in which the inference is made as to how many propositions (*avacyava*) are to be admitted. It may be that two, three, four or five propositions are deemed necessary at the time of making an inference. We find it said in the *Tattva-ratnākara* also that, though five propositions would make a complete statement, yet there is no hard and fast rule (*anīyama*) regarding the number of propositions necessary for inference¹.

Veṅkaṭanātha urges that inference is always limited to perceptible objects. Things which entirely transcend the senses cannot be known by inference. Inference, though irrefragably connected with perception, cannot, on that account, be regarded as a mode of perception; for the knowledge derived from perception is always indirect (*a-parokṣa*). Inference cannot also be regarded as due to memory; for it always reveals new knowledge. Further, it cannot be said to be a form of mental intuition, on account of the fact that inference works by rousing the subconscious impressions of the mind; for such impressions are also found to be active in percep-

¹ *Nyāya-parīśuddhi* and *Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṃgraha*.

² *Ibid.*

tion, and on that analogy even perception may be called mental intuition.

Vyāpti (concomitance) may be defined as that in which the area of the probandum (*sādhya*) is not spatially or temporally less than (*a-nyūna-deśa-kāla-vṛtti*) that of the reason, *hetu*—and reason is defined as that, the area of which is never wider than that of the probandum (*a-nadhik-deśa-kāla-niyataṃ vyāpyam*). As an illustration of spatial and temporal co-existence (*yaugapadya*) Veṅkaṭanātha gives the instance of sugar and sweetness. As an illustration of temporal co-existence (*yaugapadya*) he gives the example of the measure of the shadow and the position of the sun. As a case of purely spatial co-existence he gives the instance of heat and its effects. Sometimes, however, there is concomitance between entities which are separate in space and time, as in the case of tides and their relation to the sun and the moon¹.

Such a concomitance, however, between the probandum and the reason can be grasped only by the observation of numerous instances (*bhūyo-darśana-gamyā*), and not by a single instance, as in the case of Śāṅkara Vedānta as expounded by Dharmārājādhvarīndra. Bhaṭṭārakaguru, in his *Tattva-ratnākara*, in explaining the process by which the notion of concomitance is arrived at, says that, when in numerous instances the concomitance between the probandum and the reason is observed, the result of such observation accumulates as subconscious impressions in favour of the universal concomitance between all cases of probandum and all cases of the reason, and then in the last instance the perception of the concomitance rouses in the mind the notion of the concomitance of all probandum and all reason through the help of the roused subconscious impressions previously formed. Veṅkaṭanātha admits concomitance through joint method of Agreement and Difference (*anvaya-vyatireki*) and by pure Agreement (*kevalā-nvayi*), where negative instances are not available. Ordinarily the method of difference contributes to the notion of concomitance by demonstrating that each and every instance in which the probandum does not occur is also an instance in which the reason does not occur. But in the case of *kevalā-nvayi* concomitance, in which negative instances

¹ *vyāpti* is thus defined by Veṅkaṭanātha—*atre'daṃ tattvaṃ yādṛg-rūpasya yad-deśa-kāla-vartinō yasya yādṛg-rūpeṇa yad-deśa-kāla-vartinā yenā'vinā-bhāvaḥ tad idam avinā-bhūtaṃ vyāpyam. tat-pratisambandhi-vyāpakam iti. Nyāya-parisuddhi*, pp. 101-102.

are not available, the non-existence of the reason in the negative instance cannot be shown. But in such cases the very non-existence of negative instances is itself sufficient to contribute to the notion of *kevalā-nvayi* concomitance. The validity of *kevalā-nvayi* concomitance is made patent by the fact that, if the reason remains unchanged, the assumption of a contrary probandum is self-contradictory (*vyāhata-sādhya-viparyayāt*), and this distinguishes it from the forms of *kevalā-nvayi* arguments employed by Kulārka in formulating his *Mahā-vidyā* doctrines.

Rāmānuja's own intention regarding the types of inference that may be admitted seems to be uncertain, as he has never definitely given any opinion on the subject. His intention, therefore, is diversely interpreted by the thinkers of his school. Thus, Meghanādāri gives a threefold classification of inference: (1) of the cause from the effect (*kāraṇā-numāna*); (2) of the effect from the cause (*kāryā-numāna*); and (3) inference by mental association (*anubhavā-numāna*—as the inference of the rise of the constellation of Rohiṇī from the Kṛttikā constellation). As an alternative classification he gives (1) the joint method of agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyatireki*); (2) inference through universal agreement in which no negative instances are found (*kevalā-nvayi*); and (3) inference through exclusion, in which no positive instances are found (*kevala-vyatireki*). Bhaṭṭarakaguru and Varadaśiṣṇu Miśra, who preceded Venkaṭanātha in working out a consistent system of Rāmānuja logic, seem also to admit the three kinds of inference, viz. *anvayi*, *kevalā-nvayi*, and *kevala-vyatireki*, as is evident from the quotation of their works *Tattva-ratnākara* and *Māna-yāthātmya-nirṇaya*. Venkaṭanātha, however, tries to explain them away and takes great pains to refute the *kevala-vyatireki* form of argument¹. His contention is that there can be no inference through mere negative concomitance, which can never legitimately lead to the affirmation of any positive character when there is no positive proposition purporting the affirmation of any character. If any such positive proposition be regarded as implied in the negative proposition, then also the contention that there can be inference from purely negative proposition fails. One of the conditions of validity

¹ Venkaṭanātha points out that Yāmunācārya, also the accredited teacher of Rāmānuja, did not admit the *kevala-vyatireki* form of inference in his *Siddhī-traya*.

of inference is that the *hetu* or reason must exist in the *sa-pakṣa* (that is, in all such instances where there is the *sādhya*), but in the *vyatireki* form of inference, where there are no positive instances of the existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya* excepting the point at issue, the above condition necessarily fails¹. The opponent might say that on the same analogy the *kevalā-nvayi* form of argument may also be denied; for there negative instances are found (e.g. *idaṃ vācyaṃ prameyatvāt*). The reply would be that the validity of a *kevalā-nvayi* form of argument is attested by the fact that the assumption of a contrary conclusion would be self-contradictory. If the contention of the opponent is that the universal concomitance of the negation of the *hetu* with the negation of the *sādhya* implies the absolute coincidence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, then the absolute coincidence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya* would imply the absolute coincidence of the opposites of them both. This would imply that from the absolute coincidence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya* in a *kevalā-nvayi* form of inference the absolute coincidence of their opposites would be demonstrable. This is absurd². Thus, the Naiyāikas, who admit the *kevalā-nvayi* inference, cannot indulge in such ways of support in establishing the validity of the *kevala-vyatireki* form of argument. Again, following the same method, one might as well argue that a jug is self-revealing (*sva-prakāśa*) because it is a jug (*ghaṭatvāt*); for the negation of self-revealing character (*a-sva-prakāśatva*) is found in the negation of jug, viz. the cloth, which is impossible (*yan naivam tan naivam yathā patah*). Thus, merely from the concomitance of two negations it is not possible to affirm the concomitance of their opposites. Again, in the above instance—*anubhūtir ananubhāryā anubhūtitvāt* (immediate intuition cannot be an object of awareness, because it is immediate intuition)—even the existence of *an-anubhāryatva* (not being an object of awareness) is doubtful; for it is not known to exist anywhere else than in the instance under discussion, and therefore, from the mere case of

¹ The typical forms of *vyatireki* inference are as follows: *anubhūtir an-anubhāryā anubhūtitvāt, yan naivam tan naivam yathā ghaṭah. prthivī itarebhyo bhidyate gandharvatvāt yan naivam tan naivam yathā jalam*. In the above instance *an-anubhāryatva* (non-cognizability) belongs only to immediate intuition. There is thus no *sa-pakṣa* of *anubhūti* where *an-anubhāryatva* was found before.

² *idaṃ vācyaṃ prameyatvāt* (this is definable, because it is knowable) would, under the supposition, imply that the concomitance of the negation of *vācya* and *prameyatva*, viz. *avācya* (indefinable) and *aprameyatva* (unknowable), would be demonstrable; which is absurd, since no such cases are known.

concomitance of the negation of *an-anubhāvyatva* with the negation of *anubhūti* the affirmation of *an-anubhāvyatva* would be inadmissible. Moreover, when one says that that which is an object of awareness (*anubhāvyā*) is not immediate intuition, the mere affirmation of the negative relation makes *anubhūti* an object of awareness in a negative relation, which contradicts the conclusion that *anubhūti* is not an object of awareness. If, again, the character that is intended to be inferred by the *vyatireki anumāna* is already known to exist in the *pakṣa*, then there is no need of inference. If it is known to exist elsewhere, then, since there is a *sa-pakṣa*¹, there is no *kevala-vyatireki* inference. Even if, through the concomitance of the negation of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, the *sādhya* is known to exist elsewhere outside the negation of the *hetu*, its presence in the case under consideration would not be demonstrated. Again, in the instance under discussion, if, from the concomitance of the negation of not being an object of awareness and the negation of immediate intuition, it is argued that the character as not being an object of awareness (*a-vedyatva*) must be present somewhere, then such conclusion would be self-contradictory; for, if it is known that there is an entity which is not an object of awareness, then by that very fact it becomes an object of awareness. If an existent entity is ruled out from all possible spheres excepting one, it necessarily belongs to that residual sphere. So it may be said that "willing, being an existent quality, is known to be absent from all spheres excepting the self; it, therefore, necessarily belongs thereto." On such an interpretation also there is no necessity of *vyatireki anumāna*; for it is really a case of agreement (*anvaya*); and it is possible for us to enunciate it in a general formula of agreement such as "an existent entity, which is absent from all other spheres excepting one must necessarily belong to that residual sphere." Again, in such an instance as "all-knowingness (*sarva-vittva*), being absent in all known spheres, must be present somewhere, as we have a notion of it, and therefore there must be an entity to which it belongs, and such an entity is God," we have the well known ontological argument which is of *vyatireki* type. Against such an inference it may well be contended with justice that the notion of

¹ *sa-pakṣa* are all instances (outside the instance of the inference under discussion) where the *hetu* or reason is known to co-exist with the *sādhya* or probandum.

a hare's horn, which is absent in all known spheres, must necessarily belong to an unperceived entity which is obviously false.

It may be contended that, if the *vyatireki* inference is not admitted, then that amounts to a denial of all defining characters; for a defining character is that which is absent everywhere except in the object under definition, and thus definition is the very nature of *vyatireki* inference. The obvious reply to this is that definition proceeds from the perception of special characteristics which are enunciated as the defining characteristics of a particular object, and it has therefore nothing to do with *vyatireki* inference¹. It may also be urged that defining characteristics may also be gathered by joint method of agreement and difference, and not by a *vyatireki* inference as suggested by the opponents. In such an instance as where knowability is defined as that which is capable of being known, no negative instances are known but it still remains a definition. The definition of definition is that the special characteristic is existent only in the object under definition and nowhere else (*a-sādhāraṇa-vyāpako dharmo lakṣaṇam*)². In the case where a class of objects is defined the defining class-character would be that which should exist in all individuals of that class, and should be absent in all other individuals of other classes. But when an individual which stands alone (such as God) is defined, then we have no class-character, but only unique character which belongs to that individual only and not to a class. Even in such cases, such a defining character differentiates that entity from other entities (*Brahmā, Śiva*, etc.) with which, through partial similarity, He might be confused. Thus, the definition is a case of agreement of a character in an entity, and not a negation, as contended by those who confuse it with *vyatireki* inference. Therefore, the *kevala-vyatireki* form of inference cannot be supported by any argument.

On the subject of propositions (*avayava*) Veṅkaṭanātha holds that there is no reason why there should be five propositions for all inference. The dispute, therefore, among various logicians regarding the number of propositions that can be admitted in an inference is meaningless; for just so many propositions need be admitted for an inference as are sufficient to make the inference appeal to the

¹ *arthā-sādhāraṇā-kāra-pratipatti-nibandhanam*
sajātīya-vijātīya-vyavachcheda lakṣaṇam.

Tattva-ratnākara, quoted in *Nyāya-parīśuddhi*, p. 143.

² *Nyāya-parīśuddhi*, p. 145.

person for whom it may be intended. Thus, there may be three, four, or five propositions, according to the context in which the inference appears.

In addition to inference Veṅkaṭanātha also admits *śabda*, or scriptural testimony. No elaboration need be made here regarding the *śabda-pramāṇa*, as the treatment of the subject is more or less the same as is found in other systems of philosophy. It may be remembered that on the subject of the interpretation of words and sentences the Naiyāikas held that each single element of a sentence, such as simple words or roots, had its own separate or specific sense. These senses suffer a modification through a process of addition of meaning through the suffixes of another case-relation. Viewed from this light, the simple constituents of sentences are atomic, and gradually go through a process of aggregation through their association with suffixes until they grow into a total meaning of the sentence. This is called the *abhihitā-nvaya-vāda*. The opposite view is that of *anvitā-bhīdhāna-vāda*, such as that of Mīmāṃsaka, which held that no sentence could be analysed into purely simple entities of meaning, unassociated with one another, which could go gradually by a process of aggregation or association. Into however simple a stage each sentence might be capable of being analysed, the very simplest part of it would always imply a general association with some kind of a verb or full meaning. The function of the suffixes and case-relations, consists only in applying restrictions and limitations to this general connectedness of meaning which every word carries with itself. Veṅkaṭanātha holds this *anvitā-bhīdhāna-vāda* against the *abhihitā-nvaya-vāda* on the ground that the latter involves the unnecessary assumption of separate specific powers for associating the meaning of the simplest word-elements with their suffixes, or between the suffixed words among themselves and their mutual connectedness for conveying the meaning of a sentence¹. The acceptance of *anvitā-bhīdhāna* was conducive to the philosophy of Rāmānuja, as it established the all-connectedness of meaning (*viśiṣṭā-rtha*).

Rāmānuja himself did not write any work propounding his views of logic consistent with his system of philosophy. But Nāthamuni had written a work called *Nyāya-tattva*, in which he criticized

¹ *abhihitā-nvaye hi padānām padā-rthe padā-rthānaṃ vākyā-rthe padānām ca tatra iti śakti-traya-kalpanā-gauravaṃ syāt. Nyāya-parisuddhi*, p. 369.

the views of Gotama's logic and revised it in accordance with the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* tradition. Viṣṇucitta wrote his *Saṅgati-mālā* and *Prameya-saṃgraha*, following the same lines, Bhaṭṭāarakaguru wrote his *Tattva-ratnākara*, and Varadaviṣṇu Miśra also wrote his *Prajñā-paritrāṇa* and *Māna-yāthātmya-nirṇaya*, working out the views of *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* logic. Veṅkaṭanātha based his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* on these works, sometimes elucidating their views and sometimes differing from them in certain details. But, on the whole, he drew his views on the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* logic from the above writers. His originality, therefore, in this field is very limited. Meghanādāri, however, seems to differ very largely from Veṅkaṭanātha in admitting *Upamāna* and *arthāpatti* as separate *pramāṇas*. He has also made some very illuminating contributions in his treatment of perception, and in his treatment of inference he has wholly differed from Veṅkaṭanātha in admitting *vyatireki anumāna*.

Meghanādāri admits *upamāna* as a separate *pramāṇa*. With him *upamāna* is the *pramāṇa* through which it is possible to have the knowledge of similarity of a perceived object with an unperceived one, when there was previously a knowledge of the similarity of the latter with the former. Thus, when a man has the knowledge that the cow which he perceives is similar to a bison, and when later on, roaming in the forest, he observes a bison, he at once notes that the cow which he does not perceive now is similar to a bison which he perceives. This knowledge, Meghanādāri contends, cannot be due to perception, because the cow is not before the perceiver; it also cannot be due to memory, since the knowledge of similarity dawns before the reproduction of the cow in the mind. Meghanādāri holds that no separate *pramāṇa* need be admitted for the notion of difference; for the knowledge of difference is but a negation of similarity. This interpretation of *upamāna* is, however, different from that given in *Nyāya*, where it is interpreted to mean the association of a word with its object on the basis of similarity, e.g. that animal is called a bison which is similar to a cow. Here, on the basis of similarity, the word "bison" is associated with that animal. Meghanādāri tries to explain this by the function of recognition, and repudiates its claim to be regarded as a separate *pramāṇa*¹. He also admits *arthāpatti* as a separate *pramāṇa*. *Arthāpatti* is generally translated as "implication," where a certain hypothesis, without the

¹ See MS. *Naya-dyu-maṇi*. Chapter on *Upamāna*.

assumption of which an obscured fact of experience becomes inexplicable, is urged before the mind by the demand for an explanation of the observed fact of experience. Thus, when one knows from an independent source that Devadatta is living, though not found at his house, a natural hypothesis is urged before the mind that he must be staying outside the house; for otherwise either the present observation of his non-existence at his house is false or the previous knowledge that he is living is false. That he is living and that he is non-existent at his house can only be explained by the supposition that he is existing somewhere outside the house. This cannot be regarded as a case of inference of the form that "since somewhere-existing Devadatta is non-existent at his house, he must be existent somewhere else; for all somewhere-existing entities which are non-existent at a place must be existent elsewhere like myself." Such an inference is meaningless; for the non-existence of an existing entity in one place is but the other name of its existing elsewhere. Therefore, the non-existence of an existing entity in one place should not be made a reason for arriving at a conclusion (its existence elsewhere) which is not different from itself. *Arthāpatti* is thus to be admitted as a separate *pramāṇa*.

Epistemology of the Rāmānuja School according to Meghanādāri and others.

Veṅkaṭanātha, in his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, tries to construct the principles of Logic (*Nyāya* or *Nīti*) on which Rāmānuja's system of philosophy is based. He was not a pioneer in the field, but he followed and elaborated the doctrines of *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* logic as enunciated by Nāthamuni, the teacher of Yāmuna, in his work called *Nyāya-tattva*, and the works of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa on the subject. Regarding the system of *Nyāya* propounded by Gotama, Veṅkaṭa's main contention is that though Gotama's doctrines have been rejected by Bādarāyaṇa as unacceptable to right-minded scholars, they may yet be so explained that they may be made to harmonize with the true Vedantic doctrines of *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita*. But the interpretations of Gotama's *Nyāya* by Vātsyāyana take them far away from the right course and have therefore to be refuted. At any rate Veṅkaṭa, like Viṣṇucitta, is not unwilling to accept such doctrines of Gotama as are not in conflict with the Vedānta view. Thus, there may be a divergence of opinion regarding the sixteenfold classi-

fication of logical categories. There can be no two opinions regarding the admission of the fact that there are at least certain entities which are logically valid; for if logical validity is denied, logic itself becomes unfounded. All our experiences assume the existence of certain objective factors on which they are based. A general denial of such objective factors takes away the very root of experience. It is only when such objective factors are admitted to be in existence in a general manner that there may be any inquiry regarding their specific nature. If everything were invalid, then the opponent's contention would also be invalid. If everything were doubted, then also it would remain uncontradictory. The doubt itself cannot be doubted and the existence of doubt would have to be admitted as a decisive conclusion. So, even by leading a full course of thoroughgoing doubt, the admission of the possibility of definite conclusion becomes irresistible¹. Therefore, the contention of the Buddhists that there is nothing valid and that there is nothing the certainty of which can be accepted, is inadmissible. If, therefore, there are things of which definite and valid knowledge is possible, there arises a natural inquiry about the means or instruments by which such valid knowledge is possible. The word *pramāṇa* is used in two senses. Firstly, it means valid knowledge; secondly, it means instruments by which valid knowledge is produced. *pramāṇa* as valid knowledge is defined by Veṅkaṭa as the knowledge which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are (*yathā-vasthita-vyavahārā-nugunam*)². The definition includes behaviour as an indispensable condition of *pramāṇa* such that, even though in a particular case a behaviour may not actually be induced, it may yet be *pramāṇa* if the knowledge be such that it has the capacity of producing a behaviour which would tally with things as they are³. The definition

¹ *vyavahāro hi jagato bhavaty ālmbane kvacit
na tat sāmānyato nāsti kathantā tu parikṣyate
sāmānya-niścita-rthena viśeṣe tu bubhutsitam
parikṣā hy ucitā sve-ṣṭa-pramāṇo-tpādanā-tmikā...*

*sarvaṃ sandigdham iti te nipuṇasyā'sti niścayaḥ
saṁśayaś ca na sandigdhaḥ sandigdha-dvaita-ādinah.*

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 31 (Chowkhamba edition).

² *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, by Veṅkaṭanātha, p. 36.

³ *anuguna-padam vyavahāra-janana-svarūpa-yogya-param tenā'janita-vyavahāre yathā-rtha-jñāna-viśeṣe nā'vyāptiḥ*. Śrinivāsa's *Nyāya-sāra* on *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, p. 36.

of *pramāṇa* as knowledge leading to a behaviour tallying with facts naturally means the inclusion of valid memory within it. An uncontradicted memory is thus regarded as valid means of knowledge according to the Rāmānuja system¹. Veṅkaṭa urges that it is wrong to suppose the illicit introduction of memory as the invariable condition of illusion, for in such illusory perception as that of yellow conch-shell, there is manifestly no experience of the production of memory. The conch-shell directly appears as yellow. So in all cases of illusions the condition that is invariably fulfilled is that one thing appears as another, which is technically called *anyathā-khyāti*. But it may as well be urged that in such an illusion as that of the conch-shell-silver, the reason why the conch-shell appears as the silver is the non-apprehension of the distinction between the sub-conscious image of the silver seen in shops and the perception of a shining piece before the eyes, technically called *akhyāti*. Thus, in all cases of illusion, when one thing appears as another there is this condition of the non-apprehension of the distinction between a memory image and a percept. If illusions are considered from this point of view, then they may be said to be primarily and directly due to the aforesaid psychological fact known as *akhyāti*. Thus, both these theories of illusion have been accepted by Rāmānuja from two points of view. The theory of *anyathā-khyāti* appeals directly to experience, whereas the *akhyāti* view is the result of analysis and reasoning regarding the psychological origin of illusions². The other theory of illusion (*yathārtha-khyāti*), which regards illusions also as being real knowledge, on the ground that in accordance with the *pañcī-karaṇa* theory all things are the result of a primordial admixture of the elements of all things, is neither psychological nor analytical but is only metaphysical, and as such does not explain the nature of illusions. The illusion in such a view consists in the fact or apprehension of the presence of such silver in the conch-shell as can be utilized for domestic or ornamental purposes, whereas the metaphysical explanation only justifies the perception of certain primordial elements of silver in the universal admixture of the elements of all things in all things.

¹ *smṛti-mātrā-pramāṇatvaṃ na yuktam iti vakṣyate
abādhita-smṛiter loke pramāṇatva-parigrahāt.*

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 38.

² *idaṃ rajatam anubhavāmi'ty ekaṭvenai'va prāṭhyamānāyāḥ prāṭṭer
grahaṇa-smaraṇā-tmakatvaṃ anekatvaṃ ca yuktitaḥ sādhyamānaṃ na prāṭṭi-
patham ārohati. Nyāya-sāra*, p. 40.

In refuting the *ātma-khyāti* theory of illusion of the Buddhists, Veṅkaṭa says that if the idealistic Buddhist can admit the validity of the different awarenesses as imposed on the one fundamental consciousness, then on the same analogy the validity of the perceived objects may also be admitted. If the different subjective and objective awarenesses are not admitted, then all experiences would be reduced to one undifferentiated consciousness, and that would be clearly against the Buddhistic theory of knowledge. The Buddhist view that entities which are simultaneously apprehended are one, and that therefore knowledge and its objects which are apprehended simultaneously are one, is wrong. Knowledge and its objects are directly apprehended as different, and therefore the affirmation of their identity is contradicted in experience. The Mādhyamika Buddhists further hold that, just as in spite of the falsehood of the defects (*doṣa*), illusions happen, so in spite of the falsehood of any substratum or any abiding entity, illusions may appear as mere appearances without any reality behind them. Against such a view, Veṅkaṭa says that whatever is understood by people as existent or non-existent has always a reference to a reality, and mere phenomena without any basis or ground on reality are incomprehensible in all our experience. Hence the pure phenomenalism of the Mādhyamika is wholly against all experience¹. When people speak of non-existence of any entity, they always do it with some kind of spatial or temporal qualification. Thus, when they say that the book does not exist, they always qualify this non-existence with a “here” and a “there” or with a “now” or a “then.” But pure unqualified non-existence is unknown to ordinary experience². Again all positive experience of things is spatially limited (e.g. there is a jug “here”); if this spatial qualification as “here” is admitted, then it cannot be held that appearances occur on mere nothing (*nir-adhiṣṭhāna-bhramā-nupapattiḥ*). If, however, the limitation of a “here” or “there” is denied, then no experience is possible (*pratīter apahnava eva syāt*).

Criticizing the *a-nirvacanīya* theory of illusion of the Vedāntists Veṅkaṭanātha says that when the Śāṅkarites described all things as

¹ *loke bhāvā-bhāva-śabdayos tat-pratītyoś ca vidyumānasyai'eva vastunaḥ avasthā-viśeṣa-gocaratvasya pratipāditatvāt. prakārā-ntarasya ca loka-siddha-pramāṇā-viśayatvād ity-arthaḥ. Nyāya-sāra*, p. 46.

² *sarvo'pi niṣedhaḥ sa-pratītyogiko niyata-deśa-kālaśca pratyate. Nīrūpa-dhir niyata-deśa-kāla-pratītyogi-viśeṣaṇa-rahito niṣedho na pratyate iti. Ibid.* p. 46.

indefinable (*a-nirvacanīya*), the word “indefinable” must mean either some definite trait, in which case it would cease to be indefinable, or it might mean failure to define in a particular manner, in which case the Śāṅkarites might as well accept the Rāmānuja account of the nature of the universe. Again when the Śāṅkarites are prepared to accept such a self-contradictory category as that which is different both from being and non-being (*sad-asad-vyatirekaḥ*), why cannot they rather accept things as both existent and non-existent as they are felt in experience? The self-contradiction would be the same in either case. If, however, their description of the world-appearance as something different from being and non-being is for the purpose of establishing the fact that the world-appearance is different both from chimerical entities (*tuccha*) and from Brahman, then Rāmānujists should have no dispute with them. Further, the falsity of the world does not of itself appeal to experience; if an attempt is made to establish such a falsity through unfounded dialectic, then by an extension of such a dialectic even Brahman could be proved to be self-contradictory. Again the assertion that the world-appearance is non-existent because it is destructible is unfounded; for the Upaniṣads speak of Brahman, the individual souls and the *prakṛti* as being eternal. The Śāṅkarites also confuse destruction and contradiction (*na cai'kyam nāśa-bādhayoḥ*)¹.

The followers of Patañjali speak of an illusory comprehension through linguistic usage in which we are supposed to apprehend entities which have no existence. This is called *nirviśaya-khyāti*. Thus, when we speak of the head of Rāhu, we conceive Rāhu as having an existence apart from his head, and this apprehension is due to linguistic usage following the genitive case-ending in Rāhu, but Veṅkaṭa urges that it is unnecessary to accept a separate theory of illusion for explaining such experience, since it may well be done by the *akhyāti* or *anyathā-khyāti* theory of illusion, and he contends that he has already demonstrated the impossibility of other theories of illusion.

Meghanādāri, however, defines *pramāṇa* as the knowledge that determines the objects without depending on other sources of knowledge such as memory².

¹ *Nyāya-parisuddhi*, pp. 48-51.

² “*tatrā'nya-pramāṇā-napekṣam artha-paricchedakam jñānam pramāṇam, artha-paricchede'nya-pramāṇa-sāpekṣa-smṛtāv ativyāpti-parihāre'nya-pramāṇa-napekṣam iti.*” *Naya-dyu-maṇi*, Madras Govt. Oriental MS.

Though knowledge is self-revealing (*sva-mūrtāv api svayam eva hetuḥ*), and though there is a continuity of consciousness in sleep, or in a state of swoon, yet the consciousness in these stages cannot reveal objects of cognition. This is only possible when knowledge is produced through the processes known as *pramāṇa*. When we speak of the self-validity of knowledge, we may speak of the cognition as being determined by the objects that it grasps (*artha-paricchinnam pramāṇam*). But when we speak of it from the perceptual point of view or from the point of view of its determining the objects of knowledge, we have to speak of knowledge as determining the nature of objects (*artha-paricchedaka*) and not as being determined by them. Knowledge may thus be looked at from a subjective point of view in self-validity of cognition (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*). Then the self-validity refers to its content which is determined by the objects of comprehension. It has also to be looked at from the objective point of view in all cases of acquirement of knowledge and in our behaviour in the world of objects, and then the knowledge appears as the means by which we determine the nature of the objects and measure our behaviour accordingly. The definition of knowledge as that which measures the nature of objects (*artha-pariccheda-kāri jñānam pramāṇam*), as given by Meghanādāri is thus somewhat different from that given by Veṅkaṭa, who defines it as that which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are (*yathā-vasthita vyavahārā-nugūṇam*). In the case of Veṅkaṭa, knowledge is looked at as a means to behaviour and it is the behaviour which is supposed to determine the nature of correspondence. In Meghanādāri's definition the whole question of behaviour and of correspondence is lost sight of, or at least put in the background. The emphasis is put on the function of knowledge as determining the objects. The supposition probably is that in case of error or illusion also the real object is perceived, and the illusion is caused through the omission of other details, a correct perception of which would have rendered the illusion impossible. We know already that according to the *yathārtha-khyāti* theory of Rāmānuja there are elements of all things in all things, according to the Upaniṣadic theory of "*trivṛt-karaṇa*" and its elaboration in the *pañcī-karaṇa* doctrine. What happens therefore in illusion (e.g. the conch-shell-silver) is that the visual organ is in contact with the element of

silver that forms one of the constituents of the conch-shell. This element of silver no doubt is infinitesimally small as compared with the overwhelmingly preponderating parts—the conch-shell. But on account of the temporary defect of the visual organ or other distracting circumstances, these preponderating parts of the conch-shell are lost sight of. The result is that knowledge is produced only of the silver elements with which the sense-organ was in contact; and since the conch-shell element had entirely dropped out of comprehension, the silver element was regarded as being the only one that was perceived and thus the illusion was produced. But even in such an illusion the perception of silver is no error. The error consists in the non-perception of the preponderating part—the conch-shell. Thus, even in illusory perception, it is undoubtedly a real object that is perceived. The theory of *anyathā-khyāti* is that illusion consists in attributing a quality or character to a thing which it does not possess. In an indirect manner this theory is also implied in the *yathārtha-khyāti* theory in so far that here also the characters attributed (e.g. the silver) to the object of perception (*purovartī vastu*) do not belong to it, though the essence of illusion does not consist in that, and there is no real illusion of perception. Meghanādāri thus holds that all knowledge is true in the sense that it has always an object corresponding to it, or what has been more precisely described by Anantācārya that all cognitive characters (illusory or otherwise) universally refer to real objective entities as objects of knowledge¹. We have seen that Veṅkaṭa had admitted three theories of illusion, namely, *anyathā-khyāti*, *akhyāti* and *yathārtha-khyāti*, from three different points of view. This does not seem to find any support in Meghanādāri's work, as he spares no effort to prove that the *yathārtha-khyāti* theory is the only theory of illusion and to refute the other rival theories. The main drift of Meghanādāri's criticism of *anyathā-khyāti* consists in the view that since knowledge must always refer to an object that is perceived, it is not possible that an object should produce a knowledge giving an entirely different content, for then such a content would refer to no object and thus would be chimerical (*tuccha*). If it is argued that the object is present elsewhere, then it might be contended that since the presence of the object can be determined

¹ "Tat-tad-dharma-prakāra-*jñānatva-vyāpakam tat-tad-dharmavad-viśeṣ-yakatvam iti yathārtham sarva-vijñānam iti."* Anantācārya, *Jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda* (MS.).

only by the content of knowledge, and since such an object is denied in the case of illusory perception where we have such a knowledge, what is the guarantee that the object should be present in other cases? In those cases also it is the knowledge that alone should determine the presence of the object. That is to say, that if knowledge alone is to be the guarantor of the corresponding object, it is not right to say in two instances where such knowledge occurs that the object exists in one case and not in the other¹.

In refuting the *anirvacanīya-khyāti* Meghanādāri says that if it is supposed that in illusions an indefinable silver is produced which is mistaken for real silver, then that is almost the same as the *anyathā-khyāti* view, for here also one thing is taken as another. Moreover, it is difficult to explain how the perception of such an indefinable silver would produce the real desire for picking it up which is possible only in the case of the perception of real silver. A desire which can be produced by a real object can never be produced by a mere illusory notion. Nor can there be any similarity between a mere illusory notion and the real shining entity, viz. silver². The so-called indefinable silver is regarded either as being of the nature of being and non-being, or as different from being and non-being, both of which are impossible according to the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle. Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that such an extra-logical entity is possible, it would be difficult to conceive how it could have any similarity with such a positive entity as ordinary silver. It cannot be admitted that this complex of being and non-being is of the nature of pure vacuity, for then also it would be impossible to conceive any similarity between a vacuum entity and real silver³.

¹ *na ca tadbajjñāne'strviti vācyam. tad-ākārasya satyatve bhrāntitvā-nupapattiḥ asattve tu na tasya jñānā-kāratā. tucchasya vastr-ākāratā-nupapatteḥ. tad-ākāratve ca khyātir eva tucche'ti sūktikādaḥ na rajatā-rthi-pravṛttiḥ.* Meghanādāri, *Naya-dyu-maṇi* (MS.).

The general drift of Meghanādāri's theme may be summed up in the words of Anantācārya in his *Jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda* (MS.) as follows: "tathā ca rajatatam sūkti-niṣṭha-viśayatā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavat sūkty-avṛttitvāt yo yad-avṛttiḥ sa tan-niṣṭha-dharma-nirūpitā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavān iti sāmānya-vyūptau daṇḍa-niṣṭha-kāraṇatā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavad daṇḍā-vṛtti ghaṭatvādikaṃ drṣṭāntah."

² "tasyā'nirvācyā-rajatatayā grahaṇād viparita-khyāti-pakṣa-pātaḥ... sam-yaḥ-rajata-dhīr hi pravṛtti-hetuḥ... tasya pratity-ātmaka-vastr-ātmakayor bhāvaratvā-di-sādrśyā-bhāvāt." Ibid.

³ *ekasya yugapat sad-asadā-tmaka-viruddha-dharmavattvā-nupapatteḥ. tad-upapattāv api sādrśyā-nupapatteśca... śūnya-vastuni pramānā-bhāvāt. tat-sad-bhāve'pi tasya rajata-sādrśyā-bhāvācca tato na pravṛttiḥ.* Ibid.

Again it is said that the illusory silver is called indefinable (*anirvacanīya*) because it is different from pure being such as the self which is never contradicted in experience (*ātmano bādhā-yogāt*) and from non-being such as the chimerical entities like the hare's horn which can never be objects of knowledge (*khyāty-ayogāt*). But in reply to this it may very well be urged that the being of the self cannot itself be proved, for if the self were the object of knowledge it would be as false as the world appearance; and if it were not it could not have any being. It cannot also be said to have being because of its association with the class concept of being, for the self is admitted to be one, and as such cannot be associated with class concept¹. Again want of variability cannot be regarded as a condition of reality, for if the cognitive objects are unreal because they are variable, the knower himself would be variable on account of his association with variable objects and variable relations, and would therefore be false. Again being (*sattā*) is not as universal as it is supposed to be, for it is different from the entities (jug, etc.) to which it is supposed to belong and also from negation in the view that holds negation to be a positive category². If the self is regarded as self-luminous, then it may also be contended that such self-luminosity must be validly proved; and it may also be urged that unless the existence of the self has already been so proved its character cannot be proved to be self-luminous.³

Again the *akhyāti* view is liable to two different interpretations, in both of which it may be styled in some sense as *yathārtha-khyāti*. In the first interpretation the illusion is supposed to be produced in the following manner: the visual organ is affected by the shining character of something before the eyes, and this shining character, being of the same nature as that of the silver, the shining character of the silver is remembered, and since it is not possible to dis-

¹ *tasya drīyatvā-nabhyupagame śāśa-viśāṇā-dī-sāmyam. ātmanah prameyatā ca ne'ste'ti, na tatas tat-sattā-siddhiḥ. tad-abhyupagatau ca prapañcavanmithyātvaṃ... ātma-vyakter ekatvā-bhimānāt tad-vyatirikta-padārthasyā'sattvā-bhimān-ācca sattā-samavāyitvā-nupapatteḥ. Meghanādāri, Naya-dyu-maṇi.*

² *atha ghaṭa-paṭā-di-bhedānām vyāvartamānatvenā'pāramārthyam... ātma-no'pi ghaṭa-paṭādi-sarva-padārthebhya vyāvartamānatvān mithyātvā-pattih... abhivyāñjakā-pāramārthyē'bhivyāñgyā-pāramārthyam... na ca sattvasyai'va sam-asta-padārtheṣv anuvartamānaṃ pāramārthyam. ghaṭādayo'pi tad-apekṣayā vyāvartante... abhāvasya padārthā-ntarbhāve'pi tatra sattā-nabhyupagamāt sarva-padārthā-nuṣṭṭi-abhāvāt. Ibid.*

³ *na ca tasya svayam-prakāśatvān na pramāṇā-pekṣe'ti svayam-prakāśatvasyā'pi pramāṇā-dhīnatvāt pramāṇā-ntara-siddhā-tmanah svayam-prakāśatvasya sādhyatvācca. na hi dharmy-aprasidhau dharma-sādhyatā. Ibid.*

tinguish whether this shining character belongs to silver or to something else, and since the object in front is associated with such an undiscriminated shining character, the shining character cannot be treated as a mere self-ejected idea, but has to be taken as having its true seat in that something before the eye; thus, the notion of silver is a result of a true perception. It would have been a false perception if the conch-shell had been perceived as silver, but in such a perception it is not the conch-shell, but “this” in front, that is perceived as silver. The general maxim is that the idea which corresponds to any particular kind of behaviour is to be regarded as a true representation of the object experienced in such a behaviour (*yad-artha-vyavahārā-nugunā ya dhīḥ sā tad-arthā*). This maxim has its application here inasmuch as the “this” in front can be experienced in practical behaviour as such, and the silvery character has also a true reference to real silver. So the notion “this silver” is to be regarded as a complex of two notions, the “this” and the “silver.” Thus, the perception involved in the above interpretation is a true perception according to the *akhyāti* view. In the above explanation it is contended that just as the two different notions of substance and quality may both appear in the same concept, so there cannot be any difficulty in conceiving of a legitimate unity of two different notions in one illusory perception as “this silver.” Such a fusion is possible on account of the fact that here two notions occur in the same moment and there is no gap between them. This is different from the *anyathā-khyāti* view, in which one thing is supposed to appear as another. The objections against this view are: firstly, that a defect cannot possibly transmute one thing into another; secondly, if illusions be regarded as the appearance of one thing as another, then there is scope for such a fear, even in those cases which are regarded as correct perception; for all knowledge would be exposed to doubt, and this would land us in scepticism. If, therefore, it is suggested that illusion is due to a non-comprehension of the difference between the presence of a conch-shell and the memory-image of silver, that also would be impossible. For if “difference” means only the different entities (*bhedo vastu-svarūpam-eva*), then non-comprehension of difference (which is regarded as the root-cause of illusion in the present view) would mean the comprehension of the identity of the memory-image and the percept, and that would not account for the qualified concept where

one notion (e.g. the silver) appears as qualifying the other notion (the “this” before the eye). Moreover, if two independent notions which are not related as substance and quality be miscomprehended as one concept, then any notion could be so united with any other notion, because the memory-images which are stored in our past experiences are limitless. Again the silver that was experienced in the past was experienced in association with the space in which it existed, and the reproduction of the silver and memory would also be associated with that special spatial quality. This would render its mis-association with the percept before the perceiver impossible on account of the spatial difference of the two. If it is contended that through the influence of defects the spatial quality of the memory-image is changed, then that would be the *anyathā-khyāti* theory, which would be inadmissible in the *akhyāti* view. Again since all sensible qualities must be associated with some kind of spatial relation, even if the original spatial quality be transmuted or changed, that would be no reason why such a spatial image should be felt as being in front of the perceiver. It must also be said that the distinctive differences between the memory-image and the percept are bound to be noted; for if such a distinctive difference were not noted, the memory-image could not be distinguished as “silver-image.” It cannot also be said that though the percept can be distinguished from the memory-image the latter cannot be distinguished from the former, for the discriminative character is a constituent of both, and it is nothing but the white shining attribute. If it is urged that the spatial and other distinctive qualities are not noted in the memory-image and it appears merely as an image, then it may well be objected that any and every memory-image may be confused with the present percept, and even a stone may appear as silver.

Since both the *a-nirvacaniya-khyāti* and the *akhyāti* are in some sense *yathārtha-khyāti*, Meghanādāri refuted these two theories of illusion and attempted to show that the *yathārtha-khyāti* would be untenable in these views. Now he tries to show that all other possible interpretations of *yathārtha-khyāti* are invalid. The fundamental assumption of *yathārtha-khyāti* is that all knowledge must correspond to a real object like all right knowledge¹. Thus, in other

¹ *vipratipannaḥ pratyayo yathā-rthaḥ pratyatvāt, sampratipanna-pratyaya-vaditi. Naya-dyu-maṇi*, p. 140 (MS.).

interpretations, the *yathārtha-khyāti* or the correspondence theory, might mean that cognition is produced by a real object or by the objective percept or that it means uncontradicted experience. The first alternative is untenable because even in the illusion of the conch-shell-silver the notion of silver has been produced by a real object, the conch-shell; the second view is untenable, for the object corresponding to the illusory percept of silver is not actually present in the conch-shell according to other theories; and so far as the operation of the memory impression of the silver as experienced in the past is concerned (*pūrvā-nubhūta-rajata-saṃskāra-dvārā*) its instrumentality is undeniable both in right and in illusory cognitions. The third alternative is untenable because contradiction refers to knowledge or judgment and not to things themselves. If it is said that the cognition refers to the illusory appearance and hence it is the illusory entity existing outside that is the object of perception, the obvious objection would be that perception refers to a non-illusory something in front of the perceiver, and this cannot be obviated. If non-illusory something is a constituent in the cognition, then it would be futile to say that the mere illusory perceptual form is all that can be the object of perception.

It cannot also be said that the illusory perception has no object (*nirviṣaya-khyāti*) and that it is called cognition, because, though it may not itself be amenable to behaviour as right cognitions are, it is similar to them by producing an impression that it also is amenable to behaviour, just as autumn clouds, which cannot shower, are also called clouds. The illusory cognition has for its content not only the illusory appearance but also the non-illusory "this" to which it objectively and adjectively refers. The truth, however, is that it is not indispensable for constituting the objectivity of a cognition that all the characters of the object should appear in the cognition; if any of its characters are manifested, that alone is sufficient to constitute the objectivity of an entity with regard to its cognition. The position, therefore, is that all cognitions refer and correspond to certain real entities in the objective world, and this cannot be explained on any other theory than on the supposition of a metaphysico-cosmological theory akin to the theory of *homoimeriae*.

Anantācārya, in his *ĵñāna-yāthārthya-vāda*, more or less repeats the arguments of Meghanādāri when he says that no cognition can

be possible without its being based on a relation of correspondence to an objective entity. The content of knowledge must therefore have a direct correspondence with the objective entity to which it refers. Thus, since there is a perception of silver (in the illusory perception of conch-shell-silver), it must refer to an objective substratum corresponding to it¹. The Mīmāṃsā supposition that errors are produced through non-discrimination of memory-image and perception is also wrong, because in that case we should have the experience of remembering silver and not of perceiving it as an objective entity before us². Both Meghanādāri and Anantācārya take infinite pains to prove that their definition of error applies to all cases of illusions of diverse sorts, including dreams, into the details of which it is unnecessary for our present purposes to enter³.

The Doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge.

Pramāṇa, or valid knowledge, is defined as the cognition of objects as they are (*tathā-bhūtā-rtha-jñānam hi pramāṇam ucyate*), and *apramāṇa*, or invalid knowledge, is described as cognition representing a wrong notion of an object (*a-tathā-bhūtā-rtha-jñānam hi a-pramāṇam*). Such a validity, it is urged by Meghanādāri, is manifested by the knowledge itself (*tathātvā-vadhāraṇā-tmakam pramāṇyam ātmanai'va niścīyate*). This does not expose it to the criticism that knowledge, being passive, cannot at the same moment be also regarded as active, determining its own nature as valid (*na ca karma-kartṛtā-virodhaḥ*); for since it is of the nature of a faithful representation of the object, the manifestation of its own nature as such is an affirmation of its validity. If knowledge had no power by itself of affirming its own validity, there would be no way by which such a validity could be affirmed, for the affirmation of its validity by any other mediate process, or through any other instrumentality, will always raise the same question as to how the testimony of those processes or instruments can be accepted. For on such a supposition, knowledge not being self-valid, each such testimony has to be

¹ *tathā ca rajatatvaṃ śukti-niṣṭha-viśayatā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavat śukty-avyttivāt yo yad-avyttiḥ sa tan-niṣṭha-dharma-nirūpitā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavāniti. Jñāna-yāthārthya-vāda (MS.).*

² *rajata-smaraṇe idaṃ-padārtha-grahaṇa-rūpa-jñāna-dvaya-kalpane rajataṃ smaromīti tatrā'rubhava-prasaṅgaḥ, na tu rajataṃ paśyāmīti, sākṣāt-kāratva-vyañjaka-viśayatāyāḥ smaraṇe'bhāvāt. Ibid.*

³ (a) *Ibid.* (b) Meghanādāri, *Naya-dyu-maṇi*.

corroborated by another testimony, and that by another, and this will lead us to infinite regress.

In repudiating other views Meghanādāri points out that if validity is admitted as belonging to the collocative causes of knowledge (involving the self, the senses, and the object), then even the object would have to be regarded as a *pramāṇa*, and there would be no *prameya* or object left. Again, if affirmation is regarded as being of the nature of awareness, then even memory-knowledge has to be regarded as valid, since it is of the nature of awareness. Further, if affirmation of validity be of the nature of power, then such power, being non-sensible, has to be manifested by some other means of knowledge. If, again, validity is supposed to be produced by the causes of knowledge, then the dictum of the self-manifestation of validity would have to be given up. Uncontradicted behaviour also cannot be regarded as a definition of validity, for in that case even memory has to be regarded as valid by itself. It cannot also be defined as merely knowledge as such, for knowledge, not being able to turn back on itself to apprehend its own validity, would have to depend on something else, and that would imply the affirmation of validity through extraneous reference (*parataḥ-prāmāṇya*). Again in those cases where the cause of error is known, the cognition, though known as erroneous, irresistibly manifests itself to us (e.g. the movement of the sun). The assumption that all knowledge is associated with its validity is inapplicable to such cases. If, again, it is held that, whenever a later cognition rejects the former, we have a clear case as to how the invalidity of the previous cognition is demolished by the valid knowledge of a later moment; it may be urged that, when the generic knowledge of an object is replaced by a cognition of details, we have a case when one cognition replaces another, though it does not involve any criticism of the former knowledge.

In the Bhātṭa view, where it is supposed that when the object attains its specific cognized character its knowledge as an internal operation is inferred, both validity and invalidity ought to depend upon the objects. If, however, it is urged that the notion of validity shows itself in the faultless character of the instruments and condition of cognition, that would also imply the notion of validity as of extraneous origin. In the Prābhākara view, where knowledge is supposed to reveal the knower, the object and knowledge in one

sweep, we have a much better case in so far that here knowledge has not to depend on anything extraneous. In this case self-invalidity may apply only to memory which has to depend on previous perception. To this the Nyāya objection is that since memory is also knowledge, and since all knowledge is self-revealing, the Prābhākaras ought consistently to admit the self-validity of memory.

Meghanādāri holds that all these objections against the self-validity of knowledge are invalid; for if the knowledge of the validity of any cognition has to depend on other *pramāṇas*, then there is an infinite regress. If, however, an attempt is made to avoid the regress by admitting the self-validity of any later *pramāṇa*, then it virtually amounts to the admission of self-validity (*anavasthā-parihārāya kasyacit svatastvā-ṅgikāre ca na parataḥ-prāmāṇyam*). It may be urged that we are not necessarily prompted to action by a consciousness of validity, but through the probability of the same which is sought to be tested (*ajñātatayā jñātatayai'va*) by our efforts in the direction of the object. But in such a supposition there is no meaning in the attempt of our opponents in favour of the doctrine of the validity of cognition through extraneous means (*parataḥ-prāmāṇya*), for such a supposition is based on the view that our efforts are produced without a previous determination of the validity of cognition. When we see that a person, having perceived an object, makes an effort towards it, our natural conclusion is that he has, as the basis of the effort, a knowledge of the validity of his perception, for without it there can be no effort. It is hopeless to contend that there is validity of cognition in such cases without the knowledge of validity, for validity of knowledge always means the consciousness of such validity. The fact is that what constitutes a *pramāṇa* constitutes also its validity. It is wrong to think that validity appertains to anything else outside the cognition in question. When we see fire, its validity as a burning object is grasped with the very notion of fire and does not wait for the comprehension of any super-sensible power or burning capacity of fire. The comprehension of fire as a burning object involves the knowledge of its association with its burning capacity. The knowledge of the burning capacity by itself cannot induce any action on our part, for we are always led to act by the comprehension of objects and not by their capacities. It is, therefore, wrong to separate the capacity from the object and speak of it as the cause of our effort. So the cognition of a *pramāṇa*

involves with it its validity. Thus validity cannot be dissociated from the cognition of the object¹. Further, validity cannot be defined as uncontradictedness, for if that test is to be applied to every knowledge it would lead to infinite regress. If, however, the knowledge of the validity of any cognition has to depend upon the knowledge of the defectlessness or correctness of the means and conditions of cognition, then, since validity of such knowledge has to depend upon another knowledge for the correctness of the means and condition, and that upon another, there is obviously an infinite regress. Since knowledge normally corresponds to the object, ordinarily there should not be any fear of any error arising from the defects of the causes and conditions of such knowledge; it is only in specific cases that such doubts may arise leading to special inquiries about the correctness or incorrectness of the means and conditions of knowledge. If there is an inquiry as to the validity of every knowledge, we should be landed in scepticism. Thus, validity means the manifestation of any form of content not awaiting the confirmation by other means of knowledge (*pramāṇā-ntarā-ṇapekṣayā'rthā-vacchinnattvam*), and such a conviction of validity is manifested along with the cognition itself. Memory, however, depends upon a prior cognition, and as such the conviction of its validity depends upon the validity of a prior knowledge, and hence it cannot be regarded as self-valid.

Rāmānujācārya, the teacher and maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭanātha, anticipates the objection that if self-validity of cognition is to be

¹ Rāmānujācārya, the maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭanātha, anticipates an objection that perceptual cognition reveals only the content (*vastu*). The revelation of such a content does not also involve the knowing relation which must necessarily be of a very varied nature, for a knowledge may refer to a content in infinitely diverse relation. The revelation of the mere content, therefore, without the specific knowing relation, does not involve the judgmental form, though the truth of this content may be ascertained at a later moment when it is reduced to a judgmental form as "I know it." There is no possibility of the affirmation of any validity at the moment of the revelation of the content. In reply to this, Rāmānujācārya says that the revelation of a content necessarily implies all its knowing relations in a general manner; and therefore, by the mode of its revelation at any particular moment, the mode of its specific knowing relation at any particular moment is grasped along with the content. Thus, since the revelation of the content implies the specific knowing relation, all cognitions may be regarded as implicitly judgmental, and there cannot be any objection to the self-validity of such knowledge.

If the content and knowledge were regarded as entirely distinct, as they must be, and if the knowing relation were not given implicitly along with the content, then all knowledge would be contentless, and as such any future attempt to relate them would be impossible. *Nyāya-kulīśa* (MS.).

admitted, then no doubt could arise with reference to any cognition¹. The reply of Rāmānujācārya is that all cognitions are associated with a general conviction of their self-validity, but that does not prevent the rise of doubt in a certain specific direction. Self-validity in this view means that all cognitions produce by themselves a general conviction regarding their validity, though it does not rule out misapprehension in a specific direction².

The Ontological categories of the Rāmānuja School according to Veṅkaṭanātha.

(a) *Substance.*

Veṅkaṭanātha in his *Nyāya-siddhāṇṇana* and *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, tries to give a succinct account of the different categories, admitted or presumed, in the philosophy of Rāmānuja which the latter did not bring prominently to the view of his readers. The main division is that of the substance (*dravya*) and that which is non-substance (*adravya*). Substance is defined as that which has states (*daśāvat*) or which suffers change and modification. In admitting substance he tries to refute the Buddhist view that there is no substance, and all things are but a momentary conglomeration of separate entities which come into being and are destroyed the next moment. The Vaibhāṣika Buddhists say that there are four ultimate sense-data, viz. colour, taste, touch, and smell, which are themselves qualities and are not themselves qualities of anything. These can be grasped by our specific senses³. The Vātsīputriya school includes sound as a separate sense-data which can be perceived by the ear. Against this Veṅkaṭa urges that in all perception we have a notion that we touch what we see; such a perception cannot be false, for such a feeling is both invariable and undicted in experience (*svārasika-bādhā-dṛṣter anānyathā-siddheśca*). Such a perception implies recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) involving the notion that it is a permanent entity in the objective field which is perceived by a constant and unchangeable perceiver, and that the two sense-qualities refer to one and the same object. This recognition does not refer merely to the colour sensation, for the colour

¹ *sāmānyasya svato-graheṇā'bhyāsa-daśo-tṛanna-jñāne tat-saṁśayo na syāt. Tattva-cintā-maṇi* (A.S. B), p. 184.

² *Nyāya-kulīśa*, p. 27 (MS.).

³ *evam āhur vaibhāṣikāḥ nirādhārā nirdharmakāśca rūpādayaś catvāraḥ padārthāḥ. Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 8.

sensation does not involve the tactile; nor does it refer merely to the tactile, as that does not involve colour. Perception, therefore, refers to an entity to which both the colour and the tactile qualities belong. Such a perception of recognition also repudiates the Buddhist view of the conglomeration of entities. For such a view naturally raises the question as to whether the conglomeration is different from or the same as the entities that conglomerate. In the latter case there cannot be any recognition of the object as one entity to which both the colour and the tactile quality belong. In the former case, when conglomeration is regarded as extraneous to the conglomerated entities, such a conglomeration must either be positive or negative. In the first alternative it amounts virtually to an admission of substances, for the assumption of the existence of merely the complex characters is inadmissible, since there cannot be anything like that which is neither a substance, nor quality, nor a qualifying relation. In the second alternative, if the conglomeration (*saṃghāta*) is non-existent, then it cannot produce the recognition. If conglomeration be defined as absence of interval between the perceived qualities, then also, since each sense quality has an appeal only to its own specific sense-organ, it is impossible that the perception of two different sense-qualities by two different organs should point to a common entity. Conglomeration cannot also be defined as spatial identity, for it must also involve temporal identity in order to give the notion of conglomeration. It cannot also be said that time and space are identical, for such a view which is true of momentariness, will be shown to be false by the refutation of momentariness. Space cannot also be of the nature of *ākāśa*, which in the Buddhist view means unobstructedness and is not a positive concept. Space cannot also be regarded as material identity with the sense-qualities, for the different sense-qualities are regarded as the unique nature of different moments¹. If it means that the different sensible qualities have but one material behind them, that amounts to the admission of substance². If the sensible qualities be regarded as a conglomeration on account of their existence in the same material object, then the material object would have to be described as a conglomeration by virtue of the existence of its elemental entities

¹ *na co'pādāna-rūpaḥ sparśa-rūpādinām bhinna-svalakṣaṇo-pādānatvā-bhy-upagamāt. Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 9.

² *eko-pādānatve tu tad eva dravyam. Ibid.*

in some other entity and that again in some other entity, and thus we have a vicious infinite. It cannot also be urged that the tactile sensation is inferred from the colour sensation, for such an inference would involve as its pre-condition the knowledge of the concomitance of the colour datum and the tactile, which is not possible unless they are known to belong to the same object. Neither can it be urged that the tactile and the colour-data are mutually associated; this gives rise to the notion that what is seen is touched, for the two sensations are known to be different in nature and originate through different sense-organs. It cannot also be said that our apperception that we touch what we see, being due to the operation of our instinctive root-desire (*vāsanā*), is false, for proceeding on the same analogy and following the *Yogācāra* view, one may as well deny all external data. If it is said that the sense-data are never contradicted in experience and thus that the idealistic view is wrong, then it may as well be pointed out that our notion that we experience an object to which colour and the tactile sensations belong is also never contradicted in experience. If it is urged that such an experience cannot be proved to be logically valid, then it may be proved with equal force that the existence of external sense-data cannot be logically proved. Therefore, our ordinary experience that the object as a substance is the repository of various sense-qualities cannot be invalidated. The view that all the other four elements, excepting air (*vāyu*), are themselves of diverse nature and are hence perceived as coloured, as touchable, etc., and that they are capable of being grasped by different senses is also false, as it does not necessarily involve the supposition that they are the repository of different sense-qualities; for experience shows that we intuit the fact that the objects are endowed with qualities. No one perceives a jug as being merely the colour-datum, but as an object having colour. It is also impossible that one neutral datum should have two different natures; for one entity cannot have two different natures. If it is said that two different qualities can abide in the same object, then that amounts to the admission of a substance in which different qualities inhere. It is also wrong to suppose that since the colour-datum and the tactile are grasped together they are identical in nature, for in the case of one error where a white conch-shell appears as yellow, the conch-shell is grasped without its white character, just as the yellow colour is grasped without its

corresponding object. And it cannot be said that a separate yellow conch-shell is produced there; for such a view is directly contradicted in experience when we perceive the yellow colour and assert its identity with the conch-shell by touch. So, by the simultaneity of perception, coherence of qualities in an object is proved and not identity.

Moreover, even the Buddhists cannot prove that the tactile and the colour sensations occur simultaneously. If this were so, the testimony of the two different senses naturally points to the existence of two different characters. When an object is near we have a distinct perception of it, and when it is at a distance perception is indistinct. This distinctness or indistinctness cannot refer merely to the sense-character, for then their difference as objects would not be perceived. It cannot also refer to the size (*parimāṇa*), for the notion of size is admitted to be false by the Buddhists. Under the circumstances, it is to be admitted that such perceptions should refer to the objects.

The Buddhists are supposed to urge that if qualities are admitted to be separate from the substance, then it may be asked whether these qualities (*dharma*) have further qualities themselves or are without quality. In the latter alternative, being qualitiless, they are incapable of being defined or used in speech. In the former alternative, if qualities have further qualities, then the second grade qualities would have to be known by further qualities adhering to it, and that again by another, and thus we have a vicious infinite. Again, qualitiness (*dharmatva*) would itself be a quality. And it cannot be said that qualitiness is the very nature of quality, for a thing cannot be explained by having reference to itself. If qualitiness is something different from the quality, then such a concept would lead us in infinite regress. To this Veṅkaṭa's reply is that all qualities are not qualitiless. In some cases quality appears as itself qualified, as testified by experience. In those cases where a quality is not demonstrable with particularizing specification, such as "this quality is so and so" (*ittham-bhāva*), it does not depend for its comprehension on any other quality. Such qualities may be illustrated in the case of all abstract qualities and universals, and the opposite may be illustrated in the case of adjectival qualities such as the word "white" in the case of "white horse." There may be further specification regarding the nature of whiteness in the

white horse, whereas when the word “whiteness” stands by itself any inquiry regarding its further specification becomes inadmissible. Logically, however, there may be a demand of further specification in both the cases and the fear of an infinite regress, but it is not felt in experience¹. Moreover, one might imagine a vicious infinite in the necessity of having an awareness of an awareness, and then another and so on, but still this is only hyper-logical; for the awareness, in manifesting itself, manifests all that needs be known about it, and there is actually nothing gained by continuing the series. Thus a quality may be supposed to have further qualities, but whatever could be manifested by these may be regarded as revealed by the quality itself². Again the assertion that if qualities are themselves without quality then they are unspeakable would involve the Buddhists themselves in a great difficulty when they described the nature of all things as unique; for obviously such a uniqueness (*svalakṣaṇya*) is without quality, and if that which has no quality cannot be described, then its specification as unique or *svalakṣaṇa* is impossible³.

It may be urged that a quality may belong to that which has no quality or to that which has it. The former alternative would imply the existence of an entity in its negation which is impossible; for then everything could exist everywhere, and even the chimerical entities, which are not regarded as existing anywhere, would be regarded as existing. In the other alternative a quality would exist in a quality, which is an absurd conception, being only a circular reasoning (*ātmāśraya*). The reply of Veṅkaṭa to this is that he does not hold that the quality belongs to the locus of its negation or to that which has it already, but he holds that a qualified entity possesses the quality not as a qualified entity but as taken apart from it⁴. It cannot be urged that this virtually implies the old objection of the existence of a quality in the locus of its negation. To this Veṅkaṭa's reply is that the special feature of a qualified entity does

¹ *udāhṛteṣu nīyatā-nīyata-niṣkarṣaka-śabdeṣu jāti-guṇādeḥ pradhānatayā nirdeśe'pi santi kecit yathā-pramāṇam ittham-bhāvāḥ tvayā'pi hetu-sādhya-dīdharmānām pakṣa-dharmatva-dīdharmāḥ svikāryā anavasthā ca kathaṅcid upaśamanīyā. Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 16.*

² *svikṛtaṅca samavedana-samvedane śabda-śabdātau sva-para-nirvāhakatvam. Ibid.*

³ *kīṅca sva-lakṣaṇā-dīnām jātyā-dīnāṅca samvṛti-siddhānām nirdharmakatve'pi kathaṅcid abhilāpārhatvaṁ tvayā'pi grāhyam. Ibid.*

⁴ *vastutas' tad-viśiṣṭe viśeṣye tad viśiṣṭa-vṛty-abhāve tac-chūnye vṛtti syād eva. Ibid. p. 17.*

not belong to any of its constituents, and qualities of any of the constituents may not belong to the constituted entity¹. If by the hyper-logical method the manner of the subsistence of a quality in a qualified entity is criticized, then it might lead to the view that the conception of qualified entity is without any sufficient ground, or self-contradictory, or that such a conception is itself inadmissible. All such views are meaningless, for the wildest criticism of opponents would involve the very notion of qualified entity in the use of their logical apparatus. So it has to be admitted that qualities adhere in qualified entities and that such an adherence does not involve infinite regress.

(b) *Criticism of the Sāṃkhya Inference for Establishing the Existence of Prakṛti.*

Venkaṭanātha admits the doctrine of *prakṛti* as the theory of materiality, but he thinks that such a doctrine can be accepted only on the testimony of scriptures and not on inference. He therefore criticizes the Sāṃkhya inference as follows. Neither *prakṛti* nor any of its evolutes such as *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, *tanmātras*, etc., can be known through perception. Neither *prakṛti* nor any of its evolutes can also be known by inference. The Sāṃkhyists hold that the effect has the same qualities as the cause. The world of effects, as we find it, is pleasurable, painful or dulling (*mohātmaka*); so its cause also must have, as its nature, pleasure, pain and a feeling of dullness. To this the question naturally arises regarding the relation of the causal qualities with the effects. They cannot be identical – the whiteness of the cloth is not identical with the thread of which it is made; the effect as a substance is not identical with causal qualities, for the white and the cloth are not identical. Further it cannot be said that the identity of the cause and the effect means merely that the effect is subordinate to the cause, as when one says that the effect, cloth, exists only in the *samavāya* relation in the cause and in no other form (*adr̥ṣṭer eva tantu-samavetate'vāt paṭasya tantu-guṇatvoktiḥ*), for the obvious reply is that the Sāṃkhya itself does not admit the *samavāya* relation or any ultimate distinction between the whole and the part. If it is said that all that is intended is that the effect exists in the cause, then it may be pointed out that merely by such an affirmation nothing is gained; for that would not explain

¹ *na ca ghaṭavati bhūtaḥ vartamānānāṃ guṇādīnāṃ ghaṭe'pi vṛtter adr̥ṣṭeḥ. Tattva-muktī-kalāpa, Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 18.

why the causal matter (*prakṛti*) should have the nature or qualities as the effect substance (*na kāraṇā-vasthasya sukha-duḥkhā-dyā-tmakatva-siddhiḥ*). If it is held that the effect shares the qualities of the cause, then also it is against the normal supposition that the effect qualities are generated by the cause qualities; and, moreover, such a supposition would imply that the effect should have no other quality than those of the cause. It cannot also be said that the effect is of the same nature as the cause (*sajātīya-guṇavattvam*), for the Sāṃkhyaists admit the *mahat* to be a different category existent in the *prakṛti* as its cause (*vilakṣaṇa-mahatvā-dy-adhikaraṇatvād*). If it is held that the effect must have only qualities similar to the cause, then they may be admitted with impunity; if the effect has all its qualities the same as those of the cause, then there will be no difference between the effect and the cause. If, again, it is held that only certain specific traits which are not inappropriate in the cause can be supposed to migrate to the effect, and that the relation of the transmission of qualities from cause to the effect can thus be limited by a specific observation of the nature of the essential trait of the cause, then such cases in which living flies are produced from inanimate cow-dung would be inexplicable as cases of cause and effect¹.

The Sāṃkhyaists are supposed to argue that if pure intelligence were supposed naturally to tend to worldly objects, then there would be no chance of its attaining liberation. Its association, therefore, must needs be supposed through the intermediary of some other category. This cannot be the senses, for even without them the mind alone may continue to imagine worldly objects. Even when the mind is inactive in sleep, one may dream of various objects. And this may lead to the assumption of the category of ego or *ahaṃkāra*; and in dreamless sleep, when the operation of this category of *ahaṃkāra* may be regarded as suspended, there is still the functioning of breathing, which leads to the assumption of another category, viz. *manas*. But as this has a limited operation, it presupposes some other cause; if that cause is also regarded as limited, then there would be an infinite regress. The Sāṃkhyaists, therefore, rest with the assumption that the cause of *mahat* is unlimited, and this is *prakṛti* or *avyakta*. The reply of Veṅkaṭa

¹ *mṛt-suvarṇā-divat-kārya-viśeṣa-vyavasthāpaka-kāraṇa-svabhāva-sājātya-vivakṣāyām gomaya-makṣikā-dy-ārabdha-vṛścikā-diṣu vyabhicārāt. Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 22.*

to this is that the association of pure intelligence with worldly objects is through the instrumentality of *kurma*. It is also not possible to infer the existence of *Manas* as a separate category through the possibility of the thinking operation, for this may well be explained by the functioning of the subconscious root-impressions; for even the assumption of mind would not explain the thinking operation, since *manas*, by itself, cannot be regarded as capable of producing thought. *Manas*, being merely an instrument, cannot be regarded as playing the role of a substance of which thought may be regarded as a modification. In the state of dream also it is not necessary to assume the existence of a separate category of *ahamkāra* to explain dream experiences, for this may well be done by mind working in association with subconscious root-impression. The breathing operation in deep, dreamless sleep may also be explained by ordinary bio-motor functions, and for this there is no necessity for the assumption of *mahat*.

It is also wrong to suppose that the cause must be of a more unlimited extent than the effect, for it is not testified in ordinary experience, in which a big jug is often found to be made out of a lump of clay of a smaller size. It is also wrong to suppose that whatever is found to abide in an effect must also be found in its cause (*na hi yad yenā'nugatam tat tasya kāraṇam iti niyamah*), for the various qualities that are found in a cow are never regarded as its cause. Following the same assumption, one would expect to find a separate cause of which the common characteristics of the *prakṛti* and its evolutes are the effects, and this would involve the admission of another cause of the *prakṛti* itself (*vyaktā-vyakta-sādhāraṇa-dharmāṇām tad-ubhaya-kāraṇa-prasaṅgāt tathā ca tattvā-dhikya-prasaṅgah*). Thus, the argument that an effect must have as its cause qualitative entities that inhere in it is false. The earthiness (*mṛttva*) which inheres in the jug is not its cause, and the earthy substance (*mṛd-dravya*) which shows itself in its unmodified form or its modified form as jug cannot be said to be inherent in the jug. Again the argument that things which are related as cause and effect have the same form is also false; for if this sameness means identity, then no distinction can be made between cause and effect. If this sameness means the existence of some similar qualities, then there may be such similarity with other things (which are not cause and effect) as well. Again applying the same analogy to the Sāṃkhya doctrine

of *puruṣas* (which are admitted to have the common characteristic of intelligence), the Sāṃkhyists may well be asked to hold a new category as the cause of the *puruṣas*. Further, two jugs which are similar in their character are not for that reason produced from the same lump of clay; and, on the other hand, we have the illustration of production of effects from an entirely different cause, as in the case of production of insects from cow-dung. Thus, from our experiences of pleasure, pain, and dullness it does not follow that there is a common cause of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, for these experiences can in each specific instance be explained by a specific cause, and there is no necessity to admit a separate common cause of the nature of three *guṇas*. If for the explanation of the ordinary pleasurable and painful experiences a separate pleasure-and-pain complex be admitted as the cause, then there may be further inquiry regarding this pleasure-and-pain complex and this will lead to infinite regress. Again if the three *guṇas* are regarded as the cause of the world, then that would not lead to the affirmation that the world is produced out of one cause; for though the three *guṇas* may be in a state of equilibrium, they may still be regarded as having their special contribution in generating the varied types of effects. Thus, the *triṅguṇa* or the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya can never be proved by inference. The only mode of approach to the doctrine of *prakṛti* is through the scriptures. The three *guṇas* rest in the *prakṛti*, and in accordance with the gradual prominence of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, three kinds of *mahat* are produced. From these three types of *mahat* three kinds of *ahamkāras* are produced. Out of the first type (i.e. *sāttvika ahamkāra*) the eleven senses are produced. Out of the last type (viz. the *tāmasa ahamkāra*) the *tanmātras* (also called the *bhūtādi*) are produced. The second type of *ahamkāra* (called *rājasa ahamkāra*) behaves as an accessory for the production of both the eleven senses and the *bhūtādi*. There are some who say that the conative senses are produced by *rājasa ahamkāra*. This cannot be accepted, as it is against the scriptural testimony. The *tanmātras* represent the subtle stage of evolution between the *tāmasa ahamkāra* and the gross elemental stage of the *bhūtas*¹. The *śabda-tan-mātra* (sound-

¹ *bhūtānām avyavahita-sūkṣmā-vasthā-viśiṣṭam dravyam tanmātram dadhirūpeṇa pariṇamamānasya payaso madhyamā-vasthāvad bhūta-rūpeṇa pariṇamamānasya dravyasya tataḥ pūrvā kācid avasthā tanmātrā. Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 25.*

potential) is produced from *bhūtādi*, and from it the gross elemental sound is produced. Again the *rūpa-tanmātra* (light-heat-potential) is produced from the *bhūtādi* or the *tāmasa ahaṃkāra*, and from the *rūpa-tanmātra* (light-heat-potential) gross light-heat is produced, and so on. Lokācārya, however, says that there is another view of the genesis of the *tanmātra* and the *bhūta* which has also the support of the scriptures and cannot therefore be ignored. This is as follows: *śabda-tanmātra* is produced from the *bhūtādi* and the *ākāśa* is produced from the *śabda-tanmātra* (sound-potential); the *ākāśa* again produces the *sparsa-tanmātra* (the touch-potential) and air is produced from the touch-potential. Again from air heat-light-potential (*rūpa-tanmātra*) is produced and from heat-light-potential *tejas* (heat-light) is produced; from *tejas*, *rasa-tanmātra* (taste-potential) is produced, and from it water. From water again the *gandha-tanmātra* (smell-potential) is produced, and from it the earth¹.

The view is explained by Varavara on the supposition that just as a seed can produce shoots only when it is covered by husks, so the *tanmātras* can be supposed to be able to produce further evolutes only when they can operate from within the envelope of the *bhūtādi*².

The process of evolution according to the said interpretation is as follows. *Śabda-tanmātra* is produced from *bhūtādi* which then envelops it, and then in such an enveloped state *ākāśa* is produced. Then from such a *śabda-tanmātra*, *sparsa-tanmātra* is produced which

¹ This view seems to be held in the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, I. 3. 66, etc. where it is distinctly said that the element of *ākāśa* produces *sparsa-tanmātra* (touch-potential). Varavara, however, in his commentary on the *Tattvatraya* of Lokācārya, wishes to point out that according to Parāśara's commentary this has been explained as being the production of *tanmātras* from *tanmātras*, though it clearly contradicts the manifest expressions of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* when it states that *tanmātras* are produced from the *bhūtādi*. He further points out that in the *Mahābhārata* (*Sāntiparva Mokṣadharmā*, Ch. xxx) the *vikāras* or pure modifications are described as sixteen and the causes (*prakṛti*) as eight. But in this counting the sixteen *vikāras* (eleven senses and the five categories—*śabda*, etc.), the distinction between the five *tanmātras* and the five elements has not been observed on account of there not being any essential difference, the grosser stages being only modified states of the subtler ones (*tanmātrāṇām bhūtebhyah svarūpa-bhedā-bhāvāt avasthā-bhedā-mātrattvāt*). According to this interpretation the eight *Prakṛtis* mean the *prakṛti*, the *mahat*, the *ahaṃkāra* and five categories of *ākāśa*, etc., in their gross forms. The five categories included under the sixteen *vikāras* are the *tanmātras* which are regarded as modifications of the elemental states of the *bhūtas*.

² *yathā tvak-śūnya-vījasya'ṅkura-śaktir nāsti,*
tathā'varaṇa-śūnyasyo'ttara-kārya-śaktir nāstīti bhānāt
kāraṇa-guṇaṃ vino'ttara-ttara-guṇa-viśeṣeṣu...
sva-viśeṣasyo'kta-guṇā-tīṣayā-nupapatteḥ.

Varavara's *bhāṣya* on *Tattvatraya*, p. 58.

envelops the *śabda-tanmātra*. The *sparsa-tanmātra*, as enveloped by the *śabda-tanmātra*, produces the *vāyu* through the accessory help of *ākāśa*. Then from this *sparsa-tanmātra* the *rūpa-tanmātra* is produced. The *rūpa-tanmātra* in its turn envelops the *sparsa-tanmātra* and then from the *rūpa-tanmātra*, as enveloped by the *sparsa-tanmātra*, *tejas* is produced through the accessory help of *vāyu*. Again the *rasa-tanmātra* is produced from the *rūpa-tanmātra*, which again envelops the *rasa-tanmātra*. From the *rasa-tanmātra* enveloped by the *rūpa-tanmātra* water is produced through the accessory help of *tejas*. From the *rasa-tanmātra* the *gandha-tanmātra* is produced which again, enveloped by *rasa-tanmātra*, produces earth through the accessory help of water¹.

Varavara points out that in the *Tattva-nirūpaṇa* another genesis of creation is given which is as follows. *Śabda-tan-mātra* is produced from *bhūtādi* and as a gross state of it *ākāśa* is produced. The *bhūtādi* envelops the *śabda-tanmātra* and the *ākāśa*. From the transforming *śabda-tan-mātra*, through the accessory of the gross *ākāśa* as enveloped by *bhūtādi*, the *sparsa-tanmātra* is produced and from such a *sparsa-tanmātra* *vāyu* is produced. The *śabda-tan-mātra* then envelops both the *sparsa-tanmātra* and the *vāyu*, and from the transforming *sparsa-tanmātra*, through the accessory of *vāyu* as enveloped by *śabda-tanmātra*, the *rūpa-tanmātra* is produced. From the *rūpa-tanmātra*, similarly, *tejas* is produced, and so on. In this view, in the production of the *sparsa* and other *tanmātras* the accessory help of the previous *bhūtas* is found necessary.

As Veṅkaṭanātha accepts the view that the gross *bhūta* of *ākāśa* acts as accessory to the production of the later *bhūtas*, he criticizes the Sāṃkhya view that the gross *bhūtas* are produced from the synthesis of *tanmātras*². The Sāṃkhyists, again, think that the evolution of the different categories from *prakṛti* is due to an inherent teleology and not to the operation of any separate agent. Veṅkaṭa, however, as a true follower of Rāmānuja, repudiates it and asserts that the evolving operation of the *prakṛti* can only proceed through the dynamic operation of God Himself.

¹ Varavara's *bhāṣya* on *Tattvatraya*, p. 59.

² *sāṃkhyāstu pañcā'pi tanmātrāṇi sākṣāt-tāmasā-haṃkāro-tpannāni tatra śabda-tanmātram ākāśa-rambhakam itarāṇi tu tanmātrāṇi pūrva-pūrva-tanmātra-sahakṛtāny uttaro-uttara-bhūtā-rambhakāni'ty āhuḥ tad asat. ākāśād vāyur ity-ādy-ananyathā-siddho-pādānakrama-viśeṣā-bhīdhāna-darśanāt. Nyāya-siddhāntja*, pp. 25-26.

(c) *Refutation of the Atomic Theory of Nyāya in relation to Whole and Part.*

In refuting the *Nyāya* view that the parts attach themselves to each other and thereby produce the whole, and ultimately the partless atoms combine together to form a molecule, Veṅkaṭa introduces the following arguments. So far as the association of the wholes through their parts (beginning from the molecules) through the association of the parts are concerned, Veṅkaṭa has nothing to object. His objection is against the possibility of an atomic contract for the formation of molecules. If the atoms combine together through their parts, then these parts may be conceived to have further parts, and thus there would be infinite regress. If these parts are regarded as not different from the whole, then the different atoms could well be regarded as occupying the same atomic space, and thus they would not produce a conglomeration bigger in size than the constituent atoms. Further, it is not possible to imagine that there should be wholes without the parts also being present. Proceeding in this way, if the atomic combination cannot account for the origin of bigger measures, the possibility of objects of different magnitude through conglomeration (e.g. a hill or a mustard seed) would be inexplicable. If it is said that parts refer to the different sides of an atom, then also it might be urged that a partless atom cannot have sides.

It is held that knowledge, though one, can refer to many, though it is partless. It may also be urged in this connection that if it refers to all objects in their entirety, then the constituent entities would not be referred to separately, and it cannot also refer to the objects separately in parts, for then intelligence itself would not be partless. The Naiyāyika may also, on this analogy, urge that any solution that the idealist may find to his difficulty also applies to the atomic theory. To this the obvious answer of the idealist is that in the case of intelligence, experience testifies that though one and partless it can refer to many, and the Naiyāyikas have no such advantage to show in their favour, for the Naiyāyikas do not admit that in any case wholes may combine except through their parts. The objection cannot be laid against the Buddhist theory of conglomeration (*saṅghāta*), for there such conglomeration is not due to contact. The Naiyāyikas may be supposed to raise an objection regarding the association of all-pervasive entities (*vibhu*) with finite

objects; such an association has to be admitted, for otherwise the association of the self or the *ākāśa* with objects cannot be explained; it is not also possible to hold that all pervasive entities have parts. So ultimately it has to be admitted that the partless all-pervasive entities have contact with finite objects, and if their procedure is accepted, then the same might explain the contact of partless atoms. To this Veṅkaṭa's reply is that the illustration of the contact of all-pervasive entities with finite objects might well be thrown in our face, if we had attempted to refute the view that wholes had no specific qualities; but our main object is to show the inconsistency to which the Naiyāyikas are exposed when they apply their theory that all combinations of wholes must be through parts to the combination of the supposed partless atoms. As a matter of fact, the error lies in the assumption that the atoms are partless. If it is supposed that division of particles must ultimately take us to partless atoms, the obvious reply is that from the division of parts we could not go to the partless, the better way being the acceptance of the smallest visible particles called the *trasareṇu*. If it is urged that if *trasareṇu* is the atom, then it must be invisible, the obvious reply is that there is no such general concomitance between atomic nature and invisibility. The better course, therefore, is to accept the *trasareṇu* as ultimate particles of matter. There is, therefore, no necessity to admit *dvyanuṅka* also.

Veṅkaṭanātha further objects to the Nyāya doctrine of the formation of wholes (*avayavī*) from parts (*avayava*) and points out that if this is to be admitted, then the weight of an object must be due to the weight of the atoms; but the Naiyāyikas hold that the atoms have no weight. The proper view therefore is that the effect, or the so-called whole, is to be regarded as being only a modified condition of the parts. The causal operation in such a view is justified in producing the change in the condition of the causal object and not in producing a new object in the effect or the whole as is supposed by the Naiyāyikas. Again in the consideration of the production of the wholes from parts, when the thread is regarded as the cause of the production of the whole, the cloth, it may be observed that in the process of the production we find various accretions through the gradual addition of one thread after another. In each such addition we have separate wholes, since the process may easily be stopped anywhere; and in such a view we have the

addition of a part to a whole for the production of another whole. This is obviously against the Nyāya view, which would not lend any support to the doctrine that the addition of parts to wholes would produce other wholes. The Naiyāyikas urge that if a whole as a different entity from the parts be not admitted, and if a whole be regarded as nothing more than a collection of atoms, then, the atoms being invisible, the wholes would be invisible. The production of gross wholes not being admitted, the supposed explanation that there is an illusion of grossness in the atoms would also be inadmissible¹. The question now is what is meant by grossness. If it means a new measure, then it is quite admissible in the Rāmānuja view in which the production of separate wholes is not admitted; for just as the atomists would think of the production of the new wholes from atoms, so the Rāmānujist may also agree to the production of a new measure (*parimāṇa*). If the Naiyāyikas object to this and urge that the production of a new measure from the atomic is inadmissible, then they may as well be asked how they would also account for the notion of plurality in a collection of separate entities, each of which may be regarded as one in itself. If it is said that the conception of number as plurality proceeds from a mental oscillation incorporating the diversity, then it may also be argued that from the absence of any such oscillation there may be a failure in noting the separateness which may give rise to a notion of gross measure. Moreover, there is nothing incongruous in the fact that if individuals are not visible the collection may be visible. If the grossness is supposed to mean the occupation of more spatial units than the individual entities, then also it is not inadmissible; for in a collection of small particles they are cognized as occupying different spatial units. If it is urged that since no separate wholes are admitted to be produced the gross dimension cannot be perceptible, the obvious reply is that the perception of grossness has no connection with the perception of wholes. Even before the dyad is produced the combining atoms have to be admitted as occupying more space in their totality than in their individual capacity; for otherwise they in their totality could not produce a bigger dimension. Thus, there is no reason for admitting the production of wholes separate from the parts. Under the same specific

¹ *sthūla-dravyā-bhāve cā'nu-saṁhatau sthūlatvā-dhyāso na siddhyet. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 46.

kind of combination of threads in which the Naiyāyikas think that a cloth could be produced, the Rāmānujists think that the threads under the selfsame condition are the cloth and there is no separate production of cloth¹. But it should not be thought that any slight change in the condition of an object would mean that thereby there is a new object so long as the object remains sufficiently unchanged to be recognized as the same for all practical purposes. The causal operation, according to the Rāmānujists, only brings about new changes of conditions and states in the already existent causal substance. This is thus different from the Sāṃkhya theory of *sat-kārya-vāda*, according to which the effect is already existent in the cause even before the causal operation is set in motion. Veṅkaṭa, therefore, criticizes the Sāṃkhya theory of *sat-kārya-vāda*.

(d) *Criticism of the Sāṃkhya Theory of Sat-kārya-vāda.*

The Sāṃkhya is wrong in supposing that the effect (e.g. the jug) was pre-existent in its cause (e.g. earth), for had it been so the causal operation would have been fruitless. The Sāṃkhya may, however, say that the causal operation serves to manifest what was potentially existing in the cause; the function of causal operation is thus manifestation and not production. This, however, is wrong, for manifestation (*vyāṅga*) and production (*kārya*) are two different words having two different concepts. Manifestation can occur only in the operation of a manifesting agent with the help of its accessories in making an object manifested with regard to a particular sense-organ in a particular place where the manifesting agent exists². It would first be proved that the pre-existent effect is manifested and not produced; only then would it have been worth while to inquire into the conditions of the causal operation to see whether it satisfied the necessary conditions of a manifesting agent. But the Sāṃkhya can hardly succeed in showing that it is so. The Sāṃkhyist says that the effect is pre-existent before the causal

¹ *yadi saṃsṛṣṭās tantava eva paṭas tatas tantu-rāśimātre'pi paṭa-dhāḥ syād ity āha saṃsargāder iti. na hi tvayā'pi tantu-saṃsarga-mātram paṭasyā'samavāyikāraṇam iṣyate tathā sati kuvindā-di-vyāpāra-nairapekṣya-prasaṅgāt ato yādṛśāt saṃsarga-viśeṣād avayavāḥ tava'tpadyate tādrśa-saṃsarga-viśiṣṭās tantavaḥ paṭa iti kvā'tiprasaṅgaḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 48.*

² *kārya-vyāṅgya-śabdau ca vyavasthita-viśayau loke dṛṣṭau kārika-vyāṅjaka-bhedaś ca kārikam samagram apy ekam utpādayati vyāṅjakantu saḥakāri-sampannam samāne-ndriya-grāhyāni samāna-deśa-sthāni tādrśāni sarvānyapi vyanakti. Ibid. pp. 55-56.*

operation; but the causal operation is itself an effect, and if their previous assertion is correct then it was non-existent when the effect was non-manifested. If the causal operation was also existent at the time of the existence of the cause, then the effect would also have been present in the cause in a manifested state. The Sāṃkhya says that what is non-existent cannot be produced, and this implies that a thing is existent because it can be produced, which is, on the face of it, self-contradictory. The theory that the effect is pre-existing in the cause could have been admitted as a last resort if there were no other theory available, but the ordinary notion of causality as invariable and immediate antecedent is quite sufficient to explain the phenomenon of production. Therefore, there is no necessity for such a chimerical theory. Again instead of holding that the effect is nothing more than the potential power in the cause, it is much better to say that the cause has such power by which it can produce the effect under certain conditions¹. Again it may be thought about the instrumental and other accessory agents that if they lead to the generation of effort, as indeed they do, they should also be accepted as subtle potential states of the effect. But this is not admitted by the Sāṃkhyist, for according to him it is only the material cause which is regarded as the potential effect. Otherwise even the *puruṣa*, which, teleologically, is to be regarded as the instrumental cause of the world phenomenon, has to be regarded as a part of *prakṛti*. Again consider the destructive agents. Are the destructible effects already present in the destructible agent? It cannot be so, for they are entirely opposed to each other. If it were not so, it could not destroy it². If it were not so and yet if it would be destroyed by the destructive agent, then everything could be destroyed by everything.

Turning to the function of the material cause, it may be pointed out that it cannot be defined as that from which an effect is produced (*tajjanyatva*); for then even an instrumental cause would be included in the material cause. Nor can it be regarded as a modification (*tadvikāratva*), for then the effect would be only the quality of the cause, and there would be no difference between the cause

¹ *yathā sarveṣu draveṣu tilā eva taila-garbhāḥ s'va-kāraṇa-śaktiṃ sṛjyante tathā tat-tat-kārya-niyata-pūrva-bhāvitayā tat-tad-utpādaka-svabhāvas te te bhāvās tathai've'ti svikāryam. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 59.

² *nāśakeṣu ca nāśya-vṛttir asti na vā. asti cet bahnav tūlavau virodhaḥ na cet katham tadeva tasya nāśakam. Ibid.* p. 60.

and the effect. But we see that the cloth is different from threads¹. If the effect is regarded as identical with the cause on the ground that though there cannot be any contact between the effect and the cause yet the former is never outside the latter, the obvious reply is that in the view that the effect is not a substance there need not be any contact, and if it is a property of the cause it is never beside it². On the view that the effect is a manifestation, it may be asked whether such a manifestation is eternal or itself an effect. In the former case no causal operation is necessary for the manifestation. In the latter case, if the manifestation be regarded as a separate effect, then it virtually amounts to a partial sacrifice of *sat-kārya-vāda*. If for the manifestation of a manifestation causal operation is necessary, then that will lead to a vicious infinite. Moreover, if manifestation is itself regarded as an effect, then since it did not exist before, its coming into being would involve the sacrifice of *sat-kārya-vāda*.

It may be urged that the production of an effect is not of the nature of the effect itself, for one always speaks of an effect as being produced. Thus the effect is different from production. If this is admitted, then what is the difficulty in accepting the view that the effect may be manifested? If the word production be considered more logical, then with regard to it also there may be the same question, whether a production is produced or manifested, and in the former case there would be infinite regress, and in the latter no necessity for the causal operation. With regard to the manifestation also there would be the same difficulty as to whether it is produced or manifested, and in both cases there would be vicious infinite. The reply to this is that production means the operation of the causal agents, and if this operation be again admitted to be produced by the operation of its own causal constituent, and that by another, there is no doubt an infinite regress, but it is not vicious and is admitted by all. When there is a movement of a specific nature in the thread, we say a cloth is produced, or rather at the very first moment of such a movement involving the cloth-state of the thread

¹ *tad-dharmatva-hetū-ktā-doṣād eva ubhayatra paṭā-vasthā tantvā-tmā na bhavati tantubhyo bhinnatvāt ghaṭavad iti prati-prayogasya śakyatvācca. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 60.

² *tādātmya-vīrahe'pi anyatarasyā'dravyatvāt saṃyogā-bhāvaḥ tad-dharma-svabhāvatvād eva aprāpti-parihārāt iti anyathā-siddhasya asādhakatvāt. Ibid.* p. 61.

we say that a cloth is produced¹. It is for this reason that we can speak of an effect as being produced. Such a production has no further production.

(e) *Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness.*

The Buddhists hold that the theory of causal efficiency proves that whatever is existent must be momentary; for the same efficiency cannot be produced again and again. So, in accordance with each efficiency or the production of effects, a separate entity has to be admitted. Since the efficiency at two different moments cannot be identical, the entities producing them also cannot be identical. Since the different characters that are supposed to belong to the same object represent different efficiencies, their attribution to the same object is also erroneous. Therefore, there are as many different entities as there are different character points in a particular moment (*yo yo viruddha-dharmā-dhyāsavān sa sa nānā*). To this Venkaṭanātha's reply is that things are not associated with diverse opposite characters, and that though in certain cases, e.g. the flowing river or the flame of a lamp, changing entities may show the appearance of an unchanging whole, there are undeniable cases of true recognition in all such cases where we perceive that it is the same thing which we both see and touch. The fact that in such cases subconscious impressions may also be working should not be exaggerated to such an extent as to lead us to believe that recognition is a mere affair of memory. Recognition is a case where perception predominates, or at the worst it may be said to be a joint complex of memory and perception. The objection that the presence of memory falsifies recognition is wrong, for not all memory is false. It is also wrong to think that memory is only subjective and as such cannot lead us to an objective determination; for memory is not only subjective but has also an objective reference involving the time character of the objects as past. Again the Buddhists say that the association of many characters to an object is wrong, for each character-point represents the efficiency of a momentary unit, and that, therefore, the association of many characters in recognition is false. To this Venkaṭa's reply is that if each momentary unit

¹ *yadā hi tantvā-dayaḥ vyāprijante tadā paṭa utpadyate iti vyavaharanti ādya-kṣaṇā-vacchinna-paṭatvā-vasthai-va vā paṭo'tpattir ucyate sai'va tadava-sthasyo'tpattir iti bhāṣyam api tad-abhiprāyam eva. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 62.*

is by itself capable of producing any effect, it ought to do it by its own nature, and it ought not to wait for the assistance of other accessories. Following the same analogy, even the unique nature of any momentary unit would not be the same with any other unique nature of any other moment, and thus the idea of identity would be impossible and would land us in nihilism. It is, therefore, wrong to suppose that there is a separate entity corresponding to each and every character unit¹. The Buddhists are supposed to urge further that the experience of recognition identifies a past moment with a present, which is impossible. The reply of Venkaṭa is that though it would be absurd to connect a past moment with the present, there is no incongruity in associating them with an entity which has lived through the past and is also persisting in the present moment². It is true that the affirmation of a past time in the present is contradictory, but the real mystery of the situation is that one time appears as many under diverse conditions (*upādhi*). In such cases the contradiction arises in associating the different conditions in each other's conditioned time unit, but this does not imply that the reference to the different conditions and time is inadmissible; for had it been so, even the concept of a successive series of moments would be inadmissible, since the notion of successive moments implies a reference of before and after, and hence in some way or other it brings together the past, the present and the future. If this be not admitted, the very concept of momentariness would have to be sacrificed³. If it is urged that momentariness (*kṣaṇa-sambandhitva*) means the unique self-identity of any entity, then that leads us to no new knowledge. Thus, the mere association of the past with the present leads us to no temporal self-contradiction.

Again the Buddhists are supposed to urge that perception refers

¹ *viruddhānām deśa-kālā-dya-samāhita-virodhatvena sva-lakṣaṇasyā'pi viruddha-śata-kṣuṇmatayā nānātve tat-kṣodānām ca tathā tathā kṣode kiñcid apy ekam na siddhyet tad-abhāve ca kuto nai'kam iti mādhyamika-matā-pātaḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 66.

² *kāla-dvayasya'nyonyasminn-abhāve'pi tad-ubhaya-sambandhini vastuny abhāvā-bhāvāt yas tu tasmin vastuny asambaddha kālāḥ tasya tatra sabbhāvaṃ na brūmah. Ibid.* p. 68.

³ *pūrvā-para-kāla-yogo hi viruddhaḥ sveno'pādhinā'vacchinnaśyāi'kasya kāla-syā'vāntaro-pādhibhir nānātve'pi tat-tad-upādhinām eva tat-tad-avāntarakāladvayānvaya-virodhaḥ anyā-pekṣayā pūrvā-para-kālayor anyasya viruddhatve kṣaṇa-kālasyā'py anyā-pekṣayā paurvāparyāt tat-kāla-vartitvam api vastuno viruddhyeta. Ibid.*

only to the present moment. It can never lead us to the comprehension of the past. Our notion, therefore, that things existent in the past are persistent in the present is an illusion due to the operation of the subconscious root-impressions which ignore difference between the past and the present, and impose the former on the latter, as silver is imposed on conch-shell. The reply of Veṅkaṭa to this is that perception demonstrates only the presence of an object in the present moment as against its absence; but it does not on that account deny its existence in the past. Just as "this" indicates the presence of an object in the present moment, the perceptual experience "that is this" demonstrates the persistence of the object in the past and in the present¹. If it is urged that perception reveals its object as a present entity, then the Buddhist theory of perception as indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*), which cannot reveal the object as qualified by the temporal character as present, falls to the ground. If it is urged that perception reveals the existence of the object at the moment of the perceptual revelation, then also it is impossible in the Buddhist view, for the momentary object with which the sense-organ was in touch has ceased to exist by the time knowledge was produced. So, in whichever way the Buddhist may take it, he cannot prove that perception reveals an object only as present; whereas in the Rāmānuja view, since the sense-contact, the object as associated with it, and the temporal element associated with them, are continuous, the mental state is also continuous and as such the perception reveals the object as that with which the sense was in contact. Even after the cessation of the sense-contact, the mental state, indicating the perception of the object with which the sense was in contact, is comprehended².

Again if it is argued that whatever is invariably produced from anything must also be produced unconditionally without awaiting any causal operation, then it must be said that when leaves and flowers grow from a plant they do so unconditionally, which is absurd. Moreover, when in a series of momentary entities one entity follows another, it must do so without awaiting any cause; then, on the one hand, since each of the preceding entities has no

¹ *yathā idam iti tat-kāla-sattā grhyate tathā tad idam iti kāla-dvaya-sattvam api pratyakṣeṇai'va grhītam. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 69.

² *asman-mate tv indriya-samprayogasya tad-viśiṣṭa-vastunas tad-upahita-kālā-mśasya ca sthāyitvena dhī-kṣaṇānūvṛttau tad-viśayatayā pratyakṣo-dayāt samprayogā-nantara-kṣaṇe dhīr api nirvartyate. Ibid.* p. 70.

special function to fulfil, it is without any causal efficiency and as such is non-existent; and, on the other hand, since each succeeding entity rises into being without waiting for any cause, it may rise into being in the preceding moment as well, and if this is so there would be no series at all. Again it is argued that since whatever is produced must necessarily be destroyed, destruction as such is unconditioned and takes place without awaiting any cause. Negation can be unconditioned only when it is an implication of position which as such is never produced but is always associated with any and every position (e.g. cow implies the negation of a horse). But negations which are produced always depend on certain causes which can produce them just as much as any positive entity, as in the case of the destruction of a jug by the stroke of a stick. If it is argued that the stroke of a stick does not produce any destruction but only starts a new series of existence in the form of the particles of the jug, then also there are many other illustrations (e.g. the blowing out of a flame) in which the explanation of the starting of a new series is not available. If it is argued that negation is mere nothing and as such does not depend on a cause like chimerical entities, e.g. the lotus of the sky, such an explanation would be meaningless; for negations or destructions are conditioned in time just as are any positive entities, and as such are different from chimerical entities (*pratiyogivād eva niyata-kālatayā pramītasya atyantā-tucchatā-yogāt*). If negations be regarded as similar to chimerical entities, then the former would be as beginningless as the latter, and, if this were so, then there would be no positive entities, all being beginningless negations. If negation were chimerical, then even at the time of negation there could be the positive entities, for negation being chimerical could not condition anything and this would amount to the persistence of all entities and cannot be acceptable to momentarists like the Buddhists. If negations were devoid only of certain specific characters, then they would be like the unique-charactered entities (*svalakṣaṇa*) which are also devoid of certain specific characters. If they were devoid of all characters (*sarva-svabhāva-viraha*), then they could have no place in a proposition which must affirm some predicate of them. If it is said that negation has a character as such, then that being its character it would not be devoid of any character. If such negations were not pre-existent, then their coming into being must depend on some

causal operation. If they were pre-existent, then there would not be any positive entities (*prāk-sattve tu bhāvā-pahnavah*).

If it is urged that the effect-moment as destruction is simultaneous with the cause-moment, then the positive entity and its destruction would occur at the same moment; and if this were so, there is no reason why the destruction should not precede the positive entity. If destruction is admitted to appear at a moment succeeding that of the production of the positive moment, then the destruction would not be unconditioned. If the sequence of the positive entity and its destruction be with reference to the positive entity itself and not to its production, then the positive entity would be the cause of the destruction. It cannot be said that destruction is conditioned only by the position, for its dependence on other accessory agents cannot be repudiated. It cannot be argued that the production of a moment is also its destruction, for that would be self-contradictory. It is sometimes maintained that difference does not constitute destruction, and hence the rise of a different-charactered moment does not imply the destruction of the previous moment. The destruction of a moment has thus to be regarded as a separate fact, and as such it is involved and inherent in the very production of a moment¹. To this the reply is that a different-charactered entity must also be regarded as the destruction of the previous entity, for otherwise it would be impossible to assign any cause to the rise of such a different-charactered entity. If, again, the destruction be the very essence of an entity, then such an essence might as well manifest itself at the time of the rise of the present entity, and thus reduce it to the negation which would mean the universal negation of all things. If it is urged that an entity produces its own destruction by itself, then it would be meaningless to hold that destruction is unconditional; and if it is thus conditioned by itself, it would be idle to suppose that it does not depend on any other condition, for there is no means of knowing it. If it is admitted that an entity produces its own destruction with the help of other accessories, then the doctrine of momentariness fails. It has also been shown before that the affirmation of momentariness is distinctly contradicted by the phenomenon of recognition

¹ *yad yato bhidyate na tat tasya dhvamsaḥ yathā rūpasya rasaḥ. dhvamsas tu kasyacid eva bhavati iti tad-ātmakaḥ. ataḥ sva-tpattāu eva svātmani dhvamse sannihite katham kṣaṇā-ntaram prāpnuyāt. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 72.

as elaborated above. Again when the momentarist says that all things are momentary, how does he explain the fact that the effect-moment is caused by the cause-moment? If causation means nothing more than immediate succession, then the universe at a particular moment is caused by the universe at the preceding moment. The problem is whether such immediacy of succession is by itself competent to produce the effect-moment or needs the accessories of space and time. If such accessories are not necessary, then spatial co-existence or concomitance (as in the case of smoke and fire) ought not to lead to any inference. If such accessories are awaited, then it would mean that whatever is produced at any unit of space has also its cause in that unit of space and that unit of time. On such a view the effect-moment would be in the space and time of the cause, and thus the cause-space or cause-time would be co-extensive in two moments. If this were admitted, then the momentarist might as well admit that the cause persists in two moments. So, the momentarist who does not admit persisting time and space cannot also admit that any sequence should be conditioned by them. If it is said that a cause-moment starts its effect in the very space or time in which it exists, then there would be no unity of the series between the cause and the effect; and, by supposition, they are regarded as having different sets of moments for themselves. There might be superimposition but no unity of the series. If the unity of the series be not admitted, then the expectation that just as when a cotton-seed is dyed there is redness in the cotton, so in the moral sphere whenever there is the *vāsanā* or root-inclination there is also its fruit, fails. The co-existence of the causal-moment and the effect-moment does not imply the unity that is expected in a normal cause and effect relation, and it would therefore be difficult to say that such an effect has such a cause, for the momentaristic theory cannot establish the bond between cause and effect.

Let us now analyse the concept of momentariness. It may mean the fact that (1) an entity is associated with a moment (*kṣaṇa-sambandhavattva*), or (2) association with a momentary unit of time (*kṣaṇa-kāla-sambandhatvam*), or (3) existence for only one moment (*kṣaṇa-mātra-varitva*), or (4) absence of relation with two moments (*kṣaṇa-dvaya-sambandha-śūnyatva*), or (5) identity with the moment of time (*kṣaṇa-kālatvam*), or (6) being determinant of the moment-

character (*kṣaṇa-pādhitvam*). The first alternative is inadmissible, for even those who believe in persistent entities admit that such entities, since they persist in time, are associated with a moment. The second alternative is inadmissible because the Buddhists do not believe in any separate category of time apart from the *kṣaṇa*¹. On such an admission, again, an entity as time which is beyond a *kṣaṇa* has to be virtually accepted, which contradicts the doctrine of momentariness. The third alternative is directly contradicted in the experience of recognition which testifies to the fact that we touch what we see. The fourth view is also for the same reason contradicted in experience; and if any supposed entity which is not itself a *kṣaṇa* is not associated with two time-moments, then it can have only a chimerical existence, and, curiously enough, the Buddhists often compare all existent entities with chimerical objects². The fifth alternative is also inadmissible, for just as an entity exists in a unit of space and cannot be identical with it, so also it cannot be identical with the time in which it exists, and it is directly contradicted in experience. The sixth alternative is also inadmissible for the reason that if objects were in their own nature determinants of moments, then there would be nothing to explain our notion of temporal succession³; and all our experiences depending on such a succession would be contradicted. If things did not persist in time and were absolutely destroyed without leaving any trace (*nīranvaya-vināśah*), then the ordinary experience of the world in which things are done for the purpose of reaping their benefits could not be explained. The man who had done some work would not wait a moment for his reward. In the Rāmānuja view persistence of the self is well explained in self-consciousness. The theory that such a self-consciousness refers only to the succeeding terms produced in the series of the *ālaya-vijñāna* is only a theory which has no verification, and such a theory is directly contradicted by the well attested maxim that the experience of one individual cannot be remembered by another (*nānya-dṛṣṭam smaraty anyah*). There is also no way in which the

¹ *kālam evā'nicchatas te ko'sau kṣaṇa-kālah kaś ca tasya sambandhaḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 74.

² *yasmīnmanityatā nāsti kāryatā'pi na vidyate tasmīn yathā kha-puspādāviti śakyam hi bhāṣitum. Ibid.* p. 75.

³ *yadā hi ghaṭā-dayaḥ svarūpeṇa kṣaṇo-pādhayaḥ syuḥ kāla-tāratamya-dhīḥ kutrā'pi na bhavet. Ibid.*

terms of the *ālaya-vijñāna* series may be associated with volitional notions.

If the momentariness of entities means that they are modified or conditioned by moments, then also the question arises if they are not themselves momentary, how can they be conditioned by moments? If the conditioning by moments means that causal collocations represent only the previous moment of the effect (*kārya-prāga-bhāva-samanvita*), then it may be urged by the opponent that it would be difficult to refute such momentariness. On the side of the opponent it may be further said that the criticism that the conglomeration of the causes is something different from, or identical with the conglomerating entities, cannot be made; for, in either case, since such an entity would, according to the Rāmānujists, be a persisting one, it would not condition a moment. The reply is that conglomeration can neither mean relation nor the related entities; for the word "conglomeration" cannot apply specifically to each of the entities, and as such it is to be admitted that the causal entities, collected together by some condition, represent the conglomeration. If such entities are regarded as determining the moment, then they must necessarily be persistent. If it is held that the combining condition is the condition of the *kṣāṇa*, then the reply is that the production must be due to the joint operations of the combining conditions and the specific collocating entities. Of these the combining condition is not momentary, and since the collocating entities would stay till they were combined, they are also not momentary. The condition of the *kṣāṇa* seems, therefore, to be the last accessory agent or operation which associates with it the previous entities or operations and thereby behaves as the condition of the moment immediately antecedent to the effect. There is thus nothing momentary in it. Time being unlimited in its nature cannot be parcelled out in moments. The supposed moments can be attributed to an operation or an existing entity only for specifying particular states or conditions for practical purposes; but an entity that exists, exists in time, and thus outgrows the limits of a previous or later moment. So, though a specific unit of time may be regarded as momentary, the entity that exists, therefore, is not momentary in the nature of its own existence. Since the Buddhists do not admit time, they are not justified in speaking of momentary time in which things are sup-

posed to exist. Nor are they justified in holding that nature in itself suffers change in every moment, for that virtually amounts to the existence of a persisting entity which suffers modification¹.

The Buddhist assumption that things are destroyed entirely, and there are no elements in them that persist (*nirāṇvaya-vināśa*), on the analogy that flames are destroyed without leaving any trace of their existence, is false. For, from various other instances, e.g. the case of jugs, cloth, etc., we find that their destruction means only a change of state and not entire annihilation; and from this analogy it is reasonable to suppose that the elements of the flame that are destroyed are not completely annihilated but persist in invisible forms. Even when a flame is destroyed, the tip of the wick is felt to be slightly warm, and this is certainly to be interpreted as a remnant of the heat possessed by the flame. If the last stage in the destruction of an entity be regarded as lapsing into entire annihilation, it would have no causal efficiency and as such would be non-existent. If the last stage is non-existent, then its previous stage also would have no causal efficiency and would be non-existent, and so on. This would lead to universal non-existence.

(f) *Refutation of the Cārvāka criticism against
the Doctrine of Causality.*

The problem of causality naturally brings in the question of time relation between the cause and the effect, i.e. whether the effect precedes the cause, or whether the cause precedes the effect, or whether they are simultaneous. If the effect precedes the cause, then it would not depend upon causal operation for its existence and it would then be an eternally existent entity like space. If it is not existent, then it cannot be brought into existence by any means, for a non-existent entity cannot be produced. If the effect were produced before the cause, then the so-called "cause" could not be its cause. If the cause and effect were simultaneous, then it would be difficult to determine which is the cause and which the effect. If the cause precedes the effect, then, again, it may be asked whether the effect was already existent or beside it. If it is already existent, there is no need of causal operation, and that which is to happen

¹ *sarva-kṣaṇikatvaṃ sādhayitum upakramya sthira-dṛavya-vṛtti-kṣanika-vikāravād iti katham dṛṣṭāntayema teṣu ca na tvad-abhimatam kṣaṇikatvaṃ pradīpā-di vād āśutara-vināśitva-mātreṇa kṣaṇikato-kteḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 77.

later cannot be considered to be co-existent with that which was at a prior moment. If the effect was not co-existent with the cause, then what would be the bond which would determine why a particular cause should produce a particular effect and not others? Since production cannot be synonymous with what is produced, it must be different from it. Being a different entity, it may be demanded that production should have a further production, and that another, and this will lead to infinite regress.

To these objections Veṅkaṭanātha's reply is that the opposition of negation with position can hold good only with reference to the same unit of time and space. Therefore, the non-existence of the effect at a prior moment has no opposition to its existence at a later moment. That there is a relation between the cause of a prior moment and the effect of a later moment can be directly experienced. Such a relation is, of course, not contact, but one of dependence, of one another, as prior and later, as is perceived in experience. The dialectical criticism that production, being a separate entity, demands a further production and so forth cannot be applied to the Rāmānuja view; for here the effect is regarded as only a modified condition or state of the cause. The effect depends upon the cause in the sense that it is identical with it as being its state¹. Identity here, of course, does not mean oneness but identity in difference. The objection that no bond can be established in difference is found contradicted in our experience of cause and effect, and in many other cases, e.g. in the instance where a speaker tries to produce a conviction in his hearers who are different from him. The objection that a cause can be called a cause only by virtue of its doing some operation (*kiñcit-kara*) and that its causality towards that operation must again involve the effectuation of some other operation, and thus there is an infinite regress, is invalid; for the existence of a number of operations (as given in experience) in producing an effect cannot lead to a vicious infinite, for only those operations which are revealed in experience can be accepted as having happened. In the case of spontaneous production (*dvārā-n-tara-nirapekṣa*), there is no necessity to admit any series of operations as the causality as invariable antecedent is directly given in

¹ *na hi vāyam abhivṛyaktim vā kāraṇa-samavāyā-dikam vā janme'ti brūmah. kintū'pādānā-vasthā-viśeṣaṃ tasya kāryā-vasthā-sāmānādhikarānya-vyapadeśaḥ tādātmyena tad-āśraya-vṛttech. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 80.

experience. The objection that a cause is a cause because it produces the effect involves the previous existence of the effect, and hence the futility of the causal operation is invalid; for causality means the happening of an operation suitable to the becoming of the effect¹. This does not involve the prior existence of the effect, since the happening of the operation leading to the effect refers to the effect not as an existing fact but as anticipated in the mind of the observer (*kurvattva-nirūpaṇam tu bhāvinā'pi kāryeṇa buddhyā-rohiṇā siddheḥ*). The objection that if effect was a nature of the cause then it would be already there, and if it was not it could not come into being at any time, is also invalid on the supposition that there is an invariable uniformity of relationship (*niyata-pratisambandhika-svabhāvatā eva*). The effect entity is numerically and characteristically different from the cause entity, but yet the former and the latter are related to one another as mutually determining each other (*anyo-nya-nirūpyatayā*). The objection, that since the separate entities in a causal conglomeration cannot produce the effect, the conglomeration as a whole could not produce the effect, is invalid; for the capacity of the individual entities is defined in terms of their capacity in joint production (*samuditānām kārya-karatvam eva hi pratyekam api hi śaktiḥ*). The further objection that since the cause is destroyed on its way to produce the effect, it (cause) itself being destroyed, ought not to be able to produce the effect, is not valid; for the production of the effect requires only the existence of the cause at a prior moment (*pūrva-kṣaṇa-sattvam eva hi kāraṇasya kāryo-payogi*).

Again it is urged that the concept of invariable priority which determines causation is itself indeterminable, for time as duration has no quality in itself. Priority and posteriority therefore have to be determined by other imposed conditions (*upādhi*), and the causal phenomena could be regarded as such an imposed condition. If this is so, priority and posteriority, which are in this view supposed to originate from causal conditions, cannot be regarded as determining causality. Again if conditions are supposed to split up time as pure duration into succession, then, since time is not regarded as discrete, the supposed conditions would have to refer to the whole of time, in which case there would be no succession.

¹ *bhāvi-kāryā-nuṅuṇa-vyāpāratattvam eva kāraṇasya kurvattvam. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 81.

Moreover, if the conditions were to refer to certain parts, discrete time has first to be accepted¹. The reply to the above objection is that if by the force of the above argument time as succession is not admitted, then if things are in time they are eternal, and if they are not, they are chimerical; which is absurd. The objector is again supposed to urge that, all universals being eternally existing, priority and posteriority can never be referred mutually among them, or between them and individuals. Where the rise of the constellation Rohiṇī is inferred from the rise of the constellation Kṛttikā, priority and posteriority are not between the two. The reply is to be found in the experience that such a qualified entity is produced from such other qualified entity where the universal and the individual merge together in a complex whole—a qualified entity². Definite causal relations with definite effects are known from large experience of invariable antecedence between them, and this repudiates the idea of any denial of the uniformity of causal relation relating specific cause to specific effect. The notion of the plurality of causes is also therefore repudiated for the same reason. Where the same effect seems to be produced by different causes it is due to mal-observation and non-observation. A closer observation by experts reveals that though certain effects may be apparently similar yet they have specificity in their individual nature. By virtue of such specificity, each one of them can be referred to its own determinate cause. The negation-antecedent-to-being (*prāga-bhāva*) cannot by itself be regarded as determining the effect, for such negations in themselves, being beginningless, could not explain the occasion of an effect's coming into being. Moreover, such negations involve in some form or other the effect to which it would give rise as its constituent; for, otherwise it could not be referred to or defined as a negation-antecedent-to-being of the effect. If an effect, being existent, be without any cause, it would be eternal; and if it be non-existent without any cause, then it would be chimerical. If the effect could happen by fits and starts, then its uniform dependence upon the immediate and invariable ante-

¹ *kāle ca pūrvattvam upādhi-kṛtaṃ sa ca upādhir yady ayam eva tadā tad-adhīnam kālasya pūrvattvam kālā-dhīnaṅco'pādher ity anyonyā-śrayaḥ. anyā-pekṣāyām cakrakam anavasthā'pi kālasya kramavad upādhi-sambandha-bhedād bhedaśca kṛtsnai-ka-deśa-vikalpa-duḥṣṭha iti. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 82.

² *etad-dharmakād etad-dharmakam upajātam iti jāty-upādhi-kroḍhi-kṛta-rūpeṇa vyaktiṣu niyama-siddheḥ. Ibid.* p. 83.

cedents could not be explained. Thus the doctrine of causality stands unimpeached by any of the objections brought forward by the Cārvākas.

(g) *The Nature of the Senses according to Veṅkaṭanātha.*

The Naiyāyikas think that the visual organ has for its material cause the eight elements, for though it cannot perceive any other sense-data it can grasp colours like a lamp; and, following a similar course of argument, they hold that the tactile organ is made up of air, the gustatory organ, of water, the smell-organ, of earth, and the auditory organ, of space-element (*ākāśa*). Veṅkaṭanātha's main objection is directed against viewing the senses as the specific and most important instruments of the corresponding perceptions on the ground that in the act of perception many accessories, such as the subject, object, light, sense-organ, sense-contact, absence of obstruction, and other accessories participate in such a manner that it is impossible to single out the sense-organ as being the most important instrument (*karana*). Even if the sense-faculties be regarded as different from the sense-organs, they may be considered as the special ways of the ego-hood (*ahaṃkāra*), and this is testified by scriptural texts. Merely on the ground that the visual sense-faculty can perceive colours, it would be wrong to argue that this sense-faculty is made up of the same element as colour; for the visual sense-faculty is not by itself responsible for the colour-perception. The special predominance of the visual organ over other accessories in colour-perception, by which its affinity with the colour element may be shown, cannot be established.

Veṅkaṭa urges that the same reasons that lead to the acceptance of the five cognitive senses lead also to the admission of the five conative senses and *manas* (mind). The function of the cognitive senses is believed to be of a special kind by which the senses can operate only in a special manner and under special conditions, and the same applies also to the conative senses. These are as much associated with the subtle body as the cognitive senses, and the view of Yādavaprakāśa that the conative senses came into being with this body and were destroyed with its destruction is regarded as false¹. *Manas*, being a part of the evolution of *prakṛti*, cannot be regarded as all-pervasive. The ordinary argument that that which,

¹ *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 24.

being eternal, is not the material constituent of any other thing is all-pervasive, is faulty, for this is directly contradicted by the testimony of the scriptures, and according to the Rāmānuja view atoms are not the ultimate constituent of things. Again the argument that that which is devoid of specific qualities, like time, is all-pervasive is also untenable, for according to the Rāmānuja view there is nothing which is devoid of specific quality. The argument that since mind can remember very distant experiences it is all-pervasive is also faulty, for such remembrances are due to the contact of mind with specific subconscious root-impressions.

The senses are to be regarded as subtle (*sūkṣma*) or atomic, and yet by their functioning or in association with other things they may behave as being spread out¹. It is for this reason that in the bodies of animals of different dimensions the same senses may spread over smaller or larger areas through such functions without which they have to be admitted as becoming larger or smaller according to the dimensions of the bodies in which they may operate. If *manas* is all-pervasive, or if it occupies the span of the body, then the cognition by all the five senses may arise at one moment. The senses are regarded by Veṅkaṭa as abiding in the heart, whence they move through respective nerves to the particular sense-organs.

The sense operates by its function called *vyrtti*, which moves almost with the speed of light and grasps its object. There is thus a gradual operation of the sense-function passing from one place to another which, on account of its high speed, seems to be operative with regard to the object near at hand and also at a distance. This produces the appearance of simultaneous perception. The same process also holds good in the case of auditory perception. Since, according to the Rāmānuja school, senses are immaterial, their functions also are to be described as immaterial².

¹ *siddhe'pi hy aṇutve vikāsatayā vyrtti-viśeṣa-dvārā'pyāyaka-pracayād vā prthutvam aṅgikāryam. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 98.

² According to the Sāṃkhya view, where also the senses are regarded as immaterial, the *vyrtti* is regarded as their transformation in the form of the object and not contact. The Yoga view, however, as explained by Bhikṣu, is that the *citta* passes through the senses and comes in contact with the object and is transformed into its form in association with the senses. The transformation, therefore, is not of the *citta* alone but of the *citta* together with the senses.

(h) *The Nature of ākāśa according to Veṅkaṭanātha.*

Veṅkaṭa tries to establish in some detail the supposed fact that the *ākāśa* is perceived by the visual organ, as in our well attested experience in perceiving the blue sky or the scarlet sky in the evening and also the movement of the birds through the sky. He denies the position that the existence of *ākāśa* can only be inferred through movements, for the *ākāśa* exists even in thick walls where no movement is possible. *Ākāśa* is not its pure vacuity; its existence is manifested by its non-obstruction to the movements of animals. Some of the Buddhists and the Cārvākas argue that there are only four elements and that *ākāśa* is only the negation (*āvaraṇā-bhāva*). We do not perceive any *ākāśa* in a wall, but when it is split up we say that we perceive *ākāśa*. Such an *ākāśa* cannot be anything but a negation of obstruction; for if this is not admitted, then there is no negation of obstruction anywhere, all such cases being explainable on the supposition of *ākāśa*. It is this negation of obstruction, pure vacuity, which produces the illusion of some positive entity like a mirage. Such experiences may well be illustrated in those instances where the negation of pain is experienced as pleasure and negation of light as blue darkness. We are all familiar with the fact that mere linguistic usage sometimes produces an idea without there being an entity behind it, when someone says "the sharp horn of a hare."

To this Veṅkaṭa's reply is that the existence of categories can only be justified by an appeal to experience, and we all have a positive experience of *ākāśa*. What we call negation is also a positive entity. The very negative concept can well be regarded as a positive notion. It is useless to argue that the negative concept differs from all positivity, for each specific category has its own special notion, and it is futile to argue why a particular entity should have its own peculiar concept¹. A negation is always defined as the absence of the positive entity of which the negation is affirmed. The positivity of *ākāśa* is established by its positive experience. The view that there is no *ākāśa* in occupied space is wrong, for when the occupying object is cut asunder we perceive the *ākāśa* and we affirm of it the negation of occupation. Thus the negation of occupation (*āvar-*

¹ *nā'bhāvasya niḥsvabhāvatā abhāva-svabhāvatayai'va tat-siddheḥ svānya-svabhāvatayā siddhis tu na kasyā'pi. na ca svena svabhāvena siddhasya para-svabhāva-virahād asattvam atiprasaṅgāt. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 113.

anā-bhāvā) is the predicate which is affirmed of the positive entity *ākāśa*, for in our experience of *ākāśa* we perceive that there is no occupation (*āvaraṇa*) in the *ākāśa* (*ihā'varaṇam nāsti*). If this is not admitted, then such perceptions as "Here is an object" would be inexplicable, for the word "here" would have no meaning if it were mere absence of negation. If, again, *ākāśa* was absent in an occupying object, it would be unreasonable to define *ākāśa* as the absence of such an object; since nothing exists in itself, everything would on the above analogy become its own negation¹. The fact that *ākāśa* sometimes seems to show the false appearance of a surface is due also to the fact that it is an entity on which certain qualities are illusorily imposed. If it were mere nothing, there could have been no predication of false qualities to it. When it is said that the negation of pain is falsely conceived as pleasure, the fact is that the so-called negation is only another kind of positivity². In the case of chimerical entities such as the sharp hare's horn there is an affirmation of horn in the hare, and when the horn is known there is a deliberation in our mind whether our notion of sharpness is true or false. The affirmation of sharpness, therefore, is not on mere negation. The falsity of chimerical predication also consists of affirming a predicate to a subject which in the course of nature it does not possess, and there is nothing like pure falsity or non-existence in such notions. When one says that there is no occupation here he must show the locus where the occupation is denied or negated; for a negation implies a locus. The locus of the negation of occupation would be pure space (*ākāśa*). If the negation of occupation meant absolute non-existence, then that would land us in nihilism. If the occupation (*āvaraṇa*) did exist anywhere or did not exist anywhere, then in either case the production or destruction of such occupation would be undemonstrable; for an existent thing is never produced nor destroyed and a non-existent thing is neither produced nor destroyed. Thus, for these and other considerations, *ākāśa*, which is neither eternal nor all-pervasive, has to be regarded as a separate positive entity and not as mere negation of occupation. *Dik* or the quarter of the sky, north, south, etc., should

¹ *na tv ākāśa-mātram āvaraṇeṣv avidyamānatayā tad-abhāvu ākāśa iti cā'yuktaṃ sarveṣāṃ svasminn avidyamānatayā svā-bhāvatva-prasaṅgāt. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 114.

² *duḥkhā-bhāve sukhā-ropāt abhāvasya bhāvā-nyatva-mātram eva hy asatvaṃ siddhaṃ tena ca svarūpa-sann evā'sau. Ibid.*

not be regarded as separate entities, but it is the sky, or *ākāśa*, which appears as different kinds of *dik* on account of its association with different conditions of the perceiver and the perceived space-relations.

(i) *Nature of Time according to Veṅkaṭanātha.*

Time is eternal and beginningless, for any conception in which it might be held that time were produced would involve the view that time was non-existent before its production. This, as it is easy to see, involves a notion of before and after, and as such it may be presumed that without the assumption of time even the production of time cannot be perceived. Time is directly perceived as a quality of all perceived entities. If time is regarded as being only inferable, then since it is intimately associated with all perceptible things the non-apprehension of time by direct perception would mean that the perceived objects also are not directly apprehended but known by inference. Even those who deny the separate existence of time explain it as an unreal notion of things in relation with the movement of the sun. Thus, the category of time, whether it is admitted as real or unreal, is taken as a quality or mode of perceived things and is apprehended along with them. There is no other time than what is conceived as before and after, as modes of our experience. It may be argued that with the exception of recognition all our experiences relate to the present and as such in the apprehension of objects by perception there is no notion of before and after which constitutes time, so there is no direct perception of time. To this the suggested discussion is whether, when objects are apprehended, they are apprehended as present or not, or whether only the notion of "the present" is apprehended without any association of any other object. Such views are directly contradicted in such experience as "I see this," where the object is demonstrated as being perceived at the present time. Perception thus refers both to the object and to its temporal character as present. It cannot be said that the temporal character is only illusorily imposed upon the perceived object; for in that case it must be shown that the temporal character was at least somewhere perceived or known independently by itself. It is argued that the sense-characters are perceived as "present," and this notion of the "present" is illusorily imposed upon time. To this it may be replied that in the passing series of the momentary

sense-characters it is impossible to point out anything as “present,” since these are only perceived as “before” and “after”; by the time anything could be designated as “present” it is already past. Thus the point of time as present is undemonstrable. If the time as present may be affirmed of any sense-character, it may be affirmed of time itself. Again if time were non-existent, what is the use of assuming its imposition? If it is held that there is only the imposition of time-conception without any entity of which it is affirmed, then it would become the blind phenomenalism of the nihilists. In the Rāmānuja view of things it is possible somehow to affirm the notion as “present” of time just as it is affirmed of the sense-characters. It cannot be said that time is merely a character of the sensibles, and that there is no other entity as time apart from these sensibles; for the temporal character of the sensibles as “present” is only possible on the assumption that there is such a thing as “present” time. Again if the “present” is denied, then that would mean universal negation, for the past and future are never perceived by us. Moreover, the present cannot be conceived as something different or unrelated and independent of the past and the future. If the past and the future were regarded as constituting the present, then our experience would only be related to the past and the future and there would be no possibility for any of our present afflictions. “Present” thus may be regarded as that series of operations which has begun but has not as yet ended in fruition.

Though time is one and eternal it can appear as limited and many, like all other objects which, though they may remain as one, may yet be supposed to be many and different in respect of the states through which they may seem to pass by virtue of the various conditional qualities (*upādhi-sambandha*) with which they may be associated. Though this view may be regarded as sufficient in explaining the notion of limited time, yet there are others who think that unless time itself is supposed to be constituted of moments through which time as changeable may be apprehended, the association of conditions to explain the notion of limitation will be impossible; for such an association presupposes the fact of limitation in time to which alone the conditions could be referred. Thus, Yādavaprakāśa holds that time is beginningless and endless, and continually transforms itself through moments by which the divisions of time as hours, days and nights can be spanned; through

which again the transformation of all changeable objects can be measured¹. In this view the conditions are relative from the point of view of each person, who collects the passing time-units and forms his own conceptions of minutes, hours and days from his own point of calculation according to his own needs. A valid objection, however, may be raised against such a view when it is pointed out that the criticism that was made against the association of conditional qualities to partless time may also be raised against the present view in which time is regarded as constituted of parts as moments. For it may well be said that the parts would require further parts for associating the conditional qualities; and if it does, there would be a vicious infinite and if it does not, then it will be admitted that the whole of a moment would not require a specification of parts for the association of conditional qualities. If the whole of a moment does not stand in need of any specification of parts for such association, why should time as a whole require it? The explanation that the association of a conditional quality with a part means its association with the whole on the analogy of the association of qualities in a substance is equally applicable to partless time. Veṅkaṭa points out that though the moments are adventitiously conceived on account of the variety of conditional qualities, time in itself is eternal. "Eternal" means that it is never destroyed. Time is thus co-existent with God. It is a material cause with reference to its own modifications and is the efficient cause with reference to everything else. The scriptural pronouncements that God is all-pervading can be harmonized with the all-pervading character of time by conceiving it to be co-existent with God.

(j) *The Nature of Soul according to Veṅkaṭanātha.*

Veṅkaṭanātha first tries to establish the existence of the soul as different from the body, and in this connection tries to refute the well-known Cārvāka arguments which do not admit the existence of a soul as different from the body to which the former may be supposed to belong. The main emphasis of Veṅkaṭa's arguments lies in the appeal to the testimony of our experience which manifests the body as a whole and its parts as belonging to an "I," as

¹ *yādavaprakāśair apyabhyupagato' yam pakṣaḥ kālo' nādy-ananto' jasra-kṣaṇa-pariṇāmī muhūrta-horātrā-di-vibhāga-yuk sarveṣāṃ pariṇāma-spanda-hetuḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, pp. 148-149.

when we say “my body,” “my head,” etc. He says that though we have various parts of one body and though some of these may be destroyed, yet in spite of such variations they are all supposed to belong to one unchangeable unity, the self, which seems to persist through all changes of time. If the experiences belonged to the different parts of the body, then on the removal of any of the limbs the experiences which are associated with that limb could not be remembered; for it cannot be admitted that there is a transmission of experiences from one limb to another. Even a mother’s experience cannot be shared by the foetus. It cannot also be supposed that the experiences of the different limbs are somehow collected as impressions in the heart or brain; for it can neither be directly perceived, nor is there a datum which can lead to such an inference. Moreover, if there is a continual accumulation of impressions in the heart or brain, such a matter of conglomeration would be different at each moment through dissipation and aggregation of its constituent impressions, and as such it would be impossible to explain the fact of memory through such a changing entity¹.

The unified behaviour of an individual cannot also be regarded as being due to the co-operation of a number of individual units of consciousness; for, in that case there must be individual purposes in each of them, leading to a conflict, and if they have no such purposes, there is no reason why they should co-operate together. If it is assumed that these individual constituent conscious-entities are naturally such that they are engaged in serving one another without any conflict, then the more normal possibility would be that, having no natural attachment or antipathy, they would cease to act, and this would result in a cessation of all activities on the part of the constituted individual as a whole. Again whenever an animal is born it is perceived as endowed with certain instinctive tendencies towards certain action, such as sucking the mother’s breast, which demonstrates its attachment in that direction and necessarily presupposes an experience of that kind in a previous birth. This shows that there is a self which is different and distinct from the body and its parts. The experiences and their root-impressions

¹ *sarva-bodhaiś ca hyt-kośe samskāra-dhānam ityapi
na dr̥ṣṭam na ca tat-kṛptaṁ līṅgaṁ kim api dr̥śyate
na ca samskāra-kośas te saṅghātā-tmā prati-kṣaṇam
pracayā-pacayābhyām syād bhinnah smartā’tra ko bhavet.*

also explain the diversity of intellectual powers, tendencies and inclinations¹.

It cannot also be held that the units of consciousness of the different parts of the body are in themselves too subtle and potential to manifest themselves in their individual capacity, but they may yet co-operate together jointly to manifest the consciousness of the individual as a whole; for even the smallest molecular animals are found to be endowed with behaviouristic action. Moreover, if the units of consciousness emanating from the different parts of the body are admitted to be only potentially conscious, then it is absurd to suppose that they will be able to produce actual consciousness by mere conglomeration.

Again consciousness is a quality and as such it must await a substratum to which it would belong, but in the view in which consciousness is supposed to be material, the fundamental distinction between a quality and a substance is not observed². It cannot also be held that consciousness is but a special modification of certain of the bodily elements, for this would only be a theory, which cannot be attested by any experience. Again to such of the Cārvākas as admit the validity of inference, it may be urged that the body is a matter-complex; and, being but a conglomeration and sensible, is material like any other material object, whereas consciousness, being something entirely different from the body by virtue of its being consciousness, is also entirely distinct from it. The ordinary illusory notion which confuses the self with the body can be explained in diverse ways. The objector may say that if from such notions as "my body," "my hand," etc., it is argued that the self is something different from the body, then from such expressions as "my self" one may as well argue that the self has a further self. To this Veṅkaṭa's reply is that such expressions as "my hand" and "my body" are like such other expressions as "my house" and "my stick," where the distinction between the two things is directly apprehended. In such an expression as "my self" we have a linguistic usage in which the possessive case can be explained only in the sense of ideality, having only such an imaginary distinction between the two terms as may be in the mind of the observer at the

¹ *evaṃ manuṣyā-dī-śarīra-prāpti-daśāyām adṛṣṭa-viśeṣāt pūrva-janmā-nubhava-saṃskāra-bhedair evaṃ abhiruci-bhedāś ca yujyante. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, pp. 153-154.

² *nanu caitanyam iti na kaścid guṇaḥ, yasyā'dhāro'pekṣyaḥ kintu yā'sau yuṣ-mākaṃ caitanya-sāmagrī sai'va caitanya-padārthaḥ syāt. Ibid.* p. 154.

moment and due to his emphasizing a difference from a conditional point of view. Veṅkaṭa holds that further arguments may also be brought forward by the Cārvākas¹, to which effective replies may be given. But instead of going into a big chain of arguments and counter arguments the most effective way is to appeal to the testimony of scripture which in its self-validity affirms both positively and by implication the existence of the permanent self as distinct from the body. The testimony of the scriptures cannot be rebutted or refuted by mere speculative arguments.

There is a view that consciousness belongs to the senses and that cognitions through the different senses are integrated together in the same body, and it is by that means that an object perceived by the eye is also identified as the same entity as that grasped by the tactile apprehension. Another view is that the pleasurable, painful feelings associated with sense-cognitions can themselves attract or repulse an individual to behave as a separate entity who is being attracted or repelled by a sense-object. Veṅkaṭa objects to such a doctrine as being incapable of explaining our psychological experience in which we feel that we have touched the very thing that we have seen. This implies that there is an entity that persists over and above the two different cognitions of the two senses; for the

¹ The additional arguments of the Cārvākas are as follows:

When one says "I, a fat person, know," it is difficult to say that the fatness belongs to the body and the knowledge to some other entity. If the expression "my body" seems to imply that the body is different, the expression "I am fat" demonstrates the identity of the body and the self. What is definitely perceived cannot be refuted by inference, for in that case even fire could be inferred as cold. Perception is even stronger than scriptures and so there is no cause of doubt in our experience; therefore there is no reason to have recourse to any inference for testing the perceptual experience. The Sāṃkhya argument, that those which are the results of aggregation must imply some other entity for which the aggregation has been named (just as a bedstead implies someone who is to lie on the bed), is ineffective; for the second-grade entity for which the first-grade conglomeration is supposed to be intended may itself await a third grade entity, and that another, and this may lead to a vicious infinite. To stop this vicious infinite the Sāṃkhya thinks that the self does not await for any further entity. But instead of arbitrarily thinking the self to be ultimate, it is as good to stop at the body and to think that the body is its own end. The argument that a living body must have a soul because it has life is false, for the supposed self as distinct from the body is not known to us by other means. One might as well say that a living body must have a sky-lotus because it has life. The Cārvāka ultimately winds up the argument and says that the body is like an automatic machine which works by itself without awaiting the help of any other distinct entity presiding over it, and is the result of a specific modification of matter (*ananyā-dhīṣṭhita-svayaṃ-vāhaka-yantra-nyāyād vicitra-bhūta-pariṇati-viśeṣa-sambhavo'yaṃ deha-yantraḥ*). *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 157.

visual and the tactile sense-organs are limited to the apprehension of their own peculiar sense-data or sensibles, and none of them is competent to affirm the identity of the object through two different sense-appearances or sense-characteristics. Veṅkaṭa further says that the view that the impressions of the various senses accumulate in the heart, and that it is through such an integration of experiences in the heart that there is an appearance of one concrete individual, is wrong; for no such centre of integration of impressions inside our bodies is known to us, and if such a centre in the body is to be admitted there is no harm in admitting a separate soul in which these impressions inhere¹.

Consciousness also cannot be regarded as the self, for consciousness is an experience and as such must belong to some individual separate and distinct from it. In the passing conscious states there is nothing that abides and persists which can integrate the past and present states in itself and develop the notion of the person, the perceiver. Therefore, it has to be admitted that there is a conscious ego to which all cognitions and experiences belong. Such an ego is self-luminous in the sense that it is always manifest by itself to itself and not merely the locus of self-knowledge. Such a self-revealing ego is present even in our dreamless sleep, and this is attested by later recollections in which one feels "I slept happily"; and it is not contradicted by any experience. Even when one is referred to by another as "you" or "this," the ego in the latter is all the time self-manifested as "I." Such an ego refers to the soul which is a real agent and experiencer of pleasure and pain and a cognizer of all cognitions and as such is a real moral agent and is therefore distinguished from other kindred souls by its specific efforts leading to specific kinds of deeds and their fruits. The efforts, however, of the individual agents are themselves pre-determined by the resulting fruits of actions in previous births, and those by other actions of other previous births. Those who say that efforts lead to no efforts contradict themselves in all the practical behaviour which presupposes a belief in the efficacy of efforts. Only such of the efforts as are directed towards the attainment of the impossible or towards objects which require no effort are found

¹ *tvad-iṣṭa-saṃskāra-koṣe mānā-bhāvāt, anekeṣāṃ aham-arthānām eka-śarīra-yoge ca tataś ca varam yatho-palambham ekasminn aham-arthe sarvaiṣaṃ saṃskārā-dhānam. Survārtha-siddhi*, p. 160.

to be ineffective, whereas all other efforts are attended with fruition.

Veṅkaṭa urges that the theory which holds that there is but one Brahman which appears as many by its association with different minds is false; for we know that the same individual is associated with different bodies in the series of his transmigrations, and such an association with different bodies cannot produce any difference in the individual. And if this is so, that is, if association with different bodies cannot induce a difference in the individual, there is no reason why one Brahman should become many by its association with different minds. Again the view that holds that the individuals, though really different from one another, are so far identical that they are all but parts of pure Being—the Brahman—is equally false; for if the Brahman is thus one with the individual, it should also be exposed to all its sufferings and imperfections, which is absurd.

Brahmadatta held that Brahman alone is eternal and unborn and the individual souls are born out of it. Veṅkaṭa criticizes this view and propounds the theory that the souls are all uncreated and unborn. They are to be regarded as permanent and eternal; for if they are believed to be changing during the continuance of their body, then the continuity of purposive activity will be inexplicable. If they are destroyed with the death of the body, then the *karma* theory and all theories of moral responsibility have to be given up.

The soul, however, is not all-pervasive; for the Upaniṣads speak of it as going out of the body. The argument for all-pervasiveness of the soul as given by the *Naiyāyikas* is as follows. Virtue and vice are associated with a particular soul and may produce such changes in the material world, even in distant places, as would conduce to the enjoyment or suffering of that particular individual; and since virtue and vice are associated with a particular soul, they could not produce their effects on a distant place unless the soul, their locus, is co-extensive with those places. This, however, does not apply to the Rāmānujists, for according to them virtue and vice are only terms which mean that God has either been pleased or displeased owing to the particular kinds of deeds of an individual, and God's pleasure or displeasure has no limitations of operation¹.

¹ *iha hi dharmā-dharma-śabdaḥ karma-nimitte-śvara-prīti-kopa-rūpa-buddhi-dyotakaḥ. asti hi śubhe tv asau tuṣyati duṣkṛte tu na tuṣyate' sau paramaḥ śarīra-iti. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 179.

From the opponent's point of view, even if the self is regarded as all-pervasive, that would not explain the happening of favourable or unfavourable effects; for though the self may be co-extensive with those distant places, yet its *adṛṣṭa* or unseen merit occurs not throughout the entire pervasive self, but only in a part of it, and as such, since it is not in touch with the place where the effect will happen, it cannot very well explain it.

(k) *The Nature of Emancipation according to Venkaṭanātha.*

Venkaṭanātha says that an objection has been raised by some that if individuals had been in the state of bondage from beginningless time, there is no reason why they should attain emancipation at some future date. To this the reply is that it is admitted by all that there is every hope that at some time or other there will be such a favourable collocation of accessories that our *karma* will so fructify that it will lead us out of bondage, through the production of sight of discrimination and disinclination, to enjoyment of all kinds that it may give God an opportunity to exercise His mercy. Thus, though all are in a state of bondage from beginningless time, they all gradually find a suitable opportunity for attaining their emancipation. Thus, God extends His grace for emancipation only to those who deserve it by reason of their deeds, and it is theoretically possible that there should be a time when all people would receive their salvation and the world process would cease to exist. Such a cessation of the world-process will be due to His own free will, and thus there is not the slightest reason for fear that in such a state there will have been any obstruction to God's free and spontaneous activity from extraneous sources. Man is led to the way of emancipation by his experience of suffering, which nullifies the pleasure of our mundane life. He feels that worldly pleasures are limited (*alpa*) and impermanent (*asthira*) and associated with pain. He thus aspires to attain a stage in which he can get unlimited pleasure unmixed with suffering. Such an emancipation can be brought about only through the love of God (*bhakti*). *Bhakti*, however, is used here in the sense of meditation or thinking with affection¹. Such a *bhakti* also produces knowledge, and such a

¹ *mahānīya-viśaye prītir bhaktiḥ prīty-ādayaś ca jñāna-viśeṣa itī vakṣyate sneha-pūrvam anudhyānam bhaktiḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 190.

knowledge is also included in *bhakti*¹. *Bhakti* is defined here as unceasing meditation (*dhruvā-nusmṛti*), and this therefore has to be continually practised. The Śaṅkarite view that emancipation can be attained by mere knowledge is false. In the Upaniṣads knowledge means unceasing meditation, and this has to be continued and only then can it be regarded as *upāsana*, which is the same as *bhakti*².

The performance of the prescribed duties is helpful to the production of knowledge in the sense of *bhakti* by counteracting the wrong influence of such *karmas* as are antagonistic to the rise of true knowledge. Thus the prescribed duties are not to be performed along with the practice of *bhakti*, and they are not both to be regarded as joint causes of emancipation; but the performance of duties is to be interpreted as helping the rise of *bhakti* only by removing the obstructive influences of other opposing *karmas*³. The performance of scriptural duties including sacrifices is not incompatible with devotional exercises, for the gods referred to in the Vedic sacrifices may also be regarded as referring to Brahman, the only god of the *Vaiṣṇavas*. The absolutely (*nitya*) and the conditionally (*naimittika*) obligatory duties should not be given up by the devotee, for mere cessation from one's duties has no meaning; the real significance of the cessation from duties is that these should be performed without any motive of gain or advantage. It is wrong to suppose that emancipation can be attained only by those who renounce the world and become ascetics, for a man of any caste (*varṇa*) and at any stage of life (*āśrama*) may attain it provided he follows his normal caste duties and is filled with unceasing *bhakti* towards God.

It is well to point out in this connection that duties are regarded as threefold. Those that are absolutely obligatory are called *nitya*. No special good or advantage comes out of their performance, but their non-performance is associated with evil effects. Those that are obligatory under certain circumstances are called *naimittika*. If these duties are not performed under those special circumstances, sin will accrue, but no special beneficial effects are produced by

¹ *bhakti-sādhyaṃ prāpaka-jñānam api bhakti-lakṣaṇo-petam. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 191.

² *ekasmīn eva viśaye vedano-pāsana-śabdayoḥ vyatikareṇo'pakramo-pasaṃhāra-darśanāc ca vedanam eva upāsanatayā viśeṣyate. . . sā mukti-sādhana-tayo'ktā hi vittiḥ bhakti-rūpatva-paryanta-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭā. Ibid.* pp. 191-192.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 194-195.

their performance. Those duties which are to be performed only if the person is desirous of attaining special kinds of pleasurable ends such as residence in Heaven, the birth of a son, and the like, are called *kāmya*. Now a man who wishes to attain emancipation should give up all the *kāmya* duties and refrain from all actions prohibited in the scriptures, but he should perform the *nitya* and the *naimittika* duties. Though the performance of the *nitya* and the *naimittika* duties is associated with some kind of beneficial results, inasmuch as such performance keeps away the evil and the sinful effects which would have resulted from their non-performance, yet these, being fruits of a negative nature, are not precluded for a person who intends to attain emancipation. For such a person only the performance of such actions as bring positive pleasures is prohibited. When it is said that actions of a devotee should have no motive, this does not mean that it includes also actions which are performed with the motive of pleasing God; for actions with motive are only such actions as are performed with motives of one's own pleasure, and these are always associated with harmful effects¹.

It has already been said that the *naimittika* duties should be performed; but of these there are some which are of an expiatory nature, called *prāyaścitta*, by which the sinful effects of our deeds are expiated. A true devotee should not perform this latter kind of expiatory duties, for the meditation of God with love is by itself sufficient to purge us of all our sins and indeed of all our virtues also; for these latter, as they produce heavenly pleasures as their effects, obstruct the path of emancipation as much as do our sins. All that narrows our mind by associating it with narrow ends is to be regarded as sinful. Judged from this point of view even the so-called meritorious actions (*puṇya*) are to be regarded as harmful to a devotee who intends to attain emancipation². Virtue (*dharma*) can be regarded as such only relatively, so that actions which are regarded as virtuous for ordinary persons may be regarded as sinful for a person inspired with the higher ambition of attaining emancipation³. For a true devotee who has attained the knowledge

¹ *anarthā-vinā-bhūta-sukha-kāmanāto niṣṛtaṃ karma niṣkāmaṃ. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 202.

² *tad evaṃ dhī-saṅkocaka-karma-dhvaṃse dhī-vikāśa eva brahmā-nubhūtiḥ. Ibid.* p. 220.

³ *sa eva dharmāḥ so'dharmas taṃ taṃ prati naraṃ bhavet pātra-karma-viśeṣeṇa deśa-kālāvapekṣya ca. Ibid.* p. 221.

of Brahman and is pursuing the meditation of God, sinful or virtuous actions are both inefficacious, the older ones being destroyed by the meditation itself and the new ones incapable of being associated with him—the wise man.

The eschatological conception of the Rāmānuja school as explained by Veṅkaṭa is that the soul of the true devotee escapes by a special nerve in the head (*mūrdhanya-nāḍī*) and is gradually lifted from one stage to another by the presiding deities of fire, day, white fortnight, the vernal equinox, year, wind, the sun, the moon, lightning, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati, who are appointed by God for the conducting of the departed devotee¹.

The state of final emancipation is regarded as the rise of the ultimate expansion of the intellect. But though this is a state which is produced as a result of devotional exercises, yet there is no chance that there would ever be a cessation of such a state, for it is the result of the ultimate dissociation of all causes, such as sins or virtues, which can produce a contraction of the mind. Therefore, there can never be a falling off from this state.

An emancipated person can assume bodies at his own will. His body is not a source of bondage to him, for only those whose bodies are conditioned by their *karma* may be supposed to suffer bondage through them. The state of emancipation is a state of perfect bliss through a continual realization of Brahman, to whom he is attached as a servant. This servitude, however, cannot beget misery, for servitude can beget misery only when it is associated with sins. The emancipated person is omnipotent in the sense that God is never pleased to frustrate the fulfilment of his wishes.

The emancipated person regards all things as being held in Brahman as its parts and as such no mundane affair can pain him, though he may have the knowledge that in the past many things in the world caused him misery.

Veṅkaṭa denied the possibility of attaining emancipation in this life, for the very definition of emancipation is dissociation from life, sense-organs and the body generated by *karma*. So when we hear of *jīvanmukta* or those emancipated in their lifetime, it is to be interpreted to mean a state similar to the state of emancipation. The contention of the Advaitins that the principal *avidyā* vanishes with knowledge, yet that its partial states may still continue binding

¹ *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, pp. 226–227.

the emancipated person with a body, is false. For if the principal *avidyā* has vanished, its states cannot still continue. Moreover, if they do continue in spite of the knowledge, it is impossible to imagine how they will cease at the death of the emancipated person.

God in the Rāmānuja School.

We have seen that according to Rāmānuja the nature and existence of God can be known only through the testimony of the scriptures and not through inference. Veṅkaṭa points out that the Sāṃkhya theory that the world-creation is due to the movement of *prakṛti*, set in operation through its contiguity with the *puruṣas*, is inadequate; for the Upaniṣads definitely assert that just as the spider weaves its net, so does God create the world. The scriptures further assert that God entered into both the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣas*, and produced the creative movement in them at the time of creation¹. The Yoga view of God—that He is only an emancipated being who enters into the body of Hiraṇyagarbha or adopts some such other pure body—is also against all scriptural testimony. It is also idle to think that the world-creation is the result of the co-operative activity of the emancipated spirits, for it is much against the scriptural testimony as also against the normal possibility, since there cannot be such an agreement of wish among the infinite number of emancipated beings that would explain the creation of the world by unobstructed co-operation. Thus, on the strength of the scriptural testimony it has to be admitted that God has engaged Himself in world-creation, either for the good of the created beings or through His own playful pleasurable activity. The enjoyment of playful activity is not to be explained as anything negative, as avoidance of ennui or langour, but as a movement which produces pleasure of itself². When we hear of God's anger, this is not to be regarded as indicating any disappointment on God's part, for He is ever complete in Himself and has nothing to attain or to lose. So God's anger is to be interpreted simply as meaning His desire to punish those who deserve punishment.

¹ *prakṛtiṃ puruṣam caivā praviśyā'tme-cchayā hariḥ.*
kṣobhayāmāsa saṃprāpte sarga-kāle vyayā-vyayau.

Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 252.

² *kṛdā-yogād arati-yogaḥ tad-abhāvād vā tad-abhāvah syāt, mai'ram kṛdā hi prīti-viśeṣa-prabhavaḥ svayaṃ-priyo vyāpārah.* *Ibid.* p. 255.

According to the Rāmānuja system the individual souls and the material world form the body of God (*śarīra*). Anantārya of the Śeṣārya family, following Veṅkaṭa's treatment of this doctrine in the *Nyāya-siddhā-ñjana*, elaborates upon the same and enters into a critical analysis of the conception and significance of the notion of the body of God, which is not unworthy of our notice. He refuses to accept the view that the notion of body (*śarīra*) involves a class-concept (*jāti*); for though the notion of a body is found applicable in each specific instance of a body, the existence of such a notion is always associated with one or other of those specific instances and as such it does not justify the assumption of the existence of a separate category as a self-existent universal bodiness. All that one can say is that there is a universal notion of bodiness associated with the individual bodies¹. All notions of class-concepts may therefore be explained in the same manner as notions which are associated with particular kinds of groupings in their aggregate characters, and in this way they may be regarded as somewhat similar to collective notions such as an army or assembly². Vātsya Śrīnivāsa, however, in his *Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, explains the notion of class-concepts as being based upon the notion of close similarity of collocative groupings. He says that when two collocative groupings are both called cow, nothing more is seen than those individual collocative groupings. That they are both called cow is due to the fact of close similarity (*sausādṛśya*) subsisting between those groupings³. Thus there is no other entity apart from

¹ *na ce'daṃ śarīram idaṃ śarīram ity anugata-pratītir eva tat-sādhikā, anugatā-pratīteḥ bādhaka-vīrahe jāti-sādhakatvād iti vācyaṃ, siddhānte anugata-pratīteḥ saṃsthāna-viśayakatvena tad-atirikta-iāti-sādhakatvā-sambhavāt. Anantārya, Śarīra-vāda (MS.).*

² *eka-jātiyam iti vyavahārasya tat-tad-upādhi viśeṣeṇo-pāpatteḥ, rāśi-sainya-pariśad-aranyā-diṣṭv aikya-vyavahārādivat, upādhiḥ cāyam aneṣaṃ eka-smṛti-samārohaḥ. Nyāya-siddhā-ñjana, p. 180.*

³ *ayam sāśnā-dimān ayam api sāśnā-dir eva anuvṛtta-vyavahāra-viśayo dṛśyate, anuvṛtta-dhī-vyavahāra-viśayas tad-atirikto na kaś cid api dṛśyate. tasmād ubhaya-saṃpratipanna-saṃsthānenai 'va susādṛśo-pādhi-vaśād anugata-dhī-vyavahāro-pāpattāu atirikta-kalpane mānā-bhāvāt, susādṛśatvam eva gotvā-dinām anuvṛttiḥ. Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṃgraha (MS.).*

Vātsya Śrīnivāsa defines close similarity as the special character which may be regarded as the cause of the apprehension of generality amidst differences (*pratīyogī-nirūpya-pratīvyakti-vilakṣaṇa-viśaya-niṣṭha-sadṛśa-vyavahāra-sādhāraṇa-kāraṇa-dharma-viśeṣaḥ sausādṛśyam*). This similarity leads to the application of names to similar objects. When it subsists between two substances, we call it similarity of character (*dharma-sādṛśya*). When it subsists between entities other than substances (*a-dṛavya*) we call it similarity of essence (*sva-rūpa-sādṛśya*).

our notion of universality arising from specific similarity of similar groupings (*tāvad-viśayaka-jñana-rūpa-jāti-viśayakatvā-ṅgikāreṇa*).

Anantārya refers to the definition of *śarīra* in the *Rāmānuja-bhāṣya* as that which is liable to be held or controlled in its entirety for the purpose of spirit, and is thus merely a means to its end (*cetanasya yad dravyam sarvā-tmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum śakyam tac ceṣṭai-ka-svarūpaṅca tat tasya svarūpam*). Sudarśanācārya, the author of the *Śrūta-prakāśikā*, interprets this definition as meaning that when the movement of anything is wholly determined by the desire or will of any spirit and is thus controlled by it, the former is said to be the body of the latter (*kṛti-prayukta-svīya-ceṣṭā-sāmānyakatva-rūpa-niyāmyatvam śarīra-pada-pravṛtti-nimittam*)¹. When it is said that this body belongs to this soul, the sense of possession (*ādheyatva*) is limited to the fact that the movements in general of that body are due to the will of that spirit or soul². A servant cannot be called the body of his master on the same analogy, for only some of the movements of the servant are controlled by the will of the master. The assumption that underlies the above definition is that the movement in the animal and vegetable bodies presided over by individual souls and in the inanimate objects presided over by God is due to the subtle will-movements in these specific souls, though they may not always be apprehended by us³.

But anticipating the objection that there is no perceptual evidence that the physico-biological movements of bodies are due to subtle volitions of their presiding souls, a second definition of *śarīra* has been suggested in the *bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja. According to this definition a body is said to be that which may as a whole be held fast and prevented from falling by the volitional efforts of a spirit⁴. But an objection may still be raised against such a definition, as it cannot explain the usage which regards the souls as being the

¹ *Śarīra-vāda* (MS.).

² *etaj-jīvasye'dam śarīram ity-ādau ādheyatvam tasya ca śarīrā-padārthai-kadeśe kṛtau anvyayād vā taj-jīva-niṣṭha-kṛti-prayukta-svīya-ceṣṭā-sāmānyakam idam iti bodhaḥ. Ibid.*

³ *jīva-śarīre vykṣādau īśvara-śarīre parvatādau ca sūkṣmasya tat-tat-kṛti-prayukta-ceṣṭā-viśeṣasya āṅgikārān na śarīra-vyavahāra-viśayatvā-nūpapattiḥ. Ibid.*

⁴ *yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvā-tmanā dhārayitum śakyam tat tasya śarīram iti kṛti-prayukta-sva-pratītyogika-patana-pratibandhaka-samyoga-sāmānyavattvam śarīra-pada-pravṛtti-nimittam. Ibid.*

bodies of God (*yasyā'tmā śarīram*). The souls have no weight and as such it is absurd to suppose that God prevents them from falling down, and in that way they are related to Him as bodies. The definition may therefore be modified to the extent that a body is that which is wholly held together in a contactual relation with a particular spirit through its own volition¹. But a further objection may also be raised against this modification, for the definition, even so modified, fails to include time and other entities which are all-pervasive. Now the contactual relation subsisting between two all-pervasive entities is held to be eternal and uncaused. So the contactual relation of God with time and the like cannot be held to be caused by the volition of God, and if this be held to be the connotation of the body, time, etc., cannot be regarded as the body of God. So a different definition has been given which states that a body is a substance which is wholly dependent upon and subservient to a spirit. Dependence and subserviency are to be understood in the sense of productivity of a special excellence. Now, in the present context the special excellence which is produced in the spirit is its determination either as a cause or as an effect. When Brahman is regarded as cause, such causality can be understood only in relation to its association with the subtle constituents of matter and individual souls, and its evolution into the effect-stage as the manifold world is intelligible only through the transformation of the subtle matter-constituents in gross material forms and the spirits as endeavouring towards perfection through their deeds and rebirths. Brahman as such, without its relation to matter and souls, can be regarded neither as cause nor as effect. That it can be viewed as cause and effect is only because it is looked at in association with the causal or the effectuated states of matter and souls. The latter, therefore, are regarded as His body because they by their own states serve His purpose in reflecting Him as cause and effect.

The definition, however, needs a further modification in so far as the determining relation of the body is such that there is never a time when such a relation did not subsist. The relation conceived in this way (*apṛthak-siddha*) is not something extraneous, but is a defining constituent of both the body and the soul, i.e. so long as either of them exists they must have that relation of the

¹ *Patana-pratibandhakatvaṃ parityajya kṛti-prayukta-sva-pratīyogika-saṃyoga-sāmānyasya śarīra-pada-pravṛtti-nimittatva-svīkāre'pi kṣati-virahāt. Śarīra-vāda.*

determiner and the determined (*yāvat sattvam asambandhanārthayor evā'prthak sambandhā-bhyupagamāt*)¹. Thus, even the emancipated souls are associated with bodies, and it is held that with death the body associated with the living soul is destroyed; the so-called dead body is not the body with which the living soul was in association². But it may again be objected that the soul also determines the actions and efforts of the body and being inseparably connected with it, the soul may also be called the body of the body according to the definition. To meet this objection the definition is further modified, and it is held that only such inseparable relation as determines the causality or effectness in association with the production of knowledge can be regarded as constituting the condition of a body. The whole idea is that a body, while inseparably connected with the soul, conditions its cognitive experiences, and this should be regarded as the defining characteristic of a body³. This definition of *Śarīra* is, of course, very different from the Nyāya definition of "body" (*śarīra*) as the support (*āśraya*) of effort (*ceṣṭā*), senses (*indriya*), and enjoyment (*bhoga*)⁴. For in such a definition, since there may be movement in the furthest extremities of the body which is not a direct support of the original volition of the soul, the definition of the notion of support has to be so far extended as to include these parts which are in association with that which was directly moved by the soul. Extending this principle of indirect associations, one might as well include the movement of objects held in the hand, and in that case the extraneous objects might also be regarded as body, which is impossible. The defence of the Naviyāyikas would, of course, be by the

¹ *Śarīra-vāda*, p. 8 (MS.).

² *mṛta-śarīrasya jīva-sambandha-rahitatayā'pi avasthāna-darśanena yāvat-sattvam asambandhā-narhatva-irahād iti cet na pūrva-śarīratayā'vasthitasya dravyasya cetana-viyogā-nantara-kṣane eva nāśa-bhyupagamena anupapatti-irahāt. Ibid.*

³ *tac-cheṣatvam hi tan-niṣṭhā-tiśayā-dhāyakatvam, prakṛte ca tan-niṣṭhā-tiśayah kāryatva-kāranatvā-nyatarā-ūpo jñāna-vaicchinnā-muyogitākā-prthak-siddhi-sambandhā-vaichinna-kāryatva-kāranatvā-nyatarā-vaichchedakatvam śarīra pada-pravṛtti-nimittam ityarthah. Ibid.*

Brahman as associated with subtle matter and spirits is the cause, and as associated with gross matter and the souls passing through diverse gross states may be regarded as effect. The subtle and the gross states of matter and spirits may thus be regarded as determining the causal and effect states of the Brahman. — *sūkṣma-cid-acid-ṛiṣiṣṭa-brahmanah kāranatvāt sthūla-cid-acid-ṛiṣiṣṭasya ca tasya kāryatvāt brahma-niṣṭha-kāryatva-kāranatvā-nyatarā-vaichchedakatvāsyā prapañca-sāmānye sattvāt. Ibid.*

⁴ *Ceṣṭe-ndriyā-rthā-śrayah śarīram. Nyāya-sūtra, I. I. 11.*

introduction of the relation of inseparable coherence (*samavāya*) in which the parts of a body are connected together in a way different from any other object. But it has already been pointed out that the *samavāya* relation is not admitted by the Rāmānujists.

Brahman may be regarded as the material cause of the world through its body as *prakṛti* and the souls. Though a material cause, it is also the instrumental cause just as the individual souls are the efficient causes of their own experiences of pleasure and pain (through their own deeds), of which, since the latter inhere in the former, they may be regarded as their material causes. On the other hand, God in Himself, when looked at as apart from His body, may be regarded as unchangeable. Thus, from these two points of view God may be regarded as the material and efficient cause and may also be regarded as the unchanging cause.

Bhāskara and his followers hold that Brahman has two parts, a spirit part (*cidamśa*) and a material part (*acidamśa*), and that it transforms itself through its material part and undergoes the cycles of *karma* through the conditions of such material changes. Bhāskara thinks that the conditions are a part of Brahman and that even in the time of dissolution they remain in subtle form and that it is only in the emancipated stage that the conditions (*upādhi*), which could account for the limited appearance of Brahman as individual souls, are lost in Brahman. Veṅkaṭa thinks that the explanation through the conception of *upādhi* is misleading. If the *upādhi* constitutes *jīvas* by mere conjunction, then since they are all conjoined with God, God Himself becomes limited. If the conception of *upādhi* be made on the analogy of space within a jug or a cup, where space remains continuous and it is by the movement of the conditioning jugs or cups that the space appears to be limited by them, then no question of bondage or emancipation can arise. The conception of *upādhi* cannot be also on the analogy of the container and the contained, as water in the jug, since Brahman being continuous and indivisible such a conception would be absurd. The *upādhis* themselves cannot be regarded as constitutive of individual souls, for they are material in their nature. Yādavaprakāśa holds that Brahman is of the nature of pure universal being (*sarvā-tmakam sad-rūpam brahma*) endowed with three distinct powers as consciousness, matter and God, and through these powers it passes through the various phenomenal changes which are held up in it

and at the same time are one with it, just as one ocean appears in diverse forms as foam, billows and waves. Veṅkaṭa says that instead of explaining the world-creation from these makeshift points of view, it is better to follow the scriptures and regard Brahman as being associated with these changes through its body. It is wrong also to regard God, world and spirit as being phenomenal modifications of one pure being as Kātyāyana does¹. For the scriptures definitely assert that God and the changeless Brahman are one and identical. If the transformation is regarded as taking place through the transformation of the powers of Brahman, then the latter cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world, nor can these transformations be regarded as creations of Brahman. If it is said that Brahman is both identical and different from its powers, then such a view would be like the relative pluralism of the Jains. There is a further view that Brahman in His pure nature exists as the world, the souls and God, though these are different and though in them His pure nature as such is not properly and equally evident. Veṅkaṭa holds that such a view is contradicted by our experience and by scriptural texts. There is again another view according to which Brahman is like an ocean of consciousness and bliss, and out of the joy of self-realization undergoes various transformations, a small portion of which he transforms into matter and infuses the spiritual parts into its modifications. Thus, Brahman transforms itself into a number of limited souls which undergo the various experiences of pleasure and pain, and the whole show and procedure becomes a source of joy to Him. It is not a rare phenomenon that there are beings who derive pleasure from performing actions painful to themselves. The case of incarnations (*avatāra*) again corroborates this view, otherwise there would be no meaning in the course of misery and pain which they suffer of their own free will. Veṅkaṭa observes that this view is absolutely hollow. There may be fools who mistake painful actions for sources of pleasure. But it is unthinkable that Brahman, who is all-knowing and all-powerful, should engage in an undertaking which involves for Him even the slightest misery and pain. The misery of even a single individual is sufficient evil and the total miseries of the whole

¹

*īśvara-vyākṛta-prāṇair virāt-sindhur ivo'rmibhiḥ
yat pranṛtya divā bhāti tasmai sad-brahmaṇe namaḥ.*

Kātyāyana-kārikā, quoted in *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 298.

world of individual selves are intolerable in the extreme. Therefore, how can Brahman elect to shoulder all this misery of His own free choice without stultifying Himself? The case of incarnations is to be understood as that of actors on the stage. Further, this view contradicts the testimony of all scriptures. Venkaṭa thinks that the view of his school is free from all these objections, as the relation of the Brahman and individuals is neither one of absolute identity nor one of identity and difference but one of substance and adjuncts. The defects in the adjuncts cannot affect the substance nor can the association between them be a source of pollution to Brahman, the substance, because association becomes so only when it is determined by *karma*¹.

On the theological side Venkaṭa accepts all the principal religious dogmas elaborated in the *Pañcarātra* works. God is, of course, omniscient, omnipotent and all-complete. His all-completeness, however, does not mean that He has no desires. It only means that His desires or wishes are never frustrated and His wishes are under His own control². What we call our virtue and sins also proceed through His pleasure and displeasure. His displeasure does not bring any suffering or discomfort. But the term “displeasure” simply indicates that God has a particular attitude in which He may punish us or may not extend His favour.

The scriptural injunctions are but the commands of God. There is no separate instrumental as *apūrva* or *adṛṣṭa* which stands between the performance of deeds and their fruition and which, while it persists when the deeds are over, brings about the effects of these actions. But God alone abides and He is either pleased or displeased by our actions and He arranges such fruits of actions as He thinks fit³. The scriptures only show which kinds of actions will be pleasing to God and which are against His commands. The object of the scriptural sacrifices is the worship of God, and all the different deities that are worshipped in these sacrifices are but the different names of God Himself. All morality and religion are thus

¹ *asman-mate tu viśeṣaṇa-gatā doṣā na viśeṣyaṃ spr̥santi, aikya-bhedā-bhedā-nangikārāt, akarma-vaśya-saṃsargaja-doṣāṇām asaṃbhavācca. Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, p. 302.

² *āpta-kāma-śabdas tāvad īśitur eṣṭavyā-bhāvam icchā-rāhityaṃ vā na brūte ... iṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ asya prāptam eva bhavati tātparyaṃ grāhyam... sarva-kārya-viśaya-pratihatā-nanyā-dhīne-chāvēn īśvaraḥ, jīvas tu na tathā. Ibid.* p. 386.

³ *tat-tat-karmā-caraṇa-pariṇate-śvara-buddhi-viśeṣa eva adṛṣṭam. Ibid.* p. 665.

reduced in this system to obedience to God's commands and the worship of Him. It is by God's grace that one can attain emancipation when there is an ultimate expansion of one's intellect, and by continual realization of the infinite nature of God one remains plunged as it were in an ocean of bliss compared with which the so-called worldly pleasures are but sufferings¹. It is not ultimately given to man to be virtuous or vicious by his own efforts, but God makes a man virtuous or vicious at His own pleasure or displeasure, and rewards or punishes accordingly; and, as has already been said, virtue and vice are not subjective characters of the person but only different attitudes of God as He is pleased or displeased. Whomsoever He wishes to raise up He makes perform good actions, and whomsoever He wishes to throw down He makes commit sinful actions. The final choice and adjudgment rests with Him, and man is only a tool in His hands. Man's actions in themselves cannot guarantee anything to him merely as the fruits of those actions, but good or bad fruits are reaped in accordance with the pleasure or displeasure of God².

Dialectical criticism against the Śāṅkara School.

The readers who have followed the present work so far must have noticed that the chief philosophical opponents of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava school of thought were Śāṅkara and his followers. In South India there were other religious opponents of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas and the Jainas. Mutual persecution among the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas and the Jainas is a matter of common historical knowledge. Conversion from one faith to another also took place under the influence of this or that local king or this or that religious teacher. Many volumes were written for the purpose of proving the superiority of Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa to Śiva and *vice versa*. Madhva and his followers were also opponents of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, but there were some who regarded the philosophy of the Madhvas as more or less akin to the Śrī Vaiṣṇava thought.

¹ *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, pp. 663, 664.

² *sa evcinam bhūtiṃ gamayati, sa enam prītaḥ prīnāti eṣa eva sādhu karma kārayati taṃ kṣipāmy aśram aśubhā-nityā-di-bhiḥ pramāṇa-śataih īśvara-pritī-kopābhyāṃ dharmā-dharma-phala-prāptir avagamayate. Ibid.* p. 670.

There were others, however, who strongly criticized the views of Madhva, and Mahācārya's *Pārāśarya-vijaya* and Parakāla Yati's *Vijayindra-parājaya* may be cited as examples of polemical discussions against the Madhvas. The Śrī Vaiṣṇavas also criticized the views of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, and as examples of this the *Vedārtha-saṃgraha* of Rāmānuja, or the *Vāditraya-khaṇḍana* of Veṅkaṭa may be cited. But the chief opponents of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava school were Śaṅkara and his followers. The *Śata-dūṣaṇī* is a polemical work of that class in which Veṅkaṭanātha tried his best to criticize the views of Śaṅkara and his followers. The work is supposed to have consisted of one hundred polemical points of discussion as the name *Śata-dūṣaṇī* (century of refutations) itself shows. But the text, printed at the Śrī Sudarśana Press, Coṅjeeveram, has only sixty-six refutations, as far as the manuscripts available to the present writer showed. This printed text contains a commentary on it by Mahācārya alias Rāmānujadāsa, pupil of Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa. But the work ends with the sixty-fourth refutation, and the other two commentaries appear to be missing. The printed text has two further refutations—the sixty-fifth and sixty-sixth—which are published without commentary, and the editor, P. B. Anantācārya, says that the work was completed with the sixty-sixth refutation (*samāptā ca Śata-dūṣaṇī*). If the editor's remark is to be believed, it has to be supposed that the word *Śata* in *Śata-dūṣaṇī* is intended to mean "many" and not "hundred." It is, however, difficult to guess whether the remaining thirty-four refutations were actually written by Veṅkaṭa and lost or whether he wrote only the sixty-six refutations now available. Many of these do not contain any new material and most of them are only of doctrinal and sectarian interest, with little philosophical or religious value, and so have been omitted in the present section, which closes with the sixty-first refutation. The sixty-second refutation deals with the inappropriateness of the Śaṅkara *Vedānta* in barring the Śūdras from Brahma-knowledge. In the sixty-third, Veṅkaṭa deals with the qualifications of persons entitled to study *Vedānta* (*adhikāri-viveka*), in the sixty-fourth with the inappropriateness of the external garb and marks of the ascetics of the Śaṅkara school, in the sixty-fifth with the prohibition of association with certain classes of ascetics, and in the sixty-sixth with the fact that Śaṅkara's philosophy cannot be reconciled with the *Brahma-sūtra*.

First Objection. The view that Brahman is qualityless cannot give any satisfactory account of how the word Brahman can rightly denote this qualityless entity. For if it is qualityless it cannot be denoted by the term Brahman either in its primary sense or in any secondary sense of implication (*lakṣaṇā*); for if the former is not possible, the second is also impossible, since an implicative extension of meaning can take place only when in any particular content the primary meaning becomes impossible. We know also from the scriptural testimony that the word Brahman is often used in its primary meaning to denote the Great Being who is endowed with an infinite number of excellent qualities. The fact that there are many texts in which an aspect of qualitylessness is also referred to cannot be pushed forward as an objection, for these can all be otherwise explained, and even if any doubt arises the opponent cannot take advantage of it and assert that Brahman is qualityless. It is also not possible to say that the word Brahman denotes the true Brahman only by implication, for the scriptures declare the realization of the meaning of the word Brahman as being one of direct perception. So in the opponent's view of Brahman, the word Brahman would be rendered meaningless.

Second Objection. There cannot be any inquiry regarding Brahman according to Śāṅkara's interpretation of the term as a qualityless something. Śāṅkara says that Brahman is known in a general manner as the self in us all; the inquiry concerning Brahman is for knowing it in its specific nature, i.e. whether it is the body endowed with consciousness, the overlord, pure self, or some other entity regarding which there are many divergences of opinion. Venkaṭa urges that if the self-revelation of Brahman is beginningless it cannot depend on our making any inquiry about it. All that depends on causes and conditions must be regarded as an effect and in that sense Brahma-revelation would be an effect which is decidedly against Śāṅkara's intention. Thus, therefore, an inquiry regarding the general and specific nature of Brahman cannot deal with its own real pure nature. If, therefore, it is urged by the Śāṅkarites that this inquiry does not concern the real nature of Brahman, but only a false appearance of Brahman (*upahita-svarūpa*), then the knowledge derived from this inquiry would also be of this false appearance and nothing would be gained by this false knowledge. Again, when Brahman is partless and self-re-

vealing, there cannot be any meaning in knowing it in a general manner or in a specific manner, for no such distinction can be made in it. It must be known in its entirety or not known at all; there cannot be any distinction of parts such that there may be scope for different grades of knowledge in it. All inquiry (*jijñāsā*) however must imply that its object is known generally but that greater detail is sought; since Śaṅkara's unqualified homogeneous Brahman cannot be the object of such an inquiry, no such Brahman can be sought. Therefore, an inquiry can only be regarding a qualified object about which general or special knowledge is possible. The Śaṅkarites cannot legitimately urge that a distinction of general and specific knowledge is possible in their view; for it may be maintained that, though the Brahman may be known in a general manner, there is room for knowing it in its character as different from the illusory appearances, since if Brahman has no specific nature it is not possible to know it in a general manner (*nirviśeṣe sāmānya-niṣedhaḥ*). If it is urged that the knowledge of the world-appearance as false is the knowledge of Brahman, then there would be no difference between Vedānta and the nihilism of Nāgārjuna.

Third Objection. Veṅkaṭa here introduces the oft-repeated arguments in favour of the doctrine of the theory of *Jñāna-karma-samuccaya* as against the view of Śaṅkara that a wise man has no duties.

Fourth Objection. Veṅkaṭa here says that all errors and illusions do not vanish merely by the knowledge that all world-appearance is false. The performance of the scriptural duties is absolutely necessary even when the highest knowledge is attained. This is well illustrated in the ordinary experience of a jaundiced person where the illusion of yellow is not removed merely by the knowledge of its falsity but by taking medicines which overcome the jaundice. Ultimate salvation can be obtained only by worshipping and adoring God the supreme Lord and not by a mere revelation of any philosophical wisdom. It is impossible to attain the final emancipation merely by listening to the unity texts, for had it been so then Śaṅkara himself must have attained it. If he did so, he would have been merged in Brahman and would not have been in a position to explain his view to his pupils. The view that the grasping of the meaning of the unity texts is an immediate perception is also untenable, for our ordinary experience shows that scriptural know-

ledge is verbal knowledge and as such cannot be regarded as immediate and direct perception.

Fifth Objection. Śaṅkara's reply to the above objection is that though the final knowledge of the identity of all things with self be attained yet the illusion of world-appearance may still continue until the present body be destroyed. To this Veṅkaṭa asks that if *avidyā* be destroyed through right knowledge, how can the world-appearance still continue? If it is urged that though the *avidyā* be destroyed the root-impressions (*vāsanā*) may still persist, then it may be replied that if the *vāsanā* be regarded as possessing true existence then the theory of monism fails. If *vāsanā* is regarded as forming part of Brahman, then the Brahman itself would be contaminated by association with it. If *vāsanā* is, however, regarded as a product of *avidyā*, then it should be destroyed with the destruction of *avidyā*. Again, if the *vāsanā* persists even after the destruction of *avidyā*, how is it to be destroyed at all? If it can be destroyed of itself, then the *avidyā* may as well be destroyed of itself. Thus there is no reason why the *vāsanā* and its product, the world-appearance, should persist after the destruction of *avidyā* and the realization of Brahman-knowledge.

Seventh Objection. Śaṅkara and his followers say that the utterance of the unity text produces a direct and immediate perception of the highest truth in the mind of a man chastened by the acquirement of the proper qualifications for listening to the Vedāntic instructions. That the hearing of the unity texts produces the immediate and direct perception of the nature of self as Brahman has to be admitted, since there is no other way by which this could be explained. To this Veṅkaṭa replies that if this special case of realization of the purport of the unity texts be admitted as a case of direct perception through the instrumentality of verbal audition only because there is no other means through which the pure knowledge of Brahman could be realized, then inference and the auditory knowledge of other words may equally well be regarded as leading to direct perception, for they also must be regarded as the only causes of the manifestation of pure knowledge. Moreover, if the causes of verbal knowledge be there, how is that knowledge to be prevented, and how is the direct and immediate perception to be produced from a collocation of causes which can never produce it? Any knowledge gained at a particular time cannot be regarded

as the revelation of one individuated consciousness which is identical with all knowledge of all times or of all persons, and therefore the words which may lead to any such knowledge cannot be regarded as producing any such immediate realization (*āparokṣya*). If it is held that there is no other cause leading to the realization of pure consciousness apart from what leads to the apprehension of the specific forms of such consciousness, then the same is true of all means of knowledge, and as such it would be true of inference and of verbal expressions other than the unity texts. It is not possible therefore to adduce for the unity texts claims which may not be possessed by other ordinary verbal expressions and inferential knowledge. In the case of such phrases as "You are the tenth," if the person addressed had already perceived that he was the tenth, then the understanding of the meaning of such a phrase would only mean a mere repetition of all that was understood by such a perception; if, however, such a person did not perceive the fact of his being the tenth person, then the communication of this fact was done by the verbal expression and this so far cannot be regarded as direct, immediate or perceptual. It may be noted in this connection that though the object of knowledge may remain the same, yet the knowledge attained may be different on account of the ways of its communication. Thus, the same object may be realized perceptually in some part and non-perceptually in another part. Again, though Brahman is admittedly realized in direct perception, yet at the time of its first apprehension from such verbal phrases as "Thou art he" it is a verbal cognition, and at the second moment a realization is ushered in which is immediate and direct. But if the first cognition be not regarded as direct and immediate, why should the second be so? Again, the position taken by Śāṅkara is that since disappearance of the falsity of world-appearance cannot be explained otherwise, the communication imparted by the understanding of the unity texts must be regarded as being immediate; for falsehood is removed by the direct and immediate realization of the real. But the world is not false; if it is regarded as false because it is knowable, then Brahman, being knowable, would also be false. Again, if the world-appearance be regarded as false, there is no meaning in saying that such an appearance is destroyed by right knowledge; for that which never exists cannot be destroyed. If it is held that the world-appearance is not destroyed but only its knowledge

ceases, then it may be pointed out that a false knowledge may cease naturally with the change of one's mental state, just as the illusion of false silver may cease in deep dreamless sleep, or it may be removed by inferential and other kinds of cognition. There is no necessary implication that false knowledge must be removed only by direct and immediate knowledge. Again, if it is held that the cessation of the world-appearance means the destruction of its cause, then the reply is that no direct realization of reality is possible unless the cause itself is removed by some other means. So long as there is a pressure on the retina from the fingers there will be the appearance of two moons. Thus it is meaningless to suppose that it is only by direct and immediate perception that the falsity of the world-appearance would cease. If the removal of the falsity of world-appearance simply means that the rise of a knowledge is contradictory to it, then that can be done even by indirect knowledge, just as the false perception of two moons may be removed by the testimony of other persons that there is only one moon. But not only is the world not false and therefore cannot be removed, but verbal knowledge cannot be regarded as leading to immediate perception; even if it did, there must be other accessory conditions working along with it, just as in the case of visual perception, attention, mental alertness, and other physical conditions are regarded as accessory factors. Thus, mere verbal knowledge by itself cannot bring about immediate realization. Nor is it correct to suppose that perceptual knowledge cannot be contradicted by non-perceptual knowledge, for it is well known that the notion of one continuous flame of a lamp is negated by the consideration that there cannot be a continuous flame and that what so appears is in reality but a series of different flames coming in succession. Thus, even if the realization of the purport of unity texts be regarded as a case of direct perception, there is no guarantee that it could not be further contradicted by other forms of knowledge.

Tenth Objection. In refuting the reality of pure contentless consciousness, Veṅkaṭa urges that even if such a thing existed it could not manifest by itself its own nature as reality, for if it did it could no longer be regarded as formless; since if it demonstrated the falsity of all content, such content would be a constituent part of it. If its reality were demonstrated by other cognitions, then it was obviously not self-luminous. Then, again, it may be asked, to

whom does this pure consciousness manifest itself? The reply of the Śāṅkarites is that it does not reveal itself to this or that person but its very existence is its realization. But such a reply would be far from what is normally understood by the term manifestation, for a manifestation must be for some person. The chief objection against the existence of a contentless consciousness is that no such thing can be experienced by us and therefore its priority and superiority or its power of illuminating the content imposed upon it cannot also be admitted. The illustration of bliss in the deep dreamless sleep is of no use; for if in that state the pure contentless consciousness was experienced as bliss, that could not be in the form of a subjective experience of bliss, as it could not be called contentless. A later experience after rising from sleep could not communicate to the perceiver that he was experiencing contentless consciousness for a long period, as there is no recognition of it and the fact of recognition would be irreconcilable to its so-called contentless character.

Eleventh Objection. In attempting to refute the existence of indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpa*) Veṅkaṭa says that the so-called indeterminate knowledge refers to a determinate object (*nirvikalpakam api saviśeṣa-viśayakameva*). Even at the very first moment of sense-contact it is the object as a whole with its manifold qualities that is grasped by the senses and it is such an object that is elaborated later on in conceptual forms. The special feature of the *nirvikalpa* stage is that in this stage of cognition no special emphasis is given to any of the aspects or qualities of the object. If, however, the determinate characters did not in reality form the object of the cognition, such characters could never be revealed in any of the later stages of cognition and the *nirvikalpa* could never develop into the *savikalpa* state. The characters are perceived in the first stage, but these characters assume the determinate form when in the later moments other similar characters are remembered. Thus a pure indeterminate entity can never be the object of perception.

Twelfth Objection. The contention of the Śāṅkarite is that perception is directly concerned with pure being, and it is through nescience that the diverse forms are later on associated with it, and through such association they also seemingly appear as being directly perceived. Veṅkaṭa says that both being and its characters are simultaneously perceived by our senses, for they form part of

the same object that determines our knowledge. Even universals can be the objects of our direct knowledge: it is only when these universals are distinguished from one another at a later moment that a separate mental operation involving its diverse functions becomes necessary. Again, if perception only referred to indeterminate being, how then can the experience of the diverse objects and their relative differentiation be explained?

Thirteenth Objection. In refuting the view of the Śāṅkara school that the apprehension of “difference” either as a category or as a character is false, Veṅkaṭa says that the experience of “difference” is universal and as such cannot be denied. Even the much-argued “absence of difference” is itself different from “difference” and thus proves the existence of difference. Any attempt to refute “difference” would end in refuting identity as well; for these two are relative, and if there is no difference, there is no identity. Veṅkaṭa urges that a thing is identical with itself and different from others, and in this way both identity and difference have to be admitted.

Fourteenth Objection. The Śāṅkarites say that the world-appearance, being cognizable, is false like the conch-shell-silver. But what is meant by the assertion that the world is false? It cannot be chimerical like the hare’s horn, for that would be contrary to our experience and the Śāṅkarite would not himself admit it. It cannot mean that the world is something which is different from both being and non-being, for no such entity is admitted by us. It cannot also mean that the world-appearance can be negated even where it seems to be real (*pratīpanno-pādhau niṣedha-pratīyogitvam*), for if this negation cannot further be negated, then it must be either of the nature of Brahman and therefore false as world-appearance or different from it. The first alternative is admitted by us in the sense that the world is a part of Brahman. If the world-appearance can be negated and it is at the same time admitted to be identical with Brahman, then the negation would apply to Brahman itself. If the second alternative is taken, then since its existence is implied as a condition or explication of the negation, it itself cannot be denied. It cannot also be said that falsity means the appearance of the world in an entity where it does not exist (*svā-tyantā-bhāva-samāna-dhīkaraṇatayā pratīyamānatvam*), for such a falsity of the world as not existing where it appears cannot be understood by

perception, and if there is no perception for its ground no inference is also possible. If all perception is to be regarded as false, all inference would be impossible. It is said that world-appearance is false because it is different from the ultimate reality, the Brahman. Veṅkaṭa, in answer to this, says that he admits the world to be different from the Brahman though it has no existence independent and separable from it. Still, if it is argued that the world is false because it is different from reality, the reply is that there may be different realities. If it is held that since Brahman alone is real, its negation would necessarily be false, then the reply is that if Brahman is real its negation is also real. The being or reality that is attributed by Veṅkaṭa to the world is that it is amenable to proof (*prāmāṇika*). Truth is defined by Rāmānuja as that which is capable of being dealt with pragmatically (*vyavahāra-yogyatā sattvaṃ*), and the falsity of the assertion that the world is false is understood by the actual perception of the reality of the world. Again, the falsity of the world cannot be attempted to be proved by logical proof, for these fall within the world and would therefore be themselves false. Again, it may be said that Brahman is also in some sense knowable and so also is the world; it may be admitted for argument's sake that Brahman is not knowable in an ultimate sense (*pāramārthika*), so the world also is not knowable in an ultimate sense; for, if it were, the Śaṅkarite could not call it false. If that is so, how could the Śaṅkarite argue that the world is false because it is knowable, for in that case Brahman would also be false?

Sixteenth Objection. Again, it may be argued that the objects of the world are false because, though being remains the same, its content always varies. Thus we may say a jug exists, a cloth exists, but though these so-called existents change, "being" alone remains unchanged. Therefore the changeable entities are false and the unchangeable alone is real. Now it may be asked: what is the meaning of this change? It cannot mean any difference of identity, for in that case Brahman being different from other entities could be regarded as false. If, however, Brahman be regarded as identical with the false world, Brahman itself would be false, or the world-appearance would be real being identical with the real Brahman. Spatial or temporal change can have nothing to do with determining falsehood; the conch-shell-silver is not false because it does not exist elsewhere. Brahman itself is changeable in the sense that

it does not exist as unreal or as an entity which is neither being nor non-being. Change cannot here legitimately be used in the sense of destruction, for, even when the illusion of conch-shell-silver is discovered, no one says that the conch-shell-silver is destroyed (*bādha-vināśayor viviktatayai'va vyutpatteh*). Destruction (*vināśa*) is the dissolution of an entity, whereas *vādha* or contradiction is the negation of what was perceived. In such phrases as "a jug exists" or "a cloth exists," the existence qualifies jug and cloth, but jug and cloth do not qualify existence. Again, though Brahman abides everywhere, it does not cause in us the cognition "jug exists" or "cloth exists." Again, temporal variation in existence depends upon the cause of such existence, but it cannot render the existence of anything false. If non-illumination at any particular time be regarded as the criterion of falsehood, then Brahman also is false for it does not reveal itself before the dawn of emancipation. If it is held that Brahman is always self-revealing, but its revelation remains somehow hidden until emancipation is attained, then it may be said with the same force that the jug and the cloth also remain revealed in a hidden manner in the same way. Again, the eternity of illumination, or its uncontradicted nature, cannot be regarded as a criterion of reality, for it is faultlessness that is the cause of the eternity of self-illumination, and this has nothing to do with determining the nature of existence. Since the ordinary things, such as a jug or a cloth, appear as existent at some time, they are manifestations of the self-illumination and therefore real.

An opposite argument may also be adduced here. Thus, it may be said that that which is not false does not break its continuity or does not change. Brahman is false, for it is without any continuity with anything else, and is different from everything else.

Seventeenth Objection. The Śāṅkarites hold that since it is impossible to explain the existence of any relation (whatever may be its nature) between the perceiver and the perceived, the perceived entity or the content of knowledge has to be admitted as false. In reply to this Veṅkaṭa says that the falsity of the world cannot be adduced as a necessary implication (*arthāpatti*), for the establishment of a relation between the perceiver and the perceived is possible not by denying the latter but by affirming it. If, however, it is said that since the relation between the perceiver and the perceived can be logically proved chimerical, the necessary deduction

is that the perceived entity is false. To this the reply is that the falsity of the relation does not prove the falsity of the relata; the relation between a hare and a horn may be non-existent, but that will not indicate that both the hare and the horn are themselves non-existent. Following that argument, the perceiver might just as well be declared as false. If, however, it is contended that the perceiver, being self-luminous, is self-evident and cannot therefore be supposed to be false, the reply is, that even if, in the absence of the act of perceiving, the perceiver may be regarded as self-revealing, what harm is there in admitting the perceived to have the same status even when the perceiver is denied? If, however, it is said that the cognition of objects cannot be admitted to be self-established in the same way as the objects themselves, it may be asked if consciousness is ever perceived to be self-revealed. If it is said that the self-revealing character of consciousness can be established by inference, then by a counter-contention it may be held that the self-revealing character of the universe can also be proved by a suitable inference. It may again be questioned whether, if the Śāṅkarite wishes to establish the self-revealing nature of Brahman by inference, its objectivity can be denied, and thus the original thesis that Brahman cannot be the object of any process of cognition must necessarily fail.

The Śāṅkarite may indeed contend that the followers of Rāmānuja also admit that the objects are revealed by the cognition of the self and hence they are dependent on the perceiver. The reply to such a contention is that the followers of Rāmānuja admit the existence of self-consciousness by which the perceiver himself is regarded as cognized. If this self-consciousness is regarded as false, then the self-luminous self would also be false; and if this self-consciousness be admitted as real, then the relation between them is real. If the self-revealing consciousness be regarded as impossible of perception and yet real, then on the same analogy the world may as well be regarded as real though unperceived.

The objection that the known is regarded as false, since it is difficult logically to conceive the nature of the relation subsisting between the knower and the known, is untenable, for merely on account of the difficulty of conceiving the logical nature of the relation one cannot deny the reality of the related entity which is incontestably given in experience. Therefore the relation has some-

how to be admitted. If relation is admitted to be real because it is experienced, then the world is also real because it is also experienced. If the world is false because it is inexplicable, then falsity itself would be false because it is inexplicable.

The objection that there can be no relation between the past and the future is groundless, for the very fact that two things exist in the present time would not mean that they are necessarily related, e.g. the hare and the horn. If, however, it is said that it may be true that things which exist in the present time are not necessarily related, yet there are certain entities at present which are related, so also there are certain things in the present which are related with certain other things in the past and the future. It is no doubt true that the relation of contact is not possible between things of the present and the future, but that does not affect our case, for certain relations exist between entities at present, and certain other relations exist between entities in the present and the future. What relations exist in the present, past and future have to be learnt by experience. If spatial contiguity be a special feature of entities at present, temporal contiguity would hold between entities in present, past and future. However, relation does not necessarily mean contiguity; proximity and remoteness may both condition the relation. Relations are to be admitted just as they are given by experience, and are indefinable and unique in their specific nature. Any attempt to explain them through mediation would end in a conflict with experience. If an attempt is made to refute all relations as such on the ground that relations would imply further relations and thus involve a vicious infinite, the reply is that the attempt to refute a relation itself involves relation and therefore according to the opponent's own supposition stands cancelled. A relation stands by itself and does not depend on other relations for its existence.

Eighteenth Objection. In refuting the view of the Śāṅkarites that self-luminous Brahman cannot have as an object of illumination anything that is external to it, Veṅkaṭa argues that if nescience be itself inherent in Brahman from beginningless time, then there would be no way for Brahman to extricate itself from its clutches and emancipation would be impossible. Then the question may be asked, whether the *avidyā* is different from Brahman or not. If it be different, then the monism of the Śāṅkara philosophy breaks

down; if it be non-different, then also on the one hand Brahman could not free itself from it and on the other hand there could be no evolution of the *avidyā* which has merged itself in the nature of the Brahman, into the various forms of egoism, passions, etc. If this *avidyā* be regarded as false and therefore incapable of binding the free nature of Brahman, the objection may still be urged that, if this falsehood covers the nature of Brahman, how can it regain its self-luminosity; and if it cannot do so, that would mean its destruction, for self-luminosity is the very nature of Brahman. If the *avidyā* stands as an independent entity and covers the nature of Brahman, then it would be difficult to conceive how the existence of a real entity can be destroyed by mere knowledge. According to Rāmānuja's view, however, knowledge is a quality or a characteristic of Brahman by which other things are known by it; experience also shows that a knower reveals the objects by his knowledge, and thus knowledge is a characteristic quality of the knower by which the objects are known.

Nineteenth Objection. In refuting the view of Śaṅkara that ignorance or *avidyā* rests in Brahman, Veṅkaṭa tries to clarify the concept of *ajñāna*. He says that *ajñāna* here cannot mean the absolute negation of the capacity of being the knower; for this capacity, being the essence of Brahman, cannot be absent. It (*ajñāna*) cannot also mean the ignorance that precedes the rise of any cognition, for the Śaṅkarites do not admit knowledge as a quality or a characteristic of Brahman; nor can it mean the negation of any particular knowledge, for the Brahman-consciousness is the only consciousness admitted by the Śaṅkarites. This *ajñāna* cannot also be regarded as the absence of knowledge, since it is admitted to be a positive entity. The *ajñāna* which can be removed by knowledge must belong to the same knower who has the knowledge and must refer to the specific object regarding which there was absence of knowledge. Now since Brahman is not admitted by the Śaṅkarites to be knower, it is impossible that any *ajñāna* could be associated with it. The view that is held by the members of the Rāmānuja school is that the individual knowers possess ignorance in so far as they are ignorant of their real nature as self-luminous entities, and in so far as they associate themselves with their bodies, their senses, their passions, and other prejudices and ideas. When they happen to discover their

folly, their ignorance is removed. It is only in this way that it can be said to be removed by knowledge. But all this would be impossible in the case of Brahman conceived as pure consciousness. According to the view of Rāmānuja's school, individual knowers are all in their essential natures omniscient; it is the false prejudice and passions that cover up this omniscience whereby they appear as ordinary knowers who can know things only under specific conditions.

Twentieth Objection. Veṅkaṭa, in refuting the definition of immediate intuition (*anubhūti*) as that which may be called immediate perception without being further capable of being an object of awareness (*avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam*), as given by Citsukhācārya in his *Tattva-pradīpikā*, raises certain objections against it as follows. It is urged by the Śāṅkarites that if the immediate intuition be itself an object of further cognitive action, then it loses its status as immediate intuition and may be treated as an object like other objects, e.g. a jug. If by the words "immediate intuition" it is meant that at the time of its operation it is self-expressed and does not stand in need of being revealed by another cognition, then this is also admitted by Rāmānuja. Furthermore, this intuition at the time of its self-revelation involves with it the revelation of the self of the knower as well. Therefore, so far as this meaning of intuition is concerned, the denial of self-revelation is out of place.

The words "immediate intuition" (*anubhūti*) are supposed to have another meaning, viz. that the intuition is not individuated in separate individual cognitions as limited by time, space or individual laws. But such an intuition is never experienced, for not only do we infer certain cognitions as having taken place in certain persons or being absent in them, but we also speak of our own cognitions as present in past and future, such as "I know it," "I knew it" and the like, which prove that cognitions are temporally limited. It may be asked whether this immediate intuition reveals Brahman or anything else; if it reveals Brahman, then it certainly has an object. If it is supposed that in doing so it simply reveals that which has already been self-expressed, even then it will be expressive of something though that something stood already expressed. This would involve a contradiction between the two terms of the thesis *avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam*,

for, following the arguments given above, though the Brahman may be regarded as immediate, yet it has been shown to be capable of being made an object of intuition. If on the other alternative this intuition expresses something else than Brahman, that would bring the opponent to a conclusion not intended by him and contradictory as well.

Just as one may say that one knows a jug or a cloth or an orange, so one may say that one knows another man's awareness or one's own. In this way an awareness can be the object of another awareness just as another object. Again, if one cannot be aware of another man's awareness, the use of language for mental understanding should cease.

If the immediate intuition itself cannot be made an object of awareness, that would mean that it is not known at all and consequently its existence would be chimerical. It cannot be urged that chimerical entities are not perceivable because they are chimerical, but entities do not become chimerical because they cannot be perceived, for the concomitance in the former proposition is not conditional. The Śāṅkarites would not hold that all entities other than immediate intuition are chimerical. It may also be held that chimerical entities are not immediate intuition because they are chimerical; but in that case it may also be held that these objects (e.g. a jug) are not immediate intuition because of their specific characters as jug, etc. The whole point that has to be emphasized here is that the ordinary objects are other than immediate intuition, not because they can be known but because of their specific characters. The reason that an entity cannot be called immediate intuition if it can be known is entirely faulty¹.

If, again, Brahman is manifest as only immediate intuition, then neither the scriptures nor philosophy can in any way help us regarding the nature of Brahman.

Twenty-first Objection. The Śāṅkarites deny the production of individual cognitions. In their view all the various forms of so-called cognitions arise through the association of various modes of *avidyā* with the self-luminous pure consciousness. In refuting this view Veṅkaṭa urges that the fact that various cognitions arise in time is testified by universal experience. If the pure consciousness be always present and if individual cognitions are denied, then all

¹ *Śata-dūṣaṇī*, II. 78.

objects ought to be manifested simultaneously. If, however, it is ascertained that though the pure consciousness is always present yet the rise of various cognitions is conditioned by other collocating causal circumstances, the reply is that such an infinite number of causal conditions conditioning the pure consciousness would be against the dictum of the Śāṅkarites themselves, for this would be in conflict with their uncompromising monism. Now if, again, it is held that the cognitive forms do really modify the nature of pure consciousness, then the pure consciousness becomes changeable, which is against the thesis of Śāṅkara. If it is held that the forms are imposed on pure consciousness as it is and by such impositions the specific objects are in their turn illuminated by consciousness, then the position is that in order that an object may be illuminated such illumination must be mediated by a false imposition on the nature of pure consciousness. If the direct illumination of objects is impossible, then another imposition might be necessary to mediate the other false impositions on the nature of pure consciousness, and that might require another, and this would result in a vicious infinite. If the imposition is not false, then the consciousness becomes changeable and the old objection would recur. If, however, it is urged that the objects are illuminated independent of any collocating circumstances and independent of any specific contribution from the nature of the pure consciousness, then all objects (since they are all related to pure consciousness) might simultaneously be revealing. If, again, all cognitions are but false impositions on the nature of pure consciousness, then at the time of an illusory imposition of a particular cognition, say, a jug, nothing else would exist, and this would bring about nihilism. It may also be asked, if the Śāṅkarite is prepared to deny the world on account of the impossibility of any relation subsisting between it and the perceiver, how can he launch himself into an attempt to explain the relation of such a world with Brahman?

On the other hand, the experience of us all testifies to the fact that we are aware of cognitions coming into being, staying, passing away, and having passed and gone from us; except in the case of perceptual experience, there is no difficulty in being aware of past and future events; so the objection that the present awareness cannot be related to past and future events is invalid. The objection that there cannot be awareness of past or future entities because

they are not existing now is invalid, for past and future entities also exist in their own specific temporal relations. Validity of awareness consists in the absence of contradiction and not in the fact of its relating to an entity of the present moment, for otherwise an illusory perception of the present moment would have to be considered as valid. Thus, since it is possible to be aware of an awareness that was not there but which comes into being both by direct and immediate acquaintance and by inference, the view of the Śaṅkarites denying the origination of individual awareness is invalid. In the view of Rāmānuja, knowledge is no doubt admitted to be eternal; yet this knowledge is also admitted to have specific temporal characters and also specific states. Therefore, so far as these characters or states are concerned, origination and cessation would be possible under the influence of specific collocative circumstances. Again, the objection that since pure consciousness is beginningless it cannot suffer changes is invalid, for the Śaṅkarites admit *avidyā* also as beginningless and yet changeable. It may also be pointed out in this connection that the so-called contentless consciousness is never given in experience. Even the consciousness in dreamless sleep or in a swoon is related to the perceiver and therefore not absolutely contentless.

Twenty-second Objection. It is urged by the Śaṅkarites that the pure consciousness is unchanging because it is not produced. If, however, the word unchanging means that it never ceases to exist, it may be pointed out that the Śaṅkarites admit *ajñāna* to be unproduced and yet liable to destruction. Thus there is no reason why a thing should not be liable to destruction because it is not produced. If it is urged that the destruction of *avidyā* is itself false, then it may be pointed out with the same force that the destruction of all things is false. Moreover, since the Śaṅkarites do not admit any change to be real, the syllogism adduced by them that an entity which is unproduced is not changeable falls to the ground. The difference between Śaṅkara's conception of Brahman and that of Rāmānuja is that according to the former Brahman is absolutely unchangeable and characterless, and according to the latter the Brahman is the absolute, containing within it the world and the individual beings and all the changes involved in them. It is unchangeable only in so far as all the dynamical change rises from within and there is nothing else outside it which can affect it. That

is, the absolute, though changeable within it, is absolutely self-contained and self-sustained, and is entirely unaffected by anything outside it.

Twenty-third Objection. The Śāṅkarites urge that since consciousness is unproduced it cannot be many, for whatever is many is produced, e.g. the jug. If it is a pure consciousness which appears as many through the conditioning factors of *avidyā*, it may be asked in this connection whether, if the pure consciousness cannot be differentiated from anything else, it may as well be one with the body also, which is contrary to Śāṅkara's thesis. If, however, it is replied that the so-called difference between the body and the pure consciousness is only a false difference, then it would have to be admitted and that would militate against the changeless character of Brahman as held by the Śāṅkarites. Again, if the real difference between the body and the pure consciousness be denied, then it may be urged that the proposition following from it is that things which in reality differ are produced (e.g. the jug); but according to the Śāṅkarites jug, etc., are also not different from Brahman, and thus a proposition like the above cannot be quoted in support. Moreover, since the *avidyā* is unproduced, it follows that according to the maxim of the Śāṅkarites it would not be different from Brahman which, however, the Śāṅkarites would undoubtedly be slow to accept. It cannot also be held that an awareness does not differ from another awareness on the supposition that different awarenesses are but seeming forms imposed upon the same consciousness, for so long as we speak of difference we speak only of apparent difference and of apparent divergent forms; and if the apparent divergent forms are admitted, it cannot be said that they are not different. Again, it is urged that the same moon appears as many through wavy water, so it is the same awareness that appears as many, though these are identically one. To this the reply is that the analogy is false. The image-moon is not identical with the moon, so the appearances are not identical with awareness. If it is said that all image-moons are false, then on the same analogy all awarenesses may be false and then if only one consciousness be true as a ground of all awarenesses then all awarenesses may be said to be equally true or equally false. Again, as to the view that the principle of consciousness as such does not differ from individual cognitions, such a position is untenable, because the Rāmānujists

do not admit the existence of an abstract principle of consciousness; with them all cognitions are specific and individual. It may be pointed out in this connection that according to the Rāmānujists consciousness exists in the individuals as eternal qualities, i.e. it may suffer modification according to conditions and circumstances.

Twenty-fourth Objection. In objecting to the unqualified character of pure consciousness Veṅkaṭa says that to be unqualified is also a qualification. It differs from other qualities only in being negative. Negative qualifications ought to be deemed as objectionable as the positive ones. Again, Brahman is admitted by the Śāṅkarites to be absolute and unchangeable, and these are qualifications. If it is replied that these qualifications are also false, then their opposite qualifications would hold good, viz. Brahman would be admitted as changeable. Again, it may be asked how this unqualified character of Brahman is established. If it is not established by reason, the assumption is invalid; if it is established by reason, then that reason must exist in Brahman and it will be qualified by it (the reason).

Twenty-fifth Objection. Veṅkaṭa denies the assumption of the Śāṅkarites that consciousness is the self because it reveals it to itself on the ground that if whatever reveals it to itself or whatever stands self-revealed is to be called the self, then pleasure and pain also should be identical with the self, for these are self-revealed. Veṅkaṭa further urges that the revelation of knowledge is not absolutely unconditional because revelation is made to the perceiver's self and not to anything and everything, a fact which shows that it is conditioned by the self. It may also be pointed out that the revelation of knowledge is not made to itself but to the self on one hand and to the objects on the other in the sense that they form constituents of knowledge. Again, it is testified by universal experience that consciousness is different from the self. It may also be asked whether, if consciousness be identical with the self, this consciousness is unchangeable or changeable. Would later recognition be impossible? In the former alternative it may further be asked whether this unchanging consciousness has any support or not; if not, how can it stand unsupported? If it has a support, then that support may well be taken as the knower, as is done by the Rāmānujists. It may also be pointed out here that knowledge being

a character or a quality cannot be identified with that (viz. the self) which possesses that character.

Twenty-sixth Objection. The Śāṅkarites assert that the self is pure consciousness. Therefore the perception of self as “I” is false, and therefore this notion of “I” is obsolete both in dreamless sleep and emancipation. To this Venkṭa’s reply is that if the notion of “I” is obsolete in dreamless sleep, then the continuity of self-consciousness is impossible. It is no doubt true that in dreamless sleep the notion of the self as “I” is not then manifestly experienced, but it is not on that account non-existent at the time, for the continuity of the self as “I” is necessarily implied in the fact that it is experienced both before the dreamless sleep and after it. Since it is manifestly experienced both before and after the dreamless sleep, it must be abiding even at the time of the sleep. And this self-consciousness itself refers to the past and the present as a continuity. If this ego-notion was annihilated during the dreamless sleep, then the continuity of experience could not be explained (*madhye cā’ hama-rthā-bhāve saṃskāra-dhārā-bhāvāt, pratisandhānā-bhāva-prasaṅgaś ca*). It is a patent fact that in the absence of the knower neither ignorance nor knowledge can exist. It cannot also be said that the continuity of experience is transmitted to pure consciousness or *avidyā* during the dreamless sleep; for the pure consciousness cannot be a repository of experiences, and if *avidyā* is the repository it would be the knower, which is impossible; and the fact of recognition would be unexplainable, for the experience associated with *avidyā* cannot be remembered by the entity to which the ego-notion refers. Moreover, the experience of a man rising from sleep who feels “I slept happily so long” indicates that the entity referred to by the ego-notion was also experienced during the sleep. Even the experience referring to the state in dreamless sleep as “I slept so soundly that I even did not know myself” also indicates that the self was experienced at that time as being ignorant of its specific bodily and other spatial and temporal relations. It cannot be contended that the entity denoted by the ego-notion cannot abide even in emancipation, for if there was no entity in emancipation no one would attempt to attain to this stage. The existence of pure qualityless consciousness at the time of emancipation would mean the annihilation of the self, and no one would ever be interested in his own self-destruction. Moreover, if the entity

denoted by the ego-notion is not a real entity, then the view (often put forward by the Śāṅkarites) that the entity denoted by the ego-notion is often falsely identified with the body or the senses would be meaningless. If the illusion be due to a false imposition of false appearances, such as the body or the senses, on the pure consciousness, then that cannot be called the delusion of the ego-entity as the body and the senses. It cannot also be said that in the experience of the self as "I" there are two parts, the pure consciousness which is eternal and real and the egohood which is a mere false appearance. For if it is so in the ego-experience it might also be so in other experiences as objectivity as this or that. Moreover, if this is so, what is there to distinguish the specific experience as subjectivity from the experience as objectivity? What is it that constitutes the special feature of subjectivity? Thus it may be confidently stated that the ego-entity is the real nature of the self.

Twenty-seventh Objection. It is urged by the Śāṅkarites that the notion of the self as the knower is false because the ultimate reality, being the self-luminous Brahman, is absolutely unchangeable. The attribution of the characteristic of being a knower would be incompatible with this nature. To this it may be replied that if the fact of being a knower is regarded as a changeable character, then being or self-luminosity would also be a character, and they also would be incompatible with this nature. The change of the states of knowledge does not in any way affect the unchangeable nature of the self, for the self is not changed along with the change of the cognitions.

Twenty-eighth Objection. It is well known that the Śāṅkarites conceive of pure consciousness which is regarded as the witness (*sākṣin*), as it were, of all appearances and forms that are presented to it, and it is through its function as such a witness that these are revealed. It is through this *sākṣi*-consciousness that the continuity of consciousness is maintained, and during dreamless sleep the blissfulness that is experienced is also made apparent to this *sākṣi*-consciousness. The Rāmānujists deny this *sākṣi*-consciousness because it is unnecessary for them; its purpose is served by the functions of a knower whose consciousness is regarded as continuous in the waking state, in dreams, and also in dreamless sleep. Veṅkaṭa urges that the manifestation of blissfulness which is one with pure consciousness is implied by the very nature of pure consciousness as self-revealed. It may also be pointed out that the sensuous

pleasures cannot be manifested during dreamless sleep; if this is so, why should a *sākṣi*-consciousness be admitted for explaining the experience of blissfulness during dreamless sleep? Since Brahman is not admitted to be a real knower, the conception of *sākṣin* is not the same as that of a knower. It cannot also be a mere revelation; for if it be a revelation of itself as Brahman, then the mediation of the function of *sākṣi*-consciousness is unnecessary, and if it be of *avidyā*, then through its association Brahman would be false. It cannot be that the functioning of the *sākṣi*-consciousness is one with the nature of Brahman, and yet that partakes of the nature of *avidyā*; for it cannot both be identical with Brahman and the *avidyā*. If the functioning of the *sākṣi*-consciousness be false, a number of other *sākṣins* is to be admitted, leading to a vicious infinite. Thus in whatsoever way one may try to conceive of the *sākṣi*-consciousness, one fails to reconcile it either with reason or with experience.

Twenty-ninth and thirtieth Objections. Veṅkaṭa urges that the Śāṅkarites are wrong in asserting that scriptural testimony is superior in validity to perceptual experience. As a matter of fact, scriptural knowledge is not possible without perceptual experience. Therefore scriptures are to be interpreted in such a way that they do not come into conflict with the testimony of perceptual knowledge. Therefore, since the perception proves to us the reality of the many around us, the scriptural interpretation that would try to convince us of their falsity is certainly invalid. The Śāṅkarites further urge and adduce many false illustrations to prove the possibility of attaining right knowledge through false means (e.g. the fear that arises from the perception of false snakes, representations of things that are made by letters, and the combinations of letters which are combinations of lines). But Veṅkaṭa's reply to it is that in all those cases where falsehood is supposed to lead us to truth it is not through falsehood that we come to truth but from one right knowledge to another. It is because the lines stand as true symbols for certain things that they are represented by them, and it is not possible to adduce any illustration in which falsehood may be supposed to lead us to truth. If, therefore, scriptures are false (in the ultimate sense) as Śāṅkarites would say, it would be impossible for them to lead us to the true Brahma-knowledge.

Thirty-first Objection. The view of the Śāṅkarites that the emancipation may be attained by right knowledge even in this life

before death, called by them *ġivanmukti* or emancipation in life, is denied by the Rāmānujists, who hold that emancipation cannot be attained by right knowledge but by right actions and right feelings associated with right knowledge, and consequently emancipation is the result. Real separation of the association of the worldly things from the self can only come about after the body ceases to exist. Veṅkaṭa points out that, so long as the body remains, perception of the ultimate truth as one is impossible, for such a person is bound to be aware of the existence of the body and its manifold relations. If it be said that though the body persists yet it may be regarded as absolutely false or non-existent, then that would amount to one's being without any body and the distinction of emancipation in life and emancipation in death would be impossible.

Thirty-second Objection. The Śāṅkarites assert that *ajñāna* or ignorance, though opposed to knowledge, is a positive entity as it is revealed as such by perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Veṅkaṭa, in refusing this, says that if *ajñāna* be regarded as opposed to knowledge, it can only be so if it negates knowledge, i.e. if it be of the nature of negation. Such a negation must then obviously refer to a content of knowledge; and if this be admitted then the content of knowledge must have been known, for otherwise the negation cannot refer to it. To this the Śāṅkarites are supposed to say that the negation of knowledge and the content to which it refers are two independent entities such that the experience of the negation of knowledge does not necessarily imply that the content should be known. Therefore it is wrong to say that the negation of knowledge is a contradiction in terms. To this the obvious reply is that as in the case of a negation, where the presence of the object of negation contradicts a negation, so when there is a negation of all contents of knowledge the presence of any content necessarily contradicts it. So the experience that "I do not know anything" would be contradicted by any knowledge whatsoever. If it is urged that a negation of knowledge and its experience may be at two different moments so that the experience and the negation may not be contradictory, the reply is that perceptual experience always grasps things which are existent at the present time. Though in the case of the supposed perception of *ajñāna* during dreamless sleep the experience of *ajñāna* may be supposed to be

known by inference, and in cases of such perception as “I am ignorant,” “I do not know myself or anything else,” there is obviously perceptual experience of *ajñāna*. It is, therefore, impossible that “I” should perceive and be at the same time ignorant. Perception of ignorance would thus be absurd. Again, the experience of a negation necessarily must refer to a locus, and this implies that there is a knowledge of the locus and that this would contradict the experience of a universal negation which is devoid of all knowledge. It may, however, be urged that the perception of ignorance is not the experience of a negation, but that of a positive entity, and so the objections brought forward in the above controversy would not apply to it.

To this the reply is that the admission of a positive category called *ajñāna* which is directly experienced in perception may imply that it is of an entity which is opposed to knowledge; for the negative particle “a” in “*ajñāna*” is used either in the sense of absence or negation. If it does so, it may well be urged that experience of opposition implies two terms, that which opposes and that to which there is an opposition. Thus, the experience of *ajñāna* would involve the experience of knowledge also, and, therefore, when the opposite of *ajñāna* shines forth, how can *ajñāna* be perceived? It is clear, therefore, that no advantage is gained by regarding *ajñāna* as a positive entity instead of a mere negation. The conception of a positive *ajñāna* cannot serve any new purpose which is not equally attainable by the conception of it as negation of knowledge. If a positive entity is regarded as able to circumscribe or limit the scope of manifestation of Brahman, a negation also may do the same. The Śāṅkarites themselves admit that knowledge shines by driving away the ignorance which constituted the negation-precedent-to the production of (*prāga-bhāva*) knowledge, and thus in a way they admit that *ajñāna* is of the nature of negation. The supposed experience of dullness (*mugdho'smi*) involves in it the notion of an opposition. The mere fact that the word “dull” (*mugdha*) has no negative particle in it does not mean that it has no negative sense. Thus, a positive ignorance cannot be testified by perception.

It has been suggested that the existence of *ajñāna* may be proved by inference on the supposition that if light manifests itself by driving away darkness, so knowledge must shine by driving away

positive ignorance. Now inference is a mode of knowledge and as such it must drive away some ignorance which was hiding its operation. Since this *ajñāna* could not manifest itself, it must imply some other *ajñāna* which was hiding it, and without driving which it could not manifest itself, and there would thus be infinite regress. If the *ajñāna* be regarded as hiding, then the inference may as well be regarded as destroying the ignorance directly. Whenever a knowledge illuminates some contents, it may be regarded as dispelling the ignorance regarding it. The scriptural texts also do not support the conception of a positive *ajñāna*. Thus, the concept of a positive *ajñāna* is wholly illegitimate.

Fortieth Objection. The supposition that the *ajñāna* rests in the individual *jīvas* and not Brahman is also false. If the *ajñāna* is supposed to rest in the individual in its own real essence (i.e. as Brahman), then the *ajñāna* would virtually rest in Brahman. If it is supposed that *ajñāna* rests in the individual *jīvas*, not in their natural state but in their ordinarily supposed nature as suffering rebirth, etc., then this amounts to saying that the *ajñāna* is associated with the material stuff and as such can never be removed; for the material limitations of an individual can never have a desire to remove the *ajñāna*, nor has it the power to destroy it. Again, it may be asked whether the *ajñāna* that constitutes the difference of individual *jīvas* is one or many in different cases. In the former case in the emancipation of one, *ajñāna* would be removed and all would be emancipated. In the second case it is difficult to determine whether *avidyā* comes first or the difference between individual *jīvas*, and there would thus be *anyonyā-śraya*, for the Śāṅkarites do not admit the reality of difference between *jīvas*. In the theory that *ajñāna* is associated with Brahman, the difference between *jīvas* being false, there is no necessity to admit the diversity of *ajñāna* according to the diversity of *jīvas*. In any case, whether real or fictitious, *avidyā* cannot explain the diversity of the *jīvas*. Again, if the *ajñānas* which are supposed to produce the diversity of the *jīvas* be supposed to exist in the Brahman, then Brahman cannot be known. In the view that these *ajñānas* exist in the *jīvas*, the old difficulty comes in as to whether the difference of *avidyās* is primary or whether that of the *jīvas* is primary. If the difficulty is intended to be solved by suggesting that the regression is not vicious as in the case of the seed and the shoot, then it may be pointed out that

in the supposition that the *ajñānas* which produce difference in *jīvas* have these as their support then there is no scope for such a regression. The seed that produces the shoot does not produce itself. If it is suggested that the *avidyā* of the previous *jīvas* produces the later *jīvas*, then the *jīvas* would be destructible. Thus, from whichever way we may try to support the view that the *avidyā* rests in individual *jīvas* we meet with unmitigated failure.

Forty-first Objection. It is said that the defect of *avidyā* belongs to Brahman. If this defect of *avidyā* is something different from Brahman, then that virtually amounts to the admission of dualism; if it is not different from Brahman, then Brahman itself becomes responsible for all errors and illusions which are supposed to be due to *avidyā*, and Brahman being eternal all errors and illusions are bound to be eternal. If it is said that the errors and illusions are produced when Brahman is associated with some other accessory cause, then about this also the old question may be raised as to whether the accessory cause or causes are different or not different from Brahman and whether real or not. Again, such an accessory cause cannot be of the nature of a negation-precedent-to the production of the true knowledge of the identity of the self and the Brahman; for then the doctrine of a positive ignorance propounded by the Śāṅkarites would be wholly unnecessary and uncalled for. Further, such a negation cannot be identical with Brahman, for then with true knowledge and with the destruction of ignorance Brahman itself would cease. Again, since everything else outside Brahman is false, if there is any such entity that obstructs the light of Brahman or distorts it (if the distortion is in any sense real), then that entity would also be Brahman; and Brahman being eternal that distortion would also be eternal. If the defect which acts as an obstructive agent be regarded as unreal and beginningless, then also it must depend on some cause and this will lead to an infinite regress; if it does not depend upon any cause, then it would be like Brahman which shines forth by itself without depending on any defect, which is absurd. If it is supposed that this defect constructs itself as well as others, then the world-creation would manifest itself without depending upon any other defect. If it is said that there is no impropriety in admitting the defect as constructing itself, just as an illusion is the same as the construction, i.e. is made by it, then the Śāṅkarites would be contradicting their own views;

for they certainly do admit the beginningless world-creation to be due to the operation of defects. If the *avidyā* is not itself an illusory imposition, then it will be either true or chimerical. If it is regarded as both an illusory construction and a product, then it would not be beginningless. If it has a beginning, then it cannot be distinguished from the world-appearance. If illusion and its construction be regarded as identical, then also the old difficulty of the *avidyā* generating itself through its own construction would remain the same. Again, if the *avidyā* appears to Brahman without the aid of any accessory defect, then it will do so eternally. If it is urged that, when the *avidyā* ceases, its manifestation would also cease, then also there is a difficulty which is suggested by the theory of the Sāṅkarites themselves; for we know that in their theory there is no difference between the illumination and that which is illuminated and that there is no causal operation between them. That which is being illuminated cannot be separated from the principle of illumination.

If it is urged that the *avidyā* is manifested so long as there is no dawning of true knowledge, then may it not be said that the negation-precedent-to the rise of true knowledge is the cause of world-appearance and that the admission of *avidyā* is unnecessary? If it is said that the negation cannot be regarded as the cause of the very varied production of world-appearances, then it can be urged with as much force that the position may also be regarded as capable of producing the manifold world-appearance. If it is held that positive defects in the eye often produce many illusory appearances, then it may also be urged on the other side that the non-observation of distinctions and differences is also often capable of producing many illusory appearances. If it is urged that negation is not limited by time and is therefore incapable of producing the diverse kinds of world-appearances under different conditions of time, and that it is for that reason that it is better to admit positive ignorance, then also it may be asked with as much force how such a beginningless ignorance unconditioned by any temporal character can continue to produce the diverse world-appearance conditioned in time till the dawning of true knowledge. If in answer to this it is said that such is the nature and character of *avidyā*, then it may well be asked what is the harm in admitting such a nature or character of "negation." This, at least, saves us from admitting a strange and

uncalled for hypothesis of positive ignorance. It may be urged that negation is homogeneous and formless and as such it cannot undergo transformations of character, while *avidyā*, being a positive stuff, can pass through a series of transformations of character (*vivarta-paramparā*). In this connection it may be urged that the nature of *avidyā* is nothing but this succession of transformations of character; if it is so, then since it is the nature of *avidyā* to have a succession of diverse kinds of transformations, there may be all kinds of illusions at all times. It cannot also be regarded as an effect of transformation of character, for the *avidyā* is supposed to produce such effects. If it is urged that *avidyā* is a distinct entity by itself, different from the appearance of its character that is perceived, then also the old question would recur regarding the reality or unreality of it. The former supposition would be an admission of dualism; the latter supposition, that is, if it is false, the succession of it as various appearances conditioned by diverse kinds of time and space would presuppose such other previous presuppositions *ad infinitum*. If it is held that there is no logical defect in supposing that the previous sets of transformations determine the later sets in an unending series, it is still not necessary to admit *avidyā* in order to explain such a situation. For it may well be supposed that the different transformations arise in Brahman without depending upon any extraneous cause. The objection that such a supposition that Brahman is continually undergoing such diverse transformations of character (real or unreal) would inevitably lead to the conclusion that there is no Brahman beyond such transformations is invalid; for our perceptual experience shows that the transformational change of a lump of clay does not invalidate its being. In such a view Brahman may be regarded as the ground of all illusory appearances. On the other hand, it is only on the assumption of false *avidyā* that one cannot legitimately affirm the existence of a basis, for the basis of falsehood would itself be false. Therefore, if Brahman be regarded as its basis, then it would itself be false and would land us in nihilism.

Again, it may well be asked whether *avidyā* shines by itself or not. If it does not, it becomes chimerical; if it does, then it may again be asked whether this shining is of the nature of *avidyā* or not. If it is, then it would be as self-shining as Brahman and there would be no difference between them. Again, if the shining cha-

racter of *avidyā* belongs to Brahman, the Brahman being eternal, there would never be a time when *avidyā* would not shine. The shiningness cannot also be regarded as a character of either Brahman or the *avidyā*, for none of them is regarded as being a knower of it. If it is urged that the character as the knower is the result of an illusory imposition, then the objection is that the meaning of such an imposition is unintelligible unless the conception of *avidyā* is clarified. The character as knower is possible only on the supposition of an illusory imposition, and on the above supposition the illusory imposition becomes possible on the supposition of the knower. If it is due to Brahman, then Brahman, being eternal, the illusory impositions would also be eternal. If it be without any reason, then the entire world-illusion would be without any cause.

Again, any conception regarding the support of *avidyā* is unintelligible. If it has no support, it must be either independent like Brahman or be like chimerical entities. If it has a support and if that support be of the nature of Brahman, then it is difficult to conceive how the eternally pure Brahman can be the support of the impure *avidyā* which is naturally opposed to it. If the solution is to be found in the supposition that the impure *avidyā* is false, then it may well be urged that if it is false there is no meaning in the effort to make it cease. If it is said in reply that though it is non-existent yet there is an appearance of it, and the effort is made to make that appearance cease, then also the reply is that the appearance is also as false as itself. If it is admitted that though false it can yet injure one's interest, then its falsehood would be only in name, for its effects are virtually admitted to be real. If Brahman in its limited or conditioned aspect be regarded as the support of *avidyā*, then since such a limitation must be through some other *avidyā* this would merely bring us into confusion. If it is held that *avidyā* has for its support an entity quite different from Brahman conditioned or unconditioned, then the view that Brahman is the support of *avidyā* has to be given up, and there would be other difficulties regarding the discovery of another support of this support. If it be said that like Brahman *avidyā* is its own support but Brahman is not its own support, then the support of *avidyā* would have no other support. If it is said that the support can be explained on the basis of conditions, then also it would be difficult to imagine how a condition of the nature of a receptacle (*ādhārā-kāro-pādhi*) can itself

be without any support. If further supports are conceived, then there would be a vicious infinite. Again, if it is held that what is false does not require any support, then it may be urged that according to the Śāṅkarites the support is regarded as the basis on which the illusion occurs, and even the jug is regarded as an illusion on the ground. Moreover, this false experience of *avidyā* is not any of the illusory or limited perceptions, such as ego-experience or the experience of other mental states; for these are regarded as the effects of *avidyā*. If they are not so, then they must be due to some other defects, and these to other ones, and so there would be a vicious infinite. If it is held that *avidyā* is nothing different from its experience, then since all experience is of the nature of Brahman, Brahman itself would be false. Again, if the *avidyā* manifests itself as Brahman by hiding its (Brahman) nature, then all pure revelation being hidden and lost, *avidyā* itself, which is manifested by it, would also be naturally lost. If it be manifested as Brahman and its own nature be hidden, then Brahman alone being manifested there would be no question of bondage. It is obvious that it cannot manifest itself both as *avidyā* and as Brahman, for that would be self-contradictory, since knowledge always dispels ignorance. If it is held that just as a mirror reflects an image in which the character of the mirror and the real face is hidden, so *avidyā* may manifest itself and hide both itself and the Brahman. To this the reply is that in all cases of illusions of identity (*tādātmyā-dhyāsa*) the non-observation of the difference is the cause of the error. The cause of the illusion of the face and the mirror is the non-observation of the fact that the face is away from the mirror. But Brahman and *avidyā* are neither located in a proximate space so that it is possible to compare their illusion of identity by the illustration of other illusions which depend upon such proximity. If it is said of *avidyā*, not being a substance, that all criticism that applies to real and existent entities would be inapplicable to it, then such a doctrine would be almost like nihilism, for all criticisms against nihilism are accepted by nihilists as not invalidating their doctrine.

Forty-second Objection. It is held by the Śāṅkarites that *avidyā* and *māyā* are two distinct conceptions. *Māyā* is supposed to be that by which others are deluded, and *avidyā* is supposed to be that which deludes one's self. The word *māyā* is used in various senses but none of these seems to satisfy the usage of the word in Śāṅkarite

manner. If it is supposed that the word *māyā*, of which Brahman is supposed to be the support, has this peculiarity that it manifests its various forms to others as well as deludes them, then it is hard to distinguish it from the conception of *avidyā*. If it is held that the word *avidyā* is restricted to mean the agent that causes false perceptions as in the case of conch-shell-silver, then *māyā* may also be called *avidyā*, for it also causes the false world-appearance to be perceived. There is no reason why the cause of the false perception of the conch-shell-silver should be called *avidyā* and not those relatively true cognitions which contradict such illusory perceptions. *Īśvara* also may be said to be suffering from *avidyā*, for since He is omniscient He has the knowledge of all individual selves of which falsehood is a constituent. If God has no knowledge of illusions, He would not be omniscient. It is wrong also to suppose that *māyā* is that which manifests everything else except Brahman in its nature as false; for if the Brahman knows the world-appearance as false without being under an illusion, it would still be hard to repudiate the ignorance of Brahman. If Brahman knows all things as the illusions of others, then He must know the others and as such their constituent illusions, and this would mean that Brahman is itself subject to *avidyā*. It is difficult also to conceive how one can have any cognition of falsehood without being under illusion, for falsehood is not mere non-existence but the appearance of an entity where it does not exist. If Brahman sees other people only under illusions, that does not mean that Brahman deludes others by His *māyā*. There may be a magician who would try to show his magic by mere false tricks. If the Brahman tried to show His magic by mere false reflections, He would indeed be mad. It may be supposed that the difference between *avidyā* and *māyā* is that *avidyā*, by producing illusory experiences, hurts the real interests of the perceiving selves, yet the Brahman Who perceives these illusory selves and their experiences does so through the agency of *māyā* which does not injure His interest. To this the reply is that if *māyā* does not injure anybody's interest, it cannot be called a defect. It may be objected that defects have no connection with harmful or beneficial effects but they have a relation only to truth and error. Such a view cannot be accepted, for truth and error have a pragmatic value and all that is erroneous hurts one's interests; if it were not so, nobody would be anxious to remove them.

If it is argued that *māyā* is not a defect of Brahman but a quality, then it may be said that if it were so then no one would be anxious to remove it. If, again, *māyā* were a quality of Brahman and served the purpose of such a mighty person, how could the poor individual selves dare it? And if they could, they would be able to injure the practical interests of an Omnipotent Being, for *māyā* being a quality would certainly be of great use to Him. *Māyā* cannot be destroyed by itself without any cause, for that would land us in the doctrine of momentariness. If the *māyā* were eternal and real, that would be an admission of dualism. If *māyā* be regarded as being included in Brahman, then Brahman, being only self-manifesting, and *māyā* being included within it would not have the power of producing the world-delusions which it is supposed to produce. Again, *māyā* being eternal cannot also be false. Again, if the manifestation of *māyā* from Brahman be regarded as real, then the ignorance of Brahman becomes also real; if it is a false manifestation from Brahman, then it would be meaningless to suppose that Brahman should be using the *māyā* as an instrument of play. It is absurd to suppose that Brahman would be playing with false reflected images, like a child. Again, if the *jīvas* and Brahman be identical, then it is unreasonable to suppose that the ignorance of the *jīvas* would not imply the ignorance of Brahman. If, again, the *jīvas* and the Brahman be really different, then how can there be any emancipation by the knowledge of their identity? So the conception of a *māyā* and an *avidyā* different from it is wholly incomprehensible.

Forty-third Objection. It is held by the Śāṅkarites that a knowledge of monistic identity produces emancipation. Now such a knowledge cannot be different from the Brahma-knowledge; for if it is a contentless entity, then it would be no knowledge, since the Śāṅkarites hold that knowledge can only be a mental state associated with a content (*vyrtti-rūpaṃ hi jñānaṃ saviṣayam eva iti bhavatām api siddhāntaḥ*). It cannot also be identical with Brahma-knowledge, for if such a knowledge can produce emancipation the pure Brahma-knowledge would have done the same. It may be held that in the case of the illusion of conch-shell-silver, when there is a true shining regarding the nature of the "this" in its own character, then that is equivalent to the contradiction of the illusory appearance of silver, and the manifestation of identity showing the

real nature of Brahman may be regarded as contradictory to world-illusion. To this the reply is that there is no identity between the existence of the "this" as conch-shell and its appearance as silver. Thus, one knowledge may contradict the other, but in the case under review there is no new element in the notion of the identity which was not already present in the Brahma-knowledge itself. If the notion of identity be regarded as a contentful knowledge, then it would be different from the Brahma-knowledge, and being itself false it could not remove the error. The case where a thing known is again recognized is also not a proper instance for supporting the Śāṅkarite position, for here also the knowledge of recognition is not the same as the knowledge of original acquaintance, whereas the notion of identity is supposed to be the same as the Brahma-knowledge. Again, if it is supposed that a mental state of a particular content removes the illusions and produces Brahma-knowledge, then the illusions would be real entities since they were capable of being destroyed like other entities.

If it is held that the notion of identity has a reference to Brahman as limited by *avidyā*, then that will be like the manifestation of the illusory world-creations through the *sākṣi*-consciousness, and such a manifestation would not remove errors.

Again, it may be asked whether the knowledge that produces the notion that all else excepting Brahman is false can itself be regarded as constituting falsehood, for that would be self-contradictory. If the notion of the falsehood of the world-appearance be itself regarded as false, then the world would have to be regarded as real. If it is urged that as in the supposition of the death of a barren woman's son both the barren woman's son and his death are false, so here also both the world and its falsehood may be equally false. But it may be replied that in the instance put forward the falsehood of the barren woman's son and that of his death are not both false. Again, if the falsehood of the world-appearance were real, then that would imply dualism.

Again, if inferences led to the contradiction of world-appearance, then there would be no reason to suppose that the contradiction of the world-appearance would be possible only through listening to the Vedāntic texts of identity. If the contradiction of world-appearance is produced by Brahman itself, then Brahman being eternal there would be no world-illusion. Again, Brahman

has been regarded as helping the process of world-illusion in its own pure nature for otherwise there would have been no illusion at all. It is a curious doctrine that though Brahman in its pure nature helps illusion, yet, in its impure nature, as the scriptural texts or the knowledge arising out of them, it would remove it. So in whichever way we may think of the possibility of a removal of *ajñāna* we are brought into confusion.

Forty-fourth Objection. The conception of the cessation of the *avidyā* is also illegitimate. For the question that arises in this connection is whether the cessation of *avidyā* is itself real or unreal. If it is unreal, then the hope that the *avidyā* is rooted out with such a cessation is baffled, for the cessation itself is a manifestation of *avidyā*. It cannot be said that the cessation of *avidyā* has as its ground a real entity, the *ātman*, for then the *ātman* will have to be admitted as suffering change. And if in any way the cessation of *avidyā* is to be regarded as having a true cause as its support, then the cessation being real there would be dualism. If it is regarded as an illusion, and there is no defect behind it, then the assumption of *avidyā* as a defect for explaining the world-illusion would be unnecessary. If it is without any further ground like *avidyā* and Brahman, then there is no meaning in associating *avidyā* with it. There is also no reason why, even after the cessation of *avidyā*, it may not rise up again into appearance. If it is suggested that the function of the cessation of *avidyā* is to show that everything else except Brahman is false and as soon as this function is fulfilled the cessation of *avidyā* also ceases to exist, then also another difficulty has to be faced. For if the cessation of *avidyā* itself ceases to exist, then that would mean that there is a cessation of cessation which means that *avidyā* is again rehabilitated. It may be urged that when a jug is produced it means the destruction of the negation-precedent-to-production (*prāga-bhāva*), and when this jug is again destroyed it does not mean that the negation-precedent again rises into being; so it may be in this case also. To this the reply is that the two cases are different, for in the above case the negation of one negation is through a positive entity, whereas there is nothing to negate the cessation of *avidyā*; so in this case the negation would be a logical negation leading to a position of the entity negated, the *avidyā*. If it is said that there is the Brahman which negates the cessation of *avidyā*, then the difficulty would be that Brahman, the

negation of both *avidyā* and its cessation, being eternal, there ought to be no illusory world-creation at any time.

If the cessation of *avidyā* is not itself of illusory nature and if it is regarded as included in the being of Brahman, then Brahman being beginningless the *avidyā* should be regarded as having always remained arrested. It cannot be said that the existence of Brahman is itself the cessation of *ajñāna*, for then it would be impossible to connect the cessation of *avidyā* with the realization of the nature of Brahman as cause and effect.

If it is suggested that a mental state reflecting the nature of Brahman represents the cessation of *ajñāna* of Brahman and that this mental state may be removed by other causes, then the reply is that this would mean that such a mental state is illusory; and this implies that the cessation of *avidyā* is illusory. The criticism of such a view is given above. The cessation of *avidyā* is not real, being outside Brahman; neither real, something different from real, and unreal, for that could not lead to a real cessation. So ultimately it must be neither unreal nor something different from any of the above entities, for the cessation of positive and negative entities only are of the nature of real and unreal. *Ajñāna* is something different from real and unreal; its cessation is valid, being amenable to proofs. So the cessation has to be admitted as being something unique and different from all existent and non-existent entities. In reply it may be said that if the *ajñāna* is admitted to be like-a-non-existent entity (*asatīva*), then in both the two meanings of negation, that is, in the view that negation is but the other name of position and that negation is a separate category in itself, the admission of *avidyā* would involve dualism. If it is regarded as something chimerical, it could never show itself, and such a chimerical entity would have no opposition to the world-cycle. So the cessation of *avidyā* cannot lead to emancipation. Again, if the cessation of *avidyā* is non-existent, that would imply the existence of *avidyā*. The cessation of *avidyā* is not like the destruction of a jug which has a real existence, so that though it may appear like a non-being, yet the jug may be regarded as a positive entity. The destruction of *avidyā* is not of that nature, for it has no definite form. If it is held that the cessation of *avidyā* is of the fifth type, that is, different from existent, non-existent, existent-and-non-existent and different-from-existent-and-non-existent, then this is virtually the admission

of the *mādhyaṃika* doctrine of indescribability of all phenomena, for it also describes the world-phenomena as being of the fifth type. There is also really no way in which such an absolutely unique and indefinable category can be related to anything else.

Forty-fifth Objection. It is argued by the Śāṅkarites that the scriptural texts cannot signify Brahman, which is devoid of all and every specific quality. To this Veṅkaṭa replies that Brahman is endowed with all specific qualities and, therefore, it is quite legitimate that texts should signify it. It is wrong also to suppose that Brahman, being self-luminous, cannot be manifested by words, for it has been shown by the Rāmānuja school that even the self-luminous can be the object of further awareness. Brahman is also sometimes described by the Śāṅkarites as the state of being quality-less, but is itself a quality since it is used adjectively to Brahman. Moreover, if Brahman could not be signified by the scriptural texts, the texts themselves would be meaningless. It is wrong also to suppose that the scriptural words refer to Brahman only in a secondary manner, just as one may point to a tree-top in order to show that the moon is visible (*śākhā-candra-darśana*); for whatever be the method, Brahman is indicated by the texts. Even a state of non-conceptual meditation (*asamprajñāta-samādhi*) is not absolutely unpredicable. In that state one cannot apply the concepts or words. If Brahman is absolutely without any character, it cannot be admitted that it should be implied or signified in a remote manner (*lakṣya*) by the scriptures. The passages which say that Brahman is beyond word (*yato vāco nivartante*) indicate only that the qualities of Brahman are infinite. Thus, it is wholly unjustifiable on the part of the Śāṅkarites to say that Brahman is not indicated by the texts.

Forty-seventh Objection. It is maintained by the Śāṅkarites that all determinate knowledge is false because it is determinate in its nature like the conch-shell-silver. If all that is determinate is false, then since all distinctions must involve determinateness they would all be false and thus ultimately we have monism. The futility of such a position is shown by Veṅkaṭa, who points out that such an inference involves determinate concepts in all its limbs, and would thus be absolutely unwarrantable according to the thesis itself. Moreover, if the determinate knowledge is false, the indeterminate would also be false for want of corroboration. It is wrong also to suppose that determinate perceptions are false for want of cor-

roborative evidence from other awarenesses; for an illusion may be further corroborated by other illusions and may yet be false, and the last corroborative knowledge would be false for want of further corroborations, which would lead to the falsehood of the whole set of corroborations which is dependent on it. It is also wrong to suppose that determinate conceptions do not stand the test of causal efficiency, for all our practical experiences depend on determinate notions. It cannot also be held that the conceptual cognitions involving universals are false, for they are neither contradicted nor found to be doubtful in any way. Thus, if all determinate cognitions are regarded as false, then that would lead us to nihilism and not to monism. Moreover, if the indeterminate nature of Brahman is to be inferred from the indeterminate nature of our perception of external things, then on the analogy of the falsehood of the former the latter may also be false.

Fifty-fifth Objection. The Śāṅkarites hold that all effects are false, for they seem to contradict themselves if an attempt is made to conceive the logical situation. Is the effect produced out of the cause related with it or unrelated? In the first alternative the cause and the effect, being but two relata connected together by relation, there is no reason why the effect should be produced by the cause and not the cause by the effect. If the cause produces the effect without being related to it, then anything might produce anything. Again, if the effect be different from the cause, things which are different from one another would be productive of one another. If they are identical, then one could not produce the other. If it is said that cause is that which invariably precedes and effect is that which invariably succeeds, then a thing ought to be existent before the negation-precedent-to-production. Again, if the effect be regarded as having been produced from a material cause which has undergone transformation, then it may further be asked whether these transformations are produced from other transformations, and this would lead to a vicious infinite. If the effect be regarded as produced from a cause which has not undergone any transformation, then it would abide the whole time in which the material cause remains. Moreover, an effect is like the illusory silver which is non-existent in the beginning and in the end. The production of an entity cannot be either from a positive entity or a negative entity; for an effect, say, the jug, cannot be produced from its cause, the

earth-matter, without producing some change in it, that is, without negating it in some way or the other. On the other hand, if the production is regarded as being from a negation, then it will itself be a negation. So in whichever way a causal relation may be viewed, it becomes fraught with contradictions.

The reply of Venkātā to this is that the objection as to whether the effect is related to the cause in its production or unrelated to it is overcome by the view that the effect is unrelated to the cause; but that need not imply that all that is unrelated to the cause should be the effect, for mere unrelatedness does not induce the production of the effect such that the very unrelatedness will connect anything with any other thing as effect. The special powers associated with causal entity are responsible for the production of the special effects, and these can be known by the ordinary methods of agreement and difference. The relations of the causal elements among themselves are transferred to the effect. It is well known that causes produce effects of an entirely different nature, just as when a jug is produced by a stick and the potter's wheel. Even the material cause is very different from the material cause as the effect. It is indeed admitted that the effect is produced from a modified (*vikṛta*) cause, for any change in the cause, even the proximity of an accessory condition, would be a modification. But if modification or *vikāra* cannot be affirmed of the cause in the sense in which the effect is regarded as a modification, it may be said in that sense that the effect is produced from an unmodified cause. It would be wrong to suggest that any and every effect might spring from any and every unmodified cause, for an effect is produced from an unmodified cause under proper temporal conditions and the association of collocative agents. It is also wrong to suggest that in the supposition that an effect is analysable as a course of changes, the cause as the immediate antecedent would be undiscoverable; and the cause being undiscoverable the effect would also be inexplicable; for it is the effect which is recognized as perceived and this implies the existence of the cause without which it could not come into being. If it is urged that the effect is not perceived, or that it is contradicted, then the obvious reply is that both non-perception and contradiction are effects, and in denying effects through them the criticism becomes self-contradictory.

When a material cause is changed into an effect, there are cer-

tain parts of it which remain unchanged, even when that effect is changed into other objects called effects, and there are some characters which are formed only in certain effects. Thus, when gold is changed into a bangle and the bangle into a necklace, the persisting qualities of gold continue the same both in the bangle and in the necklace; but the special form of the bangle does not pass into that of the necklace. Again, the objection that if the effects were already existent in the cause, then there is no necessity of the causal operation as has elsewhere been repudiated, and it has also been pointed out that the assertion that all effects are false like conch-shell-silver is false, for these effects are not found to be contradicted like these illusory appearances. It is wrong also to suggest that because an effect does not exist in the beginning or in the end it also does not exist in the middle, for its existence in the middle is directly experienced. It may also be suggested on the other hand that because an effect exists in the middle it must also exist in the beginning and in the end.

It is suggested by the Śāṅkarites that all notions of difference as effects are illusorily imposed upon one permanent entity which permeates through all so-called different entities, and that it is this permeating entity which is real. Against such a supposition the Śāṅkarites may be asked to discover any entity that permeates both through Brahman and *avidyā*. It would be wrong to suggest that Brahman is both in itself and in the *avidyā*; for Brahman cannot have any dual entity, and also cannot be illusorily imposed upon itself.

The suggestion that since the unity of a flame is perceived to be false all perception is false is obviously wrong, for in the former case the illusion is due to the rapid coalescing of similar flames, but this does not apply to all perception.

In the sense of substance (*dravya*) an effect exists in the cause, but in the sense of an effect-state the effect does not exist in the cause. The objections of the Śāṅkhyists that if the effect-state did not exist in the cause it could not be produced and that similarly anything could be produced from anything are futile, for the effects are produced by specific powers which manifest themselves as effects in definite spatial and temporal conditions.

A question is asked whether the effects are produced from a positive or a negative entity, that is, whether when the effects are

produced they are produced as states of a substance which persists through them or not. Veṅkaṭa's reply is that the substance persists; only states and conditions change when the effect is produced. For in the production of an effect there is change only in the causal state and not in the causal substance. There is thus an agreement between the cause and the effect only so far as the substance is concerned and not with reference to their states; for it is by the negation of the causal state that the effect-state arises. It is sometimes suggested that since an effect is neither permanently existing nor permanently non-existing it must be false. But this suggestion is obviously wrong, for the fact that an entity may be destroyed at a later moment does not mean that it was non-existent at the moment when it was perceived. Destruction means that an entity which was existent at a particular moment was non-existent at another. Contradiction means that a thing is non-existent even when it is perceived. Mere non-existence is not destruction, for the negation-precedent-to-production might also be called destruction since it is also non-existent. Non-existence at a later point of time also does not mean destruction, for then even chimerical entities might also be called destruction. The case of conch-shell-silver is not a case of destruction, for clearly that is a case of contradiction in experience. Thus, if the concepts of production, destruction and non-existence be analysed, then it will be found that the concept of effect can never be regarded as illusory.

Fifty-seventh Objection. It is said that Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss (*ānanda*); but it may well be said that in whichever sense the word *ānanda* may be used it will not be possible to affirm that Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss. For if *ānanda* means an entity the awareness of which induces an agreeable experience, then Brahman will be knowable. If it means merely an agreeable experience, then Brahman would not be pure indeterminate consciousness. If it means a mere agreeable attitude, then duality will be implied. If it means negation of pain, then Brahman would not be positive and it is well admitted on all hands that Brahman is neutral. Moreover, according to the Śāṅkarites themselves the state of intuition of Brahman is regarded as a positive state like the state of dreamless sleep. Thus, in whichever way one may look at the problem the assertion that the indeterminate Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss becomes wholly unwarrantable.

Fifty-eighth Objection. The eternity of Brahman cannot be maintained, if it is regarded as indeterminate. If eternity means existence in all times, then *avidyā* also would be eternal; for it is also associated with all time, and time is itself regarded as its product. If it is urged that association with all time does not mean existence in all time, then it is wrong to regard existence in all times as a definition of eternity, for it will be enough to say that existence itself is eternal. The "inclusion of all time" as distinguished from mere existence shows the difference between existence and eternity. Eternity would thus mean existence in all time, which can be affirmed of *avidyā* also. Eternity cannot also be defined as that which does not cease in time since such a definition would apply to time also which does not cease in time. It cannot also be said that eternity means that which is not contradicted in the beginning or in the end, for then the world-appearance also would be eternal. Again, it is difficult to understand how consciousness is regarded as eternal by the Śāṅkarites, for if it is affirmed of ordinary consciousness, then that is directly against perceptual experience; and if it is affirmed of transcendental consciousness, then that is directly against experience. Further, eternity cannot be regarded as the essence, for then it would be identical with self-luminosity, and its predication, such as Brahman is eternal, would be unnecessary. If it is regarded as a knowable quality, then if such a quality existed in consciousness, consciousness would become knowable. If it did not exist in consciousness, then its knowledge would not imply the eternity of consciousness. It cannot also be said that whatever is not produced is eternal, for then negation-precedent-to-production would be eternal. If it is said that any positive entity which is not produced is eternal, then *avidyā* would also be eternal. Thus, in whichever way one may try to prove the eternity of the indeterminable pure consciousness one fails.

Sixty-first Objection. It is often asserted by the Śāṅkarites that there is a unity of the self. If by self here they mean the "ego," then clearly all the egos cannot be regarded as identical, for it is well known that the experiences of other people are never identified by us as ours. Nor can it be said that there is unity of consciousness of us all, for then each of us would know the minds of others. It is not maintainable that our underlying being is the same, for that would not mean the identity of our selves. One may think of

universal existence, but that would not mean the identity of the existents. Again, the identity of the selves cannot be regarded as real since the selves (*jīvas*) themselves are regarded as unreal. If the identity of the selves be regarded as false, then there is no reason why such a doctrine should be propounded. In any case, when one has to deal with our experiential life, one has to admit the diversity of selves and there is no other proof by which their identity may be established. Thus it would be wrong to think, as the Śāṅkarites do, that there is one self.

Meghanādāri.

Meghanādāri, son of Ātreyanātha sūri, seems to be one of the earliest members of the Rāmānuja school. He wrote at least two books, *Naya-prakāśikā* and *Naya-dyu-maṇi*, both of which are still in manuscript and only the latter has been available to the present writer. Most of the important contributions of Meghanādāri on the subject of the Rāmānuja theory of the *pramāṇas* have already been discussed in some detail in connection with the treatment of that subject under Veṅkaṭanātha. Only a few of his views on other topics of Rāmānuja philosophy will therefore be given here.

Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda. Veṅkaṭa, in his *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* and *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, says that all knowledge manifests the objects as they are. Even errors are true at least so far as they point to the object of the error. The erroneousness or error is due to the existence of certain vitiating conditions¹. When there is knowledge that there is a jug, the existence of the object is the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of it and this is made known by the very knowledge that the jug exists². Even where there is the knowledge of silver in a conch-shell, there is the knowledge of the existence of the objective silver implied in that very knowledge, and thus even in erroneous knowledge there is the self-validity so far as it carries with it the existence of the object of perception³.

Meghanādāri however, who in all probability preceded Veṅkaṭa, gives a somewhat different account of the doctrine of *svataḥ-*

¹ *jñānānām yathā-vasthitā-rtha-prakāśakatvam sāmānyam eva bhrāntasyā'pi jñānasya dharmīṇy abhrāntatvāt ato vahnyā-der dāhakatvavaj jñānānām prāmāṇyam svābhāvīkam eva upādher maṇi-mantravad doṣo-pādhi-vaśād apramāṇatvam bhrāmāṁśe. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 554.

² *ghaṭo'sti' ti jñānam utpadyate tatra viśayā-stitvam eva prāmāṇyam tat tu tenaiva jñānena pratīyate ataḥ svataḥ-prāmāṇyam. Ibid.*

³ See *Ibid.*

prāmānya. He says that validity (*prāmānya*) proceeds from the apprehension of cognition (*prāmānyam jñāna-sattā-pratīti-kāraṇādeva*), for the validity must have a cause and no other cause is traceable¹.

The Naiyāyikas, arguing against the *svataḥ-prāmānya* doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas, are supposed to say that the self-validity cannot be regarded as being produced in every case of knowledge, for the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the Vedas are eternal and thus their self-validity cannot be regarded as being produced. Self-validity cannot be regarded as produced in some cases only, for if that were the case the thesis that all cognitions are self-valid cannot stand. Therefore the proper view is that only that knowledge is self-valid which is uncontradicted in experience (*abādhitā-vyavahāra-hetutvam eva jñānasya prāmānyam*)². Self-validity cannot be regarded as a special potency, for such a potency is non-sensible and has therefore to be known by inference or some other means; neither can it be regarded as being one (*svarūpa*) with the sense-organs by which knowledge is acquired, for the existence of such sense-organs is itself inferred from mere knowledge and not from what is only true knowledge.

Arguing against the Śāṅkarites, the Naiyāyikas are supposed to say that in their view knowledge being self-luminous, there would be no way of determining validity either from uncontradicted experience or by any other means; and since, according to them, everything is false, the distinction of validity and invalidity also ought to have no place in their system, for if such distinctions are admitted it would land them in dualism. To this Meghanādāri says that if self-validity is not admitted, then the whole idea of validity has to be given up; for if validity is said to be produced from a knowledge of the proper conditions of knowledge or the absence of defects, such a knowledge has to be regarded as self-valid, for it would have to depend on some other knowledge and that again on some other knowledge, which would mean a vicious infinite. So knowledge is to be regarded as self-valid by nature and its invalidity occurs only when the defects and vitiating contributions of the causes of knowledge are known by some other means. But the method of establishing self-validity according to the followers of Kumārila is liable to criticism, for according to that system the existence of knowledge is only inferred from the fact of the revelation of the objects, and that implication cannot also further

¹ *Naya-dyu-maṇi*, p. 21 (MS.).

² *Ibid.* p. 22.

lead to the self-validity of knowledge. The theory of self-validity that it is caused by the same constituents which produce the knowledge is also inadmissible, for the senses have also to be regarded as the cause of knowledge and these may be defective. Again, it is held that knowledge which corresponds with the object (*tathā-bhūta*) is valid and that which does not correspond with the object is invalid and that such validity and invalidity are therefore directly manifested by the knowledge itself. Meghanādāri replies that if such correspondence be a quality of the object, then that does not establish the validity of knowledge; if it is a quality of knowledge, then memory has also to be regarded as self-valid, for there is correspondence in it also. Again, the question arises whether the self-validity is merely produced or also known. In the former case the self-manifestation of self-validity has to be given up, and in the latter case the Kumārila view is indefensible for by it knowledge being itself an implication from the revelation of objects its self-validity cannot obviously be self-manifested.

Meghanādāri, therefore, contends that an intuition (*anubhūti*) carries with it its own validity; in revealing the knowledge it also carries with it the conviction of its own validity. The invalidity, on the other hand, is suggested by other sources. This intuition is in itself different from memory¹. The whole emphasis of this contention is on his view that each cognition of an object carries with it its cognizability as true, and since this is manifested along with the cognition, all cognitions are self-valid in this sense. Such a self-validity is therefore not produced since it is practically identical with the knowledge itself. Meghanādāri points out that this view is in apparent contradiction with Rāmānuja's own definition of *svataḥ-prāmānya* as that which is produced by the cause of knowledge; but Rāmānuja's statement in this connection has to be interpreted differently, for the knowledge of God and the emancipated beings being eternal and unproduced any view which defines self-validity as a production from the same source from which knowledge is produced would be inapplicable to them².

Time. Time according to Meghanādāri is not to be regarded as a separate entity. He takes great pains to show that Rāmānuja has

¹ *anubhūtitaṃ vā prāmānyam astu; tac ca jñānā-vāntara-jātiḥ; sā ca smṛti-jñāna-jātitāḥ prthaktayā lokataḥ eva siddhā; anubhūteḥ svasattayā eva sphūrteḥ. Naya-dyu-maṇi, p. 31.*

² *Ibid.* p. 38.

himself discarded the view that time is a separate entity in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, the *Vedānta-dīpa* and the *Vedānta-sāra*. The notion of time originates from the relative position of the sun in the zodiac with reference to earth. It is the varying earth-space that appears as time, being conditioned by the relative positions of the Sun¹. This view is entirely different from that of Veṅkaṭa which will be described later on.

Karma and its fruits. According to Meghanādāri deeds produce their fruits through the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of God. Though ordinarily deeds are regarded as virtuous or vicious, yet strictly speaking virtue and vice should be regarded as the fruits of actions and these fruits are nothing but the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of God. The performance of good deeds in the past determines the performance of similar deeds in the future by producing helpful tendencies, capacities and circumstances in his favour, and the performance of bad deeds forces a man to take a vicious line of action in the future. At the time of dissolution also there is no separate *dharma* and *adharma*, but God's satisfaction and dissatisfaction produced by the individual's deeds determine the nature and extent of his sufferings and enjoyment as well as his tendencies towards virtue or vice at the time of the next creation. The fruits of actions are experienced in the Heaven and Hell and also in the mundane life, but not while the individual is passing from Heaven or Hell to earth, for at that time there is no experience of pleasure or pain, it being merely a state of transition. Again, except in the case of those sacrifices which are performed for injuring or molesting other fellow beings, there is no sin in the killing of animals in sacrifices which are performed for the attainment of Heaven or such other pleasurable purposes².

Vātsya Varada.

Regarding the doctrine of Vedic injunction that one should study the Vedas, Vātsya Varada in his *Prameya-mālā* holds the view, in contradistinction to the *Śabara Bhāṣya*, that Vedic injunction is satisfied only in the actual reading of the Vedic texts and that the Vedic injunction does not imply an inquiry into the mean-

¹ *sūryā-dī-sambandha-viśeṣo-pādhitah prthivya-dideśānām eva kāla-saṃjñā. Naya-dyu-maṇi*, p. 168.

² *Ibid.* pp. 243-246.

ing of those texts. Such an inquiry proceeds from the normal inquisitive spirit and the desire to know the various applications in the practical performances of sacrifices. These do not form a part of the Vedic injunction (*vidhi*).

Vātsya Varada holds that the study of the Vedic injunction and the inquiry relating to Brahman form the parts of one unified scripture, i.e. the latter follows or is a continuation of the former; and he mentions Bodhāyana in his support.

Śaṅkara had thought that the study of the Mīmāṃsā was intended for a class of people but not necessarily for those who would inquire into the nature of Brahman. The Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā were intended for different purposes and were written by different authors. These should not therefore be regarded as integrally related as two parts of a unified work. To this Vātsya Varada, following Bodhāyana, takes exception, for he thinks that though the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and Uttara-mīmāṃsā are written by different authors yet the two together uphold one common view and the two may be regarded as two chapters of one whole book.

Vātsya Varada also, in referring to Śaṅkara's view that the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā assumes the existence of a real world, whereas the purport of the *Brahma-sūtra* is to deny it and therefore the two cannot be regarded as having the same end in view, challenges it by affirming the reality of the world. Śaṅkara's argument, that all which is cognizable is false, would imply that even the self is false; for many Upaniṣads speak of the perceptibility of the self. His declaration of the falsity of the world would also imply that the falsehood itself is false, for it is a part of the world. Such an argument ought to be acceptable to Śaṅkara, for he himself utilized it in refuting the nihilists.

Regarding the denial of the category of difference by the Śaṅkarites Vātsya Varada says that the opponent cannot by any means deny that difference is perceived, for all his arguments are based on the assumption of the existence of difference. If there were no difference, there would be no party and no view to be refuted. If it is admitted that the category of difference is perceived, then the opponent has also to admit that such a perception must have its own peculiar and proper cause. The real point in the conception of difference is that it constitutes its other as a part of itself. An object in its own nature has twofold characteristics, the

characteristic of its universal similarity with other things of its class and the characteristic in which it differs from others. In its second characteristic it holds its others in itself. When it is said that a thing is different it does not mean that the difference is identical with the thing or but another name for the thing, but what is meant is that a thing known as different has an outside reference to other entities. This outside reference to other entities, when conceived along with the object, produces the perception of difference.

The conception of difference involves the conception of negation as involved in the notion of otherness. If this negation is different in nature from the object which is conceived as "different" or as the "other" of other objects, then since this negation cannot be directly known by perception "difference" also cannot be known directly by perception. The *Viśiṣṭā-dvāita* theory admits that "difference" can be directly perceived. In order to prove this point Vātsya Varada gives a special interpretation of "negation" (*abhāva*). He holds that the notion of negation of an entity in another entity is due to the latter's being endowed with a special character as involving a reference to the former. The notion of negation thus proceeds from a special modified character of an object in which the negation is affirmed. There are many Śāṅkarites who regard negation as positive, but in their case it is held to be a special category by itself which is perceived in the locus of the negation by the special *pramāṇa* of non-perception. Though positive its notion is not produced according to them by the special modified nature of the object perceived in which the negation is affirmed. But Vātsya Varada holds that the notion of negation is due to the perception of a special modified nature of the entity in which the negation is affirmed¹. The negation revealed to us in one object as the otherness of another object means that the latter is included in a special character of the former which makes the reference as the otherness possible.

Vātsya Varada also emphasizes the view that the tests referring to Brahman as *satya*, *jñāna*, *ananta*, etc., indicate the fact of the possession of these qualities by God and that the monistic interpretation that these together refer to one identical being, the Brahman, is false. He also describes the infinite and unlimited nature of

¹ *pratiyogi-buddhau vastu-viśeṣa-dhār evo'petā nāsti' ti vyavahāra-hetuḥ*. Varada, *Prameya-mālā*, p. 35 (MS.).

Brahman and explains the exact sense in which the world and the individuals may be regarded as the body of God and that the individuals exist for God who is their final end. He also deals in this work with certain topics regarding the external rituals, such as shaving of the head, wearing the holy thread, etc., by ascetics.

Varada, in his *Tattva-sāra*, collects some of the specially interesting points of the *Bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja and interprets them in prose and verse. Some of these points are as follows: (i) The view that the existence of God cannot be logically proved, but can be accepted only from scriptural testimony. (ii) The special interpretation of some of the important Upaniṣadic texts such as the *Kaṇṇya* text. (iii) The results of the discussions of the important *adhikaraṇas* of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja. (iv) The doctrine that negation is only a kind of position. (v) The interpretation of the apparent dualistic and monistic texts. (vi) The discussion regarding the reality of the world, etc.

This *Tattva-sāra* provoked a further commentary on it called *Ratna-sāriṇī* by Vīra-rāghava-dāsa, a son of Bādhūla Narasiṃha Guru, disciple of Bādhūla Varada Guru, son of Bādhūla Veṅkaṭācārya. Some of Vātsya Varada's other works are: *Sārā-rtha-catustaya*, *Ārādhana-saṃgraha*, *Tattva-nirṇaya*, *Prapanna-pārijāta*, *Yati-līṅga-samarthana* and *Puruṣa-nirṇaya*¹.

Rāmānujācārya II alias Vādi-Haṃsa-Navāmvuda.

Rāmānujācārya II, the son of Padmanābhārya, belonged to the Atri lineage. He was the maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭanātha, the famous writer of the Rāmānuja school. He wrote the *Nyāya-kulīśa* which has often been referred to in Veṅkaṭa's *Sarvārtha-siddhi*. He also wrote another work called *Mokṣa-siddhi*. Some of his interpretations of Rāmānuja's ideas have already been referred to in dealing with the Rāmānuja theory of knowledge as explained by Veṅkaṭa. Other contributions by him are mentioned in brief below.

Negation. Negation as a separate category is denied by Rāmānujācārya II. He thinks that negation of an entity means only another entity different from it. The negation of a jug thus means the

¹ In his *Tattva-nirṇaya* he tries to prove that all the important *Śruti* texts prove that Nārāyaṇa is the highest God. He refers in this work to his *Puruṣa-nirṇaya* where, he says, he has discussed the subject in more detail.

existence of some other entity different from it. The real notion of negation is thus only “difference.” A negation is described as that which is antagonistic to a positive entity and there is thus no way in which a negation can be conceived by itself without reference to a positive entity. But a positive entity never stands in need of its specification through a reference to negation¹. It is also well known that the negation of a negation is nothing else than the existence of positive entity. The existence of negation cannot be known either by perception, inference, or by implication. Veṅkaṭa, in further explaining this idea, says that the idea of absence in negation is derived from the association of the object of negation with a different kind of temporal or spatial character². Thus, when it is said that there is no jug here, it merely means that the jug exists in another place. It is argued that negation cannot be regarded as the existence of positive entity, and it may be asked if negation cannot be regarded as negation, how can negation of negation be regarded as the existence of positive entity. Just as those who admit negation regard negation and existence of positive entity as mutually denying each other, so the Rāmānujas also regard the existence of positive entities and negations as denying each other in their different spatial and temporal characters. Thus it is not necessary to admit negation as a separate category. When an existing entity is said to be destroyed, what happens is that there is a change of state. Negation-precedent-to-production (*prāga-bhāva*) and the negation of destruction do not mean anything more than two positive states succeeding each other, and there may be an infinite series of such states. If this view is not admitted, and if the negation of destruction (*pradhvaṃsā-bhāva*) and the negation-precedent-to-production (*prāg-abhāva*) be regarded as separate categories of negation, then the destruction of negation-precedent-to-production and negation-precedent-to-production of destruction will depend upon an infinite series of negations which would lead to a vicious infinite. It is the succession of a new state that is regarded as the destruction of the old state, the former being a different state from the latter. It is sometimes held that negation is mere vacuity and has no reference to the existence of positive entity. If that were so, then on the one hand

¹ *athā'bhāvasya tad-rūpaṃ yad-bhāva-pratipakṣatā nai'vam adyā'py asau yasmād bhāvo-ttīrṇena sādhitah. Nyāya-kulīśa. MS.*

² *tat-tat-pratīyogī-bhāva-sphuraṇa-sahakṛto deśa-kālā-di-bheda eva svabhāvāt nañ-prayogam api sahate. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 714.*

negation would be causeless and on the other it could not be the cause of anything; and so negations would thus be both beginningless and eternal. In that case the whole world would be within the grasp of negation and everything in the world would be non-existing. Thus it is unnecessary to admit negation as a separate category. The difference of one positive entity from another is regarded as negation.

Another problem that arises in this connection is that if negation is not admitted as a separate category how can negative causes be admitted. It is well known that when certain collocations of causes can produce an effect they can do so only when there are no negative causes to counteract their productive capacity. This capacity (*śakti*) is admitted in the Rāmānuja school as the collocation of accessories which helps a cause to produce the effect (*kāraṇasya kāryo-payogī sahakāri-kalāpaḥ śaktir ity ucyate*)¹. To this Rāmānujācārya's reply is that the absence of counteracting agents is not regarded as a separate cause, but the presence of the counteracting agents along with the other accessory collocations is regarded as making those accessory collocations unfit for producing the effect. Thus there are two sets of collocations where the effect is or is not produced, and it is the difference of two collocations that accounts for the production of the effect in one case and its non-production in another; but this does not imply that absence or negation of the obstructive factors should be regarded as contributing to the causation. In one case there was the capacity for production and in another case there was no such capacity². Capacity (*śakti*) is not regarded by Rāmānujācārya as a separate non-sensible (*atīndriya*) entity, but as an abstract specification of that which produces any effect (*śakti-gata-jāty-anabhyupagame tad-abhāvāt śaktasya'iva jātiḥ kārya-niyāmikā na tu śakti-jātir iti*)³.

Jāti (*universal*). Rāmānujācārya does not admit any *jāti* or universal in the sense of any abstract generality of individuals. Accord-

¹ *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 685.

² *siddha-vastu-virodhī ghātakah sādhyā-vastu-virodhī pratibandhakah, kat-ham yadi kārye tad-viruddhatvam iti cen na; ittham kāryam kāraṇa-pauṣkalye bhavati, tad-apauṣkalye na bhavati, apauṣkalyam ca kvacit kāraṇānām anyatama-vaikalyāt kvacit śakti-vaikalyāt iti bhidyate, yadyapi śaktir na kāraṇam tathā'pi śaktasyai'va kāraṇatvāt viśeṣaṇā-bhāve'pi viśiṣṭā-bhāva-nyāyena kāraṇā-bhāvaḥ. tad-ubhaya-kāraṇena prāg-abhāva-sthiti-karaṇāt kārya-virodhī'ti pratibandhako bhavati; tatra yathā kāraṇa-vaikalya-dṛṣṭa-rūpeṇa kurvato'bhāvah kāraṇam na syāt; tathā śakti-viḡhmitaḥ yo hi nāma pratibandhakah kāraṇam kiñcid vināśya kāryam pratibadhnāti na tasyā'bhāvah kāraṇam iti siddham. Nyāya-kulīśa. MS.*

³ *Ibid.*

ing to him any unified assemblage of parts similar to such other assemblages of parts (*susadr̥ṣa-saṃsthāna*) is called a universal¹.

Veṅkaṭa, a follower of Rāmānujācārya, defines *jāti* as mere similarity (*sausadr̥ṣya*). Criticizing the Naiyāyika theory of *jāti* he says that if that which manifests universals is itself manifested through universals, then these universals should have to be manifested by others which have to be manifested by further universals and this would lead to a vicious infinite. If to avoid such a vicious infinite it is held that the second grade parts that manifest a *jāti* (universal) do not require a further *jāti* for their manifestation, then it is better to say that it is the similar individuals that represent the notion of *jāti* and that it is not necessary to admit any separate category as *jāti*. It is clear that the notion of universals proceeds from qualities or characters in which certain individuals agree, and if that is so it should be enough to explain the notion of universals. It is these characters, the similarity of which with the similar characters of other individuals is remembered, that produce the notion of universals². When some parts or qualities are perceived in some things they of themselves naturally remind us of other similar parts in other things and it is this fact, that the two mutually stand, one beside the other, in the mind, which is called similarity³. It is inexplicable why certain qualities or characters remind us of others and it can only be said that they do so naturally; and it is this fact that they stand beside each other in the mind which constitutes their similarity as well as their universal. There is no other separate category which may either be called similarity (*sadr̥ṣya*) or universal. There is not, however, much difference between Rāmānujācārya's definition of universals and Veṅkaṭa's definition of it, for though the former defines it as any assemblages that are similar and the latter as similarity, yet the very conception of similarity of Veṅkaṭa involves within it the assemblage of parts as its constituent; for the notion of similarity according to Veṅkaṭa is not

¹ *Nyāya-kulīśa*. MS.

² *kecid dhī-saṃsthāna-bhedāḥ kvacana khalu mithas sadr̥ṣyarūpā bhānti yair bhavadīyaṃ sāmānyam abhivyaṇyate ta eva sausadr̥ṣya-vyavahāra-viśaya-bhūtāḥ sāmānya-vyavahāraṃ nirvahantu; tasmāt teṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ anyonya-sāpekṣai-kasmyti-viśayatayā tat-tad-ekāvamarsās tat-tajjātyatvā-vamarśaḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 704.

³ *yady apy ekaikasthaṃ sāsna-dī-dharma-svarūpaṃ tathā'pi tan-nirupadhi-niyataiḥ svabhāvato niyataiḥ taiḥ taiḥ sāsna-dibhir anyā-niṣṭhaiḥ sa-pratidvandvikaṃ syāt; idam eva anvanya-sa-pratidvandvika-rūpaṃ sadr̥ṣya-śabda-vācyaṃ abhidhīyate. Ibid.*

anything abstract, but it means the concrete assemblages of parts that stand beside one another in memory. Veṅkaṭa, however, points out that the notion of “universal” does not necessarily mean that it can be with regard to assemblages of parts only, for in case of those partless entities, such as qualities, there cannot be any assemblage of parts, yet the notion of universals is still quite applicable. It is for this reason that Veṅkaṭa makes “similarity” only as the condition of “universals” and does not include assemblages of parts (*saṁsthāna*) as is done by Rāmānujācārya.

Svataḥ-prāmānya (self-validity). It is sometimes argued that as in all things so in the determination of validity and invalidity the application of the methods of agreement and difference is to be regarded as the decisive test. The presence of qualities that contribute to validity and the absence of defects that make any perception invalid is to be regarded as deciding the validity or invalidity of any perception. To this Rāmānujācārya says that the ascertainment of qualities that contribute to validity cannot be determined without an assurance that there are no defects, and the absence of defects cannot also be known without the knowledge of the presence of qualities that contribute towards validity; and so, since they mutually depend upon each other, their independent determination is impossible. Thus the suggestion is that there is neither the determination of validity nor invalidity, but there is doubt. To this the reply is that unless something is known there cannot be any doubt. So there is a middle stage before the determination of validity or invalidity. Before it is known that the knowledge corresponds with the object or does not do so, there must be the manifestation of the object (*artha-prakāśa*) which, so far as it itself is concerned, is self-valid and does not depend for its validity upon the application of any other method; for it is the basis of all future determinations of its nature as true or false. So this part of knowledge—the basic part—the manifestation of objects—is self-valid. It is wrong to say that this knowledge is in itself characterless (*niḥsvabhāva*), for it is of the nature of the manifestation of an objective entity like the determination of tree-ness before its specific nature as a mango or a pine tree¹. The knowledge of the contri-

¹ *yathā-rtha-paricchedaḥ prāmānyam ayathā-rtha-paricchedaḥ aprāmānyam katham tad-ubhaya-parityāge artha-pariccheda-siddhiḥ iti cen na, aparityājyavā-bhyupagamat. tayoh sādhanam eva hy artha-paricchedaḥ brūmah śiṁśapā-palāśa-diṣu iva vṛkṣatvam. Nyāya-kūṭiśa. MS.*

butory qualities is not the cause of validity, but when validity is determined they may be regarded as having contributed to the validity. The self-validity is of the knowledge (*jñāna*) and not of its correspondence (*tathātva*). If the correspondence were also directly revealed, then there can never be any doubt regarding such correspondence. When the followers of Kumārila say that knowledge is self-valid, they cannot mean that knowledge itself imparts the fact that there has been a true correspondence, for they do not admit that knowledge is self-revealing. They have therefore admitted that there are some other means by which the notion of such validity is imparted. The validity of those will again have to depend upon the validity of other imparting agents, and there will thus be a vicious infinite. For the determination of validity one is bound to depend on the ascertainment by corroboration and causal efficiency. If validity thus depends upon the ascertainment of contributory qualities, then there is no self-validity. The Vedas also cannot be self-valid in this view. If there are no defects in them because they have not proceeded from any erring mortals, then they have no contributory qualities also because they have not proceeded (according to the Mīmāṃsā view) from any trustworthy person. So there may legitimately be a doubt regarding their validity. The truth of any correspondence depends upon something other than the knowledge itself, e.g. the falsehood of any mis-correspondence. If it depended merely on the cause of the knowledge, then even a false knowledge would be right. For establishing the validity of the Vedas, therefore, it has to be admitted that they have been uttered by an absolutely trustworthy person. Knowledge does not manifest merely objectivity but a particular thing or entity and it is valid so far as that particular thing has been manifested in knowledge¹. The validity of knowledge thus refers to the thing in its general character as the manifestation of a particular thing and not regarding its specific details in character². Such a validity, however, refers only to the form of the knowledge itself and not to objective corroboration³. Whatever may be doubtful in it is to be ascertained by contributory qualities, corroboration and the like, and when the

¹ *yad dhi jñāne vidyate tad eva tasya lakṣaṇam ucitaṃ vastu-prakāśatvam eva jñāne vidyate na tu viśaya-prakāśatvam yato vijñāne samutpanne viśayo' yam iti nā' bhāti kintu ghaṭo' yam iti. Nyāya-kulīśa. MS.*

² *jñānānām sāmānya-rūpaṃ eva prāmāṇyaṃ na vaiśeṣikaṃ rūpaṃ. Ibid.*

³ *tasmād bodhā' tmatatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā. Ibid.*

chances of error are eliminated by other sources the original validity stands uncontradicted.

Sapraśāśatva (self-luminosity). Rāmānujācārya first states the Naiyāyika objection against self-luminosity. The Naiyāyikas are supposed to argue that things are existent but they become knowable only under certain conditions and this shows that existence (*sattā*) is different from cognition or its self-illumination (*prakāśa*). Arguing from the same position it may be said that knowledge as an existent entity is different from its illumination as such¹. If knowledge itself were self-revealing, then it would not depend upon any conditioning of it by its contiguity or relationing with objects and as such any individual cognition would mean universal cognition. If, on the other hand, knowledge requires a further conditioning through its relationing with objects, then knowledge would not be self-revealing. Further, knowledge being partless, there cannot be any such conception that one part of it reveals the other. In the case of partless entities it is not possible to conceive that knowledge should be self-revealing, for it cannot be both an agent and an object at the same time. Again, if knowledge were self-revealing, then the difference between consciousness and its re-perception through introspection cannot be accounted for. Further, it must be remembered that the difference between one cognition and another depends upon the difference of its objective content. Apart from this there is no difference between one cognition and another. If the objective content was not a constituent of knowledge, then there would be no difference between the illumination of knowledge as such and the illumination of an object. If knowledge were by itself self-illuminating, then there would be no place for objects outside it and this would bring us to absolute idealism. So the solution may be either on the Mīmāṃsā lines that knowledge produces such a character in the objective entity that by that cognized character of objects cognition may be inferred, or it may be on Nyāyā lines that knowledge manifests the objects. Thus it has to be admitted that there must be some kind of cognitive relation between the object and its knowledge, and it would be the specific nature of these relations that would determine the cognitive character in each case. Now it may again be asked whether this cognitive relation is only object-pointing or

¹ *sarvasya hi svataḥ sva-gocara-jñānā-dhānaḥ prakāśaḥ samvidāṁ api tathai'va abhyupagantum ucitaḥ. Nyāya-kulīśa. MS.*

whether it is object-knowledge-pointing. In the former case the object alone would be manifested and in the latter case knowledge would be its own object, which is again absurd. If knowledge manifested the object without any specific relation, then any knowledge might manifest any object or all objects. Knowledge implies a cognitive operation and if such an operation is not admitted knowledge cannot be manifested, for the very objectivity of knowledge implies such an operation. Hence the conclusion is that as knowledge manifests other objects so it is also manifested by a further cognition of re-perception. When one says "I perceive it," it is not a case of mere knowledge-manifestation but a re-perception of having perceived that particular object. So knowledge is manifested by a further re-perception and not by itself. To this Rāmānujācārya raises an objection: it may be asked whether this re-perception of knowledge takes place in spite of the absence of any desire to re-perceive on the part of the knower or as the result of any such desire. In the former case, since the re-perception takes place automatically, there will be an infinite series of such automatic re-perceptions. In the latter case, i.e. when the re-perception takes place in consequence of a desire to do so, then such a desire must be produced out of previous knowledge and that would again presuppose another desire, and that another knowledge, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. To this the *Naiyāyika* reply is that the general re-perception takes place without any desire, but the specific re-perception occurs as a result of a desire to that effect. This ordinary re-perception of a general nature follows as a natural course, for all mundane people have always some knowledge or other throughout the course of their experience. It is only when there is a desire to know some specific details that there is a specific mental intuition (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) to that effect.

To this Rāmānujācārya's reply is that in the case of an ordinary existent thing there is a difference between its existence as such and its manifestation of knowledge, for it always depends upon specific relations between itself and knowledge; but in the case of a self-luminous entity where no such relations are needed there is no difference between its existence and its manifestation. The fire illuminates other objects but it does not need any other assistance to manifest itself. It is this that is meant by self-luminosity. Just as no entity depends upon any other entity of its own class for its

manifestation, so knowledge also does not need assistance from knowledge for its manifestation. The relations that are needed for the manifestation of other objects are not needed for the manifestation of knowledge itself¹. Knowledge thus being self-luminous helps our behaviour directly but does not depend upon anything else for lending such assistance. It is against all experience that knowledge for its manifestation requires some other knowledge, and if it has no support in our experience there is no justification for making such an extraordinary theory that any knowledge for its manifestation should require the operation of another knowledge. That only can be called an object of knowledge which though existent remains unmanifested. But it cannot be said that there was knowledge which was not known, for a cognition would not last like other objective entities awaiting the time when it might be manifested. In the case of a past knowledge which is merely inferred now, there is no notion of that knowledge, so one can always draw a distinction between the known and the unknown. If only the object were illuminated and not the knowledge of it, no one would fail for a moment to perceive that. If knowledge were merely inferred from its effect, everyone would have so experienced it, but no one has a moment's hesitation in discriminating between what is known and unknown. It is again wrong to say that knowledge arises only after inquiry, for in the present knowledge whatever is sought to be known is known directly, and in the past knowledge also there is no such inference that there was knowledge because it is remembered, but the past knowledge directly appears as memory; for if that is called an inference, then even re-perception may be regarded as an inference from memory.

Again, a thing that exists without being an object of knowledge at the same time is liable to erroneous manifestation on account of the presence of defects in the collocation conditioning the knowledge, but knowledge itself is never liable to error, and consequently it has no existence apart from being known. Just as there cannot be any doubt whether a pleasure or a pain is experienced, so there cannot be any doubt about knowledge, and this shows that whenever there is knowledge it is self-manifested. When one knows an object one is also sure about one's knowledge of it. Again, it is

¹ *jñānam ananyā-dhīna-prakāśam artha-prakāśakatvāt dīpavat. Nyāya-kulīśa. MS.*

wrong to suppose that if knowledge is self-manifested then there would be no difference between itself and its objective content, for the difference is obvious; knowledge in itself is formless, while the object supplies the content. Two entities which appear in the same manifestation, such as quality and substance, things and their number, are not on that account identical. It cannot also be said that knowledge and its object are identical because they are simultaneously manifested, for the very fact that they are simultaneously manifested shows that they are two different things. Knowledge and the object shine forth in the same manifestation and it is impossible to determine which of them shines before or after.

The self also is to be regarded as being of the nature of knowledge from the testimony of the scriptures. Self being of the nature of knowledge is also self-luminous, and it is not therefore to be supposed that it is cognized by mental intuition (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*).

Rāmānujadāsa alias Mahācārya.

Rāmānujadāsa, called also Mahācārya, was the pupil of Bādhūla Śrīnivāsācārya. He is not, however, to be confused with Rāmānujācārya II, the son of Padmanābhārya and the maternal uncle of Vedānta-deśika—who was also known as Vādi-haṁsanaṁbuda. He wrote at least three books: *Sad-vidyā-vijaya*, *Advaita-vijaya*, and *Parikara-vijaya*.

In his *Sad-vidyā-vijaya*, in refuting the Śāṅkarite doctrine that the existence of positive nescience (*bhāva-rūpā-jñāna*) can be known by the different *pramāṇas* of perception, inference and implication, he says that intuitive experience of ignorance, such as “I am ignorant,” cannot be regarded as an experience of nescience as such in its entirety (*kṛtsnā-jñāna-pratītiḥ tāvad asiddhā*), for it can never refer to all objects as negating all knowledge. A perceptual mental state of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is not admitted by the Śāṅkarites to refer to entities past and gone. Even when a man intuits that he is ignorant, there is at that stage an illumination of his own ego and the fact of his being ignorant, and it cannot be said that in such an experience the nescience in its entirety has been illuminated, for the ego is also illuminated at the time. If nescience in its entirety

is not illuminated, then the nescience is only illuminated with reference to particular objects, and if that is so the assumption of a positive nescience is useless. Again, if nescience or want of knowledge refers to a particular object, then there is a knowledge of that object implied in it; and therefore nescience as such is not experienced and a supposition of a positive nescience is no better than the ordinarily accepted view that in such cases there is only a negation of the knowledge of an object except in deep dreamless sleep. In all other stages all experiences of ignorance refer to the negation of knowledge of particular objects. All cases of ignorance mean that their objects are known only in a general manner, but not in their specific details. Again, it cannot be said that nescience is regarded as positive merely to denote that it is of the nature of a stuff that is opposed to knowledge in general (*jñāna-sāmānya-virodhī*); for in such experiences as “I am ignorant” there is the knowledge of the subject to which the ignorance belongs and also some general content regarding which there is the ignorance. Further, since the nescience has the pure consciousness as its support and since the mind (*antahkaraṇa*) is not regarded as its support, how can the experience “I am ignorant” be said to refer to the experience of this stuff? If it be held that since the mind is an illusory construction on the pure consciousness which is the support of the nescience (*ajñāna*), the latter may appear as a mental function, for both the ego and the nescience, being illusory impositions on the pure consciousness, may shine forth from the same identical basis of consciousness. The reply is that such an explanation is obviously wrong, for if both the ego-consciousness and the *ajñāna* shone forth from the same basic consciousness, the latter could not appear as the predicate of the former. If the one pure consciousness manifests both the ego and the *ajñāna*, they would not appear as different and arranged in a definite subject-predicate order. Again, if it is held that the *ajñāna* shines only as a predicative to the ego because they are based on pure consciousness, then how can such an *ajñāna* refer to the objective things (which are independent impositions on pure consciousness) in such experiences as “I do not know a jug?” If it is said that since there is the one identical consciousness on which the objective entities, the *ajñāna* and the ego-entity, are all imposed, and the *ajñāna* is always in relation with the objective entities, then it may be said that even when a jug is known, the *ajñāna*, being in

relation with other entities (such as cloth) and through them with the pure consciousness underlying them, is also in relation with the pure consciousness on which the jug is a construction. As such it would also be in relation with the jug, with the result that there would be the experience that the jug is not known. It may be argued that the very fact of the positive perception of the jug may be an obstacle to the association of *ajñāna* with it. To this the reply is that just as when one says "I do not know this tree" there is knowledge regarding the "this" and ignorance regarding the nature of the tree, so here also there may be a partial knowledge and ignorance in different aspects of the same jug. In cases of doubt one has to admit knowledge and ignorance subsisting in the same entity, and this is true in all cases of inquiry where a thing may be known in a general way and yet remain unknown so far as its specific details are concerned.

Again, it is wrongly contended by the Śāṅkarites that during deep dreamless sleep there is a direct intuition of *ajñāna*; for if *ajñāna* were then known in its own nature as such, a man could not wake up and remember that he knew nothing. He should then have remembered that he had a direct intuition of *ajñāna*. If during deep dreamless sleep the pure consciousness illuminated *ajñāna*, it must have also illuminated all known and unknown things in the world, which is absurd, for then these would have been remembered during the waking period. It cannot be said that during deep dreamless sleep only *ajñāna* is manifested and nothing else, for according to the testimony of waking consciousness time is also perceived during dreamless sleep which accounts for the memory of the waking stage "so long I did not know anything." Further, if it is held that whatever is illuminated by pure *sākṣi*-consciousness (i.e. without passing through the *vṛtti* stage) then the *ajñāna* also would not be remembered. If it is held that the objects of *ajñāna* only are not illuminated by the *sākṣi*-consciousness but only the *ajñāna*, then that could not account for the memory in the waking stage "I did not know anything," where "anything" definitely refers to some object of *ajñāna*. Moreover, if the above supposition were correct, then the pure bliss could not be illuminated during dreamless sleep and remembered later in the waking stage. If in reply to this it were contended that certain specific characters were remembered during the waking period in addition to the *ajñāna*

because they were represented through the modes of *avidyā*, the reply is that instead of assuming that there were specific modes of *avidyā* one might as well admit them to be due to mental modes or states, and the experience of *ajñāna* might well be accounted for as being the experience of absence of knowledge. Since absence of knowledge is acceptable to all, there is no justification for admitting a new entity such as a positive *ajñāna*.

Again, in the case of loss of memory of a perceived object, a person might say that he did not know the object, but that does not prove that while he knew the object he had an intuition of the *ajñāna* of that object. After an illusory perception of conch-shell-silver one says "I did not know silver so long"; and how is this to be explained? Moreover, when one sees an object at the present moment, one may say "I did not know this object so long." How is this to be explained? The obvious reply is that in all such cases we infer only that there was an absence of knowledge of those entities. In the instance under discussion also we may hold the same view and say that we infer that during dreamless sleep we had no knowledge. But we cannot say that we then intuited directly a positive *ajñāna*. The Śāṅkarites say that the existence of *ajñāna* as a positive stuff can be proved by inference also, for according to them just as light manifests things by removing the positive stuff of darkness, so knowledge also manifests things by removing the *ajñāna* stuff that was hiding them. In refuting this, Mahācārya enters into a long discourse of formal and scholastic criticism of the Śāṅkarite mode of syllogism which cannot appropriately be treated here. The main point that is worthy of our notice here and which has a philosophical significance is the view of the Rāmānuja school that the illumination of things by knowledge does not presuppose that some positive stuff of *ajñāna* must have been removed. The Śāṅkarites object that unless *ajñāna* is admitted as a separate stuff, hiding the pure bliss of the self, it is difficult to explain emancipation. To this Mahācārya's reply is that emancipation can well be explained as cessation of bondage. People are as anxious to gain positive pleasure as to remove negative pain. It is wrong to suppose that unless the bondage were false it could not be removed, for it is well known that the effects of poison can be removed by the meditation of the mythical bird Garuḍa. So worldly bondage can also be removed by the meditation of God, though it be real. Meditation

as knowledge can remove not only ignorance but also the real fact of bondage. Emancipation may thus be regarded as the eternal manifestation of bliss and it is not indispensably necessary that all manifestation of bliss or happiness must be associated with a body like other ordinary bodily pleasure¹.

The Śāṅkarites say that since the unchangeable self cannot be the material cause of the world phenomena nor anything else, it comes by implication that there must be an *ajñāna* stuff which is the material cause of the world, for it is only such a material cause that can explain the *ajñāna* characteristics of the world-phenomena. Brahman has often been designated as the material cause of the world, and this is true only so far as it is the basic cause (*adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa*), the pure being that underlies all phenomena. The *ajñāna* is the changing material cause (*pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*), and as such the world participates in the nature of *ajñāna* in its characters.

To this Mahācārya's reply is that even though the world-creation may be supposed to be false, that does not necessarily imply the assumption of a positive *ajñāna*. Thus the illusory silver is produced without any cause, or the self may be regarded as the material cause of the world-creation, which though partless may appear as the world through error. It cannot be said that a false effect must have a false entity as its cause, for no such generalization can be made. The presence of the common characteristic of falsehood cannot determine the supposition that a false entity must necessarily be the cause of a false effect, for there must be other common characteristics in other respects too and there is certainly no absolute similarity of characteristics between the cause and the effect². Moreover, an effect does not necessarily possess the same identity of existence as its changing material cause; it is therefore not impossible for the Brahman to be the material cause of the world, though its purity may not be found in the world. If the Brahman is regarded as the *pariṇāmi-kāraṇa* of the world, it cannot of course have the same identical existence as the world, but if an entity can show itself in another form we may call it a *pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*, and it is not necessary for it to have the same existence as that effect. Thus, destruction and the cessation of *avidyā* are both regarded as

¹ *Sad-vidyā-vijaya*, pp. 39-75 (MSS.).

² *namu upādāno-pādeyayohi sālakṣaṇya-niyama-darśanād eva tat-siddhir iti cet sarvathā sālakṣaṇyasya mṛd-ghaṭayoh apy adarśanāt yat kiñcit sārūpyasya śūkti-rajatā-dāv api padārthatvā-dinā satvāt. Ibid. p. 77.*

effects and yet they have not the same existence as their causes¹. It cannot therefore be argued that if Brahman be regarded as the *pariṇāmi-kāraṇa* of the world, the world would thereby be as real as Brahman. Again, the non-appearance of the Brahma-character of the world may well be explained as being due to the influence of *karma*. Even for explaining the non-appearance of the Brahma-character of the world the assumption of an *ajñāna* is not necessary. It is also not necessary to define emancipation as the cessation of *ajñāna*, for that stage, being itself a state of bliss, can thereby be regarded as an object of our efforts, and the supposition of *avidyā* and its cessation is wholly groundless.

Mahācārya also made a vigorous effort to show by textual contents that the existence of *avidyā* as a positive ignorance is not admitted in the Vedic scriptures.

In the second chapter Mahācārya attempts to show that there is no necessity to admit an *ajñāna* as an independent hiding stuff. The Śāṅkarites argue that though the self is experienced in the notion of our ego, yet the self is not expressed in our ego-experience as identical with Brahman as the fullness of bliss, and for this it is necessary to admit that there is an *ajñāna* stuff which hides the pure character of Brahman. To this Mahācārya's reply is that since *ajñāna* is regarded as beginningless its hiding capacity will also be eternal and no emancipation is possible; and if Brahman could be hidden, it will cease to have its own nature as self-luminous and will be ignorant. Moreover, the experience is of the form "I am ignorant" and as such the *ajñāna* seems to have reference only to the ego. If it is held that the existence of the veil is admitted only to explain the limited appearance of Brahman through mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*), then it may well be pointed out that the limited appearance of Brahman as ego may well be explained through the limitation of the *antaḥkāraṇa* through which it manifests itself, and for that it is not necessary to admit a separate veil of *ajñāna*.

Again it may be asked whether the veiling is identical with *ajñāna* or different from it. In the former case it would ever remain

¹ *yad uktam brahmaṇaḥ pariṇāmitayā upādānatve pariṇāmasya pariṇāmi-samāna-sattākatva-niyamena kāryasyā'pi satyatva-prasaṅga iti. tatra kim pariṇāma-śabdena kārya-mātraṁ vivakṣitam, uta rūpā-ntarā-patitih; dhvamsasya avidyā-nirvṛtteṣca pariṇāmi-samāna-sattākatvā-bhāvāt na hi tad-rūpeṇa pariṇāmi kiñcid asti. na dvītiyaṁ rūpā-ntarā-patiteḥ pariṇāmi-mātra-sāpekṣatvāt gauraveṇa sva-samāna-sattāka-pariṇāmya-apekṣā-bhāvāt. Sad-vidyā-vijaya, p. 77.*

unmanifested, and the manifestation of the world-appearance would be impossible. If the veiling is something different from *ajñāna*, then since that something is not in any way related with pure consciousness its operation would not explain the world-illusion. If this veiling is supposed to render the *ajñāna* indefinable, then it may be asked if this veiling is something different from *ajñāna* or identical with it; in the latter case it would not depend on it and in the former case it is meaningless to regard *ajñāna* as antagonistic to Brahman. Thus, since the limitations through which the Brahman manifests itself are sufficient to explain the limited appearance of Brahman as world-objects, it is unnecessary to admit a separate *ajñāna*.

Again, if *ajñāna* can veil the pure *sākṣi*-consciousness, then the whole world would be blind and there would be no knowledge at all. If the *sākṣi*-consciousness cannot be veiled, then the Brahman also cannot be veiled. Further, if Brahman is always self-luminous, then it can never be hidden by *ajñāna*. If it is said that the self-luminosity of Brahman means that it cannot be the object of cognition (*a-vedyatva*) or of immediacy (*aparokṣa*), then it is unnecessary to indulge in the conception of veiling, for the non-cognizability is neither of the two. Again, the Śāṅkarites hold that the *ajñāna* hides the bliss part of Brahman but not the part of its consciousness. This is obviously impossible, for they hold that bliss and pure consciousness are identical; and if that were so, how can the bliss part be covered without covering also the part of consciousness, and how can one identical partless being, the Brahman, be divided into two parts of which one is covered while the other is not? Again, if the self is admitted to be of the nature of pure bliss, and if our love of pleasure is explained as being due to the illusory construction of the ego on this self, then since all things of the world are but illusory impositions on the self, all things in the world would be dear to us and even pain would be pleasurable.

In the third chapter Mahācārya refutes the Śāṅkarite theory of the support of *ajñāna*. It is held by some exponents of the Śāṅkara school that the *ajñāna*-constituents of the objects are supported in the pure consciousness underlying these objects. Though there are the modifications of these *ajñāna* entities, yet they may have relation with our ego-consciousness, for both the ego and the objects are but the states of a ground-*ajñāna*. To this Mahācārya says that

if all objects of the world have separate and different *ajñāna* materials as their causes, then it is wrong to suppose that the illusory silver is produced by the *ajñāna* of the conch-shell. It would be much better to say that the *ajñāna* of the subject (*pramātā*) as it comes out with the *antaḥkaraṇa* has produced the illusory silver. Again, if the *ajñāna* of the conch-shell is regarded as beginningless, it is meaningless to regard it as being a modification of a ground-*ajñāna*, and if it is not regarded as a mode its perception cannot be explained.

There are again others who hold that the *ajñāna* constituting an external object in some sense subsists in the subject as well and thus there may be a connection between the subject and the object. To this Mahācārya says that such a view is impossible, for the consciousness underlying the object is different from that underlying the subject; and if it is held that pure consciousness is ultimately one, then all objects ought to be illuminated just as much as any particular object is illuminated at the time of any particular cognition. Again, if the consciousness underlying the objects and the subject is without any distinction, why should a man know himself to be ignorant when he says "I am ignorant"? There is no reason why this feeling of ignorance should be felt in the subject and not in the object when the consciousness underlying them are one and the same. Moreover, in that case where one person knows an object, there would be a knowledge of that object with all persons.

There are again others who say that the *ajñāna* constituent of the conch-shell has the consciousness underlying the ego-experience as its support and the consciousness underlying the conch-shell as its object. To this Mahācārya says that the *ajñāna* supported by the consciousness underlying the ego-experience cannot undergo transformation, and, if this is so, it cannot explain the diverse objects.

There are others again who think that when a man says that he does not know the conch-shell his ignorance refers to the root-*ajñāna*; for though the *ajñāna* refers to the pure consciousness, that being identical with the pure consciousness underlying the conch-shell, the *ajñāna* also refers to the conch-shell and may be so apprehended. One has also to admit that the illusory silver is also made up of the stuff of *ajñāna*, for since the illusory silver appears in perception, it must have some stuff as its material cause.

To this Mahācārya's reply is that if the apperception of self-

ignorance has a reference to the root-*ajñāna*, there is no justification for admitting separate *ajñānas* constituting the stuff of the objects. It cannot be suggested that the existence of such *ajñāna* may be proved by the fact that each perception implies the cessation of a particular *ajñāna*, for the disappearance of such an *ajñāna* is only a matter of inference, and it may as well be assumed that it does not mean anything more than that a particular cognition follows only the absence of that particular knowledge. A negation-precedent-to-a-production is always destroyed by the production of a particular entity. When one says "I did not know the jug long, but I know it now," the cessation of the absence of knowledge or the *ajñāna* has a direct and immediate reference to the subject, the knower. But the removal of the *ajñāna* hiding the objects is only a matter of inference from the fact of cognition, and it can never be immediate or intuitive. Again, if the root-*ajñāna* is supposed to veil the pure consciousness as underlying the objects, it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of separate *ajñānas* hiding the objects. If it is supposed that the pure consciousness underlying the objects, being identical with Brahman, which is referred to by the root-*ajñāna*, may appear in consciousness as being limited under the object-appearance, it may be asked how on account of the association of the root-*ajñāna* the object may appear to be unknown even when it is known. Again, the root-ignorance implied in such an experience as "I do not know" cannot belong to the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), for it is a material object and it cannot belong to the self-shining pure consciousness. Being what it is, it cannot be ignorant about itself.

Further, it may well be said that though the self is manifested in self-consciousness yet it often appears as associated with the body, and though objects may generally be known as "knowable" yet their specific nature may not be known and it is this that often leads to doubt; all these are inexplicable except on the assumption of ignorance. They may all be admitted, but even then the assumption that *ajñāna* acts as a veiling agent is wholly unwarrantable. Uncertainty (*anuvadhāraṇa*) and veiling (*āvaraṇa*) are not one and the same thing. In the appearance of water in a mirage there may be doubt due to uncertainty, and it cannot be denied that there is all the appearance of water which could not have been if the so-called *ajñāna* had veiled it. Nor can it be said that the uncertainty

is due to the veiling, for it may well be urged that since veiling cannot manifest itself either as being or as self-luminous, it is itself a mere consequence or result of the factor of uncertainty. If it is urged that the factor of indefiniteness or uncertainty itself constitutes the nature of veiling (*anavadhāraṇatvam eva āvaranam*), then it may be said that the fact that the individual ego is not felt to be identical is regarded as being due to the veiling operation; but that does not mean that there is any uncertainty in our experience as the limited individual. If there were any such uncertainty, then ego-experience would not have stood as an indubitable fact. Again, if *ajñāna* be itself of the nature of uncertainty, then there is no meaning in ascribing a separate veiling character to it. If it is held that *ajñāna* is supported only by pure consciousness, then there would be no reason why the individual selves should pass through the cycles of birth and rebirth, for such *ajñāna* would have no association with the individual selves. If it is urged that the same consciousness manifests itself through the individual self, then it may also be urged that since the consciousness underlies both the individuals and God, God may equally well be supposed to undergo the cycle of birth and rebirth¹.

It is sometimes said that it is the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which experiences pleasure and pain and it is this that constitutes bondage. The mind itself being an illusory construction on the pure consciousness, the characters of the mind are felt to belong to the consciousness. To this Mahācārya's reply is that if the bondage belonged to the mind, then the pure consciousness cannot be supposed to suffer bondage. For if the suffering of bondage is due to the false notion of the identification of the pure consciousness with the mind, the bondage is not due to mind but to that false notion. In a similar manner Mahācārya enters into a criticism of many alternative interpretations that are offered by various writers of the Śāṅkara school in support of the existence of *ajñāna* and such of its relations as may explain the world creation, and finally tries to establish his view that in whichever way the relation of *ajñāna* may be conceived it is fraught with diverse kinds of contradictions which baffle explanation.

Again, in the fourth chapter Mahācārya contends that the

¹ *ajñānasya caitanya-mātrā-śrayatve jīve saṁsāra-hetutā na syāt vaiyadhi-karanyāc caitanyasyai'va jīve-śa-vibhāgāt sāmānādhikaranye iśvarasyā'pi saṁsāra-prasaṅgaḥ. Sad-vidyā-vijaya*, p. 107 (MS.).

avidyā cannot be regarded as ultimately real (*pāramārthikī*) for then there would be no monism. It cannot be regarded as the stuff of all that is cognized in practical experience (*vyavahārikī*), for then it could not be called the stuff of illusory experiences. It is sometimes urged that even from false things, such as a false fear, there may be real illness or even death, and so even from ignorance there can be real knowledge. Mahācārya points out that this analogy is false, for even in the above instances it is knowledge that produces the said results. If *avidyā* is false, then all its material transformations must also be false, for the effect is always identical with the cause. It is urged that since the world-objects are false their knowledge must also be false; then the Brahman, which is the knowledge which is itself a product of *avidyā*, is also false.

Further, if *ajñāna* be regarded as one, then with the knowledge of conch-shell all *ajñāna* should cease; for without the cessation of *ajñāna* the conch-shell could not have been known. It cannot be said that with the knowledge of the conch-shell only the veil hiding it has been removed and that the *ajñāna* did not cease, for experience testifies to the disappearance of *ajñāna* and not that of the veil. Thus one is forced to admit the existence of many *ajñānas*. For if it is held that knowledge removes only the veil, then even the last emancipating knowledge would also remove only a particular veil and that would not result in the destruction of the ultimate *ajñāna*. Again, *ajñāna* is defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge (*jñāna*). If that is so, it is obviously wrong to define knowledge as being itself a product of *ajñāna*. The effect cannot destroy the causal entity. Again, if at the time of emancipation of a man the *ajñāna* is supposed to be destroyed, such an *ajñāna* if it is one only would be wholly destroyed and there would be no other *ajñāna* left which could bind the other unemancipated individuals. It is supposed that *ajñāna* must be false, for it is destroyed by knowledge, but at the same time it is admitted that the *ajñāna* is destroyed by the true scriptures (*śruti*), and when a thing is destroyed by another real and true entity the former cannot be regarded as false.

Again, *avidyā* is sometimes defined as something the cessation of which can be produced by knowledge (*jñānajanya*). Now Brahman is itself the cessation of *avidyā*, but it is not produced by knowledge. If knowledge is regarded as a means to the cessation of knowledge (*jñānasādhyatvāt*), then it does not necessarily mean that

it has produced the cessation (*na ca sva-janyatvam eva sva-sā-dhyatvam*). If the two concepts are regarded as identical, then the relationing of *avidyā* to which *avidyā* may be regarded as a means would also have to be admitted as being produced by *avidyā*, which is reasoning in a circle¹. Arguing on the same analogy, one might as well say that the cessation of the relationing with *avidyā* depends on the cessation of *avidyā*, but in that case since the cessation of *avidyā* itself means a relationing with *avidyā* it becomes a tautology only.

Again, in order to differentiate any ordinary erroneous view, which is removed by right knowledge from *avidyā*, it has been defined as being beginningless yet destructible by knowledge. Now, it may be asked, what is the nature of this knowledge which destroys *avidyā*? Does it mean pure consciousness or only mental states? If it is pure consciousness, then it cannot destroy the root-impressions (*saṃskāra*); for it is only the mental states (*vyrtti*) which can destroy the mental root-impressions, and if *avidyā* is a beginningless *saṃskāra* it cannot be removed by knowledge as pure consciousness and thus the assumption of its being beginningless serves no useful purpose. The second supposition, that knowledge which destroys *avidyā* is only a mental state, cannot also be correct, for it is held that knowledge as mental state can remove only the veil of *ajñāna* but not the *ajñāna* itself. If it is said that the mental state removes both the veil and the *ajñāna*, then the definition of *ajñāna* as that which can be removed by knowledge becomes too wide, as it would also signify the veil (*āvaraṇa*) which is not intended to be covered within the definition of *ajñāna*. Again, if *ajñānas* are regarded as many, then such cognitive states can remove only the *ajñānas* veiling the ordinary objects, and cannot therefore be applied to one undifferentiated *ajñāna*-whole which can be removed only by the intuition of the partless real, for this knowledge would not be a mental state which is always limited². Here also the *ajñāna* must be supposed to be hiding the nature of Brahman, and the cessation of the *ajñāna* is directly consequent upon the cessation of the veil. So, firstly, the direct cause of the cessation of the *ajñāna* is not knowledge but the removal of the veil; secondly, it is the removal of the veil that is caused by the knowledge, and so it is this that ought to be called *ajñāna* according to the definition, for the veil is both beginningless and destructible by knowledge.

¹ *Sad-vidyā-vijaya*, p. 116.

² *Ibid.*

Mahācārya enters into a series of further criticisms of the definition of *avidyā* which are more or less of a scholastic nature and may therefore be omitted here.

In the fifth chapter Mahācārya disputes the possibility that the *avidyā* is illuminated or manifested. If *avidyā* was self-manifesting, then it would be real and spiritual like the Brahman. If the manifestation of Brahman were the manifestation of the manifestation of the *avidyā*, then the former being eternal the manifestation of the *avidyā* would also be eternal; yet *avidyā* is always regarded as existing only so long as it shines, and therefore as false (*mithyā-rthasya pratibhāsa-samāna-kālinatva-niyamāt*). If the manifestation (*prakāśa*) of *avidyā* be regarded as its non-distinguishingness (*abheda*) with the manifestation of Brahman, then so long as the manifestation of Brahman remains, the *avidyā* would also remain and hence *avidyā* itself would be eternal. Again, if it is urged that, when the *avidyā* ceases, its non-distinguishingness with the Brahman-manifestation would also cease, and hence Brahman would be eternal and *avidyā* would be destructible, a further difficulty may be pointed out to this contention, namely, that if the *avidyā* be indistinguishable from the Brahman-manifestation, then either the latter would be false or the former real. It would be absurd to suggest in reply that, though different, they have an identical being (*bhinnatve satyabhinnas-attākatvam*). The criticisms suggested herein will apply to the doctrine if the illumination of *avidyā* be explained as the manifestation of Brahman, as limited by *avidyā* (*avidyā-vacchinnaṃ brahma-svarūpaṃ avidyā-prakāśaḥ*) or as conditioned by it or reflected through it.

In the next chapter Mahācārya tries to show the incompatibility of the conception that *avidyā* may be brought to an end. He says that pure consciousness cannot be supposed to destroy *avidyā*. Then *avidyā* can never exist, for the pure consciousness is eternally existing and as such by itself destroys *avidyā* and no other effort is necessary. If pure consciousness cannot destroy *avidyā*, it cannot do so when reflected through a mental state (*vr̥tti-prativimbitam*), for it is not more than the unlimited consciousness (*caitanyaḍ adhika-viśayatvā-bhāve tadvad eva nivarttakatvā-sambhavāt*). If the pure consciousness reflected through a *vr̥tti* cannot remove *avidyā*, then it cannot do so when limited by a *vr̥tti* or conditioned by it. The *vr̥tti* itself also cannot remove it, for it is itself material. If it

is held that the knowledge which contradicts the illusory notion brought about by the *ajñāna* destroys it and not the intuition of the reality, then if that contradiction is something identical with pure consciousness, it is the pure consciousness which is to be supposed as destroying the *ajñāna*; the objections against such a view have already been dealt with. If knowledge and *ajñāna* are different, then it is wrong to suppose that knowledge destroys *ajñāna*; for knowledge is the contradiction that is supposed to destroy *avidyā* and by supposition *avidyā* is not knowledge. Moreover, since that illumination which destroys *ajñāna* cannot be supposed to have a further veil which is removed by it, it cannot rightly be called knowledge; for knowledge according to the supposition of the Śāṅkarites operates by removing a veil. Further, this knowledge is supposed to be opposed to all things in the world, and if that is so how can it be said that by this knowledge only the *ajñāna* is destroyed? Again, if it is supposed that illusion consists in identifying everything with Brahman and knowledge is supposed to remove this false identification, then since knowledge is supposed to operate by removing a veil, it has to be supposed that *ajñāna* was veiling the false identification, and if that were so there could have been no knowledge in our world-experience.

Again, the cessation of *avidyā* is also incomprehensible in itself, for it cannot be different from the nature of Brahman; if it were there would be duality and emancipation would be impossible. If it were one with the Brahman, then being so it would exist always and there would be no scope for making any effort about it. It cannot also be said that *avidyā* and Brahman mutually negate each other; for *avidyā* has Brahman for its support and as such is not antagonistic to it.

Prapatti Doctrine as expounded in Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa of Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmāṭṛ Muni's Commentary on it.

According to the *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* the mercy of God remains always as submerged in His justice, but yet it always exists and its apprehension by us is obstructed by certain conditions. It is not produced by our efforts, for then God would not always be merciful (*anudbhūta-dayā-dy-udbhāṇaka-puruṣa-kāra-sāpekṣakatve nityo-dbhūta-dayā-dī-mattvaṃ vyāhataṃ syāt* 35. B.).

The mercy of God is dependent on Him and on no one else; yet there exists in Nārāyaṇa the deity Lakṣmī who is like the essence of Him or the body of Him, and who has voluntarily reconciled her will absolutely with that of Nārāyaṇa. Though in such a conception the Lakṣmī is dependent on Nārāyaṇa, yet for the devotees Nārāyaṇa and Lakṣmī go together, and for him the mercy of God is to be attributed to both Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa taken as a whole.

The conception of Lakṣmī is such that she is the greatest object of love for Nārāyaṇa, who has conceived her as a part of Himself, and Lakṣmī has also so identified herself with Him that there is no separate existence for her. As such Lakṣmī has not to make any special effort for bringing Nārāyaṇa in consonance with her will; for there is practically no existence of duality, and for this reason there is no necessity for devotees to cling separately to Lakṣmī. The nature of Lakṣmī is the pure essence of the mercy of God¹.

When the devotee is in a state of separation from God through the wrong conception of his own independence and separate individuality, he has to make an effort in the negative direction in forsaking his own sense of freedom and adopting God as his ultimate end. But once he has forsaken his false egoism and surrendered himself entirely to God, there is no need of further effort on his part. At such a stage through the influence of Lakṣmī all the sins of the devotee are destroyed and through her influence God extends His mercy to him². Lakṣmī also rouses in the human mind through internal moral persuasion the belief in the necessity of seeking His friendship. She performs the dual function, first that of turning the minds of the people, who are under the sway of beginningless *avidyā* by which they are always being attracted by mundane interest to God; and, secondly, she also melts the heart of God Who is bent upon giving fruits in accordance with the deserts of the people, and persuades Him to extend His bliss to all people by overruling the bondage of *karma*.

The *prapatti*, as seeking the protection of God, is not restricted

¹ *devyā kārūṇya-rūpaye'ti tad-guṇa-sāratvena kārūṇyaṃ svayam eve'ti. Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa. MS.*

² *prapatter deśa-niyamaḥ kāla-niyamaḥ prakāra-niyamaḥ adhikāri-niyamaḥ phala-niyamaś ca nāsti. Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa-vyākhyā. MS.*

The above idea is supported in the commentary by a quotation from *Bhāradvāja-saṃhitā* which runs as follows:

*brahma-kṣatra-viśaḥ śūdrāḥ striyaś cā'ntara-jātayaḥ
sarva eva prapadyeran sarva-dhātāraṃ acyutam. Ibid.*

by any limiting conditions of holy or unholy places, or of any special time, or of any special mode, or of any caste restriction, or that it can produce only this or that result. When God accepts any person through *prapatti* He forgives all his faults of commission and omission. The only fault that He does not forgive is insincerity or cruelty (*kraurya*). People take to *prapatti* either because they feel helpless and know no other means of saving themselves, or because they are very wise and definitely know that this is the best means, or because they are naturally attached to God, like the Ārvārs¹. In the first case true knowledge and devotion are at the minimum; in the second case there is not so much ignorance but devotion also is of the normal extent. In the third case ignorance is least and attachment is at its highest and as such even true knowledge of the nature of God is engulfed as it were by an excess of attachment. In the first case the consciousness of one's own ignorance is strongest; in the second case the consciousness of one's humbleness and ignorance is equally balanced with the true knowledge of the essence of God and the relation of one's nature with Him.

The devotee who has in great love surrendered himself to God has occasional communion and detachment with Him. In the first case he is filled with ecstatic joy by coming in direct contact with God as associated with noble qualities. But at the moment of detachment the memory of that communion and ecstasy of joy is a source of dire pain. It has been related above that God's mercy is continuous and ever-flowing; but in spite of this, on account of obstructive tendencies which by investing us with a false belief in our own independence lead to the assertion of our false individuality, the course of God's mercy is obstructed. The adoption of *prapatti* removes the obstructive attitude and renders it possible for God to extend His mercy to us. In such a conception *prapatti* is to be regarded only as a negative means. The positive means (*upāya*) is God Who extends His mercy. *Prapatti* therefore should not be regarded as the cause of our deliverance. It only removes our obstructive tendencies, and cannot therefore be regarded as an element of the cause that secures our deliverance—that cause being God

¹ As an illustration of the last type a few lines from *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa-vyākhyā* may be quoted: *bhakti-p̄ravaśyena prapaṇṇā bhagavat-prema-pauṣ-kalyena pādaḥ stabdhau manaḥ śīthilaṃ bhavati cakṣur bhramati pādaḥ hastau ca niṣceṣṭau ity ukta-prakāreṇa śīthila-karaṇatvena sādhanā-nuṣṭhāna-yogyatā-bhāvād ananya-gatikās santas tasmin bhara-samarpaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ*. MS.

and God alone. God is thus both the means and end of attainment, and the only absolute means for the devotee to attain Him. The *prapatti* view here propounded flatly denies the necessity of any other means. The essence of *prapatti* consists in the passivity involved in the mental attitude of the devotee surrendering himself to God and thus giving occasion for God's affecting powers to affect him favourably. When the devotee ceases to concern himself with any anxiety as to how he may be saved, then God exerts His will to save him¹. This view of God's relationship with the devotee involves within it the philosophical doctrine that the individual souls exist for God and have no end to realize for themselves. It is only through ignorance that the individual seems to possess an independent end for himself. The denial of this position through excessive love of God renders the philosophical reality of their mutual relationship realizable as a spiritual fact.

The definition of soul as consciousness and bliss and as atomic is only an external description (*taṭastha*). The internal situation (*antaraṅga*) of the relation of the individual soul with God may best be described as his servitude to Him.

The nature of emotional attachment which is associated with *prapatti* is such that the devotee by his tender love for God induces the same in Him so that the emotion of love may be regarded on the one hand as a consciousness of bliss and on the other hand as a relation in which the lover and the beloved are the constituents. The first inferior stage of *prapatti* is not always actuated by deep natural attachment, but by a sense of one's own insignificance and helplessness². In the second stage called the *upeya* the devotee is so much actuated by his deep love for God that he loses all considerations for himself, and the intoxication of love may grow so deep that it may lead to the annihilation of his body. But the prospect of such an annihilation does not deter him from moving forward in the path of intoxication, for at that stage he loses all interest in the consequences of such an attachment. He is simply lost in God through intoxicating emotion. This is technically called *rāga-prāpta-prapatti*.

The relation between the devotee and God is interpreted on the analogy of the wedding of the mistress with her lover, of the

¹ *asya icchā nirvṛttā cet tasya'cchā asya kāryakārī bhavati. Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa-vyākhyā. MS.*

² This is regarded as the *upāya* stage where the devotee seeks God as the means to his highest attainment.

Gopikā with Kṛṣṇa, and it is held that the deep emotion is like the erotic emotion that leads to the wedding of the bridegroom with the bride. *Bhakti* or devotion is described as a special kind of consciousness dissociated from ignorance which reveals itself in the form of a deep emotion. The devotee is supposed to pass through all the stages which a love-stricken woman would do. All the emotions of the devotee, the lover, are for rousing the pleasure of God. Just as a woman's behaviour under the influence of love is intended to bring a smile or twinkle into the eyes of her lover, so the emotion of the devotee is intended solely to please God¹. This is regarded as *siddha-prema* or natural love. Devotees intoxicated by such a love are not necessarily subjected to any kind of code of duty. It is only those whose intoxication by love is so great that they cannot wait and pass through any such discipline as is prescribed in the *vaidhī* or the *upāya* stage of *prapatti* who are driven to embrace God as it were with their melting hearts. The ordinary rules of *prapatti* are utterly unbinding on these people. In the adoption of *prapatti* of all the three types mentioned above the personal effort (*puruṣakāra*) necessary is limited to the extent that the individual should hold himself in absolute self-surrender so that God may be inclined to accept even his faults and defects as they are and remove them by His divine grace. In the case of those who are advanced in the stage of *prapatti*—the *paramārtas*—God removes even all the *prārabdha-karmas* and grants them immediate emancipation².

The person who adopts the path of *prapatti* is not anxious to attain even emancipation. He has also no specific preference as to the nature of the spiritual emancipation that may be granted to him. To desire emancipation and to attach any preference to any possible state of existence involves an egoistic desire. But the person who has sincerely adopted the path of *prapatti* must annihilate altogether even the last traces of egoism. On the one side egoism means ignorance, for it is only by false knowledge that a man asserts

¹ *ajñāna-nivṛtti-pūrvaka-bhakti-rūpā-pannam jñānam prasādhitam. mahad-vivāha-janaka-kāmaṁ samudra-tulyatayā varddhayan megha-saṁśa-vigraho smat-kṛṣṇa ity evaṁ-bhūta-pravṛtti-hetor bhakter utpādako varddhakaś ca. sā eva hi tasya bhakti-pāraśya-nivandhanā pravṛttir upāya-phalam ity ucyate... prāpya-tvarayā strī-vratayā netra-bhramāṇena etasya sambhramā sarve mad-viśayā'sm kṛtvā evam avasthā labdhā iti tan-mukha-vikāśā-rtham kṛyamāṇa-kainikaryatad upeyā-ntarbhūta. Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa-vyākhyā. MS.*

² *evam-bhūtasya śarīra-sthiti-hetuḥ prārabdha-karme'ti na vaktum śakyate sarva-pāpebhyah mokṣayiṣyāmi ity anena virodhāt. Ibid. MS.*

himself as having an independent being. On the other side egoism means insincerity (*kraurya*). It has been said above that God may forgive all our sins excepting insincerity. The fundamental requirement of *prapatti* therefore consists in the annihilation of egoism. It is only through the annihilation of egoism that the perfect self-surrender required by *prapatti* is possible¹.

The four stages precedent to the attainment of the *summum bonum* through *prapatti* are as follows: (i) *jñāna-daśā*, i.e. the state in which through the instructions of the teacher the devotee attains self-knowledge in relation to God. (ii) *varaṇa-daśā*, the state in which the devotee adopts God in a spirit of helpless surrender as the only protector. (iii) *prāpti-daśā*, the state in which he realizes God. (iv) *prāpyā-nubhava-daśā*, i.e. the state in which, having realized God, he attains the *summum bonum*².

The doctrine of *prapatti* is, indeed, very old. It is found in the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā*, *Lakṣmī Tantra*, *Bharadvāja-saṃhitā* and other *Pañca-rātra* works. The *Śrīvaiṣṇava* writers trace its origin to much older literature such as the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, *Kaṭhopaniṣad* and the *Śvetāśvatara*, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The nature of *prapatti* in the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā* has already been discussed. In the *Bharadvāja-Saṃhitā* the *prapatti* is described as self-surrender to God, and the descriptions that it gives are more or less the same as those found in the *Ahīrbudhnya*. The devotee who adopts the path of *prapatti* is not exempted from the ordinary duties of a *Vaiṣṇava* or from the regular caste duties. The *Bharadvāja-saṃhitā* describes in some detail the courses of action which are favourable or unfavourable to the adoption of such a path. Rāmānuja, in his *Śaraṇā-gati-gadya*, advocates the path of *prapatti* in which the devotee seeks protection not only of *Nārāyaṇa* but also of *Lakṣmī*. But it does not appear either in the *Śaraṇā-gati-gadya* or in his commentary of the *Gītā* that a person who has adopted the path of *prapatti* is exempted from the normal caste and other duties, nor is the function of *Lakṣmī* in awarding the fruits of *prapatti* explained by him. In his explanation of the *Bhagavad-gītā* text (*sarva-dharmān parityajya*, etc., 18. 66), he says that the devotee should perform all his normal duties without any motive of

¹ *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa-vyākhyā*. MS.

² *etad-anubhava-janita-prīti-kārita-kainkaryam eva parama-puruṣa-rthaḥ*. *Ibid*.

attaining fruits thereby¹. As regards the destruction of the *prāraddha-karma* also, Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha hold that though most of it is destroyed by the grace of God, yet a trace of it is left². Vātsya Varada, in his *Prapanna-pārijāta*, follows the same idea. Veṅkaṭanātha also repeats the same view in his *Nyāsa-viṃśati* and *Nyāsa-tilaka*, and Anṇayārya, a disciple of Vedānti Rāmānuja, follows the idea in his *Prapatti-prayoga*. Varadanātha, the son of Veṅkaṭanātha, also repeats the idea in his *Nyāsa-tilaka-vākhyā* and *Nyāsa-kārikā*. The view of Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmātr muni, the leaders of the *Tengalai* school, differs from it to the extent that while the above-mentioned *prapatti* doctrine may be true of the inferior devotees, the superior devotees who are absolutely intoxicated with God's love are through the very nature of their psychological intoxication unable to follow any of the normal duties and are entirely exempted from them. Their *prāraddha-karma* may also be entirely destroyed by God's grace. The distinction

¹ Veṅkaṭanātha in his *Tātparya-dīpikā* on *Rāmānuja-bhāṣya* on the *Gītā* (verse 18. 66) says: *etac-chlokā-pāta-pratītyā kūṭa-yuktibhīṣca yathā varṇāśrama-dharma-svarūpa-tyāgā-dī-pakṣo no'deti tathā upapāditam*.

² *sādhya-bhaktistu sā hantrī prāraddhasyā'pi bhūyati*. (*Ruhasya-rakṣā* commentary of Veṅkaṭanātha on *Śaraṇā-gati-gadya*, p. 50. Vānivilāsa Press, 1910).

In the *Nyāsa-viṃśati* and the *Nyāsa-tilaka* as commented in the *Nyāsa-tilaka-vyākhyā* by Veṅkaṭanātha's son Varadanātha *prapatti* is defined in the same manner as that by Lokācārya. *Prapatti* is an old doctrine in Southern Vaiṣṇavism and its fundamental characters are more or less final. In the *Nyāsa-tilaka-vyākhyā* great emphasis is laid on the fact that *prapatti* as a path of approach to God is different from the path of *bhakti* and superior to it. In the *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* there is a tendency to treat *bhakti* as an intermediary way to *prapatti*. In the *Nyāsa-tilaka-vyākhyā* it is said that the chief difference between *bhakti* and *prapatti* is firstly that the former is of the nature of unbroken meditation, while the latter has to be done once for all; secondly, the *prāraddha-karma* cannot be destroyed by the former, whereas in the latter it can be so done by the grace of God; thirdly, the former needs various accessory methods of worship—continual effort and continual action—whereas in the latter we have excessive faith; fourthly, the former produces fruit after a long time whereas the latter applies only to those who want immediate fruit; fifthly, the former may have different objectives and may yield different fruits accordingly, whereas the latter being of the nature of absolutely helpless surrender produces all fruits immediately. High faith is the foundation of *prapatti*. In and through many obstacles this faith and attachment to God leads the devotee to his goal. For these reasons the path of *bhakti* is inferior to the path of *prapatti*. *Prapatti* to the teacher is regarded as a part of *prapatti* to God. The difference between the conception of *prapatti* in the *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* and the *Nyāsa-tilaka* is that the latter holds that even those who adopt the path of *prapatti* should perform the obligatory duties imposed by the scriptures and refrain from committing the acts prohibited by them; for the scriptures are the commands of God. The former however thinks that a man who adopts the path of *prapatti* by the very nature of the psychological state produced by it is unable to adhere to any programme of duties outlined by the scriptures. He therefore transcends it.

between the *Varaṅgalai* and *Teṅgalai* schools depends largely on the emphasis given by the latter to the superior type of *prapatti*.

Kastūrī Raṅgācārya.

Kastūrī Raṅgācārya, otherwise called Śrī Raṅgasūri, was a disciple of Saumya Jāmāṭṭ muni and probably lived late in the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. Rāmānuja's views do not seem to have undergone great changes of interpretation, and we do not find the emergence of different schools of interpretation as in the case of the philosophy of Śaṅkara. The followers of Rāmānuja throughout the succeeding centuries directed their efforts mostly to elucidating Rāmānuja's views and adducing new arguments for his doctrines or refuting the arguments of his opponents and finding fault with the theories of other schools. A sectarian difference, however, arose with Veṅkaṭanātha's efforts to explain the nature of devotion and the ultimate nature of emancipation and various other problems associated with it. Some external ritualistic differences can also be traced from his time. One sect¹ (*Vaḍkalai* or *Uttara-kalārya*) was led by Veṅkaṭanātha and the other school (called *Teṅgalai* or *Dakṣiṇa-kalārya*) by Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmāṭṭ muni.

Kastūrī Raṅgācārya wrote two works called *Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda* and the *Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-tattva*, in which he discussed some of the most important differences of these two schools and lent his support to the *Teṅgalai* or the *Dakṣiṇa-kalārya* school. The discussion began on the occasion of the interpretation of Rāmānuja of a topic in the *Brahma-sūtra* (4.3.6-15) called the *Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda*, in which some Upaniṣad texts raised certain difficulties regarding the attainment of absolute immortality as conditioned by wisdom or worship (*upāsana*). Vādari says that the worship of Hiraṇyagarbha, the highest of the created beings, leads to absolute immortality; Jaimini says that only the worship of the highest Brahman can produce immortality. Bādarāyaṇa, however, rejects their views and holds that only those who regard their souls as naturally dissociated from *Prakṛti* and as parts of Brahman attain absolute immortality.

¹ *sarvāsu vipratipattiṣu purvā kakṣyā vedāntā-cārya-tad-anuvandhinām uttara-kalārya-saṃjñānām uttarā tu lokācārya-tad-anubandhinām dakṣiṇa-kalārya-saṃjñānām iti viveko bodhyaḥ. Kārya-kūṇḍa-dhikaraṇa-vāda, 8. 2.*

Those who cannot realize their essential difference from the material qualities with which they are seemingly associated cannot attain the highest immortality and have ultimately to follow the cycles of births and rebirths. Those alone who worship Brahman with a proper apprehension of their own nature in relation to it can attain the highest immortality. The nature of this worship has been described by Raṅgācārya in accordance with the *Gītā* which enjoins the worship of Brahman with *śraddhā* (*śraddhā-pūrvakam brahmo-pāśanam*). The word *śraddhā* ordinarily means faith. This faith undergoes a special characterization at the hands of Raṅgācārya and other thinkers of the *Tēngalai* school. Thus it is said that the first stage is the full apprehension of the great and noble qualities of God; the second stage is the attachment produced by such apprehension; the third stage is to regard Him as the ultimate end and fulfilment of our nature; the fourth stage is to think of Him as the only dear object of our life; the fifth stage is the incapacity to bear separation from God through intense love for Him; the sixth stage is absolute faith in God as the only means of self-fulfilment; the seventh and last stage is the enkindling of the spirit in its forward movement to hold fast to Him. It is this last stage as associated with all the previous stages and as integrated with them which is called *śraddhā*. The worship of God with such faith (*śraddhā*) is also called devotion or *bhakti*. The worship of God again means intense joy in Him (*prīti-rūpo-paśāntatva-lakṣaṇam*). The mere realization of one's self as dissociated from the material elements is not sufficient. Those who follow the process of *Pañcāgni-vidyā* rest only with self-discriminative wisdom and do not take to God as the final end of self-fulfilment.

The first point of dispute between the followers of *Uttara-kalārya* and *Dakṣiṇa-kalārya* concerns the nature of emancipation called *kaivalya* which consists in self-realization as the ultimate end (*ātmā-nubhava-lakṣaṇa-kaivalyā-khya-puruṣa-rthah*). Veṅkaṭa-nātha, the leader of the *Uttara-kalārya*, thinks that those who attain such emancipation have again to come back, i.e. such an emancipation is destructible. The *Dakṣiṇa-kalārya* school, however, thinks that such an emancipation is eternal. Thus Veṅkaṭa, in his *Nyāya-siddhāntajñāna*, says that mere realization of self as distinguished from all material elements is not sufficient, for it should also be supplemented by the knowledge that that self is a part of God and is

entirely subordinate to Him, and that this view is held in the *Śrī-bhāṣya*¹. He draws a distinction between the realization of one's own nature as bliss and the realization of the blissful nature of God. The former may happen without the latter. It has to be admitted that in the state of *kaivalya* there is an association of materiality (*acit-saṃsarga*), since the *karma* in its entirety is not destroyed in this case; for to know one's proper essence is to know oneself as a part of God and so long as this state is not attained one is under the influence of *māyā*. In the case of such a person the *māyā* obstructs his vision of God. Veṅkaṭa, however, cannot say anything definitely as to the ultimate destiny of those who attain *kaivalya*. He asserts only that they cannot attain the eternal Brahmahood. He is also uncertain as to whether they are associated with bodies or not. He is also aware that his interpretation of the nature of *kaivalya* is not in harmony with all the scriptural texts, but he feels that since some of the texts definitely support his views other texts also should be taken in that light.

Kastūrī Raṅgācārya, however, asserts that, according to the testimony of the old Drāviḍa texts and also of the Gītā and such other texts, those who attain emancipation through self-knowledge attain the state of absolute immortality. The difference between liberation through self-knowledge and the liberation through one's self-knowledge in association with God is only a difference in the richness and greatness of experience, the latter being higher than the former in this respect². Other points of difference between the *Uttara-kalāryas* and the *Dakṣiṇa-kalāryas* are closely connected with the point discussed above. They have been enumerated in the second chapter of *Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda* and are as follows. The *Uttara-kalāryas* think that those who attain the emancipation of a self-realization as *kaivalya* pass to a higher world through other

¹ *parama-puruṣa-vibhūti-bhūtasya prāptur ātmanaḥ svarūpa-yāthātmya-vedanam apavarga-sādhana-bhūta-parama-puruṣa-vedano-payogitayā āvaśyakam. na svata eva upāyatvena ity uktam. Nyāya-siddhānta-jana*, p. 82.

Veṅkaṭa also refers to Varada Viṣṇumiśra in support of his views. "niḥśeṣa-karma-kṣayā-bhāvāt kaivalya-prāptau na muktiḥ."

He refers to *Saṅgati-mālā*, where Śrī Viṣṇucitta says that a person wishing to attain Brahman may commit such errors of conception that instead of attaining the true Brahmahood he may attain only the lower state of *kaivalya* just as a man performing sacrifices to attain Heaven may commit errors for which he may become a *brahma-rākṣasa* instead of attaining Heaven. *Ibid.* p. 84.

² *Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda*, 3. 79. Kastūrī Raṅgācārya goes through a long course of references to scriptural texts, Dravidian and Sanskritic, in support of his views.

channels than those adopted by persons who attain ultimate emancipation. This is denied by the *Dakṣiṇa-kalāryas*. Secondly, the former hold that the absolute dissociation of all trace of the elements of *prakṛti* is the same as emancipation, but the latter deny it. Thirdly, the former hold that those who attain the *kaivalya* are associated with subtle material impurities and may still be regarded as attaining immortality in a remote sense; this is desired by the latter. Fourthly, the former hold that those who attain *kaivalya* remain in a place within the sphere of the material world and their state is therefore not unchangeable, but the latter deny it. Fifthly, the former hold that those who attain wisdom through the five sacrifices (*pañcāgni-vidyā*) are different from those that attain *kaivalya*, but the latter hold that they may or may not be so. Sixthly, the former hold that those who attain wisdom through the five sacrifices may remain within the sphere of the material world when they attain only self-knowledge, but when they realize the nature of their relation with Brahman they pass away beyond the sphere of the material world (*prakṛti*); the latter, however, deny this. Seventhly, the former hold that those who attain wisdom through *pañcāgni-vidyā*, those who realize the nature of their relation to God, have the same characteristics, but the latter deny it. Eighthly, the former hold that outside the sphere of the material world (*prakṛti*) there cannot be any difference in the nature of one's highest experience, but this also is denied by the latter¹.

In his *Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-tattva*, Raṅgācārya only repeats the same arguments and the topic of discussion is also the same as that in *Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda*.

Śaila Śrīnivāsa.

Śaila Śrīnivāsa was the disciple of Kaunḍinya Śrīnivāsa Dikṣita, the son of Śrīnivāsa Tātācārya, and the brother of Anvayārya Dikṣita. He was very much influenced by the writings of his elder brother Anvayārya and some of his works are but elaborations of the works of his elder brother who wrote many books, e.g. *Virodha-bhañjanī*, etc. Śaila Śrīnivāsa wrote at least six books: *Virodha-nirodha*, *Bheda-darpaṇa*, *Advaita-vaṇa-kuṭhāra*, *Sāra-darpaṇa*, *Mukti-darpaṇa*, *Jñāna-ratna-darpaṇa*, *Guṇa-darpaṇa*, and *Bheda-maṇi*.

¹ *Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda*, II. 7.

In his *Virodha-nirodha*, probably the last of his works, he tries mainly to explain away the criticisms that are made on the different Rāmānuja doctrines by the Śāṅkarites, and also by the writers of other Vedānticschools—viz. that the Rāmānuja views are not strictly faithful to the scriptural texts—by showing that the scriptural texts favour the Rāmānuja interpretations and not the views of the other Vedāntic writers.

In the first chapter of the *Virodha-nirodha* Śaila Śrīnivāsa first takes up the view that the Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world—which he thinks is possible only in the conception that Brahman has the individual souls and the matter-stuff associated with Him (*brahmaṇi cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-rūpatām antareṇa na ghaṭate*). The Brahman remains unchanged in itself but suffers transformations through its two parts, the soul and the matter-stuff. Brahman as cause is associated with souls and the matter-stuff in their subtle forms, and when it undergoes transformation the souls expand and broaden as it were through the various intellectual states as a result of their *karma*, and the matter-stuff passes through its grosser stages as the visible material world; the portion of God as the inner controller of these two suffers transformation only so far as it is possible through its association with these two transforming entities¹. When the scriptural texts deny the changing character of the Brahman, all that is meant by them is that it does not undergo the changes through which matter and individual souls pass through their *karma*, but that does not deny the fact that Brahman is the material cause². Brahman has two parts, a substantive and a qualifying part, and it is the substantive part that through its subtle material parts becomes the transforming cause of the grosser qualifying material part. This material part being inseparable from Brahman may be regarded as subsisting in it. So also the Brahman has a spiritual part which undergoes a sort of expansion through thought-experiences and behaves as individual souls. Thus Brahman suffers modification through its physical and spiritual parts, and from this point of view God is

¹ *acid-aṁśasya kāraṇa-vasthāyām śabdā-di-vihānasya bhogyatvāya śabdā-di-mattvayā svarūpā-nyathā-bhāva-rūpa-vikāro bhavati ubhaya-prakāra-viśiṣṭe nīyantr-aṁśe tad-avastha-tad-ubhaya-viśiṣṭatā-rūpa-vikāro bhavati. Virodha-nirodha. MS.*

² *cid-acid-gata-karmā-dy-adhūna-vikāratvaṁ nirvikāratva-śrutir niṣedhati ity etādṛśaṁ jagad-upādānatvaṁ na sā śrutir bādhte. Ibid.*

subject to development through its two parts and through their association independently as their inner controller. Unlike Veṅkaṭa, Śaila Śrīnivāsa holds that this causal transformation is like the Sāṃkhyist causal transformation¹; *vikāra* or change here means change of states. Brahman thus suffers change directly in the spiritual and the intellectual part and indirectly as their inner controller, though in itself it suffers no change. To the objection that if matter and spirit are regarded as suffering transformation there is no meaning in attributing causality to Brahman as qualified by them, the reply is that the causality of Brahman is admitted on the strength of scriptural testimony. So far as Brahman remains as the inner controller and does not suffer any change in itself, it is regarded as the efficient cause².

In the second chapter Śaila Śrīnivāsa replies to the criticisms against the Rāmānuja doctrine of soul, and says that the contraction and expansion of soul due to ignorance and increase of knowledge does not imply that it is non-eternal, for non-eternality or destructibility can be affirmed only of those who undergo accretion or decrease of parts (*avayavo-pacayā-pacayayor eva anityatva-vyāpyatayā*). Knowledge is partless and so there is no contraction or expansion of it in any real sense. What are called contraction and expansion consist in reality of its absence of relationship with objects due to the effects of *karma* or the natural extension of relations with objects like the ray of a lamp; *karma* is thus regarded as the *upādhi* (limiting condition) which limits the natural flow of knowledge to its objects and is figuratively described as contraction. It is on account of this nature of knowledge that unless obstructed by *karma* it can grasp all sensations of pain and pleasure spreading over all parts of the body, though it belongs to soul which is an atomic entity. So knowledge is all-pervading (*vibhu*)³. Knowledge also is eternal in its own nature though changeful so far as its states are concerned.

In the third chapter Śrīnivāsa deals with the question as to

¹ *viśiṣṭaṃ brahma kāraṇam ity uktam tena kāryam api viśiṣṭam eva tatra ca brahmaṇa upādānatvaṃ viśeṣaṇā-mśaṃ viśeṣyā-mśaṃ prati tatra cācid-aṃśaṃ prati yad-upādānatvaṃ tat sūkṣmā-vasthā-cid-aṃśa-dvāraṇaṃ tatra tatra dvāra-bhūtā-cid-aṃśa-gata-svarūpā nyathā-bhāva-rūpa eve vikāraḥ sa ca aprthak-siddha-vastu-gatatvāt brahma-gato'pi... evaṃ ca sāmṛkhyā-bhīmato-pādānatāyāḥ siddhāntē'py anapāyāt na ko'pi virodhaḥ. Virodha-nirodha. MS.*

² *tena tad eva advāraṇaṃ nimittaṃ-sad-vāraṇaṃ upādānam. Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

whether the souls are produced or eternal, and his conclusion is that in their own nature they are unproduced, but they are produced so far as their own specific data of knowledge are concerned¹. The production of eternal knowledge is possible only so far as its contraction and expansion are concerned, which is due to the action of the body and other accessories. It is only in this sense that knowledge though eternal in itself can be said to be suffering production through its various kinds of manifestation (*abhivyakti*).

In the fourth chapter Śrīnivāsa discusses the same question in which the Upaniṣads urge that by the knowledge of one everything is known. He criticizes the Madhva and the Śaṅkarite views and holds that the knowledge of one means the knowledge of Brahman which, being always associated with the individual souls and matter, involves the knowledge of these two entities. His exposition in this subject is based throughout on the interpretations of scriptural texts.

In the fifth chapter Śrīnivāsa explains the same question in which the individual souls can be called agents (*kartā*). Agency (*kartṛtva*) consists in an effort that may lead to the production of any action (*kāryā-nukūla kṛtimattvam*). In the Rāmānuja view effort means a particular intellectual state and as such it may well belong to the soul, and so the effort that may lead to any action also belongs to the soul which, though eternal in itself, is changeful so far as its states are concerned². The agency of the individual souls, however, is controlled by God, though the fruits of the action are enjoyed by the former, for the direction of God which determines the efforts of the individuals is in accordance with their actions. This virtually means an admixture of determinism and occasionalism.

In the seventh chapter Śrīnivāsa contends that though knowledge is universal it only manifests itself in accordance with the deeds of any particular person in association with his body, and so there is no possibility that it should have all kinds of sufferings and enjoyments and should not be limited to his own series of experiences. In the eighth and ninth chapters he tries to establish

¹ *tatra niṣedhāḥ viyad-ādivat jīva-svarūpo-tpattim pratiśedhanti utpatti-vidhayaas tu svā-sādhāraṇa-dharma-bhūta-jñāna-viśiṣṭa-veśeṇa utpattim vadanti. Virodha-nirodha. MS.*

² *prayatnā-der buddhi-viśeṣa-rūpatayā kāryā-nukūla-kṛtimattvasy'āpi kartṛtvasya jñāna-viśeṣa-rūpatayā tasya svābhā vikatayā tad-ātmanā jīvasya jñānasya nityatve'pi tat-parināma-viśeṣasya anityatvāt. Ibid.*

the view that during emancipation the individuals are cleanly purged of all their deeds, virtues and sins, but at this stage God may be pleased to endow them with extraordinary bodies for the enjoyment of various kinds of pleasures. In the remaining nineteen chapters Śaila Śrīnivāsa introduces some of the relatively unimportant theological doctrines of the Rāmānuja system and discusses them on the basis of scriptural texts which may very well be dropped for their insignificance as philosophical contribution.

In the *Bheda-darpaṇa* also Śaila Śrīnivāsa takes some of the important doctrines where the Rāmānujists and the Śāṅkarites part company, and tries to show by textual criticism that the Rāmānuja interpretation of the scriptural texts is the only correct interpretation¹. The work, therefore, is absolutely worthless from a philosophical point of view. In most of his other works mentioned above, Śaila Śrīnivāsa prefers to discuss the doctrines of Rāmānuja philosophy in the same style of scriptural criticism, and any account of these is therefore of very little value to students of philosophy.

Śrī Śaila Śrīnivāsa, in his *Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi*, discusses the nature of Brahma-causality. Brahman is both the instrumental (*nimitta*) and the material (*upādāna*) cause of the world. Such a Brahman is the object of our meditation (*dhyāna*). An object of meditation must have knowledge and will. A mere qualityless entity cannot be the object of meditation. In order that Brahman may be properly meditated upon it is necessary that the nature of His causality should be properly ascertained. It is no use to attribute false qualities for the sake of meditation. If the world is an illusion, then the causality of Brahman is also illusory, and that would give us an insight into His real nature. If God is the real cause of the world, the world must also be real. It is sometimes said that the same entity cannot be both a material and instrumental cause (*samavāya-samavāyi-bhinnam kāraṇam nimitta-kāraṇamiti*). The material cause of the jar is earth, while the instrumental cause is the potter, the wheel, etc. To this the reply is that such an objection is groundless; for it is difficult to assert that that which is an instrumental cause cannot be a material cause, since the wheel of the potter, though an instrumental cause in itself, is also the material

¹ *bhedā-bheda-śruti-vrāta-jāta-sandeha-santatāḥ
bheda-darpaṇam ādāya niścinvantu vipaścitāḥ.*

Bheda-darpaṇa. MS.

cause of its own form, colour, etc. There is thus nothing which can lead us to suppose that the material cause and the instrumental cause cannot exist together in the same entity. It may further be contended that the same entity cannot behave as the material and instrumental cause with regard to the production of another entity. To this the reply is that the internal structure of rod is both the material cause for its form as well as the instrumental cause for its destruction in association with other entities. Or it may be contended that time (*kāla*) is the cause for both the production and destruction of entities (*kāla-ghaṭa-samyogā-dikam prati kālasya nimittatvād upādānatvācca*). To this the obvious reply would be that the behaviour of the same entity as the material and the instrumental cause is limited by separate specific conditions in each case. The association of separate specific conditions renders a difference in the nature of the cause; and therefore it would be inexact to say that the same entity is both the material and the instrumental cause. This objection, however, produces more difficulty in the conception of the causality of Brahman according to the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* theory, for in our view Brahman in His own nature may be regarded as the instrumental cause and in His nature as matter (*acit*) and souls (*cit*). He may be regarded as the material cause¹. It is sometimes objected that if Brahman as described in the texts is changeless, how can He be associated with changes as required by the conception of Him as the material and instrumental cause, which involves the view of associating Him with a body? Moreover, the association of body (*śarīra*) with God is neither an analogy nor an imagery. The general conception of body involves the idea that an entity is called the body where it is only controlled by some spiritual substance². To this the reply is that Brahman may Himself remain unchangeable and may yet be the cause of changes in His twofold body-substance. The objection is that the material world is so different from the bodies of animals that the conception of body cannot be directly applied to it. The reply is that even among animal bodies there is a large amount of diversity,

¹ *evam hi brahmany'api no'pādānatva-nimittatvayor virodhah; tasya cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-veśeṇa upādānatvāt svarūpeṇa nimittatvāc ca. tat-tad-avacchedakabheda-prayukta-tad-bhedasya tasya tatra'pi niṣpratyūhantāt. Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi. MS.*

² *yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvā-tmanā svārthe niyāmyam tat tasya śarīram. Ibid.* This subject has been dealt with elaborately in Śrī Saila Śrīnivāsa's *Sāra-darpaṇa*.

e.g. the body of a man and the body of a microscopic insect. Under the circumstances we are to fall upon a general definition which would cover the concept of all bodies and ignore the individual differences. The definition given above suits the concept of bodies of all living beings and applies also to the concept of the world as the body of Brahman. This is also supported by the *Śruti* texts of the *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa*, where the world has been spoken of as the body of God. If there is an apparent difference in our conception of body as indicated in the definition as testified by the Vedic texts, with our ordinary perception of the world which does not reveal its nature as body, the testimony of the Vedic texts should prevail; for while our perception can be explained away as erroneous, a scientific definition and the testimony of texts cannot be dismissed. Our ordinary perception is not always reliable. We perceive the moon like a small dish in size, whereas the scriptural testimony reveals its nature to us as much bigger. When there is a conflict between two sources of evidence, the decision is to be made in favour of one or the other by the canon of unconditionality (*ananyathā-siddhatva*). An evidence which is unconditional in its nature has to be relied upon, whereas that which is conditional has to be subordinated to it. It is in accordance with this that sometimes the Vedic texts have to be interpreted in such a manner that they may not contradict perceptual experience, whereas in other cases the evidence of perceptual experience has to be dismissed on the strength of scriptural testimony. It cannot also be said that the evidence of a later *pramāṇa* will have greater force, for there may be a series of errors, in which case there is no certitude in any of the later *pramāṇas*. Again, there is no force also in mere cumulation of evidence, for in the case of a blind man leading other blind men mere cumulation is no guarantee of certitude¹. In the case of the conflict of *pramāṇas*, the dissolution of doubt and the attainment of certitude are achieved on the principle of unconditionality. That which is realized in an unconditional manner should be given precedence over what is realized only in a conditional manner². Our powers of perception are limited by their own limitations and can-

¹ *na ca paratvād uttarena purva-bādhah iti yuktam dhārā-vāhika-bhramasthale vyabhicārāt ata eva na bhūyastvam opi nirṇāyakam śatā'ndha-nyāyena aprayojakatvāc ca. Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi. MS.*

² *ananyathā-siddhatvam eva virodhy-aprāmānya-vyavasthā pakatā-vacchedakam iṣyate. Ibid.*

not therefore discern whether the world may after all be the body of the transcendent Brahman, and therefore it cannot successfully contradict the testimony of the Vedic texts which declare the world to be the body of God. The Vedic texts of pure monism are intended only to deny the duality of Brahman, but it can well be interpreted on the supposition of one Brahman as associated with his body, the world. The denial of dualism only means the denial of any other being like Brahman. Thus Brahman as *cit* and *acit* forms the material cause of the world, and Brahman as idea and will as affecting these is the instrumental cause of the world. The twofold causality of Brahman thus refers to twofold conditions as stated above which exist together in Brahman¹.

In the Vedāntic texts we have expressions in the ablative case indicating the fact that the world has proceeded out of Brahman as the material cause (*upādāna*). The ablative case always signifies the materiality of the cause and not its instrumentality². But it also denotes that the effect comes out of the cause and it may be objected that the world, being always in Brahman and not outside Him, the ablative expressions of the Vedāntic texts cannot be justified. To this the reply is that the conception of material cause or the signification of the ablative cause does not necessarily mean that the effect should come out and be spatially or temporally differentiated from the cause. Even if this were its meaning, it may well be conceived that there are subtle parts in Brahman corresponding to *cit* and *acit* in their manifested forms, and it is from these that the world has evolved in its manifested form. Such an evolution does not mean that the effect should stand entirely outside the cause, for when the entire causal substance is transformed, the effect cannot be spatially outside the cause³. It is true that all

¹ *sarva-śarīra-bhūtā-vibhakta-nāma-rūpā-vasthā panna-cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-veśeṇa brahmaṇahupādānatvam; tad-upayukta-samkalpā-di-viśiṣṭa-svarūpeṇa nimittatvam ca niṣpratyūham iti nimittatvo-pādānatvayor ihā' py avacchedaka-bheda-prayukta-bhedasya durāpahnnavatvā ttayor ekāśraya-vṛttitvasya prāḡ upapāditatvāt na brahmaṇo abhinna-nimitto-pādānatve kaś cid virodhaḥ. Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi. MS.*

² Such as *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante.*

³ *upādānatva-sthale'pi na sarvatra loka'pi viśeṣaḥ kṛtsna-pariṇāme tad a-sambhavāt kintu ekadeśa-pariṇāma eve'ti tad-abhiprāyakaṃ pratyākhyānaṃ vācyaṃ. tac ce'hā' pi sambhavati. viśiṣṭai-kadeśa-pariṇāmā-ṅgīkārāt. ato na tad-virodhaḥ; kiñca sūkṣma-cid-acid-viśiṣṭam upādānatvam iti vakṣyate tasmāc ca sthūlā-vasthasya viśeṣo yujyate viśeṣo hi na sarvā-tmanā kāraṇa-deśa-parityāgaḥ. Ibid. MS.*

material causes suffer a transformation; but in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* view there is no difficulty, for it is held here that Brahman suffers this modification and controls it only so far as it has reference to his body, the *cit* and *acit*. God's instrumentality is through His will, and will is but a form of knowledge.

In the *Bheda-darpaṇa* Śrīnivāsa tries to support all the principal contentions of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* theory by a reference to Upaniṣadic and other scriptural texts. In his other works mentioned above the subjects that he takes up for discussion are almost the same as those treated in *Virodha-nirodha*, but the method of treatment is somewhat different; what is treated briefly in one book is elaborately discussed in another, just as the problem of causality is the main topic of discussion in *Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi*, though it has been only slightly touched upon in *Virodha-nirodha*. His *Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha* is a brief summary in verse and prose of the contents of what the author wrote in his *Naya-dyu-maṇi*, a much bigger work to which constant references are made in the *Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha*. Śrī Śaila Śrīnivāsa wrote also another work called *Naya-dyu-maṇi-dīpikā* which is bigger than *Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha*. It is probably smaller than *Naya-dyu-maṇi*, which is referred to as a big work¹. There is nothing particular to be noted which is of any philosophical importance in *Naya-dyu-maṇi-dīpikā* or *Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha*. He generally clarifies the ideas which are already contained in the *Śrūta-prakāśikā* of Sudarśana Sūri. He also wrote *Omkāra-vādārtha*, *Ānandatāra-tamya-khaṇḍana*, *Arunādhikaraṇa-saraṇi-vivaraṇi* and *Jijñāsā-darpaṇa*. He lived probably in the fifteenth century.

Śrīnivāsa wrote first his *Sāra-darpaṇa* which was followed by *Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi*, and *Virodha-nirodha*. In fact *Virodha-nirodha* was one of his last works, if not the last. In the first chapter of this work he deals with the same subject as he did in the *Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi*, and tries to explain the nature of Brahman as the material and instrumental cause of the world. In the second chapter he tries to refute the objections against the view that the souls as associated with knowledge or rather as having their character interpreted as knowledge should be regarded as the means for God's manifestation as the world. The objector says that thought is always moving, either expanding or contracting, and as such it can-

¹ Unfortunately this *Naya-dyu-maṇi* was not available to the present writer.

not be the nature of self which is regarded as eternal. In the case of the Jains the soul is regarded as contracting and expanding in accordance with the body that it occupies, and it may rightly be objected that in such a conception the soul has to be regarded as non-eternal. But in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* conception it is only thought that is regarded as expanding or contracting. The expansion or contraction of thought means that it conceives greater or lesser things, and this is different from the idea of an entity that grows larger or smaller by the accretion or dissociation of parts. The expansion or contraction of thought is due to one's *karma* and as such it cannot be regarded as non-eternal. Knowledge in its own nature is without parts and all-pervading; its contraction is due to the effect of one's bad deeds which is often called *māyā* or *avidyā*¹. The *Viśiṣṭādvaitins* do not regard knowledge as produced through the collocations of conditions as the *Naiyāyikas* think, but they regard it as eternal and yet behaving as occasional (*āgantuka-dharmavattvam*) or as being produced. Earth in its own nature is eternal, and remaining eternal in its own nature suffers transformation as a jug, etc. In this way the conception of the eternity of the soul is different from the conception of knowledge as eternal, for in the case of knowledge, while remaining all-pervasive in itself, it seems to suffer transformation by virtue of the hindrances that obstruct its nature in relation to objects². Universal relationship is the essential nature of knowledge, but this nature may be obstructed by hindrances, in which case the sphere of relationship is narrowed, and it is this narrowing and expansive action of knowledge which is spoken of as transformation of knowledge or as the rise or cessation of knowledge. A distinction has thus to be made between knowledge as process and knowledge as essence. In its nature as essence it is the eternal self; in its nature as process, as memory, perception, thinking, etc., it is changing. The Jaina objection on this point is that in the above view it is unnecessary to admit a special quality of *ajñāna* as the cause for this expansion or contraction of thought, for it may well be admitted that the soul itself undergoes such a

¹ *jñānasya svābhāvikaṃ prasaraṇaṃ aupadhikas tu saṃkocaḥ; upādhis tu prācīnaṃ karma eva. Virodha-nirodha*, pp. 39, 40 (MS.).

² *na hi yādṛśaṃ ātmano nityatvaṃ tādṛg jñānasyā'pi nityatvaṃ abhyapugacchāmaḥ karaṇa-vyāpāra-vaiyarthyaḥ prasaṅgāt. kintu tārīkikā'dy abhīmatam jñānasya āgantuka-dharmatvaṃ nī ākartuṃ dṛśer iva svarūpato nityatvaṃ āgantukā'-vasthā'-śrayatvaṃ ca; tena rūpeṇa nityatvaṃ tu ghaṭatvā'-dy-avasthā-viśiṣṭa-veṣeṇa mṛdāderiva iṣṭam eva. Ibid.* p. 44.

transformation through the instrumentality of its deeds. To this the reply is that the Vedic texts always declare that the soul is in itself unchangeable, and if that is so the change has to be explained through the instrumentality of another factor, the *ajñāna*. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as the pure essence or nature of the soul and not as its *dharma* or character, and it is this character that is in itself universal and yet is observed to undergo change on account of obstructions. Thus, the soul in itself is eternal, though when looked at in association with its character as knowledge which is continually expanding or contracting it may seemingly appear to be non-eternal¹. Thought in itself has no parts and therefore cannot itself be regarded as non-eternal. It is nothing but relationship, and as such the analogy of change which, in other objects, determines their non-eternity cannot apply to it.

Now there are different kinds of Upaniṣadic texts, from some of which it may appear that the soul is eternal, whereas from others it may appear that the soul is created. How can this difficulty be avoided? On this point Śrinivāsa says that the eternity and uncreated nature of the self is a correct assertion, for the soul as such is eternal and has never been created. In its own nature also the soul has thought associated with it as it were in a potential form. Such an unmanifested thought is non-existent. But knowledge in its growing richness of relations is an after-production, and it is from this point of view that the soul may be regarded as having been created. Even that which is eternal may be regarded as created with reference to any of its special characteristics or characters². The whole idea, therefore, is that before the creative action of God the souls are only potentially conscious; their real conscious activity is only a result of later development in consequence of God's creative action.

Again, the Upaniṣads assert that by the knowledge of Brahman everything else is known. Now according to the Śāṅkarite explanation the whole world is but a magical creation on Brahman which alone has real being. Under the circumstances it is impossible that

¹ *nityā-nitya-vibhāga-svarūpa-dvāra-katva-svabhāva-dvāra-katvābhyām vya-vasthita iti na kaś cid doṣaḥ. Virodha-nirodha. MS.*

² *svā-sādhārāṇa-dharma-bhūta-jñāna-viśiṣṭa-veśeṇa utpattiṃ vadanti siddhasya'pi hi vastunaḥ dharmā-ntara-viśiṣṭa-veśeṇa sādhyatā vrihyā-dau drṣṭā. Ibid.*

prāk ṣṛṣṭer jivānām niṣkriyatvo-ktiyā ca idam eva darśitam. Ibid.

by the knowledge of Brahman, the real, there would be the knowledge of all illusory and unreal creation, for these two, the reality and the appearance, are entirely different and therefore by the knowledge of one there cannot be the knowledge of the other. In the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* view it may be said that when God as associated with his subtle body, the subtle causal nature of the souls and the material world, is known the knowledge of God as associated with the grosser development of His body as souls and the world is also by that means realized¹.

In performing the actions it need not be supposed that the eternal soul undergoes any transformation, for the individual soul may remain identically unchanged in itself and yet undergo transformation so far as the process of its knowledge is concerned. In the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* view, will and desire are regarded as but modes of knowledge and as such the psychological transformations of the mind involved in the performance of actions have reference only to knowledge². It has already been shown that possibly knowledge in its essential form is unchangeable and yet unchangeable so far as its nature as process is concerned. Such an activity and performance of actions belongs naturally to the individual souls.

The *Virodha-nirodha* is written in twenty-seven chapters, but most of these are devoted to the refutation of objections raised by opponents on questions of theological dogma which have no philosophical interest. These have therefore been left out in this book.

Raṅgācārya³.

A follower of Śaṅkara named Umā-Maheśvara wrote a work named *Virodha-varūthinī* in which he proposed to show one hundred contradictions in Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* and other cognate

¹ *sūkṣma-cid-acic-charitrake brahmaṇi jñāte sthūla-cid-acic-charitrakasya tasya jñānam utrā' bhīnatam. Virodha-nirodha. MS.*

² *iha prayatnāder buddhi-viśeṣa-rūpatayā kāryā-nukūla-kṛtimattvasyā'pi kartṛtvasya jñāna-viśeṣa-rūpatayā tasya svābhāvikatayā tad-ātmanā jīvasya jñānasya nityatve'pi tat-pariṇāma-viśeṣasya anityatvāc ca. Ibid.*

³ "śrī-rāmānuja-yogi-pāda-kamala-sthānā-bhīṣekaṃ gato jīyāt so'yam
ananta-purusa-guru-siṃhāsana-dhīśvaraḥ
śrī-raṅga-sūriḥ śrīśaile tasya siṃhāsane sthitaḥ
Ku-dṛṣṭi-dhvānta-mārtandaṃ prakāśayati sampratī."

He was thus a disciple of Anantārya of the middle of the nineteenth century. At the end of his *San-mārga-dīpa* he says that it was written in refutation of Rāma Miśra's work on the subject. Rāma Miśra lived late in the nineteenth century and wrote *Sneha-pūrti*.

literature of the school, such as *Śatadūsaṇi*, etc., but through illness he lost his tongue and could offer criticisms on only twenty-seven points¹. As a refutation of that work Raṅgācārya wrote his *Ku-dṛṣṭi-dhvānta-mārtanda*. It also appears that Annayārya's grandson and Śrīnivāsa-tāyārya's son, Śrīnivāsa-dīkṣita, also wrote a work called *Virodha-varūthini-pramāthini* as a refutation of *Virodha-varūthini*. The first chapter of *Ku-dṛṣṭi-dhvānta-mārtanda* is also called *Virodha-varūthini-pramāthini*.

Umā-Maheśvara says that according to the view of Rāmānuja the manifold world and the individual souls (*acit* and *cit*) exist in an undivided and subtle state in Brahman, the original cause. In the state of actualized transformation, as the manifested manifold worlds and the experiencing selves, we have thus a change of state, and as Brahman holds within Himself as qualifying Him this gross transformation of the world He is associated with them. He must, therefore, be supposed to have Himself undergone change. But again Rāmānuja refers to many scriptural texts in which Brahman is regarded as unchanging.

To this the reply is that the mode in which the *cit* and the *acit* undergo transformation is different from the mode in which the all-controlling Brahman produces those changes in them. For this reason the causality of Brahman remains unaffected by the changes through which the *cit* and the *acit* pass. It is this unaffectedness of Brahma-causality that has often been described as the changelessness of Brahman. In the Śāṅkara view, the manifested world being the transformation of *māyā*, Brahman cannot on any account be regarded as a material cause of it. The Brahman of Śāṅkara being only pure consciousness, no instrumental agencies (*nimitta-kāraṇatā*) can be attributed to it. If Brahman cannot undergo any change in any manner and if it always remains absolutely changeless it can never be regarded as cause. Causality implies power of producing change or undergoing change. If both these are impossible in Brahman it cannot consistently be regarded as the cause. According to the Rāmānuja view, however, Brahman is not absolutely changeless; for, as producer of change it also itself undergoes a change homogeneous (*brahma-samasattāka-vikārā-ṅgikārāt*) with

¹ Umā-Maheśvara is said to have written other works also, i.e. *Tattva-candrikā*, *Advaita-kāmadhenu*, *Tapta-mudrā-vidrāvaṇa*, *Prasaṅga-ratnākara*, and *Rāmāyana-tīkā*.

it. As the change is of a homogeneous nature, it may also be regarded as unchanged. The Brahman is the ultimate upholder of the world; though the worldly things have their intermediate causes, in which they may be regarded as subsisting, yet since Brahman is the ultimate and absolute locus of subsistence all things are said to be upheld in it.

Causation may be defined as unconditional, invariable antecedence (*ananyathā-siddha-niyata-pūrva-vartitā*). Brahman is certainly the ultimate antecedent entity of all things, and its unconditional character is testified by all scriptural texts. The fact that it determines the changes in *cit* and *acit* and is therefore to be regarded as the instrumental agent does not divest it of its right to be regarded as the material cause; for it alone is the ultimate antecedent substance. Brahman originally holds within itself the *cit* and the *acit* in their subtle nature as undivided in itself, and later on undergoes within itself such changes by its own will as to allow the transformation of *cit* and *acit* in their gross manifested forms. It leaves its pristine homogeneous character and adopts an altered state at least with reference to its true parts, the *cit* and the *acit*, which in their subtle state remained undivided in themselves. It is this change of Brahman's nature that is regarded as the *pariṇāma* of Brahman. Since Brahman is thus admitted to be undergoing change of state (*pariṇāma*), it can consistently be regarded as the material cause of the world. The illustration of the ocean and the waves is also consistent with such an explanation. Just as mud transforms itself into earthen jugs or earthen pots, and yet in spite of all its changes into jugs or pots really remains nothing but mud, so Brahman also undergoes changes in the form of the manifested world with which it can always be regarded as one¹. As the jug and the pot are not false, so the world also is not false. But the true conception of the world will be to consider it as one with Brahman. The upper and the lower parts of a jug may appear to be different when they are not regarded as parts of the jug, and

¹ *vahu syām prajāyeye'tyā-di-śrutibhiḥ sṛṣṭeḥ prāñ nāma-rūpa-vibhāgā-bhāvena ekatvā-vasthāpannasya sūkṣma-cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-brahmaṇaḥ paścān-nāma-rūpa-vibhāgena ekatvā-vasthā-prahāṇa-pūrvakamsthūla-cid-acid-vaiśiṣṭya-lakṣaṇa-vahutvā-pattir-hi prasphuṭaṃ pratipādyate; sai'va hi brahmaṇaḥ pariṇāmo nāma; prāg-avasthā-prahāṇenā' vasthā-ntara-prāpter eva pariṇāma-sabdā-rthatvāt... yathā sarvaṃ mṛd-dravya-vikṛti-bhūtaṃ ghaṭā-di-kārya-jātaṃ kāraṇa-bhūta-mṛd-dravyā-bhinname va na tu dravyā-ntaraṃ tathā brahmā'pi jagataḥ abhinnaṃ eva. Ku-dṛṣṭi-dhvānta-mārtanḍa, p. 66.*

in that condition to consider them as two would be false; for they attain their meaning only when they are taken as the parts of one whole jug. When the Upaniṣads say that plurality is false, the import of the text is that plurality attains its full meaning only in its unified conception as parts of God, the Absolute.

The Śāṅkarites do not admit the theory of illusion as one thing appearing as another (*anyathā-khyāti*). According to them illusion consists in the production of an indefinable illusory object. Such an object appears to a person only at a particular moment when he commits an error of perception. It cannot be proved that the illusory object was not present at the time of the commission of illusory perception. Under the circumstances the absence of that object at other times cannot prove its falsity; for an object present at one time and not present at another cannot indicate its false nature. Falsity has then to be defined as relative to the perceiver at the time of perception. When the perceiver has knowledge of the true object, and knows also that one object is being perceived as another object, he is aware of the falsity of his perception. But if at the time of perception he has only one kind of knowledge and he is not aware of any contradiction, his perception at any time cannot be regarded as false. But since the dream experiences are not known to be self-contradictory in the same stage, the experience of conch-shell-silver is not known to be illusory at the time of the illusion; and as the world experience is uncontradicted at the time of our waking consciousness, it cannot be regarded as false in the respective stages of experience. The falsehood of the dream experiences therefore is only relative to the experience of another stage at another time. In such a view of the Śāṅkarites everything becomes relative, and there is no positive certainty regarding the experience of any stage. According to the Buddhists and their scriptures, the notion of Brahman is also false; and thus, if we consider their experience, the notion of Brahman is also relatively true. In such a view we are necessarily landed in a state of uncertainty from which there is no escape¹.

¹ Raṅgācārya wrote at least one other work called *San-mārga-dīpa* which, being of a ritualistic nature, does not warrant any treatment in this work.

CHAPTER XXI

THE NIMBĀRKA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

Teachers and Pupils of the Nimbārka School.

NIMBĀRKA, Nimbāditya or Niyamānanda is said to have been a Telugu Brahmin who probably lived in Nimba or Nimbapura in the Bellary district. It is said in Harivyāsadeva's commentary on *Daśa-śloki* that his father's name was Jagannātha and his mother's name was Sarasvatī. But it is difficult to fix his exact date. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, in his *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, thinks that he lived shortly after Rāmānuja. The argument that he adduces is as follows: Harivyāsadeva is counted in the *Guru-paramparā* list as the thirty-second teacher in succession from Nimbārka, and Bhandarkar discovered a manuscript containing this list which was written in Samvat 1806 or A.D. 1750 when Dāmodara Gosvāmī was living. Allowing fifteen years for the life of Dāmodara Gosvāmī we have A.D. 1765. Now the thirty-third successor from Madhva died in A.D. 1876 and Madhva died in A.D. 1276. Thus thirty-three successive teachers, on the Madhva line, occupied 600 years. Applying the same test and deducting 600 years from A.D. 1765, the date of the thirty-third successor, we have 1165 as the date of Nimbārka. This, therefore, ought to be regarded as the date of Nimbārka's death and it means that he died sometime after Rāmānuja and might have been his junior contemporary. Bhandarkar would thus put roughly eighteen years as the pontifical period for each teacher. But Pandit Kiśoradāsa says that in the lives of teachers written by Pandit Anantarām Devācārya the twelfth teacher from Nimbārka was born in Samvat 1112 or A.D. 1056, and applying the same test of eighteen years for each teacher we have A.D. 868 as the date of Nimbārka, in which case he is to be credited with having lived long before Rāmānuja. But from the internal examination of the writings of Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa this would appear to be hardly credible. Again, in the *Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Private Libraries of the North Western Provinces*, Part I, Benares, 1874 (or *N.W.P. Catalogue*, MS. No. 274), *Madhva-mukha-mardana*, deposited in the

Madan Mohan Library, Benares, is attributed to Nimbārka. This manuscript is not procurable on loan and has not been available to the present writer. But if the account of the authors of the *Catalogue* is to be believed, Nimbārka is to be placed after Madhva. One argument in support of this later date is to be found in the fact that Mādhava who lived in the fourteenth century did not make any reference in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, to Nimbārka's system, though he referred to all important systems of thought known at the time. If Nimbārka had lived before the fourteenth century there would have been at least some reference to him in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, or by some of the writers of that time. Dr Rajendra Lal Mitra, however, thinks that since Nimbārka refers to the schools (*saṃpradāya*) of Śrī, Brahmā and Sanaka, he lived later than Rāmānuja, Madhva and even Vallabha. While there is no positive, definite evidence that Nimbārka lived after Vallabha, yet from the long list of teachers of his school it probably would not be correct to attribute a very recent date to him. Again, on the assumption that the *Madhva-mukha-mardana* was really written by him as testified in the *N.W.P. Catalogue*, one would be inclined to place him towards the latter quarter of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century. Considering the fact that there have been up till now about forty-three teachers from the time of Nimbārka, this would mean that the pontifical period of each teacher was on the average about ten to twelve years, which is not improbable. An internal analysis of Nimbārka's philosophy shows its great indebtedness to Rāmānuja's system and even the style of Nimbārka's *bhāṣya* in many places shows that it was modelled upon the style of approach adopted by Rāmānuja in his *bhāṣya*. This is an additional corroboration of the fact that Nimbārka must have lived after Rāmānuja.

The works attributed to him are as follows: (1) *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*. (2) *Daśa-śloki*. (3) *Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja*. (4) *Guru-paramparā*. (5) *Madhva-mukha-mardana*. (6) *Vedānta-tattva-bodha*. (7) *Vedānta-siddhānta-pradīpa*. (8) *Sva-dharmā-dhva-bodha*. (9) *Śrī-kṛṣṇa-stava*. But excepting the first three works all the rest exist in MS. most of which are not procurable¹. Of these the present writer

¹ *Vedānta-tattva-bodha* exists in the *Oudh Catalogue*, 1877, 42 and VIII. 24, compiled by Pandit Deviprasad.

Vedānta-siddhānta-pradīpa and *Sva-dharmā-dhva-bodha* occur in the *Notices*

could secure only the *Sva-dharmā-dhva-bodha*, which is deposited with the Bengal Asiatic Society. It is difficult to say whether this work was actually written by Nimbārka. In any case it must have been considerably manipulated by some later followers of the Nimbārka school, since it contains several verses interspersed, in which Nimbārka is regarded as an *avatāra* and salutations are offered to him. He is also spoken of in the third person, and views are expressed as being *Nimbārka-matam* which could not have come from the pen of Nimbārka. The book contains reference to the *Kevala-bheda-vādī* which must be a reference to the Madhva school. It is a curious piece of work, containing various topics, partly related and partly unrelated, in a very unmethodical style. It contains references to the various schools of asceticism and religion.

In the *Guru-paramparā* list found in the *Har-iguru-stava-mālā* noted in Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's *Report of the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts 1882-1883*, we find that Haṃsa, the unity of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, is regarded as the first teacher of the Nimbārka school. His pupil was Kumāra of the form of four *vyūhas*. Kumāra's pupil was Nārada, the teacher of *prema-bhakti* in the Tretā-yuga. Nimbārka was the pupil of Nārada and the incarnation of the power (*sudarśana*) of Nārāyaṇa. He is supposed to have introduced the worship of Kṛṣṇa in Dvāpara-yuga. His pupil was Śrīnivāsa, who is supposed to be the incarnation of the conch-shell of Nārāyaṇa. Śrīnivāsa's pupil was Viśvācārya, whose pupil was Puruṣottama, who in turn had as his pupil Svarūpācārya. These are all described as devotees. Svarūpācārya's pupil was Mādhavācārya, who had a pupil Balabhadraācārya, and his pupil was Padmācārya who is said to have been a great controversialist, who travelled over different parts of India defeating people in discussion. Padmācārya's pupil was Śyāmācārya, and his pupil was Gopālācārya, who is described as a great scholar of the Vedas and the Vedānta. He had as pupil Kṛpācārya, who taught Devācārya, who is described as a great controversialist. Devācārya's pupil was Sundara Bhaṭṭa, and Sundara Bhaṭṭa's pupil was Padmanā Bhācārya. His pupil was Upendra Bhaṭṭa; the succession of pupils is in the following order :

of *Sanskrit Manuscripts*, by R. L. Mitra, Nos. 2826 and 1216, and the *Guru-paramparā* in the *Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Private Libraries of the N.W.P.*, Parts 1-x, Allahabad, 1877-86.

Rāmacandra Bhaṭṭa, Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, Padmākara Bhaṭṭa, Śravaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Bhūri Bhaṭṭa, Madhva Bhaṭṭa, Śyāma Bhaṭṭa, Gopāla Bhaṭṭa, Valabhadra Bhaṭṭa, Gopinātha Bhaṭṭa (who is described as a great controversialist), Keśava, Gaṅgala Bhaṭṭa, Keśava Kāśmīrī, Śrī Bhaṭṭa and Harivyāsadeva. Up to Harivyāsadeva apparently all available lists of teachers agree with one another; but after him it seems that the school split into two and we have two different lists of teachers. Bhandarkar has fixed the date for Harivyāsadeva as the thirty-second teacher after Nimbārka. The date of Harivyāsadeva and his successor in one branch line, Dāmodara Gosvāmī, has been fixed as 1750-1755. After Harivyāsadeva we have, according to some lists, Paraśurāmadeva, Harivaṃśadeva, Nārāyaṇadeva, Vṛndāvanadeva and Govindadeva. According to another list we have Svabhūrāmadeva after Harivyāsadeva, and after him Karmaharadeva, Mathuradeva, Śyāmadeva, Sevadeva, Naraharideva, Dayārāmadeva, Pūrṇadeva, Maniśideva, Rādhā-kṛṣṇaśaraṇadeva, Harideva and Vrajabhūṣaṇasaraṇadeva who was living in 1924 and Santadāsa Vāvāji who died in 1935. A study of the list of teachers gives fairly convincing proof that on the average the pontifical period of each teacher was about fourteen years. If Harivyāsadeva lived in 1750 and Śāntadāsa Vāvāji who was the thirteenth teacher from Harivyāsadeva died in 1935, the thirteen teachers occupied a period of 185 years. This would make the average pontifical period for each teacher about fourteen years. By backward calculation from Harivyāsadeva, putting a period of fourteen years for each teacher, we have for Nimbārka a date which would be roughly about the middle of the fourteenth century.

Nimbārka's commentary of the *Brahma-sūtras* is called the *Vedānta-pārijata-saurabha* as has been already stated. A commentary on it, called the *Vedānta-kaustubha*, was written by his direct disciple Śrīnivāsa. Kesava-kāśmīrī Bhaṭṭa, the disciple of Mukunda, wrote a commentary on the *Vedānta-kaustubha*, called the *Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā*. He also is said to have written a commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, called the *Tattva-prakāśikā*, a commentary on the tenth skanda of *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* called the *Tattva-prakāśikā-veda-stuti-tīkā*, and a commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* called the *Taittirīya-prakāśikā*. He also wrote a work called *Krama-dīpikā*, which was commented upon by Govinda

Bhattachārya¹. The *Krama-dīpikā* is a work of eight chapters dealing mainly with the ritualistic parts of the Nimbārka school of religion. This work deals very largely with various kinds of *Mantras* and meditations on them. Śrīnivāsa also wrote a work called *Laghu-stava-raja-stotra* in which he praises his own teacher Nimbārka. It has been commented upon by Puruṣottama Prasāda, and the commentary is called *Guru-bhakti-mandākinī*. The work *Vedānta-siddhānta-pradīpa* attributed to Nimbārka seems to be a spurious work so far as can be judged from the colophon of the work and from the summary of the contents given in R. L. Mitra's *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts* (MS. No. 2826). It appears that the book is devoted to the elucidation of the doctrine of monistic Vedānta of the school of Śaṅkara. Nimbārka's *Daśa-ślokī*, called also *Siddhānta-ratna*, had at least three commentaries: *Vedānta-ratna-mañjuṣā*, by Puruṣottama Prasāda; *Laghu-mañjuṣā*, the author of which is unknown; and a commentary by Harivyāsa muni. Puruṣottama Prasāda wrote a work called *Vedānta-ratna-mañjuṣā* as a commentary on the *Daśa-ślokī* of Nimbārka, and also *Guru-bhakti-mandākinī* commentary as already mentioned. He wrote also a commentary on the *Śrī-kṛṣṇa-stava* of Nimbārka in twenty chapters called *Śruty-anta-sura-druma*, and also *Stotra-trayī*². The discussions contained in the commentary are more or less of the same nature as those found in *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, which has been already described in a separate section. The polemic therein is mainly directed against Śaṅkara *vedānta*. Puruṣottama also strongly criticizes Rāmānuja's view in which the impure *cit* and *acit* are regarded as parts of Brahman possessed of the highest and noblest qualities, and suggests the impossibility of this. According to the Nimbārka school the individual selves are different from Brahman. Their identity is only in the remote sense inasmuch as the individual selves cannot have any separate existence apart from God. Puruṣottama also criticizes the dualists, the Madhvas. The dualistic texts have as much force as the identity texts, and therefore on the strength of the identity texts we have to admit that the world exists in Brahman, and on the strength of the duality texts we have to

¹ This Keśava Kāśmīrī Bhaṭṭa seems to be a very different person from the Keśava Kāśmīrī who is said to have had a discussion with Caitanya as described in the *Caitanya-caritāmṛta*.

² The *Śrī-kṛṣṇa-stava* had another commentary on it called *Śruti-siddhānta-mañjari*, the writer of which is unknown.

admit that the world is different from Brahman. The real meaning of the view that God is the material cause of the world is that though everything springs from Him, yet the nature of God remains the same in spite of all His productions. The energy of God exists in God and though He produces everything by the diverse kinds of manifestations of His energies, He remains unchanged in His Self¹.

Puruṣottama makes reference to Devācārya's *Siddhanta-jāhnavī*, and therefore lived after him. According to Pandit Kīśoradāsa's introduction to *Śruty-anta-sura-druma*, he was born in 1623 and was the son of Nārāyaṇa Śarmā. The present writer is unable to substantiate this view. According to Pandit Kīśoradāsa he was a pupil of Dharmadevācārya.² Devācārya wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* called the *Siddhānta-jāhnavī*, on which Sundara Bhaṭṭa wrote a commentary called the *Siddhānta-setukā*.

A General Idea of Nimbārka's Philosophy.

According to Nimbārka, the inquiry into the nature of Brahman can take place only after one has studied the literature that deals with the Vedic duties leading to various kinds of beneficial results and discovered that they are all vitiated by enjoyment and cannot bring about a state of eternal bliss. After such a discovery, and after the seeker has learnt in a general manner from the various religious texts that the realization of Brahman leads to the unchangeable, eternal and ever-constant state of bliss, he becomes anxious to attain it through the grace of God and approaches his teacher with affection and reverence for instruction regarding the

¹ *yathā ca bhūmes tathā-bhūta-śakti-matyā oṣadhīnām janma-mātram tathā sarva-kāryo-tpādanā-rha-lakṣaṇā-cintyānmanta-sarva-śakter akṣara-padārthād brahmaṇo viśvam sambhavati* 'ti; *yadā sva-svā-bhāvīkā-lpā-dhika-sātiśaya-śaktima-dbhyo' cetanebhyas tat-tac-chaktya-nusāreṇa sva-sva-kārya-bhāvā-pattavapi apracyuta-sva-rūpatvaṃ pratyakṣa-pramāṇa-siddham, tarhy acintya-sarvā-cintya-viśākhyā-kāryo-tpādanā-rha-śaktimato bhagavata ukta-rityā jagad-bhāvā-pattavapya-pracyuta-sva-rūpatvaṃ kim aśakyam iti... śakti-vikṣepa-saṃharaṇasya pariṇāma-śabda-vācyaivā-bhiprāyeṇa kvacit pariṇāmo-ktiḥ. sva-rūpa-pariṇāma-bhāvaś ca pārcam eva nirūpitaḥ; śakteḥ śakti-mato' pṛthak-siddhatvāt.* (*Śruty-anta-sura-druma*, pp. 73-74.)

² Pandit Kīśoradāsa contradicts himself in his introduction to *Vedānta-maṇjuṣā* and it seems that the dates he gives are of a more or less fanciful character. Pandit Kīśoradāsa further says that Devācārya lived in A.D. 1055. This would place Nimbārka prior even to Rāmānuja, which seems very improbable.

nature of Brahman. The Brahman is Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who is omniscient, omnipotent, the ultimate cause, and the all-pervading Being. Such a Being can be realized only through a constant effort to permeate oneself with His nature by means of thought and devotion. The import of the first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* consists in the imposition of such a duty on the devotee, namely, the constant effort at realizing the nature of Brahman¹. The pupil listens to the instruction of his teacher who has a direct realization of the nature of Brahman and whose words are therefore pregnant with his concrete experience. He tries to understand the import and meaning of the instruction of his teacher which is technically called *śravaṇa*. This is indeed different from the ordinary accepted meaning of the *śravaṇa* in the Śāṅkara literature where it is used in the sense of listening to the Upaniṣadic texts. The next step is called *manana*—the process of organizing one's thought so as to facilitate a favourable mental approach towards the truths communicated by the teacher in order to rouse a growing faith in it. The third step is called *nididhyāsana*—the process of marshalling one's inner psychical processes by constant meditation leading ultimately to a permanent conviction and experiences of the truths inspired and communicated by the teacher. It is the fruitful culmination of the last process that brings about the realization of the nature of Brahman. The study of the nature of the Vedic duties, technically called *dharma*, and their inefficacy, rouses a desire for the knowledge of the nature of Brahman leading to eternal bliss. As a means to that end the pupil approaches the teacher who has a direct experience of the nature of Brahman. The revelation of the nature of the Brahman in the pupil is possible through a process of spiritual communication of which *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are the three moments.

According to Nimbārka's philosophy which is a type of *Bhedā-bheda-vāda*, that is, the theory of the Absolute as Unity-in-difference, Brahman or the Absolute has transformed itself into the world of matter and spirits. Just as the life-force or *prāṇa* manifests itself into the various conative and cognitive sense-functions, yet keeps its own independence, integrity and difference from them,

¹ As the nature of this duty is revealed through the text of the *Brahma-sūtra*, namely, that the Brahma-hood can be attained only by such a process of *nididhyāsana*, it is called the *apūrvā-vidhi*.

so the Brahman also manifests itself through the numberless spirits and matter without losing itself in them. Just as the spider spins out of its own self its web and yet remains independent of it, so the Brahman also has split itself up into the numberless spirits and matter but remains in its fullness and purity. The very existence and movement of the spirits and indeed all their operations are said to depend upon Brahman (*tad-āyatta-sthiti-pūrvikā*) in the sense that the Brahman is both the material and the determining cause of them all¹.

In the scriptures we hear of dualistic and monistic texts, and the only way in which the claims of both these types of texts can be reconciled is by coming to a position of compromise that the Brahman is at once different from and identical with the world of spirits and matter. The nature of Brahman is regarded as such that it is at once one with and different from the world of spirits and matter, not by any imposition or supposition, but as the specific peculiarity of its spiritual nature. It is on this account that this *Bhedā-bheda* doctrine is called the *svābhāvika bhedā-bheda-vāda*. In the pure dualistic interpretation of the Vedānta the Brahman is to be regarded only as the determining cause and as such the claims of all texts that speak of the Brahman as the material cause or of the ultimate identity of the spirits with the Brahman are to be disregarded. The monistic view of the Vedānta is also untenable, for a pure differenceless qualityless consciousness as the ultimate reality is not amenable to perception, since it is super-sensible, nor to inference, since it is devoid of any distinctive marks, nor also to scriptural testimony, as no words can signify it. The supposition that, just as one's attention to the moon may be drawn in an indirect manner by perceiving the branch of a tree with which the moon may be in a line, so the nature of Brahman also may be expressed by demonstrating other concepts which are more or less contiguous or associated with it, is untenable; for in the above illustration the moon and the branch of the tree are both sensible objects, whereas Brahman is absolutely super-sensible. Again, if it is supposed that Brahman is amenable to logical proofs, then also this supposition would be false; for all that is amenable to proofs or subject to any demonstration is false. Further, if it is not amenable to any proof, the Brahman would be chimerical as the

¹ Śrīnivāsa's commentary on Nimbārka's *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha* on *Brahma-sūtra*, I. i. 1-3.

hare's horn. If it is held that, Brahman being self-luminous, no proofs are required for its demonstration, then all the scriptural texts describing the nature of Brahman would be superfluous. Moreover, the pure qualityless Brahman being absolutely unassociated with any kind of impurity has to be regarded as being eternally free from any bondage, and thus all scriptural texts giving instruction in the methods for the attainment of salvation would be meaningless. The reply of the Śāṅkarites, that all duality though false has yet an appearance and serves practical purposes, is untenable; for when the scriptures speak of the destruction of bondage they mean that it was a real bondage and its dissolution is also a real one. Again, an illusion is possible in a locus only when it has some specific as well as some general characters, and the illusion takes place only when the object is known in a general manner without any of its specific attributes. But if the Brahman is absolutely qualityless, it is impossible that it should be the locus of any illusion. Again, since it is difficult to explain how the *ajñāna* should have any support or object (*āśraya* or *viśaya*), the illusion itself becomes inexplicable. The Brahman being of the nature of pure knowledge can hardly be supposed to be the support or object of *ajñāna*. The *jīva* also being itself a product of *ajñāna* cannot be regarded as its support. Moreover, since Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination and *ajñāna* is darkness, the former cannot legitimately be regarded as the support of the latter, just as the sun cannot be regarded as the supporter of darkness.

The operation that results in the formation of illusion cannot be regarded as being due to the agency of *ajñāna*, for *ajñāna* is devoid of consciousness and cannot, therefore, be regarded as an agent. The agency cannot also be attributed to Brahman because it is pure and static. Again, the false appearance of Brahman as diverse undesirable phenomena such as a sinner, an animal, and the like, is inexplicable; for if the Brahman is always conscious and independent it cannot be admitted to allow itself to suffer through the undesirable states which one has to experience in various animal lives through rebirth. If the Brahman has no knowledge of such experiences, then it is to be regarded as ignorant and its claim to self-luminosity fails. Again, if *ajñāna* is regarded as an existent entity, there is the change to dualism, and if it is regarded as non-existent then it cannot hide the nature of Brahman. Further, if

Brahman is self-luminous, how can it be hidden and how can there be any illusion about it? If the conch-shell shines forth in its own nature, there cannot be any misperception of its nature as a piece of silver. Again, if the nature of Brahman is admitted to be hidden by *ajñāna*, the question that naturally arises is whether the *ajñāna* veils the nature of the Brahman as a whole or in part. The former supposition is impossible, for then the world would be absolutely blind and dark (*jagad-āndhya-prasaṅgāt*), and the latter is impossible, for the Brahman is a homogeneous entity and has no characters or parts. It is admitted by the monists to be absolutely qualityless and partless. If it is held that ordinarily only the "bliss" part of the Brahman is hidden by *ajñāna* whereas the "being" part remains unveiled, then that would mean that Brahman is divisible in parts and the falsity of the Brahman would be demonstrable by such inferences as: Brahman is false, because it has parts like the jug (*brahma mithyā sāmśatvāt, ghaṭādivat*).

In reply to the above objections it may be argued that the objections against *ajñāna* are inadmissible, for the *ajñāna* is absolutely false knowledge. Just as an owl perceives utter darkness, even in bright sunlight, so the intuitive perception "I am ignorant" is manifest to all. Anantarāma, a follower of the Nimbārka school, raises further objections against such a supposition in his *Vedānta-tattva-bodha*. He says that this intuitively felt "I" in "I am ignorant" cannot be pure knowledge, for pure knowledge cannot be felt as ignorant. It cannot be mere egoism, for then the experience would be "the egoism is ignorant." If by "ego" one means the pure self, then such a self cannot be experienced before emancipation. The ego-entity cannot be something different from both pure consciousness and *ajñāna*, for such an entity must doubtless be an effect of *ajñāna* which cannot exist before the association of the *ajñāna* with Brahman. The reply of the Śāṅkarites that *ajñāna*, being merely false imagination, cannot affect the nature of the Brahman, the abiding substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), is also inadmissible; for if the *ajñāna* be regarded as false imagination there must be someone who imagines it. But such an imagination cannot be attributed to either of the two possible entities, Brahman or the *ajñāna*; for the former is pure qualityless which cannot therefore imagine and the latter is inert and unconscious and therefore devoid of all imagination. It is also wrong to suppose that Brahman

as pure consciousness has no intrinsic opposition to *ajñāna*, for there can be no knowledge which is not opposed to ignorance. Therefore the Śāṅkarites are not in a position to demonstrate any entity which they mean by the intuition "I" in "I am ignorant."

The final conclusion from the Nimbārka point of view therefore is that it is inadmissible to accept any *ajñāna* as a world-principle producing the world-appearance by working in co-operation with the Brahman. The *ajñāna* or ignorance is a quality of individual beings or selves who are by nature different from Brahman but are under its complete domination. They are eternal parts of it, atomic in nature, and are of limited powers. Being associated with beginningless chains of *karma* they are naturally largely blinded in their outlook on knowledge¹.

The Śāṅkarites affirm that, through habitual failure in distinguishing between the real nature of the self and the not-self, mis-perceptions, misapprehensions and illusions occur. The objection of Anantarāma against such an explanation is that such a failure cannot be attributed either to Brahman or to *ajñāna*. And since all other entities are but later products of illusion, they cannot be responsible for producing the illusion².

In his commentary Śāṅkara had said that the pure consciousness was not absolutely undemonstrable, since it was constantly being referred to by our ego-intuitions. To this the objection that naturally arises is that the entity referred to by our ego-intuitions cannot be pure consciousness; for then the pure consciousness would have the characteristic of an ego—a view which is favourable to the Nimbārka but absolutely unacceptable to the Śāṅkarites. If it is held to be illusory, then it has to be admitted that the ego-intuition appears when there is an illusion. But by supposition the illusion can only occur when there is an ego-intuition³. Here is then a reasoning in a circle. The defence that reasoning in a circle can be avoided on the supposition that the illusory imposition is beginningless is also unavailing. For the supposition that illusions as such are beginningless is false, as it is well known that illusions

¹ *paramā-tma-bhinno' lpa-śaktis tad-adhīnaḥ sanātanas tad-aṁśa-bhūto' nādi-karmā-tmikā-vidyā-vṛta-dharma-bhūtā-jñāno jīva-kṣetrajñā-di-śabdā-bhīdheya tat-pratyayā-śraya iti. Vedānta-tattva-bodha*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.* p. 13.

³ *adhyastattve tu adhyāse sati bhāsamānatvam, tasmin sati sa ity anyonyā-śraya-doṣaḥ. Ibid.* p. 14.

are possible only through the operation of the subconscious impressions of previous valid cognitions¹. Again, the reflection of the pure consciousness in the *ajñāna* is impossible, for reflections can take place only between two entities which have the same order of existence. From other considerations also the illusion has to be regarded as illegitimate. Illusions take place as the result of certain physical conditions such as contact, defect of the organs of perception, the operation of the subconscious impressions, etc. These conditions are all absent in the supposed case of the illusion involved in the ego-intuition.

The Śāṅkarites described *māyā* as indefinable. By "indefinable" they mean something that appears in perception but is ultimately contradicted. The Śāṅkarites define falsehood or non-existence as that which is liable to contradiction. The phenomena of *māyā* appear in experience and are therefore regarded as existent. They are liable to contradiction and are therefore regarded as non-existent. It is this unity of existence and non-existence in *māyā* that constitutes its indefinability. To this Anantarāma's objection is that contradiction does not imply non-existence. As a particular object, say a jug, may be destroyed by the stroke of a club, so one knowledge can destroy another. The destruction of the jug by the stroke of the club does not involve the supposition that the jug was non-existent. So the contradiction of the prior knowledge by a later one does not involve the non-existence or falsity of the former. All cognitions are true in themselves, though some of them may destroy another. This is what the Nimbārkaists mean by the *sat-khyāti* of knowledge. The theory of *sat-khyāti* with them means that all knowledge (*khyāti*) is produced by some existent objects, which are to be regarded as its cause (*sad-dhetukā khyāti*, *sat-khyāti*). According to such a view, therefore, the illusory knowledge must have its basic cause in some existent object. It is wrong also to suppose that false or non-existent objects can produce effects on the analogy that the illusory cobra may produce fear and even death. For here it is not the illusory cobra that produces fear but the memory of a true snake. It is wrong therefore to suppose that the illusory world-appearance may be the cause of our bondage.

Since illusions are not possible, it is idle to suppose that all our

¹ *adhyaśo nā'nādih, pūrva-pramā-hita-saṃskāra-janyatīāt. Vedānta-tattva-bodha*, p. 14.

perceptual, inferential, and other kinds of cognitions are produced as associated with an ego through sheer illusion. Right knowledge is to be regarded as a characteristic quality of the self and the production of knowledge does not need the intervention of a *vṛtti*. The *ajñāna* which prevents the flashing in of knowledge is our *karma* which is in accumulation from beginningless time. Through the operation of the sense-organs our selves expand outside us and are filled with the cognition of the sense-objects. It is for this reason that when the sense-organs are not in operation the sense-objects do not appear in cognition, as in the state of sleep. The self is thus a real knower (*jñātā*) and a real agent (*kartā*), and its experiences as a knower and as an agent should on no account be regarded as the result of a process of illusion¹.

The self is of the nature of pure consciousness, but it should yet be regarded as the real knower. The objection that what is knowledge cannot behave in a different aspect as a knower, just as water cannot be mixed with water and yet remain distinct from it, is regarded by the Nimbārkists as invalid. As an illustration vindicating the Nimbārka position, Puruṣottama, in his *Vedānta-ratna-mañjuṣā*, refers to the case of the sun which is both light and that from which light emanates. Even when a drop of water is mixed with another drop the distinction of the drops, both quantitative and qualitative, remains, though it may not be so apprehended. The mere non-apprehension of difference is no proof that the two drops have merged into identity. On the other hand, since the second drop has its parts distinct from the first one it must be regarded as having a separate existence, even when the two drops are mixed. The character as knower must be attributed to the self; for the other scheme proposed by the Śāṅkarites, that the character as knower is due to the reflection of the pure consciousness in the *vṛtti*, is inefficacious. The sun that is reflected in water as an image cannot be regarded as a glowing orb by itself. Moreover, reflection can only take place between two visible objects; neither pure consciousness nor the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* can be regarded as visible objects justifying the assumption of reflection.

The ego-intuition refers directly to the self and there is no illusion about it. The ego-intuition thus appears to be a continuous revelation of the nature of the self. After deep dreamless sleep one

¹ *Vedānta-tattva-bodha*, p. 20. •

says "I slept so well that I did not know even myself." But this should not be interpreted as the absence of the ego-intuition or the revelation of the self. The experience "I did not know myself" refers to the absence of the intuition of the body and the mental psychosis, but it does not indicate that the self-conscious self had ever ceased to shine by itself. The negation involved in the denial of the perception of one's self during dreamless sleep refers to the negation of certain associations (say, of the body, etc.) with which the ego ordinarily links itself. Similar experience of negation can also be illustrated in such expressions as "I was not so long in the room," "I did not live at that time," etc., where negations refer to the associations of the ego and not to the ego. The self is not only to be regarded as expressed in the ego-intuition, but it is also to be regarded as distinct from the knowledge it has. The perception of the self continues not only in the state of dreamless sleep but also in the state of emancipation, and even God in His absolute freedom is conscious of Himself in His super-ego intuition. He is also all-Merciful, the supreme Instructor, and the presiding deity of all our understanding. Like individual selves God is also the agent, the creator of the universe. If the Brahman were not an agent by nature, then He could not have been the creator of the universe, even with the association of the *māyā* conditions. Unlike Brahman the activity of the individual souls has to depend upon the operation of the conative organs for its manifestation. The self also really experiences the feelings of pleasure and pain. The existence and agency of the human souls, however, ultimately depend on the will of God. Yet there is no reason to suppose that God is partial or cruel because He makes some suffer and others enjoy; for He is like the grand master and Lord who directs different men differently and awards suffering and enjoyment according to their individual deserts. The whole idea is that though God awards suffering and enjoyment to individuals and directs their actions according to their deserts, He is not ultimately bound by the law of *karma*, and may by His grace at any time free them from their bondage. The law of *karma* is a mechanical law and God as the superintendent decides each individual case. He is thus the dispenser of the laws of *karma* but is not bound by it¹. The human souls are a part of the

¹ *na vayam brahma-niyantṛtvasya karma-sāpekṣattvaṃ brūmaḥ, kintu punyā-di-karma-kārayitṛtve tat-phala-dāyitṛtve ca. Vedānta-ratna-maṇjuṣā*, p. 14.

nature of God and as such are dependent on Him for their essence, existence, and activities (*tad-āyatta-svarūpa-sthiti-pūrvikāḥ*). God being the ultimate truth, both the human souls and inanimate nature attain their essence and existence by virtue of the fact that they are parts of Him and participate in His nature. They are therefore entirely dependent on Him for their existence and all their operations.

The individual souls are infinite in number and atomic in size. But though atomic in size they can at the same time cognize the various sensations in various parts of the body through all-pervading knowledge which exists in them as their attribute. Though atomic and partless in their nature, they are completely pervaded by God through His all-pervading nature. The atomic souls are associated with the beginningless girdle of *karma* which is the cause of the body, and are yet through the grace of God finally emancipated when their doubts are dissolved by listening to the instructions of the *śāstras* from the teachers, and by entering into a deep meditation regarding the true essence of God by which they are ultimately merged in Him. God is absolutely free in extending His mercy and grace. But it so happens that He actually extends them to those who deserve them by their good deeds and devotion. God in His transcendence is beyond His three natures as souls, the world and even as God. In this His pure and transcendent nature He is absolutely unaffected by any changes, and He is the unity of pure being, bliss and consciousness. In His nature as God He realizes His own infinite joy through the infinite souls which are but constituent parts of Him. The experiences of individuals are therefore contained in Him as constituents of Him because it is by His own *īkṣaṇa* or self-perceiving activity that the experiences of the individual selves can be accounted for. The existence and the process of all human experience are therefore contained and controlled by Him. The individual selves are thus in one sense different from Him and in another sense but constituent parts of Him. In Bhāskara's philosophy the emphasis was on the aspect of unity, since the differences were due to conditions (*upādhi*). But though Nimbārka's system is to be counted as a type of *Bhedā-bheda* or *Dvaitā-dvaita* theory, the emphasis here is not merely on the part of the unity but on the difference as well. As a part cannot be different from the whole, so the individual souls can never be dif-

ferent from God. But, in the state of bondage the individuals are apt to forget their aspects of unity with God and feel themselves independent in all their actions and experiences. When by absolute self-abnegation springing from love the individual feels himself to be absolutely controlled and regulated by God and realizes himself to be a constituent of Him, he loses all his interests in his actions and is not affected by them. The ultimate ideal, therefore, is to realize the relation with God, to abnegate all actions, desires and motives, and to feel oneself as a constituent of Him. Such a being never again comes within the grasp of mundane bondage and lives in eternal bliss in his devotional contemplation of God. The devotee in the state of his emancipation feels himself to be one with God and abides in Him as a part of His energy (*tat-tādātmyā-nubhava-pūrvakam viśvarūpe bhagavati tac-chaktyā-tmanā avasthānam*)¹. Thus, even in the state of emancipation, there is a difference between the emancipated beings and God, though in this state they are filled with the utmost bliss. With the true realization of the nature of God and one's relation with Him, all the three kinds of *karma* (*sañcita*, *kriyamāṇa* and *ārabdha*) are destroyed². *Avidyā* in this system means ignorance of one's true nature and relationship with God which is the cause of his *karma* and his association with the body, senses and the subtle matter³. The *prārabdha karma*, or the *karma* which is in a state of fructification, may persist through the present life or through other lives if necessary, for until their fruits are reaped the bodiless emancipation cannot be attained⁴. Sainthood consists in the devotional state consisting of a continual and unflinching meditation on the nature of God (*dhyāna-paripākena dhruva-smṛti-para-bhakty-ākhyā-jñānā-dhigame*). Such a saint becomes free from the tainting influence of all deeds committed and collected before and all good or bad actions that may be performed later on (*tatra uttara-bhāvināḥ kriyamāṇasya pāpasya āśleṣaḥ tat-prāg-bhūtasya sañcitasya tasya nāśaḥ. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā*, IV. 1. 13). The regular caste duties and the duties of the various stages of life help the rise of wisdom and ought therefore always to be performed, even when the wisdom has arisen; for the flame of

¹ *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 591.

² *Ibid.* p. 598.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *viduṣo vidyā-māhātmyāt sañcita-kriyamāṇayor āśleṣa-vināśau, prārabdhasya tu karmaṇo bhogena vināśaḥ, tatra prārabdhasya etac charireṇa itara-śarīrair vā bhuktvā vināśān-mokṣa iti saṅkṣepaḥ. Ibid.* p. 583.

this light has always to be kept burning (*tasmāt vidyo-dayāya svāśrama-karmā-gnihotrā-dī-rūpaṃ grhasthena, tapo-japā-dīni karmāṇi ūrdhva-retobhir anuṣṭheyāni iti siddham*). But the conglomeration of deeds which has started fructifying must fructify and the results of such deeds have to be reaped by the saint either in one life or in many lives as the case may be. The realization of Brahman consists in the unflinching meditation on the nature of God and the participation in Him as His constituent which is the same thing as the establishment of a continuous devotional relationship with Him. This is independent of the ontological fusion and return in Him which may happen as a result of the complete destruction of the fructifying deeds (*prārabdha karma*) through their experiences in the life of the saint (*vidyā-yoni-śarīra*) or in other lives that may follow. A saint, after the exhaustion of his fructifying deeds, leaves his gross body through the *suṣumnā* nerve in his subtle body, and going beyond the material regions (*prākṛta-maṇḍala*) reaches the border region—the river *virajā*—between the material regions and the universe of *Viṣṇu*¹. Here he leaves aside his subtle body in the supreme being and enters into the transcendent essence of God (*Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā*, iv. 2. 15). The emancipated beings thus exist in God as His distinct energies and may again be employed by Him for His own purposes. Such emancipated beings, however, are never sent down by God for carrying on an earthly existence. Though the emancipated beings become one with God, they have no control over the affairs of the world, which are managed entirely by God Himself².

Though it is through the will of God that we enjoy the dream experiences and though He remains the controller and abides in us through all stages of our experiences, yet He is never tainted by the imperfections of our experiential existence (*Vedānta-kaustubha* and its commentary *Prabha*, iii. 2. 11). The objects of our experiences are not in themselves pleasurable or painful, but God makes them so to us in accordance with the reward and punishment due to us according to our good or bad deeds. In themselves the objects are

¹ *para-loka-gamane dehād utsarṣaṇa-samaye eva viduṣaḥ puṇya-pāpe nira-vaśeṣaṃ kṣtyate, . . . vidyā hi sva-sāmarthyād eva sva-phala-bhūta-brahma-prāpti-pratipādanāya . . . enaṃ deva-yānena pathā gamayitum sūkṣma-śarīraṃ sthāpayati. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā*, iii. 3. 27.

² *muktasya tu para-brahma-sādharmye'pi nikhila-cetanā-cetana-patitva-tan-nīyantriva-tad-vidhāra-katva-sarva-gatatvā-dy-asambhavāt jagad-vyāpāra-varjam aiśvaryaṃ. Ibid.* iv. 4. 20.

but indifferent entities and are neither pleasurable nor painful (*Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā*, III. 2. 12). The relation of God and the world is like that of a snake and its coiled existence. The coiled (*kuṇḍala*) condition of a snake is neither different from it nor absolutely identical with it. So God's relation with the individuals also is like that of a lamp and its light (*prabhā-tadvator iva*) or like the sun and the illumination (*prakāśa*). God remains unchanged in Himself and only undergoes transformation through His energies as conscious (*cic-chakti*) and unconscious (*acic-chakti*)¹. As the individuals cannot have any existence apart from Brahman, so the material world also cannot have any existence apart from him. It is in this sense that the material world is a part or constituent of God and is regarded as being one with God. But as the nature of the material world is different from the nature of God, it is regarded as different from Him².

The Vedic duties of caste and stages of life are to be performed for the production of the desire of wisdom (*vividiṣā*), but once the true wisdom is produced there is no further need of the performance of the duties (*Ibid.* III. 4. 9). The wise man is never affected by the deeds that he performs. But though ordinarily the performance of the duties is helpful to the attainment of wisdom, this is not indispensable, and there are many who achieve wisdom without going through the customary path of caste duties and the duties attached to stages of life.

Controversy with the Monists by Mādhava Mukunda.

(a) *The Main Thesis and the Ultimate End in Advaita Vedānta are Untenable.*

Mādhava Mukunda, supposed to be a native of the village of Aruṇaghaṭī, Bengal, wrote a work called *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra* or *Hārda-saṅcaya*, in which he tried to show from various points of

¹ *ananta-guṇa-śaktimato brahmaṇaḥ pariṇāmi-svabhāva-cic-chakteḥ sthūlā-vasthāyām satyām tad-antarā-tmatvena tatrā'vasthāne'pi pariṇāmasya śakti-gatatvāt svarūpe pariṇāmā-bhāvāt kuṇḍala-dṛṣṭānto na doṣa-vahaḥ aprthak-siddhatvena abhede'pi bheda-jñāpanā-rthaḥ. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā*, III. 2. 29.

² *jīvaḥ prthak-sthity-anarha-viśeṣaṇatvena acid-vastuno brahmā-mśatvam viśiṣṭa-vastu-eka-deśatvena abheda-vyavahāro mukhyaḥ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyayoḥ svārūpa-svabhāva-bhedena ca bheda-vyavahāro mukhyaḥ. Ibid.* III. 2. 30.

view the futility of the monistic interpretation of Vedānta by Śaṅkara and his followers.

He says that the Śaṅkarites are interested in demonstrating the identity of the individuals with Brahman (*jīva-brahmai-kya*) and this forms the principal subject-matter of all their discussions. This identity may be illusory or not. In the former case duality or plurality would be real, and in the latter case, i.e. if identity be real, then the duality presupposed in the identification must also be real¹. It is not the case of the single point of an identity that Śaṅkarites are interested in, but in the demonstration of an identification of the individuals with Brahman. The demonstration of identity necessarily implies the reality of the negation of the duality. If such a negation is false, the identification must also be false, for it is on the reality of the negation that the reality of the identification depends. If the negation of duality be real, then the duality must also be real in some sense and the identification can imply the reality of the negation only in some particular aspect.

The objections levelled by the Śaṅkarites against the admission of "duality" or "difference" as a category are, firstly, that the category of difference (*bheda*) being by nature a relation involves two poles and hence it cannot be identical in nature with its locus in which it is supposed to subsist (*bhedasya na adhikaraṇa-svarūpatvam*). Secondly, that if "difference" is different in nature from its locus, then a second grade of "difference" has to be introduced and this would imply another grade of difference and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus we have a vicious infinite. To the first objection, the reply is that "difference" is not relational in nature with this or that individual locus, but with the concept of the locus as such (*bhūtalatvā-dinā nirapekṣatve'pi adhikaraṇātmakatvena sāpekṣatve kṣater abhāvāt*)². The charge of vicious infinite by the introduction of differences of differences is invalid, for all differences are identical in nature with their locus. So in the case of a series of differences the nature of each difference becomes well defined and the viciousness of the infinite series vanishes. In the instance "there is a jug on the ground" the nature of the difference of the jug is jugness, whereas in the case of the difference of the difference, the second order of

¹ *dvītiye aikya-pratīyogika-bhedasya pāramārthikatva-prasaṅgāt. Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.* p. 14.

difference has a separate specification as a special order of differenceness. Moreover, since difference reveals only the particular modes of the objects, these difficulties cannot arise. In perceiving difference we do not perceive difference as an entity different from the two objects between which it is supposed to subsist¹. One might equally well find such a fault of mutual dependence on the identification of Brahman with *jīva*, since it depends upon the identification of the *jīva* with the Brahman.

A further discussion of the subject shows that there cannot be any objections against "differences" on the score of their being produced, for they merely subsist and are not produced; or on the possibility of their being known, for if differences were never perceived the Śāṅkarites would not have been so anxious to remove the so-called illusions or mis-perception of differences, or to mis-spend their energies in trying to demonstrate that Brahman was different from all that was false, material and the like; and the saint also would not be able to distinguish between what was eternal and transitory. Again, it is held that there is a knowledge which contradicts the notion of difference. But if this knowledge itself involves difference it cannot contradict it. Whatever may signify anything must do so by restricting its signification to it, and all such restriction involves difference. Even the comprehension that demonstrates the illusoriness of "difference" (e.g. this is not difference, or there is no difference here, etc.) proves the existence of "difference." Moreover, a question may be raised as to whether the notion that contradicts difference is itself comprehended as different from difference or not. In the former case the validity of the notion leaves "difference" unmolested and in the second case, i.e. if it is not comprehended as different from "difference," it becomes identical with it and cannot contradict it.

If it is contended that in the above procedure an attempt has been made to establish the category of difference only in indirect manner and that nothing has been directly said in explanation of the concept of difference, the reply is that those who have sought to explain the concept of unity have fared no better. If it is urged that if ultimately the absolute unity or identity is not accepted then

¹ *nā'py anyonyā-śrayaḥ bheda-pratyakṣe pratiyogitā-vacchedaka-stambhatvā-di-prakāraka-jñānasyai'va hetutvāt na tāvad bheda-pratyakṣe bheda-śrayād bhinnatvena pratiyogi-jñānaṃ hetuḥ. Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra, pp. 14, 15.*

that would lead us to nihilism, then it may also be urged with the same force that, differences being but modes of the objects themselves, a denial of difference would mean the denial of the objects, and this would also land us in nihilism. It must, however, be noted that though difference is but a mode of the objects which differ, yet the terms of reference by which difference becomes intelligible (the table is different from the chair: here the difference of the table is but its mode, though it becomes intelligible by its difference from the chair) are by no means constituents of the objects in which the difference exists as their mode. The Śāṅkarites believe in the refutation of dualism, as by such a refutation the unity is established. The thesis of unity is thus though, on the one hand dependent upon such refutation and yet on the other hand identical with it because all such refutations are believed to be imaginary. In the same manner it may be urged that the demonstration of difference involves with it a reference to other terms, but is yet identical in nature with the object of which it is a mode; the reference to the terms is necessary only for purposes of comprehension.

It must, however, be noted that since difference is but a mode of the object the comprehension of the latter necessarily means the comprehension of all differences existing in it. An object may be known in a particular manner, yet it may remain unknown in its differential aspects, just as the monists hold that pure consciousness is always flashing forth but yet its aspect as the unity of all things may remain unknown. In comprehending a difference between any two objects, no logical priority which could have led to a vicious circle is demanded. But the two are together taken in consciousness and the apprehension of the one is felt as its distinction from the other. The same sort of distinction has to be adduced by the monists also in explaining the comprehension of the identity of the individual souls with the Brahman, otherwise in their case too there would have been the charge of a vicious circle. For when one says "these two are not different," their duality and difference depend upon a comprehension of their difference which, while present, prevents their identity from being established. If it is held that the duality is imaginary whereas the identity is real, then the two being of a different order of existence the contradiction of the one cannot lead to the affirmation of the other. The apology that in comprehending identity no two-term reference is needed is futile, for an

identity is comprehended only as the negation of the two-term duality.

Thus, from the above considerations, the main thesis of the Śāṅkarites, that all things are identical with Brahman, falls to the ground.

According to Nimbārka the ideal of emancipation is participation in God's nature (*tad-bhāvā-patti*). This is the ultimate end and *summum bonum* of life (*prayojana*). According to the Śāṅkarites emancipation consists in the ultimate oneness or identity existing between individual souls and Brahman. The Brahman in reality is one with the individual souls, and the apparent difference noticed in our ordinary practical life is due to misconception and ignorance, which impose upon us a false notion of duality. Mādhava Mukunda urges that in such a view, since the individual souls are already one with Brahman, they have nothing to strive for. There is thus really no actual end (*proyojana*) as the goal of our strivings. Mādhava Mukunda, in attempting to emphasize the futility of the Śāṅkarite position, says that, if the ultimate consciousness be regarded as one, then it would be speckled with the various experiences of individuals. It cannot be held to be appearing as different in accordance with the variety of conditions through which it appears, for in our experiences we find that though through our various cognitive organs we have various experiences they are also emphasized as belonging to one being. Variability of conditions does not necessarily imply a variety of the units of experience of individual beings, as is maintained by the Śāṅkarites. The pure and ubiquitous differenceless consciousness (*nirviśeṣa-caitanya*) cannot also be regarded as capable of being identified as one with the plurality of minds (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Again, it is admitted by the Śāṅkarites that in dreamless sleep the mind is dissolved. If that were so and if pure consciousness is regarded as being capable of manifesting itself through false identification with minds, there would be no explanation of the continuity of consciousness from day to day in the form of memory. It cannot be urged that such a continuity is maintained by the fact that minds exist in a state of potency (*saṃskārā-tmanā' vasthīṭasya*) in the deep dreamless sleep; for the mind in a potent state cannot be regarded as carrying impressions and memories, since in that case there would be memories even in dreamless sleep.

Further, if the experiences are supposed to belong to the states of ignorance, then emancipation, which refers only to pure consciousness, would refer to an entity different from that which was suffering from bondage. On the other hand, if the experiences belong to pure consciousness, then emancipation will be associated with diverse contradictory experiences at the same time according to the diversity of experiences.

The Śāṅkarites may urge that the conditions which bring about the experiences are associated with pure consciousness and hence in an indirect manner there is a continuity of the being that experiences and attains salvation. To this the reply is that the experiencing of sorrow is a sufficient description of the conditions. That being so, where the experiencing of sorrow does not exist, the conditions, of which it is a sufficient description, also do not exist. Thus, the discontinuity of the entities which suffer bondage and attain emancipation remains the same.

Again, since it is held that the conditions subsist in the pure consciousness, it may well be asked whether emancipation means the dissolution of one condition or many conditions. In the former case we should have emancipation always, for one or other of the conditions is being dissolved every moment, and in the latter case we might not have any emancipation at all, for all the conditions determining the experiences of infinite individuals can never be dissolved.

It may also be asked whether the conditions are associated with the pure consciousness in part or in whole. In the first alternative there would be a vicious infinite and in the second the differentiation of the pure consciousness in various units would be inadmissible.

Moreover, it may be asked whether conditions are associated with pure consciousness conditionally or unconditionally. In the former alternative there would be a vicious infinite and in the second case there would be no chance of emancipation. The theory of reflection cannot also explain the situation, for reflection is admitted only when the reflected image has the same order of existence as the object. The *avidyā* has a different order of existence from Brahman, and thus reflection of Brahman in *avidyā* cannot be justified. Again, in reflection that which is reflected and that in which the reflection takes place must be in two different places,

whereas in the case of *avidyā* and Brahman the former is supposed to have Brahman as its support. The conditions (*upādhi*) cannot occupy a part of Brahman, for Brahman has no parts; nor can they occupy the whole of it, for in that case there will be no reflection.

In the Nimbārka system both the monistic and the dualistic texts have their full scope, the dualistic texts in demonstrating the difference that exists between souls and God, and the monistic texts showing the final goal in which the individuals realize themselves as constituents of Him and as such one with Him. But in the Śāṅkara system, where no duality is admitted, everything is self-realized, there is nothing to be attained and even the process of instruction of the disciple by the preceptor is unavailable, as they are all but adumbrations of ignorance.

(b) *Refutation of the Śāṅkara Theory of
Illusion in its various Aspects.*

The Śāṅkarite doctrine of illusion involves a supposition that the basis of illusion (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is imperfectly or partly known. The illusion consists in the imposition of certain appearances upon the unknown part. The stump of a tree is perceived in part as an elongated thing but not in the other part as the stump of a tree, and it is in reference to this part that the mis-attribution of an illusory appearance, e.g. a man, is possible by virtue of which the elongated part is perceived as man. But Brahman is partless and no division of its part is conceivable. It must therefore be wholly known or wholly unknown, and hence there can be no illusion regarding it. Again, illusion implies that an illusory appearance has to be imposed upon an object. But the *avidyā*, which is beginningless, cannot itself be supposed to be an illusory appearance. Following the analogy of beginninglessness Brahman may be regarded as illusory. The reply that Brahman being the basis cannot be illusory is meaningless; for though the basis is regarded as the ground of the imposition, there is no necessary implication that the basis must also be true. The objection that the basis has an independent reality because it is the basis associated with ignorance which can become the datum of illusion is futile; because the basis may also be an unreal one in a serial process where at each stage it is associated with ignorance. In such a view it is not the pure Brahman which becomes the basis but the illusory Brahman which is associated with

ignorance. Moreover, if the *avidyā* and its modifications were absolutely non-existent they could not be the subject of imposition. What really exists somewhere may be imposed elsewhere, but not that which does not exist at all. The pure chimericals like the hare's horn can never be the subjects of imposition, for that which is absolutely non-existent cannot appear at all.

Again, illusions are supposed to happen through the operation of impressions (*saṃskāra*), but in the beginningless cosmic illusion the impressions must also be beginningless and co-existent with the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and therefore real. The impressions must exist prior to the illusion and as such they cannot themselves be illusory, and if they are not illusory they must be real. Again, the impressions cannot belong to Brahman, for then it could not be qualityless and pure; they cannot belong to individual souls, for these are produced as a result of illusory impositions which are again the products of the operation of impressions. Further, similarity plays an important part in all illusions, but Brahman as the ground or basis which is absolutely pure and qualityless has no similarity with anything. There cannot also be any imaginary similarity imposed upon the qualityless Brahman, for such an imaginary imposition presupposes a prior illusion. Again, all illusions are seen to have a beginning, whereas entities that are not illusory, such as the individual souls, are found to be beginningless. It is also erroneous to hold that the ego-substratum behaves as the basis of the illusion, for it is itself a product of the illusion.

Furthermore, the supposition that the world-appearance is a cosmic illusion which is related to pure consciousness in an illusory relation (*ādhyāsika-sambandha*) is unwarrantable. But the Śāṅkarites admit that the relation between the external world and the knower is brought about by the operation of the mind in modification, called *vṛtti*. Moreover, if the pure consciousness be admitted to be right knowledge or *pramā*, then its object or that which shines with it must also be right knowledge and as such it cannot be the basis of false knowledge. If the pure consciousness be false knowledge, it cannot obviously be the basis of false knowledge. The mere fact that some of the known relations, such as contact, inseparable inherence, do not hold between the object of knowledge and knowledge does not prove that their relation must be an illusory one, for other kinds of relations may subsist between them. Knowledge-and-

the-known may itself be regarded as a unique kind of relation. It is also wrong to suppose that all relations are false because they are constituents of the false universe, for the universe is supposed to be false because the relations are false, and hence there would be a vicious infinite. Again, the objection that, if relations are admitted to establish connection between two relata, then further relations may be necessary to relate the relation to relata and that this would lead to a vicious infinite, and also that, if relations are identical in essence with the relata, then relations become useless, is futile. The same objections would be admissible in the case of illusory relations. If it is held that, since all relations are illusory, the above strictures do not apply, then it may be pointed out that if the order of the relations be subversed, then, instead of conceiving the jug to be a product of *māyā*, *māyā* may be taken as a product of the jug. Thus, not only the Śaṅkarites but even the Buddhists have to admit the orderly character of relations. In the Nimbārka view all relations are regarded as true, being the different modes of the manifestation of the energy of God. Even if the relations be denied, then the nature of Brahman cannot be described as this or that.

(c) *Refutation of the Śaṅkarite View of Ajñāna.*

Ajñāna is defined as a beginningless positive entity which is destructible by knowledge (*anādi-bhāvatve sati jñāna-nivartyatvam*). The definition is unavailing as it does not apply to ignorance that hides an ordinary object before it is perceived. Nor does *ajñāna* apply to the ignorance regarding the negation of an object, since it is of a positive nature. Again, in the case of the ignorance that abides in the saint who has attained the knowledge of Brahman, the *ajñāna* is seen to persist even though knowledge has been attained; hence the definition of *ajñāna* as that which is destructible by knowledge fails. In the case of the perception of red colour in the crystal through reflection, the ignorant perception of the white crystal as red persists even though it is known to be false and due to reflection. Here also the ignorance is not removed by knowledge. It is also wrong to suppose that *ajñāna*, which is but the product of defect, should be regarded as beginningless. Moreover, it may be pointed out that all things (excluding negation) that are beginningless are also eternal like the souls and it is a curious assumption that

there should be an entity called *ajñāna* which is beginningless and yet destructible. Again, *ajñāna* is often described as being different both from being and non-being, but has yet been defined as a positive entity. It is also difficult to imagine how, since negative entities are regarded as products of *ajñāna*, *ajñāna* may itself be regarded as a positive entity. Moreover, the error or illusion that takes place through absence of knowledge has to be admitted as a negative entity; but being an illusion it has to be regarded as a product of *ajñāna*.

There is no proof of the existence of *ajñāna* in the so-called perception "I am ignorant." It cannot be the pure Brahman, for then that would have to be styled impure. It cannot be a positive knowledge by itself, for that is the very point which has to be proved. Further, if in establishing *ajñāna* (ignorance) one has to fall back upon *jñāna* or knowledge, and if in establishing the latter one has to fall back upon the former, then that would involve a vicious circle. It cannot be the ego-substratum (*aham-artha*), for that is itself a product of *ajñāna* and cannot be in existence as the datum of the perception of *ajñāna*. The ego itself cannot be perceived as ignorant, for it is itself a product of ignorance. The ego is never regarded as synonymous with ignorance, and thus there is no means of proving the supposition that ignorance is perceived as a positive entity either as a quality or as a substance. Ignorance is thus nothing but "absence of knowledge" (*jñānā-bhāva*) and ought to be recognized by the Śāṅkarites, since they have to admit the validity of the experience "I do not know what you say" which is evidently nothing but a reference to the absence of knowledge which is admitted by the Śāṅkarites in other cases. There is no proof that the cases in point are in any way different from such cases of absence of knowledge. Again, if the *ajñāna* is regarded as hiding an object, then in the case of mediate knowledge (*parokṣa-vṛtti*)—where according to the Śāṅkarites the *vṛtti* or the mental state does not remove the veil of *ajñāna*) one ought to feel that one is ignorant of the object of one's mediate knowledge, for the veil of *ajñāna* remains here intact¹. Moreover, all cases of the supposed perception of ignorance can be explained as the comprehension of the absence of knowledge. In the above manner Mukunda criti-

¹ *parokṣa-vṛtter viśayā-varakā-jñāna-nivartakatvena parokṣato jñāte'pi na jñānā'mīty anubhavā-pātāt ca. Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 76.

cizes the theories of *ajñāna* and of the illusion in their various aspects. But as the method of the dialectic followed in these logical refutations is substantially the same as that attempted by Veṅkaṭa-nātha and Vyāsātīrtha which have been examined in detail it is not necessary to give a detailed study of Mukunda's treatment.

The Pramāṇas according to Mādhava Mukunda.

The followers of Nimbārka admit only three (perception, inference and testimony) out of the following eight *pramāṇas*, viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), similarity (*upamāna*), scriptural testimony (*śabda*), implication (*arthāpatti*), non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), inclusion of the lower within the higher as of ten within a hundred (*sambhava*), and tradition (*aitihya*). Perception is of two kinds, external and internal. The external perception is of five kinds according to the five cognitive senses. The mental perception called also the internal perception is of two kinds, ordinary (*laukika*) and transcendent (*alaukika*). The perception of pleasure and pain is a case of ordinary internal perception, whereas the perception of the nature of self, God and their qualities is a case of transcendent internal perception. This transcendent internal perception is again of two kinds, that which flashes forth through the meditation of an entity and that which comes out of meditation on the essence of a scriptural text. The scriptural reference that the ultimate truth cannot be perceived by the mind means either that the ultimate truth in its entirety cannot be perceived by the mind or that unless the mind is duly trained by a teacher or by the formation of right tendencies it cannot have a glimpse of the transcendent realities. Knowledge is a beginningless, eternal and all-pervasive characteristic of individual selves. But in our state of bondage this knowledge is like the rays of a lamp in a closed place, in a state of contraction. Just as the rays of a lamp enclosed within a jug may go out through the hole into the room and straight through the door of the room and flood with light some object outside, so the knowledge in each individual may by the modification of the mind reach the senses and again through their modification reach the object and, having flood-lit it, may illuminate both the object and the knowledge. The *ajñāna* (ignorance) that ceases with the knowledge of an object is the partial cessation of a state of contraction

leading to the flashing of knowledge. What is meant by the phrase “knowledge has an object” is that knowledge takes a particular form and illuminates it. The objects remain as they are, but they are manifested through their association with knowledge and remain unmanifested without it. In the case of internal perception the operation of the senses is not required, and so pleasure and pain are directly perceived by the mind. In self-consciousness or the perception of the self, the self being itself self-luminous, the mental directions to the self remove the state of contraction and reveal the nature of the self. So God can be realized through His grace and the removal of obstruction through the meditative condition of the mind¹.

In inference the knowledge of the existence of the *hetu* (reason) in the minor (*pakṣa*) having a concomitance (*vyāpti*) with the probandum (*sādhya*), otherwise called *parāmārśa* (*vahni-vyāpya-dhūmavān ayam evaṃ-rūpaḥ*), is regarded as the inferential process (*anumāna*) and from it comes the inference (e.g. “the hill is fiery”). Two kinds of inference, i.e. for the conviction of one’s own self (*svārthānumāna*) and for convincing others (*parārthānumāna*), are admitted here; and in the latter case only three propositions (the thesis, *pratijñā*, the reason, *hetu*, and the instance, *udāharaṇa*) are regarded as necessary. Three kinds of inference are admitted, namely *kevalā-nvayi* (argument from only positive instances, where negative instances are not available), *kevala-vyatireki* (argument from purely negative instances, where positive instances are not available), and *anvaya-vyatireki* (argument from both sets of positive and negative instances). In addition to the well-known concomitance (*vyāpti*) arising from the above three ways, scriptural assertions are also regarded as cases of concomitance. Thus there is a scriptural passage to the following effect: The self is indestructible and it is never-divested of its essential qualities (*avināśi vā are ātma an-ucchitti-dharmā*), and this is regarded as a *vyāpti* or concomitance, from which one may infer the indestructibility of the soul like the Brahman.² There are no other specially interesting features in the Nimbārka doctrine of inference.

Knowledge of similarity is regarded as being due to a separate *pramāṇa* called *upamāna*. Such a comprehension of similarity (*sādrśya*) may be due to perception or through a scriptural assertion

¹ *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, pp. 203–206.

² *Ibid.* p. 210.

of similarity. 'Thus a man may perceive the similarity of the face to the moon or he may learn from the scriptures that the self and God are similar in nature and thus comprehend such similarity. This may be included within the proposition of instance or illustration in an inference (*upamānasya dr̥ṣṭānta-mātrā-ika-vigraha-tvenā'numānā-vayave udāharāṇe antarbhāvaḥ*. *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 254).

That from which there is a communication of the negation or non-existence of anything is regarded as the *pramāṇa* or *anupalabdhi*. It is of four kinds: firstly, the negation that precedes a production, called *prāg-abhāva*; secondly, the negation of one entity in another, i.e. the negation as "otherness," called *anyonyā-bhāva*; thirdly, the negation as the destruction of an entity, called *dhvaṃ-sā-bhāva*; fourthly, the negation of an entity in all times (*kālatraye'pi nastī'ti pratīti-viśayaḥ atyantū-bhāvaḥ*). But it is unnecessary to admit *abhāva* or *anupalabdhi* as a separate *pramāṇa*, for according to the Nimbārka's negation is not admitted as a separate category. The perception of negation is nothing but the perception of the locus of the object of negation as unassociated with it. The negation-precedent (*prāg-abhāva*) of a jug is nothing but the lump of clay; the negation of destruction of a jug is nothing but the broken fragments of a jug; the negation of otherness (*anyonyā-bhāva*) is the entity that is perceived as the other of another, and the negation existent in all times is nothing but the locus of a negation. Thus the *pramāṇa* of negation may best be included with perception. The *pramāṇa* of implication may well be taken as a species of inference. The *pramāṇa* of *sambhava* may well be regarded as a deductive piece of reasoning.

The Nimbārka's admit the self-validity of the *pramāṇas* (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) in the manner of the Śāṅkarites. Self-validity (*svataṣṭva*) is defined as the fact that in the absence of any defect an assemblage forming the data of cognition produces a cognition that represents its nature as it is (*doṣā-bhāvatve yāvat-svā-śraya-bhūta-pramāṅgrāhaka-sāmagrī-mātra-grāhyatvam*)¹. Just as the eye when it perceives a coloured object perceives also the colours and forms associated with it, so it takes with the cognition of an object also the validity of such a cognition.

The nature of God can, however, be expressed only by the

¹ *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 253.

scriptural texts, as the signifying powers of these texts directly originate from God. Indeed, all the powers of individual minds also are derived from God, but they cannot signify Him as they are tainted by the imperfections of the human mind. The Mīmāṃsists are wrong to think that the import of all parts of the Vedas consists in enjoining the performance of the Vedic duties, for the results of all deeds ultimately produce a desire for knowing Brahman and through it produce the fitness for the attainment of emancipation. Thus considered from this point of view the goal of the performance of all duties is the attainment of emancipation¹. There cannot be any scope for the performance of duties for one who has realized the Brahman, for that is the ultimate fruit of all actions and the wise man has nothing else to attain by the performance of actions. Just as though different kinds of seeds may be sown, yet if there is no rain these different kinds of seeds cannot produce the different kinds of trees, so the actions by themselves cannot produce the fruits independently. It is through God's grace that actions can produce their specific fruits. So though the obligatory duties are helpful in purifying the mind and in producing a desire for true knowledge, they cannot by themselves be regarded as the ultimate end, which consists in the production of a desire for true knowledge and the ultimate union with God.

Criticism of the views of Rāmānuja and Bhāskara.

The view of Rāmānuja and his followers is that the souls and the inanimate world are associated with God as His qualities. The function of qualities (*viśeṣana*) is that by their presence they distinguish an object from other similar objects. Thus, when one says "Rāma the son of Daśaratha," the adjective "son of Daśaratha" distinguishes this Rāma from the other two Rāmas, Balarāma and Paraśurāma. But no such purpose is served by styling the individual souls and the inanimate nature as being qualities of Brahman, for they do not distinguish Him from any other similar persons; for the Rāmānujists also do not admit any other category than the conscious souls, the unconscious world and God the controller of them both. Since there is nothing to differentiate, the concept of the souls and matter as quality or differentia also fails. Another

¹ *Para-ṣakṣa-giri-vajra*, pp. 279-280.

function of qualities is that they help the substance to which they belong to become better known. The knowledge of souls and matter as qualities of God does not help us to know or comprehend Him better.

Again, if God be associated with matter and souls, He is found to be associated with their defects also. It may be argued whether the Brahman in which the souls and matter are held to abide is itself unqualified or qualified. In the former alternative the Rāmānujas like the Śāṅkarites have to admit the existence of an unqualified entity and a part in Brahman has to be admitted which exists in itself as an unqualified entity. If the Brahman be in part qualityless and in part associated with qualities, then it would in part be omniscient only in certain parts of itself. Again, if the pure unassociated Brahman be regarded as omniscient, then there would be one Brahman associated with omniscience and other qualities and another Brahman associated with matter and soul, and the doctrine of qualified monism would thus break down. The pure Brahman being outside the souls and matter, these two would be without a controller inside them and would thus be independent of God. Moreover, God in this view would be in certain parts associated with the highest and purest qualities and in other parts with the defiled characters of the material world and the imperfect souls. In the other alternative, i.e. if Brahman as associated with matter and souls be the ultimate substance which is qualified with matter and souls, then there would be two composite entities and not one, and God will as before be associated with two opposite sets of pure and impure qualities. Again, if God be admitted to be a composite unity and if matter and souls which are regarded as mutually distinct and different are admitted to be constituents of Him though He is different in nature from them, it is difficult to imagine how under the circumstances those constituents can be at once one with God and yet different from Him¹.

In the Nimbārka view Śrī Kṛṣṇa is the Lord, the ultimate Brahman and He is the support of the universe consisting of the souls and matter which are derivative parts of Him and are absolutely under His control and thus have a dependent existence only (*para-tantra-sattva*). Entities that have dependent existence are of two kinds, the souls which, though they pass through apparent

¹ *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 342.

birth and death, are yet eternal in their nature and the substance of the corporeal structure that supports them, the matter. The scriptural texts that speak of duality refer to this duality that subsists between the ultimate substance, the Brahman, which alone has the independent existence, and souls and matter which have only a dependent existence. The scriptural texts that deny duality refer to the ultimate entity which has independent existence which forms the common ground and basis of all kinds of existence. The texts that try to refer to Brahman by negations (*ne'ti, ne'ti*) signify how Brahman is different from all other things, or, in other words, how Brahman is different from matter and the souls which are limited by material conditions¹. Brahman is thus the absolute Being, the abode of all good and noble qualities, which is different from all entities having only dependent existence. The monistic texts refer to the fact, as has already been noted, that the world of matter and the infinite number of souls having but dependent existence cannot exist independent of God (*tad-aprthak-siddha*) and are, in that sense, one with Him. They also have the essence of their being in Brahman (*brahmā-tmatva*), are pervaded through and through by it (*tad-vyāpyatva*), are supported in it and held in it and are always being completely controlled and dominated by it². Just as all individual objects, a jug, a stone, etc., may be said to have substantiality (*dravyatva*) permeating through them by virtue of their being substances, so the souls and the matter may be called God by virtue of the fact that God permeates through them as their inner essence. But just as none of these individual objects can be regarded as substance *per se*, so the souls and matter cannot also be identified with God as being one with Him³.

The Bhāskarites are wrong in asserting that the individuals are false inasmuch as they have only a false appearance through the

¹ *vastutas tu ne'ti ne'ti'ti naibhyām prakṛta-sthūla-sūkṣmatvām-di-dharmavat jada-vastu - tad - avacchinna - jīva - vastu - vilakṣaṇam brahme'ti pratipādyate. Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra, p. 347.*

² *tayoś ca brahmā-tmakatva-tan-niyamyatva-tad-vyāpyatva-tad-adhina-sattva-tad-ādheyatva-di-yogena tad-aprthak-siddhatvāt abhedo'pi svābhāvikaḥ. Ibid. p. 355.*

³ *yathā ghaṭo dravyam, prthivī-dravyam ity-ātau dravyatvā-vacchinna saha ghaṭatvā-vacchinna-prthivītvā-vacchinnaayoḥ sāmānādhikarānyam mukhyam eva viśeṣasya sāmānyā-bhinnatva-niyamāt evam prakṛte'pi sārvaññyā-dy-anantā-chintyā-parimita-viśeṣā-vacchinnaenā'paricchinna-śakti-vibhūtikena tat-padārthena para-bhrahmaṇā svā-tmaka-cetana-cetanatvā-vacchinnyayos tad-ātma-rūpayos tvam-ādi-padārthayoḥ sāmānādhikarānyam mukhyam eva. Ibid. pp. 355-356.*

limitations (*upādhi*) imposed upon the pure Brahman. The nature of the imposition of Brahman by the so-called conditions is unintelligible. It may mean that the atomic individual is the result of the imposition of the conditions on Brahman by which the Brahman as a whole appears as the individual soul or by which the Brahman is split asunder, and being thus split appears as the individual self or the Brahman as qualified by the conditions or that the conditions themselves appear as the individuals. The Brahman being homogeneous and unchangeable cannot be split asunder. Even if it can be split asunder, the individual selves being the products of such a splitting would have a beginning in time and would not thus be eternal; and it has to be admitted that on such a view Brahman has to be split up into as many infinite parts as there are selves. If it is held that the parts of Brahman as limited by the conditions appear as individual souls, then Brahman would be subject to all the defects of the conditions which could so modify it as to resolve it into parts for the production of the individual selves. Moreover, owing to the shifting nature of the conditions the nature of the selves would vary and they might have in this way spontaneous bondage and salvation¹. If with the shifting of the conditions Brahman also shifts, then Brahman would not be partless and all-pervasive. If it is held that Brahman in its entirety becomes envisaged by the conditions, then, on the one hand, there will be no transcendent pure Brahman and, on the other, there will be one self in all the different bodies. Again, if the individuals are regarded as entirely different from Brahman, then the assertion that they are but the product of the conditioning of Brahman has to be given up. If it is held that the conditions themselves are the individuals, then it becomes a materialistic view like that of the Cārvākas. Again, it cannot be held that the conditions only cover up the natural qualities of Brahman such as omniscience, etc., for these being natural qualities of Brahman cannot be removed. Further questions may arise as to whether these natural qualities of Brahman are different from Brahman or not, or whether this is a case of difference-in-identity. They cannot be absolutely different, for that would be an admission of duality. They cannot be identical with Brahman, for then they

¹ *kiñ ca upādhau gacchati sati upādhinā svā-vacchinna-brahma-pradeśa-karṣanā-yogāt anukṣaṇam upādhi-samyukta-pradeśa-bhedāt kṣane kṣane bandha-mokṣau syātām. Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra, p. 357.*

could not be regarded as qualities of Brahman. If it be its own essence, then it cannot be covered up, for in that case Brahman would lose all its omniscience. If it is held that it is a case of difference-in-identity, then it comes to an acceptance of the Nimbārka creed.

Again, if it is held that the so-called natural qualities of omniscience, etc., are also due to conditions, it may be asked whether such conditions are different from or identical with Brahman. In the latter alternative they would have no capacity to produce any plurality in Brahman. In the former alternative, it may be asked whether they are moved by themselves into operation or by some other entity or by Brahman. The first view would be open to the criticism of self-dynamism, the second to that of a vicious infinite, and the third to a vicious circle. Moreover, in this view, Brahman being eternal, its dynamism would also be eternal; at no time would the conditions cease to operate, and thus there would be no emancipation. The conditions cannot be regarded as false, unreal or non-existent, for then that would be an acceptance of the Nimbārka creed¹.

It may further be asked whether the conditions are imposed by certain causes or whether they are without any cause. In the former alternative we have a vicious infinite and in the latter even emancipated beings may have further bondage. Again, it may be asked whether the qualities, e.g. omniscience, that belong to Brahman pervade the whole of Brahman or whether they belong only to particular parts of Brahman. In the former view, if there is entire veiling of the qualities of Brahman there cannot be any emancipation and the whole field of consciousness being veiled by ignorance there is absolute blindness or darkness (*jagad-āndhya-prasaṅga*). In the second view the omniscience of Brahman being only a quality or a part of it the importance of Brahman as a whole fails.

Following the Bhāskara line it may be asked whether the emancipated beings have separate existence or not. If the former alternative be admitted, and if after destruction of the conditions the individuals still retain their separate existence then the view that differences are created by the conditions has to be given up (*aupādhika-bheda-vādo datta-jalāñjaliḥ syāt*). If the distinctness of the souls is not preserved in their emancipation, then their very

¹ *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 358.

essence is destroyed, and this would almost be the same as the *māyā* doctrine of the Śāṅkarites, who hold that the essential nature of both God and souls is destructible.

It is wrong to suppose that individuals are but parts of which a structural Brahman is constituted, for in that case, being made up of parts, the Brahman would be itself destructible. When the scriptures speak of the universe and the souls as being but a part of Brahman, the main emphasis is on the fact that Brahman is infinite and the universe is but too small in comparison with it. It is also difficult to imagine how the minds or the *antaḥkaraṇas* can operate as conditions for limiting the nature of the Brahman. How should Brahman allow these so-called conditions to mutilate its nature? It could not have created these conditions for the production of individual souls, for these souls were not in existence before the conditions were in existence. Thus the Bhāskara doctrine that the concept of distinction and unity of Brahman is due to the operation of conditions (*aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda*) is entirely false.

According to the Nimbārka view, therefore, the unity and difference that exist between the individuals and Brahman is natural (*svābhāvika*) and not due to conditions (*aupādhika*) as in the case of Bhāskara. The coiling posture (*kuṇḍala*) of a snake is different from the long snake as it is in itself and is yet identical with it in the sense that the coiling posture is an effect; it is dependent and under the absolute control of the snake as it is and it has no separate existence from the nature of the snake as it is. The coiled state of the snake exists in the elongated state but only in an undifferentiated, unperceivable way; and is nothing but the snake by which it is pervaded through and through and supported in its entirety. So this universe of matter and souls is also in one aspect absolutely identical with God, being supported entirely by Him, pervaded through and through by Him and entirely dependent on Him, and yet in another aspect different from Him in all its visible manifestations and operations¹. The other analogy through which the Nimbārkaists try to explain the situation is that of the sun and its rays which are at once one with it and are also perceived as different from it.

¹ *yathā kuṇḍalā-vasthā-pannasya aheḥ kuṇḍalaṁ vyaktā-pannatvāt pratyakṣa-pramāṇa-gocaraṁ tad-bhedasya svābhāvika-tvāt lambāyamānā-vasthūyām tu sarvā-yatā-vacchinnā-svārūpeṇa kuṇḍalasya tatra sattve'pi vyakta-nāma-rūpatā-patya pratyakṣa-gocaratvaṁ sarvā-tmakatva-tad-ādheyatva-tad-vyāpyatvā-dinā tad-aprthak-siddhatvād abhedasyā'pi svābhāvika-tvam. Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra, p. 361.*

The difference of this view from that of the Rāmānujists is that while the latter consider that the souls and the matter qualify the nature of Brahman and are in that sense one with it, the former repudiate the concept of a permanent modification of the nature of Brahman by the souls and matter.

The Reality of the World.

The Śāṅkarites hold that if the world which is of the nature of effect were real it would not be liable to contradiction at the time of Brahma-knowledge; if it were chimerical it would not appear to our sense. The world, however, appears to our senses and is ultimately liable to contradiction; it has therefore an indefinable (*anirvacanīya*) nature which is the same thing as saying that the world is false¹. But what is the meaning of this indefinability? It cannot mean the absolutely non-existent, like the chimerical entities of the hare's horn; it cannot mean that which is absolutely non-existent, for then it would be the souls. But all things must be either existent or non-existent, for there is no third category which is different from the existent and the non-existent. It cannot also be that of which no definition can be given, for it has already been defined as indefinability (*nā'pi nirvacanā-narhattvaṃ anenai'va nirucyamānatayā asambhavāt*). It cannot be said to be that which is not the locus of non-existence, for even the chimericals are not so, and even Brahman, which is regarded as existent and which is absolutely qualityless, is not the locus of any real existence; for Brahman is only existent in its own nature and is not the locus of any other existence. If it is said that Brahman is the locus of the existence of false appearances, then that may be said to be true as well of the so-called indefinable. Brahman is not the locus of any existence that has the same status as itself. It cannot be defined as that which is not the locus of either the existent or the non-existent, for there is nothing which is the locus of absolute non-existence, since even the chimerical is not the locus of its own non-existence. Moreover, since Brahman and the chimerical have the quality of being qualityless, they may themselves be regarded as the locus of that which is both existent and

¹ *asac cen na prattiyate sac cen na vādhyate, prattiyate vādhyate ca atah sad-asad-vilakṣaṇaṃ hy anirvacanīyam eva abhyūpagantavyam. Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 384.

non-existent, and as such may themselves be regarded as indefinable.

It cannot also be said that indefinability is that of which no sufficient description can be given that "this is such" or that "this is not such," for no such sufficient description can be given of Brahman itself. There would thus be little difference between Brahman and the indefinable. If it is held that "the indefinable" is that regarding the existence of which no evidence can be put forward, then the same may be said about Brahman, because the Brahman being the conceptless pure essence, it is not possible to prove its existence by any proof.

Again, when it is said that the indefinable is that which is neither existent nor non-existent, the meaning of the two terms "existence" and "non-existence" becomes somewhat unintelligible. For "existence" cannot mean only "being" as a class concept, for such a concept does not exist either in Brahman or in the world-appearance. Existence cannot be defined as causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*), nor as that which is never contradicted; nor non-existence as that which is contradicted, for the world-appearance which is liable to contradiction is not supposed to be non-existent; it is said to be that which is neither existent nor non-existent. Existence and non-existence cannot also be defined as that which can or cannot be proved, for Brahman is an entity which is neither proved nor unproved. Moreover, the world-appearance cannot be said to be that which is different from all that which can be called "existent" or "non-existent," for it is admitted to have a practical existence (*vyavahārika-sattā*). Again, it cannot be urged that if the nature of anything cannot be properly defined as existent or non-existent that it signifies that such an entity must be wholly unreal (*avāstava*). If a thing is not properly describable as existent or non-existent, that does not imply that it is unreal. The nature of the final dissolution of *avidyā* cannot be described as existent or not, but that does not imply that such a dissolution is itself unreal and indefinable (*nā'nirvācyaśca tat-kṣayaḥ*).

Again, from the simple assertion that the world is liable to dissolution through knowledge, its falsity does not necessarily follow. It is wrong to suppose that knowledge destroys only false ignorance, for knowledge destroys its own negation which has a content similar to that of itself; the knowledge of one thing, say

that of a jug, is removed by the knowledge of another, the sub-conscious impression is removed by recognition, attachment is removed by the knowledge of the defects of all worldly things and so also virtuous actions destroy sins. In the case under discussion also it may well be supposed that it is not merely the knowledge of Brahman but meditation of its nature that removes all false notions about the world. Thus, even if the bondage is real, there cannot be any objection that it cannot be cut asunder through the meditation of the nature of Brahman if the scriptures so direct. It does not follow from any legitimate assumption that what can be cut asunder or removed must necessarily be false. Again, it is well known in experience that what demolishes and what is demolished have the same status of existence; if the knowledge of Brahman can destroy our outlook of the world, that outlook must also be a real and true one. As the knowledge and the object of knowledge have the same status, the defects, as also the locus wherein the defects are imposed, have the same status; the Brahman and the *ajñāna* also have the same status and both are equally real.

Further, if what is called *ajñāna* is merely false knowledge, then even when it is removed by the realization, there is no reason why it should still persist in the stage of *jīvanmukti* or sainthood. The mere fact, therefore, that anything is removable by knowledge does not prove its falsity but only its antagonism to knowledge. So the world is real and the bondage also is real. The bondage is removed not by any kind of knowledge but by the grace of God¹. The function of true knowledge is to awaken God to exert His grace to cut asunder the knots of bondage.

Again, all the scriptures agree in holding that the world we see around us is being protected and maintained by God. If the world were but a mere false appearance, there would be no meaning in saying that it is being maintained by God. For knowing the world-appearance to be false, He would not be tempted to make any effort for the protection and maintenance of that which is false and unreal. If God Himself is admitted to be under the influence of ignorance, He cannot be entitled to be called God at all.

Pursuing the old dialectical type of reasoning, Mādhava Mukunda urges that the sort of falsehood that is asserted of the

¹ *vastutas tu bhagavat-prasādād eva bandha-nivṛttir na prakāra'ntareṇa. Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 388.

world can never be proved or demonstrated. One of the reasons that is adduced in favour of the falsity of the world is that it is knowable or the object of an intellectual state (*dṛśya*). But if the Vedāntic texts refer to the nature of Brahman, the due comprehension and realization of the meaning of such texts must involve the concept of the nature of Brahman as its object, and thus Brahman itself would be the object of an intellectual state and therefore false. If it is urged that the Brahman can be the object of an intellectual state only in a conditioned form and that the conditioned Brahman is admitted to be false, then the reply is that since the Brahman in its pure form can never manifest itself its purity cannot be proved. If the Brahman does not express itself in its purity through an ideational state corresponding to scriptural texts describing the nature of Brahman, then it is not self-luminous; if it is expressed through such a state, then being expressible through a mental state it is false. It cannot also be said that since all that is impure is known to be non-self-luminous it follows that all that is pure is self-luminous, for the pure being absolutely unrelatined cannot be referred to or known by way of a negative concomitance. Thus the impure is known only in itself as a positive entity and not as the opposite of the pure, for such a knowledge would imply the knowledge of purity. If, therefore, the predicate of self-luminosity is not denied of impurity as an opposite of "purity," the predicate of self-luminosity cannot also be affirmed of "purity." Moreover, if the pure Brahman is never intelligibly realizable, then there would be no emancipation, or there would be an emancipation only with the conditioned Brahman.

Moreover, if all objects are regarded as illusory impositions on pure Brahman, then in the comprehension of these objects the pure Brahman must also be comprehended. The scriptures also say: "Brahman is to be perceived with the mind and with the keen intellect" (*manasa'vā'nudraṣṭavyam . . . dṛśyate tvagrayā buddhyā*). There are also scriptural passages which say that it is the pure Brahman which is the object of meditation (*taṁ paśyati niṣkalam dhyāyamānam*).

Again, if perceivability or intelligibility determining falsehood is defined as relationing with consciousness, then since pure consciousness is supposed to have a relationing through illusion it also is liable to the charge of being perceivable. In this connection it is

difficult to conceive how Brahman, which has no opposition to *ajñāna*, can have an opposing influence against it when it is in conjunction with a mental state or *vytti*. Instead of such an assumption it might as well be assumed that the object itself acquires an opposing influence to its own ignorance when it is in association with a mental state having the same content as itself. On such a supposition perceivability does not consist in relation with consciousness as conditioned by mental state, for the conditioning has a bearing on the object and not on the consciousness. Thus it may well be assumed that an object becomes perceivable by being conditioned by a mental state of its own content. The assumption that the *vytti* or the mental state must be reflected on pure consciousness is unnecessary, for it may well be assumed that the ignorance is removed by the mental state itself. An object comes into awareness when it is represented by a mental state, and in order to be aware of anything it is not necessary that the mental state, idea or representation should be reflected in consciousness. Again, if Brahman cannot be its own object, it cannot also be termed self-luminous. For self-luminous means that it is manifest to itself independently, and this involves the implication that the Brahman is an object to itself. If that which is not an object to itself can be called self-luminous, then even material objects can be called self-luminous. Moreover, in the differenceless Brahman there cannot be any immediacy or self-luminousness apart from its nature (*nirviśeṣe brahmaṇi svarūpa-bhinnā-parokṣasya abhāvena*).

In the monistic view the self is regarded as pure knowledge which has neither a subject nor an object. But that which is subjectless and object-less can hardly be called knowledge, for knowledge is that which manifests objects. If that which does not manifest objects can be called knowledge, even a jug can be called knowledge. Again, the question naturally arises whether, if knowledge be regarded as identical with the self, such knowledge is valid or invalid; if it be valid, then the *ajñāna* which shines through it should also be valid, and if it be invalid, then that must be due to some defects and there are no such defects in the self. If it is neither false nor right knowledge, it would not be knowledge at all. Again, if the world-appearance is an illusion, then it must be an imposition on the Brahman. If Brahman be the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the illusory imposition, then it must be an entity that is known in a general

manner but not in its details. But Brahman is not an entity of which we can have either any general or specific knowledge. Brahman cannot therefore be regarded as the basis of the imposition of any illusion. In this connection it has further to be borne in mind that if the world were non-existent then it could not have appeared in consciousness; the chimerical entities are never perceived by anyone. The argument that even the illusory snake can produce real fear is invalid, for it is not the illusory snake that produces fear but the real knowledge of snakes that produces it. The child is not afraid of handling even a real snake, for it has no knowledge of snakes and their injurious character. Even dreams are to be regarded as real creation by God and not illusory impositions. The argument that they are false since they can only be perceived by the dreamer and not by others who are near him is invalid, for even the feelings and ideas felt or known by a person cannot be perceived by others who are near him¹.

The world is thus not an illusory imposition on the pure Brahman, but a real transformation of the varied powers of God. The difference of this view from that of Sāṃkhya is that while the Sāṃkhya believes in the transformation of certain primary entities in their entirety, the Nimbārkists believe in the transformation of the various powers of God. God Himself remains unchanged and unmodified, and it is only His powers that suffer modification and thereby produce the visible world².

The explanation that the world is produced through the reflection of Brahman in *māyā* or by its limitation through it is invalid, for since the *māyā* is an entity of an entirely different order, there cannot be any reflection of Brahman in it or a limitation by it. It is not possible to bind down a thief with a dream-rope.

Vanamālī Miśra.

Vanamālī Miśra, a native of Triyaga, a village within two miles of Brindavan, of Bharadvāja lineage, in his *Vedānta-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, called also *Śruti-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, gives some of the important tenets of the Nimbārka school. The work is written in the form of *Kārikās* and a commentary on it and is based on the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* by Nimbārka and other commentaries on it.

¹ *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, p. 420.

² *Ibid.* p. 429.

He regards sorrow as being due to attachment to things that are outside one's own self, and the opposite of it as happiness¹. All actions performed with a view to securing any selfish end, all performance of actions prohibited by Vedic injunctions and non-performance of duties rendered obligatory by Vedas produce sins. The opposite of this and all such actions as may please God are regarded as producing virtue. It is the power of God which is at the root of all virtue and vice which operates by veiling the qualities of God to us. This nescience (*avidyā*) is real and positive and different in different individuals. It produces the error or illusion which consists in regarding a thing as what it is not; and it is this false knowledge that is the cause of rebirth². This *avidyā* is different with different individuals. It is through this *avidyā* that one gets attached to one's possession as "mine" and has also the false experience of individual freedom. In reality all one's actions are due to God, and when a person realizes this he ceases to have any attachment to anything and does not look forward for the fruits of his deeds. The *avidyā* produces the mind and its experiences of sorrows and pleasures; it also produces the false attachment by which the self regards the experiences as its own and ceases to realize its own nature as pure knowledge and bliss. Only the *videhi-muktas* enjoy this state; those in the state of *jīvanmukti* or sainthood enjoy it only to a partial extent. It is on account of attachments produced by ignorance that man is stirred to be led by the will of God. But as the ignorance is a true ignorance, so the experience of sorrow is also a true experience. All our rebirths are due to our actions performed against the mandates of the Vedas or for the fulfilment of our desires³. The purity of the soul is attained by the realization of the idea that all our actions are induced by God and that the performer has no independence in anything. When a person feels that it is through false association with other things, and by considering oneself as the real independent agent that one gets into trouble, one naturally loses all interest in one's actions and experience of

¹ *Śruti-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, I. 9, 10, 11.

² *prati-jīvaṃ vibhinnā syāt satyā ca bhāva-rūpiṇī | a-tasmīṃs tad-dhiyo hetur midānam jīva-saṃsṛtau.* || *Ibid.* I. 15.

³ *ataḥ kāmyaṃ niṣiddhaṃ ca duḥkh-avijāṃ tyajed budhaḥ.* *Śruti-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, I. 63. According to Vanamālī Miśra at death a person goes to Heaven or to Hell according to his deeds and then after enjoying the fruits of his actions or suffering therefrom he is born as plants and then as lower animals, then as *Yavanas* or *mlecchas* and then in lower castes and finally as Brahmins.

pleasure and pain, and regards all objects as being invested with harmful defects. It is this disinclination or detachment that pleases God. The process of attaining devotion is also described in the scriptures as listening to the Upaniṣads (*śravaṇa*), realizing their meaning with logical persuasion (*manana*), and continual meditation on the nature of God as an unceasing flow (*nididhyāsana*)¹. The last can come only as a result of the first two; for meditation involves a direct realization which is not possible without the performance of *śravaṇa* and *manana*. It is only through the purification of the mind by the above processes that God is pleased and makes Himself directly intuited (*aparokṣa*) by the devotee, just as one can intuit the musical melodies and tunes through musical discipline. This direct intuition is of the very nature of one's own self. For at this stage one has no functioning of the mind. The destruction of experiential knowledge is identical with the intuition of God. This stage therefore implies the annihilation of *avidyā* or the mind². It is in this way that the nature of God as bliss is realized by man in his state of supreme emancipation; but even then it is not possible for him to know all the qualities of God, for even God Himself does not know all His qualities. Such an emancipation can be realized only through the grace of God. In the state of emancipation, man exists in God just as the fish swims about in the ocean. God creates because of the spontaneity of His grace and not in order to increase His grace; so also emancipated souls dally in God out of the spontaneity of their essence as bliss and not in order to increase their bliss³. The nature of God is always within us, and it is only when it is directly intuited that we can attain salvation. Some people attain emancipation in this world while others attain it in the upper worlds through which they pass as a result of their deeds. But emancipation of all kinds may be defined as the existence of man in his own nature as a result of the destruction of nescience⁴. The *jīvanmuktas* or saints are those whose *avidyā* has

¹ *anyā-rtha-viśayaḥ puro brahmā-kāra-dhīyām sadā
nididhyāsana-śabdā-rtho jāyate sudhīyām hi saḥ.*

Śruti-siddhānta-saṃgraha, II. 13.

² *brahma-gocarasya vedānta-vāsita-manasi utpannasya ā-parokṣasya yaḥ
prāga-bhavaḥ tasya abhāvo dhvamsō jñāna-tad-dhvamsā-nyatara-rūpo jñāna-
brahmaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, samsāra-daśāyām nāsti. Ibid.* II. 19.

³ *ānando-drekuto viṣṇoryathā srstyā-di-ceṣṭanam.*

tathā mukta-citām kṛdā na tv ānanda-vivṛddhaye. Ibid. II. 37.

⁴ *sva-rūpeṇa sthitir muktir ajñāna-dhvamsa-pūrvakam (Ibid.* II. 58). This *mukti* can be of four kinds: *sārūpya*, i.e. the same external form as Kṛṣṇa;

been destroyed, but who have still to suffer the effects of their *prārabdha karma*. The realization of God can destroy the *sañcita* and *kriyamāṇa karma*, i.e. previously collected *karma* and those that are performed in the present life, but not the *prārabdha karma*, i.e. the *karma* that is already in a state of fruition.

It is wrong to suppose that the attainment of a state of bliss can be desired by any person; the state desired can only be one in which a person enjoys unobstructed bliss¹. In a state of deep dreamless sleep one can enjoy a little bliss, but not the full bliss, as the *māyāvādins* hold. There is but little difference between the *māyāvādins* and the Buddhists; the difference is only in the mode of expression².

The self is regarded as atomic, but its existence is definitely proved by the notion of the ego (*ahaṃ-pratyayavedya*) who enjoys all his experiences. Even though he may be dependent upon God, yet he is a real and active agent who works through the influence of *avidyā*. The existence of the self is also proved by the continuity of experiences through all stages of life. The self-love manifested in all beings for selfish ends also shows that each person feels a self or soul within himself and that this self is also different in different individuals. The difference between *jīva* and *īśvara* is that the former is of little power and little knowledge and always dependent, and the latter is omniscient, omnipotent and independent; He makes the *jīvas* work or assert their supposed independence by His *avidyā*-power. The *jīvas* are thus different from God, but as they exist in Him at the time of emancipation and as all their actions are guided by the *avidyā*-power of God, they are regarded also as being

sālokya, i.e. existence in the same sphere as God; *sāyujya*, as being merged in God; *sāmīpya*, as existence in proximity to God as associated with a particular form of Him. The merging in God called *sāyujya* should not be regarded as being unified with God. This merging is like the animals roaming in the forest. The emancipated beings are different from God, but exist in Him (*evaṃ muktvā harer bhinna ramante tatra modataḥ* (*Ibid.* II. 61). They can thus come out of God also, and we hear of them as entering in succession the bodies of Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Saṃkarṣaṇa and Vāsudeva. Such emancipated beings are not associated with the creation and destruction of the worlds, but remain the same in spite of all cosmic changes. They are like the being of *Śvetadvīpa* referred to in the Nārāyaṇīya section of the *Mahābhārata*. But they are still always under the control of God and do not suffer any sorrow on account of such control.

¹ *puṣṭā-rthaṃ sukhitaṃ hi na tv ānanda-svarūpatā. Śruti-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, II. 96.

² *meyato na viśeṣo'sti māyī-saugatayor mate bhaṅgī-mātra-bhidā tu syāt ekasminn api darśane. Ibid.* II. 136.

one with Him. The mind of the individual being a creation of God's *avidyā*, all His world experience is also due to God's activity. In His own nature as self the *jīvas*, the individuals, have the revelation of God's nature which is pure bliss. The existence of individuals in their own essential nature is therefore regarded as a state of salvation. The individuals in their essential nature are therefore of the nature of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, and though atomic they can enjoy the experiences all over the body through their internal functioning just as a lamp illuminates the whole room by rays. The experience of sorrow also is possible through the expansion or dilatation of the mind (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) through the various parts of the body and by means of the help of *avidyā* by which the *jīva* wrongly identifies himself with other objects. As the relation of the self with other objects takes place through the *antaḥ-karaṇa* of each person the sphere of experience of each of the *jīvas* is limited by the functioning of his own *antaḥ-karaṇa*. The *antaḥ-karaṇa* is different in different persons.

The Upaniṣads speak of God as the all (*sarvaṃ khalv'idaṃ Brahma*), and this is due to the fact that He pervades all things and controls all things. It means that the souls are dependent on Him or maintained in Him (*tad-ādhāratva*), but it does not mean their identity with Him. God is Himself able to create all things by Himself; but for His pleasure, for His mere sportive dalliance, He takes the help of *prakṛti* and the destiny born out of the deeds of human beings as His accessories. Though God makes all persons act in the manner in which they do act, yet His directive control is regulated in accordance with the *adṛṣṭa* or the destiny of the human beings which is beginningless. The theory of *karma* doctrine herein suggested is different from that propounded by Patañjali. According to Patañjali and his commentators, the fruits of the deeds, i.e. pleasure or pain, are enjoyed by the persons while they are free to act by themselves. Here, however, the freedom of the individuals is controlled and limited by God in accordance with the previous good or bad deeds of the individual, which are beginningless. Thus in our ordinary life not only our pleasures and pains but also our power to do good or bad actions are determined by previous deeds and the consequent control of God.

CHAPTER XXII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJÑĀNA BHIKṢU

A General Idea of Vijñāna Bhikṣu's Philosophy.

THE ultimate goal is not the cessation of sorrow, but the cessation of the experience of sorrow; for when in the state of emancipation one ceases to experience sorrow, the sorrow as such is not emancipated since it remains in the world and others suffer from it. It is only the emancipated individual who ceases to experience sorrow. The ultimate state of emancipation cannot be a state of bliss, for since there are no mental organs and no mind in this state there cannot be any experience of bliss. The self cannot itself be of the nature of bliss and be at the same time the experiencer of it. When it is said that self is of the nature of bliss (*ānanda*), the word bliss is there used in a technical sense of negation of sorrow.

Bhikṣu admits a gradation of realities. He holds that one is stabler and more real than the other. Since *paramātmā* is always the same and does not undergo any change or transformation or dissolution, he is more real than the *prakṛti* or *puruṣa* or the evolutes of *prakṛti*. This idea has also been expressed in the view of the Purāṇas that the ultimate essence of the world is of the nature of knowledge which is the form of the *paramātman*. It is in this essential form that the world is regarded as ultimately real and not as *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* which are changing forms; *prakṛti*, so far as it exists as a potential power in God, is regarded as non-existent but so far as it manifests itself through evolutionary changes it is regarded as existent. The state of emancipation is brought about by the dissociation of the subtle body consisting of the five *tammātras* and the eleven senses. Consequent upon such a dissociation the self as pure consciousness is merged in Brahman as the rivers mingle with the ocean, a state not one of identity but identity-in-difference. According to the Sāṃkhya, emancipation cannot be attained until the fruits of the *karmas* which have ripened for giving experiences of pleasure and pain are actually exhausted through experiencing them, i.e. even when ignorance or *avidyā* is destroyed the attainment of the emancipation is delayed until the *prārabdha*

karma is finished. The Yogin, however, can enter into an objectless state of meditation (*asamprajñāta yoga*) and this wards off the possibility of experiencing the *prārabdha karma*. From the state of *asamprajñāta samādhi* he can at will pass into a state of emancipation. The state of emancipation is reached not merely by realizing the purport of the text of the Upaniṣads but by philosophic wisdom attained through a reasoned process of thought and by the successive stages of *Yoga* meditation.

The world does not emanate directly from Brahman as pure consciousness, nor are the *kāla*, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* derived from Brahman through transformatory changes (*pariṇāma*). Had the world come into being directly from Brahman, evil and sins would have been regarded as coming into being from it. With the association of *sattva* through the beginningless will of God at the beginning of the previous cycles the Brahman behaves as *Īśvara* and brings into actual being the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* which are already potentially existent in God, and connects the *prakṛti* with the *puruṣa*. The moment of God's activity in bringing out the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* may be regarded as *kāla*. In this sense *kāla* is often regarded as the dynamic agency of God. Though *puruṣas* in themselves are absolutely static, yet they have a seeming movement as they are always associated with *prakṛti*, which is ever in a state of movement. *kāla* as the dynamic agency of God is naturally associated with the movement of *prakṛti*, for both the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* are in themselves passive and are rendered active by the dynamic agency of God. This dynamic agency is otherwise called *kāla*, and as such it is an eternal power existing in Brahman, like the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. In all other forms of actual existence *kāla* is determinate and conditioned, and as such non-eternal and to some extent imaginary. It is only as the eternal power that subsists in and through all the operations of dynamic activity that *kāla* may be called eternal. The *kāla* that produces the connection of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* and also produces the *mahat* is non-eternal and therefore does not exist at the time of *pralaya* when no such connection exists. The reason for this is that the *kāla* that produces the connection between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is a determinate *kāla* which is conditioned, on the one hand by the will of God, and, on the other, by the effects it produces. It is this determinate *kāla* that can be designated as present, past and future. But the terms pre-

sent, past and future imply an evolutionary change and such a change implies activity; it is this activity as dissociated from the manifest forms of *kāla* as present, past and future that can be regarded as eternal¹.

The reference to the *Atharva-Veda*, as noted below in the footnote, will show how the conception of time in very ancient eras reveals "time" as a separate entity or energy which has brought everything into being, maintains it, and destroys everything. The God, *parameṣṭhin* Brahman or *prajāpati* is said to be derived from it. In the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* we also hear of the conception of *kāla* or time as *akāla* or timeless. The timeless time is the primordial time which is only the pure energy unmeasured and immeasurable. It appears in a measurable form when, after the production of the sun from it, it is measured in terms of the movement of the sun. The entire course of natural phenomena is thus seen to be an emanation or manifestation of the energy of time undirected by any other superintendent. Such a conception of time seems to be of an atheistic character, for even the highest gods, the *parameṣṭhin* and the *prajāpati*, are said to be produced from it.

In the first chapter of the *anuśāsana parvan* of the *Mahābhārata* there is a dialogue between Gautamī, whose son was bitten by a serpent, the hunter who was pressing for killing the serpent, the serpent, the *mṛtyu* or death and *kāla*. It appears from the dialogue that time is not only the propeller of all events by itself but all states of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, all that is moving and the unmoved in the heaven and in the earth, all our movements and cessation of movements, the sun, the moon, the waters, the fire, the sky, the earth, the rivers, the oceans and all that is being or not being are of the

¹ *Atharva-Veda*, xix. 54. In the *Atharva-Veda* time is regarded as a generator of the sky and the earth and all beings exist through time. *Tapas* and Brahman exist in time and time is the god of all. Time produced all creatures. The universe has been set in motion by time, has been produced by it and is supported in it. Time becoming Brahman supports *parameṣṭhin*. In the *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad* time is regarded as being held by the sun as the ultimate cause. In the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, vi. 14, it is said that from time all creatures spring, grow and decay. Time is a formless form (*kālāt sravanti bhūtāni, kālāt vṛddhiṃ prayānti ca. | kāle cā'staṃ niyacchanti kālo mūrtir amūrtimān*).

It is again stated in the same work that there are two forms of Brahman, Time and no-Time.

² That which is before the sun is no-Time and is devoid of parts, and that which is after the sun is Time with parts.

nature of time and brought into being by time and dissolved in time. Time is thus the original cause. Time, however, operates in accordance with the laws of *karma*; there is thus the beginningless relation between time and *karma* which determines the courses of all events. *Karma* in itself is also a product of time and as such determines the future modes of the operation of time. Here we have an instance of the second stage, the conception of time as the transcendental and immanent cause of all things. Here time is guided by *karma*. In the third stage of the conception of time, which is found in the *purāṇas* and also adopted by Bhikṣu, it is regarded as the eternal dynamic power inherent in Brahman and brought into operation by the will of God¹.

The word *puruṣa* is often used in the scriptural text in the singular number, but that signifies only that it is used in a generic sense, cf. *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, I. 154 (*nā'dvaita-śruti-virodho jāti-paratvāt*)². The difference between the superior *puruṣa* or God and the ordinary *puruṣas* is that while the latter are subject to experiences of pleasure and pain as a result of the actions or *karma*, the former has an eternal and continual experience of bliss through its reflection from its *sattvamaya* body to itself. The ordinary *puruṣas*, however, have not the experience of pleasure and pain as of constitutive definition, for in the stage of saintliness (*jīvanmukti*) they have no such experiences. God can, however, have an experience of the experiences of pleasure and pain of other *puruṣas* without having been affected by them. The ultimate principle or the Brahman is a principle of pure consciousness which underlies

¹ In the *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā*, the work of the *Pañcarātra* school, *niyati* (destiny) and *kāla* (time) are the two manifestations of the power of transcendent *kāla* as arising from *aniruddha*. From this *kāla* first arises the *sattva-guṇa* and from that the *rajo-guṇa* and thence the *tamo-guṇa*.

It is further said that it is time which connects and separates. The *kāla* of course in its own turn derives its power from the self-perceiving activity (*sudarśana*) of Viṣṇu. That the *prakṛti* transforms itself into its evolutes is also due to the dynamic function of *kāla*.

The *Māthara vṛtti* on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, however, refers to the doctrine of *kāla* as the cause of the world (*kālāḥ sṛjati bhūtāni, kālāḥ saṃharate prajāḥ | kālāḥ supteṣu jāgṛti tasmāt kālas tu kāraṇam*) and refutes it by saying that there is no separate entity as *kāla* (*kālo nāma na kaś cit padārtho'sti*), there are only three categories, *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *puruṣa*, and *kāla* falls within them (*vyaktam avyaktam puruṣa iti trayāḥ eva padārthāḥ tatra kālo antarbhūtaḥ*).

² The *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā*, however, explains the singular number by the concept of a conglomeration of *puruṣa* or a colony of cells, as the honey-comb, which behaves as a totality and also in a multiple capacity as separate cells. *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā*, VI. 33.

the reality of both the *puruṣas*, *prakṛti* and its evolutes; and it is because they are emergent forms which have their essence in the Brahman that they can appear as connected together. The movement of the *prakṛti* is also ultimately due to the spontaneous movement of the pure consciousness, the basic reality.

The *viveka* and the *aviveka*, the distinction and the non-distinction, are all inherent in *buddhi*, and this explains why the *puruṣas* fail to distinguish themselves from the *buddhi* with which they are associated. The association of the *puruṣas* with the *buddhi* implies that it has in it both the characters of distinction and non-distinction. The difficulty is that the "revelation of the distinction" is so opposed by the force of non-distinction that the former cannot find scope for its manifestation. It is the purpose of *yoga* to weaken the force of the tendency towards non-distinction and ultimately uproot it so that revelation of distinction may manifest itself. Now it may be asked what is the nature of this obstruction. It may be replied that it is merely a negative condition consisting in the non-production of the cognition of the distinction through association with the products of *prakṛti*, such as attachment and antipathy, through which we are continually passing. The Sāṃkhya, however, says that the non-production of the distinction is due to the extreme subtleness of the nature of *buddhi* and *puruṣa* which so much resemble each other that it is difficult to distinguish their nature. But this view of the Sāṃkhya should not be interpreted as meaning that it is only the subtleness of the natures of these two entities that arrests our discriminating knowledge regarding them. For had it been so, then the process of *yoga* would be inefficacious in attaining such a knowledge. The real reason is that our association with attachment and antipathy with regard to gross objects obstructs our discriminating vision regarding these subtle entities. Our attachment to gross objects is also due to our long association with sense-objects. A philosopher, therefore, should try to dissociate himself from attachment with gross objects. The whole purpose of creation consists in furnishing materials for the experiences of *puruṣa* which seems to undergo all experiential changes of enjoyment and suffering, of pleasure and pain, in and through the medium of *buddhi*. With the dissociation of *buddhi*, therefore, all experience ceases. The God is essentially pure consciousness, and though the knowledge of Him as such

brings about liberation, yet epithets of omnipotence, all-pervasiveness and other personal characteristics are attributed to Him because it is through an approach to God as a super-personal Being that devotion is possible, and it is through devotion and personal attachment that true knowledge can arise. It is said in the scriptures that God cannot be realized by *tapas*, gifts or sacrifices, but only by *bhakti*¹. The highest devotion is of the nature of love (*attuyuttamā bhaktiḥ prema-lakṣaṇā*).

God remains within all as the inner controller and everything is revealed to, His super-consciousness without the mediation of sense-consciousness. God is called all-pervasive because He is the cause of all and also because He is the inner controller.

Bhakti consists in the whole process of listening to God's name, describing His virtues, adoration to Him, and meditation ultimately leading to true knowledge. These are all to be designated as the service of God. These processes of operations constituting *bhakti* are all to be performed with love. Bhikṣu quotes *Garuḍa purāṇa* to prove that the root "*bhaj*" is used in the sense of service. He also refers to the Bhāgavata to show that the true *bhakti* is associated with an emotion which brings tears to the eyes, melts the heart and raises the hairs of the body. Through the emotion of *bhakti* one dissolves oneself as it were and merges into God's existence, just as the river Ganges does into the ocean.

It will be seen from the above that Bhikṣu urges on the doctrine of *bhakti* as love, as a way to the highest realization. The metaphysical views that he propounded give but small scope for the indulgence of such an attitude towards divinity. For, if the Ultimate Reality be of the nature of pure consciousness, we cannot have any personal relations with such a Being. The ultimate state of realization is also the entrance into a state of non-difference with this Ultimate Being, who is not Himself a person, and therefore no personal relations ought to be possible with Him. In the *Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, IV. 1. 3, Bhikṣu says that at the time of dissolution or emancipation the individuals are not associated with any content of knowledge, and are therefore devoid of any consciousness, and being of the nature of unconscious entities like wood or stone they

¹ *aham prakṛtaḥ bhaktito'anyaiḥ sādhanaiḥ draṣṭum na śakyah, bhaktir eva kevalā mad-darśane sādhanam.*

Īśvara-gītā-tīkā (MS. borrowed from N. N. Gopinātha Kavirāja, late Principal, Queen's College, Benares).

enter into the all-illuminating great Soul just as rivers enter into the ocean. Again, it is this great Soul that out of its own will sends them forth like sparks of fire and distinguishes them from one another and goads them to action¹. This great Soul or *paramātman* is the inner-controller and mover of our selves. But it may be remembered that this great Soul is not also the Ultimate Principle, the pure consciousness, but is the manifestation of the pure consciousness in association with the *sattvamaya* body. Under the circumstances the metaphysical position does not allow of any personal relation between the human beings and the Ultimate Entity. But yet the personal relation with the divinity as the ultimate consciousness not being philosophically possible, that relation is ushered in more out of a theistic tendency of Bhikṣu than as a necessary natural conclusion. The theistic relation is also conceived in a mystical fashion in the indulgence of the emotions of love rising to a state of intoxication. Such a conception of Divine love is found in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*; and later on in the school of Vaiṣṇavism preached by Caitanya. It is different from the conception of devotion or *bhakti* as found in the system of Rāmānuja, where *bhakti* is conceived as incessant continual meditation. He seems to have been, therefore, one of the earliest, if not the earliest, exponent of emotionalism in theism, if we do not take into account the Purāṇic emotionalism of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. There are instances in the writings of modern European philosophers also, where the difficult position does not justify an emotionalism that is preached merely out of the theistic experiences of a personal nature, and as an illustration one may refer to the idea of God of Pringle Pattison. In the conception of *jīva* or individuals also there seems to be an apparent contradiction. For while the *puruṣas* are sometimes described as pure consciousness, they are at other times described as inert and wholly under the domination of *paramātman*. The contradiction is to be solved by the supposition that the inertness is only relative, i.e. the *puruṣas* are to be regarded as themselves inactive, being goaded to action by the inlying controller,

¹ *tasmāt pralaya-mokṣā-dau viśaya-sambandhā-bhāvāt kāṣṭha-loṣṭrā-dīvat jaḍāḥ sānto jīvā madhyandīnā-dītyavat sadā sarvā-vabhāsake paramā-tmani viliyante samudre nada-nadya iva punasca sa eva paramā-tmā sve-cchayā gni-vissphul īṅgavat tā-nupāyi-sambandhena svato vibhajyā'ntaryāmī sa na prerayati tathā cokaṣṭha cākṣuṣmatā'ndhā iva nīyamānā iti atah sa eva mukhya ātmā-ntaryāmy amṛtaḥ. Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya, iv. 1. 3.*

paramātman. They are called “*jaḍa*,” resembling stone or wood only in the sense that they are inactive in themselves. But this inactivity should not be associated with want of consciousness. Being sparks of the eternal consciousness they are always of the nature of consciousness. Their activity, however, is derived from the *paramātman*, so that, drawn by Him, they come out of the Eternal consciousness and play the role of a mundane individual and ultimately return to Brahman like rivers into the ocean at the time of emancipation. This activity of God is an eternal activity, an eternal creative impulse which is absolutely without any extraneous purpose (*carama-kāraṇasya kṛteḥ nityatvāt*)¹. It proceeds from the spontaneous joy of God in a spontaneous manner like the process of breathing, and has no reference to the fulfilment of any purpose. In the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* it is said that the creation of God is for the benefit of living beings. But Bhikṣu does not support any purpose at all. This activity is sometimes compared with the purposeless playful activity. But Bhikṣu says that even if there is any slight purpose in play that also is absent in the activity of God. The action also proceeds spontaneously with the creative desire of God, for which no body or senses are necessary. He is identical with the whole universe and as such His action has no objective outside of Himself, as in the case of ordinary actions. It is He who, depending upon the beginningless *karma* of human beings, makes them act for good or for evil. The *karma* itself, also being a part of His energy and a manifestation of His impulse, cannot be regarded as limiting His freedom². The analogy of the doctrine of grace where the king bestows his grace or withholds it in accordance with the good or bad services of his servants is also regarded as helpful to conceive of the freedom of God in harmony with the deeds of the individual. If it is argued now, if the creative activity of God is eternal, it can depend on the *karma*, Bhikṣu’s reply is that the *karmas* act as accessory causes determining the eternal creative impulse of God as producing pleasurable and painful experiences. Following the trend of the Purāṇic method Bhikṣu further suggests that it is the Hiranyagarbha created by God who appears as the law-giver of the law of *karma*, as manifested in the spontaneous activity of God. It is He, therefore, who is responsible for the suffering of humanity

¹ See *Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 32.

² *Ibid.* II. 1. 33.

in accordance with their *karmas*. God helps the process only by letting it go on in an unobstructed manner¹. In another passage he says that God perceives within Himself as parts of Him the *jīvas* and their conditioning factors (*upādhi*) as associated with merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*); associating these conditions with the *jīvas* He brings them out of Himself. He is thus the maker of souls, just as the potter is the maker of pots².

The self is regarded as being itself untouchable and devoid of any kind of association (*a-śaṅga*). The association between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, therefore, is not to be interpreted in the sense of a direct contact in the ordinary sense of the term, but the association is to be understood only as transcendental reflection through the conditioning factors which make the pure soul behave as a phenomenal self or *jīva*. The self has no knowledge as its quality or character, and is in itself pure consciousness, and there is at no time a cessation of this consciousness, which exists even during dreamless sleep. But in dreamless sleep there is no actual knowledge, as there is no content present at the time; and it is for that reason that the consciousness though present in the very nature of the self cannot be apperceived. The *vāsanās* or desires existing in the *antaḥkaraṇa* cannot affect the pure soul, for at that time the *antaḥkaraṇa* remains in a dissolved condition. Knowledge of contents or objects is possible only through reflections from the states of the *buddhi*. The pure consciousness being identical with the self, there cannot also be the self-consciousness involving the notion of a duality as subject and object during dreamless sleep. The pure consciousness remains the same and it is only in accordance with changes of mental state that knowledge of objects arises and passes away³. The *jīvas* are thus not to be regarded as themselves the products of the reflection of *paramātman* as the Śāṅkarites suppose; for in that case the *jīvas* would be absolutely unreal, and bondage and emancipation would also be unreal.

¹ *Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 33.

² *Īśvaro hi svā-ṁśa-sva-śarīrā-ṁśa-tulyau jīva-tad-upādhi svā-ntar-gatau dharmā-di-sahitau sāksād eva paśyann a-para-tantraḥ svā-līlayā saṁyoga-viśeṣaṁ brahmā-dīnām api dur-vibhāvyaṁ kurvat kumbhakāra iva ghaṭam. Ibid.* II. 1. 13.

³ *Ibid.* II. 3. 5.

The Brahman and the World according to Vijñānā-mṛta-bhāṣya.

The production, existence, maintenance, modification, decay and destruction of the world are from Brahman as God. He holds within Himself all the energies constituting the *prakṛti* and *puruṣas*, and manifests Himself in other diverse forms; Brahman as pure consciousness is associated with the conditioning factor of His own being, the *māyā* as pure *sattva* quality in all this creative activity, so from that great Being who is devoid of all afflictions, *karmas* and their fruits are also produced. The fact that the *Brahma-sūtra*, II. 2, says that Brahman is that from which the world has come into being and is being maintained implies that the world as it is in its own reality is an eternal fact in the very being of the ultimately real and the unmanifested. The production, the transformation and the destruction of the world are only its phenomenal aspect¹. Brahman is here regarded as the *adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa*. This means that Brahman is the basis, the ground, the *ādhāra* (container) as it were of the universe in which it exists as undivided and as indistinguishable from it and which also holds the universe together. Brahman is the cause which holds together the material cause of the universe so that it may transform itself into it². Brahman is the principle of ultimate cause which renders all other kinds of causality possible. In the original Brahman, the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣas* exist in the eternal consciousness and as such are held together as being one with it. The Brahman is neither changeable nor identifiable with *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. It is because of this that, though Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness and unchangeable, yet it is regarded as being one with the universe and as the material cause. The material cause or *upādāna-kāraṇa* is the name which is given to changing material cause (the *vikāri-kāraṇa*) and to the ground cause or the *adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa*. The underlying principle of both the ground cause (*adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa*) and the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) is that the effect is held in it as merged in it or

¹ *atra cai'tad yata ity'anuktvā janmā-dyasya yata iti vacanād avyakta-rūpeṇa jagan nityam eva ity ācāryā-śayaḥ. Vijñānā-mṛta-bhāṣya, I. 1. 2.*

² *kim punar adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇatvam ucyate tad evā' dhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇam yatra' vibhaktam yeno' paṣṭabdham ca sad upādāna-kāraṇam kāryā-kāreṇa pārīṇamate. Ibid.*

indistinguishable from it¹. The idea involved in *avibhāga* or oneness with the cause is not regarded as an ordinary relation of identity but as a sort of non-relational relation or a situation of uniqueness which cannot be decomposed into its constituents so that a relational bond may be affirmed of them. The upshot of the whole position is that the nature of the universe is so founded in Brahman which forms its ground that it cannot be regarded as a mere illusory appearance of it or as a modification or a product of it; but while these two possible ways of relation between the cause and the effect fail, the universe as such has no existence, significance or meaning without the ground in which it is sustained and which helps its evolutionary process. The ordinary relation of the sustainer and the sustained is inadequate here, for it implies a duality of independent existence; in the present case, however, where Brahman is regarded as the ground cause there is no such duality and the universe cannot be conceived as apart from Brahman which forms its ground and essence while remaining unchanged in its transcendent reality. Thus, though it may have to be acknowledged that there is a relation between the two, the relation has to be conceived as the transcendental one, of which no analogy is found elsewhere. The seeming pictorial analogy which falls far short of the situation is to be found in the case where water is mixed with milk². Here the existence of the water is dependent upon the existence of the milk so long as the two exist in a mixed condition; and neither of them can be conceived without the other. The nature of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* is also manifested from the essence of God's nature as pure consciousness. The causality of substance, qualities and actions is also due to the underlying essence of God which permeates all things. The difference between the relation of *samavāya* and this unique relation of indistinguishableness in the ground is that while the former applies to the case of the intimate relation of the effects in and through themselves, the latter refers only to the special fact of the indistinguishable character of the effect in the cause, and has no reference to the relation of the effect-parts among themselves with reference to the whole as an inseparable concatenation of effects. The ordinary organic relation such

¹ *Kāryā-vibhāgā-dhāratvasyai' vo' pādāna-sāmānya-lakṣaṇatvāt. Vijñānamṛta-bhāṣya*, I. 1. 2.

² *avibhāgaś cā' dhāratvāt svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣo' tyanta-saṃmīśraṇarūpo dugdha-jalādy-ekatā-pratyaya-miṣṛamakah. Ibid.*

as that which subsists between the parts of a living body is thus different from that which is referred to here as the indistinguishable character of the effects in the ground. The parts of the universe as comprising the living and the non-living may be regarded as inseparably united with one another in the whole, but such a relation is an intimate relation between the effects, and the whole is nothing but an assemblage of these. This is what may be called the special feature of *samavāya* relation. But in the unique relation of indistinguishableness in the ground the effect subsists in the ground in such a manner that the effect has no separate reality from the cause¹. Brahman in this view is the basis or the substratum—the ground which supports the totality of the unity of *prakṛti* and the *puruṣas* to evolve itself into the universe with its varied forms². It does not, therefore, in itself participate in the changing evolution and transformation of world-forms, but it always exists as one with it, and being in it and supported by it, it develops into the world.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that the Vaiśeṣikas believe that God is the dynamic or the instrumental agent, whereas he thinks that the causality of God cannot be regarded as being either of the *samavāyi*, *asamavāyi* or *nimitta* types, but is a fourth kind of conception—cause as ground or container³. He also describes this type of causation as being *adhiṣṭhāna*, a term with which we are familiar in Śāṅkara Vedānta. But the difference between the two kinds of conception of *adhiṣṭhāna kāraṇa* is indeed very great, for while Bhikṣu considers this to be the unchangeable ground which sustains the movements of the principle of change in it in an undivided unity, Śāṅkara regards *adhiṣṭhāna* as the basis of all changes which are unreal in themselves. According to Bhikṣu, however, the changing phenomena are not unreal, but they are only changes which are the modifications of a principle of change which subsists in an undivided unity with the ground cause. When they say that the world is both being and non-being (*sad-asadrūpa*), and is hence unreal and illusory, the Śāṅkarites suffer from a grave misconception. The

¹ *tatra samavāya-sambandhena yatrā' vibhāgas tad vīkāri-kāraṇam; yatra ca kāryasya kāraṇā' vibhāgena avibhāgas tad adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇam. Ibid.*

² *yadi hi paramā-tmā dehavat sarvaṃ kāraṇam nā'dhitiṣṭheta tarhi dravya-guṇa-karmā-di-sādhāraṇā-khila-kārye itthaṃ mūla-kāraṇam na syāt. Iśvara-gītā-bhāṣya. MS.*

³ *asmābhis tu samavāy-asamavāyibhyām udāśīnam nimitta-kāraṇebhyaś ca vilakṣaṇatayā caturtham ādhāra-kāraṇatvam. Ibid.*

world is called *sat* and *asat* (being and non-being), because it represents the principle of becoming or change. It is affirmed as "this" and yet because it changes it is again not affirmed as "this." The future forms of the changing process are also non-existent as it were in the present form and the present form is also non-existent as it were in the future forms that are to be. Thus, any of its forms may be regarded as not existing and hence false when compared with an entity that always exists and in the same form¹. All objects of the world so far as they are past and future are contradicted by their present states and are therefore regarded as false, but so far as they are perceived in their present state they are regarded as real².

The universe has, however, an eternal and immutable form as pure consciousness in the very nature of Brahman from which it is separated out as the world of matter and souls. The pure consciousness in itself is the only ultimate reality which is ever the same and is not subject to any change or process of becoming. Both the individual souls and the world of matter are ultimately dissolved and merged in Brahman, the pure and ultimate consciousness. These, therefore, are regarded as being names and forms when compared with the ultimate changeless Reality, Brahman³. But this does not mean that the universe of matter and souls is absolutely unreal and mere *māyā* or illusion. If all that appears were absolutely false, then all moral values would disappear and all notions of bondage and emancipation would become meaningless. If the falsity of all things except the pure consciousness can be proved by any means, that itself would prove that such proofs have validity and that therefore there are other things over and above pure consciousness which may be valid. If such proofs are invalid but can establish the validity of pure consciousness as against the validity of all other things, then such proofs may also prove the reality of all other things in the world. It may be held that what ordinary people consider as true can be proved to be invalid by what is regarded by them as valid means of proof; but on the Śāṅkarite view nothing is regarded as valid and therefore there are

¹ *eka-dharmena sattva-daśāyām pariṇāmi-vastūnām atītā-nāgata-dharmena asattvāt. Vijñānā-mṛta-bhāṣya*, I. 1. 3.

² *ghaṭā-dayo hi anāgatā-dy-avasthāsu vyaktā-dy-avasthābhir bādhyante iti. ghaṭā-dayo mithyā-śabdena ucyante vidyamāna-dharmāḥ ca tadāntm na bādhyante iti satyā ity api ucyante. Ibid.*

³ *jñāna-svarūpaḥ paramā-tmā sa eva satyaḥ jīvaś cā'mśatayā amsīny ekibhūtāḥ athavā' vayavattvena paramā-tmā-pekṣayā te' py asantaḥ. Ibid.*

no proofs by which the validity of the world-process can be maintained. But the reply that naturally comes to such a view is that though the validity of the world may not be proved, yet that does not lead to the conclusion that the world-process is unreal; for even if its validity is not proved, its validity or reality may at least be doubtful. There is, therefore, nothing by which we may come to any conclusion about its invalidity and unreality. The reality of the universe is of a different order from that of Brahman, which is of the nature of pure consciousness, as the former consists of practical efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*). But even though in the state of a changing process the reality of the world is only its reality as becoming and as causal efficiency, yet it has also an ultimate reality in itself, since it has come into being from the ultimate reality, Brahman. The world of matter and souls exists in God as pure consciousness and therefore as one with Him. When from out of its state as pure consciousness it is manifested as the world of matter and souls, we mark it as the stage of creation. When again they retire back into God as being one with His consciousness, that is marked as the state of dissolution¹. The universe of matter and souls is also ultimately to be regarded as being of the nature of consciousness, and is as such a constituent of the ultimate pure consciousness in which it remains as it were merged and lost. The world of visible forms and changes is also thus of the nature of thought, and only the ignorant regard them as mere objects². When the scriptural texts speak of the identity of the world and Brahman they refer to this ultimate state in which the world exists in the pure consciousness—Brahman as one with it. But it is not only in the state of dissolution that the world exists in Brahman in undivided unity, but in the state of creation also the world exists in Brahman as one with it, for all the so-called mechanical and other kinds of forces that are to be found in matter and which constitute its reality are but the energy of God. And as the energy is always conceived as being one with that which possesses it, it is believed that the world with all its changes exists in God³. In the state of

¹ *pralayeḥi puṁ-prakṛtyā-dikam jñāna-rūpeṇai'va rūpyate na tv artha-rūpeṇa arthato vyañjaka-vyāpārā-bhāvāt. Vijñānā-mṛta-bhāṣya*, 1. 1. 4.

² *jñāna-svarūpaṁ akhilaṁ jogad etad abuddhayaḥ 1. artha-svarūpaṁ paśyanto bhrāmyante moha-samplāḥ. Ibid.*

³ *śaktimat-kārya-kāraṇā-bhedenai'va brahmā-dvaitaṁ bodhayanti . . . ayaṁ ca sārva-kālo brahmaṇi prapañcā-bhedaḥ. Ibid.*

pralaya the world-energies exist in God as some form of consciousness or conscious energy which is later on manifested by Him as material energy or matter. The unity of the world-energies in God is such that though these retain some kind of independence yet it is so held up and mixed up as it were in the reality of God that it cannot be separated from Him. Their independence consists in the fact that they are of the nature of energy, but as God possesses them they can have no existence and they cannot be conceived as apart from Him. As thus described the world of matter has no permanent reality, and the consciousness of this fact may be called the *bādha* or contradiction (*pāramārthika-sattvā-bhāva-niścaya eva bādhaḥ*)¹. But in spite of this *bādha* the universe has a relative or *vyavahārika* existence (*tādrśa-bādhe'pi ca sati jñāna-sāadhanā-dīnām vyavahārika-sattvāt*).

The causality of *prakṛti* and *paraśa* is limited to their specific capacities which determine the nature of modifications. But God is the universal all-cause behind them which not only shows itself through these specific limitations but which regulates the inner harmony and order subsisting in them and in their mutual relations. Thus the visual organ is limited in its function to the operation of vision, and the tactile organ is limited in its function to the operation of touch, but the functions and activities of all these are organized by the individual self which operates and manifests itself through them. Thus Brahman in this sense may be regarded as being both the instrumental and the material cause². According to Sāṃkhya and Yoga the *prakṛti* is supposed to be associated with the *puruṣas* through the inner and inherent teleology, but according to the Vedāntic view as interpreted by Bhikṣu their mutual association is due to the operation of God³.

¹ *Vijñānā-mṛta-bhāṣya*, I. I. 4.

² *brahmaṇas tu sarva-śaktikatvāt tat-tad-upādhibhiḥ sarva-kāraṇatvaṃ yathā cakṣurā-dīnām darśanā-di-kāraṇatvaṃ yat pray-ekam asti tat sarvaṃ sarvā-dhyakṣasya jīvasya bhavati, etena jagato' bhīma-nimitto-pādānattvaṃ vyākhyātam. Ibid.* I. I. 2.

³ *sāṃkhya-yogibhyaṃ puruṣā-rtha-prayuktā pravṛttiḥ svayam eva puruṣeṇa ādya-jīvena saṃyuyyate... asmābhis tu prakṛti-puruṣa-saṃyoga īśvareṇa kriyate. Ibid.*

The Individual.

In his commentary on the *Īśvara-gītā*, Bhikṣu says that the more universal has a wider sphere than the less universal and therefore it is called Brahman in relation to it. The cause of an effect is wider and more universal than the effect and is therefore called Brahman in comparison with it. Thus there is a hierarchy of Brahman. But that which is at the apex of the hierarchy is the highest universal and the ultimate cause, and is therefore called the highest Brahman. Brahman is thus the highest and the ultimate reality. The determinations that make the universe of matter exist in Brahman as merged in its nature as thought. Creation means that these determinations which exist there in a potential form and without any operation are manifested and made operative as the world of nature. God in His nature as pure consciousness has a full and complete acquaintance of all the possible developments and modifications of the pre-matter as evolving into the actual universe. The starting point in the evolution of the pre-matter or *prakṛti* is the moment of its association with the spirits. The scriptural text says that the Lord entered into the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣas*, disturbed the equilibrium and associated them with one another. The *puruṣas* are, however, like sparks of consciousness and it is not possible to produce any disturbance in them. The disturbance is thus produced in the *prakṛti* and the effect of such disturbance in the *prakṛti* on the *puruṣas* is interpreted as seeming disturbances in the *puruṣas* as well. The *puruṣas* are to be conceived as being parts of God and there cannot be a real identity between the *puruṣas* and the Brahman. The so-called identity between the *puruṣas* and the Brahman refers merely to the fact of the *puruṣas* being the constituent entities in the being of God such as that which exists between the parts and the whole. The assertion of the Śāṅkarites that the individual soul is the same as Brahman and that the difference is due to external limitations of nescience or on account of reflections through it is wrong. The kind of unity that exists between the individual souls and the Brahman lies in the fact that they are indistinguishable in character from it (*avibhāga*). If the reality of individual souls is denied, that would amount to a denial of religious and moral values and of bondage and emancipation.

In this connection it is also urged that the individual souls are derived from God just as sparks come out of fire or the son comes out of the father. The individual souls resemble God so far as they are of the nature of pure consciousness. But though they have come out of Him, yet they retain their individuality and thus preserves for them the sphere of their moral career. The individual souls are free and emancipated in their own nature, they are all-pervasive and they also hold the universe within them in their consciousness. In all these they share the nature of Brahman. But in association with the limiting conditions (*upādhi*) they appear as finite and limited. When the entire career of the individual souls is known as existing in Brahman as part of it, as being manifested out of it as separate entities, as leading a career of their own in association with the limiting conditions and ultimately dissociating themselves from them and realizing their own natures as one with Brahman and in a sense different from it, this is the true philosophic knowledge and realization of their own nature. When the individuals start their career and destiny in life they are different from Brahman; but there was a time when they remained in one undivided unity with Brahman. But in spite of this unity the Brahman is always felt as different and as the other of the individuals, and this difference is never sublated¹. But the difference of this view from the Sāṃkhya is that the Sāṃkhya is satisfied only with considering the individuality and separateness of the *puruṣas*, but the Vedāntic view as interpreted herein cannot ignore the fact that in spite of their separateness they are one in essence with Brahman and have sprung out of it, and after the fulfilment of their career of individuality and destiny will again be merged in it, and even during their mundane career have an aspect of undividedness with Brahman inasmuch as they are the powers or energies of it². The difference that exists between the individuals and Brahman is most apparent during the mundane career on account of the fact that the world of nature has a separate existence in the consciousness of the individual centres and each one of them is limited to his own experiences. But at the time of dissolution, when the world of nature merges in the Brahman as a potential level of its energies, the individuals are

¹ *bhedā-bhedau vibhāgā-vibhāga-rūpau kāla-bhedena aviruddhau anyonyā-bhāvaś ca jīva-brahmaṇor ātyantika eva. Vijñānā-mṛta-bhāṣya*, 1. 1. 2.

² *ata idam brahmā-tma-jñānam vivikta-jīva-jñānāt sāmkyo-ktād api śreṣṭham. Ibid.* 1. 1. 2.

also merged in it and have no separate spheres of experience for themselves and thus cease to have any descriptive definition of themselves.

The nature of the relation of part and whole that exists between the individuals and Brahman is regarded as that subsisting between the son and the father. The father is reborn in the son. Before birth the son lies in a state of undivided unity in the vital energy of the father and yet when he separates out of him it is the same vital energy of the father that repeats itself in its new career and has a sphere of activity which is definitely its own. Again, when it is said that the individuals are parts of Brahman, it should not be interpreted to mean that they have any share in the existence of Brahman as God or world-creator. God is not homogeneous in His nature, but the element of individuation and differentiation always exists in Him. Had He been a homogeneous being His parts would have no specific differentiation and they would be like the parts of space which are always indistinguishable from one another. But the fact that God has within Him the principle of differentiation explains the fact that the individuals resemble Brahman only in the aspect of their consciousness but have no share in His creative functions or omnipotence. The Sāṃkhyaists hold that salvation is attained through dissociation of attachment as "mine" to one's experiences, mental faculties, senses, understanding and body, owing to one's knowledge of the fact that the self is the self-shining entity to which all experiences appear and within which they are held together as one with it though they are all different from it. But the Vedānta as herein interpreted holds that the attachment as "mine" vanishes with the knowledge of self as pure consciousness, with the knowledge of God as the being from which they come into being, by which they are maintained and into which they ultimately return, and with the knowledge that they all exist in the consciousness of God as parts of it; and that the self is not the real enjoyer of the experiences but is only the consciousness in which the universe and its experiences shine forth. Thus, though both in the Sāṃkhya and in the Vedānta as herein interpreted salvation is attained through the dissolution of the false attachment as "mine-ness," the dissolution of "mine-ness" is here due to an entirely different philosophic conception¹.

¹ *Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, p. 56.

Consciousness is not a quality but it is the very substance of the self. Just as light is a substance which illuminates other things, so consciousness is also a substance which illuminates other things. When one says "I know it," knowledge appears to be a quality of "I" which is neither self nor a homogeneous entity. The "I" is a complex of sense-faculties, understanding, etc., to which a quality can be attributed; the self is not a complex entity, but a homogeneous simple substance—the consciousness. The complex entity, the "I," expresses all things by a manifestation of consciousness. Bliss or happiness, however, cannot be regarded as a self-revealing substance, but it is an independent substance like sorrow which is revealed by consciousness. Neither the Brahman nor the self can therefore be regarded as being of the nature of bliss or happiness as this is a modification of *prakṛti* and has therefore to be regarded as expressible (*dṛśya*) and not as expressing (*darśana*). The consciousness requires the intermediary of intellectual functions for the illumination of objects, but consciousness in itself does not require the intermediary of any other functions, as such a view would lead only to an infinite regressus without solving the point at issue. It is also wrong to suppose that the principle of consciousness exercises any operation in order to reveal itself, for an entity cannot operate on itself (*karma-kartr-virodhāt*). If for the above reasons the self cannot be regarded as being of the nature of bliss, then at the time of salvation also there cannot be any bliss in the self. There is only a cessation of sorrow at that time, or rather a cessation of both happiness and sorrow which is technically called a state of happiness or *sukha* (*sukhaṃ duḥkha-sukhā-tyayaḥ*)¹. At the time of emancipation all conditioning factors such as the intellectual functions and the like are dissolved and as a consequence thereof all experiences of pleasure and pain also vanish, for these are substances belonging to objects which were presented to the self through these conditions. When the Upaniṣads say that the self is dearest to us, it need not necessarily be supposed that it is the pleasure that is dearest to us, for the self may be regarded as being valued for its own sake; it may also be supposed that pleasure here means the cessation of pain². The desire for immortality or con-

¹ *Vijñānā-mṛtā-bhāṣya*, 1. 1. 2.

² *ātmatvasyā'pi prema-prayojakatvāt duḥkha-nivṛtti-rūpattvād vā bodhyam.*
Ibid.

tinued existence of the self illustrates the feeling of fondness that we all have for ourselves. The other view, that the ultimate object of realization is extermination of all sorrow is also not open to any objection on the ground that pleasure and pain never belonged to the selves; for the association of pleasure and pain is only with reference to their enjoyment and suffering and not directly as a bond of attachment to the self. The term "*bhoga*," which may be translated only semi-accurately as "experience," has a twofold application as referring to *buddhi* or psychosis and to *puruṣa*. The *prakṛti* is composed of *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha* substances, and *buddhi* is an evolute of the *prakṛti*; therefore, when the *buddhi* is in association with *sukha* or *duḥkha*, such an association supplies the *buddhi* with the stuff of which it is made and thus sustains and maintains its nature and constitution. But when the word *bhoga* has a reference to *puruṣa*, it means that the pleasure or sorrow held in the *buddhi* is reflected on it and is thereby intuited. It is this intuition of pleasure and pain through their reflection in the *puruṣa* that is regarded as their *bhoga* or experience by *puruṣa*. The *buddhi* cannot have any *bhoga* or experience, even in a remote sense of the term, for the simple reason that it is unconscious. But it may well be argued that since the *puruṣa* is not in reality the ego, it cannot have any experience in any real sense of the term; and since it cannot in reality have any experience of sorrow, it cannot in reality regard its cessation as being of the utmost value to it. The reply to such an objection is that the realization of the fact that the cessation of sorrow is of ultimate value to the experiencer, the *puruṣa*, leads the *suddhi* on its onward path of progress. Had it not been so there would be no movement of the *buddhi* on lines of utility. So though pleasure and pain do not belong to *puruṣa*, they may yet be experienced by it and the *buddhi* may be guided by such experiences.

When the Upaniṣad says "that art thou," the idea at the back of it is that the self is not to be identified with any of the elements of the psychosis—the *buddhi*—or with any of the evolutes of the *prakṛti*. The self is part of the pure consciousness—the Brahman. When a man learns from the Upaniṣad text or one's teacher that he is a part of Brahman he tries to realize it through a process of meditation. The difference of the Vedāntic view from that of Sāṃkhya is that the latter rests with the individual selves as the ultimate entities whereas the former emphasizes the Brahman as

the ultimate reality, and also the fact that the reality of all other things, the selves and the matter, depends ultimately on their participation in it.

Brahma-Experience and Experience.

Cause may be defined as the productivity due to direct and immediate perception of the material cause. The *buddhi* is regarded as an effect because, like jugs and other things, it is produced through some direct and immediate intuition of its causal material. This naturally implies that the *buddhi* has a causal material which is directly perceived by some Being and to which His creative activity is directed and this Being is God. It is said in the *Brahma-sūtras* that Brahman can be known by the testimony of the scriptures. But this cannot be true, for the Upaniṣads say that the Brahman cannot be expressed by words or known by intellect. The reply to this is that the denial contemplated in such passages refers only to the fact that Brahman cannot be known in entirety or in its uniqueness by the scriptural texts, but these passages do not mean that it is not possible to have a generic knowledge of the nature of Brahman. It is only when we have such a generic knowledge from the scriptures that we enter the sphere from which we may proceed further and further through the processes of Yoga and have ultimately a direct intuitive apperception of it. The specific nature of God as devoid of any quality or character only means that His nature is different from the nature of all other things, and though such a nature may not be realized by ordinary perception, inference or other sources of knowledge, there cannot be any objection to its being apprehended by the intuition of Yoga meditation. There are some Vedāntists who think that the Brahman cannot be felt or apprehended intuitively, but there is a mental state or function (*vyrtti*) which has the Brahman as its object. Such a mental state destroys the nescience and as a result of this the Brahman shines forth. But Bhikṣu objects to this and says that the *vyrtti* or mental function is admitted for relating the consciousness or the self with the objects, but once this connection is effected the objects are directly apprehended; so, in order to bring Brahman within the sphere of knowledge, the intuitive apperception is in itself sufficient for the purpose. It cannot be held that, since Brahman is itself of

the nature of pure illumination, no special intuitive apprehension is necessary and that the existence of the mental function or *ṛtti* was admitted for explaining the dissolution of *ajñāna*; for Brahman, being of the nature of consciousness, can be realized only through intuitive apprehension which is itself of the nature of knowledge. Since all apprehension is direct and immediate, self-knowledge must also be of the same kind. There is also no necessity to assume a principle of obstruction which has to be overcome as a condition of the rise of knowledge. In the state of deep dreamless sleep a principle of obstruction in the shape of the function of *tamas* has to be admitted in order to explain the absence of knowledge which leads to the absence of all cognitive or practical behaviour. To the opponent's idea that since Brahman is self-luminous it cannot have any relation with anything else, and that since Brahman and the self are identical there cannot be any self-knowledge of Brahman, for the Brahman cannot be both the knower and the known, Bhikṣu's reply is that self-luminousness does not mean unrelatedness; and the absolute identity of the self and the Brahman cannot also be admitted, and even if it be admitted we can explain the method of Brahma-knowledge by the same manner in which our experiential knowledge or self-consciousness can be explained.

Bhikṣu thinks that since we do not find in the *Brahma-sūtras* any account of the origin and growth of knowledge, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga account of knowledge may well be accepted on account of the general affinity of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga ideas with the Vedānta. According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga there is first a contact of the senses with their respective objects and as a result the *tamas* aspect of the *buddhi* is subordinated at the time; and the *buddhi* as pure *sattva* assumes the form of the object. This state of *buddhi* is called an objective state of the *buddhi* or a sensory idea or state (*sā buddhya-vasthā viśayā-kārā buddhi-ṛttir ity ucyate*). During dreams and contemplative states images of external objects arise in the mind and are directly perceived and therefore valid. The connection of the *puruṣa* with the external objects is thus effected through the intermediary of the *buddhi*. So long as the *buddhi* remains impure the *puruṣa* cannot get itself related to objects through it. It is for this reason that during deep sleep when the *buddhi* is dominated by *tamas* the *puruṣa*-consciousness cannot manifest itself or make itself related with other objects. As soon as the *buddhi* is

modified into a sensory or image-state it is reflected in the *puruṣa*, which then reveals it as a flash of conscious state. It is in this manner that the pure infinite consciousness can manifest itself into finite forms of objects. As the *buddhi* is constantly transforming itself into various forms and reflecting them on the *puruṣa* from beginningless time there is a continuous flow of conscious states only occasionally punctuated by dreamless sleep. The *puruṣa* in its turn is also reflected in the *buddhi* and thereby gives rise to the notion of ego. In this connection Bhikṣu criticizes the view of Vācaspati that the reflection of the *puruṣa* in the *buddhi* is sufficient to explain the cognitive situation, and says that a reflection of consciousness cannot itself be conscious and hence cannot explain why the states of *buddhi* should appear as conscious. But the assumption that the states of *buddhi* are reflected in the consciousness explains their real connection with consciousness. It may be said that since it is only the reflections that are associated with consciousness, the things as they exist are not known. The reply to such an objection is that the *buddhi*-states are but copies of the external objects; and if the copies are intelligized, we have in the validity of such direct acquaintance of the copies the guarantee of their application to objects. It may be said again that when the reflections of the *buddhi*-states in the consciousness appear as one with it and therefore produce the phenomenon of knowledge we have in such phenomena an illusory unity of the consciousness with the states; our knowledge then becomes illusory. The reply to such an objection is that even if there is an element of illusion in knowledge, that does not touch the reality and validity of the objects to which such knowledge refers. Valid knowledge (*pramā*) thus consists of this reflection of the *buddhi*-states in the *puruṣa*. The fruit of the cognitive process (*pramāṇa-phala*) belongs to the pure consciousness or the *puruṣa* who thus behaves as the knower, though he is absolutely unattached to all experiences. The Vaiśeṣikas lay stress on the appearance of knowledge as produced and destroyed and therefore regard knowledge as being produced or destroyed by the collocation of causes. The reflection of the mental states to *puruṣa* is explained by them as if the knowledge belonged to the self. The Vedāntic epistemological process in which the *puruṣa* appears to be the knower and the enjoyer is explained by them as being due to a separate cognitive process called *anu-vyavasāya*.

The transcendental experience of God has also to be explained on the basis of the origin of ordinary experiential knowledge. Through the understanding of the meaning of the scriptural texts and by the processes of Yoga there arises in the *buddhi* a modification of the form "I am Brahman." This valid form of modification, being reflected in the *puruṣa*, is revealed as an intuitive apperception of the fact as true self-knowledge belonging to *puruṣa*. The difference between ordinary experiential knowledge and this knowledge is that it destroys egoism (*abhimāna*). In such a conception of self-knowledge the objection that the self cannot be both the knower and the known does not hold good; for the self that is known, being a mental state, is different in character from the transcendent self which knows it. The transcendent self as such is the knower, while its reflection in the *buddhi* as coming back to it is the self that is known¹. The objection that the admission of the possibility of self-knowledge stands against the doctrine of the self-luminosity of the self is not valid. The self-luminosity of the self simply means that it shines by itself and does not require the aid of any conditions to manifest itself.

Self-Luminosity and Ignorance.

Citsukha has defined self-luminosity as that which not being knowable may yet be treated or felt as immediate (*avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam*). Bhikṣu argues that such a definition of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*) is quite inadmissible. It is nowhere so defined in the Upaniṣads and it does not follow from the etymology of the word *svaprakāśatva*. The etymology only indicates the meaning "known by itself." Again, if a thing is not known or cognized, it cannot for that simple reason have any relation to us; and such a meaning would be directly against the scriptural testimony which affirms that the ultimate truth can be apprehended or intuited. It may be suggested that though the Brahma-state of the mind cannot be directly known yet it will have the effect of removing the *avidyā* in the *puruṣa*. But this is open to various objections. Firstly, the self-luminous is a valid means of knowledge—a *pramāṇa*; but the mere removal of the *avidyā* from

¹ *ātmā'pi bimba-rūpeṇa jñātā bhavati svagata-sva-pratibimba-rūpeṇa ca jñeyah. Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, I. 1. 3.

the *puruṣa* cannot be regarded as valid knowledge or a *pramāṇa*. In this connection it is also relevant to ask the meaning of the term "*avidyā*." If it means an illusory mental state, it must be a state of the *buddhi*, and its destruction must also belong to the *buddhi* and not to the *puruṣa*. If it means the psychical instincts or root-inclinations which are the cause of errors, then also since such root-instincts belong to the *guṇas* of the *prakṛti* the destruction of such root-instincts must also qualify the *prakṛti*. If it is regarded as a *tamas*—substance which covers the self, the supposition would be inadmissible, for if the *tamas* inherent in the *buddhi* is not removed there cannot be any modification of the *buddhi* copying the object in it, and if the *tamas* in the *buddhi* is once so removed then there cannot be any reflection of it in the *puruṣa*. Thus the view that knowledge leads to the dissolution of the veil of ignorance cannot be supported. The veil is only related to the instruments of knowledge, such as the eye, and cannot therefore be regarded as having anything to do with the pure consciousness. The explanation of the rise of knowledge as being due to the removal of the veil in the pure consciousness cannot therefore be justified. There cannot be any veil in the self. If the self be of the nature of pure consciousness, there cannot be any veil of ignorance inherent in it as the two suppositions are self-contradictory. Again, if it is supposed that the world-appearance is due to the operation of the principle of ignorance or *avidyā* in the mind and if it is supposed that true knowledge dispels such ignorance, then we are led to the absolutely unwarrantable conclusion that the world may be destroyed by knowledge, or that when one self attains true knowledge the world-appearance as such ceases, or that when emancipation is attained during the lifetime of a saint he will have no experience of the world around him. If it is held that the emancipated saint has still an element of ignorance in him, then the theory that knowledge destroys ignorance has to be given up. Moreover, if the self be regarded as being absolutely unattached to anything (*a-saṅga*), it is wrong to suppose that it would be associated with *avidyā* or ignorance. The veil can have reference only to the mental states, but it cannot have any relation to pure and unchangeable consciousness; for we have no analogy for such a thing. Again, if it is held that there is natural association of ignorance with pure consciousness, such an association can never be broken off. If such an

association be regarded as the consequence of some causal condition, it may well be said that such causality may be found in the mental states themselves. At least this would be a much simpler supposition than the primary assumption of a relationship of *avidyā* with pure consciousness and then to assume the operation of the mental states to dissolve it. The association of a veil with the mental states has to be admitted at least in the case of deep sleep, swoon or senility. Thus, if the veil has to be associated with the mental states, as the instrument of knowledge, it is quite unnecessary to assume it with reference to the self or pure consciousness. Patañjali, in his *Yoga-sūtra*, has defined *avidyā* as a mental state which apprehends the non-eternal as the eternal, the impure as the pure, the pleasure as sorrow. It is not, therefore, to be regarded as a separate substance inseparably associated with pure consciousness. In the same way it is wrong to define knowledge as the cessation of *avidyā*, which belongs to the *puruṣa* in this capacity. The proper way of representing it would be to say that knowledge arises in the *puruṣa* with the cessation of *avidyā* in the mental states. With the rise of the final knowledge as "I am Brahman" towards which the whole teleological movement of the *prakṛti* for the *puruṣa* was tending, the ultimate purpose of the *prakṛti* for the sake of the *puruṣa* is realized, and that being so the teleological bond which was uniting or associating the *buddhi* with the *puruṣa* is torn asunder and the mind or the *buddhi* ceases to have any function to discharge for the sake of the *puruṣa*. With the destruction of false knowledge all virtue and vice also cease and thus there is the final emancipation with the destruction of the integrity of the *buddhi*. *Avidyā* (false knowledge), *asmitā* (egoism), *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (antipathy), *abhiniveśa* (self-love) may all be regarded as *avidyā* or false knowledge which is their cause, and *avidyā* may also be regarded as *tamas* which is its cause. This *tamas* obstructs the manifestation of *sattva* and it is for this reason that there is false knowledge. When the *tamas* is dominated by the *sattva*, the *sattva* manifests through its instrumentality the ultimate self. The words "knowledge" (*jñāna*) and "ignorance" (*ajñāna*) are used in the scriptures to denote *sattva* and *tamas*. The word *tamas* is used to denote *ajñāna* and there is no such *ajñāna* as indescribable or indefinite entity as is supposed by the Śāṅkarites. In ordinary experiential knowledge this *tamas* is only temporarily removed, but

in the case of the rise of true and ultimate knowledge the power of the *guṇas* to undergo modification for the sake of the relevant *puruṣa* is destroyed. Before the *sattva* can show itself in its own *ṛtti* or state, it must dominate the *tamas* which would have resisted the *sattva* state. Thus the ontological opposition of the *sattva* and the *tamas* must settle their differences before a psychological state can make its appearance.

Relation of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta according to Bhikṣu.

Bhikṣu thinks that the Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophies are intimately connected with the Vedānta and are referred to in the Upaniṣads. For this reason when certain topics, as for example the problem of experiential knowledge, are not described in the Vedānta, these are to be supplemented from the Sāṃkhya and Yoga. If there is any seeming antagonism between the two, these also have to be so explained that the opposition may be reconciled. Bhikṣu takes this attitude not only towards Sāṃkhya-yoga but also towards Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the *Pañcarātra*. According to him all these systems have their basis in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads and have therefore an internal affinity which is not to be found in the Buddhists. The Buddhists are therefore the only real opponents. Thus he attempts to reconcile all the *āstika* systems of philosophy as more or less supplementary to one another or at least presenting differences which can be reconciled if they are looked at from the proper angles of vision. Bhikṣu collects his materials from the Upaniṣads, the Purāṇas and the *smṛtis* and tries to build his system of interpretation on that basis. It may, therefore, be regarded on the whole as a faithful interpretation of the theistic Vedānta which is the dominant view of the Purāṇas in general and which represents the general Hindu view of life and religion. Compared with this general current of Hindu thought, which flows through the Purāṇas and the *smṛtis* and has been the main source from which the Hindu life has drawn its inspiration, the extreme Sāṃkhya, the extreme Vedānta of Śaṅkara, the extreme Nyāya, and the extreme dualism of Madhva may be regarded as metaphysical formalisms of conventional philosophy. Bhikṣu's philosophy is a type of *bhedā-bheda* which has shown itself in various forms in Bharṭṛ-prapañca,

Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and others. The general viewpoint of this *bhedā-bheda* philosophy is that it believes in the reality of the universe as well as in its spirituality, the distinctness of the individual souls as well as in their being centres of the manifestation of God, moral freedom and responsibility as well as a spiritual determinism, a personal God as well as an impersonal reality, the ultimate spirit in which matter and pre-matter are dissolved into spirituality, an immanent teleology pervading through matter and souls both in their origin and mutual intercourse as well as in the holiness of the divine will, omnipotence and omniscience, in the superior value of knowledge as well as of love, in the compulsoriness of moral and social duties as well as in their abnegation.

The ordinary classical Sāṃkhya is well known to be atheistic and the problem arises as to how this may be reconciled with theism and the doctrine of incarnations. In interpreting *sūtra* 1. 1. 5, of the *Brahma-sūtra*, Bhikṣu says that since the scriptures say that "it perceived or desired," Brahman must be a Person, for desire or perception cannot be attributed to the inanimate pre-matter (*prakṛti*). Śaṅkara, in interpreting this *sūtra*, asserts that the purport of the *sūtra* is that *prakṛti* is not the cause of the world because the idea of a *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is unvedic. Bhikṣu quotes a number of passages from the Upaniṣads to show that the idea of a *prakṛti* is not unvedic. *Prakṛti* is spoken of in the Upaniṣads as the cause of the world and as the energy of God. *Prakṛti* is also spoken of as *māyā* in the *Śvetāśvatara*, and God is spoken of as *māyāvī* or the magician who holds within Himself the magic power. The magician may withhold his magic, but the magic power lies all the same in him (*māyāyā vyāpāra-nivṛttir evā'vagamyate na nāśah*)¹. The ordinary *prakṛti* is always undergoing change and transformation and it is only the special *sattva*-stuff associated with God that is always regarded as unchanging.

A question that may naturally arise in this connection is, if God is Himself unchangeable and if the *sattva*-body with which He is always associated is also always unchangeable, how is it that God can have a desire to produce the world at any particular time? The only explanation of this is that the attribution of will to God at a particular creative moment is only a loose usage of language. It

¹ *Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, 1. 1. 5.

means only that when the proper collocation of the causal conditions is ready for emergence into creative production at any particular point of time, it is designated as the manifestation of the creative will of God. God's knowledge and will cannot have a beginning in time¹. But if God's creative will be regarded as the cause of the movement of the *prakṛti*, then the Sāṃkhya view that the movement of the *prakṛti* is solely due to its inherent teleology to be of service to the *puruṣas* becomes indefensible. The *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in the *mahat* are indeed regarded in Sāṃkhya as the triad of three persons, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara—the three created gods as it were (*janye-śvara*). But the Sāṃkhya does not believe in any eternal God (*nitye-śvara*). According to Yoga the *sattva* part of *mahat* associated with eternal powers and existing eternally in the emancipated state is the person called *Īśvara*. His *sattva* body is, however, of the nature of an effect as it is derived from the *sattva* part of *mahat* and His knowledge is also not timeless.

In justification of Sāṃkhya, Bhikṣu maintains that the denial of God by the Sāṃkhya may be interpreted to mean that there is no necessity of admitting God for salvation. Salvation may be achieved by self-knowledge also. If this process is to be adopted, then it becomes quite unnecessary to prove the existence of God. It may, however, be remarked in this connection that this explanation of Bhikṣu can hardly be regarded as correct, for the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* is not merely silent about God, but it makes a positive effort to prove the non-existence of God, and there is not one redeeming statement that can be interpreted to mean that Sāṃkhya was not antagonistic to theism. Bhikṣu, however, further reiterates that Sāṃkhya was not atheistic and refers to the statement in the *Śvetāśvatara* (vi. 16) that salvation can be obtained by knowing the ultimate cause as declared in the Sāṃkhya-yoga and to the statement of the *Gītā* where atheism is regarded as a demonic view.

In referring to Yoga, Bhikṣu says that it is curious that though the Yoga admitted the existence of God yet it did not make any effort to repudiate the idea that He might be partial or cruel; and instead of giving God His true cosmological place accepted a naturalistic view that *prakṛti* of itself passes through the transformatory changes, being determined by its own inherent teleology in relation to the *puruṣas*. *Īśvara*, in Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra*, is an

¹ *Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, I. 1. 5.

object of Yoga meditation and He shows His mercy to his devotees and other beings. Bhikṣu, however, thinks that unless God is made to serve a cosmological purpose the association of *prakṛti* with the *puruṣas* cannot be explained.

The *Īśvara* is not conditioned in His activities by any entities which are associated with *rajas* or *tamas* which are of a fluctuating nature but with an entity which is always the same and which is always associated with eternal knowledge, will and bliss¹. The natural implication of this is that the will of God behaves like an eternal and unchangeable law. This law, however, is not a constituent of God but a constituent of *prakṛti* itself. It is through this part, an eternal unchangeable law which behaves as the eternal will and knowledge of God, that the phenomenal or the changeable part of *prakṛti* is determined.

In the *Gītā* Śrī Kṛṣṇa says that He is the highest *puruṣa* and that there is nothing higher than Him. Bhikṣu gives two explanations of such statements which seem to be in opposition to the concept of God explained above. One explanation is that the reference of Kṛṣṇa as God to Himself is only a relative statement, made in a popular manner which has no reference to the nature of absolute God who is unrelationable to ordinary experience. The other explanation is that Kṛṣṇa calls Himself God by feeling Himself as identified with God. There is thus a distinction between *para-brahma* and *kārya-brahma*; and Śrī Kṛṣṇa, being the *kārya-brahman*, popularly describes Himself as the *kāraṇa-brahma*. When other beings identify themselves with *brahma*, such identification is true only with reference to *kārya-brahma*, Śrī Kṛṣṇa or Nārāyaṇa. They therefore have no right to speak of themselves as the absolute God. Beginningless absolute Brahman is unknown and unknowable, even by the gods and the sages. It is only the Nārāyaṇa who can know Him in His absolute nature. Nārāyaṇa is therefore to be regarded as the wisest of all beings². Those beings who in the previous creation became one with God by *sāyujya-mukti* exist in the *Īśudeva-tyūha*. In the *Īśudeva-tyūha* Vāsudeva alone is the

¹ *rajas-tamah-sambhinnatayā malinaṃ kārya-tattvaṃ parama-śvarasya no' pādhiḥ kintu kevalaṃ nitya-jñāne-ccā-nandā-dimat-sada-ka-rūpaṃ kāraṇa-sattvaṃ eva tasyo' pādhiḥ. Īśvara-gītā. MS.*

² *anādyam taṃ paraṃ brahma na devā
narāyaṇa viduḥ
ekas tad vedu bhagavān dhātā nārāyaṇaḥ
prabhuh. Viṣṇāna-mṛta-bhāṣya, 1. 1. 5.*

eternal God; the other beings are but His parts. The other *vyūhas*, such as the Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, are but the manifestations of Vāsudeva (*vibhūti*) and they are to be regarded as partial creation of God or as Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. The power of the lesser gods, Viṣṇu or Śiva, is limited, since they cannot produce any change in the regulation of the cosmic affairs. When they speak of themselves as the Supreme God they do so only by a process of self-identification with the absolute God. The mahattatva, with its threefold aspect as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, forms the subtle body of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva or Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. These three gods, therefore, are supposed to have the one body, the “*mahat*,” which forms the basic foundation and substratum of all cosmic evolution. It is for this reason that they are said to have the cosmos or the universe as their body. These three deities are regarded as mutually interdependent in their operations, like *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha*. It is for this reason that they are said to be both different from one another and yet identical¹. These three deities are identical with “*mahat*” which again is the unity of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. It is for this reason that Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara are to be regarded as the partial manifestations (*aṃśāvatam*) of Gods and not direct incarnations².

The penetration of *Īśvara* into *pradhāna* and *puruṣa* is through His knowledge, will and effort by which He rouses the *guṇas* and helps the production of the *mahat*. Bhikṣu takes great pains to show that Bhagavān or absolute God is different from Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu who are direct manifestations of Him just as sons are of the father. Bhikṣu here differs from the opinion of the *Pañcarātra* school and of other thinkers such as Madhva, Vallabha and Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas who regard Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa as identical with God. The other *avatāras*, such as the Matsya, Kūrma, etc., are regarded by Bhikṣu as the *līlā-vatāra* of Viṣṇu and the *āveśā-vatāra* of God as *bhagavān* or *parameśvara*.

¹ *Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, I. 1. 5.

² In this connection Bhikṣu quotes the famous verse of the *Bhāgavata*, *ete cā mśa-kalāḥ puṃsaḥ kṛṣṇas tu bhagavān sryam*. I. 1. 5. He, however, paraphrases Kṛṣṇa as Viṣṇu and explains *svayaṃ bhagavān* as being the part of God just as the son is the part of the father: *atra kṛṣṇo viṣṇuḥ svayaṃ parameśvaras tasya putravat sākṣād aṃśa ity arthaḥ*. *Ibid*. This, however, goes directly against the interpretation of the verse by the Gauḍīya school of Vaiṣṇavas who regard Kṛṣṇa as being the absolute God.

Māyā and Pradhāna.

Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, I. 1. 4, discusses the meaning of the term *avyakta* and holds that it has no technical meaning but is merely a negation of *vyakta* or manifested form. He says that the word *avyakta* is compounded of the negative particle *na* and *vyakta*. He points out that since the term *avyakta* has thus a mere etymological meaning and signifies merely the unmanifested, it cannot be regarded as having a technical application to the *Pradhāna* of Sāṃkhya. The *avyakta* according to Śaṅkara thus means the subtle cause, but he does not think that there is an independent subtle cause of the world corresponding to the *Pradhāna* of the Sāṃkhya¹. He holds that this primal state of the existence of the universe is dependent upon God and is not an independent reality. Without the acceptance of such a subtle power abiding in God, God cannot be a creator. For without power God cannot move Himself towards creation; it is the seed power called *avidyā* which is denoted by the term *avyakta*. It is the great sleep of *māyā* (*māyāmayī mahā-supti*) depending upon God. In it all the *jīvas* lie without any self-awakening. The potency of the seed power is destroyed by knowledge in the case of emancipated beings and for that reason they are not born again². Vācaspati, in commenting on it in his *Bhāmātī*, says that there are different *avidyās* with reference to different selves. Whenever an individual attempts to gain wisdom, the *avidyā* associated with him is destroyed, though the *avidyā* associated with other individuals remains the same. Thus, even though one *avidyā* is destroyed, the other *avidyās* may remain in an operative condition and may produce the world. In the case of the Sāṃkhyaists, however, who admit one *pradhāna*, its destruction would mean the destruction of all. Vācaspati says further that if it is held that though the *pradhāna* remains the same yet the *avidyā* as non-distinction between *puruṣa* and the *buddhi* is responsible for bondage, then there is no necessity of admitting the *prakṛti* at all. The existence and the non-existence of *avidyā* would explain the problem of bondage and emancipation.

¹ *yadi rayam sva-tantram kāñcit prāg-avasthām jagataḥ kṛāṇatvenā' bhyupagacchema praśaṅjayema tadā pradhāna-kāraṇa-vādam. Vedānta-sūtra, I.*

4. 3.

² *muktānām ca punar an utpattiḥ; kutaḥ vidyayā tasyā vīja-śakter dāhāt. Ibid.*

The objection that the distinction of selves depends upon *avidyā* and the distinction of *avidyā* upon the distinction of the selves is invalid, for the process is beginningless. The term *avyakta* refers to *avidyā* in a generic sense as including all *avidyās*. The *avidyā* rests in the individual but is yet dependent upon God as its agent and object. The *avidyā* cannot come into operation without having the Brahman as its support, though the real nature of the selves is Brahman; yet, so long as they are surrounded by *avidyā*, they cannot know their real nature.

In reply Bhikṣu says that since without power God alone is unable to create the manifold universe it has to be admitted that God does so by a power distinct from Him, and this power is the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*. If it is said that this power is *avidyā*, then also since it is a dual factor separate from Brahman that may as much nullify the monistic doctrine as the admission of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. It cannot also be said that in the time of *pralaya* the *avidyā* is non-existent, for in that case there being only Brahman the world would have to be admitted as coming into being from Brahman alone, and the selves that lie identified with Brahman and one with Him would, even though emancipated, undergo the world-process (*saṃsāra*). If it is held that bondage and emancipation are all imaginary, then there is no reason why people should undergo so much trouble in order to attain an imaginary emancipation. If it is held that *avidyā* may be said to have a secondary or *vyavahārika* existence at the time of *pralaya*, and if it is argued that under the circumstances bondage and emancipation may also be regarded as having a merely secondary existence, the view of monism would be unexceptional. But if such an *avidyā* be admitted which has mere *vyavahārika* or secondary existence, the same may be supposed with regard to *pradhāna*. If we inquire into the meaning and significance of the term *vyavahārika*, we find that its connotation is limited to the power of effectuation and service towards the fulfilment of the purpose. If that is so, then *prakṛti* may also be admitted to have a similar kind of existence¹. It is true no doubt that the *pradhāna* is regarded as eternal, but this eternality is an eternality of ceaseless change. *Avidyā* is regarded by the Vedāntists as *apāramārthikā*, that is, *avidyā* is not true

¹ *pradhāne' pīdaṃ tulyaṃ pradhāne artha-kriyā-kāritva-rūpa-vyavahārika-sattvasyaivā'smākam iṣṭattvāt. Vijnāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, 1. 4. 3.

absolutely. This negation of absolute truth may mean that it is not immediate and self-apparent or that it cannot manifest itself as being or that it has no existence in all times. But such limitations are true also of *pradhāna*. The *pradhāna* is eternal as changeful, but it is non-eternal in all its products. All the products of *prakṛti* are destructible; being unintelligent by nature they can never be self-apparent. Again, though *pradhāna* may be said to be existent in any particular form at any particular time, yet even at that time it is non-existent in all its past and future forms. Thus, since *vyavahārikatva* cannot mean absolute non-existence (like the hare's horn) and since it cannot also mean absolute existence it can only mean changefulness (*pariṇāmittva*); and such an existence is true of the *pradhāna*. Thus Śāṅkarites do not gain anything in criticizing the doctrine of *pradhāna*, as a substitute of the *avidyā* is supposed by them to be endowed with the same characteristics as those of the *prakṛti*.

It is thus evident that Śāṅkara's criticism against *prakṛti* may well apply to the *prakṛti* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, but it has hardly any application to the doctrine of *prakṛti* as conceived in the Purāṇas as interpreted by Bhikṣu, where *prakṛti* is regarded as a power of Brahman. If *avidyā* is also so regarded, it becomes similar to *prakṛti*. As it is believed to be existent in a potential form in God, even in the *pralaya*, most of the connotations of *avidyā* that distinguish it from the absolute reality in the Brahman are also the connotations of *prakṛti*.

According to the view propounded by Bhikṣu *pradhāna* is not regarded as having a separate and independent existence but only as a power of God¹.

In explaining *Brahma-sūtra* 1. 4. 23, Bhikṣu points out that *Īśvara* has no other *upādhi* than *prakṛti*. All the qualities of *Īśvara* such as bliss, etc., proceed from *prakṛti* as is shown in *Patañjali-sūtra*. *Prakṛti* is to be regarded as the characteristic nature of Brahman, which is not directly the material cause of the world, but is only the abiding or the ground cause (*adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa*), and *prakṛti*, as it were, is its own character or part (*sṛīyo bhāvaḥ padārtha upādhir ity arthah*). The relation between this *upādhi* and *prakṛti* is one of the controller and the controlled or the possessor

¹ *Prakṛtasya tad-upapattaye pradhānam kāraṇatva-svīritavac chakṛtvīdhava-*
vo'cyate na svatantryeṇa'ity aṇ adhiyāta ity arthah *Viṅṇāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, 1. 4. 4.

and the possessed. The fact that God can think or will also testifies to the fact that God must have as His instrument the *prakṛti* which can make such thinking possible for Him. For God is in Himself only pure consciousness. *Prakṛti*, however, behaves as the *upādhi* of God with its purer parts of the eternally pure *sattva*. *Kāla* and *adr̥ṣṭa* also form part of the *prakṛti* and as such are not regarded as the separate powers of God.

Bhikṣu's criticism of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga.

In commenting on the *Brahma-sūtra*, II. 1. 1, 2, 3, Bhikṣu says that Manu speaks of the original cause as being the *prakṛti*, and so also does the Sāṃkhya, and both of them are regarded as authoritative¹. But since the Sāṃkhya doctrine of atheism is contradicted by the opinions of Patañjali and Parāśara, the view of the *Brahma-sūtras* cannot be interpreted merely on the atheistic suggestion of Sāṃkhya. It has also to be admitted that the atheistic portion of Sāṃkhya has no authoritative support either in the Vedas or in the Purāṇas and has therefore to be regarded as invalid².

It is wrong, however, to suppose that Kapila really intended to preach atheism. He quoted atheistic arguments from others and showed that even if God were not accepted emancipation could be obtained by differentiation of *prakṛti* from *puruṣa*. The Sāṃkhya also emphasizes the fact that emancipation can be obtained merely by knowledge. This, however, should not be interpreted as being in conflict with the Upaniṣadic texts which declare that emancipation can be obtained only by the true knowledge of God. For these signify only that there are two ways of obtaining emancipation, the inferior one being through knowledge of the distinction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, and the superior one through the true knowledge of God. The Yoga also shows two ways of emancipation, the inferior one being through the ordinary Yoga processes, and the superior one through the renunciation to God of all actions and through devotion to Him. It is also wrong to suppose that the Sāṃkhya is traditionally atheistic, for in the *Mahābhārata* (*Śānti-parvan* 318. 73) and *Matsya Purāṇa* (4. 28) we hear of a twenty-sixth category,

¹ *sāṃkhyam yogam pañca-rātram vedāḥ pāsupatam tathā* 1. *paras-parāṇy aṅgāny etāni hetubhir na virodhayet. Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 1.

² *itaś ce'śvara-pratiṣedhā-mśe kapila-smṛteḥ mūlānām anupalabdheḥ a-pratyakṣatvāt durvalatvam ity āha. Ibid.*

the God. So the difference between the theistic and the atheistic Sāṃkhya is due to the difference of representation as the true Sāṃkhya doctrine and the Sāṃkhya doctrine which proposes to ensure emancipation even for those who are not willing to believe in God. In this connection Bhikṣu admits the probability of two different schools of Sāṃkhya, one admitting *Īśvara* and the other not admitting it, and it is only the latter which he thinks to be invalid¹. He also refers to the *Kūrma Purāṇa* in which the Sāṃkhyaists and the Yogins are said to be atheistic. The chief defect of the Śāṅkara school is that instead of pointing out the invalidity of theistic Sāṃkhya, Śāṅkara denies all theistic speculations as non-vedic and misinterprets the *Brahma-sūtras* accordingly. Bhikṣu refers to *Praśna*, 4. 8, where the twenty-three categories of Sāṃkhya are mentioned and only *prakṛti* has been omitted. The *mahat-tattva* is not mentioned directly, but only as *buddhi* and *citta*. The fourfold division of the *buddhi-tattva* as *manas*, *buddhi* *ahaṃkāra* and *citta* is also admitted there. In the *Garbha Upaniṣad* eight *prakṛtis* and sixteen *vikāras* are mentioned. In the *Maitreya-upaniṣad* we hear of the three *guṇas* and their disturbance by which creation takes place. We hear also that the *puruṣas* are pure consciousness. In *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, v. 2, it is said that the *tamas*, being disturbed by the supreme being, gives rise to *rajas* and that to *sattva*². In the *Cūlikā Upaniṣad* the categories of the Sāṃkhya doctrine are also mentioned in consonance with the monistic doctrine of the Vedānta. It also says that there are various schools of the Sāṃkhya, that there are some who admit twenty-six categories, others twenty-seven, and again others who admit only twenty-four categories. There is also said to be a monistic and also a dualistic Sāṃkhya and that they find expression in three or five different ways. Thus Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that the Sāṃkhya doctrine is definitely supported by the Upaniṣadic texts.

Concerning the Yoga also it can be said that only that part of it may be regarded as opposed by the Upaniṣads which holds a separate and independent existence of *prakṛti* as apart from *Īśvara*. In the *Sūtras* of Patañjali it is said that God helps the movement of the *prakṛti* only by removing the obstacles, just as a ploughman enables

¹ *athavā kapilai-ka-deśasya prāmānyam astu. Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 2.

² *tamo vā idm ekamagre āsti vai rajasas tat pure syāt tat pareṇ'ritam viśamatvaṃ prayāty etad rūpaṃ tad rajasḥ khalv i-ritam viśamatvaṃ prayāty etad vai sattvasya rūpaṃ tat sattvaṃ eva. Maitrī Upaniṣad*, v. 2.

water to pass from one field to another. But the Upaniṣads definitely say that God is the generator of the movement and the disturbance of the *prakṛti*. The *sattva* body of God is thus there held to be a product of *prakṛti* as it comes into being from the *prakṛti* through desire in a previous creative cycle. The *sattva* body of God is thus derived from the *prakṛti*, through the will of God serving as the vehicle of the will of God for the removal of the obstructions in the course of the evolutionary process of the *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* in itself therefore is not regarded by Patañjali as the *upādhi* of *Īśvara*¹. Bhikṣu seeks to explain this part of the Yoga doctrine also in the same manner as he did with the Sāṃkhya by accepting the so-called *abhyūpagama-vāda*. He maintains that the Yoga holds that even if it is considered that the *prakṛti* is independent and runs into evolutionary activity by herself, undetermined by the eternal knowledge and will of God, and even if it be admitted that the eternal God has no eternal knowledge and will and that the movement of *prakṛti* is due to an inner teleology in accordance with *karma*, and that in the beginning of the creation *prakṛti* is transformed into the *sattvo'pādhi* of God, even then by self-abnegation to God *kaivalya* can be attained. Thus, in the Yoga view the *upādhi* of *Īśvara* is a product and not the material or the instrumental cause of the world, whereas in the Vedānta view as propounded by Bhikṣu the *upādhi* of *Īśvara* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, and this *upādhi* which forms the material stuff of the world is *prakṛti* herself and not her product. In the Yoga view God is eternal, but His thought and will are not eternal. This thought and will are associated with the *sattva* part of *prakṛti* which lies embedded in it at the time of *pralaya* which only shows itself at the beginning of a new creative cycle through the potency left in it by the will of God in the previous creative cycle. God, in the view of Yoga, is thus not both the material and the instrumental cause of the world as the Vedānta holds. According to the Vedānta as explained by Bhikṣu, the *prakṛti* plays her dual part; in one part she remains as the eternal vehicle of the eternal knowledge and will of God, and through the other part she runs through an evolutionary process by producing disturbances of *sattva*, *rajas* and

¹ *yogā hi'śvarasya jagan-nimittatvaṃ prakṛtitenā'bhyupagacchanti Īśvaro-pādheh sattva-viśeṣasya purva-sargīya-tat-saṃkalpa-vaśāt sargā-dau sva-tantra-prakṛtita utpaty-āṅgikārāt. Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 2.

tamas. This also explains the Purāṇic view of the gradual derivation of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* as stages in the evolution of *prakṛti* through which at a later stage the cosmic evolution takes place. Thus the *prakṛti* which remains associated with God as the vehicle of His knowledge and will is unchangeable and eternal¹.

Īśvara-gītā, its Philosophy as expounded by Vijñāna Bhikṣu.

In the second part (*uttara-vibhāga*) of the *Kūrma Purāṇa* the first eleven chapters are called *Īśvara-gītā*. In the first chapter of this section Suta asks Vyāsa about the true knowledge leading to emancipation as originally instructed by Nārāyaṇa in his incarnation as a tortoise. It is reported by Vyāsa that in Vadarikāśrama in an assembly of the sages Sanat-kumāra, Sanandana, Sanaka, Aṅgirā, Bhṛgu, Kaṇāda, Kapila, Garga, Valadeva, Śukra, and Vasiṣṭha Ṛṣi Nārāyaṇa appeared and later on Śiva also came there. Śiva then at the request of the sages gave a discourse regarding the ultimate nature of reality, the world and God. The real discourse begins with the second chapter. Vijñāna Bhikṣu wrote a commentary on the *Īśvara-gītā*; he thought that since the *Īśvara-gītā* contains the main purport of the *Bhagavad-gītā* it was unnecessary for him to write any commentary on the latter. Apart from the Sāṃkhya and Yoga works, Vijñāna Bhikṣu wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, a commentary on the Upaniṣads, and a commentary on the *Īśvara-gītā* of the *Kūrma Purāṇa*. In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* he quotes a passage from Ācārya of the thirteenth century. He himself probably flourished some time in the fourteenth century. Bhikṣu's other works are *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, *Yoga-vārtika*, *Yoga-sūtra*, *Sāṃkhya-sāra*, and the *U'padeśa-ratnamālā*. In his interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* and of the *Īśvara-gītā* he has followed the line of interpretation of Vedānta as adopted in the Purāṇas, where the Sāṃkhya-yoga and Vedānta appear to be welded together into one indivisible harmonious system. The philosophy of the *Īśvara-gītā* as dealt with here is based upon Bhikṣu's commentary, called the *Īśvara-gītā-bhāṣya* which was available to the present writer as a manuscript by courtesy of M. M. Gopīnātha Kavirāja, of the Benares Sanskrit College.

¹ *Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya*, pp. 271, 272.

The main questions that were asked by the sages which led to the discourse of Śiva are the following: (1) What is the cause of all? (2) Who suffers rebirth? (3) What is the soul? (4) What is emancipation? (5) What is the cause of rebirth? (6) What is the nature of rebirth? (7) Who can realize all? (8) What is the ultimate reality, the Brahman? The answers to these questions are not given serially, but the most important topics as they appeared to the instructor, Śiva, were handled by him in his own order of discourse. Thus the eighth question was taken up for answer before all other questions. This answer begins with a description of the nature of *Ātman* not as the individual soul, but as the highest self.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu seems to acknowledge the doctrine of absolute absorption or assimilation of the individual soul within the universal and infinite soul. And even during his existence in this world, the soul is said to be merely a witness.

He explains that in the answer to the eighth question in the *Kūrma Purāṇa*, II. l. 7, p. 453¹, the word *ātmā* refers to the God-head, though in ordinary usage it stands only for the finite souls, and suggests the self-sameness of the finite and infinite souls. The reference here is thus to the *prākṛtā-tmā* and not to the *jīvā-tmā*². God is called *sarvā-ntara* as He has already entered the hearts (*antaḥ*) of the diverse living beings and exists there in the capacity of being only a witness (*sarveṣāṃ sva-bhinnānām antaḥ-sākṣitvena' nugataḥ*)³. A *sākṣī* (witness) is he who illuminates (*sva-prati-vimbīta-vastu-bhāsaḥ*), without any efforts on his part (*vyāpāram vinai' va*). He is called *antaryāmi* on account of his association with finite intelligences and through this association even the individual soul shares the greatness of the highest self.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that the line "*asmād vijāyate viśvam atraī' va pravīṇiyate*" occurs here by way of giving a reason for the *śakti-śaktimad-a-bhedatva* doctrine so ably put forth by calling the ultimate Reality or *paramā-tman*, *antaryāmin* and then explaining the doctrine a little by giving him a few adjectives more to bring out the significance of the esoteric doctrine or suggestion of *śakti-śaktimad-abhedatva*. Now it is said that as it is from Him that the inverse-effects are created, in Him they exist and in Him they are

¹ *Bibliotheca Indica* edition, 1890.

² See *Īśvara-gītā-bhāṣya*, MS.

³ *evam antaryāmi-sattva-sambandhāt cin mātro'pi paramā-ntaryāmi bhavati sarvā-ntaratvena sarva-śaktiṣv' avibhāga-lakṣaṇā-bhedāt. Ibid.*

annihilated. He is non-different (or better, inseparable) from *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, because of His being the support and the ground of the whole universe beginning from *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*; i.e. of the effects right down from *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and inclusive of them. If like the body He had not superintended all the causal agencies, then the cause, like the *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, etc., could not have effected any causal function (*yadi hi paramā-tmā dehavat sarvaṃ kāraṇaṃ nā'dhitiṣṭheta tarhi dravya-guṇa-karmā-di-sādhāraṇā-khila-kriyā-rtha-mūla-kāraṇaṃ na syād iti*)¹. If it is said that the sentence speaks of effectedness (or causality) as common to all tangible manifestations, then the idea of the previous sentence maintaining the identity between Brahman and the world would not be admissible².

Brahman is the *upādāna-kāraṇa* of the universe, but this universe is a *pariṇāmi-rūpa* of Brahman. His is not therefore the *pariṇāmi-rūpa*, because that will contradict the statements made by the scriptures declaring the Brahman to be unchangeable (*kūṭastha*). Then Vijñāna Bhikṣu defines that God being the ultimate substratum of all, the functioning of all types of causes is helped in its operation by Him and it is this that is called the *adhīṣṭhāna-kāraṇatā* of God.

Then he maintains his doctrine of *jīvātma-paramā-tmanor aṃśāṃśy-abheda* by the line “*sa māyī māyayā baddhaḥ karoti vividhās tanūḥ*” and says further that *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* and *Vedānta-sūtra* also preach the same doctrine. *Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā* says the same thing. Then comes the elaboration of the same idea. A reference to Śaṅkara by way of criticizing him is made³. *Māyā-vāda* is called a sort of covert Buddhism and for support a passage from *Padma-purāṇa* has also been quoted.

Adhīṣṭhāna-kāraṇatva, or the underlying causality, is defined as that in which, essence remaining the same, new differences emerge just as a spark from the fire. This is also called the *aṃśāṃśi-bhāva*, for, though the *niravayava* Brahman cannot be regarded as having parts, yet it is on account of the emergence of different characters from a common basis that the characterized units are called the parts of the common basis. It should be noted that Vijñāna Bhikṣu is against the view that the Brahman undergoes any transformatory

¹ *Īśvara-gītā-bhāṣya*. MS.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

change. Though the Brahman does not undergo any transformatory change, yet new differences emerge out of it. In the sentence "*Sa māyī māyayā baddhaḥ*" the idea is that the *māyā* itself is an integral part of the Divine entity and not different from it. The *māyā* is like an *amśa* which is identical with the *amśin*.

Though in the scriptures both the distinction and the identity of the individual with the Brahman have often been mentioned, yet it is by the realization of the difference of the individual with the Brahman that ultimate emancipation can be attained¹.

The self is of the nature of pure consciousness and is not in any way bound by its experiences. The assertion of Śaṅkara that *ātma* is of the nature of joy or bliss is also wrong; for no one can always be attached to himself, and the fact that everyone seeks to further his own interest in all his actions does not imply that the soul is of the nature of bliss. Moreover, if the soul is of the nature of pure consciousness, it cannot at the same time be of the nature of pure bliss; at the time of acquiring knowledge we do not always feel pleasure.²

Egoism (*abhimāna*) also does not belong to the soul but like *sukha* and *duḥkha* belongs to *prakṛti*, which are wrongly attributed to the self.³ The soul is, however, regarded as an enjoyer of its experiences of pleasure and pain, a reflection of them on it through the *vr̥tti*, and such a reflection of pleasure and pain, etc., through the *vr̥tti* is regarded as the realization (*sākṣātkāra*) of the experiences. Such an enjoyment of experiences, therefore, is to be regarded as *anaupādhika* (or unconditional). This is also borne out by the testimony of the *Bhagavad-gītā* and Sāṃkhya. Such an enjoyment of the experiences does not belong to the *prakṛti* (*sākṣātkāra-rūpa-dharmasya dṛṣya-dharmatva-sambhavāt*)⁴. The passages which say that the experiences do not belong to the *puruṣa* refer to the modifications of *vr̥tti* in connection with the experiences. The assertion of Śaṅkara, therefore, that the *ātman* is as incapable of experiences (*bhoga*) as of the power of acting (*kar̥tr̥tva*) is therefore false.

Ajñāna, according to Vijñāna Bhikṣu, means *anyathā-jñāna*. *Pradhāna* is so called because it performs all the actions for the sake of the *puruṣa*; and it is through the fault of his association with *pradhāna* that the *puruṣa* is associated with false knowledge.

¹ *Īśvara-gītā-bhāṣya*.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

The *ātman* remains unchanged in itself and the differences are due to the emergence of the association of *buddhi* and other faculties which give rise to experience. At the time of emancipation *jīvas* remain undifferentiated with Brahman. *Prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, and *kāla* are ultimately supported in Brahman and yet are different from it.

There are indeed two kinds of scriptural texts, one emphasizing the monistic side, the other the dualistic. A right interpretation should, however, emphasize the duality-texts, for if everything were false then even such a falsity would be undemonstrable and self-contradictory. If it is argued that one may accept the validity of the scriptural texts until the Brahman is realized and when that is done it matters little if the scriptural texts are found invalid, the reply to such an objection is that, whenever a person discovers that the means through which he attained the conclusion was invalid, he naturally suspects the very conclusion arrived at. Thus the knowledge of Brahman would itself appear doubtful to a person who discovers that the instruments of such knowledge were themselves defective.

The individual soul exists in the *paramā-tman* in an undifferentiated state in the sense that the *paramā-tman* is the essence or ground-cause of the *jīvas*; and the texts which emphasize the monistic side indicate this nature of *paramā-tman* as the ground-cause. This does not imply that the individual souls are identical with Brahman.

Pleasure and pain do not belong to the self; they really belong to the *antaḥkaraṇa* and they are ascribed to the self only through the association of the *antaḥkaraṇa* with the self. In the state of emancipation the self is pure consciousness without any association of pleasure and pain. The ultimate end is the cessation of the suffering of sorrow (*duḥkha-bhoga-nivṛtti*) and not the cessation of sorrow (*na duḥkha-nivṛttiḥ*); for when one has ceased to suffer sorrow, sorrow may still be there and the avoidance of it would be the end of other persons. The assertion of Śaṅkara that there is bliss in the stage of emancipation is wrong. For during that stage there is no mental organ by which happiness could be enjoyed. If the self be regarded as of the nature of bliss, then also the self would be both the agent and the object of the enjoyment of bliss, which is impossible. The ascription of *ānanda* in the state of emancipation only refers to it in a technical sense, i.e., *ānanda* means the absence of pleasure and pain.

Bhikṣu admits a gradation of realities. He holds further that when one entity is stabler than another, the former is more real than the latter. Since *paramā-tman* is always the same and does not undergo any change or transformation or dissolution, He is more real than the *prakṛti* or *puruṣa* or the evolutes of *prakṛti*. This idea has also been expressed in the view of the Purāṇas that the ultimate essence of the world is of the nature of knowledge which is the form of the *paramā-tman*. It is in this essential form that the world is regarded as ultimately real and not as *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* which are changing forms.

The *prakṛti* or *māyā* has often been described as that which can be called neither existent nor non-existent. This has been interpreted by the Śāṅkarites as implying the falsity of *māyā*. But according to Vijñāna Bhikṣu it means that the original cause may be regarded as partly real and partly unreal in the sense that while it is unproductive it is regarded as unreal, and when it passes through the course of evolutionary changes it is regarded as real (*kīñcit sad-rūpā kiñcit asad-rūpā ca bhavati*).

Now coming to *sādhana* he says that by *āgama*, *anumāna* and *dhyāna* one should attain self-knowledge. This self-realization leads to the *asamprajñāta-yoga* which uproots all the *vāsanās*. It is attained not only by the cessation of *ajñāna* but also by the destruction of the *karmas*. He also maintains that the emphasis of Śāṅkara on the understanding of the Upaniṣadic texts as a means to the attainment of self-realization is also wrong.

In the state of *mukti*, self having dissociated itself from the *liṅga-śarīra* becomes one with Brahman, just as the river becomes one with the sea. This is not a case of identity, but one of non-difference (*liṅga-śarīrā-tmaka-ṣoḍaśa-kala-sūnyena ekatām avi-bhāga-lakṣanā-bhedam atyantam vrajet*). Here in the state of *mukti* the identity and difference of *jīva* and Brahman have been indicated on the analogy of the river and the sea.

Bhikṣu says that there is a difference between the Sāṃkhya and Yoga regarding the attainment of emancipation. The followers of the Sāṃkhya can attain emancipation only by the cessation of their *prārabdha karmas*. Since *avidyā* has been destroyed, the realization of emancipation has only to wait till the *prārabdhās* exhaust themselves. The followers of Yoga, however, who enter into a state of *asamprajñāta-samādhi* have not to suffer the fruits of the *prārabdha*,

because being in a state of *asamprañāta* meditation the *prārabdha* can no longer touch them. They can, therefore, immediately enter into a state of emancipation at their own sweet will.

According to Bhikṣu, though *Īśvara* transcends the *guṇas*, yet through his body as pure *sattva* he carries on the creative work and the work of superintending and controlling the affairs of the universe. Though his agency is manifested through his body as pure *sattva* as a directive activity, yet it is without any association of passions, antipathies, etc.

In the third chapter of the *Kūrma Purāṇa* it is said that *pradhāna*, *puruṣa* and *kāla* emerge from *avyakta*, and from them the whole world came into being. Bhikṣu says that the world did not emanate directly from Brahman but from *pradhāna*, *puruṣa* and *kāla*. There cannot be any direct emanation from Brahman; for that would mean that Brahman undergoes a change. A direct emanation would imply that evil and hell also sprang from Brahman. The emanation of *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* and *kāla* from Brahman is explained on the supposition that Brahman is a kind of ground-cause of *prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, and *kāla* (*abhivyakti-kāraṇa* or *ādhāra-kāraṇa*). But this emanation of *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* and *kāla* is not through modificatory processes in the manner in which curd is produced from milk. In the time of dissolution *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are unproductive of any effects and may therefore be regarded as it were as non-existent. It is through the will of God that the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are drawn out and connected together, and the point of motivation is started for the processes of modification of the *prakṛti*. This point of motivation is called *kāla*. It is by such a course that all these three may be regarded as producing an effect and therefore as existent. It is in this sense that *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* and *kāla* are regarded as brought into being by God¹.

Avyakta as God is so called because it transcends human knowledge. It is also so called because it is a state of non-duality, where there is no difference between energy and its possessor, and where everything exists in an undifferentiated manner. *Avyakta* used in

¹ *na tu sākṣād eva brahmaṇaḥ... atra kālā-di-trayaśca brahma-kāryatvaṃ abhivyakti-rūpaṃ eva vivakṣitam... prakṛti-puruṣayoś ca mahad-ādi-kāryo-nmukhatañ ca parame-śvare-kytād anyonya-samyogād eva bhavati, evaṃ kālasya prakṛti-puruṣa-samyogā-khya-kāryo-nmukhatvaṃ parame-śvare-cch ayuḥ'va bhavati. Īśvara-gītā-bhāṣya. MS.*

the sense of *prakṛti* is the basis of change, or change as such; and *puruṣa* denotes the knower.

The *paramā-tman* is spoken of as the soul of all beings. This should not, however, be taken to mean that there is only the *paramātman* which exists and that all things are but false impositions on his nature. The *paramā-tman* or *Parameśvara* is both different and identical with *kāla*, *pradhāna* and the *puruṣa*. The existence of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* has to be regarded as less ultimate than the existence of God, because the existence of the former is relative as compared with the existence of God (*vikāra-pekṣayā sthiraṭvena apekṣakam etayos tattvam*, p. 44). Time is regarded as an instrumental cause of the connection of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Time is a superior instrumental agent to deeds, for the deeds are also produced by time (*karmā-dīnam api kāla-janyatvāt*). Though the time is beginningless, yet it has to be admitted that it has a special function with reference to each specific effect it produces. It is for that reason that at the point of dissolution time does not produce the evolutes of *mahat*, etc. *Mahat-tatva* is in itself a combination of the conscious centres and the material element.

When the word *puruṣa* is used in the singular number, such a use should not be interpreted to mean a denial of the individual *puruṣas*. It only means that in such instances of scriptural texts the word *puruṣa* has been used in a generic sense. *Puruṣas* are also of two kinds—the *apara* and the *para*. Both are in themselves devoid of any qualities and of the nature of pure consciousness. But there is this difference between the *para puruṣa* and the *apara puruṣa*, that while the former never has any kind of association with any experience of pleasure and pain, the latter may sometimes be associated with pleasure and pain which he at that time feels to be his own (*anye guṇā-bhimānāt saguṇā iva bhavanti paramātmā tu guṇā-bhimāna-śūnyaḥ*, p. 46). It must be understood, however, that the experiencing of pleasure and pain is not an indispensable part of the definition of *puruṣa*, for at the stage of *jīvan-mukti* the *puruṣas* do not identify themselves with the experiences of pleasure and pain, but they are still *puruṣas* all the same. God, however, who is called the superior *puruṣa*, does not associate Himself with the experiences that proceed as a fruit of *karma* and which are enjoyed in a spatial-temporal manner. But God continues to enjoy eternal bliss in association with His own special *upādhi* or conditions

(*svo-pādhistha-nityā-nanda-bhokṛtvaṃ tu paramā'tmano'pi asti*). When the scriptural texts deny the enjoyment of the experiences of pleasure and pain with regard to the Supreme *puruṣa*, the idea is that though the Supreme *puruṣa* underlies the ordinary *puruṣas* as their ground yet he is not in any way affected by their experiences (*ekasminn eva buddhāv avasthānena jīva-bhogataḥ prasaktasya paramā-tma-bhogasyai'eva pratiśedhaḥ*). So the Supreme *puruṣa* has in common with ordinary *puruṣas* certain experiences of his own. These experiences of pure eternal bliss are due to the direct and immediate reflection of the bliss in the *puruṣa* himself, by which this bliss is directly and immediately experienced by him. By such an experience the *puruṣas* cannot be admitted to suffer any change. He can, however, be aware of the mental states of ordinary persons as well as their experiences of pleasure and pain in a cognitive manner (such as that by which we know external objects) without being himself affected by those experiences. This enjoyment of experience is of course due to the action of God's mind through the process of reflection.

The monism of such a view becomes intelligible when we consider that the *puruṣa*, the *mahat*, the *ahamkāra* and all its products exist in an undifferentiated condition in the very essence of God. The ultimate *puruṣa* as the supreme cognitive principle underlies the very being of *puruṣas* and the faculties such as the *buddhi* and the *ahamkāra*, and also all in later material products. For this reason, by the underlying activity of this principle all our cognitions become possible, for it is the activity of this principle that operates as the faculties of the origins of knowledge. In the case of the experience of pleasure and pain also, though these cannot subsist outside the mind and may not apparently be regarded as requiring any separate organ for their illumination, yet in their case also it is the mind, the *buddhi*, that behaves as the internal organ. So though pleasures and pains cannot be regarded as having an unknown existence, yet their experiences are also interpreted as being due to their reflection in the mind.

When the *mahat* becomes associated with the *puruṣa* and no distinction is felt between it, the *puruṣas* and the original ground-cause, it is then that the cycle of world-existence appears. It is the super-consciousness of God that holds together the objective and the subjective principles. The objective principle, the *prakṛti*, and

the subjective centres, the *puruṣas*, are held together in a state of non-distinction. It is this that gives rise to all experiences of sorrow and bondage with reference to the conscious centres. It may be asked how it is that the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* are held in non-distinction instead of being distinguished from one another. The reply is that distinction and non-distinction are both possible elements in the *buddhi*, and the function of Yoga is to destroy the obstruction in the way of the realization of such a mutual distinction (*yogā-dinā tu pratibandha-mātram apākriyate*).

Love of God proceeds in two stages: first, from the notion of God as satisfying our highest needs; and, secondly, in the notion of Him as being one with the self of the devotee. These highest needs find their expression firstly in our notion of value as pleasure and satisfaction in our experiences; secondly, in our notion of value in our emancipation; thirdly, in our notion of value in the satisfaction that we achieve in our realization of the sublimity in experiencing the greatness of God (*Prema ca anurāga-viśeṣaḥ paramā-tmani iṣṭa-sādhana-tā-jñānāt ātmatva-jñānāc ca bhavati. iṣṭam api dvi-vidhaṁ bhogā-pavargau tan-mahimā-darśano-ttha-sukhaṁ ca iti tad evaṁ mātmya-pratipādanasya phalaṁ prema-lakṣaṇā bhaktiḥ*).

Māyā, as identified with *prakṛti*, should be regarded as substantive entity. The *prakṛti* has two elements in it, *sattva* and *tamas*. Through *sattva*, wisdom or true knowledge is produced; through *tamas* is produced delusion or false knowledge. It is this aspect of *prakṛti* as producing false knowledge that is called *māyā*. *Māyā* is described as being *triguṇā-tmikā prakṛti* or the *prakṛti* with three *guṇas*. But though the *māyā* is identified with *prakṛti*, yet this identification is due to the fact that the *tamas* side of *prakṛti* cannot be taken as apart from the *prakṛti* as a whole. When it is said in the scriptures that God destroys the *māyā* of Yogins, it does not mean that the *triguṇā-tmikā prakṛti* as a whole is destroyed, but only that the operation of the *tamas* side is suspended or destroyed or ceases only with reference to the Yogin. *Māyā* is also described as that which cannot produce an illusion in Him on whom it has to depend for its existence, i.e. God, but that it can produce illusion or false knowledge in others (*svā-śraya-vyāmohakatve sati para-vyāmohakatvam*).

It is further said that God creates the world by his *māyā-śakti* as composed of the three *guṇas*. The significance of the designation

māyā in this connection implies that it is by the false identification of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* that the latter evolutionary process of the formation of the world and world-experience becomes possible. The term *māyā* is generally restricted to *prakṛti* in its relation to God, whereas it is called *avidyā* as a delusive agent with reference to individuals.

True knowledge does not consist in a mere identification with Brahman as pure consciousness, but it means the knowledge of Brahman, his relationship with *pradhāna*, *puruṣa*, and *kāla*, and the manner in which the whole cosmic evolution comes into being, is maintained, and is ultimately dissolved in Brahman; and also in the personal relationship that he has with the individuals, and the manner in which he controls them and the ultimate ways of attaining the final realization. *Kāla* is, again, here referred to as the conditional *upādhi* through which God moves the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* towards the evolution of the cosmic process.

The great difficulty is to explain how God who is regarded in essence of the nature of pure consciousness and therefore absolutely devoid of desire or will can be the cause of the great union of *prakṛti* with the *puruṣas*. The answer proposed by Bhikṣu is that in God's nature itself there is such a dynamization that through it He can continue the actualizing process and the combining activities of the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* lying dormant in Him. Though *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* may also be regarded as the causes of the world, yet since the combination happens in time, time may be regarded primarily as a dynamic agent; the condition existing in God through which He renders the union is made possible (*mama svīyo bhāvaḥ padārthah sva-bhāva upādhiḥ tatas tasya preraṇāt bhagavān a-pratihato mahā-yogasya prakṛti-puruṣa-di-saṃyogasya īśvaras tatra samarthah ... prakṛti-prati-kṣaṇa-pariṇāmānam eva kālo-pādhivāt*). Since God moves both the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* through His own dynamic conditions, the whole universe of matter and spirits may be regarded as His body in the sense that they are the passive objects of the activity of God. God is thus conceived as dancing in his activity among his own energies as *prakṛti* and *puruṣas*. It may be argued that *puruṣa* being itself absolutely static, how can these be moved into activity consists of the fact that they are turned to the specific operations or that they are united with the *prakṛti*. Sometimes it is also suggested that the *prakṛti* is the condition of

the *puruṣas* and that the movement of the *prakṛti* in association with the *puruṣas* is interpreted as being the movement of the *puruṣas*.

In the seventh chapter of *Īśvara-gītā* Brahman is defined as the Universal. Thus any cause may be regarded as Brahman in relation to its effect. So there may be a hierarchy of Brahman as we proceed from a lesser universal to a higher universal. The definition of Brahman is: “*yad yasya kāraṇaṃ tat tasya brahma tad-apekṣayā vyāpakatvāt.*” As God contains within Himself all the universals, He is called *brahma-māyā*. God is always associated with the *puruṣas*. But yet His dynamic activity in association with the *puruṣas* consists in bringing about such an association with *prakṛti* that the objects of the world may be manifested to them in the form of knowledge.

The *jīva* or individual is regarded as being a part of God, the relation being similar to that of a son and father. When the *jīvas* dedicate all their actions to God with the conviction that if it is God who works through them, then virtues and vices lose their force and become inefficacious to cause any bondage to them. As all *jīvas* are the parts of God, there is a great similarity between them in spite of their diversity. God exists in the *jīvas* just as the whole exists in the parts.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu conceives of the *adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa* as the ground cause, as one which in itself remains the same and yet new differences emerge out of it. This is also his doctrine of the part and the whole. The parts are thus supposed to be emergents from the whole which does not itself participate in any change. The relation is thus not organic in the sense that the dissolution of the parts would mean the dissolution of the whole. In the *pralaya* the parts are dissolved, yet pure Brahman remains just as it was in the stage of creation. So, again, when the parts are affected pleasures and pains are experienced, but the affection of the parts does not involve in the least the affection of the whole. But the whole is not affected by the sufferings that exist in the emergents. It is further stated that it is through the function of the ground-cause that the emergents, e.g. substance, quality and action, can express themselves or operate in their specific forms. The underlying whole, the ground-cause, has really no parts in itself. Yet from this common basis various emergents of appearances as characterized units show themselves, and since they are seen to emerge from it they are in

this specific technical sense called the parts of the underlying ground cause.

It will thus be seen that the Brahman, the ground-cause, always remains unchangeable in itself, but it is said that the Brahman is associated with *māyā* and is united by it (*sa māyī māyayā baddhah*). The idea is that the *māyā* is an integral part of the divine entity and not different from it. *Māyā* is like a part which is identical with the whole.

Though in the scriptures both the distinction and the identity of the individual with the Brahman have often been mentioned, yet it is by the realization of the difference of the individual from the Brahman that the ultimate emancipation can be attained¹.

In the *Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II. 4. 5, it is stated that all other things are desired because we desire the self. Śaṅkara infers from it that we are primarily attached to the self, and since all attachments imply attachment to pleasure, it follows that the self is of the nature of pleasure or bliss. Other things are desired only when they are falsely regarded as ourselves or parts of ourselves. Bhikṣu denies this proposition. He says that firstly it is not true that we are always attached to our own selves; nor, therefore, is it true that seeking of happiness from other sources is always the seeking of the selves. It is, therefore, wrong to suppose that self is of the nature of bliss. If the soul is of the nature of pure consciousness, it cannot be the nature of pure bliss. If bliss and consciousness were the same, all knowledge would imply pleasure, but our knowledge is as much associated with pleasure as with pain. Pleasure and pain, as also egoism (*abhimāna*), belong to *prakṛti* or its product *buddhi* and are transferred through its function (*vytti*) to the self, which is the real enjoyer and sufferer of pleasure and pain. The self is thus the real experiencer and the experiences therefore do not belong to the *prakṛti* but to the self². Through the operation of the sense-contact with the object and light the mental states are generated. These mental states are called *vytti* and belong to *buddhi* and therefore to *prakṛti*, but corresponding to each such mental state there is an intuition of them on the part of the *puruṣa* (*vytti-sākṣātkāra*)

¹ *yady api bheda-bhedā-vubhāv eva śruti-smṛtyoruktau tathā'pi ya'hokta-bheda-jñāna-rūpa-vivekad eva sarvā-bhimāna-nivṛtyā sākṣāt mokṣaḥ. Śvara-gītā. MS.*

² *sākṣāt-kāra-rūpa-dharmasya drśya-dharmatva-sambhavāt. Bhikṣu's commentary on Śvara-gītā. MS.*

and it is this intuition that constitutes the real experience of the *puruṣa*. The word *bhoga* has an ambiguity in meaning. It sometimes refers to the mental states and at other times to their intuition and it is as the former state that the *bhoga* is denied of the *puruṣa*.

The *ajñāna* (ignorance) in this system means false knowledge. When the *puruṣa* intuits the *vyttis* of the *buddhi* and thereby falsely regards those *vyttis* as belonging to itself there is false knowledge which is the cause of the bondage. The intuition in itself is real, but the associations of the intuitive characters with the self are erroneous. When the self knows its own nature as different from the *vyttis* and as a part of Brahman in which it has an undifferentiated reality, we have what is called emancipation. The existence of the self as undifferentiated with Brahman simply means that the Brahman is the ground-cause, and as such an unchangeable ground-cause Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness. It is in its nature as pure consciousness that the whole world may be regarded as existing in the Brahman of which the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*, the one changing by real modifications and the other through the false ascription of the events of *prakṛti* to itself, may be regarded as emergents. The world is ultimately of the nature of pure consciousness, but matter and its changes, and the experience itself are only material and temporary forms bubbling out of it. But since these emergent forms are real emanations from Brahman an over-emphasis on monism would be wrong. The reality consists of both the ground-cause and the emergent forms. Śaṅkara had asserted that the duality was true only so long as the one reality was not reached. But Bhikṣu objecting to it says that since the monistic truth can be attained only by assuming the validity of the processes that imply duality, ultimate invalidation of the dualistic processes will also nullify the monistic conclusion.

CHAPTER XXIII

PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS OF SOME OF THE SELECTED PURĀṆAS

THE readers who have followed the philosophy of the Vedānta as interpreted by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and the *Īśvara-gītā* section of the *Kūrma Purāṇa* must have noticed that, according to him, the Vedānta was associated with the Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and in support of his view he referred to many of the Purāṇas, some of which are much earlier than Śaṅkara. Vijñāna Bhikṣu, therefore, quotes profusely from the Purāṇas and in the writings of Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Jīva Goswamī and Baladeva we find profuse references to the Purāṇas in support of their views of the philosophy of the Vedānta.

It is highly probable that at least one important school of ideas regarding the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra* was preserved in the Purāṇic tradition. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra* seems to have diverged very greatly from the semi-realistic interpretation of them as found in the Purāṇas. It was, probably, for this reason that Śaṅkara seldom refers to the Purāṇas; but since Śaṅkara's line of interpretation is practically absent in the earlier Purāṇas, and since the extreme monism of some passages of the Upaniṣads is modified and softened by other considerations, it may be believed that the views of the Vedānta, as found in the Purāṇas and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, present, at least in a general manner, the oldest outlook of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra*.

It seems, therefore, desirable that the treatment of the philosophy of Rāmānuja and Vijñāna Bhikṣu should be supplemented by a short survey of the philosophy as found in some of the principal Purāṇas. All the Purāṇas are required to have a special section devoted to the treatment of creation and dissolution, and it is in this section that the philosophical speculations are largely found¹. In the present section I shall make an effort to trace the philosophical speculations as contained in the *sarga-pratisarga* portions

¹ *sargaś ca pratisargaś ca vaṃśo manv-antarāṇi ca | vaṃśā-nucaritaṃ cai'va purāṇaṃ pañca-lakṣaṇaṃ. || Kūrma Purāṇa, 1. 12.*

of some of the selected Purāṇas so as to enable readers to compare this Purāṇic philosophy with the philosophy of Bhāskara Rāmānuja, Vijñāna Bhikṣu, and Nimbārka.

The first manifestation of Brahman according to the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* is *puruṣa*; then come the other manifestations as *vyaktā-vyakta* and *kāla*. The original cause of *pradhāna*, *puruṣa*, *vyakta* and *kāla* is regarded as the ultimate state of Viṣṇu. Here then we find Brahma-Viṣṇu¹.

In *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1. 2. 11, it is said that the Ultimate Reality is only pure existence, which can be described only as a position of an eternal existence. It exists everywhere, and it is all (this is Pantheism), and everything is in it (this is Panentheism) and therefore it is called Vāsudeva². It is pure because there is no extraneous entity to be thrown away³. It exists in four forms: *vyakta*, *avyakta*, *puruṣa* and *kāla*. Out of His playful activity these four forms have come out⁴. *Prakṛti* is described here as *sadasad-ātmaka*⁵ and as *triguṇa*⁶. In the beginning there are these four categories: Brahman, *pradhāna*, *puruṣa* and *kāla*⁷, all these being different from the unconditional (*Trikālika*) Viṣṇu. The function of *kāla* is to hold together the *puruṣa* and the *pradhāna* during the creational period, and to hold them apart at the time of dissolution. As such it (*kāla*) is the cause of sensibles. Thus there is a reference to the ontological synthetic activity and the ontological analytical activity of *kāla*⁸. ("Ontological" in the sense that *kāla* appears here not as instrumental of the epistemological aspect of experience, but as something "being" or "existing," i.e. ontological.) As all manifested things had returned to the *prakṛti* at the time of the last dissolution, the *prakṛti* is called *pratisaṅcara*⁹. *Kāla* or time is beginningless

¹ Brahman is also regarded as *sraṣṭā*, Hari as *pātā* (Protector), and Maheśvara as *saṃhartā*.

*āpo nārā iti proktā, āpo vai nara-sūnavah
āyanam tasya tāh pūrvam tena nārāyaṇah smṛtah.* Manu. 1. 10.

² *sarvatra'sau samastam ca vasaty ātre'ti vai yatah.
tatah sa vāsudeve'ti vidvadbhiḥ paripāthyate.* *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1. 2. 12.

³ *Heyā-bhāvāc-ca nirmalam.* *Ibid.* 1. 2. 13.

⁴ *vyaktam viṣṇus tathā'vyaktam puruṣaḥ kāla eva ca 1. kṛdato bālakasye'va
ceṣṭām tasya nīśumaya.* *Ibid.* 1. 2. 18.

⁵ *Ibid.* 1. 2. 19.

⁶ *Ibid.* 1. 2. 21.

⁷ *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1. 2. 23.

⁸ *Viṣṇoḥ svarūpāt parato hi tenye rūpe pradhānam puruṣaśca vipra
tasyai'va tenyena dhṛte viyukte rūpā-di yat tad doṣa kāla-samjñām.*

Ibid. 1. 2. 24.

⁹ *Ibid.* 1. 2. 25.

and so exists even at the time of dissolution, synthesizing *prakṛti* or *puruṣa* together and also holding them out as different at the time of creation. At that time God enters by His will into *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* and produces a disturbance leading to creation¹. When God enters into *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* His proximity alone is sufficient to produce the disturbance leading to creation; just as an odorous substance produces sensation of odour by its proximity without actually modifying the mind². He (God) is both the disturber (*kṣobha*) or disturbed (*kṣobhya*), and that is why, through contradiction and dilation, creation is produced³. Here is once again the Pantheistic view of God, its first occurrence being manifested ultimately in four main categories, all of which are, so to speak, participating in the nature of God, all of which are His first manifestations, and also in which it is said that all is God, and so on. *Anu* means *jīvā-tman*⁴. Viṣṇu or *Īśvara* exists as the *vikāra*, i.e. the manifested forms, the *puruṣa* and also as Brahman⁴. This is clear Pantheism.

The commentator says that the word “*kṣetrajñā*” in “*kṣetrajñā-dhiṣṭhānāt*” means *puruṣa*. But apparently neither the context nor the classical Sāṃkhya justifies it. The context distinctly shows that *kṣetrajñā* means *Īśvara*; and the manner of his *adhiṣṭhān* by entering into *prakṛti* and by proximity has already been described⁵. From the *pradhāna* the *mahat-tattva* emerges and it is then covered by the *pradhāna*, and being so covered it differentiates itself as the *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa mahat*. The *pradhāna* covers the *mahat* just as a seed is covered by the skin⁶. Being so covered there spring from the threefold *mahat* the threefold *ahamkāra* called *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtā-di* or *tāmasa*. From this *bhūtā-di* or *tāmasa ahamkāra* which is covered by the *mahat* (as the *mahat* itself was covered by *pradhāna*) there springs through its spontaneous self-modification the *śabda-tanmātra*, and by the same process there springs from that *śabda-tanmātra* the *ākāśa*—the gross element. Again, the *bhūtā-di* covers up the *śabda-tanmātra* and the *ākāśa* differentiated from it as the gross element. The *ākāśa*, being thus conditioned, produces spontaneously by self-modification the

¹ *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1. 2. 29.

² *Ibid.* 1. 2. 30.

³ *Ibid.* 1. 2. 31.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1. 2. 32.

⁵ *guṇa-sāmyāt tatas tasmāt kṣetrajñā-dhiṣṭhānāt mune*
guṇa-vyañjana-sambhūtiḥ sarga-kāle dvījo-ttama. *Ibid.* 1. 2. 33.

⁶ *pradhāna-tattvena samam tvacā bijam ivā'vrtam.* *Ibid.* 1. 2. 34.

sparśa-tanmātra, which produces immediately and directly the gross *vāyu*. The *bhūtādi* again covers up the *ākāśa*, *śabda-tanmātra*, *sparśa-tanmātra* and the differentiated *vāyu* which later then produces the *rūpa-tanmātra* which immediately produces the gross light-heat (*jyoti*)¹. The *sparśa-tanmātra* and the *vāyu* cover up the *rūpa-tanmātra*. Being thus conditioned, the differentiated gross *jyoti* produces the *rasa-tanmātra* from which again the gross water is produced. In a similar manner the *rasa-tanmātra* and the *rūpa-tanmātra*, being covered up, the differentiated gross water produces the *gandha-tanmātra*, from which again the gross earth is produced. The *tanmātras* are the potential conditions of qualities and hence the qualities are not manifested there. They are, therefore, traditionally called *aviśeṣa*. They do not manifest the threefold qualities of the *guṇas* as *śānta*, *ghora* and *mūḍha*. It is for this reason also that they are called *aviśeṣa*².

From the *taijasa-ahamkāra* the five conative and cognitive senses are produced. From the *vaikārika-ahamkāra* is produced the *manas*³. These elements acting together in harmony and unity, together with the *tanmātras*, *ahamkāra* and *mahat*, form the unity of the universe under the supreme control of God. As the universe grows up, they form into an egg which gradually expands from within like a water-bubble; and this is called the materialistic body of Viṣṇu as Brahman. This universe is encircled on the outer side by water, fire, air, the *ākāśa* and the *bhūtā-di* and then by the *mahat* and the *avyakta*, each of which is ten times as large as the earth. There are thus seven coverings. The universe is like a cocoanut fruit with various shell-coverings. In proper time, again by causing a preponderance of *tamas*, God eats up the universe in His form as Rudra, and again creates it in His form as Brahmā. He maintains the world in His form as Viṣṇu. Ultimately, however, as God holds the universe within Him, He is both the creator and the created, the protector and the destroyer.

Though the Brahman is qualityless, unknowable and pure, yet

¹ The commentator notes that when the *ākāśa* is said to produce *sparśa-tanmātra*, it is not the *ākāśa* that does so but the *bhūtā-di* manifesting itself as *ākāśa*, i.e. it is through some accretion from *bhūtā-di* that the *ākāśa* can produce the *sparśa-tanmātra*. *Ākāśaḥ ākāśamayo bhūtā-diḥ sparśa-tanmātraṃ sasarja*.

² See the commentary to śloka. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1. 2. 44.

³ The commentator notes that the word *manas* here means *antaḥkāraṇa*, including its four functions as *manas*, *buddhi*, *citta* and *ahamkāra*.

it can behave as a creative agent by virtue of its specific powers which are incomprehensible to us. As a matter of fact the relation between the powers or energies and the substance is unthinkable. We can never explain how or why fire is hot¹. The earth, in adoring Hari, described Him as follows: "Whatever is perceived as having visible and tangible forms in this world is but your manifestation. The ordinary people only make a mistake in thinking this to be a naturalistic universe. The whole world is of the nature of knowledge, and the error of errors is to regard it as an object. Those who are wise know that this world is of the nature of thought and a manifestation of God, who is pure knowledge. Error consists in regarding the world as a mere naturalistic object and not as a manifestation of the structure of knowledge."²

In the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, I. 4. 50-52, it is said that God is only the dynamic agent (*nimitta-mātram*), the material cause being the energies of the objects of the universe which are to be created. These energies require only a dynamic agent to actualize them in the form of the universe. God is here represented to be only a formative agent, whereas the actual material cause of the world is to be found in the energies which constitute the objects of the world, through the influence and presence of God. The commentator notes that the formative agency of God consists merely in his presence (*sānnidhya-mātreinai'va*)³.

In the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, I. 4, we find another account of creation. It is said that God in the beginning thought of creation, and an unintelligent creation appeared in the form of *tamas*, *moha*, *mahā-moha*, *tāmisra* and *andha-tāmisra*. These were the five kinds of *avidyā* which sprang from the Lord. From these there came a creation of the five kinds of plants as *vyksa*, *gulma*, *latā*, *virūt* and

¹ *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, I. 3. 1-2.

² *yad etad drśyate mūrtam, etad jñānā-tmanas tava.
bhrānti-jñānena paśyanti jagad-rūpam ayoginah. Ibid. I. 4. 39.
jñāna-sv-arūpam akhilaṃ jagad etad abuddhayaḥ
artha-sv-arūpam paśyanto bhrāmyante moha-samplave. Ibid. I. 4. 40.*

³ *nimitta-mātram evā'sīt srjyānām sarga-karmani
pradhāna-kāraṇi-bhūtā yato vai srjya-śaktayaḥ. Ibid. I. 4. 51.
nimitta-mātram muktvai'kaṃ nā'nyat kiñcid aśekṣyate
niyate tapatām śreṣṭha sva-śaktiā vastu vastutām. Ibid. I. 4. 52.
sisrṅṣuḥ śakti-yukto'sau srjya-śakti-pracoditaḥ. Ibid. I. 5. 65.*

In this passage it is hinted that the will of God and His power to create is helped by the energies of the objects to be created.

tr̥ṇa (to which are to be added the mountains and the hills) which have no inner or outer consciousness and may be described as having, as it were, closed souls (*saṃvṛtā-tman*). Not being satisfied with this He created the animals and birds, etc., called *tiryak-srota*. The animals, etc., are called *tiryag*, because their circulation is not upwards but runs circularly in all directions. They are full of *tamas*, and are described as *avedinaḥ*. The commentator notes that what is meant by the term *avedin* is that the animals have only appetitive knowledge, but no synthetic knowledge, i.e. cannot synthesise the experience of the past, the present and the future and cannot express what they know, and they have no knowledge about their destinies in this world and in the other, and are devoid of all moral and religious sense. They have no discrimination regarding cleanliness and eating; they are satisfied with their ignorance as true knowledge, i.e. they do not seek the acquirement of certain knowledge. They are associated with the twenty-eight kinds of *vādhā*¹. They are aware internally of pleasure and pain but they cannot communicate with one another². Then, being dissatisfied with the animal creation, God created "the gods" who are always happy and can know both their inner feelings and ideas, and also the external objects, and communicate with one another. Being dissatisfied with that creation also He created "men," which creation is called *arvāk-srotas* as distinguished from the creation of gods which is called *ūrddhva-srotas*. These men have an abundance of *tamas* and *rajas*, and they have therefore a preponderance of

¹ In the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 49, we hear of twenty-eight *vādhās*. The reference to *vādhās* here is clearly a reference to the technical *vādhās* of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, where it also seems certain that at the time of *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* the technical name of the Sāṃkhya *vādhās* must have been a very familiar thing. It also shows that the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* was closely associated with the Sāṃkhya circles of thought, so that the mere allusion to the term *vādhā* was sufficient to refer to the Sāṃkhya *vādhās*. The *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* was probably a work of the third century A.D.; and the *Kārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa was composed more or less at the same time. In the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* (Venkatesvara edition, ch. 44, v. 20) we have the reading *Aṣṭāvimśad-vidhātmikā*. In the B. 1. edition of *Mārkaṇḍeya* by K. M. Banerji we have also in ch. 47, v. 20, the same reading. The reading *vādhānveitā* occurs neither in the *Mārkaṇḍeya* nor in the *Padma Purāṇa* 13, 65. The supposition, therefore, is that the twenty-eight kinds in *Mārkaṇḍeya* were changed into twenty-eight kinds of *vādhā* through the Sāṃkhya influence in the third century. The *Mārkaṇḍeya* is supposed to have been written in the first half of the second century B.C. It is not easy to guess what twenty-eight kinds of animal creation were intended by Mārkaṇḍeya. But the identification of them with the twenty-eight kinds of Sāṃkhya *vādhā* seems to be quite inappropriate.

² *antaḥ prakāśās te sarva āvṛtās tu paras-param. Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1. 5. 10.

suffering. There are thus nine creations. The first three, called the unintelligent creation (*avuddhi-pūrvaka*), is the naturalistic creation of (i) *mahat*, (ii) the *tannātras*, and (iii) the *bhūtas*, the physiological senses. The fourth creation, called also the primary creation (*mūkhya-varga*), is the creation of plants; fifth is the creation of the *tiryag-srotas*; sixth the *ūrdha-srotas*; seventh the *arvāk-srotas* or men. The eighth creation seems to be the creation of a new kind. It probably means the distinctive characteristic of destiny of each of the four creations, plants, animals, gods and men. The plants have, for their destiny, ignorance; the animals have mere bodily energy; the gods have pure contentment; and the men have the realization of ends. This is called the *anugraha-sarga*¹. Then comes the ninth *sarga*, called the *kaumāra-sarga*, which probably refers to the creation of the mental children of God such as *Sanatkumāra*, etc.

There are four kinds of *pralayas*: they are called the *naimittika* or *brāhma*, the *prākṛtika*, the *ātyantika* and the *nitya*. The *naimittika-pralaya* takes place when Brahmā sleeps; the *prākṛtika* occurs when the universe merges in *prakṛti*; the *ātyantika-pralaya* is the result of the knowledge of God, i.e. to say, when Yogins lose themselves in *paramā-tman*, then occurs the *ātyantika-pralaya*; and the fourth, viz. the *nitya-pralaya*, is the continual destruction that takes place daily.

In the *Vāyu Purāṇa* we hear of an ultimate principle which is associated with the first causal movement of God. This is regarded as the transcendental cause (*kāraṇam aprameyam*) and is said to be known by various names, such as Brahman, *pradhāna*, *prakṛti*, *prasūti* (*prakṛti-prasūti*), *ātman*, *guha*, *yoni*, *cakṣus*, *kṣetra*, *amṛta*,

¹ The *Vāyu Purāṇa*, vi. 68, describes it as follows:

*sthāvaṛeṣu viparyāsaḥ tiryag-yoniṣu śaktitā
siddhā-tmāno manuṣyāḥ tu tuṣṭir deveṣu kṛtsnaśaḥ.*

The sixth *sarga* is there described as being of the ghosts.

bhūtā-dikānāṃ sattvānāṃ śaṣṭhaḥ sargah sa ucyate.

Ibid. vi. 58-59.

te parigrahiṇaḥ sarve samvibhāga-ratāḥ punaḥ.

khādanāś cā'py aśilāś ca jñeyā bhūtā-dikāś ca te. *Ibid.* vi. 30.

In the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, *anugraha-sarga* is described as being the fifth

In the *Kūrma Purāṇa*, 7. 11, these *bhūtas* are regarded as being the fifth *sarga*. The *Kūrma Purāṇa* describes the first creation as the *mahat-sarga*, the second as *bhūta-sarga*, the third as *Vaikārike'-ndriya-sarga*, the fourth as the *mukhya-sarga*, and the fifth as *tiryak-sarga*. There is thus a contradiction, as the fifth *sarga* was described in the eleventh verse in the same chapter as the creation of ghosts. This implies the fact that probably two hands were at work at different times, at least in the seventh chapter of the *Kūrma Purāṇa*.

akṣara, śukra, tapas, satyam, atiprakāśa. It is said to cover round the second *puruṣa*. This second *puruṣa* is probably the *loka-pitā-maha*. Through the association of time and preponderance of *rajas* eight different stages of modification are produced which are associated with *kṣetrajñā*¹. In this connection the *Vāyu Purāṇa* speaks also of the *prākṛtika*, the *naimittika* and the *ātyantika-pralaya*². It also says that the categories of evolution have been discovered both by the guidance of the *śāstras* and by rational argument³, and that *prakṛti* is devoid of all sensible qualities. She is associated with three *guṇas*, and is timeless and unknowable in herself. In the original state, in the equilibrium of *guṇas*, everything was pervaded by her as *tamas*. At the time of creation, being associated with *kṣetrajñā*, *mahat* emerges from her. This *mahat* is due to a preponderance of *sattva* and manifests only pure existence. This *mahat* is called by various names, such as *manas, mahat, mati, brahmā, pur, buddhi, khyāti, Īśvara, citi, prajñā, smṛti, samvit, vipura*⁴. This *mahat-prajñā*, being stirred by desire to create, begins the work of creation and produces *dharma, adharma* and other entities⁵. Since the cause of the gross efforts of all beings exists always as conceived in a subtle state in the *mahat*, it is called “*manas*.” It is the first of all categories, and of infinite extent and is thus called *mahān*. Since it holds within itself all that is finite and measurable and since it conceives all differentiations from out of itself and appears as intelligent *puruṣa*, by its association with experience it is called *mati*. It is called *brahman* since it causes all growth. Further, as all the later categories derive their material from it, it is called *pur*. Since the *puruṣa* understands all things as beneficial and desirable and since it is also the stuff through which all understanding is possible, it is called *buddhi*. All experience and integration of experience and all suffering and enjoyment depending upon knowledge proceed from it; therefore it is called *khyāti*. Since it directly knows everything as the great Soul it is called *Īśvara*. Since all sense-perceptions are produced from it, it is called *prajñā*. Since all states of knowledge and all kinds of

¹ *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 3. 11, and compare the *Pañcarātra* doctrine as elaborated in *Ahīrbudhnyā*.

² *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 3. 23.

³ *tac-chāstra-yuktyā sva-mati-prayatnāt samastam āviṣkṛta-dhī-dhṛtibhyaḥ*. *Ibid.* 3. 24.

It speaks of five *pramāṇas*. *Ibid.* 4. 16.

⁴ *Ibid.* 4. 25.

⁵ *Ibid.* 4. 24.

karman and their fruits are collected in it for determining experience, it is called *citi*. Since it remembers the past, it is called *smṛti*. Since it is the storehouse of all knowledge, it is called *mahā-tman*. Since it is the knowledge of all knowledge, and since it exists everywhere and everything exists in it, it is *saṃvit*. Since it is of the nature of knowledge, it is called *jñāna*. Since it is the cause of all desideratum of conflicting entities, it is called *vipura*. Since it is the Lord of all beings in the world, it is called *Īśvara*. Since it is the knower in both the *kṣetra* and the *kṣetrajña*, and is one, it is called *ka*. Since it stays in the subtle body (*ṣūyām śete*) it is called *puruṣa*. It is called *svayambhu*, because it is uncaused and the beginning of creation. *Mahān* being stirred up by the creative desire manifests itself in creation through two of its movements, conception (*saṃkalpa*) and determination (*adhyavasāya*). It consists of three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. With the preponderance of *rajas*, *ahaṃkāra* emerged from *mahat*. With the preponderance of *tamas* there also emerges from *mahat*, *bhūtā-di*, from which the *bhūtas* and *tanmātras* are produced. From this comes the *ākāśa* as vacuity which is associated with sound. From the modification of the *bhūtā-di* the sound-potential (*śabdatanmātra*) has been produced. When the *bhūtādi* covers up the sound-potential, then the touch-potential was produced. When the *ākāśa* covers up the sound-potential and the touch-potential, the *vāyu* is produced. Similarly the other *bhūtas* and qualities are produced. The *tanmātras* are also called *aviśeṣas*. From the *vaikārika* or *sāttvika-ahaṃkāra* are produced the five cognitive and the five conative senses and the *manas*¹.

These *guṇas* work in mutual co-operation, and thereby produce the cosmic egg like a water-bubble. From this cosmic egg, the *kṣetrajña* called *Brahmā*—also called *Hiranyagarbha* (the four-faced God)—is produced. This god loses His body at the time of each *pralaya* and gains a new body at the time of a new creation². The cosmic egg is covered by water, light, heat, air, *ākāśa*, *bhūtādi*, *mahat*, and *avyakta*. The eight *prakṛtis* are also spoken of, and probably the cosmic egg is the eighth cover³.

¹ This is different from other accounts. No function is ascribed to the *rājas ahaṃkāra*, from which the conative senses are generally derived.

² *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 4. 68.

³ The passage is obscure, as it is difficult to find out exactly what these eight *prakṛtis* are. *Ibid.* 4. 77-78.

In Chapter VIII it is said that *rajas* remains as the dynamic principle inherent in *sattva* and *tamas*, just as oil remains in seas *amum*. It is further said that Maheśvara entered the *pradhāna* and *puruṣa*, and with the help of the dynamic principle of *rajas* produced a disturbance in the equilibrium of the *prakṛti*¹. By the disturbance of the *guṇas* three gods are produced, from *rajas* Brahmā, from *tamas* Agni, and from *sattva* Viṣṇu. The Agni is also identified with *kāla* or Time.

The *Vāyu Purāṇa* also describes the nature of *māheśvara-yoga*². This is said to be constituted of five elements or *dharma*s, such as *prāṇāyāma*, *dhyāna*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, and *smaraṇa*. *Prāṇāyāma* is of three kinds, *manda*, *madhyama*, and *uttama*. *Manda* is of twelve *mātrās*, *madhyama* of twenty-four, and *uttama* of thirty-six. When the *vāyu* is once controlled by gradual practice, then all sins are burnt and all bodily imperfections are removed. By *dhyāna* one should contemplate the qualities of God. Then *prāṇāyāma* is said to bring about four kinds of results: (i) *śānti*, (ii) *praśānti*, (iii) *dīpti*, and (iv) *prasāda*. *Śānti* means the washing away of sins derived from impurities from parents and from the association of one's relations. *Praśānti* means the destruction of personal sins, as greed, egotism, etc. *Dīpti* means the rise of a mystical vision by which one can see past, present and future and come in contact with the wise sages of the past and become like Buddha. *Prasāda* means the contentment and pacification of the senses, sense-objects, mind, and the five *vāyus*.

The process of *prāṇāyāma* beginning with *āsana* is also described. *Pratyāhāra* is regarded as the control of one's desires and *dharma* is regarded as the fixing of the mind on the tip of the nose, or the middle of the eyebrows, or at a point slightly higher than that. Through *pratyāhāra* the influence of external objects is negated. By *dhyāna* one perceives oneself like the sun or the moon, i.e. there is an unobstructed illumination. The various miraculous powers that the *yogī* attains are called the *upasargas* and it is urged that one should always try to keep oneself free from the callings of these miraculous powers. The various objects of *dhyāna*

¹ It has been noted before that the creation of the material world proceeded from the *tāmasa ahaṁkāra*, and that of the cognitive and conative senses from the *sāttvika ahaṁkāra*. The *rājasa ahaṁkāra* was not regarded as producing anything, but merely as a moment leading to disturbance of equilibrium. See also *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 5. 9.

² *Ibid.* chap. 11-15.

are regarded as being the elements originating from the earth, *manas* and *buddhi*. The Yogin has to take these objects one by one, and then to leave them off, so that he may not be attached to any one of them. When he does so and becomes unattached to any one of these seven and concentrates on Maheśvara associated with omniscience, contentment, beginningless knowledge, absolute freedom (*svātantrya*), unobstructed power, and infinite power, he attains Brahman. So the ultimate object of Yoga realization is¹ the attainment of Brahmahood as Maheśvara which is also called *apavarga*².

In the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, yoga is described as a cessation of *ajñāna* through knowledge, which is, on the one hand, emancipation and unity with Brahman, and, on the other, dissociation from the *gunas* of *prakṛti*³. All sorrows are due to attachment. With the cessation of attachment there is also the cessation of the feeling of identifying all things with oneself (*mamatva*); and this leads to happiness. True knowledge is that which leads to emancipation, all else is *ajñāna*. By experiencing the fruits of virtues and vices through the performance of duties and other actions, through the accumulation of fruits of past *karman* (*apūrvā*), and through the exhaustion of certain others, there is the bondage of *karma*. The emancipation from *karma*, therefore, can only result from an opposite procedure. The *prāṇāyāma* is supposed to destroy sins⁴. In the ultimate stage the *yogī* becomes one with Brahman, just as water thrown in water becomes one with it⁵. There is no reference here to *chitta-vṛtti-nirodha* as *yoga*.

Vāsudeva is described here as the ultimate Brahman, who by His creative desire has created everything through the power of time. Through this power He separated the two entities of *pra-*

¹ There is no reference in the chapters on *yoga* of the *Vāyu Purāṇa* to *vṛtti-nirodha* and *kaivalya*.

² There is a chapter both in the *Vāyu Purāṇa* and in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* on *aṛiṣṭa*, similar to what is found in the *Jayākhya-saṃhitā* where signs are described by which the *yogin* is to know the time of his death, though the description of his death is entirely different from that given in the other two works.

³ *jñāna-pūrvā viyogo yo'jñānena saha yoginaḥ | sā muktir brahmaṇā cai'kyaṃ anāikyam prakṛtair guṇaih. || Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, 39. 1.*

⁴ The method of *prāṇāyāma* and other processes of *yoga* is more or less the same as that found in the *Vāyu Purāṇa*.

⁵ *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, 40. 41.*

The *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, in this connection, says that the *yogin* should know the approach of his death by the signs described in ch. 40, so that he may anticipate it and may not get dispirited.

dhāna and *puruṣa* from within Himself and connected them both. The first entity that emerged from *prakṛti* in this creative process was *mahat*, from which emerged *ahamkāra*, and from which again emerged *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. From *tamas* came the five *tan-mātras* and the five *bhūtas*; from *rajas* came the ten senses and the *buddhi*. From *sattva* came the presiding gods of the senses and the *manas*¹. It is further said that Vāsudeva exists in the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣas* and all the effects, both as pervading through them and also separate from them, that is, He is both immanent and transcendent. Even when He exists as pervading through them, He is not in any way touched by their limitations and impurities. True knowledge is that which takes account of the nature of all those which have emanated from Vāsudeva in their specific forms as *prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, etc., and also of Vāsudeva in His pure and transcendent form².

It should be noted that in the *Padma Purāṇa* there is a mention of *brahma-bhakti*, which is either *kāyika*, *vācika* and *mānasika* or *laukikī*, *vaidikī* and *ādhyātmikī*. This *ādhyātmikī-bhakti* is further subdivided into the *sāṃkhya-bhakti* and *yoga-bhakti*³. The knowledge of twenty-four principles and of their distinction from the ultimate principle called *puruṣa*, as also of the relation among *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and the individual soul, is known as *sāṃkhya-bhakti*⁴. Practice of *prāṇayāma* and meditation upon the Lord Brahma constitute the *yoga-bhakti*⁵. The term *bhakti* is here used in a very special sense.

In *Nāradiya Purāṇa* Nārāyaṇa is said to be the Ultimate Reality, that is, if seen in theological perspective it may be said to create from itself Brahmā the creator, Viṣṇu the protector and preserver, and Rudra the destroyer⁶. This Ultimate Reality has also been called *Mahā-viṣṇu*⁷. It is through his characteristic power that the universe is created. This *śakti* or power is said to be both of the type of existence and non-existence, both *vidyā* and *avidyā*⁸. When the universe is seen as dissociated from *Mahā-viṣṇu*, the vision is clearly due to *avidyā* ingrained in us; when, on the other hand, the consciousness of the distinction between the knower and the known disappears and only the consciousness of

¹ *Skanda Purāṇa*, II. 9. 24, verses 1-10.

³ *Padma Purāṇa*, I. 15, verses 164-177.

⁵ *Ibid.* verses 187-190.

⁷ *Ibid.* verse 9.

² *Ibid.* verses 65-74.

⁴ *Ibid.* verses 177-186.

⁶ *Nāradiya Purāṇa*, I. 3. 4.

⁸ *Ibid.* verse 7.

unity pervades, it is due to *vidyā* (it is *vidyā* itself)¹. And just as Hari permeates or pervades through the universe, so also does His *śakti*². Just as the quality of heat exists by pervading, i.e. as in and through Agni its support, even so the *śakti* of Hari can never be dissociated from Him³. This *śakti* exists in the form of *vyaktā-vyakta*, pervading the whole universe. *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* and *kāla* are her first manifestations⁴. As this *śakti* is not separate from *Mahā-viṣṇu*, it is said that at the time of first or original creation *Mahā-viṣṇu*, being desirous of creating the universe, becomes, i.e. takes the forms of *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* and *kāla*. From *prakṛti*, disturbed by the presence of the *puruṣa*, comes out *mahat*, and from *mahat* comes into existence *buddhi*, and from *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*⁵.

This Ultimate Principle has also been called Vāsudeva, who is said to be the ultimate knowledge and the ultimate goal⁶.

Sorrow or misery of three kinds is necessarily experienced by all beings born in the universe—and the only remedy that sets them free from misery is the final obtaining of the Lord (or God)⁷. The ways to find God are two, the way of knowledge (*jñāna*) and that of action (*karma*). This *jñāna* springs up either from the learning of scriptural texts or from *viveka* (discriminative knowledge)⁸.

¹ *Nāradya Purāṇa*, 1. 3, verses 7–9.

² *Ibid.* verse 12.

It should be distinctly noted here that the creation of the universe has been attributed to Hari through the *upādhi avidyā*, which is His own *śakti*. The whole account sounds the note of the Vedānta philosophy. The following line should be particularly noted:

avidyo-pādhi-yogena tathe'dam akhilaṃ jagat. Ibid. 3. 12.

And this line should be read with the previous verse—

*viṣṇu-śakti-samudbhūtam etat sarvaṃ carā-caṇam
yasmād bhinnam idam sarvaṃ yacce'gaṃ yacca teṅgati
upādhibhir yathā'kāśo bhinnatvena pratiyate.*

Ibid. verses 10–11.

³ *Ibid.* verse 13.

⁴ *Ibid.* verse 17.

⁵ *Ibid.* verses 28, 31.

⁶ *Ibid.* verse 80.

⁷ For the concept of *antaryāmin* see verse 26 of *Adhyāya* 3 and also verse 48 of *Adhyāya* 33.

⁸ *Nāradya Purāṇa*, verses 4, 5.

*utpattim pralayaṃ caivā bhūtānām agatim gatim
vetti vidyām avidyāṃ ca sa vācya bhagavān iti
jñāna-śakti-balai-śvarya-īrya-tejāmsy aśeṣataḥ
bhagavac-śabda-vācya'yaṃ vinā heyair guṇā-dibhiḥ
sarvaṃ hi tatra bhūtāni vasanti paramā-tmani
bhuteṣu vasate sāntar vāsudevas tataḥ smṛtaḥ.
bhūteṣu vasate sāntar vasanty atra ca tāni yat
dhātā vidhātā jagatām vāsudevas tatas smṛtaḥ.*

Ibid. 1. 46, verses 21–24.

The attributes of Vāsudeva are described in following four verses. It should also be noted that Bhagavān means Vāsudeva. (*Ibid.* verse 19.)

yoga is also defined in the next chapter. It is described as *Brahma-laya*. The *manas* is the cause of bondage and emancipation. Bondage means association with sense-objects, and emancipation means dissociation from them. When, like a magnet, the self draws the mind inside and directs its activities in an inward direction and ultimately unites with Brahman, that is called *yoga*¹.

Viṣṇu is described as having three kinds of *śakti* (power): *parā* or ultimate, the *aparā* (which is identical with individual efforts), and a third power which is called *vidyā* and *karma*². All energies belong to Viṣṇu, and it is through His energies that all living beings are moved into activity³.

The word *bhakti* has also been used in another chapter in the sense of *śraddhā*, and is held to be essential for all the various actions of life⁴.

According to the *Kūrma Purāṇa* it seems that God exists firstly as the unmanifested, infinite, unknowable and ultimate director. But He is also called the unmanifested, eternal, cosmic cause which is both being and non-being and is identified with *prakṛti*. In this aspect He is regarded as *para-brahman*, the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*. In this state the *puruṣa* exists within Himself as it were, and this is also called the state of *prākṛta-pralaya*. From this state of unmanifestedness God begins to assert Himself as God and enters into *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* by His own inner intimate contact. This existence of God may be compared with the sex-impulse in man or woman which exists within them and manifests itself only as a creative impulse although remaining one and the same with them all the while. It is for this reason that God is regarded as both passive (*kṣobhya*) and dynamic (*kṣobhaka*). It is therefore said that God behaves as *prakṛti* by self-contraction and dilatation. From the disturbed *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* sprang up the seed of *mahat*, which is of the nature of both *pradhāna* and *puruṣa* (*pradhāna*

¹ *ātma-prayatna-sāpekṣā viśiṣṭā yā mano-gatiḥ
tasyā brahmaṇi samyogo yoga ity abhidhīyate.*

Nārādīya Purāṇa, 47. 7.

There is also a description of *prāṇāyāma*, *yama*, and *niyama*, etc., from v. 8 to v. 20.

² *Ibid.* 1. 47, verses 36-38.

³ *Ibid.* verses 47-49.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1, verse 4.

⁵ *Kūrma Purāṇa* contains the following verse:

*maheśvaraḥ paro'vyaktaś catur-vyūhaḥ sanātanaḥ
anantaś cā'prameyaś ca niyantaḥ sarvato-mukhaḥ.*

(4. 5.)

Two points should be noted here. Firstly, that the Ultimate Reality has been called *Maheśvara* and not *Viṣṇu*. Secondly, *catur-vyūha* is one of the adjectives mentioned in this verse to explain the nature of that Ultimate Reality.

puruṣāt-makam). From this came into existence *mahat*, also called *ātman*, *matī*, *brahmā*, *prabuddhi*, *khyāti*, *Īśvara*, *prajñā*, *dhṛti*, *smṛti*, *saṃvit*. From this *mahat* came out the threefold *ahamkāra-vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi* (also called *tāmasa ahamkāra*). This *ahamkāra* is also called *abhimāna*, *kartā*, *mantā*, and *ātman*, for all our efforts spring from this.

It is said that there is a sort of cosmic mind called *manas* which springs directly from the *avyakta* and is regarded as the first product which superintends the evolution of the *tāmasa ahamkāra* into its products¹. This *manas* is to be distinguished from the *manas* or the sense which is the product of both the *taijasa* and *vaikārika ahamkāra*.

Two kinds of views regarding the evolution, the *tanmātras* and the *bhūtas*, are given here in succession, which shows that the *Kūrma Purāṇa* must have been revised; and the second view, which is not compatible with the first, was incorporated at a later stage. These two views are as follows:

(1) *Bhūtādi* has, in its development, created the *śabda-mātra*, from which sprang into existence the *ākāśa*, which has sound as its quality. The *sparsa-mātra* was created from the *ākāśa*, developing itself; and from the *sparsa-tanmātra* came out *vāyu*, which, consequently has *sparsa* as its quality. *Vāyu*, in the state of development, created the *rūpa-mātra* from which came into existence *jyoti* (light-heat), which has colour (*rūpa*) as its quality. From this *jyoti*, in the condition of development, sprang up *rasa-mātra* (taste-potential), which created water, which has taste for its quality. The water, in the state of development, created the smell-potential (*gandha-mātra*), from which came into existence the conglomeration, which has smell as its quality.

(2) *Ākāśa* as the sound-potential covered up the touch-potential, and from this sprang up *vāyu*, which has therefore two qualities—the sound and touch. Both the qualities, *śabda* and *sparsa*, entered the colour-potential, whence sprang up the *vahni* (fire), with three qualities—the *śabda*, the *sparsa*, and the *rūpa*. These qualities, viz. *śabda*, *sparsa* and *rūpa*, entered the taste-potential, whence came into existence water having four qualities

¹ *manas tv avyakta-jaṃ prō'ktuṃ vikārah prathamah smṛtaḥ
yenā'sau jāyate kartā bhūtā-diṃś cā'nupaśyati.*

—*śabda*, *sparsa*, *rūpa* and *rasa*. These four qualities entered smell-potential, from which sprang into existence gross *bhūmi* (the earth), which has all the five qualities of *śabda*, *sparsa*, *rūpa*, *rasa*, and *gandha*.

Mahat, *ahamkāra* and the five *tanmātras* are in themselves unable to produce the orderly universe, which is effected through the superintendence of the *puruṣa* (*puruṣā-dhiṣṭhitatvāc ca*) and by the help of *avyakta* (*avyaktā-nugraheṇa*). The universe thus created has seven coverings. The production of the universe, and its maintenance and ultimate dissolution, are all effected through the playful activity (*sva-līlayā*) of God for the benefit of his devotees¹.

¹ The God is called Nārāyaṇa, because He is the ultimate support of all human beings:

narāṇām ayaṇaṇi yasmāt tena nārāyaṇas smṛtaḥ.

Kūrma Purāṇa, iv. 62.

APPENDIX TO VOLUME I

THE *LOKĀYATA*, *NĀSTIKA* AND *CĀRVĀKA*

THE materialistic philosophy known as the *Lokāyata*, the *Cārvāka* or the *Bārhaspatya* is probably a very old school of thought. In the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* a number of heretical views are referred to and among these we find the doctrine which regarded matter or the elements (*bhūtāni*) as the ultimate principle. The name *Lokāyata* is also fairly old. It is found in Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra*, where it is counted with Śamkhya and Yoga as a logical science (*ānvikṣikī*)¹. Rhys Davids has collected a number of Pāli passages in which the word *Lokāyata* occurs and these have been utilized in the discussion below². Buddhaghoso speaks of *Lokāyata* as a *vitandā-vāda-sattham*³. *Vitandā* means tricky disputation and it is defined in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 2. 3, as that kind of tricky logical discussion (*jalpa*) which is intended only to criticize the opponent's thesis without establishing any other counter-thesis (*sā pratipakṣa-sthāpanā-hinā vitandā*), and it is thus to be distinguished from *vāda* which means a logical discussion undertaken in all fairness for upholding a particular thesis. *Vitandā*, however, has no thesis to uphold, but is a kind of *jalpa* or tricky argument which seeks to impose a defeat on the opponent by wilfully giving a wrong interpretation of his words and arguments (*chala*), by adopting false and puzzling analogies (*jāti*), and thus to silence or drive him to self-contradiction and undesirable conclusions (*nigraha-sthāna*) by creating an atmosphere of confusion. But *vitandā* cannot then be a *vāda*, for *vāda* is a logical discussion for the ascertainment of truth, and thus the word *vitandā-vāda* would be self-contradictory. Jayanta, however, points out that the Buddhists did not make any distinction

¹ Kauṭilya, *Artha-śāstra*, I. 1.

² *Dialogues of the Buddha*, vol. I, p. 166. In recent times two Italian scholars, Dr Pizzagalli and Prof. Tucci, have written two works called *Nāstika*, *Cārvāka Lokāyatika* and *Linee di una storia del Materialismo Indiano* respectively in which they attempt to discover the meaning of the terms *nāstika*, *cārvāka* and *lokāyata* and also the doctrines of the sects. Most of the Pāli passages which they consider are those already collected by Rhys Davids.

³ *Abhidhāna-ppadīpikā*, v. 112, repeats Buddhaghoso's words "*vitandā-sattham viññeyam yaṃ taṃ lokāyatam*."

between a pure logical argument and a tricky disputation and used the same word *vāda* to denote both these forms of argument¹. This explains why *Lokāyata*, though consisting merely of *vitandā*, could also be designated as *vāda* in Buddhist literature. A few examples of this *vitandā* are given by Buddhaghosa in the same commentary in explaining the term “*loka-khāyikā*” (lit. “popular story,” but “popular philosophy” according to P.T.S. Pāli Dictionary) —the crows are white because their bones are white, the geese are red because their blood is red². Such arguments are there designated as being *vitandā-sallāpa-kathā*, where *sallāpa* and *kathā* together mean conversational talk, *sallāpa* being derived from *sam* and *lap*. According to the definitions of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, 2. 18, these would not be regarded as instances of *vitandā* but of *jāti*, i.e. inference from false analogies where there is no proper concomitance, and not *vitandā* as just explained. Rhys Davids quotes another passage from the *Sadda-nīti* of the *Aggavaṃsa* (early twelfth century) which, in his translation, runs as follows: “*Loka* means ‘the common world’ (*bāla-loka*). *Lokāyata* means ‘*āyatanti*, *ussāhanti* *vāyamanti* *vādassadenāti*’; that is, they exert themselves about it, strive about it, through the pleasure they take in discussion. Or perhaps it means ‘the world does not make any effort (*yatati*) by it,’ that it does not depend on it, move on by it (*na yatati na ihati vā*). For living beings (*sattā*) do not stir up their hearts (*cittaṃ na uppādentī*) by reason of that book (*taṃ hi gandhaṃ nissāya*)³.” Now the *Lokāyata* is the book of the unbelievers (*titthia-satthaṃ yaṃ loke vitandā-satthaṃ uccati*), full of such useless disputations as the following: “All is impure; all is not impure; the crow is white, the crane is black; and for this reason or for that”—the book which is known in the world as the *vitandā-sattha*, of which the Bodhisattva, the incomparable leader, Vidhura the Pundit, said: “Follow not the *Lokāyata*, that works not for the

¹ *ity udāhṛtam idaṃ kathā-trayaṃ yat paraṣpara-vivikta-lakṣaṇam sthūlam apy anavalokya kathyate vāda eka iti śākya-śiṣyakaiḥ.*

Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 596.

² *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*, I. 90, 91.

³ This translation is inexact. There is no reference to any book in the Pāli passage; in the previous sentence there was a word *vādassādāna* which was translated as “through the pleasure they take in discussion,” whereas the literal translation would be “by the taste (*assāda*) of the disputation,” and here it means “pursuing that smell” people do not turn their minds to virtuous deeds.

progress in merit¹." Thus, from the above and from many other passages from the Pāli texts it is certain that the *Lokāyata* means a kind of tricky disputation, sophistry or casuistry practised by the non-Buddhists which not only did not lead to any useful results but did not increase true wisdom and led us away from the path of Heaven and of release. The common people were fond of such tricky discourses and there was a systematic science (*śāstra* or *sattha*) dealing with this subject, despised by the Buddhists and called the *viṭaṇḍā-sattha*². *Lokāyata* is counted as a science along with other sciences in *Dīghanikāya*, III. 1. 3, and also in *Aṅguttara*, I. 163, and in the *Diṅyāvadāna* it is regarded as a special branch of study which had a *bhāṣya* and a *pravacana* (commentaries and annotations on it)³.

There seems to be a good deal of uncertainty regarding the meaning of the word *Lokāyata*. It consists of two words, *loka* and *āyata* or *ayata*; *āyata* may be derived as *ā + yaṃ + kta* or from *ā + yat* (to make effort) + *a* either in the accusative sense or in the sense of the verb itself, and *ayata* is formed with the negative particle *a* and *yat* (to make effort). On the passage in the *Agga-vamsa* which has already been referred to, it is derived firstly as *a + yatanti* (makes great effort) and the synonyms given are *ussāhanti vāyamanti*, and secondly as *a + yatanti*, i.e. by which people cease to make efforts (*tena loko na yatati na ihati vā lokā-yatam*). But Prof. Tucci quotes a passage from Buddhaghosa's *Sārattha-pakāsinī* where the word *āyata* is taken in the sense of

¹ See *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I. 168. The translation is inexact. The phrase "All is impure; all is not impure" seems to be absent in the Pāli text. The last passage quoted from *Vidhura-pañḍita-jātaka* (Fausboll, VI, p. 286) which is one of the most ancient of the *jātakas* runs as follows: "na seve lokāyatikaṃ na' etam paññāya vaddhanam." The unknown commentator describes the *lokāyatika* as "lokāyātikan ti anattā-nissitam sagga-maggānām adāyakam aniyyānikam viṭaṇḍa-sallāpam lokāyatika-vādam na seveyya." The *Lokāyata* leads to mischievous things and cannot lead to the path of Heaven or that of release and is only a tricky disputation which does not increase true wisdom.

² Rhys Davids seems to make a mistake in supposing that the word *Vidaddha* in *Vidaddharādi* is only the same word as *viṭaṇḍā* wrongly spelt (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, I. 167) in the *Aṭṭhasālinī*, pp. 3, 90, 92, 241. The word *vidaddha* is not *viṭaṇḍā* but *vidaggha* which is entirely different from *viṭaṇḍā*.

³ *lokāyatam bhāṣya-pravacanam*, *Diṅyāvadāna*, p. 630; also *chandasi vā vyākaraṇe vā lokāyate vā pramāṇa-mīmāṃsāyām vā na cai-śam ūhā-pohaḥ prajñāyate*. *Ibid.* p. 633.

It is true, however, that *lokāyata* is not always used in the sense of a technical logical science, but sometimes in its etymological sense (i.e. what is prevalent among the people, *lokeṣu āyato lokā-yataḥ*) as in *Diṅyāvadāna*, p. 619, where we find the phrase "*lokāyata-yajña-mantreṣu niṣṇātaḥ*."

āyatana (basis), and *lokāyata* according to this interpretation means "the basis of the foolish and profane world¹." The other meaning of *lokāyata* would be *lokeṣu āyata*, i.e. that which is prevalent among the common people, and this meaning has been accepted by Cowell in his translation of *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* and here the derivation would be from *a + yam + kta* (spreading over)². The *Amara-koṣa* only mentions the word and says that it is to be in the neuter gender as *lokāyatam*. It seems that there are two *lokāyata* words. One as adjective meaning "prevalent in the world or among the common people" and another as a technical word meaning "the science of disputation, sophistry and casuistry" (*vitāṇḍā-vāda-sattham*); but there seems to be no evidence that the word was used to mean "nature-lore," as suggested by Rhys Davids and Franke, or "polity or political science" as suggested by other scholars. The *Śukra-nīti* gives a long enumeration of the science and arts that were studied and in this it counts the *nāstika-śāstra* as that which is very strong in logical arguments and regards all things as proceeding out of their own nature and considers that there are no Vedas and no god³. Medhātithi, in commenting upon *Manu*, VII. 43, also refers to the *tarka-vidyā* of the Cārvākas, and all the older references that have been discussed show that there was a technical science of logic and sophistry called the *Lokāyata*. Fortunately we have still further conclusive evidence that the *Lokāyata-śāstra* with its commentary existed as early as the time of Kātyāyana, i.e. about 300 B.C. There is a *Vārtika* rule associated with VII. 3. 45 "*varṇaka-tāntave upasaṃkhyānam*," that the word *varṇaka* becomes *varṇakā* in the feminine to mean a blanket or a wrapper (*prāvarana*), and Patañjali (about 150 B.C.), in interpreting this *vārtika sūtra*, says that the object of restricting the formation of the word *varṇaka* only to the sense of a cotton or woollen wrapper is that in other senses the feminine form would

¹ *Linee di una storia del Materialismo Indiano*, p. 17. *Sārattha-pakāṣint* (Bangkok), II. 96.

² Rhys Davids describes *lokāyata* as a branch of Brahmanic learning, probably Nature-lore, wise sayings, riddles, rhymes and theories, handed down by tradition, as to the cosmogony, the elements, the stars, the weather, scraps of astronomy, of elementary physics, even of anatomy, and knowledge of the nature of precious stones, and of birds and beasts and plants (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, I. 171). Franke translates it as "logische beweisende Naturerklärung," *Digha*, 19.

³ *yuktir valiyasi yatra sarvaṃ svābhavikaṃ mataṃ-kasya'pi ne'śvaraḥ kartā na vedo nāstikaṃ hi tat*. *Śukra-nīti-sāra*, IV. 3. 55.

be *varṇikā* or *varttikā* (e.g. meaning a commentary) as in the case of the *Bhāguri* commentary on the *Lokāyata*—*varṇikā bhāguri-lokāyatasya*, *varttikā bhāguri lokāyatasya*¹. Thus it seems to be quite certain that there was a book called the *Lokāyata* on which there was at least one commentary earlier than 150 B.C. or even earlier than 300 B.C., the probable date of Kātyāyana, the author of the *vārttika-sūtra*. Probably this was the old logical work on disputation and sophistry, for no earlier text is known to us in which the *Lokāyata* is associated with materialistic doctrines as may be found in later literature, where *Cārvāka* and *Lokāyata* are identified². Several *sūtras* are found quoted in the commentaries of Kamalaśīla, Jayanta, Prabhācandra, Guṇaratna, etc. from the seventh to the fourteenth century and these are attributed by some to *Cārvāka* by others to *Lokāyata* and by Guṇaratna (fourteenth century) to Bṛhaspati³. Kamalaśīla speaks of two different commentaries on these *sūtras* on two slightly divergent lines which correspond to the division of *dhūrta* Cārvāka and *śuśikṣita* Cārvāka in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*. Thus it seems fairly certain that there was at least one commentary on the *Lokāyata* which was probably anterior to Patañjali and Kātyāyana; and by the seventh century the *lokāyata* or the *Cārvāka-sūtras* had at least two commentaries representing two divergent schools of interpretation. In addition to this there was a work in verse attributed to Bṛhaspati, quotations from which have been utilized for the exposition of the Cārvāka system in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*. It is difficult, however, to say how and when this older science of sophistical logic or of the art of disputation became associated with materialistic theories and revolutionary doctrines of morality, and came to be hated by Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism alike. Formerly it was hated only by the Buddhists, whereas the Brahmins are said to have learnt this science as one of the various auxiliary branches of study⁴.

It is well known that the cultivation of the art of disputation is very old in India. The earliest systematic treatise of this is to be found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* (first century A.D.) which is only a

¹ Patañjali's *Mahā-bhāṣya* on *Pāṇini*, VII. 3. 45, and Kaiyaṭa's commentary on it.

² *tan-nāmāni cārvāka-lokāyate-ty-ādini*. Guṇaratna's commentary on *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, p. 300. *Lokāyata* according to Guṇaratna means those who behave like the common undiscerning people—*lokā nirvicārāḥ sāmānyā lokās tadvad ācaranti sma iti lokāyatā lokāyatikā ity api*.

³ *Ibid.* p. 307, *Tattva-saṃgraha*, p. 520.

⁴ *Āṅguttara*, I. 163.

revision of an earlier text (*Agniveśa-saṃhitā*), which suggests the existence of such a discussion in the first or the second century B.C. if not earlier. The treatment of this art of disputation and sophistry in the *Nyāya-sūtras* is well known. Both in the Āyur-veda and in the Nyāya people made it a point to learn the sophisticated modes of disputation to protect themselves from the attacks of their opponents. In the *Kathā-vatthu* also we find the practical use of this art of disputation. We hear it also spoken of as *hetu-vāda* and copious reference to it can be found in the *Mahābhārata*¹. In the *Aśva-medha-parvan* of the *Mahābhārata* we hear of *hetu-vādins* (sophists or logicians) who were trying to defeat one another in logical disputes². Perhaps the word *vākovākya* in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VII. 1. 2, VII. 2. 1, VII. 7. 1, also meant some art of disputation. Thus it seems almost certain that the practice of the art of disputation is very old. One other point suggested in this connection is that it is possible that the doctrine of the orthodox Hindu philosophy, that the ultimate truth can be ascertained only by an appeal to the scriptural texts, since no finality can be reached by arguments or inferences, because what may be proved by one logician may be controverted by another logician and that disproved by yet another logician, can be traced to the negative influence of the sophists or logicians who succeeded in proving theses which were disproved by others, whose findings were further contradicted by more expert logicians³. There were people who tried to refute by arguments the Vedic doctrines of the immortality of souls, the existence of a future world either as rebirth or as the *pitṛ-yāna* or the *deva-yāna*, the efficacy of the Vedic sacrifices and the like, and these logicians or sophists (*haituka*) who reviled the Vedas were called *nāstikas*. Thus, Manu says that the Brahmin who through a greater confidence in the science of logic (*hetu-śāstra*) disregards the authority of the Vedas and the *smṛti* are but *nāstikas* who should be driven out by good

¹ *Mahābhārata*, III. 13034, v. 1983; XIII. 789, etc.

² *Ibid.* XIV. 85. 27.

³ Compare *Brahma-sūtra* "tarkā-pratiṣṭhānād apy anyathā-numānam iti ced evam api avimokṣa-prasaṅgaḥ." II. 1. 11.

Śaṅkara also says: *yasmān nirāgamāḥ puruṣo-prekṣā-mātra-nibandhanāḥ tarkāḥ a pratiṣṭhitā bhavanti utprekṣāyāḥ niranakuṣatoāt kair apy utprekṣitāḥ santaḥ tato'nyair ābhāsyante iti na pratiṣṭhitatvaṃ tarkānam śakyam āsrayitum*.

Vācaspati, commenting on the commentary of Śaṅkara, quotes from *Vākya-padīya*: *yatnenā' numito' py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātrbhiḥ abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathai'vo'pādīyate*.

men¹. The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* again says that one should neither follow the Vedic cult, nor be a heretic (*pāṣaṇḍī*, by which the Buddhists and Jains were meant), nor a logician (*haituka*) and take the cause of one or the other party in dry logical disputations². Again, in *Manu*, iv. 30, it is said that one should not even speak with the heretics (*pāṣaṇḍino*), transgressors of caste disciplines (*vikarmasthān*), hypocrites (*vaidāla-vratika*), double-dealers and sophists (*haituka*)³. These *haitukas*, sophists or logicians thus indulged in all kinds of free discussions and controverted the Vedic doctrines. They could not be the Naiyāyikas or the Mīmāṃsists who were also sometimes called *haitukā* and *tarkī* because they employed their logical reasonings in accordance with the Vedic doctrines⁴. Thus we reach another stage in our discussion in which we discover that the *haitukas* used sophistical reasonings not only in their discussions, but also for repudiating the Vedic, and probably also the Buddhistic doctrines, for which they were hated both by the Vedic people and the Buddhists; and thus the sophistical or logical science of disputation and criticism of Vedic or Buddhistic doctrines grew among the Brahmanic people and was cultivated by the Brahmins. This is testified by *Manu*, ii. 11, where Brahmins are said to take this *hetu-śāstra*, and this also agrees with *Aṅguttara*, i. 163, and other Buddhistic texts.

But who were these *nāstikas* and were they identical with the *haitukas*? The word is irregularly formed according to Paṇini's rule, iv. 460 (*asti-nāsti-diṣṭam matih*). Patañjali, in his commentary, explains the word *āstika* as meaning one who thinks "it exists" and *nāstika* as one who thinks "it does not exist." Jayāditya, in his *Kāśikā* commentary on the above *sūtra*, explains *āstika* as one who believes in the existence of the other world (*para-loka*), *nāstika* as one who does not believe in its existence, and *diṣṭika* as one who believes only what can be logically demonstrated⁵. But we have the

¹ *yo'vamanyeta te mūle hetu-śāstrā-śrayād dvijaḥ | sa sādhubhir vahiṣ-kāryo nāstiko veda-nindakaḥ*. *Manu*, ii. 11.

² *veda-vāda-rato na syān na pāṣand īna haitukāḥ | śuṣka-vāda-vivāde na kañ cit pakṣam samāśrayet*. *Bhāgavata*, xi. 18. 30.

³ Medhātithi here describes the *haitukas* as *nāstikas*, or those who do not believe in the future world (*para-loka*) or in the sacrificial creed. Thus he says, *haitukā nāstikā nāsti paraloko, nāsti dattam, nāsti hutam ity evaṃ sthita-prajñāḥ*.

⁴ *Manu*, xii. 111.

⁵ *paralokaḥ asti'ti yasya matir asti sa āstikaḥ, tadviparīto nāstikaḥ; pramāṇa-nūpātīt yasya matih sa diṣṭikaḥ*. *Kāśikā* on Paṇini, iv. 4. 60. Jayāditya lived in the first half of the seventh century.

definition of *nāstika* in Manu's own words as one who controverts the Vedic doctrines (*veda-nindaka*¹). Thus the word *nāstika* means, firstly, those who do not believe in the existence of the other world or life after death, and, secondly, those who repudiate the Vedic doctrines. These two views, however, seem to be related to each other, for a refusal to believe in the Vedic doctrines is equivalent to the denial of an after-life for the soul and also of the efficacy of the sacrifice. The *nāstika* view that there is no other life after the present one and that all consciousness ceases with death seems to be fairly well established in the Upaniṣadic period; and this view the Upaniṣads sought to refute. Thus, in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* Naciketa says that there are grave doubts among the people whether one does or does not exist after death, and he was extremely anxious to have a final and conclusive answer from Yama, the lord of death². Further on Yama says that those who are blinded with greed think only of this life and do not believe in the other life and thus continually fall victims to death³. Again, in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (II. 4. 12, IV. 5. 13) a view is referred to by Yājñavalkya that consciousness arises from the elements of matter and vanishes along with them and that there is no consciousness after death⁴. Jayanta says in his *Nyāya-mañjarī* that the *Lokāyata* system was based on views expressed in passages like the above which represent only the opponent's (*pūrvu-pakṣa*) view⁵. Jayanta further states in the same passage that no duties are prescribed in the *lokāyata*; it is only a work of tricky disputation (*vaitaṇḍika-kathai'vā'sau*) and not an *āgama*⁶.

References to the *nāstikas* are found also in the Buddhist litera-

¹ *Manu*, II. 11. Medhātithi in explaining *nāstikā'-krāntam* (*Manu*, VIII. 22) identifies *nāstikas* with *lokāyatas* who do not believe in the other world. Thus he says, *yathā nāstikāḥ para-lokā-pavādibhir lokāyatikā-dyair ākrāntam*. But in *Manu*, IV. 163, *nāstikya* is explained by him as meaning the view that the Vedic doctrines are false: *veda-pramāṇakānām arthānām mīthyātvā-dhyavasāyasya nāstikya-sābdena pratipādanam*.

² *ye'yaṃ prete vicikitsā manuṣye asti'ty eke nā'yaṃ asti'ti cai'ke, etad-vidyām anuśiṣṭas tvayā'haṃ varānām eṣa varas tṛtiyah. Kaṭha*, I. 20.

³ *na sāmparāyāḥ pratibhāti bālaṃ pramādy-antaṃ vitta-mohena mūḍham; ayam loko nāsti para iti māni punaḥ punar vaśam āpadyate me. Ibid.* II. 6.

⁴ *vijñāna-ghana eva etebhyaḥ bhūtebhyo samutthāya tāny evā'nuvinaśyati, na pretya samjñā'sti ity are bravīmi. Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, II. 4. 12.

⁵ *tad evaṃ pūrvu-pakṣa-vacana-mūlatvāt lokāyata-sāstram api na svatantram. Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 271, V.S. Series, 1895.

⁶ *nāhi lokāyate kiñ cit kartavyam upadiśyate vaitaṇḍika-kathai'va'san na punaḥ kaś cid āgamaḥ. Ibid.* p. 270.

ture. The P.T.S. Pāli Dictionary explains the meaning of the word *natthika* as one who professes the motto of “*natthi*,” a sceptic, nihilist, and *natthika-diṭṭhi* as scepticism or nihilistic view. It may, however, seem desirable here to give brief accounts of some of the heretics referred to in Buddhistic literature who could in some sense or other be regarded as sceptics or nihilists. Let us first take up the case of Pūraṇa Kassapa described in *Dīgha Nikāya*, II. 16, 17. Buddhaghoso, in commenting on the *Dīgha Nikāya*,¹ I. 2, in his *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*, says that, in a family which had ninety-nine servants, Kassapa was the hundredth servant and he having thus completed (*pūraṇa*) the hundredth number was called by his master *pūraṇa* (the completer), and Kassapa was his family name. He fled away from the family and on the way thieves robbed him of his cloth and he somehow covered himself with grass and entered a village. But the villagers finding him naked thought him to be a great ascetic and began to treat him with respect. From that time he became an ascetic and five hundred people turned ascetics and followed him. King Ajātaśatru once went to this Pūraṇa Kassapa and asked him what was the visible reward that could be had in this life by becoming a recluse, and Pūraṇa Kassapa replied as follows: “To him who acts, O king, or causes another to act, to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate, to him who punishes or causes another to punish, to him who causes grief or torment, to him who trembles or causes others to tremble, to him who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into houses, who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway robbery, or adultery, or who speaks lies, to him thus acting there is no guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges giving alms and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit, nor increase of merit. Thus, Lord, did Pūraṇa Kassapa, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound his theory of non-action (*akiriyam*)¹.” This theory definitely repudiates the doctrine of *karma* and holds

¹ *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I. 69-70.

that there is neither virtue nor vice and thus no action can lead to any fruit¹. This is what is here called the doctrine of *akiriya* and it is in a way an answer to the question what may be the visible reward in this life of being a recluse. Since there is neither virtue nor vice, no action can produce any meritorious or evil effect—this is one kind of *nāttikavāda*. But it is wrong to confuse this *akiriya*² doctrine with the doctrine of inactivity (*akāraka-vāda*) attributed to Sāṃkhya by Śilāṅka in his commentary on *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra*, I. 1. 13. That *akāraka* doctrine refers to the Sāṃkhya view that the souls do not participate in any kind of good or bad deeds³.

Let us now turn to another nihilistic teacher, viz. Ajita Keśakambalī. His doctrines are briefly described in *Dīgha*, II. 22–24, where Ajita says: “There is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next (*n’atthi ayam loka na paro loka*). There is neither father nor mother, nor beings springing into life without them. There are in the world no recluses or Brahmins who have reached the highest point, who walk perfectly and who, having understood and realized, by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others. A human being is built up of the four elements; when he dies the earth in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, his wind to the air, and his faculties pass into space. The four bearers, with the bier as the fifth, take the dead body away; till they reach the burning ground men utter eulogies, but there his bones are bleached and his offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated and after death they are not.”⁴ Ajita Keśakambalī was so called because he used to wear a garment made of human hair which was hot in summer and cold in winter and was thus a source of suffering.⁴ It is easy to see that Ajita Keśakambalī’s views were very similar to

¹ Buddhaghoso, in commenting on it says, *sabbathāpi pāpaṇṇānam kiriyam eva paṭikkhipati. Sumaṅgala-vilāsini*, I. 160.

² This has been interpreted by Dr Barua as representing the doctrine of Pūraṇa Kassapa, which is evidently a blunder. *Prebuddhist Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1921, p. 279.

³ *bāle ca paṇḍite kāyassa bheda ucchijjanti vinassanti, na honti param maraṇā ti. Dīgha*, II. 23. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, pp. 73–74.

⁴ *Sumaṅgala-vilāsini*, I. 144.

the views of the Cārvākas as known to us from the fragments preserved as quotations and from accounts of them given by other people. Thus, Ajita did not believe in the other world, in virtue or vice, and denied that *karmas* produced any fruits. He, however, believed in the view that the body was made up of four elements, that there was no soul separate from the body, that with the destruction of the body everything of this life was finished, and that there was no good in the Vedic sacrifices.

Let us now turn to the doctrine of Makkhali Gosāla or Mankhali-putta Gosāla or Makkhali Gosāla who was a contemporary of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. Buddhaghoso says that he was born in a cow-shed (*go-sāla*). As he grew up he was employed as a servant; while going in the mud to bring oil he was cautioned by his master to take care not to let his feet slip (*mākhali*) in the mud; but in spite of the caution he slipped and ran away from his master, who, following him in a rage, pulled the ends of his *dhōti*, which was left in his hands, and Makkhali ran away naked. Thus left naked he afterwards became an ascetic like Pūraṇa Kassapa¹. According to the *Bhagavatī-sūtra*, xv. 1, however, he was the son of Makkhali who was a *mankha* (a mendicant who makes his living by showing pictures from house to house) and his mother's name was Bhaddā. He was born in a cow-shed and himself adopted the profession of a *mankha* in his youth. At his thirtieth year he met Mahāvīra and after two years he became his disciple and lived with him for six years practising penances. Then they fell out, and Makkhali Gosāla, after practising penances for two years, obtained his Jina-hood while Mahāvīra became a Jina two years after the attainment of Jina-hood by Gosāla. After this Gosāla continued to be a Jina for sixteen years and Mahāvīra met him at the end of that period in Sāvattthi where there was a quarrel between the two and Gosāla died through fever by the curse of Mahāvīra. Hoernlé shows in his edition of the text and translation of *Uvāsagadasāo*, pp. 110-111, that Mahāvīra died in 450-451 B.C. at the age of 56. Makkhali was the founder of the *Ājīvaka* sect. *Ājīvakas* are mentioned in the rock-hewn cave (which was given to them) on Barabar hills near Gaya, in the seventh Pillar Edict of Asoka in 236 B.C. and in the rock-hewn caves on Nāgārjuni hill in 227 B.C. in the reign of Asoka's successor Dāśaratha. They are also mentioned in the

¹ *Sumaṅgala-vilāsini*, I. 143, 144.

Bṛhaj-jātaka (xv. 1) of Varāha Mihira in the middle of the sixth century A.D. Śilāṅka (ninth century) also refers to them in his commentary on the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra* (I. 1. 3. 12 and I. 3. 3. 11), in which the *Ājīvakas* are mentioned along with *Trai-rāśikas* as being followers of Makkhali Gosāla¹. Halāyudha also mentions the *ājīvas* as being the same as the Jains in general; but does not distinguish the *nirgranthas* from the *Digambaras* or identify the latter with the *Ājīvakas* as Hoernlé says in his article on the *Ājīvakas*. Hoernlé further points out in the same article that in the thirteenth-century inscriptions on the walls of the Perumāl Temple at Poygai near Virinchipuram reference is made to the taxes imposed on the *Ājīvakas* by the Chola king Rājārāja in the years A.D. 1238, 1239, 1243 and 1259. Thus it is clear that the *Ājīvaka* school of Makkhali which was started by Makkhali in the fifth century B.C. continued to exist and spread not only in North India but also in South India, and other schools also have developed out of it such as the *Trai-rāśikas*. Pāṇini's grammar has a rule (iv. 1. 154), *maskara-maskariṇau veṇuparivṛājakayoḥ*, which signifies that *maskara* means a bamboo and *maskarin* a travelling ascetic. Patañjali, however, in commenting on it, says that *maskarins* were those who advised the non-performance of actions and held that cessation (*śānti*) was much better (*māskṛta karmāṇi śāntir vah śreyasī ityāha ato maskarī parivṛājakaḥ*). The word, therefore, does not necessarily mean *ekadaṇḍins* or those who bore one bamboo staff. The identification of Makkhali with *maskarins* is therefore doubtful¹. It is also very doubtful whether the *Ājīvakas* can be regarded as the same as *Digambara* Jains, as Hoernlé supposes, for neither Varāha nor Bhoṭṭolpala identifies the *Ājīvakas* with the Jains, and Śilāṅka treats them as different and not as identical². Halāyudha also does not speak of the *Digambaras*

¹ The *Trai-rāśikas* are those who think that the self by good deeds becomes pure and free from *karma* and thus attains *mokṣa*, but seeing the success of its favourite doctrines it becomes joyous and seeing them neglected it becomes angry, and then being born again attains purity and freedom from *karma* by the performance of good deeds and is again born through joy and antipathy as before. Their canonical work is one containing twenty-one *sūtras*. In commenting on I. 3. 3. 11 Śilāṅka mentions also the *Digambaras* along with the *Ājīvakas*, but it does not seem that he identifies them in the way Hoernlé states in his scholarly article on the *Ājīvakas* in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. The exact phrase of Śilāṅka is *ājīvakā-dīnām para-tīrthikānām digamvarāṇām ca asad-ācaranair upaneyā*.

² Hoernlé, in his article on the *Ājīvakas* in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, says: "From this fact that Gosāla is called Makkhaliputta or Mankhali (*Maskarin*), i.e. the man of the bamboo staff, it is clear that originally he belonged

as *Ājīvakas*¹. It is, therefore, very doubtful whether the *Ājīvakas* could be identified with the *Digambara* Jains unless by a confusion in later times, probably on account of the fact that both the *Digambaras* and the *Ājīvakas* went about naked².

The fundamental tenet of Gośāla appears in more or less the same form in *Uvāsagadasāo*, I. 97, 115, II. 111, 132, *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. 210, *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I. 286 and the *Dīgha Nikāya*, II. 20. In the last-mentioned work Gośāla is reported to say to king Ajātaśatru: "There is no cause for the sufferings of beings; they therefore all suffer without any cause; there is no cause for the purity (*viśuddhi*) of beings; they all become pure without any cause; there is no efficiency in one's own deeds or in the deeds of others (*n'atthi atta-kāre na'tthi parakāre*) or in one's free efforts (*purīṣa-kāre*); there is no power, no energy, no human strength or heroic endeavours (*parākkama*)³. All vertebrates (*sabbe sattā*), all animals with one or more senses (*sabbe pāṇā*), all lives emanating from eggs or ovaries (*sabbe bhūtā*), all vegetable lives, are without any power or efficiency. They become transformed in various forms by their inherent destiny, by their manifestation in various life-forms, and by their different natures (*niyati-saṅgati-bhava-pariṇati*), and it is in accordance with their six kinds of life-states that they suffer pains and enjoy pleasures." Again, in the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga sūtra*, II. 6. 7, Gośāla is reported to say that there is no sin for ascetics in having intercourse with women⁴. These doctrines of Gośāla

to the class of *eka-danḍins* (or *danḍin*) ascetics; and, though he afterwards joined Mahāvīra and adopted his system, he held some distinguishing tenets of his own, and also retained his old distinguishing mark, the bamboo staff." This is all very doubtful, for firstly *mankha* and *maskarin* cannot be identified; secondly, *mankha* means a beggar who carried pictures in his hands—*mankha's citra-phalaka-vyagra-karo bhikṣuka-viśeṣaḥ* (Abhayadeva Sūri's comment on the *Bhagavati-sūtra*, p. 662. Nirṇaya Saṅgāra ed.). Gośāla's father was a *mankha* and his name was Mankhali from which Gośāla was called Makkhaliputta. Both Jacobi (*Jaina Sūtras*, II. 267 footnote) and Hoernlé (*Ājīvaka, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, p. 266) are here wrong, for the passage referred to is Śīlāṅka's commentary on *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra*, III. 3. 11 (*ājīvakā-dīnām para-tīrthikānām digamvarāṇām ca*), and the "ca" in the passage which is to be translated as "and" and not as "or" distinguishes the *Ājīvakas* from the *Digamvaras*.

¹ *nagnā ṭo dig-vāsāḥ kṣapaṇaḥ śramaṇaś ca jīvako jainah, ājīvo mala-dhārī nirgranthaḥ kathyate śadbhiḥ*. II. 190.

² *Dīvyaavadāna*, p. 427, refers to an episode where a Buddha image was dishonoured by a *nirgrantha* and in consequence of that 8000 *Ājīvakas* were killed in the city of Puṇḍravardhana. Dr Barua also refers to this passage in his small work, *The Ājīvakas*.

³ As Buddhaghosho says, these are all merely specifications of *purīṣa-kāra* (*sarvaiva purīṣa-kāra-viv'ecanam eva*). *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*, II. 20.

⁴ There is another passage in the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra*, III. 4. 9 (*evamege u asattha paṇṇavanti anāriyā; itthivāsam gayā bālā jinasāsana-parāmmuhā*), where

interest us only so far as they may be considered similar to the other *nāstika* teachings. But unlike other *nāstikas*, Gosāla believed not only in rebirths but also introduced a special doctrine of re-animation¹. Several other doctrines which are not of philosophical, ethical or eschatological interest but which refer only to *Ājīvaka* dogmatics are related both in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, II. 20, and in the *Bhagavati-sūtra*, xv, and have been elaborately dealt with by Hoernlé in his article on the *Ājīvaka* and his translation of the *Uvāsagadasāo*. The two important points that we need take note of here are that the *Ājīvakas* who were an important sect did not believe in the efficiency of our will or our *karma* and regarded sex-indulgence as unobjectionable to recluses. Other heretics are also alluded to in the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga sūtra*, I. III. 4. 9-14, where they also are alluded to as having similar tendencies². Thus it is said: "Some unworthy heretics, slaves of women, ignorant men who are averse to the Law of the Jainas, speak thus: 'As the squeezing of a blister or boil causes relief for some time, so it is with (the enjoyment of) charming women. How could there be any sin in it? As a ram

it is said that some wrongdoers and others who belong to the Jaina circle have turned their faces from the laws imposed upon them by Jina and are slaves of women. Hoernlé says (*Ājīvaka, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, p. 261) that this passage refers to the followers of Gosāla. But there is no evidence that it is so, if at least we believe in Śīlāṅka's commentary. Śīlāṅka explains "ege" or "eke" as *bauddha-vīśeṣa mila-paṭādayaḥ nātha-vādika-maṇḍala-praviṣṭā vā śaiva-vīśeṣaḥ* and *pasattha* as *sad-amuṣṭhānāt pārśve tiṣṭhanti iti parśvasthāḥ* *sva-yūthyā vā pārśvasthā-vasanna-kuṣa-lā-dayaḥ* *strī-pariśaha-parājitāḥ*. Thus, according to him, it refers to some Buddhists wearing blue garments, the *nātha-vādins*, the *Śaivas*, or some Jains with bad characters, or bad people in general.

¹ Gosāla thought that it was possible that one person's soul could reanimate other dead bodies. Thus, when he was challenged by Mahāvīra, who forbade his disciples to hold any intercourse with him, he is reported to have said that the Makkhaliputta Gosāla who was the disciple of Mahāvīra was long dead and born in the abode of the gods while he was in reality Udāyī-kuṇḍiyyāṇiya, who in the seventh and the last change of body through reanimation had entered Gosāla's body. According to Gosāla, a soul must finish eighty-four thousand *mahā-kalpas* during which it must be born seven times in the abode of the gods and seven times as men, undergoing seven reanimations, exhausting all kinds of *karmas*. See *Bhagavati-sūtra*, xv. 673, Nirṇaya Sagaraed. See also Hoernlé's two Appendices to his translation of *Uvāsagadasāo* and the article on *Ājīvika, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, p. 262. A *mahā-kalpa* is equal to 300,000 *saras* and one *sara* is the time required to exhaust the sands of the seven Ganges (each Ganges being 500 *yojanas* or 2250 miles in length, 2½ miles in breadth, and 50 *dhanus* or 100 yards in depth), at the rate of putting 100 years for the removal of one grain of sand. See *ibid.*; also Rockhill's Appendix 1 to his *Life of the Buddha*.

² According to Śīlāṅka they were a sect of Buddhists wearing blue garments, Śaivas, the Nāthas, and some degraded Jains also.

drinks the quiet water, so it is with (the enjoyment of) charming women. How can there be any sin in it?' So say some unworthy heretics who entertain false doctrines and who long for pleasures as the ewe for her kid. Those who do not think of the future but only enjoy the present will repent of it afterwards when their life or their youth is gone¹."

Again, some heretics (identified by Śīlāṅka with the *Lokāyata*) are reported in the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra*, II. 1. 9-10, as instructing others as follows: Upwards from the sole of the feet up to the bottom of the tips of hair and in all transverse directions the soul is up to the skin; so long as there is the body there is the soul and there is no soul apart from this body, so the soul is identical with the body; when the body is dead there is no soul. When the body is burnt no soul is seen and all that is seen is but the white bones. When one draws a sword from a scabbard, one can say that the former lies within the latter, but one cannot say similarly of the soul that it exists in the body; there is in reality no way of distinguishing the soul from the body such that one may say that the former exists in the latter. One can draw the pith from a grass stalk, or bones from flesh or butter from curd, oil from sesamum and so forth, but it is not possible to find any such relation between the soul and the body. There is no separate soul which suffers pains and enjoys pleasures and migrates to the other world after the death of the body, for even if the body is cut into pieces no soul can be perceived, just as no soul can be perceived in a jug even when it is broken to pieces, whereas in the case of a sword it is found to be different from the scabbard within which it is put. The *Lokāyatas* thus think that there is no fault in killing living beings, since striking a living body with a weapon is like striking the ground. These *Lokāyatas*, therefore, cannot make any distinction between good and bad deeds as they do not know of any principle on which such a distinction can be made, and there is thus no morality according to them. Some slight distinction is made between the ordinary nihilists and the haughty nihilists (*pragalbha nāstika*) who say that if the soul was different from the body then it would have some specific kind of colour, taste or the like, but no such separate entity is discoverable, and therefore it cannot be believed that there is a separate soul. The *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra*, II. 1. 9 (p. 277), speaks

¹ See Jacobi's translation of *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra*. *Jaina Sūtras*, II. 270.

of these *Pragalbha Nāstikas* as renouncing (*niṣkramya*) the world and instructing other people to accept their doctrines. But Śīlāṅka says that the *Lokāyata* system has no form of initiation and thus there cannot be any ascetics of that school; it is the ascetics of other schools such as the Buddhists who sometimes in their ascetic stage read the *Lokāyata*, became converted to *lokāyata* views, and preached them to others¹.

After the treatment of the views of the *lokāyata nāstikas* the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra* treats of the Sāṃkhyas. In this connection Śīlāṅka says that there is but little difference between the *lokāyata* and the Sāṃkhya, for though the Sāṃkhyas admit souls, these are absolutely incapable of doing any work, and all the work is done by *prakṛti* which is potentially the same as the gross elements. The body and the so-called mind is therefore nothing but the combination of the gross elements, and the admission of separate *puruṣas* is only nominal. Since such a soul cannot do anything and is of no use (*akimcītkara*), the *Lokāyatas* flatly deny them. Śīlāṅka further says that the Sāṃkhyists, like the *Lokāyatikas*, do not find anything wrong in injuring animal lives, for after all the living entities are but all material products, the so-called soul being absolutely incapable of taking interest or part in all kinds of activities². Neither the *nāstikas* nor the Sāṃkhyists can, therefore, think of the distinction between good and bad deeds or between Heaven and Hell, and they therefore give themselves up to all kinds of enjoyments. Speaking of the *lokāyata nāstikas*, the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtras* say as follows: "Thus some shameless men becoming monks propagate a law of their own. And others believe it, put their faith in it, adopt it (saying): 'Well you speak the truth, O Brahmaṇa (or) O Śramaṇa, we shall present you with food, drink, spices and sweetmeats, with a robe, a bowl, or a broom.' Some have been induced to honour them, some have made (their proselytes) to honour them. Before (entering an order) they were determined to become Śramaṇas,

¹ *yady api lokāyatikānām nāsti dikṣādikaṃ tathā'pi apareṇa śākyā-dīnā pravrajyā-vidhānena pravrajyā paścāt lokāyatikam adhiyānasya tathāvidha-parīṇateḥ tad eva'bhīrucitam*. Śīlāṅka's commentary on the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra*, p. 280 a (Nirṇaya Sagaraed).

In pp. 280-281 Śīlāṅka points out that the *Bhāgavatas* and other ascetics at the time of their renouncement of the world take the vow of all kinds of self-restraint, but as soon as they become converted to the *lokāyata* views they begin to live an unrestrained life. They then wear blue garments (*mīla-paṭa*).

² *Ibid.* pp. 281, 283.

houseless, poor monks, who would have neither sons nor cattle, to eat only what should be given them by others, and to commit no sins. After having entered their Order they do not cease (from sins), they themselves commit sins and they assent to another's committing sins. Then they are given to pleasures, amusements and sensual lust; they are greedy, fettered, passionate, covetous, the slaves of love and hate¹."

But we find references to the *lokāyata* doctrines not only in the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra* but also in the *Bṛhad-āranyaka*, the *Kaṭha* as described above and in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VIII. 7, 8, where Virocana, the representative of the demons who came to Prajāpati for instruction regarding the nature of self, went away satisfied with the view that the self was identical with the body. Prajāpati asked both Indra and Virocana to stand before a cup of water and they saw their reflections, and Prajāpati told them that it was that well dressed and well adorned body that was the self and both Indra and Virocana were satisfied; but Indra was later on dissatisfied and returned for further instructions, whereas Virocana did not again come back. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* relates this as an old story and says that it is for this reason that those, who at the present time believe only in worldly pleasures and who have no faith (in the efficiency of deeds or in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul) and who do not perform sacrifices, are called demons (*asura*); and it is therefore their custom to adorn the dead body with fine clothes, good ornaments and provide food for it with which they probably thought that the dead would conquer the other world.

This passage of the *Chāndogya* seems to be of special importance. It shows that there was a race different from the Aryans, designated here as *asuras*, who dressed their dead bodies with fine clothes, adorned them with ornaments, provided them with food, so that when there was a resurrection of these dead bodies they might with that food, clothes and ornaments prosper in the other world and it is these people who believed that the body was the only self. The later *Lokāyatas* or *Cārvākas* also believed that this body was the self, but the difference between them and these *dehātma-vādins* referred to in the *Chāndogya* is that they admitted "another world" where the bodies rose from the dead and prospered in the fine clothes, ornaments and food that were given to

¹ See Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, II. 341-342.

the dead body. This custom is said to be an *asura* custom. It seems possible, therefore, that probably the *lokāyata* doctrines had their beginnings in the preceding Sumerian civilization in the then prevailing customs of adorning the dead and the doctrine of bodily survival after death. This later on became so far changed that it was argued that since the self and the body were identical and since the body was burnt after death, there could not be any survival after death and hence there could not be another world after death. Already in the *Kaṭha* and the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* we had proof of the existence of people who did not believe in the existence of any consciousness after death and thought that everything ended with death; and in the *Chāndogya* we find that Virocana believed in the doctrine that the body was the *ātman* and this doctrine is traced here to the custom of adorning the dead body among the *asuras*.

The tenets and doctrines of these *asuras* are described in the *Gītā*, xvi. 7-18, as follows: The *asuras* cannot distinguish between right and wrong conduct; they do not have any purity, truthfulness and proper behaviour. They do not think that the world is based on any truth and reality; they do not believe in God and consider all beings to have come out from the desires of the sexes and from nothing more than from mutual sex-relations. These foolish people with such views do harm to the world, engage themselves in ferocious deeds and destroy their own selves (as they have no faith in the other world or in the means thereto)¹. Full of insatiable desire, egoism, vanity and pride, they take the wrong course through ignorance and live an impure life. They think that existence ends finally at death and that there is nothing beyond this world and its enjoyments, and they therefore give themselves up to earthly enjoyments. Bound with innumerable desires, anger, attachment, etc., they busy themselves in collecting materials of earthly enjoyments through wrong means. They always think of their riches, which they earn daily, and which they accumulate, with which they fulfil their desires in the present or wish to fulfil in the future; of the enemies whom they have destroyed, or whom they wish to destroy; of their powers, their success, their joys, their strength, and so forth.

A doctrine similar to that of the *Lokāyatikas* is preached by Jābāli in *Rāmāyaṇa*, II. 108, where he says that it is a pity that there

¹ Śrīdhara says that these refer to the *Lokāyatikas*. *Gītā*, xvi. 9.

should be some people who prefer virtue in the other world to earthly goods of this world; the performance of the different sacrifices for the satisfaction of the dead is but waste of food, for being dead no one can eat. If food eaten by people here should be of use to other bodies, then it is better to perform *śrāddhas* for people who make a sojourn to distant countries than to arrange for their meals. Though intelligent men wrote books praising the merit of gifts, sacrifices, initiation and asceticism, in reality there is nothing more than what is directly perceived by the senses.

In the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (I, 6. 29-31) certain people are alluded to who did not believe in the efficacy of the performance of sacrifices and spoke against the Vedas and the sacrifices; and in the *Mahābhārata*, XII. 186, it has been urged by Bharadvāja that life-functions can be explained by purely physical and physiological reasons and that the assumption of a soul is quite unnecessary. In the *Mahābhārata* references are made also to *haitukas* who did not believe in the other world; they were people with strong old convictions (*dṛḍha-pūrve*) who could hardly change their views; they were learned in the Vedas (*vahusṛuta*), were well read in older *śāstras*, made gifts, performed sacrifices, hated falsehood, were great orators in assemblies, and went among the people explaining their views. This passage reveals a curious fact that even in the Vedic circles there were people who performed sacrifices, made gifts and were well read in the Vedas and in older literature, who despised falsehood, were great logicians and speakers and yet did not believe in anything except what exists in this world (*nai'tad asti'ti-vādinah*). We know from the Buddhistic sources that the Brahmins were well versed in the *lokāyata* learning; we know also that in the Upaniṣadic circles the views of those who did not believe in life after death are referred to and reproached, and the *Chāndogya* refers to people among whom the doctrine that the self and the body were identical was current as a corollary underlying their custom of adorning the dead. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* we find that Jāvali taught the doctrine that there was no life after death and that the ritualistic offerings for the satisfaction of the dead were unnecessary. In the *Gītā* we find also the holders of such views referred to, and they are there reported as performing sacrifices only in name, as they did not adhere to the proper ritualistic course¹. But in the

¹ *yajante nāma-jajñais te dambhenā'vidhi-pūrvakam. Gītā, XVI. 17.*

Mahābhārata certain people are referred to who were well read in the Vedas and other older literature and yet did not believe in the other world and in the immortality of the soul. This shows that this heterodox view (that there was no life after death) was gradually spreading amongst certain sections of the Vedic people, and that though some of them were worthless people who utilized the doctrine only to indulge in sense-gratifications and to live in a lower plane of life, there were others who performed the Vedic practices, were well read in Vedic and other literature and yet did not believe in the doctrine of immortality or in a world beyond the present. Thus, even in those early times, on the one hand there were in the Vedic circle many moral and learned people who believed in these heretical views, whereas there were also immoral and bad people who lived a vicious life and held such heretical views either tacitly or openly¹.

We thus know that the *lokāyata* views were very old, probably as early as the Vedas, or still earlier, being current among the Sumerian people of pre-Aryan times. We know further that a commentary on the *Lokāyata-śāstra* by Bhāgurī was very well known in 200 or 300 B.C., but it is exceedingly difficult to say anything regarding the author of the *Lokāyata-śāstra*. It is attributed to Brhaspati or to Cārvāka². But it is difficult to say who this Brhaspati may have been. One *Brhaspati-sūtra*, a work on polity, has been edited with translation by Dr F. W. Thomas and published from Lahore. In this work the *lokāyatas* have been mentioned in II. 5, 8, 12, 16, 29, and III. 15. Here they are very severely abused as thieves who regard religion as a mere means of advantage and who are destined to go to Hell. It is therefore absolutely certain

¹ The *Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, VII. 8, 9, says that there are many others who by adopting useless arguments, illustrations, false analogies and illusory demonstrations wish to oppose the Vedic ways of conduct; they do not believe in the self and are like thieves who would never go to Heaven and with whom no one should associate. One sometimes forgets that the doctrine of these people is nothing new but is only a different kind of Vedic science (*veda-vidyā'ntaran tu tat*). Brhaspati became Śukra and taught the *Asuras* this doctrine so that they might be inclined to despise the Vedic duties and consider bad to be good and good to be bad.

² The *Maitrāyaṇīya* attributes these doctrines to Brhaspati and Śukra; the *Prabodha-candro-daya* of Kṛṣṇa Miśra says that these were first formulated by Brhaspati and then handed over to Cārvāka who spread them among people through his pupils.

See also Mr D. Śāstri's *Cārvāka-śaṣṭi*, pp. 11-13, where he refers to a number of authorities who attribute this to Brhaspati.

that the Bṛhaspati who was the author of these *sūtras* on polity could not have been the author of the *lokāyata* science. Nor could it have been the legal writer Bṛhaspati. In Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra* a Bṛhaspati is referred to as a writer on polity, but this must be a different one from the *Bārhaspatya-sūtra* published by Dr Thomas¹. The Bṛhaspati of Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra* is reported there as admitting agriculture, trade and commerce (*vārtā*), law and statecraft (*daṇḍa-nīti*), as the only sciences; in the next passage of the same chapter (*Vidyā-samuddeśa*) *daṇḍa-nīti* is regarded as the one subject of study by Uśanas. In the *Prabodha-candro-daya* Kṛṣṇa Miśra makes Cārvāka hold the view that law and statecraft are the only sciences and that the science of *vārtā* (i.e. agriculture, commerce, trade, dairy, poultry, etc.) falls within them. According to this report the Cārvākas took only *daṇḍa-nīti* and *vārtā* into account, and thus their views agreed with those of Bṛhaspati and Uśanas, and more particularly with those of the latter. But we cannot from this assume that either Bṛhaspati or Uśanas mentioned by Kauṭilya could be regarded as the author of the original *lokāyata*. Bṛhaspati, the author of the *Lokāyata-śāstra*, is thus a mythical figure, and we have practically no information regarding the originator of the *lokāyata* system. It is probable that the original *lokāyata* work was written in the form of *sūtras* which had at least two commentaries, the earliest of which was probably as early as 300 or 400 B.C. There was at least one metrical version of the main contents of this system from which extracts are found quoted in Mādhava's *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* and in other places.

It is difficult to say whether Cārvāka was the name of a real person or not. The earliest mention of the name is probably to be found in the *Mahābhārata*, XII. 38 and 39, where Cārvāka is described as a Rākṣasa in the garb of an ascetic Brahmin with three staffs (*tridaṇḍī*), but nothing is said there about the doctrine that he professed. In most of the early texts the *lokāyata* doctrines are either mentioned as the *lokāyata* view or attributed to Bṛhaspati. Thus, in the *Padma Purāṇa* in the *Sṛṣṭ-khaṇḍa*, XII. 318-340, some of the *lokāyata* doctrines are described as being the instructions of Bṛhaspati. Kamalaśīla, of the eighth century, refers to the Cārvākas as being the adherents of the *lokāyata* doctrine; the *Prabodha-candro-daya* speaks of Cārvāka as being the great teacher who

¹ Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra*, pp. 6, 29, 63, 177, 192, Mysore ed. 1924.

propagated through a succession of pupils and pupils of pupils the *Lokāyata-śāstra* written by Vācaspati and handed over to him. Mādhava, in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, describes him as one who follows the views of Bṛhaspati and the chief of the nihilists (*bṛhaspati-matā-nusāriṇā nāstika-śiromaṇinā*). Guṇaratna, however, in his commentary on the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, speaks of the Cārvākas as being a nihilistic sect who only eat but do not regard the existence of virtue and vice and do not trust anything else but what can be directly perceived. They drank wines and ate meat and were given to unrestricted sex-indulgence. Each year they gathered together on a particular day and had unrestricted intercourse with women. They behaved like common people and for this reason they were called *lokāyata* and because they held views originally framed by Bṛhaspati they were also called *Bārhaspatya*. Thus it is difficult to say whether the word Cārvāka was the name of a real personage or a mere allusive term applied to the adherents of the *lokāyata* view.

Both Haribhadra and Mādhava have counted the Lokāyata or Cārvāka philosophy as a *darśana* or system of philosophy. It had a new logic, a destructive criticism of most of the cherished views of other systems of Indian philosophy, a materialistic philosophy, and it denied morality, moral responsibility and religion of every kind.

Let us, therefore, first take up the Cārvāka logic. The Cārvākas admitted the validity only of perception. There is nothing else but what can be perceived by the five senses. No inference can be regarded as a valid means of knowledge, for inference is possible only when the universal concomitance of the reason (*hetus*) with the probandum is known, and such a reason is known to be existing in the object of the minor term (*vyāpti-pakṣa-dharmatā-śāli hi lingaṃ gamakam*). Such a concomitance is possible when it is known not only to be unconditional but when there is no doubt in the mind that it could be conditional. Such a concomitance must first be known before an inference is possible; but how can it be known? Not by perception, for concomitance is not an objective entity with which the senses can come in contact. Moreover, the concomitance of one entity with another means that the entities are associated with each other in the past, present and future (*sarvo-pasamhārayatṛi vyāptiḥ*), and the sense-organs can have no

scope with regard to future associations or even with regard to all past time. If it is urged that the concomitance is between the class-character (*sāmānya-gocaram*) of the probandum (e.g. fire) and the class-character of the reason (e.g. smoke), then it is not necessary that the concomitance of the reason with the probandum should have actually to be perceived at all times by the sense-organs. But if the concomitance is between the class-character of smoke and fire, why should any individual fire be associated with every case of smoke? If the concomitance cannot be perceived by the sense-organs, it cannot be perceived by the mind either, for the mind cannot associate itself with the external objects except through the sense-organs. The concomitance cannot be known through inference, for all inference presupposes it. Thus, there being no way of perceiving concomitance, inference becomes impossible. Again, a concomitance which can lead to a valid inference must be devoid of all conditions; but the absence of such conditions in the past or in the future cannot be perceived at the time of making the inference. Moreover, a condition (*upādhi*) is defined as that which, having an unfailing concomitance with the probandum, has not the same concomitance with the reason (*sādhana-vyāpakatve sati sādhyasama-vyāptih*)¹.

Again it is said that an inference is possible only when the reason (e.g. smoke) is perceived to be associated with the object denoted by the minor term (*pakṣa*, e.g. hill), but in reality there is no association of the smoke with the hill nor can it be a character of it, for it is a quality of fire. There is no universal agreement between smoke and hill so that one can say that wherever there is a hill there is smoke. Nor can it be said that wherever there is smoke there is both the hill and the fire. When the smoke is first seen it is not perceived as the quality of fire associated with a hill; therefore it is not enough to say that the reason (e.g. smoke) belongs to the minor term (*pakṣa*, e.g. hill) as its character (*pakṣa-dharma*), but that the reason belongs to the minor term associated with the probandum. The assertion that in an inference the reason must be known as a quality of the minor term (*pakṣa*) has therefore to be interpreted as being a quality of a part of the minor term as associated with the probandum.

A valid inference can be made when the two following con-

¹ *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, I.

ditions are satisfied: (1) An invariable and unconditional concomitance is known between the reason and the probandum such that in every case when the reason is present the probandum must also be present in all places and in all times, without the association of any determining condition. (2) That a reason having such a concomitance with the probandum must be known to exist in the minor term (*pakṣa*) in which the probandum is asserted. Now the Cārvāka contention is that none of these conditions can be fulfilled and that therefore valid inference is impossible. Firstly, concomitance is ascertained through an experience of a very large number of cases (*bhūyo-darśana*) of agreement between the reason (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*). But according to the difference of circumstances, time and place, things differ in their power or capacity and thus since the nature and qualities of things are not constant it is not possible that any two entities should be found to agree with each other under all circumstances in all times and in all places¹. Again, an experience of a large number of cases cannot eliminate the possibility of a future failure of agreement. It is not possible to witness all cases of fire and smoke and thus root out all chances of a failure of their agreement, and if that were possible there would be no need of any inference². The Cārvākas do not admit "universals," and therefore they do not admit that the concomitance is not between smoke and fire but between smoke-ness (*dhūmatva*) and fire-ness (*vahnitva*)³. Again, it is impossible to assure oneself that there are no conditions (*upādhi*) which would vitiate the concomitance between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, for though they may not now be perceivable they may still exist imperceivably⁴. Without a knowledge of agreement in absence (i.e. in a case where there is no fire there is no smoke), there cannot be any assurance of concomitance. It is impossible to exhaust in

¹ *deśa-kāla-daśa-bheda-vicitrā-tmasu vastuṣu
avinā-bhāva-miyamo na śakyo vastum āha ca.*

Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 119.

² *na pratyakṣī-kṛtā yāvad dhūmā-gñi-vyaktayo'kṣilāḥ
tāvat syād api dhūmo' sau yo' nagner iti śaṅkyate
ye tu pratyakṣato viśvaṃ paśyanti hi bhavadṛśaḥ
kiṃ divya-caṅkuṣām eṣām anumāna-prayojanam* *Ibid.*

³ *sāmānya-dvārako' py asti nā'vinābhāva-niścayaḥ
vāstavam hi na sāmānyam nāma kiñcana vidyate.* *Ibid.*

⁴ Compare *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, p. 693:
*vyāghāto yadi śaṅkā'sti na cec chaṅkā tatastarām
vyāghātā-vadhūr āśaṅkā tarkaḥ śaṅkā-vadhiḥ kutaḥ.*

experience all cases of absence of fire as being also the cases of the absence of smoke. Thus since without such a joint method of agreement in presence and absence the universal invariable concomitance cannot be determined, and since it is not possible to assure oneself of the universal agreement in presence or in absence, the concomitance itself cannot be determined¹.

Purandara, however, a follower of Cārvāka (probably of the seventh century), admits the usefulness of inference in determining the nature of all worldly things where perceptual experience is available; but inference cannot be employed for establishing any dogma regarding the transcendental world, or life after death or the laws of *Karma* which cannot be available to ordinary perceptual experience². The main reason for upholding such a distinction between the validity of inference in our practical life of ordinary experience, and in ascertaining transcending truths beyond experience, lies in this, that an inductive generalization is made by observing a large number of cases of agreement in presence together with agreement in absence, and no cases of agreement in presence can be observed in the transcendent sphere; for even if such spheres existed they could not be perceived by the senses. Thus, since in the supposed supra-sensuous transcendent world no case of a *hetu* agreeing with the presence of its *sādhya* can be observed, no inductive generalization or law of concomitance can be made relating to this sphere³. In reply to this contention Vādideva says that such a change may be valid against the Mīmāṃsists who depend upon the joint method of agreement and difference for making any inductive generalization, but this cannot

¹ *niyamaś cā'numānā-ṅgaṃ grhitaḥ pratipadyate
grahaṇaṃ cā'sya nā'nyatra nāstitā-niścayaṃ vinā
darśanā-darśanābhyam hi niyama-grahaṇaṃ yadi
tad apy asad anagnau hi dhūmasye'ṣṭam adarśanam
anagnis ca kiyaṃ sarvaṃ jagaj-jvalana-varjitam
tatra dhūmasya nāstite'va nai'va paśyanty ayogināḥ.*

Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 120.

² He is mentioned in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, p. 431, *Purandaras tv āha loka-prasiddham anumānaṃ cārvākair api'syate eva, yat tu kaiś cit laukikaṃ mārgam atikramya anumānam ucyate tan niśidhyate*. Vādideva Sūri also quotes a *sūtra* of Purandara in his commentary *Syādvāda-ratnākūra* on his *Pramāṇa-naya-tattva-lokā-lanikāra*, II. 131: *pramāṇasya gauṇatvād anumānād artha-niścaya-durlabhāt.*

³ *avyabhicārā-vagamo hi laukika-hetunām
anumeyā'vagame nimittaṃ sa nāsti tantra-siddheṣu
iti na tebhyah parokṣā-rthā'vagamo nyāyyo'ta idam
uktam anumānād artha-niścayo durlabhah.*

apply against the Jaina view of inference which is based on the principle of necessary implication (*anyathā-nupapattāveva tat-svarūpatvena svīkārāt*).

Other objections also made against the possibility of a valid inference are as follows: (1) impressions made by inferential knowledge are dim and not so vivid (*aspaṣṭatvāt*) as those produced by perception; (2) inference has to depend on other things for the determination of its object (*svārtha-mīscaye parā-pekṣatvāt*); (3) inference has to depend on perception (*pratyakṣa-pūrvakatvāt*); (4) inferential cognitions are not directly produced by the objects (*arthād anupajāyamānatvāt*); (5) inference is not concrete (*avastuviṣayatvāt*); (6) it is often found contradicted (*bādhyamānatvāt*); (7) there is no proof which may establish the law that every case of the presence of the *hetu* should also be a case of the presence of the *sādhya* (*sādhya-sādhanayoḥ pratibandha-sādhaka-pramāṇa-bhāvād vā*)¹. None of these can be regarded as a reason why inference should be regarded as invalid from the Jaina point of view. For in reply to the first objection it may be pointed out that vividness has never been accepted as a definition of *pramāṇa*, and therefore its absence cannot take away the validity of an inference; illusory perceptions of two moons are vivid, but are not on that account regarded as valid. Again, an inference does not always depend on perception, and even if it did, it utilized its materials only for its own use and nothing more. Perception also is produced from certain materials, but is not on that account regarded as invalid. The inference is also produced from objects and is as concrete as perception since like it it involves universals and particulars. Again, false inferences are indeed contradicted, but that is no charge against right inferences. The invariable relationship between a *hetu* and a *sādhya* can be established through mental reasoning (*tarka*)².

Jayanta points out in this connection that a law of universal agreement of the *sādhya* with the *hetu* has to be admitted. For an inference cannot be due to any mere instinctive flash of intelligence (*pratibhā*). If a knowledge of invariable and unconditional agreement was not regarded as indispensable for an inference, and if it was due to a mere instinctive flash, then the people of the Coconut

¹ Vāidīva Sūri's *Syādvāda-ratnākāra*, pp. 131, 132. Nirṇaya Sagara Press, 1914.

² *Ibid.*

island who do not know how to make fire would have been able to infer fire from smoke. Some say that the invariable association of the *hetu* with the *sādhya* is perceived by mental perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*). They hold that in perceiving the association of smoke with fire and the absence of the former when the latter is absent, the mind understands the invariable association of smoke with fire. It is not necessary in order to come to such a generalization that one should perceive the agreement of smoke and fire in all the infinite number of cases in which they exist together, for the agreement observed in the mind is not between smoke and fire but between smoke-ness and fire-ness (*jvalanatvā-di-sāmānya-puraḥsaratayā vyāpti-grahṇāt*). The objection against this view would be the denial of class-concepts as held by the Cārvākas, Buddhists, and others. There are others, again, who say that even if universals are admitted, it is impossible that there should be universals of all cases of absence of fire as associated with the absence of smoke, and under the circumstances unless all positive and negative instances could be perceived the inductive generalization would be impossible. They, therefore, hold that there is some kind of mystic intuition like that of a yogin (*yogi-pratyakṣa-kalpam*) by which the invariable relation (*pratibandha*) is realized. Others hold that an experience of a large number of positive instances unaccompanied by any experience of any case of failure produces the notion of concomitance. But the Nyāya insists on the necessity of an experience of a large number of instances of agreement in presence and absence for arriving at any inductive generalization of concomitance¹. The Cārvākas, of course, say to this that in determining the unconditional invariable agreement of every case of a *hetu* with its *sādhya* the absence of visible conditions may be realized by perception; but the possibility of the existence of invisible conditions cannot be eliminated even by the widest experience of agreement in presence, and thus there would always be the fear that the invariable concomitance of the *hetu* with the *sādhya* may be conditional, and thus all inference has the value of more or less probability but not of certainty, and it is only through perceptual corroboration that the inferences come to be regarded as valid². The reply of Nyāya to this is that the assertion that in-

¹ Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 122.

² *athā-numānaṃ na pramāṇaṃ yogyo-pādhinām yogyā-nupalabdhyā'bhāva-nis-caye' py' ayogyo-pādhi-saṅkayā vyabhicāra-samśayāt śataśaḥ saḥacaritayor api vyabhicāro-palabdheś ca loke dhūmā-di-darśanā-ntaraṃ vahnayā'di-vyarahāraś ca*

ference is not valid is itself an inference based on the similarity of inferential processes with other invalid mental processes. But this does not properly refute the Cārvāka position that inductive generalizations are only probable, and that therefore (as Purandara says) they acquire some amount of validity by being corroborated by experience and that they have no force in spheres where they cannot be corroborated by perceptual experience.

Since the Cārvākas do not attribute any more validity to inference than probability, other forms of *pramāṇas*, such as the testimony of trusty persons or the scriptures, analogy or implication, also were not regarded as valid. According to Udayana's statement, the Cārvākas denied the existence of anything that was not perceived, and Udayana points out that if this doctrine is consistently applied and people begin to disbelieve all that they do not perceive at any particular time, then all our practical life will be seriously disturbed and upset¹. The school of *dhūrta Cārvākas*, in their *Sūtra* work, not only denied the validity of inference but criticized the Nyāya categories as enunciated in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 1. 1, and tried to establish the view that no such enumeration of categories was possible². It is no doubt true that the Cārvākas admitted perception as the only valid *pramāṇa*, but since illusions occurred in perception also, ultimately all *pramāṇas* were regarded as indeterminable by them.

The Cārvākas had to contend on the one hand with those who admitted a permanent soul, such as the Jains, the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṃkhya-yoga and the Mīmāṃsā, and on the other hand with the idealistic Buddhists who believed in a permanent series of conscious states; for the Cārvākas denied all kinds of existence after death. Thus they say that since there is no permanent entity that abides after death, there is no existence after death. As the body, understanding and sense-functions, are continually changing, there cannot be any existence after death, and hence no separate soul can be admitted. According to some, Cārvākas consciousness is pro-

sambhāvana-mātrāt saṃvādena ca prāmāṇyā-bhimānād. Tattva-cintāmaṇi Anumiti. For a similar view see Russel, "On the notion of Cause" in his *Mysticism and Logic*.

¹ Udayana's *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, III. 5, 6.

² *cārvāka-dhūrtas tu athā'tas tattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāma iti pratijñāya pramāṇa-prameya-saṃkhyā-lakṣaṇa-niyamā-sakya-karaṇīyatvaṃ eva tattvaṃ vyākhyā-tavān; pramāṇa-saṃkhyā-niyam-āśakya-karaṇīyatva-siddhaye ca pramiti-bhedān pratyakṣā-di-pramāṇān upajanyān idrṣān upādarśayāt. Nyāya-mañjari*, p. 64.

duced (*utpadyate*) from the four elements, and according to others it is manifested (*abhivyajyate*) from them like fermenting intoxication (*surā*) or acids. It is on account of diverse kinds of arrangements and rearrangements of the atoms of air, water, fire and earth that consciousness is either produced or manifested and the bodies and senses are formed or produced. There is nothing else but these atomic arrangements, and there is also no further separate category¹.

The school of *Suśīkṣita Cārvākas* holds that, so long as the body remains, there is an entity which remains as the constant perceiver and enjoyer of all experiences. But no such thing exists after the destruction of the body. If there was anything like a permanent self that migrated from one body to another, then it would have remembered the incidents of the past life just as a man remembers the experiences of his childhood or youth². Arguing against the Buddhist view that the series of conscious states in any life cannot be due to the last conscious state before death in a previous life, or that no state of consciousness in any life can be the cause of the series of conscious states in another future life, the Cārvākas say that no consciousness that belongs to a different body and a different series can be regarded as the cause of a different series of conscious states belonging to a different body. Like cognitions belonging to a different series, no cognition can be caused by the ultimate state of consciousness of a past body³. Again, since the last mental state of a saint cannot produce other mental states in a separate birth, it is wrong to suppose that the last mental state of a dying man should be able to produce any series of mental states in a new birth. For this reason the Cārvāka teacher Kambalāśvatara says that consciousness is produced from the body through the operation of the vital functions of *prāṇa*, *apāna* and other bio-motor faculties. It is also wrong to suppose that there is any dormant consciousness in the early stages of the foetal life, for consciousness means the cognition of objects, and there cannot be any consciousness in the foetal state when no sense-organs are properly developed; so also there is no consciousness in a state of swoon, and

¹ *tat-samudāye viśaye-ndriya-saṃjñā. Cārvāka-sūtra* quoted in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, p. 520.

² *Nyāya-mañjari*, p. 467.

³ *yadi jñānam na tad vivakṣitā-tīta-deha-varti-caram ajñāna-janyam. jñānatvāt yathā'nya-santāna-varti-jñānam. Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā*, p. 521.

it is wrong to suppose that even in these stages consciousness exists as a potential power, for power presupposes something in which it exists and there is no other support for consciousness excepting the body, and, therefore, when the body is destroyed, all consciousness ceases with it. It cannot also be admitted that at death consciousness is transferred to another intermediary body, for no such body is ever perceived and cannot therefore be accepted. There cannot also be the same series of consciousness in two different bodies; thus the mental states of an elephant cannot be in the body of a horse.

The Buddhist reply to this objection of the Cārvākas is that if by discarding after-life the Cārvākas wish to repudiate the existence of any permanent entity that is born and reborn, then that is no objection to the Buddhists, for they also do not admit any such permanent soul. The Buddhist view is that there is a beginningless and endless series of states of conscious states which, taken as a period of seventy, eighty or a hundred years, is called the present, past or future life. It is wrong on the part of the Cārvākas to deny the character of this series as beginningless and endless; for if it is so admitted, then a state of consciousness at birth has to be regarded as the first and that would mean that it had no cause and it would thus be eternal, for since it existed without any cause there is no reason why it should ever cease to exist. It could not also have been produced by some eternal consciousness or god, for no such eternal entities are admitted; it cannot be admitted as being eternal by itself; it cannot be produced by eternal atoms of earth, water, etc., for it may be shown that no eternal entities can produce anything. Thus, the last alternative is that it must have been produced by the previous states of consciousness. Even if the atoms are regarded as momentary it would be difficult to prove that consciousness was produced by them. The principle which determines causation is, firstly, that something is the cause which, being present, that which was worthy of being seen but was not seen before becomes seen¹. Secondly, when two instances are such that though all the other conditions are present in them both, yet with the introduction of one element there happens a new phenomenon in the one which does not happen in the other, then that element is the cause of that

¹ *yeṣāṃ upalambhe sati upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptam pūrvam anupalabdham sad upalabhyate ity evam āśrayaṇtyam.* Kamalaśīla, *Pañjikā*, p. 525.

phenomenon¹. The two instances, which differ from each other only in this that there is the effect in the one and not in the other, agree with each other in all other respects excepting that that in which there is the effect has also a new element which is not present in the other, and it is only in such a case that that element may be regarded as the cause of that effect. Otherwise, if the cause is defined as that which being absent the effect is also absent, then there is the alternative possibility of the presence of another element which was also absent, and it might be that it was on account of the absence of this element that the effect was absent. Thus, the two instances where an effect occurs and where it does not occur must be such that they are absolutely the same in every respect, except the fact that there is one element in the case where there is the effect which was absent in the other instance. The causal relation between body and mind cannot be established by such a rigorous application of the joint method of agreement and difference. It is not possible to employ the method of agreement to determine the nature of relation between one's own body and mind, for it is not possible to observe the body in the early foetal stage before the rise of mind, for without mind there cannot be any observation. In other bodies also the mind cannot be directly observed and so it is not possible to say that the body is prior to mind. The method of difference also cannot be employed, for no one can perceive whether with the cessation of the body his mind also ceases or not; and since the minds of other people cannot be directly perceived, such a negative observation cannot be made with reference to other people, and no assertion can therefore be made as to whether with the cessation of other people's bodies their minds also ceased or not. No inference can be drawn from the immobility of the body at death that it must be due to the destruction of mind, for it may still exist and yet remain inoperative in moving the body. Moreover, the fact that a particular body is not moved by it, is due to the fact that the desires and false notions which were operative with reference to that body were then absent.

Again, there are other reasons why the body cannot be regarded as the cause of mind: for if the body as a whole was the cause of

¹ *satṣu tad-anyeṣu samartheṣu ta-dhetuṣu yasyai'kasyā'bhāve na bhavati'ty evam āśrayaṇīyam anyathā hi kevalam tad-abhāve na bhavati'ty upadāśane sandigdham atra tasya sāmāthyam syāt anyasyā'pi tat-samarthasyā'bhāvāt.* Kamalaśīla, *Pañjikā*, p. 526.

mind, then slight deformities of the body would have changed the character of the mind, or minds associated with big bodies like those of elephants would be greater than those of men. If with the change of one there is no change in the other, the two cannot be said to be related as cause and effect. Nor can it be said that the body with the complete set of senses is the cause of mind, for in that case with the loss of any sense the nature and character of the mind would also be changed. But we know that this is not so, and when by paralysis all the motor organs are rendered inoperative, the mind may still continue to work with unabated vigour¹. Again, though the body may remain the same, yet the mental temperament, character or tone might considerably change, or sudden emotions might easily unhinge the mind though the body might remain the same. Even if instances are found which prove that the conditions of the body affect the conditions of the mind, yet that is no reason why the mind or soul should cease to exist with the destruction of the body. If on account of co-existence (*saha-sthiti-niyama*) of body and mind they may be said to be connected with each other in bonds of causation, then since body is as much co-existent with mind as mind with body, the mind may as well be said to be the cause of body. Co-existence does not prove causation, for co-existence of two things may be due to a third cause. Heated copper melts, so through heat the foetal elements may be supposed to produce on the one hand the body and on the other hand to manifest mind or consciousness. So the co-existence of body and mind does not necessarily mean that the former is the material cause of the latter.

It is said that though the later mental states are perceived to be produced by the previous ones, yet the first manifested consciousness has a beginning and it is produced by the body, and thus the theory of the Buddhists that the series of conscious states is without beginning is false. But if the mental states are in the first instance produced by the body, then these could not in later cases be produced in other ways through the visual or other sense organs. If it is urged that the body is the cause of the first origin of knowledge, but not of the later mental states, then the later mental states ought to be able to raise themselves without being in any way dependent

¹ *prasūptikā-di-rogā-dīnā kārye-ndriyā-dīnām upaghāte'pi mano-dhūr avikṛtaikā-vikalām sva-sattām anubhavati*. Karmalaśīla, *Pañjikā*, p. 527.

on the body. If it is held that a mental state can produce a series of other mental states only with the help of the body, then each of them would produce an infinite series of such mental states, but such an infinite number of infinite series is never experienced. It cannot also be said that the body generates consciousness only at the first stage and that in all later stages the body remains only as an accessory cause, for that which once behaves as a generating cause cannot behave as an accessory cause. Thus, even if the physical elements be admitted to be impermanent, they cannot be regarded as the cause. If the mental states be regarded as having a beginning, it may be asked whether by mental states the sense-knowledge or the mental ideas are meant. It cannot be the former, for during sleep, swoon or inattentive conditions there is no sense-knowledge, even though the sense-organs are present, and it has therefore to be admitted that attention is the necessary pre-condition of knowledge, and the sense-organs or the sense-faculties cannot be regarded as the sole cause of sense-knowledge. The mind cannot also be regarded as the sole cause, for unless the sense-data or the sense-objects are perceived by the senses, the mind cannot work on them. If the mind could by itself know objects, then there would have been no blind or deaf people. Admitting for argument's sake that mind produces the cognitions, it may be asked whether this cognition is *savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa*; but there cannot be any *savikalpa* unless the association of names and objects (*saṅketa*) is previously learnt. It cannot be also *nirvikalpa* knowledge, for *nirvikalpa* represents the objects as they are in their unique character, which cannot be grasped by the mind alone without the help of the sense-organs. If it is held that even the sense-data are produced by the mind, then that would be the admission of extreme idealism and the giving up of the Cārvāka position. Thus, the conscious states are to be regarded as beginningless and without any origin. Their specific characters are determined by experiences of past lives, and it is as a reminiscence of these experiences that the instincts of sucking or fear show themselves even with the newly-born baby¹. It has therefore to be admitted that the conscious states are produced neither by the body nor by the mind, but that they are beginningless and are generated by the previous

¹ *tasmāt pūrvā-bhyāsa-kṛta evā'yaṃ bālānām iṣṭā-niṣṭo-pādāna-parityāga-lakṣaṇo vyavahāra iti siddhā buddher anādītā.* Kamalaśīla, *Pañjikā*, p. 532.

states, and these by other previous states, and so on. The parental consciousness cannot be regarded as being the cause of the consciousness of the offspring, for the latter are not similar in nature, and there are many beings which are not of parental origin. It has, therefore, to be admitted that the conscious states of this life must be produced by the states of another life previous to it. Thus, the existence of a past life is proved. And since the mental states of this life are determined by the mental states of other lives, the mental states of this life also are bound to determine other mental states, and this establishes the existence of future lives; provided, however, that these mental states are associated with the emotions of attachment, anger, antipathy, etc. For the mental states can produce other mental states only when they are affected by the emotions of attachment, anger, etc., and these are inherited by the new-born baby from the mental states of his previous life which determined the series of experiences of his present life. Though the past experiences are transferred to the present life, yet owing to a severe shock due to the intervention of the foetal period these experiences do not at once show themselves in infancy, but reveal themselves gradually with age. One does not always remember what one experienced before; thus, in dreams and deliriums, though the elements of the past experience are present, yet they are reconstructed in a distorted form and do not present themselves in the form of memory. So the past experiences cannot ordinarily be remembered by the infant, though there are some gifted beings who can remember their past lives. It is wrong to suppose that the mind is supported by the body or inheres in it, for the mind is formless. Again, if the mind inhered in the body and was of the same stuff as the body, then the mental states should be as perceptible by the visual organ as the body itself. The mental states can be perceived only by the mind in which they occur, but the body can be perceived both by that mind as well as by others; therefore, these two are of entirely different character and are hence entirely different. The body is continually changing, and it is the unitary series of conscious states that produces the impression of the identity of the body. For though the individual consciousnesses are being destroyed every moment, yet the series remains one in its continuity in the past lives, the present life and the future. When the series is different, as in that of a cow and a horse or between two different

persons, the states of the one series cannot affect those in the other. One conscious state is thus admitted to be determining another conscious state, and that another, and so on, within the series. Thus it has to be admitted that consciousness exists, even in the unconscious state; for had it not been so, then there would be a lapse of consciousness at that time and this would mean the breaking up of the series. States of consciousness are independent of the sense-organs and the sense-objects, as they are determined by the previous states; in dreams, when the sense-organs are not operating and when there is no sense-object contact, the conscious states continue to be produced; and in the case of the knowledge of past or future events, or the knowledge of chimerical things like the hare's horn, the independence of conscious states is clearly demonstrated. Thus it is proved that consciousness is neither produced by the body nor is in any way determined or conditioned by it, and it is determined only by its past states and itself determines the future states. Thus also the existence of the past and the future lives is proved.

The arguments of the Jains and of the Naiyāyikas against the Cārvākas are somewhat of a different nature from those of the idealistic Buddhists just described, as the former admitted permanent souls which the latter denied. Thus Vidyānandi, in his *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika*, says that the chief reason why the soul cannot be regarded as a product of matter is the fact of undisputed, unintermittent and universal self-consciousness unlimited by time or space. Such perceptions as "this is blue" or "I am white" depend upon external objects or the sense-organs, and cannot therefore be regarded as typical cases of self-consciousness. But such perceptions as "I am happy" which directly refer to the self-perception of the ego do not depend on the operation of any external instruments such as the sense-organs or the like. If this self-consciousness were not admitted to be established by itself, no other doctrine, not even the Cārvāka doctrine which seeks to demolish all attested convictions, could be asserted, for all assertions are made by virtue of this self-consciousness. If any consciousness required another consciousness to have itself attested, then that would involve a vicious infinite and the first consciousness would have to be admitted as unconscious. Thus, since the self manifests itself in self-consciousness (*sva-samvedana*), and since the body is perceived

through the operation of the senses like all other physical things, the former is entirely different from the latter and cannot be produced by the latter, and because it is eternal it cannot also be manifested by the latter. Again, since consciousness exists even without the senses, and since it may not exist even when there is the body and the senses (as in a dead body), the consciousness cannot be regarded as depending on the body. Thus, the self is directly known as different from the body by the testimony of self-consciousness. The other arguments of Vidyānandi are directed against the idealistic Buddhists who do not believe in a permanent self but believe in the beginningless series of conscious states, and this discussion had better be omitted here¹.

Jayanta argues in the *Nyāya-mañjarī* that the body is continually changing from infancy to old age, and therefore the experiences of one body cannot belong to the new body that has been formed through growth or decay, and therefore the identity of the ego and recognition which form the essential constitutive elements of knowledge cannot belong to the body². It is true no doubt that good diet and medicine which are helpful to the body are also helpful to the proper functioning of the intellect. It is also true that curds and vegetable products and damp places soon begin to germinate into insects. But this is no proof that matter is the cause of consciousness. The selves are all-pervading, and when there is appropriate modifications of physical elements they manifest themselves through them according to the conditions of their own *karmas*. Again, consciousness cannot also be admitted to belong to the senses, for apart from the diverse sense-cognitions there is the apperception of the ego or the self which co-ordinates these diverse sense-cognitions. 'Thus I feel that whatever I perceive by the eyes I touch by the hand, which shows distinctly that apart from the sense-cognitions there is the individual perceiver or the ego who co-ordinates these sensations, and without such a co-ordinator the unity of the different sensations could not be attained. The *Suśikṣita Cārvākas*, however, hold that there is one perceiver so long as the body exists, but that this perceiver (*pramāṭṛ-tattva*) does not transmigrate, but is destroyed with the destruction of the body; the soul is thus not immortal, and there is no after-world after the destruction of this body³. To this Jayanta's reply is that if

¹ *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika*, pp. 26-52.

² *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 439-441.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 467, 468.

a self is admitted to exist during the lifetime of this body, then since this self is different from the body, and since it is partless and non-physical by nature, there cannot be anything which can destroy it. No one has ever perceived the self to be burnt or torn to pieces by birds or animals as a dead body can be. Thus, since it has never been found to be destroyed, and since it is not possible to infer any cause which can destroy it, it is to be regarded as immortal. Since the self is eternal, and since it has a present and past association with a body, it is not difficult to prove that it will have also a future association with a body. Thus, self does not reside either in any part of the body or throughout the body, but is all-pervading and behaves as the possessor of that body with which it becomes associated through the bonds of *karma*. *Para-loka* or after-life is defined by Jayanta as rebirth or the association of the soul with other bodies after death. The proofs that are adduced in favour of such rebirths are, firstly, from the instinctive behaviour of infants in sucking the mother's breast or from their unaccountable joys and miseries which are supposed to be due to the memory of their past experiences in another birth; and, secondly, from the inequalities of powers, intelligence, temper, character and habits, inequalities in the reaping of fruits from the same kind of efforts. These can be explained only on the supposition of the effects of *karma* performed in other births¹.

Śaṅkara, in interpreting the *Brahma-sūtra*, III. 3. 53, 54, tries to refute the *lokayatika* doctrine of soullessness. The main points in the *lokayatika* argument here described are that since consciousness exists only when there is a body, and does not exist when there is no body, this consciousness must be a product of the body. Life-movements, consciousness, memory and other intellectual functions also belong to the body, since they are experienced only in the body and not outside of it². To this Śaṅkara's reply is that life-movements, memory, etc., do not sometimes exist even when the body exists (at death), therefore they cannot be the products of the body. The qualities of the body, such as colour, form, etc., can be

¹ *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 470-473.

² *yad dhi yasmīn sati bhavaty asati ca na bhavati tat tad-dharmatvena adhyavasyate yathā'gni-dharmāv auṣṇya-prakāśau; prāṇa-ceṣṭā-caitanya-smṛtyā-dayaś cā'tma-dharmatvenā'bhimatā ātma-vā-dinām te' py antar eva deha upalabhyamānā bahiḥ cā'nupalabhyamānā asiddhe deha-vyat irikte dharmiṇi deha-dharmā eva bhavitum arhanti; tasmād avyatyireko dehād ātmāna iti. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, III. 3. 53.*

perceived by everyone, but there are some who cannot perceive consciousness, memory, etc. Again, though these are perceived so long as the living body exists, yet there is no proof that it does not exist when this body is destroyed. Further, if consciousness is a product of the body, it could not grasp the body; no fire can burn itself and no dancer can mount his own shoulders. Consciousness is always one and unchangeable and is therefore to be regarded as the immortal self. Though ordinarily the self is found to manifest itself in association with a body, that only shows that the body is its instrument, but it does not prove that the self is the product of the body, as is contended by the Cārvākas. The Cārvākas criticized the entire social, moral and religious programme of orthodox Hindus. Thus Śrīharṣa, in representing their views in his *Naiṣadha-carita*, says as follows: "The scriptural view that the performance of sacrifices produces wonderful results is directly contradicted by experience, and is as false as the Purāṇic story of the floating of stones. It is only those who are devoid of wisdom and capacity for work who earn a livelihood by the Vedic sacrifices, or the carrying of three sticks (*tridaṇḍa*), or the besmearing of the forehead with ashes. There is no certainty of the purity of castes, for, considering the irrepressible sex-emotions of men and women, it is impossible to say that any particular lineage has been kept pure throughout its history in the many families on its maternal and paternal sides. Men are not particular in keeping themselves pure, and the reason why they are so keen to keep the women in the harem is nothing but jealousy; it is unjustifiable to think that unbridled sex-indulgence brings any sin or that sins bring suffering and virtues happiness in another birth; for who knows what will happen in the other birth when in this life we often see that sinful men prosper and virtuous people suffer?" The Vedic and the *smṛti* texts are continually coming into conflict with one another, and are reconciled only by the trickery of the commentators; if that is so, why not accept a view in which one may act as one pleases? It is held that the sense of ego is associated with the body, but when this body is burnt, what remains there of virtue or vice, and even if there is anything that will be experienced by another ego and in another body and as such that cannot hurt me. It is ridiculous to suppose that any one should remember anything after death, or that after death the fruits of *karma* will be reaped, or that by feeding Brahmins after death the so-called departed soul will have any

satisfaction. The image-worship, or the worship of stones with flowers, or of bathing in the Ganges as a religious practice is absolutely ridiculous. The practice of performing *śrāddha* ceremonies for the satisfaction of the departed is useless, for if the offering of food could satisfy the dead then the hunger of travellers could also be removed by their relations offering them food at home. In reality with death and destruction of the body everything ends, for nothing returns when the body is reduced to ashes. Since there is no soul, no rebirth, no god and no after-life, and since all the scriptures are but the instructions of priests interested in cheating the people, and the Purāṇas are but false mythical accounts and fanciful stories, the one ideal of our conduct is nothing but sense-pleasures. Sins and virtues have no meaning, they are only the words with which people are scared to behave in a particular manner advantageous to the priests. In the field of metaphysics the Cārvākas are materialists and believe in nothing beyond the purely sensible elements of the atoms of earth, water, air and fire and their combinations; in the field of logic they believe in nothing but what can be directly perceived; they deny *karma*, fruits of *karma*, rebirth or souls. The only thing that the Cārvākas cared for was the momentary sense-pleasures, unrestrained enjoyment of sensual joys. They did not believe in sacrificing present joys to obtain happiness in the future, they did not aim at increasing the total happiness and well-being of the whole life as we find in the ethical scheme of Caraka; with them a pigeon to-day was better than a peacock to-morrow, better to have a sure copper coin to-day than a doubtful gold coin in the future¹. Thus, immediate sense-pleasures were all that they wanted and any display of prudence, restraint, or other considerations which might lead to the sacrifice of present pleasures was regarded by them as foolish and unwise. It does not seem that there was any element of pessimism in their doctrine. Their whole ethical position followed from their general metaphysical and logical doctrine that sense-objects or sense-pleasures were all that existed, that there was no supra-sensible or transcendent reality, and thus there was no gradation or qualitative difference between the pleasures and no reason why any restraint should be put upon our normal tendency to indulge in sense-pleasures.

¹ *varam adya kapotaḥ śvo mayūrāt*
varam saṃśayikān niṣkāda saṃśayikāḥ
kāśāpaṇa iti lokāyatikāḥ. *Kāma-sūtra*, 1. 2. 29, 30.

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SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

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TO THE SACRED AND BLESSED MEMORY OF
THE LATE MAHĀTMĀ
MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI,

THE POET
RABINDRANATH TAGORE,
*and those martyrs and patriots who have
died or worked
for the liberation and elevation of
India*

THIS HUMBLE WORK, WHICH SEEKS TO DISCOVER
INDIA AT ITS BEST AND HIGHEST, IS
DEDICATED WITH SINCEREST
REVERENCE AND
HUMILITY

PREFACE

THE third volume of the present series was published in 1940. The manuscript of the fourth volume was largely ready at that time and it would have been possible to send it for publication at least by 1942. But the second world-war commenced in 1939 and although the Cambridge University Press was prepared to accept the manuscript even during war-time, the despatch of the manuscript from Calcutta to Cambridge and the transmission of proofs to and fro between England and India appeared to me to be too risky. In 1945, after retiring from the Chair of Philosophy in the Calcutta University, I came to England. But shortly after my arrival here I fell ill, and it was during this period of illness that I revised the manuscript and offered it to the University Press. This explains the unexpected delay between the publication of the third volume and the present one. The promises held out in the preface to the third volume, regarding the subjects to be treated in the present volume, have been faithfully carried out. But I am not equally confident now about the prospects of bringing out the fifth volume. I am growing in age and have been in failing health for long years. The physical and mental strain of preparing a work of this nature and of seeing it through the Press is considerable, and I do not know if I shall be able to stand such a strain in future. But I am still collecting the materials for the fifth volume and hope that I may be able to see it published in my life-time.

The present volume deals with the philosophy of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, the philosophy of Madhva and his followers, the philosophy of Vallabha and the philosophy of the Gauḍīya school of Vaiṣṇavism. So far as I know, nothing important has yet been published on the philosophy of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and that of Vallabha. Two important works by Mr Nāgarāja Śarmā of Madras and by Professor Helmuth von Glasenapp on the philosophy of Madhva have been published in English and German respectively. But so far nothing has appeared about the philosophy of the great teachers of the Madhva school such as Jaya-tīrtha and Vyāsa-tīrtha. Very little is known about the great controversy between the eminent followers of the Madhva school of thought and of the followers of the

Śaṅkara school of Vedānta. In my opinion Jaya-tīrtha and Vyāsa-tīrtha present the highest dialectical skill in Indian thought. There is a general belief amongst many that monism of Śaṅkara presents the final phase of Indian thought. The realistic and dualistic thought of the Sāṃkhya and the *yoga* had undergone a compromise with monism both in the Purāṇas and in the hands of the later writers. But the readers of the present volume who will be introduced to the philosophy of Jaya-tīrtha and particularly of Vyāsa-tīrtha will realize the strength and uncompromising impressiveness of the dualistic position. The logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyāsa-tīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole field of Indian thought. Much more could have been written on the system of Madhva logic as explained in the *Tarka-tāṇḍava* of Vyāsa-tīrtha. In this great work Vyāsa-tīrtha has challenged almost every logical definition that appears in the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa, which forms the bed-rock of the new school of Nyāya logic. But this could have been properly done only in a separate work on the Madhva logic. Of the controversy between the monists of the Śaṅkara school and the dualists of the Madhva school, most people are ignorant of the Madhva side of the case, though there are many who may be familiar with the monistic point of view. It is hoped that the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers undertaken in the present volume will give new light to students of Indian thought and will present many new aspects of dialectical logic hitherto undiscovered in Indian or European thought.

The treatment of the philosophy of Vallabha which is called *viśuddhādvaita* or pure monism, presents a new aspect of monism and also gives us a philosophical analysis of the emotion of devotion. Though readers of Indian philosophy may be familiar with the name of Vallabha, there are but few who are acquainted with the important contributions of the members of his school.

I have not devoted much space to the philosophy of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. Much of its philosophical views had already been anticipated in the treatment of the Sāṃkhya, *yoga* and the Vedānta. As regards the position of God and His relation to the world the outlook of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* is rather ambiguous. The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* has therefore been referred to for support by the Madhvas, Vallabhas and thinkers of the Gauḍīya school.

The Gauḍīya school seems to make the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* the fundamental source of its inspiration.

The chief exponent of the Gauḍīya school of thought is Caitanya. He, however, was a religious devotee and very little is known of his teachings. He did not produce any literary or philosophical work. But there were some excellent men of letters and philosophers among his disciples and their disciples. The treatment of the Gauḍīya school of Vaiṣṇavism thus gives a brief exposition of the views of Rūpa Gosvāmī, Jīva Gosvāmī and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa. Dr S. K. De has contributed a number of important articles on the position of Jīva Gosvāmī, though it does not seem that he cared to put an emphasis on the philosophical perspective.

In writing the present volume I have been able to use the huge amount of published materials in Sanskrit as well as a number of rare manuscripts which I collected from South India on my journeys there on various occasions.

My best thanks are due to my old friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, who, in spite of his advanced age and many important pre-occupations, took the trouble to revise some portions of the manuscript and of revising and correcting the proofs, with so much care and industry. But for his help the imperfections of the present work would have been much greater. I also have to thank Dr E. J. Thomas for the many occasional helps that I received from him from the time of the first inception of the present series. My best thanks are also due to my wife, Mrs Surama Dasgupta, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab), Śāstrī, for the constant help that I received from her in the writing of the book and also in many other works connected with its publication. I am also grateful to Dr Satindra Kumar Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., my former pupil, for the help that I received from him when I was preparing the manuscript some years ago. I wish also to thank the Syndics of the University Press for undertaking the publication of this volume at a time when the Press was handicapped by heavy pressure of work, and by great difficulties of production.

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

Trinity College, Cambridge

August, 1948

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE BHĀGAVATA-PURĀṆA

The Bhāgavata-purāṇa.

THE *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* shares with the *Bhagavad-gītā* a unique position in the devotional literature of India. It cannot however claim the same antiquity: before the tenth century A.D. no references to it have been discovered by the present writer. Even Rāmānuja (born in A.D. 1017) had not mentioned its name or made any quotations from it. But by the time of Madhva the work had become famous: one of the principal works of Madhva (thirteenth century A.D.) is called the *Bhāgavata-tātparya*, in which he deals with the principal ideas of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, and lays emphasis on them so far as they support his views. The thoughts of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* are loftily poetic, but the style is more difficult. The present writer is of opinion that it must have been composed by a Southerner, as it makes references to the Ālvars, who have probably never been referred to by any writer in Northern or Upper India. The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, however, was so much appreciated that immediately commentaries were written upon it. Some of these commentaries are:

Amṛta-raṅgiṇī, *Ātmapriyā*, *Kṛṣṇa-padī*, *Caitanya-candrikā*, *Jaya-maṅgalā*, *Tattva-pradīpikā*, *Tātparya-candrikā*, *Tātparya-dīpikā*, *Bhagavallīlā-cintāmaṇi*, *Rasa-mañjarī*, *Śukapakṣīyā Prabodhinī*, a *ṭikā* by Janārdana Bhaṭṭa, a *ṭikā* by Narahari, *Prakāśa* by Śrīnivāsa, *Tattva-dīpikā* by Kalyāṇa Rāya, a *ṭikā* by Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, a *ṭikā* by Kaura Sādhū, a *ṭikā* by Gopāla Cakravartī, *Anvaya-bodhinī* by Cūḍāmaṇi Cakravartī, *Bhāva-prakāśikā* by Narasiṃhācārya, a *ṭikā* by Yadupati, *Subodhinī* by Vallabhācārya, *Pada-ratnāvalī* by Vijayadhva-jā-tīrtha, a *ṭikā* by Viṭṭhala Dikṣita, *Sārārtha-darśinī* by Viśvanātha Cakravartī, a *ṭikā* by Viṣṇusvāmin, *Bhāgavata-candrikā* by Vīrarāghava, *Bhāvārtha-dīpikā* by Śivarama, *Bhāvārtha-dīpikā* by Śrīdhara-svāmī, *Sneha-pūraṇī* by Keśavadāsa, a *ṭikā* by Śrīvāsācārya, a *ṭikā* by Satyābhinava-tīrtha, a *ṭikā* by Sudarśana Sūri, a *ṭikā* by Braja-bhūṣaṇa, *Bhāgavata-purāṇārka-prabhā* by Hari-bhānu, *Bhāgavata-purāṇa-prathama-śloka-ṭikā* by Jayarāma and

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Pañcama-skandha-tīkā* by Vallabhācārya, *Subodhinī* by Bālakṛṣṇa Yati, *Vaiṣṇava-toṣiṇī* by Sanātana Gosvāmī, *Budharañjini* by Vāsudeva, *Nibandha-prakāśa* by Viṭṭhala Dikṣita, *Anukramaṇikā* by Vallabhācārya, *Ekādaśa-skandha-tātparya-candrikā* by Brahmānanda, *Anukramaṇikā* by Vopadeva. Many other works also have been written on the diverse subjects of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and some have also summarized it. Some of these works are by Rāmānanda-tīrtha, Priyādāsa, Viśveśvara, Puruṣottama, Śrīnātha, Vṛndāvana Gosvāmī, Viṣṇu Purī and Sanātana.

Dharma.

The word *dharma*, ordinarily translated as “religion” or “virtue,” is used in very different senses in the different schools and religious traditions of Indian thought. It will be useful to deal with some of the more important of these notions before the reader is introduced to the notion of *dharma* as explained in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. The *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* begins with an enquiry regarding the nature of *dharma*, and defines it as that good which is determinable only by the Vedic commands.¹ According to Śabara’s and Kumārila’s interpretation, the good that is called *dharma* means the Vedic sacrifices that lead to good results—the attainment of Heaven and the like. The fact that the Vedic sacrifices may bring about desirable results of various kinds can neither be perceived by the senses nor inferred from other known data: it can be known only from the testimony of the Vedic commands and directions. *Dharma*, therefore, means both the good results attainable by the Vedic sacrifices and the sacrifices themselves, and, as such, it is determinable only by the Vedic injunctions. Desirable results which are attained by rational and prudent actions are not *dharma*: for by definition *dharma* means only those desirable results which are attainable by operations which are performed strictly in accordance with Vedic injunctions. But in the Vedas are described various kinds of sacrifices by the performance of which one may take revenge on his enemies by destroying them or causing grievous injuries of various kinds to them, but action causing injury to any fellow-being is undesirable, and such action cannot be *dharma*.

¹ *athāto dharma-jijñāsā. Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 1. 1. 1.
codanā-lakṣaṇa’rtho dharmah. Ibid. I. 1. 2.

Dharma in this sense has nothing to do with God, or with ordinary or customary morality, or any kind of mystical or religious fervour as we understand it now. It simply means Vedic rituals and the good results that are supposed to follow from their performances; it has but little religious or moral application; and such a *dharma* can only be known through scriptural injunctions¹. It contains however just a little germ of the idea of non-injury, inasmuch as the performance of rituals for injuring others is not included within its content. *Dharma* also definitely rules out all kinds of emotion, mystic feeling, and exercise of intellect or thought of any description, and merely presupposes a strict loyalty to external scriptural commands; there is not the slightest trace here of any internal spiritual law, or rational will, or loyalty to God's will. The scriptural command however is categorically imperative in some cases, whereas in others it is only conditionally imperative, i.e. conditioned by one's desire for certain good things. Kumārila, in interpreting this idea, says that any substance (*dravya*), action (*kriyā*) or quality (*guṇa*) which may be utilized to produce happiness, by a particular kind of manipulation of them in accordance with Vedic commands, is called *dharma*². Though these substances, qualities etc. may be perceived by the senses yet the fact that their manipulation in a particular ritualistic manner will produce happiness for the per-

¹ *ya eva śreyas-karah, sa eva dharma-śabdena ucyate; katham avagamyatām; yo hi yāgam amutiṣṭhati, taṁ dhārmika iti samācakṣate; yaśca yasya kartā sa tena vyapadiṣyate; yathā pāvakah, lāvaka iti. tena yaḥ puruṣaṁ niḥśreyasena saṁyunnakti, sa dharma-śabdena ucyate...ko'rthah—yo niḥśreyasāya jyotiṣtomādiḥ. ko'narthah—yaḥ pratyavāyāyah. Śabara-bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, 1. 1. 2.*

Prabhākara however gives a different interpretation of this rule, and suggests that it means that every mandate of the Vedas is always binding, and is called *dharma* even when by following it we may be led to actions which are injurious to other people:

tataḥ sarvasya vedārthasya kīryatvam arthatvaṁ ca vidhīyata iti śyenādīnīyogānām api arthatvaṁ syāt.

Śāstra-dīpikā, p. 17, Nirṇaya-sāgara Press, Bombay, 1915.

Kumārila, further interpreting it, says that an action (performed according to the Vedic commands) which produces happiness and does not immediately or remotely produce unhappiness is called *dharma*.

² *phalaṁ tāvādharmo'sya śyenādeḥ sampradhāryate yadā yeneṣṭa-siddhiḥ syād anuṣṭhānābandhinī tasya dharmatvam ucyeṭa tataḥ śyenādi-varjanam yadā tu codanā-gamyah kāryākāryānapekṣayā dharmah prīti-nimittam syāt tadā śyene'pi dharmatā yadā tvapriti-hetur yaḥ sāksād vyavahito'pi vā so'dharmaś codanātaḥ syāt tadā śyene'py adharmatā.*

Śloka-vārttika, on *sūtra* 2, *śloka* 270-273.

former can be known only by Vedic injunctions; and it is only with regard to this knowledge that the *dharma* is dependent on the Vedas¹. Doing an injury to one's enemy may immediately give one happiness, but by its nature it is bound to produce unhappiness in the future, since it is prohibited by the Vedic injunctions. [But injury to the life of animals in the performance of sacrifices does not produce any sin, and must be regarded as being included within *dharma*.]

On the other hand, there are actions performed with the motive of injuring one's enemies, which are not *commanded* by the Vedas, but the methods of whose performance are *described* in the Vedas only in the case of those who are actuated by such bad motives; these actions alone are called *adharma*. Thus not all injury to life is regarded as sinful, but only such as is prohibited by the Vedas: whereas those injuries that are recommended by the Vedas are not to be regarded as sin (*adharma*) but as virtue (*dharma*). By nature there are certain powers abiding in certain substances, actions or qualities which make them sinful or virtuous, but which are sinful and which can only be known by the dictates of the scriptures². *Dharma* and *adharma* are thus objective characters of things, actions, etc., the nature of which is only revealed by the scriptures. It has already been noted above that Prabhākara gave an entirely different meaning of *dharma*. With him *dharma* means the transcendental product (*apūrva*) of the performance of Vedic rituals which remains in existence long after the action is completed and produces the proper good and bad effects at the proper time³.

The *smṛti* literature is supposed to have the Vedas as its sources, and therefore it is to be regarded as authoritative; even when its contents cannot be traced in the Vedas it is inferred that such Vedic

¹ *dravya-kriyā-guṇādīnāṃ dharmatvaṃ sthāpayaṣyate*
teṣāṃ cindriyakatve'pi na tādṛūpyeṇa dharmatā
śreyah-sāadhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedūt pratiyate
tādṛūpyeṇa ca dharmatvaṃ tasmān nendriya-gocarah.

Śloka-vārttika, sūtra 2. 13, 14.

² *dharmādharmaṁrthibhir nityaṃ mṛgyau viddhi-niṣedhakau*
krucid asyā niṣiddhatvāc chaktiḥ śāstreṇa bodhitā...
vidyamānā hi kathyante śaktayo dravya-karmanām
taḥ eva cedam karmeti śāstram evāmudhāvatā.

Ibid. 249, 251.

³ *na hi jyotiṣṭomādi-yūgasyāpi dharmatvaṃ asti. apurvaṣya dharmatvā-*
lhyupagamāt. Sastra-dipī, p. 33, Bombay, 1915.

texts must have existed¹. It is only when the *smṛti* is directly contradicted by the Vedas in any particular injunction or statement of fact that the former is to be regarded as invalid. The *smṛti* works are therefore generally regarded as a continuation of the Vedas, though as a matter of fact the *smṛti* works, written at different times at a later age, introduce many new concepts and many new ideals; in some of the *smṛtis*, however, the teachings of the *Purāṇas* and *Smṛtis* are regarded as possessing a lower status than those of the Vedas². On the relation of the *Smṛtis* and the Vedas there are at least two different views. The first view is that, if the *Smṛtis* come into conflict with the Vedas, then the *smṛti* texts should be so interpreted as to agree with the purport of the Vedic texts; and, if that is not possible, then the *smṛti* texts should be regarded as invalid. Others hold that the conflicting *smṛti* text should be regarded as invalid. Mitra Miśra, commenting on the above two views of the Śāvara and Bhaṭṭa schools, says that, on the first view, it may be suspected that the author of the conflicting *smṛti* texts is not free from errors, and as such even those non-conflicting *smṛti* texts which cannot be traced in the Vedas may be doubted as erroneous. On the second view, however, *smṛti* is regarded as valid, since no one can guarantee that the non-conflicting texts which are not traceable to the Vedas are really non-existent in the Vedas. Even in the case of irreconcilably conflicting texts, the *smṛti* directions, though in conflict with the Vedic ones, may be regarded as optionally valid³. The Vedic idea of *dharma* excludes from its concept all that can be known to be beneficial, to the performer or to others, through experience or observation; it restricts itself wholly to those ritualistic actions, the good effects of which cannot be known by experience, but can only be known through Vedic commands⁴. Thus the digging of wells, etc., is directly known by experience to be of public good (*paropakārāya*) and therefore is not *dharma*. Thus nothing that is *drṣṭārtha*, i.e. no action, the

¹ *virodhe tvanapekṣyam syād asati hyanumānam. Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 3. 3.

² *ataḥ sa paramo dharmo yo vedād avagamyate
avarah sa tu vijñeyo yaḥ purāṇādiṣu smṛtaḥ
tathā ca vaidiko dharmo mukhya utkrṣṭatvāt, smṛtaḥ amukalpaḥ apakṣṭatvāt.
Vyāsa-smṛti* as quoted in *Viramitrodaya-paribhāṣāprakāśa*, p. 29.

³ See *Viramitrodaya*, Vol. I, pp. 28, 29.

⁴ *tathā pratyupasthita-niyamānām ācārānām drṣṭārthatvād eva prāmānyam...
prapās tadāgāmi ca paropakārāya na dharmāya ity eva'avagamyate.*

Śābara-bhāṣya on *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 3. 2.

beneficial effects of which may be known through experience, can be called *dharma*. The *Āṅgirah smṛti* echoes this idea when it says that, excepting efforts for attaining self-knowledge, whatever one does out of his own personal desire or wish is like child's play and unnecessary¹.

Many of the important *Smṛtis* however seem to extend the limits of the concept of *dharma* much further than the pure Vedic commands. As Manu's work is based entirely on the purport of the Vedas, he is regarded as the greatest of all *smṛti* writers; whatever *smṛti* is in conflict with Manu's writings is invalid². Manu defines *dharma* as that which is always followed by the learned who are devoid of attachment and antipathy, and that to which the heart assents³. In another place Manu says that *dharma* is of four kinds; the observance of the Vedic injunctions, of the injunctions of *smṛti*, the following of the customary practices of good people, and the performance of such actions as may produce mental satisfaction (*ātmanas tuṣṭiḥ*) to the performer⁴. But the commentators are very unwilling to admit any such extension of the content and meaning of *dharma*. Thus Medhātithi (9th century), one of the oldest commentators, remarks that *dharma* as following the Vedic injunctions is beginningless; only the Vedic scholars can be said to know *dharma*, and it is impossible that there should be other sources from which the nature of *dharma* could be known. Other customs and habits and disciplines of life which pass as religious practices are introduced by ignorant persons of bad character (*mūrkha-duṣṣīla-puruṣa-pravarttitāḥ*): they remain in fashion for a time and then die out. Such religious practices are often adopted out of greed (*lobhān mantra-tantrādiṣu pravarttate*)⁵. The wise and the good are

¹ *svābhiprāya-kṛtaṃ karma yatkiñcij jñāna-varjitaṃ
kṛtā-karṇeva bālānāṃ tat-sarvaṃ niṣ-prayojanam.*

Vīramitrodaya-paribhāṣāprakāśa, p. 11.

² *vedārthopanibandhṛtvāt prādhānyaṃ hi manoh smṛtaṃ
manvartha-viṣarītā tu yā smṛtiḥ sā na praśaṣyate.*

Brhaspati quoted in *Vīramitrodaya*, *ibid.* p. 27.

³ *vidvadbhiḥ sevitaḥ sadbhīr nityam adveṣa-rāgibhiḥ
hṛdayenābhyamujñāto yo dharmas taṃ nibodhata.*

Manu-saṃhitā, II. 1.

⁴ *vedo'khilo dharma-mūlaṃ smṛti-śīle ca tadvidāṃ
ācāraś caiva sādḥūnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca.*

Ibid. II. 6.

⁵ Medhātithi says that such practices as those of besmearing the body with ashes, carrying human skulls, going about naked or wearing yellow robes, are adopted by worthless people as a means of living. *Ibid.* II. 1.

only those who know the injunctions of the Vedas, who carry them into practice out of reverence for the law, and who are not led astray into following non-Vedic practices out of greed or antipathy to others. And, though a man might be tempted in his mind to perform many actions for his sense-gratification, real contentment of the heart can come only through the performance of Vedic deeds¹. Consistently with his own mode of interpretation Medhātithi discards not only the Buddhists and the Jains as being outside the true Vedic *dharma*, but also the followers of Pāñcarātra (i.e. the Bhāgavatas) and the Pāsupatas as well, who believed in the authority of the authors of these systems and in the greatness of particular gods of their own choice. He held that their teachings are directly contrary to the mandates of the Vedas: and as an illustration he points out that the Bhāgavatas considered all kinds of injury to living beings to be sinful, which directly contradicts the Vedic injunction to sacrifice animals at particular sacrifices. Injury to living beings is not in itself sinful: only such injury is sinful as is prohibited by the Vedic injunctions. So the customs and practices of all systems of religion which are not based on the teachings of the Vedas are to be discarded as not conforming to *dharma*. In interpreting the phrase *smṛti-śīle ca tad-vidām*, Medhātithi says that the word *śīla* (which is ordinarily translated as "character") is to be taken here to mean that concentration which enables the mind to remember the right purports of the Vedic injunctions². By customary duties (*ācāra*) Medhātithi means only such duties as are currently practised by those who strictly follow the Vedic duties, but regarding which no Vedic or *smṛti* texts are available. He supposes that minor auspices and other rituals which are ordinarily

¹ In interpreting the meaning of the word *hṛdaya* (heart) in the phrase *hṛdayena abhyamujñāta* Medhātithi says that the word *hṛdaya* may mean "mind" (*manas*, *antar-hṛdaya-vartīni buddhyādi-tattvāni*); on this supposition he would hold that contentment of mind could only come through following the Vedic courses of duties. But, dissatisfied apparently with this meaning, he thinks that *hṛdaya* might also mean the memorized content of the Vedas (*hṛdayam vedah, sa hy adhīto bhāvanā-rūpeṇa hṛdaya-sthito hṛdayam*). This seems to mean that a Vedic scholar is instinctively, as it were, led to actions which are virtuous, because in choosing his course of conduct he is unconsciously guided by his Vedic studies. A man may be prompted to action by his own inclination, by the example of great men, or by the commands of the Vedas; but in whichever way he may be so prompted, if his actions are to conform to *dharma*, they must ultimately conform to Vedic courses of duties.

² *samādhiḥ śīlam ucyate...yac cetaso'nya-viśaya-vyākṣepa-parihāreṇa śāstrārtha-nirūpaṇa-pravaṇatā tac chīlam ucyate.* Medhātithi's commentary, II. 6.

performed by the people of the Vedic circle have also ultimately originated from the Vedic injunctions. Similarly it is only the feeling of self-contentment of those persons who are habituated to work in accordance with the Vedas that can be regarded as indicating the path of *dharma*. It simply means that the instinctive inclination of the true adherents of the Vedas may be relied on as indicating that those actions to which their minds are inclined must be consistent with the Vedic injunctions, and must therefore conform to *dharma*. Other commentators however take a more liberal view of the meaning of the words *śīla*, *ātmanas tuṣṭi* and *hṛdayeṇa abhyānujñāta*. Thus Govindarāja explains the last phrase as meaning “absence of doubt” (*antaḥ-karaṇa-cikitsā-sūnya*), and Nārāyaṇa goes so far as to say that, unless the heart approves of the action, it cannot be right: Rāmānanda says that, when there is any doubt regarding two conflicting texts, one should act in a way that satisfies his own mind. The word *śīla* has been interpreted as “character” (*vr̥tta* or *caritra*) by Rāmānanda in his *Manvarthacandrikā* and as dissociation of attachment and antipathy by Govindarāja: Kullūka takes it according to Hārīta’s definition of *śīla* as involving the qualities of non-injury to others, absence of jealousy, mildness, friendliness, gratefulness, mercy, peace, etc. Self-satisfaction can in practice discern the nature of *dharma*, but only when there are no specified texts to determine it. Thus, though the other later commentators are slightly more liberal than Medhātithi, they all seem to interpret the slight concession that Manu had seemed to make to right character and self-contentment or conscience as constituent elements of *dharma*, more or less on Medhātithi’s line, as meaning nothing more than loyalty to scriptural injunctions.

It has been pointed out that Medhātithi definitely ruled out the Pāncarātra and the Pāsupata systems as heretical and therefore invalid for inculcating the nature of *dharma*. But in later times these too came to be regarded as Vedic schools and therefore their instructions also were regarded as so authoritative that they could not be challenged on rational grounds¹.

¹ Thus *Yogi-yājñavalkya* says: *Sāṃkhyam yogam pañca-rātram vedāḥ pāsupatam tathā ati-pramāṇānyetāni hetubhir na virodhayet*, quoted in *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 20, but not found in the printed text, Bombay. This *Yogi-yājñavalkya* is a work on *yoga* and the other a work on *smṛti*, and it is the former text

It is however a relief to find that in some of the later *Smṛtis* the notion of *dharma* was extended to morality in general and to some of the cardinal virtues. Thus Bṛhaspati counts kindness (*dayā*, meaning a feeling of duty to save a friend or foe from troubles), patience (*kṣamā*, meaning fortitude in all kinds of difficulty), the qualities of appreciating others' virtues and absence of elation at others' faults (*anasūyā*), purity (*śauca*, meaning avoidance of vices, association with the good and strict adherence to one's caste duties), avoidance of vigorous asceticism (*sannyāsa*), performance of approved actions and avoidance of disapproved ones (*maṅgala*), regular charity even from small resources (*akārpaṇya*), contentment with what little one may have and want of jealousy at others' prosperity (*asprhā*), as constituting the universal *dharma* for all¹. Viṣṇu counts patience (*kṣamā*), truthfulness for the good of all beings (*satya*), mind-control (*dama*), purity (*śauca* as defined above), making of gifts (*dāna*), sense-control (*indriya-samyama*), non-injury (*ahiṃsā*), proper attendance to teachers (*guru-śuśrūṣā*), pilgrimage, kindness (*dayā*), straightforwardness (*ārjava*), want of covetousness, adoration of gods and Brahmins, as constituting universal *dharma*. Devala considers purity (*śauca*), gifts (*dāna*), asceticism of the body (*tapas*), faith (*śraddhā*), attendance to teachers (*guru-sevā*), patience (*kṣamā*), mercifulness in the sense of pity for others' sufferings, showing friendliness as if these were one's own (*dayā*), acquirement of knowledge, Vedic or non-Vedic (*vijñāna*), mind-control and body-control (*vinaya*), truthfulness (*satya*), as constituting the totality of all *dharma*s (*dharma-samuccaya*). Yājñavalkya speaks of *ahiṃsā*, *satya*, *asteya* (avoidance of stealing), *śauca*, *indriya-nigraha* (sense-control), *dāna*, *dama*, *dayā*, and *kṣānti* as constituting universal *dharma* for all. The *Mahābhārata* counts truthfulness (*satya*), steadiness in one's caste duties (*tapas* as *sva-dharma-varjitva*), purity (*śauca*), con-

that has been printed. The present writer has no knowledge whether the latter text has been published anywhere.

Viṣṇudharmottara also speaks of Pañcarātra and Pāśupata as means of enquiry into Brahman:

sāṃkhyam yogaṃ pañcarātram vedāḥ pāśupatam

tathā kṛtānta-pañcakam viddhi brahmaṇaḥ parimārgaṇe. Ibid. p. 22.

But Mitra Miśra on the same page distinguishes between Pāśupata as a Vedic *āgama* and as a non-Vedic *āgama*. Similarly there was a Vedic and non-Vedic Pañcarātra too. *Ibid. p. 23.*

¹ *Ibid. pp. 32-4.*

tentment, meaning sex-restriction to one's own wife and also cessation from sense-attractions (*viṣaya-tyāga*), shame at the commission of evil deeds (*hrī*), patience as capacity in bearing hardships (*kṣamā*), evenness of mind (*ārjava*), philosophic knowledge of reality (*jñāna*), peace of mind (*śama* as *citta-praśāntatā*), desire to do good to others (*dayā*), meditation, meaning withdrawal of the mind from all sense objects (*dhyāna* as *nirviṣaya*), as universal *dharma*s. Yājñavalkya says that the highest of all *dharma*s is self-knowledge through *yoga*.

These universal *dharma*s are to be distinguished from the special *dharma*s of the different castes, of the different stages of life (*āśrama*), or under different conditions. We have thus three stages in the development of the concept of *dharma*, i.e. *dharma* as the duty of following the Vedic injunctions, *dharma* as moral virtues of non-injury, truthfulness, self-control etc., *dharma* as self-knowledge through *yoga*.

But the *Bhāgavata* presents a new aspect of the notion of *dharma*. *Dharma* according to the *Bhāgavata* consists in the worship of God without any ulterior motive—a worship performed with a perfect sincerity of heart by men who are kindly disposed towards all, and who have freed themselves from all feelings of jealousy. This worship involves the knowledge of the absolute, as a natural consequence of the realization of the worshipfulness of the spirit, and naturally leads to supreme bliss¹. The passage under discussion does not directly refer to the worship of God as a characteristic of the definition of *dharma* as interpreted by Śrīdhara². The *dharma* consists of absolute sincerity—absolute cessation of the spirit from all motives, pretensions and extraneous associations of every description: and it is assumed that, when the spirit is freed from all such extraneous impurities, the natural condition of the spirit is its natural *dharma*. This *dharma* is therefore not a thing that is to be attained or achieved as an external acquirement, but it is man's own nature, which manifests itself as soon as the impurities are removed. The fundamental condition of *dharma* is not therefore something positive but negative, consisting of the dissociation (*projjhita*) of extraneous elements (*kitava*). For, as soon as the extraneous elements are wiped out, the spirit shows itself in its own

¹ *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, 1. 1. 2, interpreted according to Śrīdhara's exposition.

² *komalam īśvarārādhanā-lakṣaṇo dharmo nirūpyate*. Śrīdhara's comment on the above passage.

true nature, and then its relation to absolute truth and absolute good is self-evident: the normal realization of this relationship is what is called *dharma* or worship of God, or what Śrīdhara calls the tender worshipfulness towards God. The primary qualifications needed for a person to make a start towards a true realization of the nature of *dharma* in himself are, that he should have no jealousy towards others, and that he should have a natural feeling of friendliness towards all beings. The implications of this concept of *dharma* in the *Bhāgavata*, which breaks new ground in the history of the development of the notion of *dharma* in Indian Philosophy, are many, and an attempt will be made in the subsequent sections to elucidate them. That this dissociation from all extraneous elements ultimately means motiveless and natural flow of devotion to God by which the spirit attains supreme contentment, and that it is supreme *dharma*, is very definitely stated in I. 2. 6: If anything which does not produce devotion to God can be called *dharma*, such a *dharma* is mere fruitless labour¹. For the fruits of *dharma* as defined by the Vedic injunctions may lead only to pleasurable consequences which are transitory. The real *dharma* is that which through devotion to God leads ultimately to self-knowledge, and as such *dharma* cannot be identified with mere gain or fulfilment of desires. Thus *dharma* as supreme devotion to God is superior to the Vedic definition of *dharma*, which can produce only sense-gratification of various kinds.

Brahman, Paramātmān, Bhagavat and Parameśvara.

The opening verse of the *Bhāgavata* is an adoration of the ultimate (*param*) truth (*satya*). The word *para* however is explained by Śrīdhara as meaning God (*parameśvara*). The essential (*sva-rūpa*) definitive nature of God is said to be truth (*satya*). Truth is used here in the sense of reality; and it is held that by virtue of this supreme reality even the false creation appears as real, and that on account of this abiding reality the entire world of appearance attains its character of reality. Just as illusory appearances (e.g. silver) appear as real through partaking of the real character of the real object (e.g. the conch-shell) or the substratum of the illusion, so in this world-appearance all appears as real on account of the underlying reality of God. The fact that the world is produced from

¹ *Ibid.* I. 2. 7.

God, is sustained in Him and is ultimately dissolved in Him, is but an inessential description of an accidental phenomenon which does not reveal the real nature of God.

God is called by different names, e.g. Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat, but, by whatever name He may be called, His pure essence consists of pure formless consciousness (*arūpasya cidātmanah*)¹. He creates the world by His *māyā*-power, consisting of the three *guṇas*. Underlying the varied creations of *māyā*, He exists as the one abiding principle of reality which bestows upon them their semblance of reality. The *māyā* represents only His external power, through which He creates the world with Himself as its underlying substratum. But in His own true nature the *māyā* is subdued, and as such He is in His pure loneliness as pure consciousness. Śrīdhara in his commentary points out that God has two powers called *vidyā-śakti* and *avidyā-śakti*. By His *vidyā-śakti* God controls His own *māyā-śakti* in His own true nature as eternal pure bliss, as omniscient and omnipotent. The *jīva* or the individual soul can attain salvation only through right knowledge obtained through devotion. On this point Śrīdhara tries to corroborate his views by quotations from Viṣṇusvāmin, who holds that Īśvara a being, intelligence, and bliss (*saccid-ānanda īśvara*) is pervaded with blissful intelligence (*hlādinī samvit*), and that the *māyā* is under his control and that his difference from individual souls consists in the fact of their being under the control of *māyā*. The individual souls are wrapped up in their own ignorance and are therefore always suffering from afflictions (*kleśa*)². God in His own nature as pure consciousness transcends the limits of *māyā* and *prakṛti* and exists in and for Himself in absolute loneliness; and it is this same God that dispenses all the good and bad fruits of virtue and vice in men under the influence of *māyā*³. That God in His own true

¹ *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, 1. 3. 30.

² *Ibid.* 1. 7. 6 (Śrīdhara's comment):

*tad uktaṁ viṣṇu-svāminā
hlādinī samvidāśliṣṭaḥ sac-cid-ānanda īśvaraḥ
svāvidyā-saṁvṛto jīvaḥ saṁkleśa-nikarākarāḥ*

tathā sa īśo yad-vaśe māyā sa jīvo yas tayārditaḥ, etc.

Jīva quotes the same passage and locates it in *Sarvajña-śukti Śaṭ-sandarbha*, p. 191.

³ *tvam ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ sāṅśād īśvaraḥ prakṛteḥ paraḥ
māyāṁ vyudasya cic-chaktyā kaivalye sthita ātmani
sa eva jīva-lokasya māyā-mohita-cetaso*

vidhatse svena vīryeṇa śreyo dharmādi-lakṣaṇam.

Ibid. 1. 7. 23, 24.

nature is pure consciousness and absolutely devoid of all duality and all distinctions is emphasized again and again in numerous passages in the *Bhāgavata*. In this He is ultimate and transcendent from all: the individual souls also lie dormant, and in this stage all the *guṇa* reals exist only in their potential forms; and it is by His own power that He rouses the *prakṛti* which is His *māyā* by which the individual souls are being always led into the experience of diverse names and forms. God in His own nature is therefore to be regarded as absolutely formless pure consciousness; by His power of consciousness (*cic-chakti*) He holds the individual souls within Him and by His power of materiality He spreads out the illusion of the material world and connects it with the former for their diverse experiences¹.

It is thus seen that God is admitted to have three distinct powers, the inner power as forming His essence (*antaraṅga-svarūpa-śakti*), the external power (*bahiraṅga-śakti*) as *māyā* and the power by which the individual souls are manifested. This conception however may seem to contradict the view already explained that Brahman is one undifferentiated consciousness. But the interpreters reconcile the two views by the supposition that from the ultimate point of view there is no distinction or difference between "power" and "possessor of power" (*śakti* and *śaktimān*). There is only one reality, which manifests itself both as power and possessor of power². When this one ultimate reality is looked at as the possessor of power, it is called God; when, however, emphasis is laid on the power, it is called the great power which is mythologically represented as Mahā lakṣmī³. Thus the terms Brahman, Bhagavat and Paramātman are used for the same identical reality according as the emphasis is laid on the unity or differencelessness, the possessor of power, or the transcendent person. The *antar-aṅga*, or the essential power, contains within it the threefold powers of bliss (*hlādinī*), being (*sandhinī*) and consciousness (*saṁvīt*), of which the two latter are regarded as an elaboration or evolution or

¹ *anantāvyakta-rūpeṇa yenedam akhilaṁ tatam
cid-acic-chakti-yuktāya tasmai bhagavate namaḥ.*

Bhāgavata, VII. 3. 34.

² *atha ekam eva svarūpaṁ śaktitvena śaktimattvena ca virājati.*

Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā, p. 188 (Śyāmalāl Gosvāmī's edition).

³ *yasya śakteḥ svarūpa-bhūtatvaṁ nirūpitam tac-chaktimattva-prādhānyena virājamānam bhagavat-saṁjñām āpnoti tac ca vyākhyātam; tad eva ca śaktitva-prādhānyena virājamānam lakṣmī-saṁjñām āpnoti. Ibid.*

manifestation of the former (the *hlādinī* power, or bliss). This threefold power is also called *cic-chakti* or *ātma-māyā* (essential *māyā*), and, as such, is to be distinguished from God's external power of *māyā* (*bahiraṅga-māyā*), by which He creates the world. His other power, by which He holds the individual souls (which are but parts of Himself) within Himself and yet within the grasp and influence of His external power of *māyā*, is technically called *taṭastha-śakti*. The individual souls are thus to be regarded as the parts of God as well as manifestations of one of His special powers (*taṭastha-śakti*). Though the individual souls are thus contained in God as His power, they are in no way identical with Him, but are held distinct from Him as being the manifestations of one of His powers. The unity or oneness (*advaya-tattva*) consists in the facts that the ultimate reality is self-sufficient, wholly independent, and standing by itself; and that there is no other entity, whether similar (e.g. the individual souls) or dissimilar to it (e.g. the matrix of the world, the *prakṛti*), which is like it; for both the *prakṛti* and the *jīvas* depend upon God for their existence, as they are but manifestations of His power. God exists alone with His powers, and without Him the world and the souls would be impossible¹. The nature of His reality consists in the fact that it is of the nature of ultimate bliss (*parama-sukha-rūpatva*), the ultimate object of all desires (*parama-puruṣārthatā*) and eternal (*nitya*). It is this ultimate eternal reality which has formed the content of all Vedānta teachings. Thus the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* points out that it is this reality which is the cause of the production, maintenance and destruction of all; it is this that continues the same in deep sleep, dreams and in conscious life; it is this that enlivens the body, senses, life and mind, yet in itself it is without any cause. It is neither born, nor grows, nor decays, nor dies, yet it presides over all changes as the one constant factor—as pure consciousness; and even in deep sleep, when all the senses have ceased to operate, its own self-same experience continues to be just the same².

Now this reality is called Brahman by some, Bhagavat by some and Paramātmān by others. When this reality, which is of the nature

¹ *advayatvaṃ ca asya svayaṃ-siddha-tādṛśātādṛśa-tattvāntarābhāvāt śva-śaktyeka-sahāyatvāt, paramāśrayaṃ taṃ vinā tāsāṃ asiddhatvāc ca.*

Tattva-sandarbha, p. 37.

² *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, xi. 3. 35-39.

of pure bliss, is experienced by sages as being identical with their own selves, and when their minds are unable to grasp its nature as possessing diverse powers, and when no distinction between itself and its powers is realized, it is called Brahman. In such experiences this reality is only grasped in a general featureless way in its abstractness¹. But when this reality is realized by the devotees in its true nature as being possessed of diverse powers in their distinction from the former, He is called by the name Bhagavat. In this it is the pure bliss which is the substance or the possessor, and all the other powers are but its qualities. So, when the reality is conceived in its fulness in all its proper relations, it is called Bhagavat: whereas, when it is conceived without its specific relations and in its abstract character, it is called Brahman². So far as this distinction between the concepts of Brahman and Bhagavat is concerned it is all right. But in this system philosophy is superseded at this point by mythology. Mythologically Kṛṣṇa or the lord Bhagavān is described in the *Purāṇas* as occupying His throne in the transcendent Heaven (*Vaikuṇṭha*) in His resplendent robes, surrounded by His associates. This transcendent Heaven (*Vaikuṇṭha*) is non-spatial and non-temporal; it is the manifestation of the essential powers (*svarūpa-śakti*) of God, and as such it is not constituted of the *guṇas* which form the substance of our spatio-temporal world. Since it is non-spatial and non-temporal, it is just as true to say that God exists in *Vaikuṇṭha* as to say that He Himself is *Vaikuṇṭha*. Those who believed in this school of religion were so much obsessed with the importance of mythological stories and representations that they regarded God Himself as having particular forms, dress, ornaments, associates etc. They failed to think that these representations could be interpreted mythically, allegorically or otherwise. They regarded all these intensely anthropomorphic descriptions as being literally true. But such admissions would involve the irrefutable criticism that a God with hands, feet,

¹ *tad ekam eva akhaṇḍānanda-rūpaṁ tattvaṁ...parama-hamsānāṁ sādhanavaśāt tādātmyaṁ anupapāmyaṁ satyāṁ api tadīya-svarūpa-śakti-vaicitryāṁ tad-grahaṇa-sāmarthyē cetasi yathā sāmānyato lakṣitaṁ tathaiṣa sphuraḍ vā tad-vad eva avivikta-śakti-śaktimattābhedaṭayā pratipādyamānaṁ vā brahmeti śabdyate.*

Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā, pp. 49-50.

² *evaṁ ca ānanda-mātraṁ viśeṣyaṁ samastāḥ śaktayaḥ viśeṣaṇāni viśiṣṭo bhagavān ityāyātam. tathā caivaṁ vaiśiṣṭye prāpte pūrṇāvirbhāvatena akhaṇḍa-tattva-rūpo'sau bhagavān brahma tu sphuṭam aprakaṭita-vaiśiṣṭyākāratvena tasyaiva asaṁyag-āvirbhāvaḥ. Ibid. p. 50.*

and dream would be destructible. To avoid this criticism they held that God's forms, abode, etc., were constituted of non-spatial and non-temporal elements of His non-material essential power. But forms involve spatial notions, and non-spatial forms would mean non-spatial space. They had practically no reply to such criticism, and the only way in which they sought to avoid it was by asserting that the essential nature of God's powers were unthinkable (*acintya*) by us, and that the nature of God's forms which were the manifestations of this essential power could not therefore be criticized by us on logical grounds, but must be accepted as true on the authoritative evidence of the *Purāṇas*.

This notion of the supra-logical, incomprehensible or unthinkable (*acintya*) is freely used in this school to explain all difficult situations in its creeds, dogmas, and doctrines. *Acintya* is that which is to be unavoidably accepted for explaining facts, but which cannot stand the scrutiny of logic (*tarkāsaham yaj-jñānam kāryānyathānupapatti-pramāṇakam*), and which can account for all happenings that may be deemed incomprehensible or impossible (*durghaṭa-ghaṭakatvam*). How the formless Brahman may be associated with the three powers by which it can stay unchanged in itself and yet create the world by its external power of *māyā* or uphold the individual souls by its other power is a problem which it is attempted to explain by this concept of incomprehensibility (*acintya*)¹. The *māyā* which is the manifestation of the external power of God is defined in the *Bhāgavata* as that which cannot manifest itself except through the ultimate reality, and which yet does not appear in it, i.e. *māyā* is that which has no existence without Brahman and which, nevertheless, has no existence in Brahman². This *māyā* has two functions, viz. that with which it blinds the individual souls, called *jīva-māyā*, and the other by which the world transformations take place, called the *guṇa-māyā*.

Jīva Gosvāmī argues in his *Sarva-saṁvādinī*, which is a sort of a running commentary on *Tattva-sandarbhā*, that the followers of Śāṅkara consider ultimate reality to be pure consciousness, one and

¹ In the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* these three powers are called *parā*, *avidyā-karma-saṁjñā* and *kṣetrajñākhya*. This *parā māyā* or the *śvarūpa-śakti* is also sometimes called *yoga-māyā*.

² *ṛte'rtham yat pratīyeta na pratīyeta cātmani
tad vidyād ātmano māyām yathābhāso yathā tamaḥ.*

Bhāgavata, II. 9. 33.

undifferentiated. There exists no other entity similar or dissimilar to it, and it is this fact that constitutes its infinitude and its reality. According to them such a reality cannot have any separate power or even any power which may be regarded as its essence (*svarūpa-bhūta-śakti*). For, if such a power were different from reality, it could not be its identical essence; and if it were not different from reality, it could not be regarded as being its power. If such an essential power, as distinct from reality, be admitted, such a power must be of the same nature as reality (i.e. of the nature of pure consciousness); and this would make it impossible to conceive of this power as contributing God's diverse manifestations, His transcendent forms, abode and the like, which are admitted to be the principal creed of the Vaiṣṇavas. But against the views of the followers of Śāṅkara it may be urged that even they have to admit that the Brahman has some power by which the world-appearance is manifested; if the world is wholly a creation of *māyā* and Brahman has nothing to do in it, there is no good in admitting its existence, and the *māyā* would be all in all. This power cannot be different in nature from the reality that possesses it, and, since the nescience or *avidyā* cannot exist without Brahman, it is an additional proof that the *avidyā* is also one of his powers. The power of any entity always exists in it as its own self even when it is not manifested. If it is argued that the Brahman is self-shining and that it does not require any power, it may be replied that the very reason by virtue of which it is self-shining may be regarded as its power. In this way Jīva follows some of the fundamental points in Rāmānuja's argument in favour of the doctrine that ultimate reality, the Brahman, is not formless and qualityless, but a qualified being, having its powers and qualities. In attempting to prove this view Jīva follows briefly the central argument of Rāmānuja. But Jīva introduces the notion that the relation of the qualities and powers of ultimate reality is supra-logical, inexplorable on logical grounds, and that therefore in a mysterious manner the powers are different from reality and yet one with it; so that in spite of the manifestation of ultimate reality as concrete God with human forms, dress etc., He is, at the same time, unchanged in His own changeless existence as Brahman. The introduction of the mystic formula of incomprehensibility seems to discharge the Vaiṣṇavas of this school from all responsibility of logically explaining

their dogmas and creeds, and, thus uncontrolled, they descend from the domain of reason to the domain of the *purāṇic* faith of a mythological character.

In describing the special excellences of God, Jīva follows Rāmānuja in holding that He has none of the evil qualities that are found in the world, but possesses all the excellent characters that we can conceive of. In the light of the concept of incomprehensibility (*acintya*) all these excellent characters are regarded as somehow manifestations of His essential power and therefore identical with Him. The introduction of the supra-logical concept of *acintya* enables Jīva and other interpreters of the *Bhāgavata* of his school to indulge in eclecticism more freely than could otherwise have been possible; and thus it is that, though Jīva follows Rāmānuja in admitting ultimate reality to be qualified, he can in the same breath assert that ultimate reality is formless and characterless. Thus he says that, though the followers of Rāmānuja do not accept the view of Brahman as characterless, yet admission of characters naturally presupposes the admission of the characterless also¹. The idea of introducing the concept of the supra-logical in order to reconcile the different scriptural texts which describe reality as characterless (*nirviśeṣa*), qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) and many, can be traced to the introduction of the concept of *viśeṣa* in the philosophy of Madhva, already described in a previous chapter, by which Madhva tried to reconcile the concept of monism with that of plurality. The Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism, introduced by Caitanya, is based principally on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, and of the many writers of this school only two are prominent as authors of philosophical treatises, Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Jīva Gosvāmī. Of these Baladeva has again and again referred to the indebtedness of this school to the philosophy of Madhva, and to the initiation of Caitanya as an ascetic by a follower of the Madhva school of Vaiṣṇavism. Though he was a junior contemporary of Jīva Gosvāmī and a commentator of the latter's *Tattva-sandarbha*, yet he often reverts to Madhva's doctrine of *viśeṣa* in reconciling the monistic position with the positions of qualified monism and pluralism. Had he adhered to Jīva's concept of the supra-logical, the

¹ *yadyapi śrī-Rāmānujyair nirviśeṣaṁ brahma na manyate tathāpi savīṣeṣaṁ manyamānair viśeṣātiriktaṁ mantavyam eva.*

Jīva's *Sarva-saṃvādinī*, p. 74 (Nityasvarūpa Brahmācārī's edition).

concept of *viśeṣa* would have been entirely unnecessary. Baladeva, however, uses not only the concept of *viśeṣa*, but also the concept of the supra-logical (*acintya*), and he characterizes the concept of *viśeṣa* as being itself the concept of the supra-logical. Thus in his *Siddhānta-ratna* he says that the qualities of consciousness, bliss, etc., do not differ from the nature of Brahman, and yet Brahman is consistently described as possessing these different qualities because of the supra-logical functions of *viśeṣa* (*acintya-viśeṣa-mahimnā*). This assertion does not involve the doctrine that reality is from a particular point of view different from its qualities and from another point of view identical with them (*na caivam bhedabhedau syātām*), and the only solution of the difficulty is to assume the doctrine of the supra-logical (*tasmād avicintyataiva śaraṇam*). In this connection Baladeva further says that the doctrine of *viśeṣa* must be accepted as something which even in the absence of difference can explain the phenomena of difference¹. This concept of *viśeṣa*, however, is to be applied only in reconciling the simultaneous plurality and unity of ultimate reality. But so far as the relation between reality and individual souls is concerned, their difference is well known, and therefore the application of the principle of *viśeṣa* would be unjustifiable. The principle of *viśeṣa* is, however, applied not only in reconciling the unity of Brahman with the plurality of his qualities and powers, but also with his divine body, divine dress, his divine abode and the like, so that though these appear to be different from him they are at the same time identical with him².

Speaking on the same topic, Jīva holds that God Viṣṇu's power of consciousness (*cic-chakti*) is identical with His own essence. When this essence is on the way to produce effects, it is called power (*sva-rūpam eva kāryyonmukhaṃ śakti-śabdena uktam*). Now this special state of reality cannot be regarded as different from it, and can have no separate existence from it, since it can never be regarded (*cintayitum aśakyatvād*) as different from the essence of reality; since moreover difference itself cannot be regarded as being in any way different, the difference between the power and its possessor is unthinkable, incomprehensible and supra-logical. This view is not that of Rāmānuja and his followers, who regard the

¹ *Siddhānta-ratna*, pp. 17-22 (Benares, 1924).

² *tathā ca vīgrahādeḥ sva-rūpānatireke'pi viśeṣād eva bheda-vyavahārah*. *Ibid.* p. 26.

power as different from its possessor; yet, since they also believe that God's powers are essentially contained in Him, there is a good deal of similarity between the Rāmānuja school and the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism¹. Arguing against the followers of Śāṅkara, Jīva says that even in the Upaniṣad passage on pure consciousness, bliss, the Brahman (*vijñānam ānandaṁ Brahma*), the consciousness and the bliss cannot be identical, for then the two words would be mere repetition; they cannot be different, for then Brahman would have two conflicting qualities within himself. If the two words *vijñāna* and *ānanda* mean the negation of ignorance and of sorrow, then these two negations, being two different entities, are co-existent in Brahman. If the two negations mean one entity, how can one entity be the negation of two different things? If it is said that only agreeable consciousness is called bliss, then again the quality of agreeableness stands out as a separate quality. Even if these words stood merely as negations of ignorance or sorrow, then these also would be specific characters; if it is urged that these are not specific characters, but represent only special potencies (*yogyatā*) by virtue of which ignorance and sorrow are negated, then nonetheless those special potencies would be special characters. Thus the theory that ultimate reality is characterless is false. The characters of Brahman are identically the same as his powers, and these are all identical with his own self.

On the subject of the nature of self, Jīva says that individual selves are not pure consciousness, but entities which are characterized by self-consciousness as "ego" or "I." Individual souls are on no account to be regarded as being identical with God or Paramātmān, and each individual self is different from every other². These individual souls are of atomic size and therefore partless. The atomic self resides in the heart, whence it pervades the whole body by its quality of consciousness, just as sandal paste pervades the whole neighbourhood by its sweet smell. Just so, individual selves are atomic, but they pervade the bodies in which they are located by their power of consciousness. Consciousness is called a quality of the self because it is always dependent on that and serves its purpose (*nitya-tad-āśrayatva-tac-cheṣatva-nibandhanah*)³. Again,

¹ *Sarva-saṃvādinī*, pp. 29, 30.

² *tasmāt prati-kṣetram bhinna eva jīvaḥ*. *Ibid.* p. 87.

³ *Ibid.* p. 94.

consciousness, being thus dependent on the self, expands and contracts in order to pervade the different bodies in which it may be operating at the time. Being thus different from God, individual selves, even in emancipation, remain separate and distinct. They are thus produced from the highest self (Paramātman or God), and they are always under His absolute control and pervaded by Him. It is on this account that God is called Paramātman as distinguished from individual souls (*ātman*). They are like rays emanating from Him and are therefore always entirely dependent on Him and cannot exist without Him¹. They are also regarded as God's disengaged power (*taṭastha-śakti*), because, though they are God's power, yet they are in a way disengaged and separately situated from Him, and therefore they are under the delusion of God's other power, *māyā*, which has no influence on God Himself; and therefore, though individual selves are suffering under the blinding operation of ignorance (*avidyā*), the highest self (paramātman) is absolutely untouched by them. As individual souls are the powers of God, they are sometimes spoken of as identical with Him and sometimes as different from Him. Of these individual selves some are always naturally devoted to God, and others are dominated by ignorance and are turned away from Him; it is the latter that are the denizens of this world and suffer rebirth.

Māyā, the external power (*bahiraṅga-śakti*) has two functions, creative (*nimitta*) and passive (*upādāna*); of these, time (*kāla*), destiny (*daiva*), and actions (*karma*) represent the former, and the three *guṇas* the latter. Individual selves contain within them as integral parts elements of both these functions of *māyā*. The creative function of *māyā* has again two modes, which operate either for the bondage or for the liberation of man. This creative *māyā* also typifies the cosmic knowledge of God, His will and His creative operation³. Knowledge of God is also regarded as twofold—that which is His own self-knowledge and which forms a part of His essential power (*svarūpa-śakti*), and that which is turned

¹ *tadīya-raśmi-sthānīyatve'pi nitya-tad-āśrayitvāt, tadvyatirekeṇa vyatirekāt. Śaṭ-sandarbhā, p. 233.*

² *tad evaṃ śaktitve'pi anyatvam asya taṭasthatvāt, taṭasthatvaṃ ca māyā-śakti-atītatvāt, asya avidyā-parābhavādi-rūpeṇa doṣeṇa paramātmāno lopābhāvāc ca. Ibid. p. 234.*

³ *nimittāṃśa-rūpayā māyākhyayaiva prasiddhā śaktis tridhā dṛśyate jñāne-cchā-kriyā-rūpatvena. Ibid. p. 244.*

towards cosmical operation for the good of the individual selves. It is this cosmic knowledge of God that falls within the creative function of His power of *māyā*. This cosmic knowledge is again twofold—that which abides in God as His omniscience, His desire of creation, and his effort of creation (otherwise called time (*kāla*)); and that which He passes over to individual selves as their desire for enjoyment or liberation from their works (*karma*), etc.; these in their turn are regarded as their ignorance (*avidyā*) and wisdom (*vidyā*)¹. *Māyā* according to this view does not mean ignorance, but power of manifold creation (*mīyate vicitrām nirmīyata anayā iti vicitrārtha-kara-śakti-vaicitvam eva*), and therefore the world is to be regarded as a transformation of Paramātman (*paramātma-pariṇāma eva*)². By the supra-logical power of God, He remains unchanged in Himself and is yet transformed into the manifold creations of the world. According to Jīva, *pariṇāma* does not mean the transformation of reality (*na tattvasya pariṇāma*), but a real transformation (*tattvato pariṇāmah*)³. The manifestation of God in Himself in His own essential power (*svarūpa-śakti*) remains however always untouched by His transformations through His supra-logical *māyā* power unto the world. This does not mean that God has two distinct forms, but merely that what appears contradictory to our ordinary reason may yet be a transcendental fact; and in the transcendental order of things there is no contradiction in supposing God as unchanged and as at the same time changeable by the operation of His two distinct powers. *Māyā* in this system is not something unreal or illusory, but represents the creative power of God, including His omniscience and omnipotence, the entire material substance of the world in the form of the collocation and combination of the *guṇas*, and also the totality of human experience for good and for evil in all its diverse individual centres of expression. But in spite of all these transformations and manifestations of Himself through His supra-logical power of *māyā*, He remains entirely complete and unchanged in the manifestations of His supra-logical essential power. On the one side we have God as the creator and upholder of the universe, and on the other we have the God of religion, the object of the mystic raptures of His

¹ *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, p. 244.

² *Ibid.* p. 247.

³ *tattvato'nyathā-bhāvaḥ pariṇāma ityeva lakṣaṇam na tu tattvasya.*

Sarva-saṃvādinī, p. 121.

devotees. The world is produced by the *māyā* power of God and is therefore not identical with Him. The gross and the impure selves and the world, all that is conscious and unconscious, the cause and the subtle pure element of the self—none of them are different from God, because the subtler ones are of the nature of His power, and the grosser ones are the modification or effects of His power; and though the world is one with Him, yet the defects and impurities of the world do not affect Him in the least, for in spite of these transformations He is untouched by them; such is the supra-logical character of His power¹.

Jīva then proceeds to show that the ultimate substance of the gross physical world, of the five elements and their modifications, is none other than the highest self, Paramātman or God. There is nothing in gross physical objects which can explain their appearance of unity as concrete wholes. For these wholes cannot be wholes in the same sense as forests made up of trees; these latter, indeed, cannot properly be called wholes, for, if one pulls a tree, the forest is not pulled; whereas in the case of a concrete object, when one pulls at one end, the object itself is pulled. If it is argued that there is a whole distinct from the parts, then its relation to the latter would be incomprehensible, for it is never experienced as entirely different from the parts; if the whole is supposed to be connected with each of the parts, then even a finger may be felt as a whole body; if it is supposed that a whole exists in parts only, in parts, then the same difficulty will again arise, and there will be a vicious infinite. So no concrete whole as distinct from the parts can be admitted to exist, and for the same reason the separate concrete existence of the elements may be denied. If the existence of wholes is denied in this way, then the existence of parts must also be denied; for, if there are no wholes, then there cannot be any parts, since it is only the wholes that are directly experienced, and parts are only admitted to account for the experience of the wholes. So the only assumption that remains is that God is the ultimate substance. Jīva refers to the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, III. 6. 1-3, which seems to hold that the discrete elements of God's own powers form the twenty-three Sāṃkhya categories, which are combined and united into wholes through the element of time, which is but another name for His transcendent effort. The curious doctrine here put forth is

¹ *Ibid.* p. 251.

rather very new in the history of Indian philosophy, though it is unfortunate that it has not been further developed here. It seems to maintain that the discrete elements of the substantial part (*upādānāmśa*) of *māyā* derive their appearance of reality from God, and that through God's *élan* or activity as time these elements are held together and produce the notion of wholes, since there is no other whole than God. How time is responsible for the combination of atoms into molecules and of molecules into wholes is not explained.

Kapila's philosophy in the Bhāgavata-purāṇa.

The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* gives an account of Sāṃkhya which is somewhat different from the account that can be got from the classical Sāṃkhya works. There is one beginningless qualityless *puruṣa*, which shines forth as all the individual souls, self-shining, which transcends the sphere of the *prakṛti*¹. It is this *puruṣa* that playfully (*līlayā*) accepts the *prakṛti* that approaches it of its own accord; it is this *puruṣa* that is probably regarded as Īśvara or God². He however, having perceived the *prakṛti* as producing diverse kinds of creation out of its own stuff, was Himself blinded (*vimūḍha*) by the veiling power of ignorance (*jñāna-gūhaya*) of this *prakṛti*³. By a false imposition the *puruṣa* conceives itself to be the agent in the changes that take place by the natural movement of the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*; and hence it exposes itself to births and rebirths and becomes bound by the laws of *karma*. In reality the *prakṛti* itself is the cause and agent of all its own self-abiding effects, and *puruṣa* is only the passive enjoyer of all pleasures and pains. In describing the evolution of the categories we have the five gross elements or *mahābhūtas*, the five *tanmātras*, the ten senses and the microcosm (*antarātmaka*)—consisting of *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *citta*.

¹ *anādīr ātmā puruṣo nirguṇaḥ prakṛteḥ parah
pratyaḡ-dhāmā svayaṃ-jyotir viśvaṃ yena samanvitam.*

Bhāgavata-purāṇa, III. 26. 3.

² *ayam īśvara ity ucyate.* Subodhinī commentary on *ibid*.

³ Subodhinī points out here that in this state, in which the *puruṣa* blinds himself, he is called *jīva*. Vijaya-dhvājī, however, takes it in the sense that the transcendent *puruṣa* or *īśvara* which had accepted the *prakṛti* as its own thus blinds the individual souls through it. Śrīdhara says that there are two kinds of *puruṣa*, *īśvara* and *jīva*; and, further, that according to its blinding power (*āvaraṇa-śakti*) and creative power (*vikṣepa-śakti*) *prakṛti* is twofold; and that *puruṣa* also is twofold, according as it behaves as individual souls or as God.

In addition to these there is the twenty-fifth category, called time (*kāla*), which some regard as a separate category, not as an evolute of *prakṛti*, but as the transcendental effort of *puruṣa* (used in the sense of God)¹. It is said that God manifests Himself in man internally, as his inner self, as the controller of all his experiences, and externally, as time in the manifold objects of experience. Thus there are twenty-five categories if time, individual soul, and God are taken as one; if time is taken separately and God and *puruṣa* are taken as one, there are twenty-six categories; and if all the three are taken separately, there are twenty-seven categories². It is the *puruṣa* which is to be taken as being under the influence of *prakṛti* and as free of it in its transcendent capacity as God (in an implicit manner). It is by the influence of time (*kāla*) that the equilibrium of the *guṇas* in the *prakṛti* is disturbed and that their natural transformations take place; and through the direction of laws of *karma* superintended by God the category of *mahat* is evolved³. It is curious that, though *mahat* is mentioned as a stage of *prakṛti*, it is only regarded as a creative state (*vr̥tti*) or *prakṛti*, and not as a separate category. In another passage in the *Bhāgavata* it is said that in the beginning God was alone in Himself with His own dormant powers, and not finding anything through which He could reflect Himself and realize Himself, He disturbed the equilibrium of His *māyā* power through the functioning of time and through His own self (*puruṣa*), impregnating it with consciousness; and thus the process of creation started through the transformations of the *prakṛti*³. In another passage the question is raised how, if God is free in Himself, can He put Himself in bondage to *māyā*; and the reply given is that in reality there is no bondage of God, but, just as in dreams a man may perceive his own head to be struck off his body, or may perceive his own reflection shaking in water on account of its ripples, so it is but the reflection of God that appears as individual souls suffering bondage to world-experiences. It follows therefore, according to this view, that individual souls are illusory creations, and that both they and their world-experience must consequently be false⁴. In another passage which immediately

¹ *prabhavaṃ pauraṣaṃ prāhuḥ kālam eke yato' bhayam. Ibid.* III. 26. 16.

² *Prakṛti* is not included in this enumeration; if it were, there would be twenty-eight categories.

³ *Ibid.* II. 5. 22, 23.

⁴ *Ibid.* III. 5. 22-27.

follows the previous one it is definitely stated that the world only appears in consciousness, but that in reality it does not exist¹. It is clear that these passages of the *Bhāgavata* distinctly contradict the interpretation of its philosophy given by Jīva in the previous section, as they deny the reality of individual souls and the reality of world-appearance.² But this is just what we may expect if we remember that the *Bhāgavata* is a collection of accretions from different hands at different times and not a systematic whole. If the Sāṃkhya theory described in II. 5, III. 5, III. 7 and III. 26 be interpreted consistently, then the result is that there are two fundamental categories, God and His own *māyā*, the *prakṛti*; that God, in His desire to realize Himself, reflects Himself in the *prakṛti*, which is but His own power, and it is through this impregnation of Himself in His own power that He appears as individual souls suffering the bondage of *prakṛti*; it is again through this impregnation of Himself that *prakṛti* is enlivened by consciousness; and then, through His creative effort, which is designated as time, the equilibrium of the *guṇas* of *prakṛti* is disturbed, the transformatory movement is set up in the *prakṛti*, and the categories are evolved.

In a passage in the fifth chapter (v. 12. 6-9) the existence of wholes is definitely described as illusory. There are no entities but the partless atoms, and even these atoms are imaginary constructions without which it would not be possible to conceive of wholes. All our conceptions of the external world start with atoms, and all that we see or feel gradually grows through a series of accretions. This growth in accretion is not a real growth, but is only an application of the time-sense. Time is therefore co-pervasive with the universe. The conception of an atom is but the conception of the smallest moment, and the entire conception of wholes of atoms as developing into dyad molecules, grosser specks and so on is nothing but advancing temporal construction and the growing combination of time-moments. The ultimate reality underlying all these changes is one all-pervasive unchanging whole, which through the activity of time appears as moments and their accretions (corresponding to atoms and their combinations)³. Time is

¹ *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, III. 7. 9-12.

² *arthābhāvaṃ vimāścītya pratītyāyāpi nātmanah. Ibid.* III. 7. 18.
anātmanah prapañcasya pratītyāyāpi arthābhāvaṃ artho'tra nāsti kintu
pratīti-mātram. (Śrīdhara's comment on Bhāgavata, III. 7. 18).

³ *Ibid.* III. 11. 1-5.

thus not a product of *prakṛti* but the transcendent activity of God, through which the unmanifested *prakṛti* is transformed into the gross world and by which all the discrete entities appear as wholes¹. In God this time exists as His inherent power of activity. It has been pointed out in the last section how Jīva considered time to be the active element of the *māyā* and the *guṇas* the passive element.

The first category evolved from the *prakṛti* is *mahat*, which contains the germs of the entire universe; it is pure translucent *sattva* (also called *citta* and *Vāsudeva* according to the terminology of the Bhāgavata cult). From the category of *mahat* the threefold *ahamkāra*, viz. *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *tāmasa*, was produced. In the terminology this *ahamkāra* is called *Samkarṣaṇa*. All activity, instrumentality and transformatory character as effect is to be attributed to this *ahamkāra*. The category of *manas* is produced from the *vaikārika ahamkāra*, and it is called *Aniruddha* in the terminology of the Bhāgavata cult. The Bhāgavata cult here described believed in three *vyūhas* of *Vāmadeva*, *Samkarṣaṇa* and *Aniruddha*, and therefore there is no mention here of the production of the *Pradyumna-vyūha*. *Pradyumna* in this view stands for desire; desires are but functions of the category of *manas* and not a separate category². From the *taijasa-ahamkāra* the category of *buddhi* is evolved. It is by the functions of this category that the functioning of the senses, the cognition of objects, doubts, errors, determinateness, memory and sleep are to be explained³. Both the conative and cognitive senses are produced from the *taijasa-ahamkāra*. From the *tāmasa-ahamkāra* the sound-potential (*śabda-tanmātra*) is produced, and from it the element of *ākāśa* is produced. From the element of *ākāśa* the heat-light-potential (*rūpa-tanmātra*) is produced, and from that the element of light, and so on.

The *puruṣa* is immersed in the *prakṛti*, but nevertheless, being unchangeable, qualityless and absolutely passive, it is not in any way touched by the qualities of *prakṛti*. It has already been pointed

¹ This view of time is different from the *yoga* view of time as moments (as explained by Vijñāna-bhikṣu in his *Yoga-vārttika*, III. 51). There a moment is described as the movement of a *guṇa* particle through a space of its own dimension, and the eternity of time is definitely denied. Time in that view can only be the discrete moments.

² *Ibid.* III. 26. 27. *yasya manasaḥ saṅkalpa-vikalpābhyāṃ kāma-sambhavo varitata iti kāma-rūpā vyatīlakṣaṇatvena uktā na tu pradyumna-vyūhotpattiḥ tasya saṅkalpādi-kāryatvābhāvāt.* (Śrīdhara's comment on the above.)

³ Those who believe in four *vyūhas* call this the *pradyumna-vyūha*.

out that the influence of the *prakṛti* is limited to the image of *puruṣa* in the *prakṛti*, and that, being reflected in the *prakṛti*, the one *puruṣa* throws a shadow of infinite selves. These selves are deluded by egoism and consider themselves to be active agents, and, though there are no real births and rebirths, yet they continue to suffer the bondage of the *saṃsāra* cycle like a man who suffers from bad dreams.

Those who wish to be emancipated should therefore steadily practise disinclination from worldly joys and keen devotion. They should take to the path of self-control, make their minds free of enmity to all beings, practise equality, sex-control and silence, should remain contented with anything that comes in their way, and should have a firm devotion to God. When they leave their false self-love and egoism and can realize the truth about *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, viz. that the latter is the unconditioned and underlying reality of all, as the one Sun which creates illusions like its reflections in the water; when they understand that the real self, the ultimate reality, is always experienced as the underlying being which manifests our biological, sensory and psychical personality or egohood, and that this reality is realized in deep dreamless sleep (when this egohood temporarily ceases to exist), they attain their real emancipation¹. The well-known *yoga* accessories mentioned by Patañjali, such as non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing, contentment with the bare necessities of life, purity, study, patience, control of the senses, are also regarded as a necessary preparation for self-advancement. The practice of postures (*āsana*), breath-control (*prāṇāyāma*), and that of holding the mind steadily on particular objects of concentration, are also advised as methods of purifying the mind. When the mind is thus purified and concentration practised, one should think of God and His great qualities². Devotion to God is regarded as the second means of attaining right knowledge and wisdom about the oneness of the ultimate and the relation between the *prakṛti* and the illusory individual selves. Thus it is said that, when one meditates upon the beautiful transcendent and resplendent form of Hari and is intoxicated with love for Him, one's heart melts through devotion, through excess of emotion one's hair stands on end, and one floats in tears of excessive delight through yearning after God; it is thus that the hook of the

¹ *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, III. 27.

² *Ibid.* III. 28.

mind is dislodged from the sense-objects to which it was attached¹. When through such excess of emotion one's mind becomes disinclined to all other objects, and thus there is no object of meditation, the mind is destroyed like a flame extinguished, and the self, returning from the conditions imposed upon it by the transformations of the *guṇas*, finds itself to be one with the transcendent and the highest self². Devotion is said to be of four kinds, *sāttvika*, *rājasa*, *tāmasa* and *nirguṇa*. Those who want God's grace and are devoted to Him in order to satisfy their personal jealousy, pride or enmity are called *tāmasa*, those who seek Him for the attainment of power, fame, etc. are called *rājasa*, and those who are devoted to Him or who renounce all their *karmas* and their fruits to Him through a sense of religious duty or for the washing away of their sins are called *sāttvika*. But those who are naturally inclined towards Him without any reason save deep attachment, and who would not desire anything but the bliss of serving Him as His servants, it is they who may be said to possess the *nirguṇa* devotion (*bhakti*). But this *nirguṇa* devotion must manifest itself in realizing God as pervading all beings: devotees of this type would consider all beings as their friends, and with them there is no difference between a friend and a foe. No one can claim to possess this high devotion merely by external adorations of God; he must also serve all humanity as a friend and brother³. Thus either by *yoga* methods of self-purification and concentration of the mind on God and His super-excellent qualities, or by a natural love for Him, one may attain the ultimate wisdom, that the one reality is God and that individual selves and their experiences are but mere reflections in *prakṛti* and its transformations.

It may however be pointed out that even the first method of *yoga*

- ¹ *evam harau bhagavati prati-labdha-bhāvo
bhaktyā dravād-hṛdaya utpulakaḥ pramodāt
autkaṇṭhya-vāṣpa-kalayā muhur ardyamānas
tac cāpi citta-baḍiṣaṁ śanakair viyukte.* *Ibid.* III. 28. 34.
- ² *muktāśrayaṁ yan nirviṣayaṁ viraktam
nirvāṇam rehati manaḥ sahasā yathā'rciḥ
ātmānam atra puruṣo'vyavadhānam ekam
amīkṣa'e prati-nivṛtta-guṇa-pravāhaḥ.* *Ibid.* III. 28. 35.
- ³ *yo mān sarveṣu bhūteṣu śāntam ātmānam īśvaram
hitvā'rcāṁ bhajate maudhyād bhasmany eva juhoti saḥ
aham uccāvacair dravyaiḥ kriyayotpanmayā'naghe
naiva tuṣye'rcito'rcāyām bhūta-grāmāvamāninaḥ.* *Ibid.* III. 29. 22, 24.

is associated with some kind of *bhakti* or devotion, as it involves meditation upon God and the blissful feeling associated with it. The word *yoga* is not used in this connection in Patañjali's technical sense (from the root *yuj samādhau*), but in the more general sense of *yoga* (*yoga* as "connection," from the root *yujir yoge*). Though this system involves most of the accessories of *yoga* for the purification of mind and as preparation for concentration, yet the ultimate aim is the realization of unity of the phenomenal self with God, which is entirely different from the *yoga* of Patañjali. So, as this *yoga* essentially aims at a unification with God through meditation upon Him, it may also be called a sort of *bhakti-yoga*, though it in its turn is different from the other *bhakti-yoga*, in which all the purposes of *yoga* discipline are served by an excess of emotion for God¹.

Kapila has been described as an incarnation of God, and the philosophy that is attributed to him in the *Bhāgavata* forms the dominant philosophy contained therein. All through the *Bhāgavata* the philosophy of theistic Sāṃkhya as described by Kapila is again and again repeated in different passages in different contents. Its difference from the classical Sāṃkhya as expounded by Īśvara-kṛṣṇa or by Patañjali and Vyāsa is too patent to need explanation at any length. In the *Bhāgavata*, XI. 22 a reference is made to different schools of Sāṃkhya which count their ultimate categories as three, four, five, six, seven, nine, eleven, thirteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, twenty-five and twenty-six, and it is asked how these differences of view can be reconciled. The reply is that these differences do not involve a real difference of Sāṃkhya thought; it is held that the difference is due to the inclusion of some of the categories within others (*parasparānupraveśāt tattvānām*); for instance, some of the effect categories are included within the cause categories, or some categories are identified from particular considerations. Thus, when one thinks that the *puruṣa*, being always under the influence of beginningless ignorance (*anādyavidyā-yuktasya*), cannot by itself attain the knowledge of ultimate reality, it becomes necessary to conceive the existence of a super-person, different from it, who could grant such knowledge; according to

1

yataḥ sandhāryamānāyām yogino bhakti-lakṣaṇaḥ
 āśu sampadyate yoga āśrayam bhadrām iṣṭataḥ.

Bhāgavata-purāṇa, II. 1. 21.

this view there would be twenty-six categories. But, when one thinks that there is not the slightest difference between the *puruṣa* (or the individual soul) and God, the conception of the latter as separate from the former becomes quite unnecessary; on this view there would be only twenty-five categories. Again, those who reckon nine categories do so by counting *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, *mahat*, *ahaṁkāra* and the five *tanmātras*. In this view knowledge (*jñāna*) is regarded as a transformation of the *guṇas*, and (*prakṛti* being nothing more than the equilibrium of the *guṇas*) knowledge may also be regarded as identical with *prakṛti*; similarly actions are to be regarded as being only transformations of *rajas* and ignorance as transformation of *tamas*. Time (*kāla*) is not regarded here as a separate category, but as the cause of the co-operative movement of the *guṇas*, and nature (*svabhāva*) is identified with the *mahat-tattva*. The cognitive senses are here included within the cognitive substance of *sattva*, the conative senses within the *rajas*, and the cognitions of touch, taste, etc. are regarded as the fields of the manifestations of the senses and not as separate categories. Those who reckon eleven categories take the cognitive and conative senses as two additional categories and, considering the sensations of touch, taste, etc. as being manifestations of the senses, naturally ignore their claim to be considered as categories. In another view *prakṛti*, which is moved into activity by the influence of *puruṣa*, is regarded as different from it, and thus there are the two categories of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, then are the five *tanmātras*, the transcendental seer and the phenomenal self; thus there are nine categories in all. Upon the view that there are six categories, only the five elements and the transcendent self are admitted. Those who hold that there are only four categories admit only the three categories of light-heat (*tejas*), water and earth, and accept the transcendent self as the fourth. Those who hold that there are seventeen categories admit the five *tanmātras*, five elements and five senses, *manas* and the self. Those who hold that there are sixteen categories identify *manas* with the self. Those who hold that there are thirteen categories admit the five elements (which are identified with the *tanmātras*), the five senses, *manas*, and the transcendent and the phenomenal selves. Those who admit only eleven categories accept only the five elements, five senses and the self. There are others, again, who admit eight *prakṛtis* and the *puruṣa*, and thus reduce the

number to nine. The eclectic spirit of the *Bhāgavata* tried to reconcile the conflicting accounts of the Sāṃkhya categories by explaining away the differences; but to an impartial observer these differences are sometimes fundamental, and at least it is evident that, though these different lines of thought may all be called in some sense Sāṃkhya, they signify the existence of a good deal of independent thinking, the exact value of which, however, cannot be determined for want of detailed and accurate information regarding the development of these schools¹.

The fundamental difference of the Bhāgavata school of Sāṃkhya from that of the classical Sāṃkhya is that it admits one *puruṣa* as the real all-pervading soul, which is the real seer of all our experiences and the basic universal being that underlies all things of this universe. The individual phenomenal selves appear as real entities only by the delusive confusion of the universal *puruṣa* with the transformations of the *prakṛti* and by the consequent false attribution of the movements and phenomena of the *prakṛti* to this universal *puruṣa*. The false individual selves arise out of such false attribution and there is thus produced the phenomenon of birth and rebirth, though there is no association of the *prakṛti* with the universal *puruṣa*. All our world-experiences are mere illusions, like dreams, and are due to mental misconceptions. The emphasis on the illusory character of the world is very much stronger in the passages that are found in the *Bhāgavata*, xi. 22 than in the passages that deal with Kapila's philosophy of Sāṃkhya just described; and though the two treatments may not be interpreted as radically different, yet the monistic tendency which regards all worldly experiences as illusory is so remarkably stressed that it very nearly destroys the realistic note which is a special feature of the Sāṃkhya schools of thought².

¹ In Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddha-carita* there is an account of Sāṃkhya which counts *prakṛti* and *vikāra*. Of these *prakṛti* consists of eight categories—the five elements, egoism (*ahaṃkāra*), *buddhi* and *avyakta*, and the *vikāra* consists of seventeen categories—the five cognitive and the five conative senses, *manas*, *buddhi* and the five kinds of sense-knowledge. In addition to these there is a category of *kṣetrajña* or self or *ātman*.

² *yathā mano-ratha-dhiyo viśayānubhavo mṛṣā
svapna-dṛṣṭās ca dāśārha tathā saṃsāra ātmanah
arthe hy avidyamāne'pi saṃsṛtir na nivartate
dhyāyato viśayān asya svapne'narthāgamo yathā.*

Bhāgavata, xi. 22. 55, 56.

IN XI. 13 this monistic interpretation or rather this monistic transformation of Sāṃkhya reaches its culmination; it is held that ultimate reality is one, and that all differences are but mere differences of name and form. Whatever may be perceived by the senses, spoken by words or conceived in thought is but the one reality, the Brahman. The *guṇas* are the product of mind and the mind of the *guṇas*, and it is these two illusory entities that form the person; but one should learn that both of them are unreal and that the only reality, on which both of them are imposed, is Brahman. Waking experiences, dreams, and dreamless sleep are all functions of the mind; the true self is the pure seer (*sākṣin*), which is entirely different from them. So long as the notion of the "many" is not removed by philosophical reasonings, the ignorant person is simply dreaming in all his waking states, just as one feels oneself awake in one's dreams. Since there is nothing else but the self, and since all else is mere illusion like dreams, all worldly laws, purposes, aims and works are necessarily equally false. One should observe that we have the notion of the identity of our selves, in our wakeful and dream experiences and in our experiences of dreamless deep sleep, and one should agree that all these experiences in all these three stages of life do not really exist, they are all but the manifestations of *māyā* on the ultimate reality, the Brahman; and thus by such inferences and considerations one should remove all one's attachments and cut asunder all one's fetters by the sword of knowledge. One should regard the entire world and its experiences as nothing more than the imagination of the mind—a mere appearance which is manifested and lost; all experiences are but *māyā* and the only underlying reality is pure consciousness. Thus it is through right knowledge that true emancipation comes, though the body may hold on so long as the fruits of *karma* are not exhausted through pleasurable and painful experiences. And this is said to be the secret truth of Sāṃkhya and Yoga. It may generally appear rather surprising to find such an extreme idealistic monism in the *Bhāgavata*, but there are numerous passages which show that an extreme form of idealism recurs now and then as one of the principal lines of thought in the *Bhāgavata*¹.

The first adoration verse is probably the most important passage in the *Bhāgavata*. And even in this passage it is said (in one of its

¹ *Ibid.* XI. 13.

prominent and direct interpretations) that the creation through *guṇas* is false and that yet, on account of the all-pervading reality that underlies it, it appears as real; that the production, maintenance and destruction of the universe all proceed from the ultimate reality, Brahman, and that it is through the light of this reality that all darkness vanishes¹. In another passage, in VI. 4. 29-32, it is said that Brahman is beyond the *guṇas*, and that whatever may be produced in the world, or as the world, has Brahman for its ground and cause, and that He alone is true; and that both the atheistic Sāṃkhya and the theistic Yoga agree in admitting Him as the ultimate reality.

It was pointed out in a previous section that according to Jīva the *māyā* had two parts, formative and constitutive, and it was the latter that was identified with *prakṛti* or the three *guṇas*. But this *māyā* was regarded as an external power of God as distinguished from His essential power. The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, however, does not seem to make any such distinction; it says that the great Lord manifests Himself through His playful activity as *prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, the manifold world and time, but yet it considers the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* to be different from the essential nature of the Lord, and time as that which holds these two together and impels them for the creational forms². Thus, since time is the cause which connects the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*, it exists even when all creational modes have shrunk back into the *prakṛti* in the great dissolution. When the *guṇas* are in equilibrium, the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* remain disconnected, and it is then that the element of time proceeds out of the Lord and connects the two together³. But the *prakṛti* in both its unmanifested and manifested forms or its contraction and dilation (*saṃkoca-vikāśābhyām*) is a part of God's nature; so in disturbing the equilibrium of *prakṛti* it is God who disturbs His

¹ *janmādyasya yato'nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñāḥ svarāt
tene brahma hṛdā ya ādikavaye muhyanti yat sūrayaḥ.
tejo-vāri-mṛdām yathā vinimayo yatra trisargo'mṛṣā
dhāmnā svena sadā nirasta-kuhakaṃ satyaṃ param dhīmahi.*

Bhāgavata, I. 1. 1.

² *vyaktaṃ viṣṇus tathāvyaktaṃ puruṣaḥ kāla eva ca.
kṛtato bālakasyeva ceṣṭām tasya niśāmaya.
viṣṇoḥ svarūpāt parato hi te'nye rūpe pradhānam puruṣaś ca viprās
tasyaiva te'nyena dhṛte viyukte rūpādi yat tad devīja kāla-samjñam.*

Viṣṇu-purāṇa, I. 2. 18, 24.

³ *guṇa-sāmye tatas tasmin pṛthak puṃsi vyavasthite
kāla-svarūpa-rūpaṃ tad viṣṇor maitreya vartate. Ibid. 27.*

own nature (*sa eva kṣobhako brahman kṣobhyaś ca puruṣottamah*), and this He does through the instrumentality of time. Through His will He penetrates into the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*, and sets off the creative operation of the *prakṛti*, though this operation of the will does not involve any notion of ordinary physical activity¹. Time is thus regarded as the spiritual influence of God, by which the *prakṛti* is moved though He remains unmoved Himself. From *prakṛti* there is the threefold evolution of *mahat* (*sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*) by a process of differentiation and development of heterogeneity². By the same process the differentiation of *mahat* into *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi* takes place as integrated within the *mahat* as integrated within the *prakṛti*³. Being similarly integrated in the *mahat*, the *bhūtādi* is further differentiated into the *tanmātric* stage and produces first the sound-potential (*śabda-tanmātra*). From the *śabda-tanmātra* the element of *ākāśa* was produced from the relevant matter of *bhūtādi*; this *śabda-tanmātra* and *ākāśa* was further integrated in *bhūtādi* and in this integrated state the element of *ākāśa* transformed itself into the touch-potential (*sparsa-tanmātra*); then from this touch-potential air was produced by its transformation (through accretion from *bhūtādi*). Then in association of the integration of the element of *ākāśa* and *śabda-tanmātra* with the touch-potential (*sparsa-tanmātra*) the element of air produced the heat-light-potential (*rūpa-tanmātra*) in the medium of the *bhūtādi*, and from that the element of heat-light was produced by an accretion from *bhūtādi*. Again in association of the integration of touch-potential, the element of air and the heat-light-potential, the element of heat-light transformed itself into the taste-potential in the medium of the *bhūtādi*, and in a similar way water was produced by an accretion from the *bhūtādi*. Again, from the integration of taste-potential, heat-light potential and water, the smell-potential was produced by a transformation of the element of water in the medium of the *bhūtādi*, and out of this smell-potential in integration with the above the element of earth was produced by an accretion from *bhūtādi*. Out of the

¹ *pradhānam puruṣam cāpi praviśyātmecchayā hariḥ
kṣobhayāmāsa saṃprāpte sarga-kāle vyayāvayau Ibid. 29.*

² This view of the evolution of three different kinds of *mahat* is peculiar to the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, which is different from the classical Sāṃkhya.

³ This second stage is in agreement with the doctrine of Sāṃkhya as explained in the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on the *Yoga-sūtra*, II. 19 of Patañjali.

taijasa-ahamkāra the ten conative and cognitive senses were produced, and *manas* was produced out of the *vaikārika-ahamkāra*. The five *tanmātras* are called the unspecialized modifications (*aviśeṣa*), and the senses and the gross elements are regarded as fully specialized modifications (*viśeṣa*)¹.

It will appear from the above and also from what has already been said in the chapter on the Kapila and Patañjala school of Sāṃkhya in the first volume of the present work that the system of Sāṃkhya had undergone many changes in the hands of various writers at different times. But it is difficult to guess which of these can be genuinely attributed to Kapila. In the absence of any proof to the contrary it may be assumed that the account of Sāṃkhya attributed to Kapila in the *Bhāgavata* may generally be believed to be true. But Īśvarakṛṣṇa also gives us an account of what can be called the classical Sāṃkhya in his *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, which he says was first taught by Kapila to Āsuri and by him to Pāñcaśikha, and that his account of Sāṃkhya was a summary of what was contained in the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* with the exception of the polemical portions and fables; also that he himself was instructed in the traditional school of Sāṃkhya as carried down from Āsuri through generations of teachers and pupils. But the *Bhāgavata* account of Kapila's Sāṃkhya materially differs from the Sāṃkhya of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, for, while the former is definitely theistic, the latter is at least tacitly atheistic, for it is absolutely silent about God; apparently God has no place in this system. But the theistic Sāṃkhya as described in the *Bhāgavata*, which is of course quite different and distinct from the theistic Sāṃkhya of Patañjali and *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, is not an isolated instance which can easily be ignored; for most of the *Purāṇas* which have a Vaiṣṇava tradition behind them generally agree in all essential features with the theistic element of the Kapila Sāṃkhya of the *Bhāgavata*, and some of the important Pāñcarātra *āgamas* also in some ways support it. Thus the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā* describes the Sāṃkhya system as that which believes the *prakṛti* to be the cause of the manifold world and that this *prakṛti* is moved into creative transformations through the

¹ *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, 1. 2. See also Dr Sir B. N. Seal's interpretation of this passage in P. C. Ray's *Hindu Chemistry*, Vol. II, pp. 90-5.

The same verses occur in the *Padma-purāṇa* (*Svarga-khaṇḍa*) regarding the evolution of the Sāṃkhya categories.

influence of time by the will of Lord Viṣṇu. There is but one *puruṣa*, who is the sum-total of all *puruṣas* and who is absolutely changeless (*kūṭastha*); there is the *prakṛti*, constituted of the three *guṇas* in equilibrium; and there is also the element of time (*kāla*), through which by the will of the Lord (*viṣṇu-saṃkalpa-coditāt*) the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are connected and the creative movement of the *prakṛti* set up. The *puruṣa*, *prakṛti* and *kāla* are in their turn but special manifestations of Lord Viṣṇu¹. The evolution of the gross elements is also described here as being directly from their respective *tanmātras*. It also believes that the powers of the Lord are supra-logical (*acintya*), and therefore cannot be contested on purely formal grounds of reason or logical principles of self-contradiction. It holds however the rather unique view that from time the *sattva-guṇa* springs into being and from *sattva rajas* and from *rajas tamas*, and it also gives a different interpretation of the *vyūha* doctrine—but these have already been discussed in the chapter on the Pañcarātra philosophy. The *Ahīrbudhnya*, however, ascribes this Sāṃkhya philosophy to Kapila (the incarnation of Viṣṇu) who wrote the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra*, and it also enumerates the names of the chapters or *tantras* of this work². The work is divided into two books; in the first book there is one chapter (*tantra*) on Brahman, one on *puruṣa*, three on power (*śakti*), destiny (*niyati*) and time (*kāla*), three on the *guṇas*, one on the changeless (*akṣara*), one on *prāṇa* and one on the agent (*kartr*), one on the Lord, five on cognition, five on actions, five on *tanmātras* and five on the five gross elements; thus altogether there are thirty-two chapters in the first book. In the second book there are twenty-eight chapters—five on duties, one on experience, one on character, five on afflictions, three on the *pramāṇas*, one on illusions, one on *dharma*, one on disinclination, one on miraculous powers, one on *guṇa*, one on *līṅga* or signs, one on perception, one on Vedic performances, one on sorrow, one on final achievement, one on removal of passions, one on customs and one on emancipation³. Thus we have a theistic

¹ *puruṣaś caiva kālaś ca guṇaś ceti tridhocyate
bhūtiḥ śuddhetarā viṣṇoḥ....* *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā*, vi. 8.

² *sāṃkhya-rūpeṇa saṃkalpo vaiṣṇavaḥ kapilād ṛṣeḥ
udito yādṛśaḥ pūrvam tādṛśaṃ śṛṇu me'khilam
ṣaṣṭi-bhedaṃ smṛtaṃ tantraṃ sāṃkhyaṃ nāma mahāmune
prākṛtaṃ vaikṛtaṃ ceti maṇḍale dve samāsataḥ.* *Ibid.* xii. 19.

³ *Ibid.* xii. 20-30.

and an atheistic account of Sāṃkhya, both alleged to be based on the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra Śāstra*, both described as the philosophy of Kapila and both derived from authoritative ancient texts. Not only does the *Bhāgavata* refer to Kapila as an incarnation of God, but many of the Pañcarātra texts also allude to him as an incarnation of God Viṣṇu; the *Mahābhārata* describes him as Bhagavān Hari and Viṣṇu (III. 47. 18), with Vasudeva (III. 107. 31) and with Kṛṣṇa, and also describes him as a great *ṛsi* who reduced the sons of Sagara into ashes by his wrath. In the *Bhagavad-gītā* also Kṛṣṇa says that of the seers he is the sage Kapila (x. 26), but in the *Mahābhārata* (III. 220. 21) Kapila is identified with the Fourth Fire. A sage Kapila is also mentioned in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (v. 2), and Śaṅkara says in the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* that this Kapila must be different from the Kapila (who reduced the sons of Sagara to ashes) and the Kapila who wrote the Sāṃkhya philosophy cannot be ascertained. Thus we have at least three Kapilas, the Kapila who reduced the sons of Sagara into ashes, and who is regarded by the *Mahābhārata* as an incarnation or manifestation of Viṣṇu, Hari or Kṛṣṇa, a Kapila who is regarded as an incarnation of Fire, and the Upaniṣadic sage Kapila, who is regarded there as mature in wisdom. The first two are definitely reputed to be authors of Sāṃkhya philosophy, and Nīlakaṇṭha, the commentator on the *Mahābhārata*, says that it is Kapila (=the incarnation of Fire) who was the author of the atheistic Sāṃkhya¹. In the *Mahābhārata* (XII. 350. 5) it is said that the sage Kapila based his Sāṃkhya philosophy on the doctrine that it is the one *puruṣa*, the great Nārāyaṇa, who in himself is absolutely qualityless and untouched by all worldly conditions and is yet the superintendent of all phenomenal selves associated with their subtle and gross bodies, and is the ultimate ground of all the cognitional and sense-experiences enjoyed by them, the absolute and ultimate reality which appears as the subjective and the objective world and yet behaves as the cosmic creator and ruler in his four-fold personality as Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Aniruddha and Pradyumna². Before examining other accounts of Sāṃkhya as found in the *Mahābhārata* we may point out that Pañcaśikha himself was not only called Kapileya from his sucking the breasts of a woman called

¹ Nīlakaṇṭha's commentary on the *Mahābhārata*, III. 220. 21.

² See the *Mahābhārata*, XII. 351. See also the commentary of Nīlakaṇṭha on it.

Kapilā while an infant, but was also called *Paramarṣi Kapila*¹. It seems practically certain that there had been a number of pantheistic, theistic and atheistic varieties of Sāṃkhya. Since the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā* gives the names of the chapters of the *Śaṣṭi-tantra*, it is almost certain that the author had seen this work, and that his account of Sāṃkhya is in the main in agreement with it. The table of subjects enumerated shows that the work contained a chapter on Brahman, *puruṣa*, *śakti* (power), *niyati* (destiny), and *kāla* (time), and it is these elements that occur in the *Ahīrbudhnya* account of Sāṃkhya. It therefore seems very probable that the *Ahīrbudhnya* account of Sāṃkhya is largely faithful to the *Śaṣṭi-tantra*. We know that the Sāṃkhya philosophy of Kapila had begun to change its form in some of its most important features, and it is quite probable that it had changed considerably by the time it was traditionally carried to Īśvarakṛṣṇa. It might still have been regarded as containing the essential instructions of the *Śaṣṭi-tantra* and yet be very different from it; there is no proof that Īśvarakṛṣṇa had a chance of reading this original *Śaṣṭi-tantra*, and it is reasonable to suppose that he had access only to a later version of it or to a revised compendium supposed to be based on it; it may be that the *Śaṣṭi-tantra*, being an ancient work, was probably so loosely worded that it was possible to get different interpretations from it—like the *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa—or even that there were two *Śaṣṭi-tantras*².

¹ *yam āhuḥ Kāpilam sāmṅhyam paramarṣim prajāpatim. Ibid. xii. 218. 9.*

This Pañcaśikha is also described as *pañca-rātra-viśārada*, well-versed in the *pañca-rātra* rites.

² In the *Māthara-vṛtti* of Mātharācārya on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa it is said that *Śaṣṭi-tantra* means a *tantra* or work dealing with sixty subjects and not a work containing sixty chapters (*tantrayante vyutpādyante padārthā iti tantram*). These sixty subjects are: five *viparyayas* or errors, twenty-eight defects (*aśakti*), nine false satisfactions (*tuṣṭi*), and eight miraculous achievements (*siddhi*)—altogether fifty items (*kārikā* 47)—the other ten subjects being the existence of *prakṛti* as proved by five reasons (called the category of *astitva*), its oneness (*ekatva*), its teleological relation to *puruṣas* (*arthavattva* and *pārārthya*), the plurality of the *puruṣas* (*bahutva*), the maintenance of the body even after *jīvan-mukti* (*sthiti*), association and dissociation of *prakṛti* with *puruṣa* (*yoga* and *viyoga*), difference of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*anyatva*), and final cessation of *prakṛti* (*niṛvṛti*). Māthara quotes a *Kārikā* enumerating the latter ten subjects: *astitvam, ekatvam, arthavattvam, pārārthyam, anyatvam, arthamivṛttiḥ. yoga viyogo, bahavaḥ pumāṃsaḥ, sthitiḥ, śarīrasya viśeṣa-vṛttiḥ. Māthara-vṛtti, 72.*

This enumeration, however, seems to be entirely arbitrary, and apparently there is nothing to show that the *Śaṣṭi-tantra* was so called because it treated of these sixty subjects.

According to the interpretation of the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā* God or Īśvara is above all, and then there is the category of the unchangeable, the Brahman (consisting of the sum-total of the *puruṣas*), the *prakṛti* as the equilibrium of the *guṇas*, and time (*kāla*), as has already been explained¹. Time is regarded as the element that combines the *prakṛti* with the *puruṣas*. It is said that the *prakṛti*, the *puruṣas* and time are the materials which are led to their respective works in producing the manifold universe by the development of the categories through the will-movement of God (*Sudarśana*).² It is thus one unchangeable *puruṣa* that appears as the many individuals or parts of the Lord Viṣṇu or Īśvara³. The will of Īśvara, otherwise called *Sudarśana* or *saṃkalpa*, which is regarded as a vibratory (*parispanda*) thought movement (*jñāna-mūla-kriyātma*), is the dynamic cause of the differentiation of *prakṛti* into the categories (*mahat* and the rest). Time is not identified here with this power, but is regarded as a separate entity, an instrument through which the power acts. Yet this "time" has to be regarded as of a transcendental nature, co-existent with *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, and distinguished from "time" as moments or their aggregates, which is regarded as the *tamas* aspect of the category of *mahat*. The *sattva* aspect of the *mahat* manifests itself as definite understanding (*buddhir adhyavasāyinī*), and the *rajas* aspect as life-activity (*prāṇa*). The *sattva* aspect of *mahat* as *buddhi* also manifests itself as virtue, wisdom, miraculous powers and as disinclination from worldly joys (*vairāgya*), and the *tamas* aspect as vice (*adharma*), ignorance, attachment and weakness. In the category of *mahat* the general sense-power is generated, by which objects are discerned as cognitional modes; the ego (*ahaṃkāra*) is also generated in the *mahat*, involving the notion of integrating all experience which

¹ anyūnānatiriktam yad guṇa-sāmyam tamomayaṃ
tat sāmṛkhyair jagato mūlam prakṛtiś ceti kathyate.
kramāvatīrno yas tatra catur-manu-yugaḥ pumān
samaṣṭiḥ puruṣo yoniḥ sa kūṭastha itīryate
yat tat kālamayaṃ tattvaṃ jagataḥ samprakālanam
sa tayoh kāryam āsthāya saṃyojaka-vibhājakah.

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, VII. 1-3.

² mṛt-piṇḍi-bhūtam etat tu kālādi-tritayaṃ mune
viṣṇoḥ sudarśanenaiva sva-sva-kārya-pracoditam
mahadādi-prthivyanta-tattva-vargopapāḍakam. *Ibid.* 4.

³ kūṭastho yaḥ purā proktaḥ pumān vyomnaḥ parād adhaḥ
mānava devatādyāś ca tad-vyaṣṭaya itīritāḥ.
jīva-bhedā mune sarve viṣṇu-bhūty-āṃśa-kalpitaḥ. *Ibid.* 58.

belongs to a person (*abhimāna*) as a cognizer and enjoyer of all experiences. The implication seems to be that the category of *mahat* manifests itself as the sense-faculties and the person who behaves as the cognizer, because these are the modes through which thought must interpret itself in order to realize its own nature as thought. The *sāttvika* aspect of the *ahamkāra* is called *vaikārika*, the *rājasa* character *taijasa* and the *tāmasa* aspect *bhūtādi*. It is well to point out here that this account greatly differs from the classical Sāṃkhya in this respect, that the sense-power is here generated prior to *ahamkāra* and not from *ahamkāra*, and that, while the evolution of *ahamkāra* is regarded as the evolution of a separate category by the thought-movement of God, the sense-power is regarded only as modes or aspects of *buddhi* or *mahat* and not as separate categories. The only sense-faculty that is evolved through the thought-activity of God out of *ahamkāra* is *manas*, the reflective sense (*cintanātmakam ahamkārikam indriyam*). From the *tamas* aspect of *ahamkāra* as *bhūtādi* the infra-atomic sound-potential (*śabda-tanmātra*) is produced and from this the element of *ākāśa*. *Ākāśa* here is supposed to be of two kinds, as the maintainer of sound and as manifesting vacuity, unoccupation or porosity (*avakāśa-pradāyi*). From the *vaikārika ahamkāra* the organs of hearing and speech are produced as categories through the thought-activity of God. In a similar manner the infra-atomic touch-potential (*sparsa-tanmātra*) is produced from the *bhūtādi*, and from this again air, as that which dries up, propels, moves and conglomerates, is produced; again, through the thought-activity of God the organ of touch and the active organ of grasping are produced, and in a similar manner the infra-atomic heat-light-potential (*rūpa-tanmātra*) is produced from *bhūtādi* and from that the element of heat-light; from the *vaikārika* also the visual organ and the conative organs of the two feet are produced, from the *bhūtādi* the infra-atomic taste-potential (*rasa-mātra*) is produced and from it water, and from the *vaikārika ahamkāra* the organ of taste and the genitals are produced; from the *bhūtādi* true infra-atomic smell-potential (*gandha-mātra*) is produced, and from it earth; from the *vaikārika-ahamkāra* the organs of smell and of excretion are produced. Will, energy, and the five kinds of bio-motor activities (*prāṇa*) are produced jointly from *manas*, *ahamkāra* and *buddhi*. The power (*śakti*) of Hari or Viṣṇu or Īśvara is one,

but it is not a physical power, a power that involves mechanical movement, but it is in a sense homogeneous with God, and is of the nature of pure self-determined thought (*svacchanda-cinmaya*); it is not however thought in the ordinary sense of thought—with particular contents and object—but it is thought in potentiality, thought that is to realize itself in subject-object forms, manifesting itself as a spiritual thought movement (*jñāna-mūla-kriyātma*). It is this spiritual movement of that which by self-diremption splits itself up (*dvidhā-bhāvam ṛcchati*) as the thought of God (*saṃkalpa*), the determiner (*bhāvaka*) and the passive objectivity (*bhāvya*) called the *prakṛti*, and it is through the former that the latter developed and differentiated itself into the categories mentioned above. What is meant by the vibratory movement of the thought of God is simply its unobstructed character, its character of all potentiality for actuality without any obstruction. It is the pure unobstructed flow of God's thought-power that is regarded as His will, idea or thought (*sudarśanatā*)¹. The *prakṛti* is thus as much spiritual as God's thought; it represents merely objectivity and the content of the thought of God, and it only has an opportunity of behaving as an independent category of materiality when by the self-diremption of God's power the thought-energy requires an objective through which it can realize itself.

In another chapter of the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā* it is said that the power in its original state may be conceived to be pure stillness (*staimitya-rūpa*) or pure vacuity (*śūnyatva-rūpiṇī*), and it is out of its own indescribable spontaneity that it begins to set itself in motion². It is this spontaneity, which springs out of itself and is its own, that is described as the thought of God or its self-diremption activity, its desire for being many. All creation proceeds out of this spontaneity; creation is not to be described as an event which happened at a particular time, but it is the eternal spontaneity of this power of God that reveals itself as eternal creation, as eternal and continuous self-manifestation³. Whatever is described as movement (*kriyā*), energy (*vīrya*), self-completeness (*tejas*) or strength (*bala*) or God are but different aspects of this power. The strength

¹ *avyāghātas tu yas tasya sā sudarśanatā mune
jñāna-mūla-kriyātmāsau svacchaḥ svacchanda-cinmayah.*

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, vii. 67.

² *svātantryād eva kasmāccit kvacit sonmeṣam ṛcchati. Ibid. v. 4.*

³ *satataṃ kurvato jagat. Ibid. ii. 59.*

(*bala*) of God consists in the fact that He is never tired or fatigued in spite of His eternal and continuous operation of creation; His energy (*vīrya*) consists in this, that, though His own power is split up as the material on which His power acts, He does not suffer any change on that account¹. His lustre of self-completeness (*tejas*) consists in this, that He does not await the help of any instrument of any kind for His creative operations²: and it is the self-spontaneity of this power that is described as His agency (*kartrtva*) as the creator of the world. God is described as being both of the nature of pure consciousness and of the nature of power. It is the all-pervasive consciousness of Himself that constitutes the omniscience of God, and, when this stillness of omniscience and self-complete steady consciousness as pure differenceless vacuity dirempts itself and pulsates into the creative operation, it is called His power. It is on this account that the power (*śakti*) of God is described as thought-movement (*jñāna-mūla-kriyātmaka*). This power or consciousness may be regarded both as a part of God, and therefore one with Him, and also as His specific character or quality; it is this power which dirempts itself as consciousness and its object (*cetya-cetana*), as time and all that is measured by time (*kalya-kāla*), as manifest and unmanifest (*vyaktāvyakta*), as the enjoyer and that which is enjoyed (*bhoktr-bhogyā*), as the body and that which is embodied (*deha-dehin*)³. The conception of *puruṣa* seems to indicate the view of a conglomeration of the individual selves into a colony or association of individual selves, like the honeycomb of the bees⁴. They are regarded as unchangeable in themselves (*kūṭastha*), but yet they are covered over with the dusty impurities of beginningless root-desires (*vāsanā*), and thus, though pure in themselves, they may be also regarded as impure⁵. In themselves they are absolutely unaffected by any kind of affliction, and, being parts of God's nature, are omniscient and eternally emancipated beings. These *puruṣas* are, however, through the will of God or rather of necessity through the creative operation of His power, differently affected by ignorance

¹ *tasyopādāna-bhāve'pi vikāra-viraho hi yah vīryam nāma guṇaḥ so'yaṁ acyutatvāparāhvyam. Ibid. II. 60.*

² *sahakāry-anapekṣā yā tat tejaḥ samudāhṛtam. Ibid. II. 61.*

³ *Ibid. v. 6-12.*

⁴ *sarvātmanām samaṣṭir yā kośo madhu-kṛtām iva. Ibid. VI. 33.*

⁵ *śuddhyasuddhimayo bhāvo bhūteḥ sa puruṣaḥ smṛtaḥ anādi-vāsanā-reṇu-kunṭhitair ātmabhiḥ citaḥ. Ibid. VI. 34.*

(*avidyā*), which makes them subject to various kinds of affliction, and, as a result thereof, their own natures are hidden from themselves and they appear to be undergoing all kinds of virtuous and sinful experiences of pleasures and pains; and, being thus affected, they are first associated with the creative power (*śakti*) of God, and then, as this power first evolves itself into its first category of time as the all-determining necessity (*niyati*), they become associated with it; and then, as the third movement posits itself as all-grasping time, they become associated with that category, and then, as the *sattva-guṇas* gradually evolve from *kāla*, the *rājasa guṇas* from *sattva* and the *tāmasa guṇas* from *rajas*, the colony of *puruṣas* is associated first with *sattva*, then with *rajas* and then with *tamas*. When all the *guṇas* are evolved, though the three *guṇas* are then all disturbed for further creative operation, they are not disturbed in all their parts; there are some parts of the *guṇa* conglomeration which are in equilibrium with one another; and it is this state of equilibrium of the *guṇas* that is called *prakṛti*¹. The account of the evolution of the various categories from the creative will of God up to the *prakṛti* does not occur in the seventh chapter of the *Ahīrbudhnya*, which is definitely described as the Sāṃkhya philosophy of Kapila; it is only a Pāñcarātra account given to supplement that of the Sāṃkhya, which starts from the evolution of the categories from the *prakṛti*—the equilibrium of the *guṇas*. According to the Pāñcarātra account of the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā* the colony or the honeycomb of the *puruṣas* thus forms a primal element, which is associated with the self-evolving energy of God from the first moment of its movement, continues to be so associated with each of the evolving stadiums of categories up to the evolution of the *prakṛti*, and later on with all the other categories that are evolved from the *prakṛti*. In the account of Kapila Sāṃkhya as found in the *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā* this conglomeration of the *puruṣas* is admitted to be the changeless category that is associated with the evolution of the categories and descends gradually through the successive stages of their evolution until we come to the complete human stage with the evolution of the different senses and the gross elements. Unlike the account of *puruṣa* that is found in the classical Sāṃkhya

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*codyamāne'pi sṛṣṭyartham pūrṇaṃ guṇa-yugaṃ tadā
amśataḥ sāmyam āyāti viṣṇu-saṃkalpa-coditam.*

Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā, VI. 62.

treatises, which regards the *puruṣas* as being absolutely untouched by the instinctive root-desires (*vāsanā*) and the afflictions, it considers (like the Jains) that the *puruṣas* are coated with the impurities of *vāsanās* and *kleśas*, though in themselves they are essentially pure; again, the classical Sāṃkhya considers that the *vāsanās* are produced in a beginningless way, through *karma*, through an endless series of births and rebirths, whereas the Pañcarātra holds that different *puruṣas* are originally associated with different *vāsanās* according to the will of God. Unlike the account of the classical Sāṃkhya, where the *vāsanās* are regarded as a part of *prakṛti* as *buddhi* or *citta*, in this it is an original extraneous impurity of the *puruṣas*. It is probable, however, that this account of *vāsanās* and their original association with the *puruṣas* through the will of God did not form any part of the philosophy of Kapila's *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra*, but was a supplementary doctrine introduced by the author of the *Ahīrbudhnya*, as it is not mentioned in the seventh chapter of the work, which is definitely devoted to the account of Sāṃkhya.

The Sāṃkhya thought described in the *Gītā* has been explained in the second volume of the present work, and it will be seen that, though the *Gītā* account is unsystematic and nebulous, with significant details missing, it is essentially theistic and intimately associated with this *Ahīrbudhnya* account of Kapila Sāṃkhya; and as such is fundamentally different from the classical Sāṃkhya of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*.

In Chapter 22 of the 11th book of the *Bhāgavatā* a reference is made to various schools of Sāṃkhya admitting different categories of being or evolutes¹. Thus some Sāṃkhyists admitted nine categories, some eleven, some five, some twenty-six, some twenty-five, some seven, some six, some four, some seventeen, some sixteen and some thirteen. Uddhava requested Lord Kṛṣṇa to reconcile these diverse opposing views. In reply Lord Kṛṣṇa said that the different enumeration of the categories is due to the varying kinds of subsumption of the lower categories into the higher or by the omission of the higher ones, i.e. by ignoring some of the effect-entities (as

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*kati tattvāni viśveśa saṃkhyātāny ṛṣibhiḥ prabho
nava-ekādaśa-pañca-trīṇy atha tvam iha śuśrūma
kecit ṣaḍvīṃśatiṃ prāhur apare pañcaviṃśatiṃ
saptaīke nava-ṣaṭ kecit catvāry ekādaśāpare
kecit saptaśa prāhuḥ ṣoḍaśaīke trayodaśa. Śloka 1, 2.*

being already contained in the cause) or by ignoring some of the successive causal entities (as being present in the effect)¹. Thus, there may be systems of Sāṃkhya schools where the *tanmātras* are not counted or where the gross elements are not counted as categories. The explanation in all such cases is to be found in the principle that some thinkers did not wish to count the *tanmātras*, as they are already contained in the gross elements (*ghaṭe mṛdvat*); whereas others did not count the gross elements, as these were but evolutes in the *tanmātras* (*mṛdi ghaṭavat*). But there are differences of opinion not only as regards the evolutionary categories of *prakṛti*, but also as regards the souls or the *puruṣas* and God. Thus there are twenty-four evolutionary categories (including *prakṛti*); *puruṣa* is counted as the twenty-fifth category, and according to the theistic Sāṃkhya God or Īśvara is counted as the twenty-sixth. It may be objected that the above principle of reconciliation of the diverse counting of categories by subsuming the effect under the cause, or by ignoring the former, cannot apply here. The theistic Sāṃkhya admits Īśvara on the ground that there must be some being who should communicate self-knowledge to individual souls, as they cannot, by themselves, attain it. If on such a view the theistic school of twenty-six categories is regarded as valid, the other school of twenty-five categories becomes irreconcilable. To this the reply is that there is no intrinsic difference in the nature of *puruṣa* and Īśvara, as they are both of the nature of pure consciousness. The objection that even on the above supposition the self-knowledge communicated by Īśvara has to be counted as a separate category is invalid, for self-knowledge, being knowledge, is only the heightening of the *sattva* quality of the *prakṛti* and as such falls within *prakṛti* itself. Knowledge is not a quality of the *puruṣa*, but of the *prakṛti*. The state of equilibrium in which the *guṇas* are not specifically manifested is called *prakṛti*. An upsetting of the equilibrium leads to the manifestation of the *guṇas*, which have, therefore, to be regarded as attributes of the *prakṛti*. The *puruṣa*, not being an agent, cannot possess knowledge as an attribute of its own. So, all activity being due to *rajas* and all ignorance being due to *tamas*, activity and ignorance are also to be regarded as con-

¹ *anupraveśaṃ darśayati ekasminnāpiti pūrvarmin kāraṇabhūte tattve sūkṣma-rūpeṇa praviṣṭāni mṛdi ghaṭavat. aparasmīn kārya-tattve kāraṇa-tattvāni amagatatvena praviṣṭāni ghaṭe mṛdvat.* Śrīdhara's commentary on sloka 8.

stituents of *prakṛti*. Time (*kāla*) also is to be identified as God, because it is by the agency of God that the *guṇas* combine, that He is regarded as the cause of the combination of the *guṇas*. The view which regards *kāla* as the cause of the combination of the *guṇas* is grounded on this fact, and it is for that reason that in the scriptures *kāla* has been regarded as the name of *Īśvara*. As everything proceeds from the category of *mahat*, that itself is called *svabhāva* or nature. Thus the two apparently conflicting views that *kāla* and *svabhāva* are to be regarded as the ultimate causes of the world may well be reconciled with the Sāṃkhya according to the above interpretation.

The school of Sāṃkhya which reckons nine categories counts merely *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra* and the five elements. Those who reckon eleven count the five cognitive and conative senses and the *manas* only. Those who reckon five categories count the five sense objects only. Those who reckon seven count the five sense-objects, the soul and God. Those who reckon six include within them the five sense-objects and the *puruṣa*. There are others, however, who regard earth, water, fire and the soul as four categories. Others take the five sense-objects, the eleven sense-organs and the *puruṣa* as categories. By excluding *manas* some hold that there are only sixteen categories. Others take the five sense-objects, the five cognitive senses, *manas*, soul and God, and thus arrive at the thirteen categories. Others take the five sense-objects, the five cognitive senses and the sense as the eleven categories. Others count *prakṛti*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, the five *tanmātras* and the *puruṣa* as the nine categories.

It is regrettable that apart from a reference to the above schools of Sāṃkhya and the attempts at their reconciliation found in the *Bhāgavata*, it is not possible to trace these doctrines to the original works, which must have long preceded the period of the composition of the *Bhāgavata*. The *Bhāgavata* is interested in the theistic Sāṃkhya doctrine, as has already been shown, and attempts to reconcile the conflicting schools of Sāṃkhya as being substantially one school of thought. It further holds that the *prakṛti* and its manifestations are produced through the operation of the diverse power of the *māyā* of *Īśvara*. At the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) God remains in absolute identity with Himself, and the *guṇas*, which are the various manifestations of His *māyā* power, remain in

equilibrium—a state in which all His energies are sleeping as it were. By His own inherent energy He breaks the equilibrium of His sleeping energy and sets Himself to the work of the creation—the *prakṛti* with its evolutes—and thereby associates them with *jīvas*, which are merely His parts, and which thus are deluding the dualistic experience of the world, which they enjoy and for which they suffer; and He also shows them the right way by instructing them through the Vedas¹. The self in its transcendent nature is pure experience and as such is devoid of and is absolutely un-associated with any kind of objective form. The association of objectivity and of content is as illusory as creations in dreams, and must be regarded as products of *māyā*².

Puruṣa as pure experience (*anubhava-svarūpa*) is to be differentiated and comprehended as different from passing mental states, as the content of the waking, dream and dreamless stages by the method of agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyatireka*). For, through the contents of experience in the various constituents involved in the mental states, that which remains constant, like a thread in a garland of pearls, is the pure experiencer, the self. Self is therefore to be regarded as different from the contents of the mental states which it illuminates³.

- ¹ *sa vai kilāyaṃ puruṣaḥ purātano
ya eka āśīd aviśeṣa ātmani
agre guṇebhyo jagad-ātmanīśvare
nimilitātman niśi supta-śaktiṣu
sa eva bhūyo nijavīrya-choditam
sva-jīva-māyāṃ prakṛtiṃ sisṛkṣatīm
anāma-rūpātmani rūpa-nāmāni
vidhīsamāno'nusasāra śāstrakṛt.*

Bhāgavata, I. 10. 21, 22.

- ² *ātma-māyāṃ ṛte rājan parasyānubhavātmanah
na ghaṭetārthasambandhaḥ swapnadrāṣṭur ivāñjasā.*

Ibid. II. 9. 1.

Illusion or *māyā* is defined as that which manifests non-existent objects but is not manifested itself.

*ṛte'rthaṃ yat praṭhyeta na praṭhyeta cātmani
tad vidyād ātmano māyāṃ yathābhāso tathā tamaḥ.*

Ibid. II. 9. 33.

- ³ *anvaya-vyatirekeṇa vivekena satātmanā
sarga-sthāna-samāmnāyair vimṛśadbhir asatvaraiḥ
budher jāgaranaṃ swapnaḥ suṣuptir iti vṛttayaḥ
tā yenaivānubhūyante so'dhyakṣaḥ puruṣaḥ paraḥ.*

Ibid. VII. 7. 24, 25.

Eschatology.

In the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, III. 32, it is held that those who perform sacrifices and make offerings to gods and forefathers pass after death to the lunar world, from which they return to earth again. Those, however, who follow their own duties and surrender all their actions to gods, pure in mind and heart and unattached to worldly things, pass after death to the solar sphere and thence to the Universal Being Who is the cause of the world. Those, however, who are obsessed with the notion of duality pass into the nature of qualified Brahman, and are then born again in the world in accordance with their past deeds. Those again who lead an ordinary life of desires and make offerings to their forefathers have first to go by the southern way of smoky path to the land of the forefathers, and are again born in the line of their own progenies.

In XI. 22. 37, however, we find a more rational view. It is said there that the *manas* of men is permeated by their deeds and their causes, and it is this *manas* that passes from one body to another. The *ātman*, the soul, follows this *manas*. Śrīdhara, the well-known commentator on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, regards *manas* here as the *liṅga-śarīra*, and holds that the self follows the *manas* infested by egoism. The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* further holds that through the destiny of *karma* the *manas* meditates over the things seen and heard and gradually loses its memory with regard to them. This *manas* entering into another body thus ceases to remember all the experiences of the previous bodies and thus death may be defined as absolute forgetfulness (*mṛtyuratyanta-vismṛtiḥ*, XI. 22. 39). Birth is regarded as the acceptance of new experiences. Śrīdhara points out that this takes place with the cessation of the functioning of egoism with reference to the experiences of past bodies and the extension of the function of egoism with reference to the experiences of the new body. Just as one does not remember one's dreams, so one ceases to remember one's past experiences, and this is conditioned by death. At birth the self that was always existent appears to be born anew. By identifying the self with the body one divides one's experiences as internal and external. As a matter of fact the body is being continually destroyed and generated, but such changes, being of a subtle nature, are overlooked. Just as

there cannot be the same flame in two moments, or one flowing river in two different moments, so the body also is different in two different moments, though on account of our ignorance we suppose that the same body is passing through various stages and conditions. But in reality no one is born and no one dies through the agency of *karma*. It is all a panorama of illusions, just as the fire, as heat, exists eternally and yet appears to be burning in association with logs of wood. All the phenomena of birth, infancy, youth, old age and death as different stages of the body are but mere fancies. They are but stages of primal matter, the *prakṛti*, which are regarded through illusion as different stages of our life. One notices the death of one's father and the birth of a son and so may speak of the destruction and generation of bodies, but no one experiences that the experiencer himself undergoes birth and death. The self thus is entirely different from the body. It is only through inability to distinguish properly between the two that one becomes attached to sense-objects and seems to pass through the cycle of birth and death. Just as a man seeing another man dance or sing imitates his action, so does the *puruṣa*, which has no movement of itself, seem to imitate the qualities of *buddhi* in the operation of these movements. Again, just as when one looks at the images of trees in flowing water, the trees themselves seem to be many, so does the self regard itself as implicated in the movement of the *prakṛti*. This gives us the world-experience and the experience of the cycles of birth and death, though none of them really exists. Thus we see that the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* agrees with the general Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta view regarding birth and death. It no doubt accepts the ordinary view of the Upaniṣads that a man, like a caterpillar, does not leave one body without accepting another at the same time (*Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, x. 1. 38-44); but at the same time it holds that such birth and re-birth are due to one's own illusion or *māyā*.

CHAPTER XXV

MADHVA AND HIS SCHOOL

Madhva's Life.

BHANDARKAR in *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems* says that in the *Mahābhārata-tātparyā-nirṇaya*, Madhva has given the date of his birth as *Kali* 4300. The *Kali* age, according to Bhāskarācārya, begins with the year 3101 B.C. The date of Madhva's birth would thus be A.D. 1199 or 1121 *śaka*. Bhandarkar says that, as some use the current year of an era and some the past, the *śaka* era 1121 may be regarded as equivalent to 1119. But the present writer has not been able to discover it in the only printed edition of the text of *Mahābhārata-tātparyā-nirṇaya* (1833 *śaka*, published by T. R. Kṛṣṇācārya). Bhandarkar, however, approaches the problem by another path also. He says that the list preserved in several of the Maṭhas gives the date of Madhva as *śaka* 1119, and, as Madhva lived for 79 years, the date of his birth was 1040 *śaka*. Bhandarkar, however, regards *śaka* 1119 as the date of his birth, and not of his death as given in the Maṭha list. He says that the inscription in the Kūrmeśvara temple at Śrīkūrma is in a Tāluka of the Ganjam district in which Narahari-tīrtha is represented to have constructed a temple and placed in it an idol of Narasiṃha dated *śaka* 1203 (*Epigraphica Indica*, Vol. VI, p. 260). The first person therein mentioned is Puruṣottama-tīrtha, who is the same as Acyutaprekṣa, then his pupil Ānanda-tīrtha, then Narahari-tīrtha, the pupil of Ānanda-tīrtha. Narahari-tīrtha was probably the same as Narasiṃha, the ruler of the Tāluk mentioned above, from *śaka* 1191 to 1225. He is mentioned in inscriptions at Śrīkūrman bearing the date *śaka* 1215, which is represented as the eighteenth year of the king's reign. He was Narasiṃha II, who was panegyricized in the *Ekāvalī*. From other inscriptions we get Narahari's date as between 1186 and 1212 *śaka*. These records confirm the tradition that Narahari-tīrtha was sent to Orissa by Ānanda-tīrtha. Now Narahari-tīrtha's active period ranged between 1186 to 1215. His teacher Madhva could not have died in *śaka* 1119, i.e. sixty-seven years before him. Bhandarkar therefore takes 1119 (as mentioned in the Maṭha list)

as the date of the birth of Madhva, not as the date of his death. This date of Madhva's birth, *śaka* 1119 or A.D. 1197, has been accepted by Grierson and Krisnasvami Aiyar, and has not so far been challenged.

We have no authentic information about the life of Madhva. All that we can know of him has to be culled from the legendary and semi-mythical lives of Madhva, called the *Madhva-vijaya*, and the *Maṇi-maṇjarī* of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Trivikrama, who was an actual disciple of Madhva. Some information can also be gathered from the adoration hymn of Trivikrama Paṇḍita. Madhva seems to have been a born enemy of Śaṅkara. In the *Maṇi-maṇjarī*, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa gives a fanciful story of a demon, Maṇimat, who interpreted the Vedānta. Maṇimat was born as a widow's bastard, and therefore he was called Śaṅkara; with the blessing of Śiva he mastered the *śāstras* at Saurāṣṭra, invented the doctrine of *sūrya-mārga*, and was welcomed by persons of demoralized temperament. He really taught Buddhism under the cloak of Vedānta. He regarded Brahman as identified with Sūrya. He seduced the wife of his Brahmin host, and used to make converts by his magic arts. When he died, he asked his disciples to kill Satyaprajña, the true teacher of the Vedānta; the followers of Śaṅkara were tyrannical people who burnt down monasteries, destroyed cattle and killed women and children. They converted Prajñā-tīrtha, their chief opponent, by force. The disciples of Prajñā-tīrtha, however, were secretly attached to the true Vedāntic doctrine, and they made one of their disciples thoroughly learned in the Vedic scriptures. Acyutaprekṣa, the teacher of Madhva, was a disciple of this true type of teachers, who originated from Satyaprajña, the true Vedic teacher, contemporary with Śaṅkara.

Madhva was an incarnation of Vāyu for the purpose of destroying the false doctrines of Śaṅkara, which were more like the doctrines of the Lokāyatas, Jainas and Pāsupatas, but were more obnoxious and injurious.

Madhva was the son of Madhyageha Bhaṭṭa, who lived in the city of Rajatapīṭha, near Udipi, which is about 40 miles west of Śrīṅgeri, where there was a celebrated *maṭha* of Śaṅkara. Udipi is even now the chief centre of Madhivism in South Kanara. The ancient name of the country, which now comprises Dharwar, the North and the South Kanara, and the western part of the State of Mysore, was Tuluva (modern Tulu), which is mostly inhabited

by the Madhvas. Grierson, writing in 1915, says that there are about 70,000 Madhvas in the locality. Elsewhere they are more distributed. It must, however, be noted that from the South of Hyderabad to Mangalore, that is, the whole of the North and the South Kanara, may also be regarded as the most important centre of Vīra-Śaivism, which will be dealt with in the fifth volume of the present work. The village of Rajatapīṭha, where Madhva was born, may probably be identified with the modern Kalyāṇapura. He was a disciple of Acyutaprekṣa, and received the name of Pūrṇaprajña at the time of initiation and later on another name, Ānanda-tīrtha; he is known by both these names. He at first studied the views of Śaṅkara, but soon developed his own system of thought, which was directly opposed to that of Śaṅkara. He refuted twenty-one *Bhāṣyas* which were written by other teachers who preceded him; and Śeṣa, the disciple of Chalāri-nṛsiṃhācārya, the commentator on the *Madhva-vijaya* of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, enumerates the designations of these commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra* as follows; Bhāratīvijaya; Saṃvidānanda; Brahmaghoṣa; Śatānanda; Vāgbhaṭa; Vijaya; Rudra Bhaṭṭa; Vāmana; Yādavaprakāśa; Rāmānuja; Bhartṛprapañca; Draviḍa; Brahmadatta; Bhāskara; Piśāca; Vṛttikāra; Vijaya Bhaṭṭa; Viṣṇukrānta; Vādīndra; Mādhavadeśaka; Śaṅkara. Even in Rajatapīṭhapura he once defeated a great scholar of the Śaṅkara school who came to visit Madhva's teacher Acyutaprekṣa. He then went to the South with Acyutaprekṣa and arrived at the city of Viṣṇumaṅgala¹. From here he went southwards and arrived at Anantapura (modern Trivandrum). Here he had a long fight with the Śaṅkarites of the Śṛṅgeri monastery. Thence he proceeded to Dhanuṣkoṭi and Rāmeśvaram, and offered his adoration to Viṣṇu. He defeated on the way there many opponents and stayed in Rāmeśvaram for four months, after which he came back to Udipi. Having thus established himself in the South as a leader of a new faith, Madhva started on a tour to North India, and, crossing the Ganges, went to Hardwar, and thence to Badarikā, where he met Vyāsa. He was here asked by Vyāsa to write a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* repudiating the false *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. He then returned to Udipi, converting many Śaṅkarites on the way, such as Śobhana Bhaṭṭa and others residing near the banks of the Godāvārī². He at last converted Acyutaprekṣa to his own doctrines. In the

¹ *Madhva-vijaya*, v. 30.

² *Ibid.* ix. 17.

eleventh and the thirteenth chapters of the *Madhva-vijaya* we read the story of the persecution of Madhva by Padma-tīrtha, the head of the Śrīgeri monastery, who tried his best to obstruct the progress of the new faith initiated by Madhva and even stole away Madhva's books, which were, however, returned to him through the intercession of the local Prince Jayasīmha of Viṣṇumaṅgala; the faith continued to grow, and Trivirama Paṇḍita, the father of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, the author of *Maṇi-mañjarī* and *Madhva-vijaya*, and many other important persons were converted to the Madhva faith. In his last years Madhva again made a pilgrimage to the North and is said to have rejoined Vyāsa, and to be still staying with him. He is said to have lived for seventy-nine years and probably died in 1198 śaka or A.D. 1276. He was known by various names, such as Pūrṇaprajña, Ānanda-tīrtha, Nandī-tīrtha and Vāsudeva¹.

The treatment of the philosophy of Madhva which is to follow was written in 1930; and so the present writer had no opportunity of diving into Mr Śarmā's excellent work which appeared some time ago, when the manuscript of the present work was ready for the Press. Padmanābhasura's *Madhva-siddhānta-sāra* contains a treatment of Madhva's doctrines in an epitomized form. Madhva wrote thirty-seven works. These are enumerated below²;

- (1) *The Ṛg-bhāṣya* a commentary to the *Ṛg-veda*, 1. 1-40;
- (2) *The Krama-nirṇaya*, a discussion on the proper reading and

¹ A few works in English have appeared on Madhva. The earliest accounts are contained in "Account of the Madhva Gooroos" collected by Major MacKenzie, 24 August 1800, printed on pp. 33 ff. of the "Characters" in the *Asiatic Annual Register*, 1804 (London, 1806); H. H. Wilson's "Sketch of the religious sects of the Hindus," reprinted from Vols. xvi and xvii of *Asiatic Researches*, London, 1861, 1, pp. 139 ff.; Krishnaswami Aiyar's *Śrī Madhva and Madhvaism*, Madras; R. G. Bhandarkar's *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*; *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. xxii, "Dharwar," Bombay, 1884; G. Venkoba Rao's "A sketch of the History of the Madhva Āchāryas," beginning in *Indian Antiquary*, xliii (1914), and C. M. Padmanābhacārya's *Life of Madhvācārya*. S. Subba Rao has a complete translation of the commentary of Śrī Madhvācārya on the *Brahma-sūtra* and a translation in English of the *Bhagavad-gītā* with the commentary according to Śrī Madhvācārya's *Bhāṣya*. The preface of this *Bhagavad-gītā* contains an account of Madhva's life from an orthodox point of view. There is also P. Ramchandra Roo's *The Brahma Sutras*, translated literally according to the commentary of Śrī Madhvācārya (Sanskrit, Kumbakonam, 1902); G. A. Grierson has a very interesting article on Madhva in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. viii; Mr Nāgarāja Śarmā has recently published a recondite monograph on the philosophy of Madhva.

² See Helmuth von Glasenapp's *Madhvas Philosophie des Viṣṇu-Glaubens*, p. 13.

order of the *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*, IV. 1-4, *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka*, IV. 1, and the Vedic hymns cited therein; (3) The *Aitareya-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (4) The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (5) *Chāndogya-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (6) *Taittirīya-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (7) *Īśāvāsyā-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (8) *Kāṭhaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (9) *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (10) *Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (11) *Praśnopaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (12) *Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya*; (13) *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya*; (14) *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya*; (15) *Bhagavad-gītā-tātparya-nirṇaya*; (16) *Bhāgavata-tātparya-nirṇaya*; (17) *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*; (18) *Brahma-sūtrānubhāṣya*; (19) *Brahma-sūtrānuvyākhyāna*; (20) *Brahma-sūtrānuvyākhyāna-nirṇaya*; (21) *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa*; (22) *Kathā-lakṣaṇa*; (23) *Upādhi-khaṇḍana*; (24) *Māyāvāda-khaṇḍana*; (25) *Prapañca-mithyātānumāna-khaṇḍana*; (26) *Tattvodyota*; (27) *Tattva-viveka*; (28) *Tattva-saṃkhyāna*; (29) *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya*; (30) *Tantra-sāra-saṃgraha*; (31) *Kṛṣṇā-mṛta-mahārṇava*; (32) *Yati-praṇava-kalpa*; (33) *Sadacāra-smṛti*; (34) *Jayantī-nirṇaya* or the *Jayantī-kalpa*; (35) *Yamaka-bhārata*; (36) *Nṛsiṃha-nakha-stotra*; (37) *Dvādaśa-stotra*.

In the list given in the *Grantha-mālikā-stotra* of Jaya-tīrtha we have *Sanmyāsa-paddhati* instead of *Brahma-sūtrānuvyākhyānyāya-nirṇaya*. The *Catalogus Catalogorum* of Aufrecht refers to the report on the search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the year 1882-3 by R. G. Bhandarkar, and enumerates a number of other books which are not mentioned in the *Grantha-mālikā-stotra*. These are as follows:

Ātmajñāna-pradeśa-ṭikā, *Ātmopadeśa-ṭikā*, *Ārya-stotra*, *Upadeśasahasra-ṭikā*, *Upaniṣat-prasthāna*, *Aitareyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Kāṭhakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Kauṣītakyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Khapuṣpa-ṭikā*, *Guru-stuṭi*, *Govindabhāṣya-pīṭhaka*, *Govindāṣṭaka-ṭikā*, *Gauḍapāḍīya-bhāṣya-ṭikā*, *Chāndogyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Taittirīya-śruti-vārttika-ṭikā*, *Tripuṭīprakaraṇa-ṭikā*, *Nārāyaṇopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Nyāya-vivaraṇa*, *Pañcikaṇa-prakriyā-vivaraṇa*, *Praśnopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Bṛhajjābālopaniṣad-bhāṣya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārttika-ṭikā*, *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-ṭikā*, *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-nirṇaya*, *Brahmānanda*, *Bhakti-rasāyana*, *Bhagavad-gītā-prasthāna*, *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya-vivecana*, *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī*, *Mitabhāṣiṇī*, *Rāmottara-tāpanīya-bhāṣya*, *Vākyasudhā-ṭikā*, *Viṣṇusaha-*

sranāma-bhāṣya, Vedānta-vārttika, Śaṅkara-vijaya, Śaṅkarācārya-avatāra-kathā, Śataśloka-ṭikā, Saṃhitopaniṣad-bhāṣya, Saṃhitopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭippanī, Śattattva, Sadācāra-stuti-stotra, Smṛti-vivaraṇa, Smṛti-sāra-samuccaya, Svarūpa-nirṇaya-ṭikā, Harimīde-stotra-ṭikā.

Succession List of Madhva Gurus.

Bhandarkar in his search for Sanskrit MSS. in 1882-3 gives the names of teachers with the dates of their deaths. Thus Ānanda-tīrtha or Madhva was succeeded by Padmanābha-tīrtha 1126 *śaka*, and he by Narahari-tīrtha 1135 *śaka*; Mādhava-tīrtha 1152; Akṣobhya-tīrtha 1169; Jaya-tīrtha 1190; Vidyādhirāja-tīrtha 1254; Kavīndra-tīrtha 1261; Vāgīśa-tīrtha 1265; Rāmachandra-tīrtha 1298; Vidyānidhi-tīrtha 1306; Raghunātha-tīrtha 1364; Raghuvarya-tīrtha 1419; Raghūttama-tīrtha 1457; Vedavyāsa-tīrtha 1481; Vidyādhīśa-tīrtha 1493; Vedanidhi-tīrtha 1497; Satyavrata-tīrtha 1560; Satyanidhi-tīrtha 1582; Satyanātha-tīrtha 1595; Satyābhinava-tīrtha 1628; Satyapūrṇa-tīrtha 1648; Satyavijaya-tīrtha 1661; Satyapriya-tīrtha 1666; Satyabodha-tīrtha 1705; Satyasannidhāna-tīrtha 1716; Satyavara-tīrtha 1719; Satyadhāma-tīrtha 1752; Satyasāra-tīrtha 1763; Satyaparāyaṇa-tīrtha 1785; Satyakāma-tīrtha 1793; Satyeṣṭi-tīrtha 1794; Satyaparāyaṇa-tīrtha 1801; Satyavit-tīrtha was living in 1882, when the *Search for Sanskrit MSS.* was being written. Thus we have a list of thirty-five Gurus, including Madhva, from 1198 *śaka* (the year of the death of Madhva) to Satyavit-tīrtha, who was living in *śaka* 1804 or A.D. 1882. This list was drawn up in consonance with the two lists procured at Belgaum and Poona. It is largely at variance with the list given in the introduction to the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* by Baladeva. Baladeva gives the list as follows:

Madhva, Padmanābha, Nṛhari, Mādhava, Akṣobhya, Jaya-tīrtha, Jñānasīmha, Dayānidhi, Vidyānidhi, Rājendra, Jayadharma, Puruṣottama-tīrtha, Brahmāṇḍa-tīrtha, Vyāsa-tīrtha, Lakṣmīpati, Mādhavendra, Īśvara. Īśvara was a teacher of Caitanya. We see that the list given by Baladeva is right as far as Jaya-tīrtha; but after Jaya-tīrtha the list given by Baladeva is in total discrepancy with the two lists from the Madhva Maṭhas in Belgaum and Poona. Under the circumstances we are unable to accept the list of Gurus given by Baladeva, which has many other discrepancies into details whereof we need not enter.

Important Madhva Works.

The *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya*. This work of Madhva consists of thirty-two chapters and is written in verse. In the first chapter Madhva begins with a very brief summary of his views. He says there that the four Vedas, the *Pañcarātras*, the *Mahābhārata*, the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, and the *Brahma-sūtras* are the only authoritative scriptural texts, and that anything that contradicts them is to be regarded as invalid. The *Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas*, being essentially nothing more than an elaboration of the *Pañcarātras*, should also be regarded as valid scriptures. The *smṛti* literature of Manu and others is valid in so far as it does not come into conflict with the teachings of the Vedas, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Pañcarātras* and the *Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas*¹. Other *śāstras* such as those of Buddhism were made by Viṣṇu to confuse the *Asuras*, and Śiva also produced the *Śaiva Śāstra* for the same object at the command of Viṣṇu. All the *śāstras* that speak of the unity of the self with Brahman either in the present life or at liberation are false. Viṣṇu is the true Lord, and is also called Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva. The process of the world is real and is always associated with five-fold differences, viz. that between the self and God, between the selves themselves, between matter and God, between matter and matter, and between matter and self². It is only the gods and the best men that may attain salvation through knowledge and grace of God; ordinary men pass through cycles of births and rebirths, and the worst are cursed in hell. Neither the demons nor those who are eternally liberated have to go through a cycle of birth and rebirth. The demons cannot

¹ *ṛg-ādayaś catvāraḥ pañca-rātram ca bhārataṃ
mūla-rāmāyaṇam Brahma-sūtram mānaṃ svataḥ smṛtaṃ.
Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya*, I. 30.
*a-viruddham tu yat tv asya pramāṇam tac ca nānyathā
etaḍ-viruddham yat tu syān na tan mānaṃ kathañcana
vaiṣṇavāni purāṇāni pañcarātrātmakatvataḥ
pramāṇāny evaṃ manvādyaḥ smṛtayo'py amukūlataḥ.*

Ibid. I. 31-32.

² *jagat-pravāhaḥ satyo'yaṃ pañca-bheda-samanvitaḥ
jīveṣayor bhidā caiva jīva-bhedaḥ paras-param
jaḍeṣayor jaḍānāṃ ca jaḍa-jīva-bhidā tathā
pañca bheda ime nityāḥ sarvāvasthāsu nityaśaḥ
muktānāṃ ca na hīyante tāratamyaṃ ca sarvadā.*

Ibid. I. 69-71.

under any circumstances attain salvation. The theory of eternal damnation is thus found only in Madhva, and in no other system of Indian philosophy. Men can attain salvation when they worship God as being associated with all good qualities and as being blissful and omniscient. Even in the state of liberation there are individual differences between the selves, and the perfect and desireless (*niṣkāma*) worship of God is the only means of salvation. It is only through devotion (*bhakti*) that there can be liberation; even the emancipated enjoy the eternal flow of pleasure through devotion; *bhakti*, or devotion, is here defined as an affection with the full consciousness of the greatness of the object of devotion¹, and it is regarded as the universal solvent. Even the performance of all religious duties cannot save a man from hell, but *bhakti* can save a man even if he commits the worst sin. Without *bhakti* even the best religious performances turn into sin, and with *bhakti* even the worst sins do not affect a man. God is pleased only with *bhakti* and nothing else, and He alone can give salvation.

In the second chapter Madhva says that in the *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya* he tries to summarize the essential teachings of the *Mahābhārata*, the text of which in his time had become thoroughly corrupt; and that, difficult as the *Mahābhārata* itself is, it had become still more difficult to get to the root of it from these corrupt texts. He further says that in order to arrive at the correct reading he had procured the text of the *Mahābhārata* from various countries and that it is only by comparison of these different texts that he made his attempt to formulate its essential teachings in consonance with the teachings of other *śāstras* and the Vedas². According to Madhva the *Mahābhārata* is an allegory, which shows a struggle between good and evil; the good representing the Pāṇḍavas, and the evil representing the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra. The object of the *Mahābhārata* is to show the greatness of Viṣṇu. Madhva does not follow the order of the story as given in the *Mahābhārata*, he omits most of the incidental episodes, and supplements the story with others culled from other *Purāṇas* and

¹ *bhaktiyarthāny akhilāny eva bhaktir mokṣāya kevalā
muktānam api bhaktir hi nityānanda-sva-rūpiṇi
jñāna-pūrva-para-sneho nityo bhaktir itīryate.*

² *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya*, I. 106-7.
*śāstrāntarāṇi sañjānan vedāṁś cāśya prasādāt
deśe deśe tathā granthān dṛṣṭvā caiva prthagvidhān. Ibid. II. 7.*

the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Thus he gives a summary of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and also the story of Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* as being a part of the *Mahābhārata*. In his treatment of the general story also he insists on the super-excellence of Bhīma and Kṛṣṇa.

There are several commentaries on this work of Madhva, viz., that by Janārdana Bhaṭṭa, called the *Padārtha-dīpikā*; by Varadarāja, called the *Mahāsubodhinī* or the *Prakāśa*; by Vādirājasvāmī; by Viṭṭhalācārya-sūnu; by Vyāsa-tīrtha; the *Durghaṭārthaprakāśikā*, by Satyābhinava Yati: the *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya-vyākhyā* (called also the *Padārthadīpikā*); the *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya-vyākhyā* (called also *Bhāvacandrikā*), by Śrīnivāsa; and the *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇayānukramaṇikā*, which is a small work giving a general summary of the work in verse. There were also other commentaries by Kṛṣṇācārya, Lakṣmaṇa Siṃha and Jayakhaṇḍin Siṃha.

In the *Bhāgavata-tātparya-nirṇaya* Madhva selects some of the important verses from the twelve *skandhas* of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, and adds short annotations with the selected verses from the selected chapters of each of the *skandhas*. These are not continuous, and many of the chapters are sometimes dropped altogether; they are also brief, and made in such a manner that his own dualistic view may appear to be the right interpretation of the *Bhāgavata*. He sometimes supports his views by reference to the other *Purāṇas*, and in conclusion he gives a short summary of his view as representing the true view of the *Bhāgavata*. The *Bhāgavata-tātparya-nirṇaya* is commented upon by various writers; some of the commentaries are *Bhāgavata-tātparya-vyākhyā* (called also *Tātparya-bodhinī*), *Bhāgavata-tātparya-nirṇaya-vyākhyā-vivarana*, *Bhāgavata-tātparya-nirṇaya-vyākhyā-prabodhinī*, *Bhāgavata-tātparya-nirṇaya-vyākhyā-padya-ratnāvalī*, *Bhāgavata-tātparya-nirṇaya-vyākhyā-prakāśa*, by Śrīnivāsa (a brief work in prose), and *Bhāgavata-tātparya-nirṇaya-ṭīkā*, by Jadupati, Chalāri and Veda-garbhanārāyaṇācārya.

The *Gītā-tātparya* of Madhva is a work in prose and verse, giving a summary of the essence of the *Gītā* as understood by Madhva. It is a continuous summary of all the eighteen chapters of the *Gītā* in serial order. The summary, however, often quotes verses from the *Gītā*, which, however, are sometimes interrupted by small prose texts serving as links, sometimes of an explanatory

nature, sometimes referring to *purāṇic* and other texts in support of Madhva's interpretations, and sometimes introducing the context and the purpose of the verses of the *Gītā*—they sometimes introduce also discussions in prose against the monistic interpretation of the *Gītā* by Śaṅkara. The *Tātparya*, a work of about 1450 *granthas*, is commented upon by the famous Madhva author Jayatīrtha; the commentary is called *Bhagavad-gītā-tātparya-nirṇaya-vyākhyā* or *Nyāya-dīpikā*. This *Nyāya-dīpikā* was commented upon by Viṭṭhala-suta-śrīnivāsācārya or Tāmraparṇī-śrīnivāsācārya in a work called *Tātparya-dīpikā-vyākhyā-nyāya-dīpa-kiraṇāvalī*. The *Bhagavadgītā-tātparya* had at least two other commentaries, the *Tātparya-ṭippanī*, by Padmanābha-tīrtha, and the *Nyāya-dīpa-bhāva-prakāśa*, by Satyaprajña-bhikṣu. In addition to this Madhva wrote also a work styled *Gītā-bhāṣya*, in which he takes up the important *ślokas*, chapter by chapter, and in the course of commenting on them discusses many important problems of a controversial nature. Thus, following Kumārila, he says that it is because the *śāstra* is *aparījñeya* (of transcendent origin) that there is an absolute validity of the *śāstras*. Regarding the performance of *karmas* he says that they are to be performed because of the injunctions of the *śāstras*, without any desire for fruit. The only desires that should not be abandoned are for greater knowledge and a greater rise of *bhakti*; even if the *karmas* do not produce any fruit, they will at least produce the satisfaction of the Lord, because in following the injunctions of the *śāstras* the individual has obeyed the commands of God. He also controverts the Śaṅkara-view of monism, and says that, if God reflects Himself in men, the reflection cannot be identified with the original. The so-called *upādhi* or condition is supposed to make the difference between the Brahman and the individual. It is not also correct to say that, as water mixes with water, so also the individual at the time of salvation meets with God and there is no difference between them; for even when water mixes with water, there is difference, which explains the greater accumulation of water. So, in the state of salvation, the individual only comes closer to God, but never loses his personality. His state of *mokṣa* is said to be the most desirable because here one is divested of all sorrowful experiences, and has nothing to desire for oneself. It is in accordance with the difference in personality of different individuals; the state of

salvation differs with each person. The common element in the state of salvation is the fact that no emancipated person has to suffer any painful experience. Madhva also takes great pains to show that Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu is the greatest or the highest Lord. In dealing with the third chapter he says that in the beginningless world even one *karma* may lead to many births and the accumulated store of *karmas* could never have yielded their full fruits to any person ; therefore, even if one does not do any *karma*, he cannot escape the fruits which are in store for him as the result of his past *karmas*; consequently no good can be attained by the non-performance of *karma*. It is only the *karma* performed without any motive or desire that associates with knowledge and leads to salvation ; so the non-performance of *karma* can never lead to salvation by itself. Madhva repudiates the idea that salvation can be attained by death in holy places, as the latter can only be attained by knowledge of Brahman. One is forced to perform the *karmas* by the force of one's internal *saṃskāras* or sub-conscious tendencies. It is unnecessary to show in further detail that in this way Madhva interprets the *Gītā* in support of his own doctrines; and he also often tries to show that the view propounded by him is in consonance with the teachings of other *Purāṇas* and the Upaniṣads. There is a number of works on Madhva's interpretation of the *Gītā*: *Gītārtha-saṃgraha* by Rāghavendra, *Gītā-vivṛti* by Rāghavendra Yati, *Gītā-vivṛti* by Vidyādhiraṇḍa Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, and *Prameya-dīpikā* by Jaya-tīrtha, which has a further commentary on it, called *Bhāva-prakāśa*. Madhva wrote another commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*. It is a small work of about 2500 *granthas*, and the commentary is brief and suggestive¹. He wrote also another work, the *Anubhāṣya*, which is a brief summary of the main contents and purport of the *Brahma-sūtra*. This has also a number of commentaries, by Jaya-tīrtha, Ananta Bhaṭṭa, Chalāri-nṛsiṃha, Rāghavendra-tīrtha and Śeṣācārya. There is also a work called *Adhikaraṇārtha-saṃgraha*, by Padmanābhācārya. The *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Ānanda-tīrtha has a commentary by Jaya-tīrtha, called *Tattva-prakāśikā*. This has a number of commentaries: the *Tātparya-prakāśikā-bhāva-bodha* and the *Tātparya-prakāśikā-gata-nyāya-vivarana* by Raghūttama Yati, and *Bhāva-dīpikā* or *Tattva-prakāśikā-ṭīpaṇī*, the *Tantra-dīpikā*,

¹ A verse containing thirty-two letters is called a *grantha*.

by Rāghavendra Yati, *Tātparya-candrikā*, by Vyāsa-tīrtha, which had other commentaries, viz. the *Tātparya-candrikā-prakāśa* by Keśava Yati, *Tātparya-candrikā-nyāya-vivaraṇa* by Timman-nācārya (or Timmapura-raghunāthācārya), and *Tātparya-candriko-dāharaṇa-nyāya-vivaraṇa*. Besides these the *Tattva-prakāśikā* had other commentaries; the *Abhinava-candrikā* by Satyanātha Yati, one by Śrīnivāsa called *Tattva-prakāśikā-vākyārtha-mañjarī*, and also the *Vākyārtha-muktāvalī* by the same author. The *Tātparya-candrikā* had another commentary, by Gururāja, and the *Tattva-prakāśikā* had another, the *Tantra-dīpikā*. The *Bhāṣya* of Madhva was also commented upon by Jagannātha Yati (the *Bhāṣya-dīpikā*), by Viṭṭhala-suta-śrīnivāsa (the *Bhāṣya-ṭippanī-prameya-muktāvalī*), by Vādirāja (the *Gurvartha-dīpikā*), by Tāmraparṇī-śrīnivāsa, and by Sumatīndra-tīrtha. There are also two others, the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣyārtha-saṃgraha* and the *Brahma-sūtrārtha*. The *Anubhāṣya* of Madhva was commented upon by Nṛsiṃha, Jaya-tīrtha, Ananta Bhaṭṭa, Chalāri-nṛsiṃha, Rāghavendra-tīrtha and Śeṣācārya. Further, Madhva wrote another work on the *Brahma-sūtra* called the *Anuvyākhyāna*. This was commented upon by Jaya-tīrtha in his *Pañjikā* and *Nyāya-sudhā*, and also by Jadupati and Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha. There is also another commentary on it, called *Brahma-sūtrānuyākhyāna-nyāya-saṃbandha-dīpikā*. Of these the *Nyāya-sudhā* of Jaya-tīrtha is an exceedingly recondite work of great excellence. *Anuvyākhyāna* is commented upon by Raghūttama in his *Nyāya-sūtra-nibandha-pradīpa* and also in his *Anuvyākhyāna-ṭikā*. The *Nyāya-sudhā* itself was commented on by several writers. Thus we have commentaries by Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha, Jadupati, Viṭṭhala-sutānanda-tīrtha, by Keśava Bhaṭṭa (the *Śeṣa-vākyārtha-candrikā*), by Rāmacandra-tīrtha, Kuṇḍalagirisūri, Vidyādhiśa, Timmannārya, Vādirāja, and Rāghavendra Yati. We have also the *Nyāyasudhopyāsa*, by Śrīpadarāja. The *Anuvyākhyāna* is a small work in verse which follows chapter by chapter the essential logical position of all the *Brahma-sūtras*. Madhva says there that in rendering the interpretations he followed the trustworthy scriptural texts—the Vedas—and also logical reasoning¹. He further says in the introduction that it is for the purpose of clearing his views in a proper manner that

1

ātma-vākyatayā tena śruti-mūlatayā tathā
yukti-mūlatayā caiva prāmāṇyaṃ trividhaṃ mahat.

Anuvyākhyāna, I. 1.

he writes the *Anuvyākhyāna*, though he had already written a *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*. He says in the first chapter that the Omkāra which designates the Brahman and which is also the purport of Gāyatri is also the purport of all the Vedas and one should seek to know it. Those who seek to know the Brahman please God by such an endeavour, and by His grace are emancipated. The existence of all things, actions, time, character and selves depends upon God, and they may cease to exist at His will. God gives knowledge to the ignorant and salvation to the wise. The source of all bliss for the emancipated person is God Himself. All bondage is real, for it is perceived as such; nor is there any means by which one can prove the falsity of bondage, for if there were any proofs of its falsity, the proofs must be existent, and that would destroy the monistic view. The mere one cannot split itself into proof and the object of proof. So all experiences should be regarded as real. That which we find in consonance with practical behaviour should be regarded as real. The monists assert that there are three kinds of existence, but they cannot adduce any proofs. If the universe were really non-existent, how could it affect anybody's interests in a perverse manner? Brahman cannot be regarded as being only pure "being," and the world-appearance cannot be regarded as false, for it is never negated in experience. If this world is to be known as different from pure non-being or the non-existent, then the non-existent has also to be known, which is impossible. It has been suggested that illusion is an example of non-existence, viz., the appearance of a thing as that which it is not. This virtually amounts to the assertion that appearance consists only of a being which does not exist, and this is also said to be indefinable. But such a position leads to a vicious infinite, because the reality of many entities has to depend on another and that on another and so on. Existence of a thing depends upon that which is not being negated, and its not being negated depends upon further experience and so on. Moreover, if the pure differenceless entity is self-luminous, how can it be covered by *ajñāna*? Again, unless it is possible to prove the existence of *ajñāna*, the existence of falsehood as a category cannot be proved. It is needless, however, for us to follow the whole argument of the *Anuvyākhyāna*, as it will be dealt with in other forms as elaborated by Vyāsa-tīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta* in controversy with the *Advaita-siddhi*.

Madhva also wrote a *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa*, *Kathā-lakṣaṇa*, *Mithyātvānumāna-khaṇḍana*, *Upādhi-khaṇḍana*, *Māyā-vāda-khaṇḍana*, *Tattva-saṃkhyāna*, *Tattvodyota*, *Tattva-viveka*, *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya*, *Karma-nirṇaya*¹. The *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa* has a number of commentaries: *Nyāya-kalpalatā*, by Jaya-tīrtha, *Sanmyāya-dīpikā*, and others by Keśava-tīrtha, Pāṇḍuraṅga, Padmanābha-tīrtha, and Caṇḍakeśava. The *Nyāya-kalpalatā* of Jaya-tīrtha is a work of 1450 *granthas*; it has a commentary called *Nyāya-kalpalatā-vyākhyā*, by two other authors. One of them is a pupil of Vidyādhiśa Yati, but nothing is known about the author of the other work. There are also two other commentaries, the *Prabodhini* and the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, by Caṇḍakeśavācārya. Other works relating to the same subject (the Madhva logic) are the *Nyāya-muktāvalī*, by Rāghavendra Yati, *Nyāya-mauktikā-mālā*, by Vijayīndra, and *Nyāya-ratnāvalī*, by Vādirāja. Jaya-tīrtha himself wrote a work called *Pramāṇa-paddhati*, which has a large number of commentaries (by Ananta Bhaṭṭa, Vedeśa-bhikṣu, Vijayīndra, Viṭṭhala Bhaṭṭa, Satyanātha Yati, Nṛsiṃha-tīrtha, Rāghavendra-tīrtha, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Janārdana Bhaṭṭa, and two others by unknown authors, the *Bhāva-dīpa* and the *Padārtha-candrikā*). The *Kathā-lakṣaṇa* of Madhva was commented on by Padmanābha-tīrtha, Keśava Bhaṭṭāraka, and Jaya-tīrtha. The *Mithyātvānumāna-khaṇḍana* of Madhva has at least four commentaries, by Jaya-tīrtha, the fourth being the *Mandāra-mañjarī*. The *Upādhi-khaṇḍana* has at least three commentaries, by Jaya-tīrtha, Ananta Bhaṭṭa and Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha. Both Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha and Padmanābha-tīrtha wrote commentaries on Jaya-tīrtha's commentary named *Upādhi-khaṇḍana-vyākhyā-vivaraṇa*. The *Māyā-vāda-khaṇḍana* of Madhva was commented upon by Jaya-tīrtha, Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha, Vyāsa-tīrtha, Keśavamīśra, Ananta Bhaṭṭa and Padmanābha-tīrtha. The *Tattva-saṃkhyāna* of Madhva was commented upon by Jaya-tīrtha, Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha, Ananta Bhaṭṭa, Veṅkaṭādrisūri, Satyaprajña Yati, Satyaprajña-tīrtha, Maudgala Narasiṃhācārya, Timmannācārya, Gururāja and Yadupati. The commentary of Jaya-tīrtha, the *Tattva-saṃkhyāna-vivaraṇa*, was commented upon by Satyadharma Yati (*Satya-dharma-tippaṇa*). The *Tattvodyota* of Madhva

¹ These ten works of Madhva are called the *daśaprakaraṇa*. Sometimes, however, the *Mithyātvānumāna-khaṇḍana* is replaced by *R̥gveda-brahma-pañcīkā*.

was commented upon by Jaya-tīrtha, Yadupati, Vedeśa-bhikṣu, Padmanābha-tīrtha, Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha, Narapaṇḍita, Rāghavendra-tīrtha, Vijayindra, Gururāja (or Keśava Bhaṭṭāraka). The *Tattva-viveka* of Madhva was commented upon by Jaya-tīrtha, Ananta Bhaṭṭa and Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha.

In the *Kathā-lakṣaṇa*, Madhva tries to give an estimate of the nature of various wholesome discussions (*vāda*) as distinguished from unwholesome discussions (wrangling, *vitāṇḍā*). *Vāda* is discussion between the teacher and the pupil for the elucidation of different problems or between two or more pupils who are interested in the discovery of truth by reasoning. When this discussion, however, takes place through egotism, through a spirit of emulation, for the sake of victory through controversy, or for the attainment of fame, the discussion is called *jalpa*. Unwholesome discussion, *vitāṇḍā*, is undertaken for the purpose of discrediting the true points of view by specious argument. There may be one or more presidents (*praśnika*) in a discussion, but such a person or persons should be strictly impartial. All discussions must be validly based, on the scriptural texts, and these should not be wrongly interpreted by specious argument¹. The *Kathā-lakṣaṇa* of Madhva seems to have been based on a work called *Brahma-tarka*. The nature of *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitāṇḍā* according to the Nyāya philosophy has already been treated in the first volume of the present work².

It is unnecessary to enter into the *Prapañca-mithyātva-numāna-khaṇḍana*, *Upādhi-khaṇḍana* and *Māyāvāda-khaṇḍana*, because the main subject-matter of these tracts has been dealt with in our treatment of Vyāsa-tīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta* in controversy with the *Advaita-siddhi*.

The *Tattva-saṃkhyāna* is a small tract of eleven verses which relates in brief some of the important tenets of Madhva's doctrines. Thus it says that there are two categories—the independent and the dependent; Viṣṇu alone is independent. The category of the dependent is of two kinds—the existent and the non-existent. The non-existent or the negation is of three kinds—negation before production (*prāgabhāva*), negation by destruction (*dhvaṃsā-*

¹ Mr Nāgarāja Śarma has summarized the contents of the *Kathā-lakṣaṇa*, utilizing the materials of the commentators Jaya-tīrtha, Rāghavendrasvāmī and Vedeśa-tīrtha, in the *Reign of Realism*.

² On the subject of the nature of *kathā* and the conditions of disputation see also *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, pp. 20 ff., Benares, 1914.

bhāva), and universal negation (*atyantābhāva*). The existents are again conscious or unconscious. The conscious entities are again twofold, those who are associated with sorrows and those who are not so. Those who are associated with sorrows are again twofold, viz., those who are emancipated and those who are in sorrow. Those who are in sorrow are again twofold, viz., those who are worthy of salvation and those who are not. There are others who are not worthy of salvation at any time. The worst men, the demons, the *rākṣasas* and the *piśācas* are not worthy of salvation at any time. Of these there are two kinds, viz., those who are already damned in hell and those who pursue the course of *saṃsāra* but are doomed to hell. The unconscious entities are again threefold, the eternal, the non-eternal, and the partly eternal and partly non-eternal. The Vedas alone are eternal. The sacred literature of the *Purāṇas*, time and *prakṛti* are both eternal and non-eternal; for, when in essence the teachings of the *Purāṇas* are eternal, time and *prakṛti* are eternal; in their evolution they are non-eternal. The non-eternal again is twofold—the created and the uncreated (*saṃśliṣṭa* and *asaṃśliṣṭa*). The uncreated ones are *mahat*, *aham*, *buddhi*, *manas*, the senses, the *tanmātras* and the five *bhūtis*. The world and all that exists in the world are created. Creation really means being prompted into activities, and as such the created entities undergo various stages: God alone is the inward mover of all things and all changes. The *Tattva-viveka* of Madhva is as small a work as the *Tattva-saṃkhyāna*, consisting only of a dozen *granthas*, and deals more or less with the same subject: it is therefore unnecessary to give a general summary of its contents.

The *Tattvodyota*, however, is a somewhat longer work in verse and prose. It starts with a question, whether there is a difference between the emancipated souls, and Madhva says that the emancipated souls are different from God because they had been emancipated at a particular time. They cannot be both different and non-different from God, for that would be meaningless. The concept of *anirvacanīya* of the Vedāntists has no illustration to support it. Madhva takes pains to refute the theory of *anirvacanīya* with the help of scriptural texts, and he holds that the so-called falsity of the Śāṅkarites cannot be supported by perception, inference or implication. There is no reason to think that the world-appearances

as such cannot be negated¹. He further says that, if everything in the world were false, then the allegation that the world would be contradicted in experience would also be false. If the contradiction of the world be false, then virtually it amounts to saying that the world-experience is never contradicted. If it is said that the world-appearance is different from being and if the predicate "being" means the class-concept of being, then it is a virtual admission of a plurality of existents, without which the class-concept of being is impossible. If however the predicate "being" means pure being, then, since such a pure "being" is only Brahman, its difference from the world would be an intelligible proposition, and it would not prove the so-called *anirvacanīya*. It is said that falsity is that which is different from both being and non-being, and that would virtually amount to saying that that which is not different is alone true². On such a supposition the plurality of causes or of effects or the diversities of grounds in inferences must all be discarded as false, and knowledge would be false. Knowledge implies diversity; for the knower, the knowledge and the object of knowledge cannot be the same. Again, it is wrong to hold that ignorance rests in the object of knowledge or the Brahman; for the ignorance always belongs to the knowledge. If on the occasion of knowledge it is held that the ignorance belonging to the objects is removed, then, the ignorance being removed in the object by one person's knowledge of it, all persons should be able to know the object. If any knowing of the jug means that the ignorance resting in the jug is removed, then, the ignorance being removed, the jug should be known even by persons who are not present here³. Again, if by the knowledge of any object the ignorance resting in another object be removed, then by the knowledge of the jug the ignorance in other objects could be removed.

Again, a material object is that which never can be a knower.

¹ *na ca bādhyam jagad ity atra kiñcin mānam.*

Tattvodyota, p. 242.

² *sad-vilakṣaṇatvam a-sad-vilakṣaṇatvam ca mithyā ity a-vilakṣaṇam eva satyam syāt. Ibid. p. 242(a).*

³ *nahī jñāna-jñeyayor ekākārātā nahi
ajñāsya ghaṭāśrayatvam brahmāśrayatvam vā
asti; puṅgavatam eva hi tamojñānena
nivartate; viśayāśrayamced ajñānam
nivartate tarhi ekena jñātasya ghaṭasya
anyair ajñātatvam na syāt. Ibid. p. 242.*

For that reason the self, as a knower, can never be regarded as material. But according to the monists the *ātman* which is equalized with Brahman, being without any quality, can never be a knower, and, if it cannot be a knower, it must be of the nature of a material object, which is impossible. Also the self, or the *ātman*, cannot be a false knower, for the category of falsehood as the indefinable (or *anirvacanīya*) has already been refuted. If materiality means non-luminousness (*aprakāśatva*), then we have to admit that the self, which is differenceless, is unable to illumine itself or anything else; and thus the self would be non-luminous. The self cannot illumine itself, because then it would itself be the subject and object of its work of illumination, which is impossible. The other objects, being false (according to the monists), cannot be illuminated either. If they are no objects and if they are only false, they cannot be illuminated. Thus the monists fail to explain the nature of the self-luminousness of Brahman. Again, the argument that things which are limited in time and space are false does not hold either; for time and the *prakṛti* are not limited by time and space, and therefore they cannot be regarded as false, as the monists wish to think. Again, if it *did* hold, things which are limited by their own nature and character would consequently be false. Thus, the selves would be false, since they are different from one another in their character.

Moreover, the world is perceived as true and real, and there is no one who has experienced it to be false (the perception of the smallness of the sun or of the moon is an illusion, due to the distance from which they are seen; such conditions do not hold regarding the world as we perceive it). There is no reason which supports the view that the world is the product of ignorance. Again, the analogy of a magician and his magic is inapplicable to the world; for the magician does not perceive his magic creation, nor is he deluded by it. But in the case under discussion God (the *Īśvara*) perceives His own creation. Therefore the world cannot be regarded as magic or *māyā*; for God perceives everything directly. Thus, from whatever point of view one may discuss the doctrine of *māyā*, one finds it untenable, and there are no proofs which can support it.

Madhva further holds that in the *Brahma-sūtra*, Book II, not only are various other philosophies refuted but that even the monistic doctrine has been refuted. The refutation of Buddhism

is in reality also a refutation of the monists, who are in reality nothing but crypto-Buddhists or Buddhists in disguise¹. The *śūnyavādi* Buddhists hold that truth is of two kinds, that which is *saṃvṛta*, or of limited or practical importance only, and that which is *pāramārtha*, or ultimately real. If one truly discusses the nature of things, there is no reality, and what is perceived as real is only an appearance. What is called the *pāramārthika* reality means only the cessation of all appearance². There is no difference between the qualityless Brahman and the *śūnya* of the Buddhists. The qualityless Brahman is self-luminous and eternal; the *śūnya* of the Buddhists is unknowable by mind or speech, and is also differenceless, self-luminous, and eternal. It is opposed to materiality, to practicality, to pain and suffering, and to cessation and the defects of bondage³. It is not actually a real-positive entity, though it supports all positive appearance; and, though in itself it is eternal, from the practical point of view it appears in manifold characters. It is neither existent nor non-existent, neither good, nor bad—it is not a thing which one should either leave aside or take, for it is the eternal *śūnya*⁴. It may be observed in this connection that the monists also do not believe in the reality of the characters of being and non-being, because the Brahman is devoid of all characters and qualities. Like *śūnya* of the Buddhists, it is unspeakable, though it is referred to by all words, and it is unknowable, though all knowledge refers to it. Neither the Śāṅkarites nor the Śūnyavādins believe in the category of being or positivity as characters. The

¹ *na ca nir-viśeṣa-brahma-vādināḥ śūnyāt kaś cid viśeṣaḥ;
tasya nirviśeṣaṃ svayaṃbhūtaṃ nirlepaṃ ajarāmaramaṃ
śūnyaṃ tattvaṃ vijñeyaṃ manovācāṃ agocaram.*

Tattvodyota, p. 243(a).

² *satyaṃ ca dvividhaṃ proktaṃ saṃvṛtaṃ pāramārthikaṃ
saṃvṛtaṃ vyavahāryaṃ syān nirvṛtaṃ pāramārthikaṃ
vicāryamānena satyaṃ cāpi pratīyate yasya tat saṃvṛtaṃ jñānaṃ vyavahāra-
padaṃ ca yat.*

Ibid. p. 243(a).

³ *nir-viśeṣaṃ svayaṃ bhūtaṃ nirlepaṃ ajarāmaramaṃ
śūnyaṃ tattvaṃ avijñeyaṃ manovācāṃ agocaram
jādyā-saṃvṛti-duḥkḥānta-pūrva-doṣa-virodhi yat
nitya-bhāvanayā bhūtaṃ tad bhāvaṃ yogināṃ nayet
bhāvārtha-pratīyogitvaṃ bhāvatvaṃ vā na tattvata
viśvākāraṇa saṃvṛtya yasya tat padam akṣayam.*

Ibid. p. 243(a).

⁴ *nāsyā sattvaṃ asattvaṃ vā na doṣo guṇa eva vā
heyopādeya-rahitaṃ tac chūnyaṃ padam akṣayam.*

Ibid. p. 243.

Śūnyavādin does not regard the *śūnya* or the void as a character. The view of the Śāṅkarites, therefore, is entirely different from belief in a personal God, endowed with characters and qualities (which is the general purport of all valid scriptural texts). If the Brahman be void of all characters, it is beyond all determination. The monists think that the Brahman is absoluteless, differenceless, and this precludes them from resorting to any argument in support of their view; for all arguments presuppose relativity and difference. In the absence of any valid argument, and in the face of practical experience of the reality of the world, there is indeed nothing which can establish the monistic view. All arguments that would prove the falsity of the world will fall within the world-appearance and be themselves false. If all selves were identical, then there would be no difference between the emancipated and the un-emancipated ones. If it is held that all difference is due to ignorance, then God, who has no ignorance, would perceive Himself as one with all individual selves, and thus share their sufferings; but the scriptural text of the *Gītā* definitely shows that God perceives Himself as different from ordinary individual selves. The experience of suffering cannot also be due to *upādhi* (or condition) which may act as a limit; for in spite of diversity of conditions the experiencer remains the same. Moreover, since God is free from all conditions, the difference of conditions ought not to prevent Him from perceiving His equality with all beings in sharing their sufferings. Those also who hold that there is only one individual and that all misconceptions are due to Him are wrong; for at his death there should be cessation of the differences. There is also no proof in support of the view that all notion of difference and the appearance of the world is due to the misconception of only one individual. Thus there are no proofs in support of the monistic view as held by the Śāṅkarites. It is therefore time that the upholders of the *māyā* doctrine should flee, now that the omniscient Lord is coming to tear asunder the darkness of specious arguments and false interpretations of spiritual texts¹.

The *Karma-nirṇaya* of Madhva deals with the nature of *karma* or scriptural duties, which forms the subject-matter of the

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*palāyadhvaṃ palāyadhvaṃ tvarayā māyi-dānavāḥ
sarvajño harir āyāti tarkāgama-darāribhid.*

Tattvodyota, p. 245(a).

Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* not only practically ignores the existence of God but also denies it. Madhva was himself a great believer in a personal God and therefore wished to interpret the *Mīmāṃsā* in an authentic manner. He held that the various gods, e.g., Indra or Agni, stood for Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* was satisfied with providing for heaven as the object of all performance of sacrifices, but with Madhva the ultimate goal was true knowledge and the attainment of emancipation through the grace of God. He disliked the idea that the scriptural sacrifices are to be performed with the object of attaining heaven, and he emphasized his notion that they should be performed without any motive; with him they should be performed merely because they are religious injunctions or the commands of God. He further held that it is only by such motiveless performance of actions that the mind could be purified for the attainment of the grace of God. The motiveless performance of sacrifices is therefore in a way preliminary and accessory to the attainment of wisdom and the grace of God.

Thus, as usual, Madhva tries to refute the argument of the monists against the possibility of possession by God of infinite attributes and in favour of a differenceless Brahma. He further says that the texts such as *satyam*, *jñānam*, *anantam*, *Brahma*, which apparently inspires a qualityless Brahman, are to be subordinated to other texts which are of a dualistic nature. Proceeding by way of inference, he says that the world, being of the nature of an effect, must have an intelligent cause—a maker—and this maker is God. The maker of this world must necessarily be associated with omniscience and omnipotence. Madhva cites the evidence of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* in favour of a *saguṇa* Brahma, a Brahma associated with qualities. Where the texts refer to Brahman as *nirguṇa*, the idea is that the Brahman is not associated with any bad qualities. Also the Brahman cannot be devoid of all determination, *viśeṣa*; the denial of determination is itself a determination, and as such would have to be denied by the monists; and this would necessarily lead to the affirmation of the determination. Madhva then resorts to his old arguments against *māyā*, *mithyā*, and *anirvacanīya*, and points out that the logic of excluded middle would rule out the possibility of a category which is neither *sat* nor *asat*. There is really no instance of a so-called *anirvacanīya*. An

illusion, after it is contradicted, is sometimes pointed out as an instance of *anirvacanīya*, but this is wholly wrong; for in the case of an illusion something was actually perceived by the senses but interpreted wrongly. The fact that something was actually in contact with the visual sense is undisputed; and, when the illusion is contradicted, the contradiction means the discovery that an object which was believed to be there is not there. The object that was erroneously perceived—e.g., a snake—was a real object, but it did not exist where it was thought to exist. To say that the illusion is false (*mithyā*) only means that the object illusorily perceived does not exist there. The mere fact that an object was illusorily perceived cannot mean that it was really existent; and nevertheless its non-existence was contradicted; so it was neither existent nor non-existent. The only legitimate point of view is that the illusorily perceived object did not exist while it was perceived, i.e. it was *asat*. The rope which was perceived as “snake” is later on contradicted, when the perception of “snake” disappears; but the world as such has never been found to disappear. Thus there is no similarity between the perception of the world and the perception of the illusory snake. Moreover that which is *anirvacanīya* is so called because it is hard to describe it on account of its uniqueness, but that does not prove that it is a category which is neither existent nor non-existent. Though it may be sufficiently described, still one may not exhaust its description. A jar is different from a cloth and also different from the merely chimerical hare’s horn, viz., a jar is different from an existent cloth and a non-existent hare’s horn; but that does not make a jar *anirvacanīya*, or false. The jar as shown above is *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*, but it is not on that account non-existent.

Again, the meaning of the phrase *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* is very vague. In the first place, if it means the conception of a difference (*bheda*), then the meaning is inconsistent. The monists hold that only the Brahman exists, and therefore, if the difference between the existent and the non-existent exists, there will be dualism. But in reply it may be held that the affirmation of dualism is only possible as a lower degree of reality which is called the *vyāvahārika*. The meaning of this word is not clear. It cannot mean a category which is different from both being and non-being, since such a category is logically invalid. If it means only conditional being, then

even the conception of the highest reality is conditioned by human knowledge, and is therefore conditional (*vyāvahārika*); and the application of the term to illusory perception or normal perception alone is doubtful. In the second place, the term *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* also cannot mean identity between the Brahman and the world; for such identity is open to contradiction. The monists can therefore affirm neither the reality of difference nor the reality of absolute identity between the world and Brahman.

The view of the monists that there are different degrees of reality, and that there is identity between them in essence and difference only in appearance, cannot be established, unless the truth of degrees of reality can be established. They hold that the world (which has an inferior degree of reality) is superimposed on the Brahman, or that Brahman has manifested Himself as the world; but such an expression is invalid if there is absolute identity between the world and the Brahman. The phrase "absolute identity" would be merely a tautology, and the scriptural texts so interpreted would be tautological. The monists argue that even identical expressions have *satyaṃ jñānaṃ anantaṃ*, and are not tautological, because they serve to exclude their negatives. To style Brahman "*satya*" or "*jñāna*" means that Brahman is not *asatya* and *ajñāna*. But such an interpretation would destroy their contention that all the scriptural epithets have an *akhaṇḍārtha*, i.e., refer to one differenceless Brahman; for according to their own interpretation the scriptural epithets do not have only one significance (viz., the affirmation of pure differenceless being), but also the negation of other qualities; and in that case the final significance of all scriptural epithets as referring to the differenceless Brahman is contradicted. Again, the *anirvacanīyatā* of the world depends upon a false analysis of illusion; and so the statement that the differencelessness of Brahman depends on the very illusoriness of the world is not established by any monist by any valid argument. The difference between the world-appearance and Brahman cannot be regarded by the monists as ultimately real; for in that case "difference" is a category having a co-existent reality with Brahman. Again, the concept of difference between the existent and the non-existent requires classification; and, unless this is done, the mere assertion that the world-appearance is both identical with and different from Brahman would have no meaning.

That which is different from the non-existent is existent and that which is different from the existent is non-existent or chimerical. The non-existent has no determination; for it cannot be known by any means, and as such its difference from the existent cannot be known either, since to know the difference between two entities one must know the two entities fully. No one can argue about whether the hare's horn is different or not different from a tree. Again, if *sat* or "existent" means the ultimately differenceless real, then, since such a difference has no character in it, it is not possible to form any concept of its difference from any other thing. Thus it is not possible to form any concept of anything which is different from the existent and also from the non-existent; if the world is different from the non-existent, it must be real; and if the world is different from the existent, it must be the hare's horn. The law of excluded middle again rules out the existence of anything which is neither existent nor non-existent; in a pair of contradictory judgments one must be right. Thus the reality of Brahman is endowed with all qualities and as a creator and sustainer of the world He cannot be denied.

Madhva then contends with the Prabhākaras, who hold that the ultimate import of propositions must lead to the performance of an action. If that were the case, the Vedic propositions would never have any import implying the reality of Brahman; for Brahman cannot be the object of the activity of man. Madhva holds that the purpose of all Vedic texts is the glorification of God; and, further, that what is effected by activity among finite human beings is already pre-established with infinite God. All actions imply *iṣṭasāadhanatā* (pleasurable motive) and not mere activity. Nothing will be put into action by any man which is distinctly injurious to him. If the chief emphasis of all actions thus be *iṣṭasāadhanatā*, then the assertion of the Mimāṃsā school, that the import of all possibilities is *kāryatā*, is false; *iṣṭasāadhanatā* includes *kāryatā*. The supreme *iṣṭasāadhanatā* of all actions is the attainment of emancipation through the grace of God. It is therefore necessary that all sacrificial actions should be performed with devotion, since it is by devotional worship alone that one can attain the grace of God. The *Karma-nirṇaya* is a small work of less than 400 *granthas*.

In the *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya*, a work of about 600 *granthas*,

Madhva discusses a number of important problems. He declares that the Vedas, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Pañcarātras*, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* and all other sacred literature that follows them are to be regarded as valid scriptures (*sad-āgama*). All other texts that run counter to them are to be counted as bad scriptures (*dur-āgama*), and by following them one cannot know the real nature of God. It is neither by perception nor by inference that one can know God; it is only by the Vedas that one can know the nature of God. The Vedas are not produced by any human being (*apauruṣeya*); unless the transcendental origin of the Vedas is admitted, there can be no absolute validity of religious duties; all ethical and religious duties will be relative. No human commands can give the assurance of absence of ignorance or absence of false knowledge; nor can it be supposed that these commands proceed from an omniscient being, for the existence of an omniscient being cannot be known apart from the scriptures. It will be too much to suppose that such an omniscient being is not interested in deceiving us. But, on the other hand, if the Vedas are regarded as not having emanated from any person, we are not forced to make any other supposition; the impersonal origin of the Vedas is valid in itself, because we do not know of any one who has written them. Their utterances are different from other utterances of an ordinary nature, because we know the authors of the latter. The Vedas exist in their own nature and have been revealed only to the sages, and their validity does not depend on anything else; for, unless this is admitted, we can have no absolute criterion of validity and there will be infinite regress. Their validity does not depend on any reasoning; for good reasoning can only show that the process of thought is devoid of logical defects, and cannot by itself establish validity for anything. Since the Vedas are impersonal, the question of the absence of logical defects does not arise. All validity is self-evident; it is non-validity which is proved by later experience. Nor can it be said that the words of Vedic utterances of one syllable are produced at the time of utterance; for in that case they would be recognized as known before. Such recognition cannot be due to similarity; for in that case all recognitions would have to be considered as cases of similarity, which would lead us to the Buddhist view; recognitions are to be considered as illusory. Thus the self-validity of the Vedas has to be accepted as the absolute determinant

of all important problems¹. These Vedas were originally perceived by God; He imparted them to sages, who at the beginning of each creation, remembered the instructions of their previous birth. The alphabets and words are also eternal, as they are always apparent in the mind of the eternal God; so, though the syllables appear in the *ākāśa*, and though the Vedas consist of a conglomeration of them, the Vedas are eternal. The Mimāṃsā view that the acquirement of words is associated with activity is wrong; for words and their meanings are already definitely settled, and it is only by physical gestures that meanings are acquired by individual people. The purpose of a proposition is finished when it indicates its meaning, and the validity of the proposition is in the realization of such a meaning. While one is acquainted with such a meaning and finds that the direction involved in it, if pursued, will be profitable, one works accordingly, but when one finds it to be injurious one desists from it. All grammars and lexicons are based on the relation already existent between words and their meanings, and no action is implied therein.

All the scriptures refer to Nārāyaṇa as omniscient and the creator of all things. It is wrong to suppose that the scriptures declare the identity of the individual selves with God; for there is no proof for such an assertion.

The existence of God cannot be proved by any inference; for inference of equal force can be adduced against the existence of God. If it is urged that the world, being an effect, must have a creator or maker just as a jug has a potter for its maker, then it may also be urged on the contrary that the world is without any maker, like the self; if it is urged that the self is not an effect and that therefore the counter-argument does not stand, then it may also be urged that all makers have bodies, and since He has no body, God cannot be a creator. Thus the existence of God can only be proved on the testimony of the scriptures, and they hold that God is different from the individual selves. If any scriptural texts seem to indicate the identity of God and self or of God and the world, this will be contradicted by perceptual experience and inference, and consequently the monistic interpretations of these texts would

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*vijñeyaṃ paramaṃ Brahma jñāpikā paramā śrutiḥ
anādi-nityā sā tac ca vinā tām na ca gamyate.*

Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya, p. 206.

be invalid. Now the scriptures cannot suggest anything which is directly contradicted by experience; for, if experience be invalid, then the experience of the validity of the scriptures will also become invalid. The teaching of the scriptures gains additional strength by its consonance with what is perceived by other *pramāṇas*; and, since all the *pramāṇas* point to the reality of diversity, the monistic interpretation of the scriptural texts cannot be accepted as true. When any particular experience is contradicted by a number of other *pramāṇas*, that experience is thereby rendered invalid. It is in this manner that the falsity of the conch-shell-silver is attested. What was perceived as silver at a distance was contradicted on closer inspection and by the contact of the hand, and for that reason the conch-shell-silver perceived at a distance is regarded as invalid. An experience which is contradicted by a large number of other *pramāṇas* is by reason of that very fact to be regarded as defective¹. The comparative value of evidence can be calculated either by its quantity or its quality². There are two classes of qualitative proofs, viz., that which is relative (*upajīvaka*) and that which is independent (*upajīvyā*); of these the latter must be regarded as the stronger. Perception and inference are independent sources of evidence, and may therefore be regarded as *upajīvyā*, while the scriptural texts are dependent on perception and inference, and are therefore to be regarded as *upajīvaka*. Valid perception precedes inference and is superior to it, for the inference has to depend on perception; thus, if there is a flat contradiction between the scriptural texts and what is universally perceived by all, the scriptural texts have to be so explained that there may not be any such contradiction. By its own nature as a support of all evidence, perception or direct experience, being the *upajīvyā*, has a stronger claim to validity³. Of the two classes of texts, viz., those which are monistic and those which are dualistic, the latter is supported by perceptual evidence. If it is urged that the purpose of the *śruti*

¹ *bahu-pramāṇa-viruddhānāṃ doṣajanyatva-niyamāt; doṣa-janyatvaṃ ca balavat-pramāṇa-virodhād eva jñāyate.*

*aduṣṭam indriyaṃ tv akṣaṃ tarko' duṣṭas tathānumā
āgamo' duṣṭavākyaṃ ca tādṛk cānubhavaḥ smṛtaḥ*
balavat-pramāṇataś caiva jñeyā doṣā na cānyathā. Ibid. p. 262 a (4).

² *dvi-vidham balavatvaṃ ca bahutvāc ca svabhāvataḥ. Ibid.*

³ Madhva here states the different kinds of *pramāṇas* according to *Brahma-tarka*. The account of the *pramāṇas* is dealt with in a separate section.

texts is to transcend perception and that it is by perception alone that we realize pure being, then it follows that the dualistic texts, which contradict ordinary perception, are to be regarded as more valid on the very ground that they transcend perception. So, whichever way we look at it, the superiority of the duality texts cannot be denied. Again, when a particular fact is supported by many evidences that strengthens the validity of that fact. The fact that God is different from the individual and the world, is attested by many evidences and as such it cannot be challenged; and the final and ultimate import of all the Vedic texts is the declaration of the fact that Lord Viṣṇu is the highest of all. It is only by the knowledge of the greatness and goodness of God that one can be devoted to Him, and it is by devotion to God and by His grace that one can attain emancipation, which is the highest object of life. Thus it is through the declaration of God and His goodness that the *śruti* serves to attain this for us.

No one can have any attachment to anything with which he feels himself identical. A king does not love his rival; rather he would try to inflict defeat on him by attacking him; but the same king would give away his all to one who praised him. Most of the ascriptions of the texts endow God with various qualities and powers which would be unexplainable on monistic lines. So Madhva urges that the ultimate aim of all *śruti* and *smṛti* texts is to speak of the superexcellence of Viṣṇu, the supreme Lord.

But his opponents argue that ascription or affirmation of qualities to reality depends upon the concept of difference; the concept of difference again depends upon the separate existence of the quality and the qualified. Unless there are two entities, there is no conception of difference; and, unless there is a conception of difference, there cannot be a conception of separate entities. Thus these two conceptions are related to each other in a circular manner and are therefore logically invalid¹. Madhva in reply says that the above argument is invalid, because things are in themselves of the nature of difference. It is wrong to argue that differences are meaningless because they can only be realized with reference to

¹ *na ca viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatayā bheda-siddhiḥ, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvaś ca bhedāpekṣaḥ dharmi-pratīyogy-apekṣayā bheda-siddhir bhedāpekṣaḥ ca dharmi-pratīyogitvam ity anyonyāśrayatayā bhedasyāyuktiḥ. Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya, p. 264.*

certain objects; for, just as unity has a separate meaning, so the difference is also realized by itself. It is wrong to think that first we have the notion of the differing objects in themselves in their unity and that then the differences are realized; to perceive the object is to perceive the difference. Difference is as simple and analysable as unity. Unity is also a simple notion, yet it can be expressed in the form of a relation of identity—such as that of Brahman and individual self, as the monists say. In the same way difference is a simple notion, though it may be expressed as subsisting between two entities. It is true that in cases of doubt and illusion our notion of difference is arrested, but so it is also in the case of our notion of unity. For to perceive an object is not to perceive its unity or identity; to perceive objects is to perceive their uniqueness, and it is this uniqueness which constitutes difference¹. The expression “its difference” signifies the very uniqueness of the nature of the thing; for, had it not been so, then the perception of the object would not have led us to realize its separateness and difference from others. If such a difference was not realized with the very perception of the object, then one might easily have confused oneself with a jug or with a piece of cloth; but such a confusion never occurs, the reason being that the jug, as soon as it is perceived, is perceived as different from all other things. Difference therefore is realized as the very nature of things that are perceived; doubts occur only in those cases where there is some similarity, while in most other cases the difference of an entity from other entities is realized with the very perception of the entity. Just as, when a number of lights are seen at a glance, they are all known in a general manner, so difference is also known in a general manner, though the particular difference of the object from any other specific object may not be realized immediately upon perception. When a number of articles is perceived, we also perceive at once that each article is different, though the specific difference of each article from the other may not be realized at once. We conclude therefore that perception of difference is dependent upon a prior perception of multiplicity as a series of units upon which the notion

¹ *padārtha-sva-rūpatvād bhedasya na ca dharmi-pratīyogy-apekṣayā bhedasya svarūpatvam aikyaavat-svarūpasyaiva tathātvāt, sva-rūpa-siddhā vai tad asiddhiś ca jīveśvaraikaṃ vadataḥ siddhaiva, bhedas tu sva-rūpa-darśana eva siddhiḥ, prāyaḥ sarvato vilakṣaṇaḥ hi padārtha-sva-rūpaḥ dṛśyate. Ibid.*

of difference is superimposed. That in the perception of each entity its specific nature and uniqueness is perceived cannot be denied even by the Vedāntists, even by the monists, who regard each entity as being different from the Brahman. Thus the circular reasoning with which the monists associate the perception of difference is a fallacy and is untenable. If an object in the very revelation of its nature did not also reveal its special difference or uniqueness, then the perception of all things would be identical. Moreover each difference has its own unique character; the difference from a jug is not the same as the difference from a cloth. Thus the perception of difference cannot be challenged as invalid; to say that what is perceived in a valid manner is false is a denial of experience, and is invalid. The illusory perception of the conch-shell silver is regarded as illusory only because it is contradicted by a stronger perceptual experience. No syllogistic reasoning has the power to challenge the correctness of valid perceptual experience. No dialectical reasoning can prove the invalidity of direct and immediate experience. Upon this reasoning all arguments denying the differences of things are contradicted by the scriptural texts, by perception and by other arguments; the arguments of those who challenge the reality of difference are absolutely specious in their nature. It is idle to say that in reality there is no difference though such difference may be realized in our ordinary practical experience (*vyāvahārika*). It has already been demonstrated that falsehood defined as that which is different from both the existent and the non-existent is meaningless. To attempt to deny the non-existent because it is unworthy of experience is meaningless; for, whether it was or was not experienced, there would be no need to deny it. The difference of anything from the non-existent would not be known without the knowledge of the non-existent. The appearance of the silver in the conch-shell cannot be described as something different from the existent and the non-existent; for the silver appearance is regarded as non-existent in the conch-shell; it cannot be argued that, since such an appearance was realized, therefore it could not have been non-existent. The perception of the non-existent as the existent is the perception of one thing as another: it is of the nature of illusion. It cannot be said that the non-existent cannot be perceived even in illusion; for it is admitted by the monists that the *anirvacanīya*, which has no real existence, can be

perceived. Nor can it be held that such a perception is itself *anirvacanīya* (or indefinable); for in that case we should have a vicious infinite, since the first *anirvacanīya* has to depend on the second and that on the third and so on. If the silver appearance was in reality *anirvacanīya* by nature, it would have been perceived as such, and that would have destroyed the illusion; for, if the silver-appearance was known at the time of perception as being *anirvacanīya* (or indefinable), no one would have failed to realize that he was experiencing an illusion. The word *mithyā*, “false”, does not in reality mean *anirvacanīya*; it should mean non-existence. Now there cannot be anything which is neither existent nor non-existent; everyone perceives that either things are existent or they are not; no one has perceived anything which is neither existent nor non-existent. Thus the supposition of the so-called *anirvacanīya* and that of the perception of the non-existent are alike invalid; the perception of difference is valid, and the monistic claim falls to the ground.

The scriptures also assert difference between the individual selves and the Brahman; if even the scriptural texts are false, then it is idle to preach monism on scriptural grounds. It is on scriptural grounds that we have to admit that Brahman is the greatest and the highest; for the purport of all the valid scriptures tends to such an assertion—yet no one can for a moment think that he is one with Brahman; no one feels “I am omniscient, I am omnipotent, I am devoid of all sorrows and all defects”; on the contrary our common experience is just the opposite, and it cannot be false, for there is no proof of its falsity. The scriptures themselves never declare the identity of the self with the Brahman; the so-called identity text (*tat tvam asi*, “That art thou”) is proclaimed with illustrations which all point to a dualistic view. The illustration in the context of every “identity” (or monistic) text shows its real purport, viz., that it asserts the difference between Brahman and the selves. When it is said that, when one is known, everything is known, the meaning is that the chief object of knowledge is one, or that one alone is the cause; it does not mean that other things are false. For, if that one alone were the truth and everything else were false, then we should expect the knowledge of all falsehood to be derived from the knowledge of the truth, which is impossible (*nahi satya-jñānena mithyā-jñānam bhavati*). It cannot be said that the know-

ledge of the conch-shell leads to a knowledge of the silver; for the two awarenesses are different. It is only by knowing "this is not silver" that one knows the conch-shell; so long as one knows the silver (which is false), one does not know the conch-shell (which is true). By knowing an entity one does not know the negation of the entity. The knowledge of the non-existence of an entity is preceded by the knowledge of its existence elsewhere. It is customary for people to speak of other things as being known when the most important and the most essential thing is known; when one knows the principal men of a village, one may say that one knows the village. When one knows the father, one may say that he knows the son; "O! I know him, he is the son of so and so, he is known to me"; from one's knowledge of one person one may affirm the knowledge of other persons like him; by knowing one woman one may say "O! I know women." It is on the basis of such instances that the scriptural texts affirm that by the knowledge of one everything else is known. There is no reason for saying that such affirmations declare the falsity of all other things except Brahman. When the texts assert that by knowing one lump of earth one knows all earthen-wares, the idea is that of similarity, since surely not all earthen-wares are *made* out of one lump of earth; the text does not say that by knowing earth we know all earthen-wares; what it does say is that by knowing one lump of earth we know all earthen-wares. It is the similarity between one lump of earth and all other earthen-wares that justifies the text. The word "*vācārambhaṇam*" does not mean falsehood, generated by words, for in that case the word *nāmadheya* would be inapplicable. We conclude that the scriptures nowhere declare the falsehood of the world; on the contrary, they abound in condemnation of the view that the world is false¹.

The highest self, the Brahman, is absolutely independent, omniscient, omnipotent and blissful, whereas the ordinary self, though similar to Him in character, is always under His control, knows little and has little power. It is wrong to suppose that self is one but appears as many because of a false *upādhi* or condition,

1

*asatyam apratiṣṭhaṃ te jagad āhur anīśvaram
a-paras-para-sambhūtaṃ kim anyat kāma-haitukam
etāṇi dr̥ṣṭim avaṣṭabhya naṣṭātmāno'ṛpa-buddhayaḥ.*

Gītā, xvi. 8. 9, as quoted by Madhva.

and impossible to conceive that the self could be misconceived as not-self. The so-called creation of illusory appearance by magic, in imitation of real things, is only possible because real things exist; it is on the basis of real things that unreal illusions appear. Dreams also occur on the basis of real experiences which are imitated in them. Dream creations can take place only through the functioning of the subconscious impressions (*vāsanā*); but there is no reason to suppose that the world as such, which is never contradicted and which is truly experienced, is illusory, like dream creations. Moreover the Lord is omniscient and self-luminous, and it is not possible that He should be covered by ignorance. If it is argued that the one Brahman appears as many through a condition (or *upādhi*) and that He passes through the cycles of birth and rebirth, then, since these cycles are never-ending, Brahman will never be free from them and He will never have emancipation because His association with *upādhi* will be permanent. It is no defence to say that the pure Brahman cannot have any bondage through conditions; that which is already associated with *upādhi* or condition cannot require a further condition for associating the previous condition with it; for that will lead to a vicious infinite. Again, the thesis of the existence of a false *upādhi* can be proved only if there is a proof for the existence of ignorance as an entity; if there is no ignorance, there cannot be any falsehood. Again, as *upādhi* cannot exist without ignorance, nor ignorance without *upādhi*, this would involve a vicious circle. According to the hypothesis omniscience can be affirmed only of that which is unassociated with a false *upādhi*; so that, if the pure Brahman is itself associated with ignorance, there can never be emancipation; for then the ignorance will be its own nature, from which it cannot dissociate itself. Moreover, such a permanent existence of ignorance would naturally lead to a dualism of the Brahman and ignorance. If it is held that it is by the *ajñāna* of the *jīva* (soul) that the false appearance of the world is possible, then it may be pointed out that there is a vicious circle here also; for without the pre-existence of *ajñāna* there is no *jīva*, and without *jīva* there cannot be *ajñāna*; without *ajñāna* there is no *upādhi*, and without *upādhi* there is no *ajñāna*. Nor can it be held that it is the pure Brahman that appears as ignorant through illusion; for, unless *ajñāna* is established, there cannot be illusion, and, unless there is illusion, there

cannot be *ajñāna*. From another point of view too it may be urged that the monists support an impossible proposition in saying that, when all the individuals are emancipated, the Brahman will be emancipated, since the living units or the souls are far more numerous than even the atoms; on the tip of an atom there may be millions of living units, and it is impossible to conceive that they should all attain salvation through the knowledge of Brahman. It also cannot be said that there is nothing to be surprised at the logical certainty of falsehood; for it must be a very strong argument against our opponent, that they cannot prove the falsehood of all things which are immediately and directly perceived; and, unless such proofs are available, things that are perceived through direct experience cannot be ignored. We all know that we are always enjoying the objects of the world in our experience, and in view of this fact how can we say that there is no difference between an experience and the object experienced? When we perceive our food, how can we say that there is no food? A perceptual experience can be discarded only when it is known that the conditions of perception were such as to vitiate its validity. We perceive a thing from a distance; we may mistrust it in certain respects, since we know that when we perceive a thing at a distance the object appears small and blurred; but, unless the possibility of such distorting conditions can be proved, no perception can be regarded as invalid. Moreover, the defects of a perception can also be discovered by a maturer perception. The falsehood of the world has never been proved as defective by any argument whatever. Moreover the experience of knowledge, ignorance, pleasure and pain cannot be contradicted; so it has to be admitted that the experience of the world is true, and, being true, it cannot be negated; therefore it is impossible to have such an emancipation as is desired by the monists. If that which is directly experienced can be negated merely by specious arguments without the testimony of a stronger experience, then even the perception of the self could be regarded as false. There is no lack of specious arguments about the existence of the self; for one may quite well argue that, since everything is false, the experience of the self also is false, and there is no reason why we should distinguish the existence of other things from the experience of the self, since as experience they are of the same order. It will be an insupportable assumption that the experience of the self belongs to a different

order, wherefore its falsity cannot be affirmed. Nor is it possible to affirm that all illusions occur on the basis of self-experience; for, in order to assert that, one must first prove that the experience of the self is not illusory, while all other experiences are so—which is exactly the point contested by the Madhvas. If it is urged that illogicality only shows that the experience is false, then it may also be urged that the illogicality or the inexplicable nature of the experience of the self in association with the objective experience only proves the falsity of the experience of the self and can lead to nothing; for the monists urge that all experiences may be mere semblances of experience, being only products of *avidyā*. The *avidyā* itself is regarded as inexplicable, and all reality is supposed to depend not on experience, but on the logical arguments; in which case one may as well say that objects are the real seers and the subject that which is seen. One may say too that there may be false appearances without a seer; the illogicality or inexplicability of the situation is nothing to shy at, since the *māyā* is illogical and inexplicable; a fact which makes it impossible to indicate in what manner it will create confusion. Creating confusion is its sole function, and therefore one may say that either there are appearances without any seer, illusions without a basis, or that the objects are the so-called seers and the self, the so-called seer, is in reality nothing but an object.

Again, if all differences are regarded as mere false appearances due to *upādhi*, why should there not on the same analogy be experience of reality? Though feelings of pleasure and pain appear in different limbs of one person, yet the experiencer is felt as the same. Why should not experiences in different bodies or persons be felt as belonging to the same individual?—the analogy is the same. In spite of the difference of *upādhis* (such as the difference between the limbs of one person), there is the feeling of one experiencer; so in the different *upādhis* of the bodies of more than one person there may be the appearance of one experiencer. And again, the destruction of one *upādhi* cannot liberate the Brahman or the self; for the Brahman is associated with other *upādhis* and is suffering bondage all the same.

Again, one may ask whether the *upādhi* covers the whole of the Brahman or a part of it. The Brahman cannot be conceived as made up of parts; if the association of *upādhi* were due to another *upādhi*, then there would be a vicious infinite. Again, since the Brahman

is all-pervading, there cannot be any difference through *upādhi*, and no conception of a part of the Brahman is possible; *upādhi* is possible only of things that are limited by time or place. Again, for the same reason experiences through different *upādhis* must be of one and the same Brahman, and in that case there ought to be the appearance of one experience through all the different bodies, just as the experience of pleasure and pain in the different limbs of a person are attributed to him alone.

Again, the pure Brahman cannot pass through cycles of births and rebirths, because it is pure. Then the birth, rebirth and bondage of the monists must be of Brahman as associated with *upādhi* and *māyā*. Now the question is: is the Brahman associated with *māyā* different from pure Brahman or identical with it? If it be identical with pure Brahman, then it cannot suffer bondage. If it is not identical, then the question is whether it is eternal or non-eternal: if it is not eternal, then it will be destroyed, and there will be no emancipation; if it is eternal, then one has to admit that the *māyā* and Brahman remain eternally associated, which virtually means the ultimate reality of two entities. If it is urged that Brahman in pure essence is one, though He appears as many in association with the *upādhi*, the simple reply is that, if the pure essence can be associated with *upādhi*, the essence in itself cannot be regarded as pure. To say that the *upādhi* is false is meaningless, because the concepts of falsehood and *upādhi* are mutually interdependent. Nor can it be said that this is due to beginningless *karma*; for, unless the plurality of the *upādhis* can be proved, the plurality of the *karma* cannot be proved either, as the two concepts are interdependent. So the monistic view is contradicted by all our means of knowledge; and all the *śruti* texts support the pluralistic view. Both the *māyā* and the Brahman are incapable of description on a monistic view; it is difficult too to realize how the Brahman or the monist can express Himself; for, if He is one and there is no activity, He ought not to be able to express Himself. If He cannot express Himself to others who do not exist, He cannot express Himself to Himself either; for self-action is impossible (*na ca svenāpi jñeyatvam tair ucyate karṭṛ-karma-virodhāt*). There cannot be any knowledge without a knower; the knowledge that is devoid of the knower and the known is empty and void, since none of us has experienced any knowledge where there is no knowledge and the knower.

The *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya* of Madhva had a comment called the *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya-ṭikā* by Jaya-tīrtha, *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya-ṭikā-ṭippanī* by Keśavasvāmin, *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya-ṭippanī* by Śrīnivāsa and Padmanābha-tīrtha, *Bhaktabodha* by Raghūttama; it had also another commentary, called *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya-ṭikopanyāsa*. Besides these there were independent works on the lines of *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya* called *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya-vākyārtha* and Vanamālī Miśra's *Viṣṇu-tattva-prahāsa*¹.

The *Nyāya-vivaraṇa* of Madhva is a work of more than six hundred granthas, which deals with the logical connection of the different chapters of the *Brahma-sūtra*. A number of commentaries was written on it, by Viṭṭhala-sutānanda-tīrtha, Mudgalānanda-tīrtha, and Raghūttama; Jaya-tīrtha also wrote on it the *Nyāya-vivaraṇa-pañjikā*. Rāghavendra, Vijayīndra and Vādirāja wrote respectively *Nyāya-muktāvalī*, *Nyāya-mauktikamālā*, and *Nyāya-ratnāvalī*, on the lines of Madhva's *Nyāya-vivaraṇa*. Madhva wrote it after he had finished his *Bhāṣya*, *Anubhāṣya* and *Anuvyākhyāna*; it is needless for us to follow the work in detail, but we may briefly indicate Madhva's manner of approach. He says that the *Brahma-sūtra* was written in order to discredit the monistic interpretations of the Upaniṣads. Thus with the monist Brahman cannot be a subject of enquiry, because He is self-luminous; in opposition to this view the *Brahma-sūtra* starts with the thesis that Brahman, being the supreme person who is full of all qualities, can hardly be known by our finite minds. There is then a natural enquiry regarding the extent of the greatness of the supreme being, and in the second *sūtra* it is shown that Brahman cannot be identical with the individual selves, because He is the source from which the world has come into being and it is He who supports the world also. In the third *sūtra* we learn that the Brahman-causality of the world cannot be known except through scripture; in the fourth we read that the scriptures from which we can know the Brahman cannot be any other than the Upaniṣads. In this way, all through his first chapter, Madhva tries to show that, if we interpret the doubtful *śruti* texts on the basis of those whose meanings are clear and definite, we find that they too declare the superiority and transcendence of the supreme Lord. The same process of reconciling the *śruti* texts with

¹ *ato jñātṛ-jñeyābhāvāt jñānam api śūnyataiva; ataḥ śūnya-vādān na kaścid viśeṣaḥ; na ca jñātṛ-jñeya-rahitaṃ jñānam kvacid dṛṣṭam. Op. cit. p. 275 (17).*

the idea of showing the transcendence of God over individual selves goes on through the remaining chapters of the first book. In dealing with the fourth book Madhva discusses his pet view that not all persons can be liberated, since only a few can be worthy of liberation¹. He further says that God must be worshipped continually by chanting His excellent qualities every day. The scriptural duties as well as meditation (*dhyāna*) and its accessories (postures, etc.) are to be carried out; without meditation there cannot be a direct intuition of God². It cannot be urged that with the rise of knowledge all *karmas* are destroyed and salvation comes by itself; for knowledge can remove only the unripe (*aprārabdha*) *karmas*. The fruit of the *prārabdha* or ripe *karmas* has to be enjoyed till they are exhausted. Thus Madhva favours the doctrine of *jīvanmukti*. Though it has been said that the rise of true knowledge removes the *aprārabdha karmas*, yet the real agency belongs to God; when the true knowledge rises in a man, God is pleased, and He destroys the unripe *karmas*³. At the time of death all wise persons pass on to fire and from there to *vāyu*, which takes them to Brahman, since it is only through *vāyu* that one can approach Brahman. Those who return to the world pass through smoke; and there are others who because of their sinful character pass on to the lowest world. Even in the state of salvation the emancipated beings enjoy devotion as pure bliss.

The *Tantra-sāra-saṃgraha* of Madhva is a work of four chapters on ritual, which deals with the methods of worshipping Viṣṇu by the use of mantras; and various processes of ritualistic worship are described. It is commented upon by Chalāri-nṛsiṃhācārya, Chalāri-śeṣācārya, Raghunātha Yati and Śrinivāsācārya. Jaya-tīrtha wrote in verse a small work called *Tantra-sāroka-pūjāvaidhi*; Śrinivāsācārya also wrote a small work on the same lines, the *Tantra-sāra-mantroddhāra*.

Madhva wrote also another small work, called *Sadācāra-smṛti*, in forty verses; this too is a work on rituals, describing the normal duties of a good *vaiṣṇava*. There is a commentary by Droṇācārya (*Sadācāra-smṛti-vyākhyā*).

¹ *mahā-phalatvāt sarveṣāṃ aśaktyā eva upapannatvāt; anyathā sarva-puruṣāṣa-kyasyaiva sādhanatayā sarveṣāṃ mokṣāpatteḥ. Nyāya-vivaraṇa, p. 16(a).*

² *dhyānam vinā aparokṣa-jñānākhyā-viśeṣa-kāryānupapatteḥ. Ibid.*

³ *karmāṇi kṣapayed viṣṇur aprārabdhāni vidyayā prārabdhāni tu bhogena kṣapayan svam padam nayet. Ibid. 16.*

He wrote also another small work, called *Kṛṣṇāṃṛta-mahārṇava*. The present writer has not been able to trace any commentary on it. It consists of two hundred and forty-two verses, describing the forms of worshipping Viṣṇu, and emphasizes the indispensable necessity of continual meditation on the super-excellent nature of God and of worshipping Him; it speaks also of repentance and meditation on God's name as a way of expiation of sins. Madhva further says that in this present Kali age *bhakti* of God is the only way to emancipation. Meditation on God alone can remove all sins¹; no ablutions, no asceticism are necessary for those who meditate on God; the name of God is the only instrument for removing sins. So the whole of the *Kṛṣṇāṃṛta-mahārṇava* describes the glory of God, as well as the methods of worshipping Him; and, further, the duties of the good *vaiṣṇavas* during the important *tithis*.

Madhva wrote another small work, the *Dvādaśa-stotra*, consisting of about one hundred and thirty verses. No commentary on this has been traced by the present writer.

He wrote also another very small work, in two verses, the *Narasimha-nakha-stotra*, and another, the *Yamaka-bhārata*, of eighty-one verses. This latter was commented upon by Yadupati and Timmaṇṇa Bhaṭṭa; and in it Madhva describes the story of Kṛṣṇa in brief, including the episodes of Vṛndāvana and that of Hastināpur in association with the Pāṇḍavas.

He wrote also the *Rg-bhāṣya*, i.e., a commentary on some selected verses of the *Rg-veda*, which was commented upon by Jaya-tīrtha, Śrinivāsā-tīrtha, Venkaṭa, Chalāri-nṛsiṃhācārya, Rāghavendra, Keśavācārya, Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa and Satyanātha Yati. Two anonymous works are known to the present writer which were written on the lines of the *Rg-bhāṣya*; they are *Rg-artha-cūḍāmaṇi* and *Rg-arthoddhāra*. Rāghavendra Yati also wrote a work on the same lines, called *Rg-artha-mañjarī*. Madhva's commentary on the *Īsoṇiṣat* was commented on by Jaya-tīrtha, Śrinivāsa-tīrtha, Raghunātha Yati, Nṛsiṃhācārya and Satyaprajña Yati, and Rāghavendra-tīrtha wrote a separate work on *Īśa*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka* and *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣads*, which follows Madhva's line of interpretation of these Upaniṣads. Madhva's

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*smaranād eva kṛṣṇasya pāpasamghaṭṭapañjarah
śatadhā bhedaṁ āyāti girir vajrāhato yathā.*

Kṛṣṇāṃṛta-mahārṇava, verse 46.

commentary on the *Aitareyopaniṣad* was commented upon by Tāmraparṇī Śrīnivāsa, Jaya-tīrtha, Viśveśvara-tīrtha and Nārāyaṇa-tīrtha; and Narasiṃha Yati wrote a separate treatise, the *Aitareyopaniṣad-khaṇḍārtha*, on which a commentary, the *Khaṇḍārtha-prakāśa*, was written by Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha. The *Kāthopaniṣad-bhāṣya* of Madhva was commented upon by Vedeśa. Vyāsa-tīrtha wrote a commentary, the *Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭīkā*, on Madhva's *Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya*, while Rāghavendra-tīrtha wrote a separate work (the *Kenopaniṣad-khaṇḍārtha*). The *Chāndogyopaniṣad-bhāṣya* of Madhva was commented upon by Vyāsa-tīrtha; Vedeśa and Rāghavendra-tīrtha wrote a separate work, the *Chāndogyopaniṣad-khaṇḍārtha*. The *Talavakāra-bhāṣya* of Madhva had the following commentaries: the *Talavakāra-bhāṣya-ṭīkā*, by Vyāsa-tīrtha, and *Talabavāra-tippaṇī*, by Vedeśa-bhikṣu; Nṛsiṃha-bhikṣu wrote the *Talavakāra-khaṇḍārtha-prakāśikā*. The *Praśnopaniṣad-bhāṣya* of Madhva was commented upon by Jaya-tīrtha in the *Praśnopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭīkā*, which had two commentaries, the *Praśnopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭīkā-tippaṇa* by Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya* of Madhva had commentaries (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-ṭīkā*) by Raghūttama, Vyāsa-tīrtha and Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha, and Raghūttama Yati wrote a separate work on it, called the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāva-bodha*. The *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-bhāṣya* of Madhva had two commentaries on it, by Vyāsa-tīrtha and Kṛṣṇācārya, and Rāghavendra Yati wrote a separate work on it, the *Māṇḍūkyakhaṇḍārtha*. The *Muṇḍakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* of Madhva has the following commentaries: the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭīkā* by Vyāsa-tīrtha and Nārāyaṇa-tīrtha; *Muṇḍakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭīkā-tippaṇī* by Kṛṣṇācārya; and *Muṇḍakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vyākhyā* by Nṛsiṃha-bhikṣu.

Teachers and Writers of the Madhva School.

Historical enquiry about the Madhvas was probably first started by Kṛṣṇasvāmī Ayer, with a paper in which he tried to solve the question of the age of Madhva¹: but he was not in a position to utilize the archaeological data as was done by H. Kṛṣṇa Śāstri². The conclusions at which he arrived were in some

¹ *Madhvācārya, a Short Historical Sketch*, by C. N. Kṛṣṇasvāmī Ayer, M.A.

² See his article, *Epigraphica Indica*, vol. vi, pp. 260-8.

cases against the records of the Madhva *maṭhas*, and the Madhva-Siddhānta Unnāhīnī Sabhā, which is annually held at a place near Tirupati, took serious objections to his statements; Subba Rao, in the introduction to his translation of the *Gītā-bhāṣya* of Madhva, severely criticized Kṛṣṇa Śāstrī for his orthodox bias, stating that he was not posted in all the facts of the question¹. Later on C. M. Padmanābhācārya also tried to deal with the subject, utilizing the epigraphical data, but only partially²; his book deals with all the central facts of Madhva's life according to the traditional accounts.

We have already dealt with the outline of Madhva's life. Madhva, on his way from Badarikāśram to South India, had met Satya-tīrtha and had journeyed together with him through the Vaṅga and Kalinga countries. In the Telugu country Madhva was challenged by Śobhana Bhaṭṭa, a famous monist, who was defeated and converted to Madhva faith. This Śobhana Bhaṭṭa was then styled Padmanābha-tīrtha. Madhva had dispute with another scholar who was a prime minister in the Kalinga country; he too was converted by Madhva, and was called Narahari-tīrtha. In the meantime the Kalinga king had died, leaving an infant son, and Narahari-tīrtha was asked to take charge of the child and administer the state on his behalf. At the instance of Madhva Narahari carried on the regency for twelve years and brought out for him the images of Rāma and Sītā which were in the treasury of the Kalinga kingdom. Madhva at one time had a hot discussion leading to a dispute with Padma-tīrtha, a prominent monist of the locality, who, upon being defeated, fled, carrying with him the library of Madhva; at the intercession, however, of a local chieftain, Jayasiṃha, the books were restored. Later on Madhva defeated another monist, Trivikrama Paṇḍita, who became converted to the Madhva faith, and wrote the *Madhva-vijaya*. After the death of Madhva Padmanābha-tīrtha became pontiff and was succeeded by Narahari-tīrtha; we have already given the list of the pontiffs in succession, with their approximate dates as far as they are available from the list of the Madhva *gurus* in the Madhva *maṭhas* of the South. In an article on the outline history of the Madhvācāryas

¹ See *The Bhagavadgītā*, by Subba Rao, M.A., printed at the Minerva Press, Madras.

² *The Life of Madhvācārya*, by C. M. Padmanābhācārya, printed at the Progressive Press, Madras.

G. Venkoba Rao gives the following chronology of the principal facts of Madhva's life: birth of Madhva, śaka 1118; assumption of holy orders, śaka 1128; tour to the South; pilgrimage to Badari; conversion of Śobhana Bhaṭṭa, Śyāmasāstrī and Govinda Bhaṭṭa; second tour to Badari; beginning of Narahari's regency, śaka 1186; end of Narahari's regency, śaka 1197; death of Madhvācārya and accession of Padmanābha, śaka 1197; death of Padmanābha-tīrtha, śaka 1204; Narahari's pontificate, śaka 1204-5.

Grierson, in his article on the *Madva-charita* in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (vol. VIII), thinks that the influence of Christianity on Madhvaism is very apparent; he says that Madhva's birth-place was either in the ancient city of Kalyānapura or close to it. Kalyānapura has always been reputed one of the earliest Christian settlements in India; these Christians were Nestorians. Again, among the legends described in Nārāyaṇa's *Madhva-vijaya* there is one which holds that the spirit of the deity Anantēśvara appeared to a Brahman and made him a messenger of good news to proclaim that the kingdom of Heaven was at hand. The child, Madhva, was being led through a forest by his parents when their passage was obstructed by evil spirits, who, being rebuked by Madhva, fled away. The child Madhva was at one time missed by his parents at the age of five and he was found teaching the way to worship Viṣṇu according to the śāstras. In his tour in the Southern districts Madhva is said to have increased the store of food to meet the needs of his followers. In his Northern tour he walked over water without wetting his feet, and on another occasion he pacified the angry sea by his stern look. From these miracles attributed to him, and from the facts that there is great similarity between the *bhakti* doctrine of Madhva and the devotionism of the Christians, and that Madhva flourished in a place where there were Christians, Grierson thinks that Madhvaism had an element of Christian influence. The fact also that according to Madhva salvation can be secured only through the intermediary of the wind god *Vāyu* has been interpreted in favour of the above thesis. I think, however, that there is not sufficient ground in these arguments for tracing a Christian influence on Madhva. The doctrine of *bhakti* is very old, and can be traced in a fairly developed form even in some of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic verses, the *Gītā*, the *Mahābhārata* and the earlier *Purāṇas*. There may have been some Christians in

Kalyānapura, but there is no evidence that they were of such importance as to influence the orthodox faith of Madhva. He, like all other teachers, urges again and again that his doctrines are based on the Vedas, the *Gītā*, the *Pañcarātras* and the *Mahābhārata*; nor do we find any account of discussion between Madhva and the Christians; and he is never reported to have been a polyglot or to have had access to Christian literature. Though occasionally *vāyu* is accepted as an intermediary, yet the main emphasis is on the grace of God, depending upon the knowledge of God; there is not the slightest trace of any Trinity doctrine in Madhva's school of thought. Thus the suggestion of a probable Christian influence seems to be very far-fetched. Burnell, however, supports the idea in his paper in *The Indian Antiquary*, 1873-4; but Garbe considers it probable that Kalyānapura might have been another Kalyāna, in the north of Bombay, while Grierson thinks that it must have been the Kalyāna in Udipi, which is close to Malabar.

Burnell again points out that before the beginning of the ninth century some Persians had settled at Manigramma, and he further suggests that these Persians were Manicheans. But Burnell's view was successfully controverted by Collins, though he could not deny the possibility that "Manigramma" was derived from the name Manes (*manī*). Grierson supports the idea of Burnell, and co-relates it with the peculiar story of Maṇimat, the demon supposed to have been born as Śaṅkara, a fabulous account of whom is given in the *Maṇimañjarī* of Nārāyaṇa. It cannot be denied that the introduction of the story of Maṇimat is rather peculiar, as Maṇimat plays a very unimportant part as the opponent of Bhīma in the *Mahābhārata*; but there is practically nothing in the philosophy or theology of Śaṅkara, which is a form of dualism wherein two principles are acknowledged, one light (God) and the other darkness.

Padmanābha-tīrtha succeeded Madhva in the pontificate in A.D. 1197 and died in 1204; he wrote a commentary on the *Amuvyāk-hāna*, the *Ṣaṇṇyāya-ratnāvalī*. Narahari-tīrtha, who is said to have been a personal disciple of Madhva, held the pontificate from 1204 to 1213¹; he wrote a *ṭippanī* on the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Madhva. We do not know of any work by Mādhava-tīrtha, the next pontiff

¹ For a discussion on Narahari's career and date see *Epigraphica Indica*, vol. vi, p. 206, etc.

(1213-30). Akṣobhya-tīrtha held the pontificate from 1230 to 1247, and then Jaya-tīrtha from 1247 to 1268. It is held by some that he was a pupil not only of Akṣobhya-tīrtha, but also of Padmanābha-tīrtha¹; he was the most distinguished writer of the Madhva school, and composed many commentaries of a very recondite character, e.g., *Rg-bhāṣya-ṭīkā* on Madhva's *Rg-bhāṣya*, *Vyākhyāna-vivaraṇa* on Madhva's *Īsopaniṣad-bhāṣya*, *Praśnopaniṣad-bhāṣya-ṭīkā*, *Prameya-dīpikā* on the *Gītā-bhāṣya*, *Nyāya-dīpikā* on the *Gītā-tātparyā-nirṇaya*, and *Tattva-prakāśikā* on the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*. His most learned and incisive work, however, is his *Nyāya-sudhā*, which is a commentary on the *Anuvyākhyāna* of Madhva; it is a big work. He begins by referring to Akṣobhya-tīrtha as his teacher. The work forms the principal source-book of most of the writers of the Madhva school; it was commented upon by Rāghavendra Yati in a work called *Nyāya-sudhā-parimala*. C. M. Padmanābhacārya says of the *Nyāya-sudhā* that in the whole range of Sanskrit literature a more masterly commentary is unknown.

Rāmānuja and Madhva.

We know that the system of Madhva, being a defence of dualism and pluralism, regarded Śaṅkara and his followers as its principal opponents, and therefore directed its strongest criticism against them. Madhva flourished in the thirteenth century, and by that time many of the principal exponents of monism, like Vācaspati, Prakāśātman, Sureśvara and others, had written scholarly treatises in support of the monistic philosophy of Śaṅkara. Madhva and his followers, Jaya-tīrtha, Vyāsa-tīrtha and others, did their best to refute the monistic arguments for the falsity of the world, and to establish the reality and the plurality of the world and the difference between self and Brahman, which latter was conceived as a personal God. They in their turn were attacked by other writers of the Śaṅkara school, and we have a long history of attacks and counter-attacks between the members of these two important schools of thought. But readers may naturally be curious about the relation between the school of Madhva and the school of Rāmānuja. Madhva himself says little or nothing

¹ Helmuth von Glasenapp, *Madhva's Philosophie des Viṣṇu-Glaubens*, 1923, p. 52.

which may be interpreted as a direct attack upon his predecessor Rāmānuja; but in later times there is evidence of recondite disputes between the followers of the Rāmānuja school and those of the Madhva. For instance, Parakāla Yati, in the sixteenth century, wrote *Vijayīndra-parājaya*, which is evidently a treatise containing refutations of some of the most important doctrines of the Madhva philosophy. It seems desirable to give a short account of this treatise, which is rare and available only in a manuscript form.

Parakāla Yati takes his views from Venkṭa's *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, and often quotes verses from it in support of his own views. His attack is made upon Madhva's view which discards the Rāmānuja division of categories (*dravya*, "substance," and *adravya*, "non-substance") and his view of the qualities as constituents of the substance; and this forms the subject-matter of the first two sections of the *Vijayīndra-parājaya*.

In describing Madhva's position upon the question of difference between substance and qualities, the writer says that the Madhvas think that the expression "the blue jug" is justified by the fact that the "blueness" enters into the "sufficient description" of the jug and has no separate existence from it. It is wrong, they say, to affirm that the qualities of the jug stood apart from the jug and entered into it at any particular moment; the conception of the jug carries with it all of its qualities, and these have no separate existence, that is, they are *a-prthak-siddha* from the jug. Parakāla Yati points out that, since we know that the unqualified jug assumes a blue colour by heat, the blue colour may be regarded as different from the jug¹. The qualities, colour etc., have the substance as their support, and they may flow into it or not according to circumstances or conditions. It cannot be said that the determining condition for the influx of qualities is nothing but the nature of the substance, consisting of inseparability from the qualities; for the possibility of such an inseparable association is the matter under dispute and cannot therefore be taken as granted; moreover, the existence of an *upādhi* is relevant only when the entities are different and when the association of the *hetu* with the *sādhya* is true only under certain

¹ *ghaṭe pākena nailyam utpannam ityananyathā-siddha-pratyakṣam ca tatra pramāṇam kiñca rūpādi svādhikaraṇād bhīnam svāsthye sphāre asya āgamopādhi-dharmatvāt. Vijayīndra-parājaya, p. 3 (MS.).*

circumstances; in which case these circumstances are called the determining condition of association (*upādhi*)¹.

But, if the Madhvas argue that even the Rāmānujas admit the inseparable nature of substance and qualities, to this the reply would be that according to Rāmānuja *a-prthak-siddhatva* or “inseparability” only means that at the time of the union (of the quality and the substance) the constituent elements cannot be separated². The mere fact that the expression “blue jug” apparently means the identity of the blueness and the jug without any qualifying suffix denoting “possession” should not be regarded as actually testifying to the identity of “blue” and the jug. The Madhvas themselves do not regard the blueness and jugness as the same and so they have to admit that blueness somehow qualifies the jug. Such an admission would repudiate their own theory³. If blueness as something different from blue be associated with lotus-ness, then the admission of the fact that, when the words blue and lotus are used adjectivally and substantively with the same suffix, they mean one and the same identical thing is by itself no sound logic. If they are understood as different, then one is substance and the other is not.

As a matter of fact our perceptual experience discloses a qualified character of all substances and qualities. No true follower of the Upaniṣads can believe that perception reveals the pure indeterminate nature of being. If no distinction can be made out between characters and substances, then it will not be possible to distinguish one substance from another; for one substance is distinguished from another only by reason of their characters.

Moreover, the distinction between substance and qualities is evident from other *pramāṇas* also. Thus a blind man can dispute about the touch-feeling of an object, but he cannot do so about the colour. So the colour and touch-feeling have to be regarded as distinct from the object itself. Moreover, we speak of a jug as having colour, but we do not say that a jug is colour. So it must be

¹ *na ceha aprthak-siddhatvam upādhistasya sādhyarūpatve sādhana-vyāpakatvād bheda-ghaṭito hi vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāvah.*

Vijayindra-parājaya.

² *rūpāder madīyam aprthak-siddhatvaṃ saṃsaktam paṭe anyatra netum aśakyatvam eva. tac ca tadrūpābhāve'pi rūpāntareṇa dharma-sattayā avirodhitayā na prthaksiddhatvena virudhyate. Ibid.*

³ *tasya tvayā'pi akhaṇḍārthatvānabhyupagamāt viśiṣṭārthatve tvad-abhimata-siddheḥ. Ibid. p. 4.*

admitted that a denial on Madhva lines of the classification of categories as *dravya* and *adravya* is illogical; it must be held that the *adravya*, though entirely different from *dravya*, remains in association with it and expresses its nature as characters of qualities. Parakāla Yati then takes up a number of Upaniṣad passages and tries to show that, if distinction of qualities and substances is not admitted, then most of the *śruti* texts are inadmissible.

There are some Madhvas who hold that there is both difference and identity, and that even with careful observation the *dravya* and the *adravya* cannot be distinguished, and therefore no distinction can be made between *dravya* and *adravya* as the Rāmānujas make. To this Parakāla Yati replies that the rule that determines the reality of anything must be based upon the principle of non-contradiction and then unconditional invariability¹. The expression "blue jug," wherein the "jugness" and "blueness" may appear in one, may be contradicted by other equally valid expressions, such as "blueness in jug," "blue-coloured jug," and it would thus be ineffective to determine the nature of reality merely by following the indication of the expression "blue jug", which may show an apparent identity between the blue and the jug. The very fact that the jug appears as qualified shows that it has a distinction in the quality that qualifies it. Nor can it be said that because a particular colour is always associated with a particular substance that colour and substance are one and the same; for a conch-shell associated with white colour may also sometimes appear as yellow. Moreover, when one substance carries with it many qualities, it cannot be regarded as being at the same time identical with all the manifold qualities². The distinction of substances on the basis of qualities will also be erroneous, if, like qualities, the special natures of the substances be themselves naturally different³. If a thing can be at the same time identical with many qualities, then that involves acceptance of the Jaina view of *saptabhaṅgī*. Thus, from whatever point of view the Madhva attempt to refute the classification of *dravya* and *adravya* is examined, it is found to be faulty and invalid.

¹ *yastu abādhitō nānyathā-siddhaś ca pratyayaḥ sa evārthaṃ vyavasthāpayati. Ibid.*, p. 30.

² *kiñca paraspara-bhinnair guṇair ekasya guṇinaḥ abhedo'pi na ghaṭate iti tad-abhedopajīvanena ity uktir api ayuktā.... Ibid.* p. 33.

³ *guṇagata-bheda-vyavahāro nir-nibandhanaś ca syāt yadi guṇavat guṇidharma-viśeṣaḥ svata eva syāt. Ibid.*

One of the important doctrines in which Madhva differs from others is that the experience in emancipation is not the same with all saints or emancipated persons. This view is supported by some of the *Purāṇas* and also accepted by the Vaiṣṇavas of the Gauḍīya school; but the Rāmānujas as well as the Śāṅkarites were strongly against it, and therefore the followers of the Rāmānuja school criticized Madhva strongly on this point. Thus Śrīnivāsa Ācārya wrote a separate *prakaraṇa* work called *Ānanda-tāratamya-khaṇḍana*. But a much longer and more critical attempt in this direction was made by Parakāla Yati in the fourth chapter of his *Vijajindra-parājaya*. Both these works exist in manuscript.

In the fourth chapter of the fourth book of the *Brahma-sūtra* the question of how the emancipated ones enjoy their experience after emancipation is discussed. It is said here that it is by entering into the nature of the supreme Lord that the emancipated beings participate in the blissful experiences by their mere desire (*samkalpa*). There are however others who hold that the emancipated enjoy the blissful experiences directly through themselves, through their bodies, as mere attempts of intelligence. It is because in the emancipated state one is entitled to all kinds of blissful experiences that one can regard it as a state of *summum bonum* or the highest good. But the emancipated persons cannot have all the enjoyable experiences that the supreme Lord has; each individual soul is limited by his own rights and abilities, within which alone his desires may be rewarded with spontaneous fruition. Thus each emancipated person is entitled to certain types of enjoyment, limited by his own capacity and rights.

Again, in the third chapter of the third book of the *Brahma-sūtra* different types of worship are prescribed for different people: and such a difference of worship must necessarily mean difference in the attainment of fruits also. Thus it must be admitted that in the state of emancipation there are grades of enjoyment, experienced by emancipated persons of different orders.

This view is challenged by the Rāmānujas, who refer to the textual quotations of the Upaniṣads. The passages in the *Brahmā-nanda-vallī* of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, where different kinds of pleasures are associated with men, *gandharvas* and other beings, are not to be interpreted as different kinds of pleasures enjoyed by different kinds of emancipated beings. According to the Rāmānuja

view individuals in an unemancipated state are under the complete control of the supreme Lord. But in the emancipated state, when they become free, they are all in harmony with God and share and participate in all His joys; they are parts of Him. The emancipated person is like a good wife who has no separate will from her husband and enjoys with her husband all that he does or feels. Thus the emancipated souls, being completely associated with God, enjoy and participate in all His joys: and there cannot be any degrees of enjoyment among the different emancipated persons¹. Sense-enjoyment, however, is not possible, as such enjoyment of Brahman at the time of emancipation would have to be the experience of the nature of Brahman, and Brahman Himself also has the self-realizing experience; this enjoyment, therefore, being only of the nature of the self-realizing experience of Brahman, cannot have any degrees or grades in it. The enjoyment of ordinary men, being of a sensuous nature, is only the contraction and expansion of their intelligence, and is therefore distinguishable into higher or lower, greater or smaller grades or degrees of enjoyment. The Madhvas think that in the stage of emancipation there are many diverse kinds of experiences, and consequently that there are degrees or grades of enjoyment associated with such experience in accordance with the capacity of the saint; but all the scriptural texts indicate that at the time of salvation one has the experience of the nature of Brahman, and, if this were admitted, there could not possibly be degrees or grades in emancipation.

In the fifth chapter Parakāla Yati, continuing the discussion, says that there is no difference in the enjoyment attained at emancipation on the ground that the methods of approaching God may be different with different persons; for, however different the methods may be, the results attained are the same, viz., the realization of the nature of Brahman. There may be some beings who are capable of greater *bhakti* or devotion and some who are capable of less, but that does not make any difference in the attainment of the final

¹ *pāratantryam pare pumsī prāpya nirgata-bandhanah
svātantryam atulam prāpya tenaiva saha modate
iti muktāḥ svadehātīyaye karma-nāśāc ca svatantraśeṣ atvena śarīratayā bhoktur
brahmaṇa eva icchām anusṛtya svānuṣaṅgika-tulya-bhogo phalaka-tad-bhaktyaivop-
pakaraṇa-bhūtāḥ yathā patnī-vyāpārādayaḥ patyur evaṃ muktānām śāstra-siddhāḥ
parasparavyāpārā api brahmaṇa eva sarvaśarīrakatayā śarītrīṇy eva śarītra-bhoga-
nyāyāt. Vijayindra-paraṇaya, p. 43.*

mukti, and, *mukti* being the same for all, its enjoyment must also be the same. The analogy of the different kinds of sacrifices leading to different results does not apply to this case; for these sacrifices are performed by external means and therefore their results may be different; but emancipation is attained by spiritual means, viz., *bhakti*. The argument that the bliss of the emancipated, being the bliss of an individual self, cannot be of the same nature is not valid either; for in the emancipated state the individuals enjoy the bliss of the realization of Brahman, which is homogeneous and ubiquitous. It is wrong too to argue that the bliss of the emancipated, being like the bliss that we experience in our worldly lives, must be capable of degrees of enjoyment. The argument that, since we have a sufficient description or definition of Brahman in regarding it as superlatively blissful, individuals cannot in the same sense be regarded as superlatively blissful, is invalid; for, since the Brahman is limitless (*ananta*), it will be wrong to limit it by such a definition as the above, since it is inapplicable to Him. The question of its conflict with the individuals who are superlatively blissful in the state of emancipation does not arise. It is also wrong to say that the bliss of Brahman, being possessed by Brahman, cannot be enjoyed by anybody else, since enjoyment (*bhoga*) really means favourable experience; the wife may thus enjoy the good qualities of her husband, the teacher of his pupil, the parents of their son. The emancipated person realizes the identity of Brahman in himself, and this realization of the nature of Brahman in himself is bliss in the superlative degree. It does not imply any decrease of qualities of Brahman, but it means that in realizing the qualities in oneself one may find supreme bliss¹.

¹ *yady atra tadtyatvena taccheṣatvaṃ tarhi rājapuruṣa-bhogye rājñi vyabhicāraḥ, bhogo hi svāmukūlatva-prakāraka-sākṣātkāraḥ tadviśayatvaṃ eva bhogyatvaṃ, tac ca dāsam prati svāmini śiṣyaṃ praty ācārye putraṃ prati mātaraḥ pitari ca sarvānubhava-siddham. Vijayindra-parājaya, p. 124.*

CHAPTER XXVI

MADHVA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS

MADHVA not only wrote a *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtras*, but also described the main points of his views regarding the purport of the *Brahma-sūtras* in a work called the *Anuvyākhyāna*. Jaya-tīrtha wrote a commentary on the *Bhāṣya* of Madhva, known as *Tattva-prakāśikā*. Vyāsa Yati wrote another commentary on the *Tattva-prakāśikā*, the *Tātparya-candrikā*, in which he draws attention to and refutes the views of the Vedānta writers of other schools of interpretation and particularly of the Śāṅkara school¹. Rāghavendra Yati wrote a commentary on the *Tātparya-candrikā*, the *Candrikā-prakāśa*. Keśava Bhaṭṭāraka, a pupil of Vidyādhiśa, wrote another commentary on it, the *Candrikā-vākyārtha-vivṛti*, but it extends only to the first book. Rāghavendra Yati wrote another commentary on the *Tattva-prakāśikā*, the *Bhāva-dīpikā*, in which he answered the criticisms of his opponents and explained the topics in a simpler manner. In the present section I shall try to trace the interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtras* by Madhva in the light of these commentaries, noting its difference from the interpretation of Śāṅkara and his commentators. There are, of course, several other commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* and its first commentaries, as also on the *Anuvyākhyāna*. Thus Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya wrote a commentary, the *Tattva-pradīpikā*, on Madhva's *Bhāṣya*. Nṛsiṃha wrote a *Bhāva-prakāśa* and Vijayindra Yati a *Nyāyādhva-dīpikā* thereon. Again, on the *Tattva-prakāśikā* of Jaya-tīrtha there are at least five other commentaries, e.g., *Bhāva-candrikā*, *Tattva-prakāśikā-bhāva-bodha*, *Tattva-prakāśikā-gatanyāya-vivaraṇa*, *Nyāya-mauktikā-mālā* and *Prameya-muktāvalī* by Narasiṃha, Raghūttama Yati, Vijayindra Yati and Śrīnivāsa. On the *Tātparya-candrikā* there are at least two other commentaries, by Timmanācārya and Vijayindra Yati, called *Candrikā-nyāya-vivaraṇa* and *Candrikādarpaṇa-nyāya-vivaraṇa*. On the *Anuvyākhyāna* there is the *Nyāya-sudhā* of Jaya-tīrtha and *Sudhā*

¹ See Helmuth von Glasenapp's *Madhva's Philosophie des Vishnu-Glaubens*, Bonn and Leipzig, 1923, pp. 51-64.

of Vijayindra Yati; and on the *Nyāya-sudhā* there is a number of commentaries such as that by Nārāyaṇa, *Nyāya-sudhā-tippaṇī* by Yadupati, *Vākyārtha-candrikā* by Vidyādhiraṇṇa, and the commentary by Śrīnivāsa-tīrtha¹.

Interpretation of Brahma-sūtra I. I. I.

In commenting on the first *sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtra* (*athāto brahma-jijñāsā*, "now therefore Brahma-enquiry"), Śaṅkara holds that the word "now" (*atha* in Sanskrit) does not refer to any indispensable necessity for previous ritualistic performances of Vedic observances in accordance with Vedic injunctions as interpreted by the Mīmāṃsā canons, but that it refers only to the previous possession of moral qualifications, such as self-control, etc., after which one becomes fit for the study of Vedānta. The word "therefore" refers to the reason, consisting in the fact that the knowledge of Brahman alone brings about the superior painless state of all-blessedness, and justifies the enquiry of Brahman. As Brahman is the self, and as the self stands immediately revealed in all our perceptions, Brahman is also always directly known to us. But, as there are divergences of opinion regarding the nature of self, there is scope for Brahma-enquiry. So, though by the general knowledge of self, Brahman is known, the enquiry is necessary for the special knowledge of Brahman or the nature of self.

Madhva explains the reason (*ataḥ*) for Brahma-enquiry as being the grace of the Lord Viṣṇu—as greater favours from the Lord Viṣṇu can be acquired only by proper knowledge of Him, Brahma-enquiry, as a source of Brahma-knowledge, is indispensable for securing His favours. Brahma-enquiry is due to the grace of the great Lord; for He alone is the mover of all our mental states². There are, according to Madhva, three stages of fitness for the study of Vedānta. A studious person devoted to the Lord Viṣṇu is in the third, a person endowed with the sixfold moral qualifications of self-control, etc., is in the second, and the person who is solely attached to the Lord and, considering the whole world to be

¹ See Helmuth von Glasenapp's *Madhva's Philosophie des Viṣṇu-Glaubens*, Bonn and Leipzig, 1923, pp. 51-64.

² *atha-śabdasyātaḥ-śabdo hetu-arthe samudiritaḥ.*
parasya brahmaṇo Viṣṇoḥ prasādād iti vā bhavet.
sa hi sarva-mano-vṛtti-prerakaḥ samudāhṛtaḥ.

transitory, is wholly unattached to it, is in the first stage of fitness¹. Again, the performance of the Vedic observances can entitle us only to the inferior grace of the Lord, listening to the scriptural texts to a little higher degree of grace; but the highest grace of the Lord, leading to *mukti*, can be secured only through knowledge². Right knowledge can be secured only through listening to scriptural texts (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), meditation (*nididhyāsana*) and devotion (*bhakti*); no one acquires right knowledge without these. The word "Brahman", Madhva holds, means the great Lord Viṣṇu. One of the most important points which Madhva wishes to emphasize against Śaṅkara in regard to the first *sūtra*, as he brings out clearly in his *Nyāya-vivaraṇa*, consists in his belief that even the root meaning of Brahman means "the great" or "endowed with all qualities of perfection", and hence it cannot be identified with the imperfect individual souls, since we know from the Upaniṣads that the world sprang forth from it³. Our object in getting ourselves employed in Brahma-enquiry is the attainment of knowledge of Viṣṇu as the all-perfect One, from whom we imperfect beings are in a sense so different; Lord Viṣṇu will be pleased by this our knowledge of Him, and He will release us from our bondage. In the *Anuvyākhyāna* Madhva tries to emphasize the fact that our bondage is real, and that the release is also real, as effected by the grace of the Lord Viṣṇu. Madhva argues that, if sorrow, pain, etc.—all that constitutes bondage—were false and unreal, there would be some proof (*pramāṇa*) by which this is established. If such a proof exists, the system naturally becomes dualistic. The form-less and difference-less Brahman (according to Śaṅkara's view) cannot itself participate in any demonstration of proof. Also the falsehood of the world-appearance cannot be defined as that which is contradicted by knowledge (*jñāna-bādhyatva*); for, if the concept of Brahman is pure and differenceless intelligence, it cannot involve within it the notion that it is different from the world-appearance (*anyathātva*) or that it negates it, which is necessary if the Brahma-knowledge is said to

¹ *Ibid.*

² *karmaṇātrādhamaḥ proktaḥ
prasādaḥ śravaṇādibhir
madhyamo jñāna-sampattiyā
prasādas tūttamo mataḥ. Ibid.*

³ *Brahma-śabdena pūrṇa-guṇatvoktenānubhava-siddhālpaguno jīvaḥhedah.
Nyāya-vivaraṇa of Madhva, 1. 1. 1.*

contradict the world-appearance. When the Brahman is considered to stand always self-revealed, what is the *ajñāna* of Śaṅkara going to hide? If it is said that it hides the false differences of an objective world, then a further difficulty arises—that the false differences owe their existence to *ajñāna*, but, in order that *ajñāna* might hide them, they must be proved to have a separate existence independent of *ajñāna*, so that it may hide them. Here is then a clear case of a vicious circle; the very name *ajñāna* shows that it can yield no knowledge of itself and it is therefore false; but even then such a false entity cannot have any existence, as the want of knowledge and *ajñāna* are so related that we have either a vicious infinite (*anavasthā*) or a vicious circle (*anyonyāśraya*); for in any specific case ignorance of any entity is due to its *ajñāna*, and that *ajñāna* is due to a particular ignorance, and so on. Śaṅkara's interpretation thus being false, it is clear that our sorrow and bondage are real, and the Vedas do not hold that the Brahman and the individual souls are identical—for such an explanation would openly contradict our experience¹.

The *Tātparya-candrikā*, a recondite commentary by Vyāsa Yati on the *Tattva-prakāśikā* of Jaya-tīrtha, not only explains the purport of the *Bhāṣya* of Madhva, but always refers to and tries to refute the views of opponents on most of the disputed points². It raises a few important philosophical problems, in which it criticizes the views of the followers of Śaṅkara—Vācaspati, Prakāśātman and others—which could hardly be overlooked. Thus it refers to the point raised by Vācaspati in his *Bhāmatī*, a commentary on the *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, viz., that there is no validity in the objection that there is no necessity of any Brahma-enquiry on the ground that the individual soul, which is identical with Brahman, is directly and immediately experienced by us, and that even the extinction of nescience (*avidyā*) cannot be considered as the desired end, since, though the self is always experienced as self revealed, such an experience does not remove the *avidyā*; and that, since the notion of the ego is implied even in studying and understanding Vedāntic

¹ *satyatvāt tena duḥkḥhādeḥ pratyakṣeṇa virodhataḥ
na brahmatvaṃ vaded vedo jīvasya hi kathamcāna.*

Anuvyākhyāna, I. I. I.

² *prati-sūtram prakāśyeta ghaṭanāghaṭane mayā
svīyānya-pakṣayoḥ samyag vidāṃkurvantu sūrayaḥ.*

Op. cit. verse 10.

texts, the Vedāntic passages which seem to describe Brahman as the pure identity of subject-objectless intelligence, being and blessedness, have to be otherwise explained to suit our ordinary experience. For it is certain that the self-revealed Vedānta passages denote the Brahman of the above description, and, since these cannot have any other meaning, our so-called experience, which may easily be subject to error, has to be disbelieved. The result arrived at according to the *Bhāmati* then is that the unmistakable purport of the Vedānta texts is the differenceless reality, the Brahman, and that, since this pure Brahman is not directly revealed in experience (*śuddho na bhāti*), an enquiry regarding the nature of pure Brahman is justified¹.

The objection which Vyāsa-tīrtha raises against the above view of Vācaspati is that, if in our ordinary experience the “pure” does not reveal itself, what could this mean? Does it mean that that which does not reveal itself is a difference from the body, the negation of our character as doer and enjoyer, or non-difference between Brahman and *ātman*, or the negation of mere duality? But is this non-revealing entity different from the self? If so, then it is contrary to the general monistic Vedāntic conclusion; and, if it is urged that the existence of a negative entity will not involve a sacrifice of the monistic principle, it can be pointed out that such a view of negation has already been refuted in the work called *Nyāyāmṛta*. If such a non-revealing entity is false, then it cannot for the scriptures be the subject of instruction. If, again, it is held that it is the self (*ātman*) that does not reveal itself in experience, then this can be held only in the sense that *ātman* has two parts, that one part is revealed while the other is not, and that there is some imaginary or supposed difference (*kalpita-bheda*) between the two, such that, though the self is revealed (*grhīta*), its non-revealing (*abhāsamāna*) part (*aṁśa*) does not seem to have been revealed and experienced (*agrhīta iva bhāti*). But, if even this is the case, it is acknowledged that there is no real difference between any two supposed parts of the self; the non-appearing part must be endowed with an unreal and illusory difference (*kalpita-bheda*), and no Vedānta can undertake the task of instructing in the nature of such an illusory and non-appearing self. The non-appearing part may be either real or unreal; if it is unreal, as it must be on such a supposition, it cannot

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 15-17.

be an object of the Vedānta to instruct about its nature. For, if the illusory non-appearing remains even when the self is known, this illusion can never break; for all illusory images break with the true knowledge of the locus or the support (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of such illusions (e.g. with the knowledge of the conch-shell the illusory image of silver vanishes)¹. Moreover, the *ātman* is self-revealed, and so it cannot be said that it does not appear in experience as self-revealed (*svaprakāśatvena bhāvayogāt*). If it is argued that, though self-revealed, yet it may be covered by *avidyā*, the answer to such an objection is that, if the *avidyā* could cover the revelation of the self, the *avidyā* itself and its products such as pain, sorrow, etc., could not be revealed by it; for it is acknowledged that the revelation of these is effected by the self-revealing self². It is also evident that intelligence (*cit*) or the being self-revealed (*sphuratī*) cannot also remain not-revealed (*asphuratī*). Nor can it be held that, though pure intelligence is itself in its purity self-revealed (*sva-prakāśa*), yet, since it is opposed to *ajñāna* only through the mental states (*vyrtti*) and not by itself, and since ordinarily there is no *vyrtti* for itself, it can lie covered by the *ajñāna* and, being thus hidden in spite of its self-revealing character, can become a fit subject of enquiry. Such a supposition is not true; for, if the pure intelligence is not opposed to nescience (*ajñāna*), the sorrow, etc. which are directly known by pure intelligence should have remained covered by *ajñāna*. The view is that pleasure, pain, etc. cannot be considered to have a reality even while they are not perceived. A mental state or *vyrtti* of the form of an object is only possible when the object is already existent; for according to Vedānta epistemology the *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind must rush out through the senses and get itself transformed into the form of the object, and for this the object must exist previously; but feelings such as pleasure, pain, etc., have no existence except when they are felt; and, if it is said that a *vyrtti* is necessary to apprehend it, then it must be admitted to have a previous objective existence, which is impossible³. It must be admitted, therefore, that feelings are directly known by

¹ *adhiṣṭhāna-jñānasyaiva bhrama-virodhitayā tasmīn satyāpi bheda-bhramasya tan-nimittakāgrhātārōpasya vā abhyupagame nirvartakāntarasyābhāvāt tad-anivṛtti-prasaṅgāt. yad uktam abhāsamāno'ṁśa ātmātrikṭas cet satyo mithyā vā iti tatra mithyā-bhūta iti brūmaḥ. Candrikā-vākyārtha-vivṛti*, p. 18.

² *sva-prakāśasyāpi avidyā-vaśād abhāne avidyāder duḥkhaś ca prakāśo na syāt, tasya caitanyaprakāśādāhina prakāśāc copagamāt. Tātparya-candrikā*, p. 19.

³ *sukhāder jñātaikasattvābhāvāpātāt. Op. cit.* p. 20.

pure intelligence, without the intervention of a *vr̥tti* or mind-state, and that would be impossible if the *cit* had no opposition of *ajñāna*; for then the *cit* by itself would always have remained hidden, and there could not have been any apprehension of pain, etc.¹ Another point also arises in this connection in our consideration of the theory of perception of ordinary objects according to the Śaṅkara school of Vedānta. For it is held there that even in the mind-states corresponding to the perception of objects (such as "this jug") there is the revelation of pure intelligence as qualified by the mind-state-form of a jug; but if this is so, if our perception of jug means only the shining of pure intelligence (*cit*) with the mind-state-form of a jug added to it, then it cannot be denied that this complex percept necessarily involves the self-revelation of pure intelligence².

Further, it cannot be suggested that there is an appearance of an element of non-self (*anātman*) and that this justifies our enquiry; for, if this non-self shines forth as an extraneous and additional entity along with the self-revealing intelligence, then, since that does not interfere with the revelation of this pure intelligence, there is no occasion for such an enquiry. It is evident that this non-self cannot appear as identical (*tādātmya*) with the self; for, when the pure intelligence shines as such, there is no room for the appearance of any element of non-self in this manner (*adhiṣṭhāne tattvataḥ sphurati anātmāropāyogāc ca*). An analogy has been put forth by Vācaspati in his *Bhāmātī*, where he wishes to suggest that, just as the various primary musical tones, though intuitively apprehended in our ordinary untutored musical perception, can only be properly manifested by a close study of musical science (*gandharva-śāstra*), so the true Brahma-knowledge can dawn only after the mind is prepared by realizing the purport of the Vedānta texts and their discussions, and so, though in the first instance in our ordinary experience there is the manifestation of the self-revealing *cit*, yet the Brahma-enquiry is needed for the fuller realization of the nature of Brahman. But this analogy does not apply; for in the case of our knowledge of music it is possible to have a general apprehension which becomes gradually more and more differenti-

¹ *sva-rūpa-cito'jñāna-virodhitve tad-vedye duḥkhādāv ajñāna-prasaṅgāt.*

Candrikā, p. 20.

² *tvan-mate ayam ghaṭa ityādy-āparokṣa-vṛtteriṇi ghaṭādyavacchinna-cid-viśayatvāc ca. Ibid.*

ated and specially manifested with the close study of the musical science; but in the case of our knowledge of Brahman, the self-revealing intelligence, the self, this is not possible; for it is absolutely homogeneous, simple and differenceless—it is not possible to have a general and a special knowledge. It is the flash of simple self-revelation, absolutely without content, and so there cannot be any greater or lesser knowledge. For the very same reason there is no truth in the assertion contained in the *Bhāmātī*, that, though by a right understanding of the great Vedāntic text “that art thou” one may understand one’s identity with Brahman, yet owing to the objections of disputants there may be doubt about Brahman which might justify a Brahma-enquiry. For, when the simple contentless pure intelligence is once known, how can there be any room for doubt? So, since the pure monistic interpretations of certain Upaniṣad texts are directly contradicted by ordinary experience, some other kinds of suitable interpretations have to be made which will be in consonance with our direct experience.

The general result of all these subtle discussions is that the Śaṅkara point of view (that we are all identical with Brahma, the self-revealing *cit*) is not correct; for, had it been so, this self-revealing must be always immediately and directly known to us, and hence there would have been no occasion for the Brahma-enquiry; for, if the Brahman or the self is always directly known to us, there is no need for enquiry about it. As against the Śaṅkara point of view, the Madhva point of view is that the individual souls are never identical with Brahman; the various ordinary concepts of life are also real, the world is also real, and therefore no right knowledge can destroy these notions. If we were identical with Brahman, there would be no necessity for any Brahma-enquiry; it is only because we are not identical with Brahman that His nature is a fit subject of enquiry, because it is only by such knowledge that we can qualify ourselves for receiving His favour and grace, and through these attain emancipation. If the self is identical with Brahman, then, such a self being always self-revealed, there is no need of enquiry for determining the meaning of the Brahma part (*Brahma-kāṇḍa*) of the Vedas, as there is for determining the meaning of the *karma* part (*karma-kāṇḍa*) of the Vedas; for the meaning of the *Brahma-kāṇḍa* does not depend on anything else for its right comprehension (*dharmavad brahma-*

kāṇḍārthasyātmanah paraprakāśyatvābhāvāt)¹. Though such a Brahman is always self-revealed in our experience, yet, since by the realization of such a Brahman we are not in any way nearer to liberation (*mokṣa*), no benefit can be gained by this *Brahma*-enquiry. So the explanations of this *sūtra*, as given by Śāṅkara, are quite out of place. By Brahman is meant here the fullness of qualities (*guṇa-pūrṭti*), which is therefore different from *jīva*, which is felt as imperfect and deficient in qualities (*apūrṇa*)².

Madhva also disapproves of the view of Śāṅkara that *Brahma*-enquiry must be preceded by the distinction of eternal and non-eternal substances, disinclination from enjoyments of this life or of the other life, the sixfold means of salvation, such as self-control, etc., and desire for liberation. For, if we follow the *Bhāmatī*, and the eternal (*nitya*) and not-eternal (*anītya*) be understood as truth and falsehood, and their distinction, the right comprehension of Brahman, as the truth, and everything else as false (*brahmaiva satyam anyad anṛtam iti vivekaḥ*), then it may very well be objected that this requirement is almost the ultimate thing that can be attained—and, if this is already realized, what is the use of *Brahma*-enquiry? Or, if the self is understood as *nitya* and the non-self as *anītya*, then again, if this distinction is once realized, the non-self vanishes for good and there is no need to employ ourselves in discussions on the nature of Self. The explanation of the *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* is that the word *nityānītya-viveka* means the comprehension that the result of *Brahma*-knowledge is indestructible, whereas the result of *karma*, etc. is destructible (*dhvaṃsa-pratīyogī*). But this is not justifiable either; for the appearance of silver in the conch-shell being always non-existent (*atyantābhāva*), the word “destructible” is hardly applicable to it. If it is said that in reality the conch-shell-silver is non-existent (*pāramārthikatvā-kāreṇa atyantābhāvaḥ*), but in its manifested form it may be said to be destroyed (*svarūpeṇa tu dhvaṃsaḥ*), this is not possible either; for no definite meaning can be attached to the word “in reality” (*pāramārthika*), which is explained as being “non-contradiction” (*abādhyatva*); “non-contradiction” means “in reality”; and thus we have an argument in a circle (*anyonyāśraya*). *Brahma*, being

¹ *Tātparya-candrikā*, p. 36.

² *jijñāśya-brahma-śabdena guṇa-pūrty-abhidhāyinā apūrṇatvenānubhūtā jīvād bhinnam pratīyate. Ibid.* p. 46.

formless (*nirākāra*), might itself be considered as non-existent (*atyantābhāva-pratīyogitvasya nirākāre brahmany api sambhavāt*)¹.

Again, if, as the *Vivaraṇa* has it, even sense-objects (*viśaya*) serve only to manifest pleasure, which is but the essence of self (*ātma-svarūpa*), then there is no reason why the enjoyment of sense-objects should be considered different from the enjoyment of liberation. Again, the desire for liberation is also considered as a necessary requirement. But whose is this desire for liberation (*mumukṣutva*)? It cannot belong to the entity denoted by ego (*aham-artha*); for this entity does not remain in liberation (*aham-arthasya muktān ananvayāt*). It cannot be of the pure intelligence (*cit*); for that cannot have any desire. Thus the interpretations of the word "now" (*atha*), the first word of the *sūtra*, were objected to by the thinkers of the Madhva school. Their own interpretation, in accordance with the *Bhāṣya* of Madhva as further elaborated by Jaya-tīrtha, Vyāsa-tīrtha, Rāghavendra Yati and others, is that the word *atha* has, on the one hand, an auspicious influence, and is also a name of Nārāyaṇa². The other meaning of the word *atha* is that the enquiry is possible only after the desired fitness (*adhikārānantaryārthaḥ*)³. But this fitness for Brahma-enquiry is somewhat different from that demanded by the Śāṅkara school, the views of which I have already criticized from the Madhva point of view. Madhva and his followers dispense with the qualifications of *nityānitya-vastu-viveka*, and they also hold that desire for liberation must be illogical, if one follows the interpretation of Śāṅkara, which identifies *jīva* and Brahman. The mere desire for liberation is not enough either; for the *sūtras* themselves deny the right of Brahma-enquiry to the Śūdras⁴. So, though any one filled with the desire for liberation may engage himself in Brahma-enquiry, this ought properly to be done only by those who have studied the Upaniṣads with devotion, and who also possess the proper moral qualities of self-control, etc. and are disinclined to ordinary mundane enjoyments⁵.

¹ *Tātparya-candrikā*, p. 69.

² *evam ca atha-śabdo maṅgalārtha iti bhāṣyasya atha-śabdo vighnotsāraṇa-sādhāraṇakaram ātmakānanuṣṭheya-viṣṇu-smaraṇāthaśabdoccāraṇarūpa-maṅgala-prayojanakah praśastarūpānanuṣṭheya-rūpa-viṣṇu-abhidhāyakaś ca iti artha-dvayam draṣṭavyam. Ibid.* p. 77. The same view is also expressed in the *Tattva-pradīpa*, a commentary on Madhva's *Bhāṣya* by Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya.

³ *Anubhāṣya*.

⁴ *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 3. 34-8.

⁵ *mukti-yogyatva-bhakti-pūrvakādhyayana-śama-damādi-vairāgya-sampattirūpādhikārāpanena, etc. Tattva-prakāśikā-bhāva-dīpikā*, p. 12.

The word “therefore” (*ataḥ*) in the *sūtra* means “through the grace or kindness of the Lord Viṣṇu”; for without His grace the bondage of the world, which is real, cannot be broken or liberation attained. Jaya-tirtha in his *Nyāya-sudhā* on the *Anuvyākhyāna* of Madhva here anticipates an objection, viz., since liberation can be attained in the natural course through right knowledge, as explained by Śaṅkara and his followers on the one hand and the *Nyāya-sūtra* on the other, what is the usefulness of the intervention of Īśvara for producing liberation? All sorrow is due to the darkness of ignorance, and, once there is the light of knowledge, this darkness is removed, and it cannot therefore wait for the grace of any supposed Lord¹. The simplest answer to such an objection, as given in the *Nyāya-sudhā*, is that, the bondage being real, mere knowledge is not sufficient to remove it. The value of knowledge consists in this, that its acquirement pleases the Lord and He, being pleased, favours us by His grace so as to remove the bondage².

The word “Brahman” (which according to Śaṅkara is derived from the root *br̥hati-*, “to exceed” (*atīśayana*), and means eternity, purity and intelligence) means according to the Madhva school the person in whom there is the fullness of qualities (*br̥hanto hy asmin guṇāḥ*). The argument that acceptance of the difference of Brahman and the souls would make Brahman limited is not sound; for the objects of the world are not considered to be identical with Brahman nor yet as limiting the infinitude of Brahman; and the same sort of answer can serve in accepting the infinitude of Brahman as well as in accepting His difference from the souls³. The infinitude of Brahman should not therefore be considered only in the negative

¹ *tathā ca jñāna-svabhāva-labhyāyām muktau kim īśvara-prasādena; na hi andhakāra-nibandhana-duḥkha-nivṛttaye pradīpam upādadanāḥ kasyacit prabhok prasādam apeksante. Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 18.

² The *Tattva-prakāśikā* says that the letter *a* means Viṣṇu, and *ataḥ* therefore means through the grace of Viṣṇu: *akāra-vācyād viṣṇos tat-prasādāt*, p. 4. The *Bhāmāṇī*, however, following Śaṅkara, explains the word *ataḥ* as meaning “since the Vedas themselves say that the fruits of sacrifices are short-lived, whereas the fruits of Brahma-knowledge are indestructible and eternal”. So that through the Vedas we have disinclination from mundane and heavenly joys (*ihāmutra-phala-bhoga-virāgaḥ*), and these through Brahma-enquiry. But the *Candrikā* points out that such a connection with *vairāgya*, as signified by *ataḥ*, is remote and, moreover, the connection with *vairāgya* was already expressed by the word *atha*.

³ *Tātparyā-ṅkā*, pp. 89-93.

way, as not being limited by difference, but as being fullness in time, space and qualities; for otherwise even the Buddhist momentary knowledge would have to be considered as equal to Brahman, since it is limited neither by time nor by space¹.

Coming to the formation of the compound Brahma-enquiry (*brahma-jijñāsā*), the *Candrikā* points out that neither Śaṅkara nor his followers are justified in explaining Brahman as being in the objective case with reference to the verb implied in "enquiry" (*jijñāsā*); for Brahma—being pure and absolute intelligence, open only to direct intuition—cannot be the fit object of any enquiry which involves discussions and arguments². But, of course, in the Madhva view there cannot be any objection to Brahma being taken as the object of enquiry. According to both the *Nyāya-sudhā* and the *Tātparya-candrikā* the word "enquiry" (*jijñāsā*) in Brahma-enquiry (*brahma-jijñāsā*) means directly (*rūdhī*) argumentative reasoning (*manana*) and not desire to know, as the followers of Śaṅkara would suggest³. The object of Brahma-enquiry involving reasoned discussions is the determination of the nature of Brahman, whether He possesses the full perception of all qualities, or has only some qualities, or whether He has no qualities at all⁴.

Not only did the followers of Madhva try to refute almost all the points of the interpretation of this *sūtra* by Śaṅkara and his followers, but Madhva in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, as interpreted in the *Nyāya-sudhā* and *Nyāya-sudhā-parimala*, raised many other important points for consideration, which seem to strike the position of Śaṅkara at its very root. A detailed enumeration of these discussions cannot be given within the scope of a single chapter like the present; and I can refer to some only of the important points. Thus the very possibility of illusion, as described by Śaṅkara, is challenged by Jaya-tīrtha, following the *Anuvyākhyāna*.

¹ *bauddhābhīmatā-kṣaṇika-vijñānāder api vastutaḥ kālādy abhāvena aparicchinmatva-prasaṅgāc ca; tasmād deśataḥ kālataś caiva guṇataś cāpi pūrṇatā brahmatā, na tu bhedasya rāhityaṁ brahmateṣyate. Tātparya-ṭīkā, p. 94.*

² *para-pakṣe vicāra-janya-jñāna-karmaṇo brahmaṇo vicāra-karmatvāyogāt, aparokṣa-vṛtti-vyāpyasya phala-vyāpyatva-niyamāc ca. Ibid. p. 95.*

³ The *Bhāmati*, however, holds that the primary meaning of the word *jijñāsā* is "desire to know"; but, since desire to know can only be with reference to an object which is not definitely known (*jñātum icchā hi sandigdha-viṣaye nirṇayāya bhavati*), it means by implication reasoned discussion (*vicāra*), which is necessary for coming to any decided conclusion.

⁴ *tasmād vedāntādīnāṁ pāta-pratīte brahmaṇi saguṇa-nirguṇālpaguṇatvādinā vipratīpatteḥ jijñāsyatvam. Tātparya-candrikā, p. 109.*

He says that the individual is by nature free in himself in all his works and enjoyments, and is dependent only on God. That such an individual should feel at any time that he was being determined by some other agent is certainly due to ignorance (*avidyā*)¹. Ignorance, so far as it may be said to be existent as such in the self, has real being (*avidyādikam ca svarūpeṇātma-sambandhitvena sad eva*). So the intellect (*buddhi*), the senses, the body and external sense-objects (*viśaya*) are really existent in themselves under the control of God; but, when through ignorance they are conceived as parts of my self, there is error and illusion (*avidyādi-vaśād ātmīyatayā adhyāsyante*). The error does not consist in their not having any existence; on the contrary, they are truly existent entities, and sorrow is one of their characteristics. The error consists in the fact that what belongs distinctly to them is considered as belonging to an individual self. When through ignorance such a false identification takes place, the individual thinks himself to be under their influence and seems to suffer the changes which actually belong to them; and, being thus subject to passions and antipathy, suffers rebirth and cannot get himself absolutely released except by the worship of God. Those who believe in the *māyā* doctrine, like Śaṅkara and his followers, however, hold that the sorrow does not exist in itself and is false in its very nature (*duḥkhādikam svarūpeṇāpi mithyā*). Śaṅkara says that we falsely identify the self with the non-self in various ways; that may be true, but how does that fact prove that non-self is false? It may have real existence and yet there may be its false identification with the self through ignorance. If the very fact that this non-self is being falsely identified with the self renders it false, then the false identification, on the other side, of the self with the non-self ought to prove that the self also is false². As the selves, which are bound, are real, so the sense-objects, etc., which bind them, are also real; their false identification through ignorance is the chain of bondage, and this also is

¹ *tasya parāyattatvābhāso'vidyā-nimittako bhramah. Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 26.

² *atra hi pramātr-pramāna-prameya-kartr-karma-kārya-bhoktr-bhoga-lakṣaṇa-vyavahāra-trayaśya śārirendriyādiṣu aham-mamādhyāsa-puraḥsaratva-pradarśanena vyavahāra-kārya-līṅgakam anumānam vyavahārānyathānupapattir vā adhyāse pramānam uktam. na cānenāntaḥkaraṇa-śārirendriya-viśayāṇām tad-dharmānām dukkhādinām ca mithyātvam sidhyati svarūpa-satām api tādātmya-tatsambandhitvābhīyam āropeṇaiva vyavahāropapatter. na ca āropitvatmātrena mithyātvam; ātmano'pi antaḥkaraṇādiṣu āropitvatena mithyātvā-prasaṅgāt.*

real, and can be removed only through knowledge by the grace of God.

The idea suggested by the Śāṅkara school, that the notion of an individual as free agent or as one enjoying his experiences is inherent in the ego (*aham-kāra*), and is simply associated with the self, is also incorrect; for the notion of ego (*aham-kāra*) really belongs to the self and it is present as such even during deep sleep (*susupti*), when nothing else shines forth excepting the self, and we know that the experience of this state is "I sleep happily". This notion "I," or the ego, therefore belongs to the self¹.

If everything is false, then the very scriptures by which Śāṅkara would seek to prove it would be false. The answer to such an objection, as given by Śāṅkarites, is that even that which is false may serve to show its own falsehood and the truth of something else, just as in the case of acquired perception, e.g. in the case of *surabhi-candana*, "fragrant sandal," the sense of sight may reveal the smell as well as the colour. But the counter-reply to this answer naturally raises the question whether the false scriptures or other proofs are really existent or not; if they are, then unqualified monism fails; for their existence would necessarily mean dualism. If, on the other hand, they do not exist at all, then they cannot prove anything. The answer of Śāṅkara, that even the false can prove the true, just as a line (a unit) by the side of zeros might signify various numbers, is incorrect; for the line is like the alphabet signs in a word and like them can recall the number for which it is conventionally accepted (*saṅketita*), and is therefore not false (*rekhāpi varṇe padām-iva arthe saṅketite taṁ smārayatīti no kiṁcid atra mīthyā asti*)².

Nor can it be maintained that the bondage of sorrow, etc. is not real; for it is felt to be so through the direct testimony of the experience of the spirit (*sākṣin*)³. Its unreality or falsehood cannot be proved by the opponent; for with him truth is differenceless (*nirviśeṣa*): but any attempt to prove anything involves duality between that which is to be proved and that whereby it is to be

¹ *aham-pratyayasya ātma-viśayatvāt. Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 27. It also distinguishes two words of the same form, *aham*, though one is an *avyaya* word and the other the nominative singular of the word *asmad*. It is the former that is used to denote an evolutionary product of *prakṛti*, whereas the latter denotes the self.

² Several other examples of this type furnished by Śāṅkara and his followers are here given and refuted in the same manner.

³ *duḥkhādi-bandha-satyatāyāṁ sākṣi-pratyakṣam eva upanyastam. Ibid.* p. 30.

proved, and that a differenceless entity may be the proof cannot be established by the differenceless entity itself; for this would involve a vicious circle. If the world were false, then all proofs whereby this could be established would also by the same statement be false; and how then could the statement itself be proved?

As has just been said, the opponents, since they also enter into discussions, must admit the validity of the means of proof (*pramāṇa* or *vyavahṛti*); for without these there cannot be any discussion (*kathā*); and, if the proofs are admitted as valid, then what is proved by them as valid (*prameya* or *vyāvahārika*) is also valid¹. In this connection Jaya-tīrtha raises the points contained in the preliminary part of the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* of Śrīharṣa, where he says that it is, of course, true that no discussions are preceded by an open non-acceptance of the reality of logical proofs, but neither is it necessary to accept the validity of any proof before beginning any discussion. Those who begin any discussion do so without any previous forethought on the subject; they simply do not pay any attention to the ultimate existence or non-existence of all proofs, but simply begin a discussion as if such a question did not need any enquiry at the time². In a discussion what is necessary is the temporary agreement (*samaya-bandha*) or the acceptance for the purpose of the discussion of certain canons of argument and proofs; for that alone is sufficient for it. It is not necessary in these cases that one should go into the very nature of the validity or invalidity, existence or non-existence of the proofs themselves³. So even without accepting the ultimate existence and validity of the *pramāṇas* it is possible to carry on a discussion, simply through a temporary mutual acceptance of them as if they did exist and were valid. So it is wrong to say that those who do not believe in their existence cannot legitimately enter into a proper discussion. After referring to the above method of safeguarding the interests of the upholders of the *māyā* doctrine, Jaya-tīrtha says that, whatever may be mutual agreement in a discussion, it remains an undeniable fact

¹ *vyavahārikam vyavahāra-viśayo duḥkhādi. Ibid. p. 31.*

² *na brūmo vayaṃ na santi pramāṇādini iti svīkṛtya kathārabhyeti kiṃ nāma santi na santi pramāṇādini ityasyāṃ cintāyāṃ udāśinaiḥ yathā svīkṛtya tāni bhavatā vyavahriyante tathā vyavahāribhir eva kathā pravartyatām. Ibid. p. 32.*

³ *tac ca vyavahāra-niyama-bandhād eva...sa ca pramāṇena tarkeṇa ca vyavahartavyam ityādi-rūpaḥ; na ca pramāṇādīnāṃ sattāpi ittham eva tubhyam āṅgikartum ucītā, tādṛśa-vyavahāra-niyama-mātrenaiva kathā-pravṛtteḥ. Ibid.*

that, if the proofs do not exist, nothing at all can be proved by such non-existing entities. Either the *pramāṇas* exist or they do not; there is no middle course. If they are not admitted to be existent, they cannot prove anything. You cannot say that you will be indifferent with regard to the existence or non-existence of *pramāṇas* and still carry on a discussion merely as a passive debater; for our very form of thought is such that they have either to be admitted as existent or not. You cannot continue to suspend your judgment regarding their existence or non-existence and still deal with them in carrying a discussion¹. You may not have thought of it before starting the discussion; but, when you are carrying on a discussion, the position is such that it is easy to raise the point, and then you are bound to admit it or to give up the discussion. Dealing with the *pramāṇas* by mutual agreement necessarily means a previous admission of their existence².

The Śāṅkarites generally speak of three kinds of being, real (*pāramārthika*), apparent (*vyāvahārika*) and illusory (*prātibhāsika*). This apparent being of world-appearance (*jagat-prapañca*) is neither existent nor non-existent (*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*). The scriptures call this false, because it is not existent; and yet, since it is not absolutely non-existent, the proofs, etc. which are held within its conception can demonstrate its own falsehood and the absolute character of the real³. Such a supposition would indeed seem to have some force, if it could be proved that the world-appearance is neither existent nor non-existent; which cannot be done, since non-existence is nothing but the simple negation of existence (*tasya sattvābhāvāvrya tirekāt*). So that which is different from existent must be non-existent, and that which is different from non-existent must be existent; there is no middle way. Even the scriptures do not maintain that the world-appearance has a character which is different from what is existent and what is non-existent (*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*).

With regard to the question what may be the meaning of the

¹ *sattvāsattve vihāya pramāṇa-svarūpasya buddhau āropayitum aśakyatvena udāśīnasya tat-svikārānupapatteh. Nyāya-sudhā, p. 34.*

² *pramāṇair vyavahartavyam iti ca niyama-bandhanam pramā-karaṇa-bhāvasya niyamāntarbhāvān niyata-pūrva-sattva-rūpaṃ karaṇatvam pramāṇānām anādāya na paryavasyati. Ibid. p. 34.*

³ *tatra vyāvahārikasya prapañcasya sad-asad-vilakṣaṇasya sad-vilakṣaṇatvād upapannam śrutyādinā mithyātva-samarthanam asad-vilakṣaṇatvāt tad-antar-gatasya pramāṇādeḥ sādhatvam ca iti. Ibid. p. 35.*

phrase “different from existents” (*sad-vilakṣaṇa*), after suggesting numerous meanings and their refutations, Jaya-tīrtha suggests an alternative interpretation, that the phrase might mean “difference (*vailakṣaṇya*) from existence in general (*sattā-sāmānya*)”. But surely this cannot be accepted by the opponent; for the acceptance of one general existence would imply the acceptance of different existents, from which the abstraction can be made¹. This cannot be accepted by a Śāṅkarite, and, as for himself, he does not accept any general existence apart from the individual existents (*dravyādy-atirikta-sattva-sāmānyasyaiva anaṅgikārāt*). The Śāṅkarites say that the indefinable nature of this world-appearance is apparent from the fact that it is ultimately destructible by right knowledge and that this world-appearance is destructible by right knowledge and that this world-appearance is destructible is admitted even by the Madhvas. To this objection Jaya-tīrtha replies that, when the Madhvas say that the world is destroyed by the Lord, it is in the same sense in which a jug is reduced to dust by the stroke of a heavy club². But even such a destruction, in our view, is not possible with regard to *prakṛti*; and this destruction is entirely different from what a Śāṅkarite would understand by the cessation (*bādhā*) through knowledge (*jñāna*). For that, as Prakāśātman writes in his *Vivaraṇa*, means that the nescience (*ajñāna*) ceases with all its effects through knowledge (*ajñānasya sva-kāryeṇa vartamānena pravilīnena vā saha jñānena nivṛttir bādhah*). Cessation (*bādhā*), according to the Madhvas, proceeds through right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) regarding something about which there was a different knowledge (*anyathā-jñāna*). The existence of any such category as “different-from-existent and non-existent” (*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*) cannot be defined as corresponding to that which ceases through right knowledge; only that which you falsely know about anything can cease through right knowledge: the example of conch-shell-silver does not prove anything; for we do not admit that there is anything like conch-shell-silver which existed and was destroyed through right knowledge, since in fact it never existed at all. Not only in the case of conch-shell-silver, but in the case of the

¹ *sattā-sāmānyāṅgikāre ca sad-bhedo durvāra eva; na hy ekāśrayaṃ sāmānyam asti. Ibid. p. 38.*

² *mudgara-prahārādina ghaṭasyeva īśvarasya jñānecchā-prayatna-vyāpārair vināśa eva. Ibid. p. 39.*

ākāśa, etc., too, the assertion that it is *sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa* is utterly wrong; for, being eternal, it can never cease.

Error or illusion consists in knowing a thing differently from what it is (*anyathā-vijñānam eva bhrāntiḥ*). Now conch-shell-silver is a simple case of *anyathā-vijñāna* or *anyathā-khyāti*, and there is nothing here of *sad-asad-vilakṣaṇatva* or *jñāna-nivartyatva* (possibility of being removed by knowledge); for it does not exist. It may be objected that, if it did not exist, one could not have the notion (*pratīti*) of it: no one can have any notion of that which does not exist; but the conch-shell-silver is to all appearance directly perceived. The answer to this is that even the opponent does not admit that there is any such concomitance that what does not exist cannot yield any notion of it; for when the opponent speaks of anything as being *asad-vilakṣaṇa*, i.e. different-from-the-non-existent, he must have a notion of what is non-existent; for, if any one is to know anything (e.g., a jug) as being different from some other thing (e.g., a piece of cloth), then, previously to this, in order to know this difference he must have known what that thing (a jug) is¹. This again raises the epistemological problem, whether it is possible to have knowledge of the non-existent. Thus it may be asked whether the sentence "There are horns on the head of the man" conveys any meaning; and, if it does, whether it is of any existing or of a non-existing entity. It cannot be the first; for then we should have actually seen the horns; there must be notion of the non-existent entity of the horn, and so it has to be admitted that we can know non-existent entities. It cannot be said that this is not non-existent, but only that it is indefinable (*anirvacanīya*); for, if even entities like the hare's horn or man's horn should not be regarded as non-existent, then from what is it intended to distinguish conch-shell-silver? for *asad-vilakṣaṇa* must be admitted to have some meaning; *asat* cannot mean "indefinable"; for in that case conch-shell-silver, which is described as being different from *asat*, would be definable². Not only can the non-existent be the object of knowledge, but it can also be the subject or the object of a verb. Thus, when it is said "the jug is being produced, *ghaṭo jāyate*," this refers

¹ *yo yadvilakṣaṇam pratyeti sa tat-pratītimān yathā ghaṭa-vilakṣaṇaḥ paṭa iti pratītimān devadatto ghaṭa-pratītimān ityanumānāt. Nyāya-sūdhā, p. 57.*

² *nirupākhyād iti cet tarhi tad-vilakṣaṇyaṁ nāma sopākhyānatvam eva. Ibid. p. 58.*

to the non-existent jug, as being the subject of the verb “to be produced, *jāyate*”; for it will be shown later that Śaṅkara’s theory of the previous or simultaneous existence of effects, even before the causal operation (*sat-kārya-vāda*), is false. Therefore, since the non-existent may be known, the objection that conch-shell-silver cannot be non-existent, because it is known, is invalid.

But a further objection is raised, that, while it is not denied that the non-existent may be known, it is denied that the non-existent cannot appear as directly perceived and as existent (*aparokṣatayā sattvena ca*); as if one should find horns on the head of a man, as he finds them on the head of a cow. But in the case of the conch-shell-silver what is perceived is directly perceived as existent; so the conch-shell-silver must be non-existent. In answer to this the following may be urged: those who do not regard conch-shell-silver as non-existent, but as indefinable (*anīrvacanīya*), have to accept the appearance of identity of “this” and the silver (*iḍam-rajatayoḥ*). Illusion, according to these Śaṅkarites, is the appearance of something in that which is not so (*atasmins tad iti pratyaya iti*). This is not, of course, *anyathā-khyāti* (a different appearance from the real); for the basis of the illusion (*adhiṣṭhāna*, as the conch-shell of the illusory silver) is not here false in itself, but only false in its appearance as silvery or associated with a false appearance (*saṁsṛṣṭa-rūpa*); but the illusory appearance (*adhyāsta*) is false both in itself (*svarūpa*) and also as associated with the object before the observer; this is admitted by the holders of the *māyā* doctrine. The holders of the *anyathā-khyāti* view of illusion think that both the conch-shell and the silver are real, only the appearances of identity of conch-shell with silver and of silver with conch-shell are false¹. This appearance of the false or the non-existent is both immediate (*aparokṣa*), as is well known to experience, and endowed with real existence; for otherwise no one could be moved by it (*sattvenā-pratītau pravṛtṭyanupapattē ca*). Until the illusion is broken this association of the non-existent silver with the “this” does not differ in the least from the perception of real silver before the observer. The opponents would say that this is not a false and non-existent association (*anyathātvam yady asat syāt*), as the Madhvas hold; but it is difficult to understand what they can mean by such an objec-

¹ *anyathā-khyāti-vādibhir adhiṣṭhānāropyaḥ ubhayaḥ api saṁsṛṣṭa-rūpeṇaiva asattvam svarūpeṇa tu sattvam ity aṅgīkṛtam. Ibid. p. 58.*

tion; for such an association of silver with the conch-shell cannot be real (*sat*), since, if it was so, why should it appear only in the case of illusions (*bhrānti*), where the first perception is contradicted, as in "this is not silver"? Again, those who think that in the case of illusion the silver is indefinable (*anirvacanīya*) may be asked what is the nature of that which appears as indefinable. Does it appear as non-existent or as illusory? It cannot be so; for then no one would trouble about it and try to pick it up, knowing it to be non-existent or illusory. So it has to be admitted that it appears as existent. This agrees with our experience of the illusion ("this silver"). The mere notion of silver is not enough to draw us towards it, apart from our notion of it as existing. But this has no real existence, since then it cannot be indefinable; if this is non-existent, then it has to be admitted that the non-existent appears in immediate perceptual experience and as endowed with existence. The opponents however may point out that this is not a right analysis of the situation as they understand it. For in their view the true "this" in the conch-shell and its association with silver is as indefinable as the indefinable silver itself, and so the silver in the appearance of silver is indefinable, and so their mutual connection also is indefinable. It is the reality in the conch-shell that becomes indefinably associated with the silver. The answer to this is that such a view is open to the serious defect of what is known as the vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). For, when it is said that the mutual association (*samsarga*) of "thisness" and "silverness" and the association of the reality of the conch-shell with the silver are both indefinable, it may be asked what exactly is meant by calling them indefinable. It is not of the nature of ordinary phenomenal experience (*vyāvahārika*); for the illusory silver is not of any ordinary use. If it is illusory (*prātibhāsika*), does it appear to be so or does it appear as if it was of the nature of ordinary phenomenal experience? If it did appear as illusory, no one would be deluded by it, when he knows it to be illusory, and he would not trouble to stoop down to pick it up. If it did appear as if it was of the nature of ordinary phenomenal experience, then it could not be really so; for then it could not be illusory. If it was not so and still appeared to be so, then the old point, that the non-existent can appear to immediate perception as existent, has to be admitted. If this appearance of silver as being of the nature of an object of ordinary

phenomenal experience is itself considered as being indefinable, then the same sorts of questions may again be asked about it, and the series will be infinite; this would be a true case of a vicious infinite, and not like the harmless infinite of the seed and the shoot; for here, unless the previous series is satisfactorily taken as giving a definite solution, the succeeding series cannot be solved, and that again depends in a similar way on another, and that on another and so on, and so no solution is possible at any stage¹. Therefore the old view that even the unreal and the non-existent may appear as the real and the existent has to be accepted; and the world-appearance should not be considered as indefinable (*anirvacanīya*).

Interpretation of *Brahma-sūtra* I. I. 2.

The literal translation of the second *sūtra*, *janmādy asya yataḥ*, is "from which production, etc., of this". The purport of Śāṅkara's commentary on this *sūtra* may briefly be stated as follows: "Production, etc." means production, existence and destruction. Production, existence and destruction of this world-appearance, which is so great, so orderly and so diversified, is from that ultimate cause, God (Īśvara); and neither the *paramāṇus* nor the inanimate *prakṛti* can be its cause. This rule is not intended to stand as an inference in favour of the existence of God, but is merely the description of the purport of the Upaniṣad texts on the nature of Brahman²; for the ultimate grasp of the nature of Brahman, which is beyond the range of our sense-organs, can only come through the right comprehension of the meaning of Upaniṣad texts.

Jaya-tīrtha, in commenting on the *Bhāṣya* of Madhva and the *Anuvyākhyāna*, follows Madhva in explaining this *sūtra* as a definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman, intended to differentiate Him from beings of His class, viz., the souls (*jīva*), and inanimate objects, which belong to a different class. The idea is that that from which the production, etc., of the world takes place is Brahman, and there are important *śruti* texts which say that the world was produced from Brahman³. It has already been pointed out that by "pro-

¹ *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 59.

² *janmādi-sūtram nānumānopanyāsārthaṁ kiṁ tarhi vedānta-vākya-pradarśanārthaṁ.*

³ Jaya-tīrtha refers to another interpretation of the *sūtra* as *janma ādyasya hiraṇyagarbhasya yatas tad brahma*. The *Tātparya-candrikā* discusses the points of view raised in the *Nyāya-sudhā* and elsewhere with regard to the meaning of

duced, etc.” in the *sūtra* Śaṅkara understood production (*śṛṣṭi*), existence (*sthiti*) and destruction (*laya* or *bhaṅga*), and he there reconciled the six stages of existent things (*bhāva-vika*) referred to by Yāska in the *Nirukta*, such as being produced, to continue to exist, to grow, to change, to decay and to be destroyed, as being included within the three stages referred to by him; for growth and change are included within production (*janma*), and decay is included within destruction. Madhva, however, includes eight different categories in the term “production, etc.”; these with him are production (*śṛṣṭi*), existence (*sthiti*), destruction (*saṃhāra*), control (*niyama*), knowledge (*jñāna*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), bondage (*bandha*) and release (*mokṣa*)¹. The existence of all these qualities implies the fullness of qualities signified by the name Brahman. That single being in whom all the above-mentioned eightfold qualities exist is called Brahman.

Generally two kinds of definitions are distinguished from each other, viz., essential (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*) and accidental (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*). Prakāśātman, the writer of the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, speaks of this definition of Brahman as being of the latter type, since it is only in association with *māyā* that Brahman can be said to be the cause of the production, etc., of the world-appearance. In itself

Brahman as referred to by the word *yataḥ*. *Bṛha*, a constituent of the word *brahman*, has several technical meanings (*rūḍhi*), such as *jāti* (class-notion), *jīva*, *Kamalāsana* or *Brahmā*. But the word is not used here in its technical sense, but in the etymological sense, which signifies the entity in which there is a fullness of qualities; for it is only in this sense that the Upaniṣad texts alluded to in connection with this *sūtra* and the previous one become significant. Again, on the basis of other texts, which speak of Him (from which everything is produced) as lying in the ocean, Brahman here means Viṣṇu (as in the *Samākhya-śruti*, *dyāvāpṛthivī param mama yonir apsu antaḥ samudre*), because it is only in Him that there is the fullness of all qualities. This characteristic would not apply to any of the other technical (*rūḍhi*) senses, such as *jāti* or *jīva*; and so it is that, though the *rūḍhi* sense is stronger than the etymological sense (*yaugika*), yet the latter has preference here: *brahma-śabdasya jīve rūḍhatve'pi bādha-sadbhāvāt tad brahma iti śruty-uktaṃ brahma viṣṇur eva (Tattva-prakāśikā)*. It may also be added that, according to the *Tattva-prakāśikā*, *Tātparya-candrikā* and other Madhva works, it is held that, though ordinarily *brahma* has the technical sense of *jīva*, yet with scholars the word always has the technical meaning of Viṣṇu. Thus a distinction is drawn between the ordinary technical sense (*rūḍhi*) and the technical sense with scholars (*vidvad-rūḍhi*), and preference is given to the latter: *viduṣāṃ brahma-śabdena viṣṇu-vyakti-pratīteḥ (Tātparya-candrikā, p. 120)*.

¹ *Anubhāṣya* of Madhva or *Brahma-sūtra*, 1. 1. 2. Madhva quotes for his authority a passage from the *Skanda-purāṇa*:

*utpatti-sthiti-saṃhāra-niyatir jñānam āvṛtiḥ
bandha-mokṣaṇi ca puruṣād yasmāt sa harir ekarāt.*

it is of the nature of pure bliss (*ānanda*), which is also identical in its nature with pure knowledge¹. Madhva and his followers, however, consider the characteristics mentioned in the *sūtra* as essential and do not think that the essences of *ānanda* and *jīva* are in any sense anything else but qualities, in which case they would not be essences identical with Brahman, as would be required by what may be called a *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*; for *ānanda* is as much a characteristic as any other characteristic is, and, if *ānanda* could be regarded as a defining essence, then the characteristic of being the cause of the world might also be regarded as a defining essence². If His being the cause involves qualities unessential to Himself, then in His purity He could neither be *ānanda*, whether as a class notion, as a desirable feeling (*anukūla-vedanā*), as being the dearest one (*parama-premāspada*), or as being opposed to sorrow; for, if these be the nature of *ānanda*, it must by its very nature be associated with inessential traits (*sopādhikatvāt*). So knowledge also must express something and must therefore by its very nature be connected with something outside of itself (*artha-prakāśātmakatvena sopādhikam eva*); for knowledge is inseparably connected with the knower and the known (*jñānasya jñātṛ-jñeya-sāpekṣatvāt*). It has been urged in the *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa* that the knowledge which forms the essential defining characteristic of Brahman is all-illuminating revelation which is not in any way conditioned by its being dependent on, or its being inseparably connected with, objects³. But the fact that it can reveal everything implies possession of power, and this power is necessarily connected with the object with reference to which it is effective. Moreover, if any power can be considered as being an essential defining characteristic, then the power of producing the world and of affecting it in other ways (as referred to in the *sūtra*) might also be considered as an essential defining characteristic⁴. The objection, that the essence (*svarūpa*) of anything cannot be expressed by a reference to anything other than itself, is not valid; for a thing wholly unrelated

¹ *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, pp. 222-3.

² *ānandaṃ lakṣaṇam iti cet tarhi jagat-kāraṇaṃ lakṣaṇam astu.*

Tātpariyā-candrikā, p. 140.

³ *anena sarvajña-sābhena sarvābhāsa-kṣamaṃ vijñapti-mātram ādityādi-prakāśavad avīśayopādhikam vijñānam eva brahma-svarūpa-lakṣaṇam.*

Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 210.

⁴ *sāmartyasya śakti-rūpatvād, viśaya-nirūpyatvāc ca, jagaj-jananādi-sāmartyasyaiva svarūpa-lakṣaṇatvopapattē ca. Tātpariyā-candrikā*, p. 141.

to, and devoid of all reference to, any other thing cannot be known (*svārūpasya sva-vedyatvāt*). It is further held by the opponents that an accidental defining characteristic like that of the Brahman being the cause of the world (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*)—as, for example, indicating a house by a temporary association, as that of a crow sitting on the roof of it—is not an inherent and intrinsic characteristic (*ananvayī*), whereas an essential characteristic like *ānanda* is an inherent and intrinsic constituent (*kāryānvayī*) of the thing. But such an objection cannot rule out the causality, etc., of Brahman as being inessential; for we want to know Brahman in its essence as the cause or *kāraṇa* of the world, as much as by any other characteristic. The essential feature of Brahman is its fullness of qualities, as the ultimate cause of production, etc., and these are in no sense less essential than His nature as *ānanda*. Like the power of burning in fire, these powers of world-creation, etc., are coextensive with the essence of Brahman. It is indeed surprising, says Vyāsa-tīrtha, that the Śāṅkarites should enter into any long discussion with regard to the distinction of essential and accidental definitions; for all definitions mean the making known of object by its distinctive characteristics such as are well known¹. But, as the Śāṅkarites believe in absolutely unqualified Brahman, how do they undertake to define it? All definitions must proceed through the means of known qualities². Whether a definition (*lakṣaṇa*) be *svārūpa* or *taṭastha*, it must proceed by way of enumerating distinctive characteristic qualities; and, as the Brahman of the opponents has no qualities, it cannot be defined at all.

Rāmānuja in his interpretation of this *sūtra* asserted that the characteristic qualities and powers of Brahman referred to in the *sūtra* belong to Brahman as He is immanent; but the Upaniṣads also define Him in His essential characteristic features, as transcendent, by speaking of Him as being truth, knowledge, the infinite (*satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma*); and this distinguishes Him from the souls and inanimate objects, which also are held within Him. But Vyāsa-tīrtha points out that Madhva has by implication denied this in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, where he distinctly asserted the causality of

¹ *prasiddhasya asādhāraṇa-dharmasya lakṣaṇatvena*; also *asādhāraṇa-dharmo hi lakṣaṇam parikīrtiyate*. *Tātparya-candrikā*, pp. 140, 143.

² *svārūpaṃ vā taṭasthaṃ vā lakṣaṇaṃ bhedaḥ katham*. *Ibid.* p. 143.

Brahman as its own intrinsic constitutive definition¹. Vyāsa-tīrtha says that in defence of the Rāmānuja point of view it may be urged that, as a special form of a jug would differentiate it from all other things, yet its possession of smell constitutes its nature as earth, so, though causality, etc., differentiate Brahman from others, yet it is His nature as truth, knowledge and infinite that really differentiates Him from souls and inanimate objects. But Vyāsa-tīrtha contends that this is wrong, since the special form of a jug differentiates it from cloth, etc., and not from earth; an earthen jug is itself earth; but the special form which distinguishes an earthen jug from other objects (such as cloth, etc.) also by that very fact shows that it belongs to a class different from them. Here also the causality which differentiates Brahman from souls, etc., also shows that He is different in nature from them. So the fact that Brahman is the ultimate cause of production, etc., constitutes its essential defining characteristic. He, Brahman, not only possesses these qualities, but in reality His qualities are infinite, and their possession forms His defining characteristic (*ananta-guṇa-sattvam eva brahmano lakṣaṇam*)².

The two principal Vedānta texts by which the Śāṅkarites seek to establish their theory of absolute monism (*advaita*) are "that art thou" (*tat tvam asi*) and "Brahma is truth, knowledge, infinite" (*satyaṃ jñānam anantam brahma*). Now Madhva urges that, since these may also be otherwise interpreted directly (*mukhyārtha*) on the basis of difference, it is not proper to explain them on the basis of non-difference with an indirect and distant meaning (*lakṣaṇa*)³. The *Nyāya-sudhā* points out that with the monistic interpretation the difficulty arises, how to identify the qualityless (*nirguṇa*) with the qualified (*saguṇa*), as in the case of the souls; the qualityless is indeterminable by itself (*nirguṇa syaiva nirūpayitum aśakyatvāt*)⁴. If this *nirguṇa brahma* were entirely different from the *saguṇa* Brahman or Īśvara acknowledged by the Śāṅkarites, then there would be a duality; if the relation is held to be indefinable (*anirvacanīya*),

¹ *asyodbhavādi-hetutvaṃ sākṣād eva sva-lakṣaṇam. Op. cit.*

² *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 107.

³ *bhedenaiva tu mukhyārtha-sambhave lakṣaṇam kutaḥ. Amvyaḥkhyāna*, p. 5. *namu abhedam upādāya sūtra-lakṣaṇam vā āśrayanīya-bhedam upādāya mukhya-vṛttir na iti sandihyate; vayaṃ tu brūmaḥ, dvitīya eva pakṣaḥ śreyān. Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 101.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 102.

then the criticisms against the indefinable suggested in the first *sūtra* apply to it¹. If, however, it is urged that the unity or identity referred to in the above passages is with regard to the Brahman as pure self-revealing intelligence and the same element as forming the principal reality of *jīva*, then it becomes difficult to understand how the Upaniṣads can have the presumption of revealing the self-revealing intelligence². Moreover, it may be objected that, if the Brahman is nothing else but pure intelligence, then its "unity" with *jīva* as taught by the Upaniṣads, being different from Brahman, is false; for "unity" is not pure intelligence, and, if unity is false, then duality becomes true. If the "unity" was identical with pure intelligence, then with the self-shining of pure intelligence there would be the self-shining of "unity" too, and even for expressing the "unity" it would not be necessary to take the help of the Upaniṣads or of anything else.

Another question of importance arises in connection with the attribution of the epithets "truth," "knowledge," "infinite" to Brahman. Is Brahman, to whom all these qualities are attributed, a simple unity in Himself, or is He a complex of many qualities, truth, knowledge, infinite, etc., which have different connotations and are not synonymous? Pure intelligence (*caitanya*) is one, but these epithets are many. How can we conceive the one *caitanya* to coexist in itself with the many attributes which are said to belong to it? How is the plurality of these attributes to be implied in the unity of the one³? To this the answer that Madhva gives in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, which is further explained by Jaya-tīrtha, is that it has to be admitted that in the unity of Brahman there is some special virtue (*atiśaya*) which represents difference and serves its purpose; there is no other way of solving the difficulty, and this is the only solution left (*gatya-antarābhāvād arthāpattiyā*). This special virtue, which serves to hold and reconcile plurality without sacrificing its

¹ In such Upaniṣad passages as *sākṣī cet kevalo nirguṇaś ca* (*Śvet.* vi. 11) the word *nirguṇa*, "qualityless," could be given a modified meaning, in view of the fact that the strict direct meaning is not possible even in the context of the sentence; for in the very passage itself the *brahman* is said to be not only *nirguṇa*, but *sākṣī* (direct perceiver) also, and this is evidently a *guṇa*. It is not possible to attribute a *guṇa* and to call it *nirguṇa* at the same time. *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 102.

² *svaprakāśa-caitanyaṁ brahmaṁ ca śāstra-pratipādyam ceti vyāhatam.*

Ibid. p. 103.

³ *caitanyaṁ ekaṁ satyatvādīny anekāni iti saṁkhyā-vailakṣaṇyam ityādi-bhedakāryāṇi cāvagamyante.* *Ibid.* p. 106.

unity, is called by the Madhvas *viśeṣa*; this *viśeṣa* exists not only in Brahman, but in all other things. Thus, for example, a cloth is not different from its whiteness, since both of them form one indissoluble whole. So it has to be admitted that there is in cloth such a special virtue, a *viśeṣa*, by which it remains one with itself and yet shows the plurality of qualities with which it is sure to form a whole. These *viśeṣas* are infinite in number in the infinite number of objects, though there is no intrinsic difference in the nature of these *viśeṣas*. Each whole or unity may be said to possess as many *viśeṣas* as there are qualities through which it expresses itself, and each of these *viśeṣas* is different from the others according to the difference of the quality with which it is associated; but these *viśeṣas* are not considered as requiring other *viśeṣas* for their connection with the thing, and so there is no vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). So there is not only one *viśeṣa* in each thing, but there are as many *viśeṣas* as there are different qualities unified with it¹.

The result attained by the first two *sūtras*, then, is that Brahman, as defined by the second *sūtra*, is the object of enquiry for those who seek release.

Interpretation of Brahma-sūtra 1. 1. 3-4.

Śaṅkara gives two interpretations of this *sūtra*, *śāstra-yonitvāt* ("because of its being scripture-cause"), expounding the compound "scripture-cause" in two ways, first, as "the cause of the scriptures," secondly as "that of which the scripture is the cause or source of revelation or *pramāṇa*." The force of the first meaning is that Brahman is omniscient not only as being the cause of the production, etc., of the world, but also as being the cause of the revelation of the Vedas, since no one but an omniscient being could be the source of the Vedas, which are the greatest repository of knowledge unfathomable by human intellect. The second meaning suggests that it is the Vedas only which can prove to us that Brahman is the cause of the production, etc., of the world².

¹ *tepy ukta-lakṣaṇa-viśeṣā aśeṣato'pi vastuṣu pratyekam anantāḥ santy ato nokta-doṣāvakāśaḥ; anantā iti upalakṣaṇam; yatra yāvanto vyavahārās tatra tāvanto viśeṣā iti jñātavyam. Ibid. p. 106.*

It may be noted in this connection that the Madhvas were more or less forced to this position of accepting the *viśeṣas*, as they could not accept the *samavāya* relation of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika*, which is rejected by the *Brahma-sūtras*.

² *śāstrād eva pramāṇāj jagato janmādi-kāraṇam brahma adhiḡgamyate.*

Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara, 1. 1. 3.

The Madhvas accept the second meaning and object to the first, on the ground that His being the source of the Vedas does not in any way add anything to His omniscience beyond what was implied in His being the cause of the production, etc., of the world, as described in the first *sūtra*¹. The commentators on Madhva's *Bhāṣya* and *Anuvyākhyāna*, Jaya-tirtha, Vyāsa-tirtha and others, following Madhva's explicit statements, argue in detail that the word "scripture" (*śāstra*) in the *sūtra* means the Vedas *R̥k*, *Sāman*, *Yajus* and *Atharva*, and not the *Śaiva āgamas*, which hold that Śiva is the cause of the production, etc., of the world². The Madhva commentators try to emphasize the fact that inference by itself is helpless to prove Brahman to be the cause of the production, etc., of the world.

Sūtra I. 1. 4. Śāṅkara here supposes a *mīmāṃsā* objection that the Vedas cannot have for their purport the establishing of Brahman, since they are always interested in orders and prohibitions with reference to some kind of action. He refutes it by saying that a proper textual study of the Upaniṣads shows that their principal purport is the establishing of pure Brahman, and that it has no connection whatever with the performance of any action.

Madhva holds that this *sūtra* (*tat tu samanvayāt*, "that however through proper relationing") means that it is intended to indicate that all the scriptures (*śāstra*) agree in holding Viṣṇu as Brahman and the ultimate cause, and not Śiva or any other gods, as held by

¹ *katham ca ananta-padārthakasya prapañcasya kartṛtvena na sphuṭam tad-eka-deśa-veda-kāraṇatvena sphuṭibhaviṣyati sarvajñam*. Jaya-tirtha further argues that there is no such concomitance whereby from the authorship of the Vedas omniscience can be inferred. Again, if the authorship of the Vedas means the literary composition representing facts known by sense experience or inference, it must be admitted that the Vedas have been composed like any other ordinary book (*pauruṣeya*); and, if the authorship means only utterance like that by a teacher, that may not mean even a thorough knowledge of the contents of the Vedas. *Nyāya-sudhā*, pp. 111, 112.

² The other scriptures which the Madhvas admitted as authoritative are the *Pañcarātra*, *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa* and not the *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga* or *Pāṇupata*. Thus Madhva says in his *Bhāṣya*: *R̥g-yajuh-sāmātharvaś ca bhārataṃ pañca-rātrakam, mūla-rāmāyaṇam caiva śāstrāṇṭīty abhidhīyate*. Whatever else agrees with these has to be accepted as valid, and the other so-called scriptures have to be rejected. The *Pañcarātra* and the Vedas are in thorough agreement, and therefore the word *śāstra* in the *sūtra* refers to the *Pañcarātra*; so that by declaring the validity of the *Pañcarātra* alone the Vedas, which agree with it, are also accepted as valid, but everything else which is in disagreement with it is rejected. Thus Madhva says in his *bhāṣya* on this *sūtra*: *veda-pañcarātrayor aikyābhīprāyeṇa pañca-rātrasyaiva prāmāṇyam uktam*.

others. The *mīmāṃsā* objection and Śaṅkara's own views are, of course, all rejected on grounds similar to those already dealt with in the first *sūtra*¹.

A general review of the other important topics of the *Brahma-sūtras*.

On the topic (*adhikaraṇa*) contained in *sūtras* 5-11 Śaṅkara suggests the following argument against the supposed Sāṃkhya claim that the ultimate causality is attributed in the Upaniṣads to *prakṛti* and not to Brahman: he says that *prakṛti* is foreign to the Upaniṣads; for they speak of perceiving (*īkṣater nāśabdā*)², and perceiving can only be true of an intelligent agent. Brahman being all-revealing eternal intelligence, omniscience and perceiving (*īkṣati*) can very well be attributed to it. The word "perceiving" (*īkṣati*) of the text cannot be otherwise explained; for its reference to an intelligent agent is further emphasized by its being called *ātman* (self), a word whose application to conscious agents is well known³; and we are certain that the word *ātman* cannot mean *prakṛti*; for the instruction of liberation is given to it⁴. Moreover, the whole chapter ends in the same vein, and there is no further correction of the sense in which the *ātman*, etc., have been used, as might have been the case, if this *ātman* had been rejected later on as bearing a meaning irrelevant to the teaching of release⁵. Moreover, the cause referred to in the above passages is also spoken of in the same textual connection as being the last place of dissolution, to which everything returns⁶. Moreover, there is in all Vedānta texts⁷ a complete agreement in regard to such an interpretation, and there are also explicit statements of the Upaniṣads (*śrutatvāc ca Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1. 11), which declare an Īśvara to be the ultimate cause of the world⁸. So according to Śaṅkara the purport of this topic is that according to these *sūtras* Brahman is the ultimate cause and not *prakṛti*.

¹ See *Tātparyā-candrikā* (on I. 1. 4), pp. 201-4.

² The Upaniṣad passage referred to is *tad aikṣata bahu syām*, etc. *Chāndogya*, VI. 2. 3.

³ *gauṇas' cet nātma-śabdāt*, *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1. 6; see also *anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya* (*Chāndogya*, VI. 3. 2).

⁴ *tan-miṣṭhasya mokṣopadeśāt*. *Ibid.* I. 1. 7; also text referred to. *Chāndogya*, VI. 14. 2.

⁵ *heyatva-vacanāc ca*. *Ibid.* I. 1. 8.

⁶ *svāpyayāt*, *ibid.* I. 1. 9; also *Chāndogya*, VI. 8. 1.

⁷ *gati-sāmānyāt*. *Ibid.* I. 1. 10.

⁸ *Śvetāśvatara*, VI. 9.

Madhva and his followers do not find any reference to a refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, but a simple assertion of the fact that Brahman is not undescribed by the *śāstras*, because they themselves enjoin that He should be perceived¹. Unless Brahman could be described by the *śāstras*, there would be no meaning in their reference to the possibility of discussing it. This refers to the highest soul, Brahman, and not only to the lower and qualified soul, because it is said that liberation depends on it, and it is also said that the final return of all things in the great dissolution takes place in it; the *nirguṇa* Brahman is also definitely described in the Upaniṣad texts.

On the sixth topic (*sūtras* 12–19) Śaṅkara tries to prove, by a comparison of the several passages from the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* and the supposed objections from the other Upaniṣads, that the word “blissful,” *ānandamaya* (in *Taittirīya*, II. 5) refers to the supreme soul or Brahman; Madhva and his followers contend that the word *ānandamaya* refers to Viṣṇu and to him alone, and not to any other deity. All the other *sūtras* of this *adhikaraṇa* are explained as giving contextual references and reasons in support of this interpretation².

¹ *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1. 5. This is quite a different interpretation of the rule and surely not less cogent. The objection raised against Śaṅkara's interpretation is that his reference to the Sāṃkhya as being foreign to the Vedas (*aśabda*) is not accepted by the adherents of the Sāṃkhya, and there are certainly passages in the Upaniṣads (e.g. *Śvet.* IV. 51) which have to be taken as distinct references to the Sāṃkhya. Moreover, if Brahman could not be grasped and described by any of the *pramāṇas*, there would be hardly any proof of its existence; it would be like the hare's horn.

² The *Nyāya-sudhā* points out that Śaṅkara's commentary is based on an untenable hypothesis that two kinds of Brahman are referred to in the Upaniṣads, Brahman as under the cover of *avidyā*, and as pure Brahman. Of the Upaniṣad passages (those which refer to the former), some are said to be for purposes of worship and consequent material advantage (*upāsanāni abhyudayārthāni*), some for attaining gradually the progressive stages towards liberation (*krama-muktyarthāni*), etc. Jayatīrtha says that this theory is wholly wrong, since it is quite unwarrantable to hold that Brahman is of two kinds (*brahmaṇo dvairūpyasya aprāmāṇikatvāt*); for all the Vedānta texts refer to Nārāyaṇa, the repository of all qualities, but some describe him as being endowed with omniscience, omnipotence, all-controlling power, beauty, etc., some with the negative qualities of being devoid of sin, sorrow, ordinary elemental bodies (*prākṛta-bhāntikaravigraha-rahitatva*), and others describe Him as unspeakable and beyond speech and thought (to show His deep and mysterious character); others again leave out all the qualities and describe Him as the one, and yet others as the soul of all (*sarvātmaka*); but these are all but different descriptions of the supreme person Viṣṇu (*parama-puruṣa*), and do not in any way refer to two different kinds of Brahman. It is only through a misconception (that Brahman has only a unitary

On the seventh topic (*sūtras* 20, 21) Śaṅkara discusses the meaning of a passage (*Chāndogya*, I. 6. 6, 7, 8), and comes to the conclusion that the person referred to as being in the orb of the sun and the eye is supreme Brahman. But Madhva refers to a quite different passage and quite a different relation of contexts; and he holds that the indwelling person referred to in that passage is Nārāyaṇa, the supreme lord¹. On the eighth topic (*sūtra* 22) Śaṅkara discusses *Chāndogya*, I. 9. 1, and concludes that the word *ākāśa* there does not mean elemental *ākāśa*, but supreme Brahman. Madhva also takes the same passage as being indicated by the *sūtra* and comes to the same conclusion; but with him supreme Brahman always means Viṣṇu. On the ninth topic (*sūtra* 23) Śaṅkara discusses *Chāndogya*, I. 11. 4, 5, and concludes that the word *prāṇa* there is used to denote Brahman and not the ordinary *prāṇa*, which is a modification of *vāyu*. Madhva, however, comes to the same conclusion with reference to the use of the word *prāṇa* in another passage of the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*². On the tenth topic (*sūtras* 24-27) Śaṅkara discusses *Chāndogya*, III. 13. 7, and concludes that the word *jyotiḥ* there means Brahman and not ordinary light. Madhva does not discuss this topic in the *Anuvyākhyāna*; in his *Bhāṣya* he comes to the same conclusion, but with reference to a quite different text. The 25th *sūtra*, which according to Śaṅkara belongs to the tenth topic, is considered by Madhva as forming a separate topic, where the word *chandas*, meaning *gāyatrī* (*Chāndogya*, III. 12. 1, *gāyatrī vā idaṃ sarvaṃ bhūtam*, “*gāyatrī* is all this”), means Viṣṇu and not the metre of that name or the combination of letters forming that metre. The next and last topic of the first chapter of the first book (*sūtras* 28-31) is explained by Śaṅkara as referring to the *Kauṣītaki* passage III. 1. 2, 3, where the word *prāṇa* is said by him to refer to Brahman, and not to any air current. Madhva, however, takes this topic in reference to a

nature) that these have been so interpreted by Śaṅkara, who had no previous teachers who knew the Vedas to guide him (*tato vyākula-buddhayo guru-sampradāya-vikalāśrūta-veda-vyākhyātāraḥ sarvatrāpi veda-rūpatām amusandadhānā vedam chindanti*). *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 124.

¹ According to Madhva doubt occurs in regard to the following passage of the *Taittirīya*, whether the word *antaḥ-praviṣṭa* in it refers to the supreme self or to some other being: *antaḥ-praviṣṭaṃ kartāraṃ etaṃ antaś candramasi manasā carantaṃ sahaiva santaṃ na vijānanti devāḥ*. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, III. 11. 5.

² *tad vai tvam prāṇo' bhavaḥ; mahān bhagati; prajāpateḥ; bhujāḥ kariṣya-māṇaḥ; yaddevān prāṇayanneveti*. *Ibid*.

number of other passages occurring in the *Aitareya*, where the word *prāṇa* occurs, and holds that textual comparisons show that the word in those passages refers to Viṣṇu and not to ordinary air currents, or souls, etc.

The second chapter of the first book has altogether seven topics or subjects of discussion according to both Śaṅkara and Madhva. On the first topic Madhva, referring to certain Vedic passages, seeks to establish that they refer to Nārāyaṇa as the culmination of the fullness of all qualities¹. Though He is capable of rousing all the powers of all objects even from a distance, yet He in a sportive way (*līlayā*) is present everywhere and presides over the budding energies of all objects. It is further pointed out that the succeeding passages distinguish the all-pervading Brahman from *jīvas*, or souls, by putting the former in the accusative and the latter in the nominative case in such a way that there ought not to be any doubt that the references to the qualities of all-pervadingness, etc., are to Brahman and not to the *jīvas*². Śaṅkara, however, refers to an altogether different text (*Chāndogya*, III. 14. 1) as hinted at by the topic and concludes, after a discussion of textual comparisons, that the passage alludes to Īśvara and not to *jīva*. On the second topic Madhva raises with reference to *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, 1. 2. 5, the doubt whether the “eats” (*atti*) refers to the destructive agency of Viṣṇu or of Aditi, and decides in favour of the former, and states that Viṣṇu is also often called by the name Aditi³. Śaṅkara, how-

¹ *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka*, III. 2. 3.

² *Ibid.*

³ Some interesting points on this topic are here noted by Jaya-tīrtha in his *Nyāya-sūdhā* on the *Anuvyākhyāna*. Thus Jaya-tīrtha says that an objection may be made that God, being the producer and the destroyer of the universe, is consequently eternal, but actions (*kriyā*) are non-eternal: and how then can the two contradictory qualities reside in God (*nityānityayoḥ katham abhedah syāt*)? The answer to the objection is that even actions in God are static (*na kevalam īśvaraḥ sthiraḥ api tu sa tadya-viśeṣa-dharmo'pi kṛyā-rūpaḥ sthiraḥ*); and this is not impossible, since there is no proof that all actions must be of a vibratory (*pariṣpanda*) nature (which may not exist in God). Again, there can be no objection to admitting vibrations to be eternally existing in God. As motion or action can as a result of continuous existence for many moments produce contacts and so forth, so eternally existing motion or action could produce contacts and separations at particular moments (*yathā aneka-kāla-vartiny api kriyā kadācit saṁyogādī ārabhate na yāvat sattvam, tathā nityāpi kadācit saṁyogādī ārabhatām ko virodhah*). All actions exist eternally in God in potential form as *śakti*, and it is only when this is actualized (*vyakti*) that real transformations of energy and performance of work happen (*śakti-rūpeṇa sthiraḥ sa yadā vyajyate, tadā vyavahārāl-ambanam*); actuality is but a condition or special state of potential power (*vyakti-śabdena śakter eva avasthāviśeṣasya vivakṣitatvāt*). In this connection Jaya-tīrtha

ever, holds that the topic relates to *Kaṭha*, I. 2. 24, and concludes that the “eater” there alluded to is *Īśvara* and not *jīva* or *agni*¹. The third topic relates according to both Madhva and Śaṅkara to *Kaṭha*, I. 3. 1, and the dual agents alluded to there are according to Madhva two forms of *Īśvara*, while according to Śaṅkara they are *jīva* and *Īśvara*. Madhva wishes to lay stress on what he thinks the most important point in relation to this topic, viz., that *brahma* and *jīva* are, upon the cumulative evidence of the Upaniṣad texts, entirely distinct². On the fourth topic Madhva alludes to a passage in *Chāndogya*, IV. 15, where a doubt seems to arise about the identity of the person who is there alluded to as being seen in the eye, i.e., whether this person is fire (*agni*) or Viṣṇu, and Madhva concludes on textual grounds that it is Viṣṇu³. Śaṅkara also alludes to the same passage here; he comes to a similar conclusion, and holds that the person referred to is *Īśvara*. The fifth topic is said, according to both Śaṅkara and Madhva, to allude to *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, III. 7. 1. 2, where an inner controller (*antar-yāmin*) of the world is referred to, and it is concluded that this inner controller is Viṣṇu (*Īśvara* according to Śaṅkara) or *jīva*. One of the *sūtras* of this topic (*śārīraś-cobhayē’pi hi bhedenainam adhīyate*) points out clearly that in both recensions of the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, III. 7. 22 (the Kaṇvas and the Mādhyandinas), the soul (*śārīra*) is distinctly said to be different from the inner controller. Śaṅkara could not ignore this; but he, of course, thinks that the difference is due to the fact that the *jīva* is limited by the limitation of *ajñāna*, as the unlimited *ākāśa* is by a jug (*ghaṭākāśavad upādhi-paricchinnatvāt*). Vyāsa-tīrtha, in his *Tātparyā-candrikā*, makes this an occasion for a severe criticism of the adherents of the theory of Advaita Vedānta.

also indulges in a long argument and discussion to prove that *karma* or actions are directly perceived and not merely inferred (*pratyakṣāśritam karma pratyakṣam eva*).

¹ The *Tātparyā-candrikā* objects to Śaṅkara’s interpretation, pointing out that the word *carācara* in the *sūtra* is not mentioned in the text referred to, and the word *odana* in the text ought to mean destruction (*saṃhārya*). Madhva quotes the *Skanda* and *Brahma-vaivarta purāṇas* in support of his view.

² Madhva quotes in support of his view *Brahma-purāṇa*, *Pañgi-śruti*, *Bhāllaveya-śruti*, etc. Śaṅkara, however, seems to be fighting with an opponent (*ākṣeptr*) who held that the dual agents alluded to in the passage cannot be either *buddhi* and *jīva* or *Jīva* and *Īśvara*.

³ Jaya-tīrtha, in his *Nyāya-sudhā* on this topic, points out that the quality that we possess of being controlled by God and the necessity that He should always remain as the controller have also been so ordained by God.

He says that, if, in spite of such manifest declarations of duality, these *sūtras* are otherwise explained, then even the Buddhists may be considered to be making a right interpretation of the *sūtras*, if they explain their purport to be the unreality of everything except the *śūnya* ("the Void"). The Buddhists make their opposition from outside the Vedas, but the holders of the *māyā* doctrine do it from within the Vedas and are therefore the more dangerous¹. The sixth topic is said to relate to the *Muṇḍaka*, I. 1. 6 (according to both Madhva and Śaṅkara), and it is held by both that *bhūta-yoni* there and *akṣara* in *Muṇḍaka*, I. 1. 7, refer to Viṣṇu (Īśvara according to Śaṅkara) and not to *prakṛti* or *jīva*. In *sūtra* 26 (*rūpōpanyāsāc ca*) of this topic Śaṅkara first tries to refute a previous interpretation of it, attributed to Vṛttikāra, who is supposed to hold here (on the ground of the contents of the *Muṇḍaka* passages (II. 1. 4) immediately following it) the view that Īśvara has for His self the entire changing universe (*sarva-vikārātmakam rūpam upanyasyamānam paśyāmaḥ*). With reference to *sūtra* 21 of this topic, Vyāsatīrtha points out in his *Tātparya-candrikā* that, in opposing the supposition that, since only inanimate things can be the cause of other immediate things, it is only *prakṛti* that can be the cause of this immediate world; Vācaspati points out that in the occurrence of illusions through illusory superimpositions without real change (*vivarta*) there is no condition that there should be any similarity between the basis of illusion (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the illusion imposed (*āropya*) on it. There is nothing to prevent illusions taking place through the perceiver's mental deficiencies, his ignorance or passions, without any similarity. The world is an illusory imposition on Brahman, the pure and unchangeable:

*vivartas tu prapañco'yam brahmaṇo pariṇāmināḥ
anādi-sāadhanodbhūto na sārūpyam apekṣate.*

Vyāsa-tīrtha, of course, cannot agree to this interpretation of Śaṅkara, and tries to argue on the basis of other Upaniṣad texts,

¹ *advaitibhir vyākriyate katham vā dvaitadūṣaṇam sūtrayatām savsiddhānta-tyāgam vinaiva tu yadi mithyārthavādinī sūtranāṭyeva kartavyam, sūtra-vyākhyā tarhi veda-bādhyā-mithyātva-bodhako bauddhāgamo'pi vedasya vyākhyā-rūpaḥ prasajyate, bauddho'pi brahma-sūtram vyākhyāyate yathā tathā bhavamiva mithyaiśo'rthāḥ kimtu tattvam śūnyameveti kīrttayet, asād-vetyādivacanam tasya syāt tattva-vedakam. svoktam śrutibhiḥ sūtre yatnena sādhitam mithyārthatām katham brūyāt sūtranām bhāṣyakṛt svyam. saugatā veda-bāhyā hi vedāprāmānya-vādināḥ, avaidikā iti jñātvā vaidikāḥ parivarjitāḥ. vedān praviśya vedānām aprāmānyam prasādhayan māyī tu yatnatas tyajyah.*

and also on the analogy of creation given there as of a spider (and not of the rope-snake, as would be the case with *vivarta*), that it should be admitted that the qualified Viṣṇu is referred to here¹. The seventh topic is said to relate to *Chāndogya*, v. 11, and the doubt arises whether the word *Vaiśvānara* used there refers to fire or to Viṣṇu; Madhva, upon a comparison of contextual passages, decides in favour of the latter (Śaṅkara prefers Īśvara)².

The first topic of the third chapter of the first book is said to allude to *Muṇḍaka*, II. 11. 5, and it is held by Madhva that the "abode of Heaven and earth" (*dyu-bhṛv-ādy-āyatana*) refers to Viṣṇu and not to Rudra. Śaṅkara holds that it signifies Īśvara and not *prakṛti*, *vāyu* or *jīva*³. The second topic is said to relate to certain passages in the *Chāndogya* (such as VII. 23, 24, VII. 15, 1, etc.), where *prāṇa* is described as great, and the conclusions of Madhva and Śaṅkara respectively are that *prāṇa* here means Viṣṇu and Īśvara. The third topic is said to relate to *Bṛhad-āranyaka*, III. 8, 7, 8, where the word *akṣara* is said to mean Viṣṇu according to Madhva and Brahman according to Śaṅkara, not "alphabetic sign," which also is ordinarily meant by that word. The fourth topic alludes, according to Madhva, to *Chāndogya*, VI. 2. 1, and it is held that the word *sat*, there used, denotes Viṣṇu and not *prakṛti*, as the word *aikṣata* ("perceived") occurs in the same context. With Śaṅkara the topic alludes to *Praśna*, v. 2, 5. This is opposed by Vyāsa-tīrtha in his *Tātparyā-candrikā* on textual grounds⁴. The fifth topic is said to allude to *Chāndogya*, VIII. 1. 1, and the word *ākāśa* there used is said to refer to Viṣṇu⁵. The sixth topic is said to relate to the *Muṇḍaka*, and the light there alluded to is said to be the light of *brahman* and not some other light or soul. The seventh topic is

¹ Jaya-tīrtha discusses on this topic, in accordance with the discussions of the *Anuvyākhyāna*, the reality of negative qualifications, and argues that negation, as otherness from, has a full substantive force. Thus such qualifications of Brahman as *adṛśya*, etc., are real qualities of Him.

² With reference to rule 26 of this topic (I. 2. 26) Śaṅkara notes a different reading (*puruṣavidham api cainam adhiyate*) for that which he accepts (*puruṣam api cainam adhiyate*). The former, however, is the reading accepted by Madhva.

³ In the concluding portions of the first rule of this topic Śaṅkara refers to the views of some other interpreter as *apara āha*. It is hard to identify him; no clue is given by any of the commentators on Śaṅkara.

⁴ *Tātparyā-candrikā*, pp. 610-12. In the first rule of this topic Śaṅkara quotes the view of some other interpreter, which he tries to refute.

⁵ In *sūtra* 19 of this topic a different interpretation of *Chāndogya*, VIII. 11, by some other interpreter is referred to by Śaṅkara. He also refers in this *sūtra* to more than one interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra*.

said to allude to *Kaṭha*, II. 4. 13, and Madhva holds that the word "Lord" (Īśvara), there used, signifies not air, but Viṣṇu. Śaṅkara, however, thinks that the difficulty is with regard to another word of the sentence, viz., *puruṣa*, which according to him means Īśvara and not *jīva*. The eighth topic purports to establish that even the gods are entitled to higher knowledge. The tenth topic is said to allude to *Kaṭha*, II. 6. 2, and it is held that the *prāṇa*, which is there referred to as shaking the world, is neither thunder nor wind, but God. The eleventh topic, according to Madhva, alludes to *Bṛhad-āranyaka*, IV. 3. 7, and it is held that the word *jyotiḥ* used there refers to Viṣṇu and not to Jīva. Śaṅkara, however, thinks that the topic alludes to *Chāndogya*, VIII. 12. 3, and maintains that the word *jyotiḥ* used there means Brahman and not the disc of the Sun. The twelfth topic is said to allude to *Chāndogya*, VIII. 14. 1, and *ākāśa*, as there used, is said to refer to Viṣṇu according to Madhva and to Brahman according to Śaṅkara. The thirteenth topic, according to Madhva, alludes to *Bṛhad-āranyaka*, IV. 3. 15, and it is held that *asaṅga* ("untouched") in this passage refers to Viṣṇu and not to Jīva. Śaṅkara, however, thinks that the allusion is to *Bṛhad-āranyaka*, IV. 3. 7, and that *vijñānamaya* ("of the nature of consciousness") refers to Brahman and not to Jīva.

The fourth chapter of the first book is divided into seven topics. Of these the first topic discusses the possible meaning of *avyakta* in *Kaṭha*, I. 3. 11, and Śaṅkara holds that it means "human body," while Madhva says that it means Viṣṇu and not the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya¹. The second topic, containing three *sūtras*, is supposed to allude to *Śvetāśvatara*, IV. 5, according to Śaṅkara, who holds that it refers to the material principles of fire, water and earth and not to

¹ The word *avyakta*, ordinarily used to denote *prakṛti* on account of its subtleness of nature, can very aptly be used to denote Brahman, who is the subtlest of all and who by virtue of that subtlety is the ultimate support (*āśraya*) of *prakṛti*. Śaṅkara's interpretation of *avyakta* as the subtle material causes of the body is untenable; for, if the direct meaning of *avyakta* is forsaken, then there is nothing to object to in its referring to the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya. The supposed Sāṃkhya argument—that the assertion contained in the passage under discussion (that *avyakta* is superior (*parā*) to *mahat* and *puruṣa* is superior to *avyakta*) can be true only if by *avyakta prakṛti* is meant here—is not true; for since all qualities of *prakṛti* are dependent on God, attributes which could be applied to *prakṛti* could also be applied to God its master (*pradhānādīgata-parāvaratvādi-dharmāṇāṃ bhagavad-adhīnatvāt*). *Tāttva-prakāśikā*, p. 67.

In this topic the *sūtra*, *avadatīti cen na prājño hi prakaraṇāt* (I. 4. 5), as read by Śaṅkara, is split up by Madhva into two *sūtras*, *avadatīti cen na prājño hi* and *prakaraṇāt*, which are counted as I. 4. 5 and I. 4. 6 respectively.

*prakṛti*¹; according to Madhva it is more an extension of the previous topic for the purpose of emphasizing the fact that, like many other words (*camasa*, etc.), *avyakta* here means Viṣṇu and not *prakṛti*.

With Madhva, however, the second topic begins with *sūtra* I. 4. 9, and not with I. 4. 8 as with Śaṅkara. With Madhva the second topic is restricted to I. 4. 9 and I. 4. 10, and it alludes to a passage beginning *vasante vasante jyotiṣā yaja*, which is regarded by others as alluding to the *Jyotiṣtoma* sacrifice; Madhva holds that the word *jyotiṣ* here used does not refer to the *Jyotiṣtoma* sacrifice, but to Viṣṇu. The third topic with both Madhva and Śaṅkara consists of *sūtras* 12, 13 and 14, and they both allude here to the same passage, viz., *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, IV. 4. 17; Śaṅkara thinks that it refers to the five *vāyus*, not to the twenty-five categories of the *Sāṃkhya*, but Madhva holds that it refers to Viṣṇu. He has been called “five” (*pañca-janāḥ*), possibly on account of the existence of five important qualities, such as of seeing (*caṅkṣuṣṭva*), of life (*prāṇatva*), etc. The fourth topic according to Śaṅkara conveys the view that, though there are many apparently contradictory statements in the Upaniṣads, there is no dispute or contradiction regarding the nature of the creator. Madhva, however, holds that the topic purports to establish that all the names, such as *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, etc., of things from which creation is said to have been made, refer to Viṣṇu. Madhva contends that the purport of the *Samanvaya-sūtra* (I. 1. 4) is that all words in the Upaniṣads refer to Viṣṇu and Viṣṇu alone, and it is in accordance with such a contention that these words (*ākāśa*, etc.), which seem to have a different meaning, should prove to refer to Viṣṇu and Viṣṇu alone. These proofs are, of course, almost always of a textual character. Thus, in support of this contention Madhva here quotes *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, III. 7. 12, etc. The fifth topic, consisting of I. 4. 16 (I. 4. 15 according to Śaṅkara), 23 (I. 4. 24 according to Śaṅkara) according to Madhva, is to the effect that there is no difficulty in the fact that words which in the Upaniṣads are intended to mean Viṣṇu are seen to have in ordinary linguistic usage quite different meanings. Śaṅkara, however, counts the topic from I. 4. 15–18 and holds that it alludes to *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*, IV. 19, and that the being who is there sought to be known is not Jīva, but Īśvara; this is opposed by Vyāsa Yati in his

¹ *ajam ekam lohita-śukla-kṛṣṇam*, etc. *Svetāśvatara*, IV. 5.

Tātparya-candrikā on grounds of *sūtra* context, which according to him does not justify a reference to the meanings of passages after the concluding remarks made shortly before in this very chapter¹. The sixth topic, consisting with Śaṅkara of I. 4. 19–22, alludes to *Bṛhād-āraṇyaka*, IV. 5. 6 and concludes that *ātman* there refers to Brahman and not to *jīva* enduring the cycles of *saṃsāra*. Madhva, however, thinks that the sixth topic (I. 4. 24–28) concludes after textual discussions that even those words, such as *prakṛti*, etc., which are of the feminine gender, denote Viṣṇu; for, since out of Viṣṇu everything is produced, there cannot be any objection to words of feminine gender being applied to him. With Śaṅkara, however, the seventh topic begins with I. 4. 23–27 (Śaṅkara's numbering), and in this he tries to prove that Brahman is not only the instrumental cause, but also the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world. To this the obvious Madhva objections are that, if the material cause and the instrumental cause of the universe could be identical, that could also have been the case with regard to a jug; one could assume that the potter and the mud are identical. Stray objections are also taken against the *Bhāmatī*, which supposes that material cause here means "the basis of illusion" (*bhramā-dhīṣṭhāna*). Śaṅkara, however, has an eighth topic, consisting of only the last *sūtra* of I. 4, which corresponds to the seventh topic of Madhva. Madhva holds that the import of this topic is that such words as *asat* ("non-existent") or *sūnya* also denote Viṣṇu, since it is by His will that non-existence or even the hare's horn is what it is. Śaṅkara, however, holds that the topic means that so far the attempts at refutation were directed against the Sāṃkhya doctrine only, because this had some resemblance to the Vedānta doctrines, in that it agreed that cause and effect were identical and also in that it was partly accepted by some lawgivers, for instance Devala and others—while the other philosophical doctrines such as the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, etc., which are very remote from the Vedānta, do not require any refutation at all.

The first chapter of the second book contains thirteen topics. The whole chapter is devoted to refuting all objections from the point of view of the accepted works of other schools of thinkers. Madhva holds that the first topic is intended to refute the objections

¹ *Tātparya-candrikā*, p. 821. Other objections also are made to Śaṅkara's interpretation of this topic.

of other schools of believers, such as the Pāsupata, etc., who deny that Viṣṇu is the ultimate cause of the world¹. But these views have no validity, since these teachings are not in consonance with the teaching of the Vedas; all such doctrines are devoid of validity. The Vedas are not found to lend any support to the traditional canonical writings (*smṛti*) known as the *Pañcarātra* or to those of the Pāsupatas or of the Yoga, except in certain parts only. Śaṅkara, however, takes this topic as refuting the opinion that the Vedic texts are to be explained in consonance with the Sāṃkhya views on the ground that the Sāṃkhya represents some traditional canonical writings deserving of our respect; if models of interpretation were taken from the Sāṃkhya, that would come into conflict with other canonical writings such as Manu, the *Gītā*, etc., which deserve even greater respect than the Sāṃkhya. That the Sāṃkhya is entitled to respect is due to the fact that it is said to represent Kapila's view; but there is no proof that this Kapila is the great sage praised in the Upaniṣads; and, if this is not so, the Sāṃkhya's claim to respect vanishes.

The second topic of Madhva (third of Śaṅkara) is supposed by him to import that no one could, on account of the unfruitfulness of certain Vedic sacrifices in certain cases, doubt the validity of the Vedas, as one could the validity of the Pāsupata texts; for the Vedas are eternal and uncreated and, as such, are different from other texts. The authority of the Vedas has to be accepted on their own account and is independent of reference to any other text². If under the circumstances, in spite of the proper performance of any sacrifice, the desired results are not seen to follow, that must be explained as being due to some defects in the performance³. The

¹ According to Madhva the topic consists of the first three *sūtras*, while Śaṅkara has one topic for the first two *sūtras* and another for the third *sūtra* (*etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ*), and the latter merely asserts that the arguments given in the first topic against the Sāṃkhya refute the Yoga also.

² Madhva mentions here the following text as being alone self-valid, quoting it from the *Bhaviṣyat-purāṇa* in his *Bhāṣya* (II. 1. 5).

*rg-yajus-sāmātharvāś ca mūla-rāmāyaṇam tathā
bhāratam pañca-rātram ca veda ity eva śabditaḥ
purāṇāni ca yānīha vaiṣṇavā nivido, viduḥ
svataḥ-prāmāṇyam eteṣāṃ nātra kimcid vicāryate.*

³ There is not only a discrepancy in the division of topics, and the order of *sūtras*, between Madhva and Śaṅkara, but also addition of a new *sūtra* in Madhva's reading of the text of the *Brahma-sūtras*. Thus the second topic with Madhva consists of the fourth and the fifth *sūtras* only, and the third topic of the sixth and the seventh *sūtras*. But the fifth *sūtra* is the sixth in the Śaṅkara's text and the

main points of the third topic of Śaṅkara (*sūtras* 4–12) are as follows : It may be objected that the unconscious and impure world could not have been produced from the pure Brahman of the pure intelligence, and that this difference of the world as impure is also accepted in the Vedas; but this is not a valid objection; for the Upaniṣads admit that even inanimate objects like fire, earth, etc., are presided over by conscious agents or deities; and such examples as the production of hair, nails, etc., from conscious agents and of living insects from inanimate cow-dung, etc., show that it is not impossible that the unconscious world should be produced from Brahman, particularly when that is so stated in the Upaniṣads. There cannot be objection that this would damage the doctrine of coexistence or pre-existence of effects (*sat-kārya-vāda*); for the reality of the world, both in the present state and even before its production, consists of nothing but its nature as Brahman. In the state of dissolution everything returns to Brahman, and at each creation it all joins the world cycle, except the emancipated ones, as in the awakened state after dreams; and such returns of the world into Brahman cannot make the latter impure, just as a magician is not affected by his magic creations or just as the earth-forms of jug, etc., cannot affect their material, earth, when they are reduced thereto. Moreover, such objections would apply also to the objectors, the Sāṃkhya. But, since these difficult problems which cannot be settled by experience cannot be solved by inference—for, however strongly any inference is based, a clever logician may still find fault with it—we have to depend here entirely on Vedic texts.

The third topic of Madhva (*sūtras* 6, 7) is supposed to raise the objection that the Vedas are not trustworthy, because they make impossible statements, e.g., that the earth spoke (*mṛd abravīt*); the objection is refuted by the answer that references to such conscious actions are with regard to their presiding deities (*abhimāni-devatā*). The fourth topic of Madhva (*sūtras* 8–13) is intended to refute other supposed impossible assertions of the Vedas, such as that concerning the production from non-existence (*asat*); it is held that,

sixth of Madhva is the fifth of Śaṅkara. The seventh *sūtra* of Madhva is altogether absent in Śaṅkara's text. The third topic of Śaṅkara consists of *sūtras* 4–11. But the topics of Madhva are as follows: second topic, *sūtras* 4, 5; third topic, *sūtras* 5, 6, 7; fourth topic, *sūtras* 8–13, the thirteenth being the twelfth of Śaṅkara's text. Śaṅkara has for his fourth topic this *sūtra* alone.

if it is urged as an answer that there may be some kind of non-existence from which on the strength of Vedic assertions production is possible (though it is well-known that production is impossible from all kinds of non-existence, e.g., a hare's horn), yet in that case the state of dissolution (*pralaya*) would be a state of absolute non-existence (*sarvā sattva*), and that is impossible, since all productions are known to proceed from previous states of existence and all destructions must end in some residue¹. The answer given to these objections is that these questions cannot be decided merely by argument, which can be utilized to justify all sorts of conclusions. Śaṅkara's fourth topic consists of only the twelfth *sūtra*, which says that the objections of other schools of thought which are not generally accepted may similarly be disregarded.

The fifth topic of Śaṅkara (*sūtra* II. 1. 13) is supposed by him to signify that the objection that the enjoyer and the enjoyable cannot be identified, and that therefore in a similar way Brahman cannot be considered as the material cause of the world, cannot hold, since, in spite of identity, there may still be apparent differences due to certain supposed limitations, just as, in spite of the identity of the sea and the waves, there are points of view from which they may be considered different. According to Madhva, however, this topic means that those texts which speak of the union of *jīva* with Brahman are to be understood after the analogy of ordinary mixing of water with water; here, though the water is indistinguishably mixed, in the sense that the two cannot be separated, still the two have not become one, since there has been an excess in quantity at least. By this it is suggested that, though the *jīva* may be inseparably lost in Brahman, yet there must be at least some difference between them, such that there cannot be anything like perfect union of the one with the other².

The sixth topic, consisting of the same *sūtras* in Śaṅkara and Madhva (*sūtras* 14-20), is supposed by Śaṅkara to affirm the identity of cause and effect, Brahman and the world, and to hold that the apparent differences are positively disproved by scriptural texts and arguments. Śaṅkara holds that *Chāndogya*, VI. 1. 1,

¹ *sata utpattiḥ saśeṣa-vināśaś ca hi loke dr̥ṣṭaḥ*. *Madhva-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 10.

² It is pointed out by Vyāsa-tīrtha that Śaṅkara's interpretation is wrong, both with regard to the supposed opponent's view (*pūrva-pakṣa*) and as regards the answer (*siddhānta*). The illustration of the sea and the waves and foam (*phena-taraṅga-nyāya*) is hardly allowable on the *vivarta* view. *Tātparyā-candrikā*, p. 872.

definitely asserts the identity of Brahman with the world after the analogy of clay, which alone is considered to be real in all its modifications as jug, etc. So Brahman (like clay) alone is real and the world is considered to be its product (like jug, etc.). There are many Upaniṣad texts which reprove those who affirm the many as real. But this again contradicts ordinary experience, and the only compromise possible is that the many of the world have existence only so long as they appear, but, when once the Brahma-knowledge is attained, this unreal appearance vanishes like dream-experiences on awaking. But even from this unreal experience of the world and from the scriptures true Brahma-knowledge can be attained; for even through unreal fears real death might occur. The practical world (*vyāvahārika*) of ordinary experience exists only so long as the identity of the self with Brahman is not realized; but, once this is done, the unreal appearance of the world vanishes. The identity of cause and effect is also seen from the fact that it is only when the material cause (e.g. clay) exists that the effect (e.g. *ghaṭa*) exists, and the effects also ultimately return to the cause. Various other reasons are also adduced in II. 1. 18 in favour of the *sat-kārya-vāda*. Madhva, however, takes the topic in quite a different way. Brahman creates the world by Himself, without any help from independent instruments or other accessories; for all the accessories and instruments are dependent upon Him for their power. Arguing against Śaṅkara's interpretation, Vyāsa-tīrtha says that the unreal world cannot be identified with Brahman (*anṛtasya viśvasya satya-brahmābheda-yogāt*). Moreover, *abheda* cannot be taken in the sense in which the *Bhāmatī* takes it, namely, as meaning not "identity", but simply "want of difference"; for want of difference and identity are the same thing (*bhedābhāve abhedadhranūyāt*). Moreover, if there is no difference (*bheda*), then one cannot be called true and the other false (*bhedābhāve satyānṛta-vyavasthāyogāc ca*). The better course therefore is to admit both difference and non-difference. It cannot be said that *ananyatva* ("no-other-ness") is the same as imposition on Brahman (*brahmany āropitatvam*). What Vyāsa-tīrtha wants to convey by all this is that, even if the Upaniṣads proclaim the identity of Brahman and the world, not only does such an identity go against Śaṅkara's accepted thesis that the world is unreal and untrue and hence cannot be identified with Brahman, but his explanation that "identity" means illusory imposition

(*āropa*) is unacceptable, since no one thinks the conch-shell to be identical with its illusory imposed silver. There are no grounds for holding that knowledge of the basis should necessarily involve knowledge of the imposed, and so the former cannot be considered as the essence of the latter; and the knowledge of earth does not remove the knowledge of jug, etc., nor does knowledge of earth imply knowledge of its form as jug¹. Jaya-tīrtha in his *Nyāya-sudhā* on this topic formulates the causal doctrine of the Madhva school as being *bhedābheda* theory, which means that effect is in some ways identical with cause and in other ways different. Thus it opposes both the extremes—the complete difference of cause and effect as in Nyāya, and their complete identity as in Śaṅkara or the Sāṃkhya. He argues that, if the effect were already existing identical with the cause, then that also would be existent previously in its cause, and so on till the original root cause is reached. Now, since the root cause is never produced or destroyed, there could be no production or destruction of ordinary things, such as cloth, jug, etc., and there could be no difference between eternal entities, such as soul, etc., and non-eternal entities, such as jug, etc., and causal operations also would be useless. Moreover, if the effect (e.g., cloth) is previously existent in the cause (e.g., threads), it ought to be perceptible; if the existence of anything which is in no way perceptible has to be accepted, then even the existence of a hare's horn has to be admitted. If the effect (e.g., cloth) were already existent, then it could not be produced now; the effect, again, is largely different from the cause; for, even when the effect is destroyed, the cause remains; the causes are many, the effect is one; and the utility, appearance, etc., of them both also widely vary. It is urged sometimes that production of the effect means its manifestation (*vyakti*) and its destruction means cessation of manifestation (*avyakti*). This manifestation and non-manifestation would then mean perception (*upalabdhi*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). That would mean that whatever is perceived at a particular time is produced at that time. If the effect were previously existent, why was it not perceived at that time? In case everything must exist, if it is to appear as produced, then it may be asked whether the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) was also existent before the appearance

¹ *mṛt-tattva-jñāne'pi tat-saṃsthāna-viśeṣatva-rūpa-ghaṭatvā-jñānena ghaṭas tattvato na jñāta iti vyavahārāt. Tātparya-candrikā, p. 879.*

of the effect; if so, then it ought to have been visible at the time; if the manifestation also requires another manifestation and that another, then there is infinite regress. The point of view of causal conception accepted by Jaya-tīrtha is that, if the cause of production exists, there is production, and if sufficient cause of destruction exists, there is destruction. A hare's horn is not produced, because there is not a sufficient cause for its production, and *ātman* is not destroyed, because there is not a sufficient cause for its destruction¹.

The seventh topic with Śaṅkara (*sūtras* 21–23) is said to answer the objection that, if Brahman and *jīva* are identical, then it is curious that Brahman should make Himself subject to old age, death, etc., or imprison Himself in the prison-house of this body, by pointing out that the creator and the individual souls are not one and the same, since the latter represent only conditional existence, due to ignorance; so the same Brahman has two different forms of existence, as Brahman and as *jīva*. According to Madhva the topic is intended to introduce a discussion in favour of Īśvara being the creator, as against the view that individuals themselves are the creators. According to him this topic consists of *sūtras* 21–26; with Śaṅkara, however, of *sūtras* 24 and 25, which according to him mean that, on account of the existence of diverse powers, it is possible that from one Brahman there should be the diversified creation. Again, *sūtras* 26–28 form according to Śaṅkara the ninth topic, which purports to establish that it is possible that the world should be produced from the bodiless Brahman. The eighth topic begins with Madhva from the 28th *sūtra*, as counted by him, and extends to the 32nd. According to Madhva the object of this topic is to refute the arguments urged against the all-creatorship of Viṣṇu. Thus it refutes the objections that, if Brahman worked without any instrument, His whole being might be involved even in creating a single straw, etc. Everything is possible in God, who possesses diverse kinds of power. According to Śaṅkara *sūtras* 30, 31, forming the tenth topic, maintain that Brahman possesses all powers and can perform everything without the aid of any sense organs. *Sūtras* 33 and 34 (32 and 33 of Śaṅkara's counting) form a new topic, which maintains that, though all His wishes are always fulfilled, yet He

¹ *yasya ca vināśa-kāraṇaṃ vidyate tat sad api nirudhyate, na ca khara-viṣāṇa-janmani ātmanvināśe vā kāraṇaṃ asti iti tayoṛ janana-vināśābhāvah.*

creates this world only in play for the good of all beings. The same is also here the purport of Śaṅkara's interpretation of this topic. The tenth topic, consisting of *sūtras* 34-36, is said to maintain that the rewards and punishments bestowed by God upon human beings are regulated by Him in accordance with the virtuous and sinful deeds performed by them, and that He does so out of His own sweet will to keep Himself firm in His principle of justice, and therefore He cannot be said to be in any way controlled in His actions by the *karma* of human beings, nor can He be accused of partiality or cruelty to anyone. The same is also the purport of Śaṅkara's interpretation of this topic. The chapter ends with the affirmation that the fact of Viṣṇu's being the fullness of all good qualities (*sadā-prāpta-sarva-sad-guṇam*) is absolutely unimpeachable.

In the second chapter of the second book, which is devoted to the refutation of the views of other systems of Indian thought, Madhva and Śaṅkara are largely in agreement. It is only in connexion with the twelfth topic, which Śaṅkara interprets as a refutation of the views of the Bhāgavata school, that there is any real divergence of opinion. For Madhva and his followers try to justify the authority of the *Pañcarātra* and interpret the topic accordingly, while Śaṅkara interprets it as a refutation of the Bhāgavata school.

The third chapter of the second book begins with a topic introducing a discussion of the possibility of the production of *ākāśa*, since two opposite sets of Upaniṣad texts are available on the subject. Madhva's followers distinguish two kinds of *ākāśa*, *ākāśa* as pure vacuity and *ākāśa* as element; according to them it is only the latter that is referred to in the Upaniṣad texts as being produced, while the former is described as eternal. The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth topics relate to the production of air, the being (*sat*) or Brahman, fire and earth, and it is held that Brahman alone is originless and that everything else has come out of Him. These topics are almost the same in Śaṅkara and Madhva. The seventh topic maintains according to Madhva that Viṣṇu is not only the creator, but also the destroyer of the world. According to Śaṅkara, however, this topic asserts that the successive production of the elements from one another is due not to their own productive power, but to the productive power of God Himself. The eighth

topic holds that the destruction of elements takes place in an order inverse to that in which they were produced. Madhva accepts the same meaning of the topic. The ninth topic, according to Madhva, discusses whether it is true that all cases of destruction must be in inverse order to their production, and it is decided in the affirmative; the objection that, since *viññāna* is produced from *manas* and yet the latter is destroyed first, these two must be considered as exceptions, is not correct, since in reality *viññāna* is not produced out of *manas*. *Manas* has two senses, as "category" and as "inner organ" (*antaḥkaraṇa*), and the word *viññāna* also means "category" and "understanding" (*avabodha*). Where *viññāna* is said to rise from *manas*, it is used only in a general way, in the sense of understanding as arising from grasping (*ālocana*); Śaṅkara, however, interprets this topic as consisting only of the 16th *sūtra* (while Madhva takes the 15th and 16th *sūtras* from this topic), asserting that the production of the sense faculties does not disturb the order of the production of the elements. The tenth topic of Madhva, the 17th *sūtra*, is supposed to hold that there cannot be any destruction of Viṣṇu. With Śaṅkara this topic, the 16th *sūtra*, is said to hold that birth and death can be spoken of only with regard to body and not with regard to the soul. The eleventh topic (the 17th *sūtra* with Śaṅkara) means that the birth of *jīva* is true only in a special sense, since in reality *jīva* has neither birth nor death. The eleventh topic, consisting of the 18th and 19th *sūtras*, gives according to Madhva the view that the individual souls have all been produced from God. According to Madhva the twelfth topic (*sūtras* 20–27) deals with the measure of *jīvas*. The topic gives, according to him, the view that the *jīva* is atomic in size and not all-pervading. Being in one place, it can vitalize the whole body, just as a lamp can illuminate a room by its light, which is a quality of the lamp; for a substance may be pervading by virtue of its quality¹. The thirteenth topic (27th *sūtra*), according to Madhva, is supposed to affirm the plurality of souls. The fourteenth topic (*sūtras* 28, 29) demonstrates that Brahman and *jīva* are different. The fifteenth topic of Madhva shows that, though the souls are produced from God, yet they are not destructible. The souls are like reflections from the Brahman, and they therefore must persist as long as the Brahman remains and

¹ A discussion is raised here by Jaya-tirtha regarding the nature of light, and it is held that light is of the nature of a quality and not a substance.

must therefore be eternal. The conditions (*upādhi*) through which these reflections are possible are twofold, external (*bāhya*) and essential (*svarūpa*). The external condition is destroyed, but not the essential one¹. The souls are thus at once one with the Brahman and different; they depend on God for their existence and are similar to Him in nature. The sixteenth topic seeks to establish the nature of souls as consciousness and pure bliss, which are however revealed in their fullness only in the state of emancipation by the grace of God, while in our ordinary states these are veiled, as it were by ignorance (*avidyā*)². The seventeenth topic seeks to reconcile the freedom of action of the *jīva* with the ultimate agency of God. It is God who makes the *jīvas* work in accordance with their past *karmas*, which are beginningless (*anādi*). Thus, though God makes all *jīvas* perform all their works, He is guided in His directorship by their previous *karmas*. The eighteenth topic seeks to establish that, though the *jīvas* are parts of God, they are not parts in the same sense as the part-incarnations, the fish-incarnation, etc., are; for the latter are parts of essential nature (*svarūpāmśa*), whereas the former are not parts of an essential nature (*jīvānām asvarūpāmśatvam*); for, though parts, they are different from God. The nineteenth topic asserts that the *jīvas* are but reflections of God.

With Śāṅkara, however, these *sūtras* yield quite different interpretations. Thus the twelfth topic (*sūtra* 18) is supposed to assert that even in deep sleep there is consciousness, and the circumstance that nothing is known in this state is due to the fact that there is no object of which there could be any knowledge (*viśayābhāvād iyaṃ acetayamānatā na caitanyābhāvāt*). The thirteenth topic (*sūtras* 19–32) discusses upon his view the question whether, in accordance with the texts which speak of the going out of self, the self should be regarded as atomic, or whether it should be regarded as all-pervasive; and he decides in favour of the latter, because of its being identical with Brahman. The fourteenth topic (*sūtras* 33–39), after considering the possible agency of mind, senses, etc., denies them and decides in favour of the agency of soul, and holds that the

¹ *jīvopādhīr dvidhā proktaḥ svarūpaṃ bāhya eva ca,
bāhyopādhīr layaṃ yāti muktāu anyasya tu sthitiḥ.*

Tattva-prakāśikā, p. 119.

² *evaṃ jīva-svarūpatvena mukteḥ pūrvam api sato jñānānanden īśvara-prasādenābhivyakti-nimittena ānandī bhavati; prāg anābhivyaktatvena amubhāvā-bhāva-prasaṅgāt. Ibid.* p. 120.

buddhi and the senses are only instruments and accessories. Yet in the fifteenth topic (*sūtra* 40) Śaṅkara tries to establish this agency of the self, not as real, but as illusory in presence of the conditions of the sense-organs, intellect, etc. (*upādhi-dharmā-dhyāsenaiṣa ātmanaḥ kartṛtvam na svābhāvikam*). Upon the sixteenth topic (*sūtras* 41–42) Śaṅkara tries to establish the fact that God helps persons to perform their actions in accordance with their previous *karma*. The seventeenth topic (*sūtras* 43–53) is interpreted by Śaṅkara as stating the view that the difference between the selves themselves and between them and Brahman can be understood only by a reference to the analogy of reflection, spatial limitations or the like; for in reality they are one, and it is only through the presence of the limiting conditions that they appear to be different.

In the fourth chapter of the first book the first topic of both Śaṅkara and Madhva describes the origin of the *prāṇas* from Brahman¹. The second topic of Madhva, containing the 3rd *sūtra* of Śaṅkara's reading, describes the origin of *manas* from Brahman. The 4th *sūtra*, forming the third topic of Madhva, holds the view that speech (*vāk*) also is produced from Brahman, though we sometimes hear it spoken of as eternal, when it is applied to the Vedas. The 5th and the 6th *sūtras*, forming the fourth topic, discuss the purports of various texts regarding the number of the *prāṇas*, and hold the view that they are twelve in number. The fifth topic of Madhva, consisting of the 7th *sūtra*, states the view that the *prāṇas* are atomic by nature and not all-pervasive, and that hence there cannot be any objection to the idea of their being produced from Brahman. The *sūtras* 8 and 9, forming the sixth topic, show the production of *prāṇas* from Brahman. The *sūtras* 10 and 11, forming the seventh topic, show that even the principal (*mukhya*) *prāṇa* is dependent on Brahman for its production and existence. In the eighth topic, consisting of the 12th *sūtra*, it is held that the modifications (*ṛtti*) of the principal *prāṇa* are like servants, so their functions are also in reality derived from Brahman. The ninth topic, consisting of the 13th *sūtra*, repeats textual proofs of the atomic character of *prāṇa*. The tenth topic, consisting of *sūtras* 14–

¹ This topic consists according to Śaṅkara of only four *sūtras*, and according to Madhva of the first three *sūtras*. Of these the third *sūtra* (*pratijñānuparodhā ca*) happens to be absent in Śaṅkara's reading of the *Brahma-sūtras*.

16, states the view that the senses are instruments of Brahman, though in a remote way they may also be regarded as instruments of the *jīva*. The eleventh topic, consisting of the 17th to the 19th *sūtras*, states the view that all the other twelve *prāṇas*, excepting the thirteenth or the principal (*mukhya*) *prāṇa*, are so many senses. The difference between these and the principal *prāṇa* consists in this, that the work of these other *prāṇas*, though depending principally on Brahman, also depends on the effort of *jīva* (*īśvara-paravaśā hi indriyāṇām pravṛttir jīva-prayatnāpekṣaiva*), but the functioning of the *mukhya prāṇa* does not in any way depend on the individual souls (*mukhyaprāṇasya pravṛttir na puruṣa-prayatnāpekṣayā*). The twelfth topic (20th *sūtra*) shows that all our bodies also are derived from Brahman. The last topic (21st *sūtra*) instils the view that our bodies are made up not of one element, but of five elements.

According to Śaṅkara, however, the chapter is to be divided into nine topics, of which the first has already been described. The second topic (*sūtras* 5-6) holds the view that there are eleven senses, and not seven only as some hold, after the analogy of seven *prāṇas*. The third topic (7th *sūtra*) states that the senses are not all-pervasive, as the adherents of Sāṃkhya hold, but are atomic by nature. The fourth topic (8th *sūtra*) states that the *mukhya prāṇa* is a modification of Brahman, like any other *prāṇa*. The fifth topic (*sūtras* 9-12) states that *prāṇa* is not simply *vāyu*, but a subjective modification of it in the fivefold form, and its general function cannot be properly explained by reference to the individual actions of the separate *prāṇas*, like the movement of a cage by a concerted effort of each one of the birds encaged therein; for the actions of the *prāṇas* do not seem to be in any way concerted. As there are five states of mind, desire, imagination, etc., so the five *prāṇas* are but modifications of the principal *prāṇa*. The sixth topic (13th *sūtra*) states that this principal *prāṇa* is atomic by nature. The seventh topic (*sūtras* 14-16) states that the *prāṇas* in their functioning are presided over by certain deities for their movement and yet these can only be for the enjoyment of the *jīvas*. The eighth topic (*sūtras* 17-19) states that the senses (conative and cognitive) are different categories (*tattvāntara*) from the principal *prāṇa*. The ninth topic (*sūtras* 20-22) states that the *jīva* is not the creator, who is *Īśvara*.

CHAPTER XXVII

A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MADHVA

Ontology.

THE philosophy of Madhva admits the categories, viz., substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), class-character (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) whole (*aṁśī*), power (*śakti*), similarity (*sādrśya*) and negation (*abhāva*)¹. *Dravya* is defined as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*)². A *dravya* is a material cause with reference to evolutionary changes (*pariṇāma*) and manifestation (*abhivyakti*) or to both. Thus the world is subject to evolutionary changes, whereas God or souls can only be manifested or made known, but cannot undergo any evolutionary change; again, ignorance (*avidyā*) may be said to undergo evolutionary changes and to be the object of manifestation as well. The substances are said to be twenty, viz., the highest self or God (*paramātmān*), *Lakṣmī*, souls (*jīva*), unmanifested vacuity (*avyākṛtākāśa*), *prakṛti*, the three *guṇas*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, *buddhi*, *manas*, the senses (*indriya*), the elements (*bhūta*), the element-potentials (*mātra*), ignorance (*avidyā*), speech-sounds (*varṇa*), darkness (*andha-kāra*), root-impressions (or tendencies) (*vāsanā*), time (*kāla*), reflection (*pratibimba*).

The qualities of Madhva are of the same nature as those of the Vaiśeṣika; but the inclusion of mental qualities, such as self-control

¹ In the *Tattva-saṃkhyāna* (p. 10) it is said that reality (*tattva*) is twofold, independent (*svatantra*) and dependent (*asvatantra*), and elsewhere in the *Bhāṣya* it is said that there are four categories (*padārtha*), viz., God, *prakṛti*, soul (*jīva*) and matter (*jaḍa*):

*iśvaraḥ prakṛtir jīvo jaḍam ceti catuṣṭayam
padārthānāṃ sannidhānāt tatteṣo viṣṇurucyate.*

But the present division of Madhva's philosophy, as admitting of ten categories, is made in view of similar kinds of division and classification used by the Vaiśeṣika and others.

² There is another definition of *dravya*, when it is defined as the object of a competitive race in the second canto of *Bhāgavata-tātparya*, also referred to in the *Madhva-siddhānta-sāra*. Thus it is said: *dravyaṃ tu dravaṇa-prāpyaṃ dvayor vivadamānayoḥ pūrvam vegābhisambandhādākāśas tu, pradeśataḥ*. But this does not seem to have been further elaborated. It is hardly justifiable to seek any philosophical sense in this fanciful etymological meaning.

(*śama*), mercy (*kṛpā*), endurance (*titikṣā*), strength (*bala*), fear (*bhaya*), shame (*lajjā*), sagacity (*gāmbhīrya*), beauty (*saundarya*), heroism (*śaurya*), liberality (*audārya*), etc., is considered indispensable, and so the qualities include not only the twenty-four qualities of the syncretist Vaiśeṣika, but many more.

Actions (*karma*) are those which directly or indirectly lead to merit (*puṇya*) or demerit (*pāpa*). There are no actions which are morally absolutely indifferent; even upward motion and the like—which may be considered as indifferent (*udāsīna*) *karmas*—are indirectly the causes of merit or demerit. *Karmas* are generally divided into three classes, as *vihita*, i.e., enjoined by the *śāstra*, *niṣiddha*, prohibited by it, and *udāsīna*, not contemplated by it or indifferent. The latter is of the nature of vibration (*pariṣpanda*), and this is not of five kinds alone, as the Vaiśeṣika supposes, but of many other kinds¹. Actions of creation, destruction, etc., in God are eternal in Him and form His essence (*svarūpa-bhūtāḥ*); the contradictory actions of creation and destruction may abide in Him, provided that, when one is in the actual form, the other is in the potential form². Actions in non-eternal things are non-eternal and can be directly perceived by the senses.

The next question is regarding *jāti*, or universals, which are considered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as one and immutable. These are considered in the Madhva school as eternal only in eternal substances like the *jīvas*, whereas in non-eternal substances they are considered to be destructible and limited specifically to the individuals where they occur. There are in destructible individuals no such universals, which last even when the individuals are destroyed. An objection is raised that, if the existence of permanent universals is not agreed to, then the difficulty of comprehending concomitance (*vyāpti*) would be insurmountable, and hence inference would be impossible. The answer that is given on the side of Madhva is that inference is possible on the basis of similarity (*sādṛśya*), and that the acceptance of immutable universals is not

¹ The syncretistic Vaiśeṣika view, that action is of five kinds, is described here; for it is held that the Vaiśeṣika view that by simple rectilinear motion (*gamana*), circular motion (*bhramana*) or other kinds of motion could be got, is strongly objected to, because circular motion is not a species of rectilinear motion; and hence the Vaiśeṣika classification of *karma* into five classes is also held to be inadequate.

² *sṛṣṭi-kāle sṛṣṭi-kriyā vyakty-ātmanā vartate, anyadā tu śakty-ātmanā, evaṃ saṃhāra-kriyāpi. Madhva-siddhānta-sāra*, p. 4.

necessary for that purpose; and this also applies to the comprehension of the meaning of words: when certain objects are pointed out as having any particular name, that name can be extended to other individuals which are extremely similar to the previous objects which were originally associated with that name¹. A difference is also drawn between *jāti* ("universal") and *upādhi* ("limiting condition") in this, that the latter is said to be that which depends for its comprehension upon the comprehension of some other primary notion, while the former is that whose comprehension is direct and does not depend upon the comprehension of some other notion². Thus the universal of cow (*gotva*) is known immediately and directly, whereas the notion of the universal of "cognizability" (*prameyatva*) can only be known through the previous knowledge of those things which are objects of knowledge. So the universal of cognizability is said to be *upādhi*, and the former *jāti*. It is further objected that, if objections are taken against an immutable universal existing in all individuals of a class at one and the same time, then the same objection may be taken against the acceptance of similarity, which must be supposed to exist at one time in a number of individuals. The answer to this is that the relation of similarity between two or three individuals is viewed in Madhva philosophy as existing uniformly between the number of individuals so related, but not completely in any one of them. When two or three terms which are said to be similar exist, the relation of similarity is like a dyadic or triadic relation subsisting between the terms in mutual dependence³; the relation of similarity existing between a number of terms is therefore not one, but many, according as the relation is noted from the point of view of one or the other of the terms. The similarity of A to B is different from the similarity of B to A, and so forth (*bhinnābhinnam sādṛśyam iti siddham*).

¹ *anugata-dharmaṃ vināpi sādṛśyena sarvatra vyāpti-ādi-graha-sambhavāt, ayaṃ dhumaḥ etat-sadṛśaś ca vahnī-vyāptya ity evaṃ-krameṇa vyāpti-grahah*, "even without the basis of the existence of identical characteristics, comprehension of *vyāpti* is possible on the basis of similarity, e.g., 'This is smoke and entities similar to these are associated with fire, etc.'" *Madhva-siddhānta-sāra*, p. 6.

² *itara-nirūpaṇādhīna-nirūpaṇakatvam upādhi-lakṣaṇam and anya-nirūpaṇādhīna-nirūpaṇatvam jātitvam. Ibid.* p. 7.

³ *eka-nirūpitāparādhikarāṇa-vṛttitvena tri-vikrama-nyāyena tat-svikārāt, pratiyogitvānyuyogitvādvat. Ibid.* p. 6.

We next come to the doctrine of specific particulars (*viśeṣa*) in the Madhva school. It supposes that every substance is made up of an infinite number of particulars associated with each and every quality that it may be supposed to possess. Thus, when the question arises regarding the relation of qualities to their substances (e.g., the relation of colour, etc., to a jug) if any quality was identical with the substance, then the destruction of it would mean destruction of the substance, and the words denoting the substance and the quality would mutually mean each other; but that is not so, and this difficulty can be solved only on the supposition that there are specific particulars corresponding as the basis to each one of the qualities. As to the exact relation of these to their substance there are divergences of view, some holding that they are identical with the substance (*abheda*), others that they are different (*bheda*), and others that they are both identical and different (*bhedābheda*). Whatever view regarding the relation of the qualities to the substance is accepted, the doctrine of specific particulars (*viśeṣa*) has to be accepted, to escape the contradiction. Thus *viśeṣas* in each substance are numberless, corresponding to the view-points or qualities intended to be explained; but there are no further *viśeṣas* for each *viśeṣa*, as that would lead to an infinite regress. For a satisfactory explanation of the diverse external qualities of God it is necessary to admit eternal *viśeṣas* in Him. In order to explain the possibility of a connection of the continuous eternal space or vacuity (*ākāśa*) with finite objects like jug, etc. it is necessary to admit the existence of *viśeṣas* in *ākāśa*¹. It will be seen from the above that the acceptance of *viśeṣas* becomes necessary only in those cases where the unity and difference of two entities, such as the substance and the qualities or the like, cannot otherwise be satisfactorily explained. For these cases the doctrine of *viśeṣas* introduces some supposed particulars, or parts, to which the association of the quality could be referred, without referring to the whole substance for such association. But this does not apply to the existence of *viśeṣa* in the atoms; for the atoms can very well be admitted to have parts, and the contact with other atoms can thus be very easily explained without the assumption of any *viśeṣa*. An atom may be admitted to be the smallest unit in comparison with

¹ *ato gaganādi-vibhu-dravyasya ghaṭādinā saṃyoga-tadabhāvobhaya-nirvāhako viśeṣo'anya-gatyā svīkaraṇīyaḥ. Ibid. p. 9.*

everything else: but that is no reason why it should not be admitted to be bigger than its own parts. If the atoms had not parts, they could not be held to combine on all their ten sides¹. So the Vaiśeṣika view, admitting *viśeṣas* in atoms, has to be rejected. It is well worth remembering here that the Vaiśeṣikas held that there were among the atoms of even the same *bhūta*, and also among the souls, such specific differences that these could be distinguished from one another by the *yogins*. These final differences, existing in the atoms themselves, are called *viśeṣas* by the Kaṇāda school of thinkers. This conception of *viśeṣa* and its utility is different from the conception of *viśeṣa* in the Madhva school².

Samavāya, or the relation of inherence accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, is discarded in the system of Madhva on almost the same grounds as in Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtras*. The view is that the appearance of the cause in the effect and of the qualities in the substance is manifestly of the nature of a relation and, as this relation is not contact (*saṃyoga*), it must be a separate relation, viz., the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). But in the same way *samavāya* (e.g., in the sentence *iha tantuṣu paṭa-samavāyāḥ*) itself may have the appearance of existing in something else in some relation, and hence may be in need of further relations to relate it. If without any such series of relations a relation of inherence can be related in the manner of a quality and a substance, then that sort of relatedness or qualifiedness (*viśiṣṭatā*) may serve all the purposes of *samavāya*. This brings us to the acceptance of "related" or "qualified" as a category separate and distinct from the categories of quality (*guṇa*) and substance (*dravya*) and the relation involved between the two³. So also the whole (*aṃśī*) is not either the relations or the parts or both, but a separate category by itself.

Power (*śakti*), as a separate category, exists in four forms: (i) as mysterious—*acintya-śakti*—as in God, (ii) causal power

¹ *anyāpekṣayā paramāṇutve'pi svāvayavāpekṣayā mahattvopapatteḥ: ... kim ca paramāṇor avayavānāṅgikāre tasya daśadikṣv abhisambandho na syāt. Madhva-siddhānta-sāra*, p. 10.

² *asmad-viśiṣṭānām yoginām nityeṣu tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātmasu ca anya-nimittāsaṃbhavād yebhyo nimittabhyāḥ pratyādhāraṃ vilakṣaṇo'yaṃ vilakṣaṇo'yaṃ iti pratyaya-vyāvṛtīḥ, deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe ca paramāṇau sa evāyaṃ iti pratyabhijñānaṃ ca bhavati te antyā viśeṣāḥ.*

Prasāsta-pāda-bhāṣya, pp. 321-2.

³ *viśiṣṭaṃ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-tatsambandhātiriktaṃ avāśyaṃ āṅgikartavyam. Madhva-siddhānta-sāra*, p. 11.

(*kāraṇa-śakti* or *sahaja-śakti*), which naturally exists in things and by virtue of which they can produce all sorts of changes, (iii) a power brought about by a new operation in a thing called the *ādheya-śakti*, as in an idol through the ritual operations of the installation ceremony (*pratiṣṭhā*), and (iv) the significant power of words (*pada-śakti*). Negation is said to be of three kinds: (i) the negation preceding a production (*prāg-abhāva*), (ii) that following destruction (*dhvaṃsābhāva*), (iii) as otherness (*anyonyābhāva*), e.g., there is the negation of a jug in a pot and of a pot in a jug: this is therefore the same as differences, which are considered as the essence of all things¹. When things are destroyed, their differences are also destroyed. But the five differences between God and souls, between souls themselves, between inanimate objects themselves, between them and God, and between them and the souls, are all eternal; for the differences in eternal things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal². The fourth kind of negation, *atyantābhāva*, is the non-existence belonging to impossible entities like the hare's horn.

God, or Paramātman, is in this system considered as the fullness of infinite qualities. He is the author of creation, maintenance, destruction, control, knowledge, bondage, salvation, and hiding (*āvṛti*). He is omniscient, and all words in their most pervading and primary sense refer to Him. He is different from all material objects, souls and *prakṛti*, and has for His body knowledge and bliss, and is wholly independent and one, though He may have diverse forms (as in *Vāsudeva*, *Pradyumna*, etc.); all such forms of Him are the full manifestation of all His qualities.

The souls (*jīva*) are naturally tainted with defects of ignorance, sorrow, fear, etc., and they are subject to cycles of transformation. They are infinite in number. They are of three kinds, viz., those who are fit for emancipation (*mukti-yogya*), e.g., gods such as Brahmā, Vāyu, etc., or sages, like Nārada, etc., or like the ancestors (*pitṛ*), or kings like Ambarīṣa, or advanced men; these advanced

¹ *bhedas tu sarva-vastūnām svarūpaṃ naijam avyayam. Ibid. p. 20.*

² Jaya-tīrtha, however, in his *Nyāya-sudhā*, I. 4. 6 (*adhikaraṇa*, p. 222), holds that differences (whether in eternal or in non-eternal things) are always eternal: *na ca kadāpi padārthānām anyonya-tādātmyam asti iti anityānām api bhedo nitya eva ity āhuḥ*. Padmanābha-tīrtha also in his *San-nyāya-ratnāvalī* or *Anuvyākhyāna* holds exactly the same view on the same topic (I. 4. 6): *vināśino'pi ghaṭāder dharma-rūpo bhedaḥ para-vādy-abhyupagataghaṭatvādi-jātivan nityo'-bhyupagantarvyaḥ*.

souls think of God as being, bliss, knowledge and *ātman*. It is only the second class of souls that are subject to transmigration and suffer the pleasures of Heaven and the sufferings of Earth and Hell. There is a third class of beings, the demons, ghosts and the like. Each one of these souls is different from every other soul, and even in emancipation the souls differ from one another in their respective merits, qualifications, desires, etc.

Next comes the consideration of unmanifested space (*avyākṛta ākāśo dig-rūpaḥ*), which remains the same in creation and destruction. This is, of course, different from *ākāśa* as element, otherwise called *bhūtākāśa*, which is a product of the *tāmasa* ego and is limited. *Ākāśa* as space is vacuity and eternal¹.

Prakṛti also is accepted in the Madhva system as the material cause of the material world². Time is a direct product of it, and all else is produced through the series of changes which it undergoes through the categories of *mahat*, etc. *Prakṛti* is accepted here as a substance (*dravya*)³ and is recognized in the Madhva system as what is called *māyā*, a consort of God, though it is called impure (*doṣa-yukta*) and material (*jaḍa*), evolving (*parīṇāminī*), though under the full control of God, and may thus be regarded almost as His will or strength (*Harer icchāthavā balam*). This *prakṛti* is to the world the cause of all bondage (*jagabhandhātmikā*)⁴. The subtle bodies (*līṅga-śarīra*) of all living beings are formed out of the stuff of this *prakṛti*. It is also the source of the three *guṇas* (*guṇa-trayādy-upādāna-bhūta*). It is held that during the time of the great creation *prakṛti* alone existed and nothing else. At that time God out of His creative desire produced from *prakṛti* in three masses *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*⁵. It is said that *rajas* is double of *tamas* and *sattva* is double of *rajas*. *Sattva* exists by itself in its pure form: *rajas* and *tamas* are always mixed with each other and with *sattva*. Thus *sattva* exists not only in this pure form, but also as an element in the mixed *rajas* variety and *tamas* variety. In the mixed *rajas* there are for each part of *rajas* a hundred parts of *sattva* and one hundredth part of *tamas*. In the *tamas* mixture there are for

¹ *bhūtākāśatīrīktāyā deśa-kāla-paricchinnyās tārīkīdy-ābhīmata-dīśā evā-smākam avyākrīkāśatvāt. Tātparyā-candrikā*, II. 3. 1 (p. 932). Also *Nyāya-sudhā*, II. 3. 1.

² *sākṣāt paramparayā vā viśvopādānam prakṛtiḥ. Padārtha-saṃgraha*, 93.

³ *Nyāya-sudhā* and *San-nyāya-ratnāvali* on the *Anuśākhāyāna*, II. 1. 6 (p. 21).

⁴ *Bhāgavata-tātparyā*, III. 10. 9 (p. 29). ⁵ *Madhva-siddhānta-sāra*, p. 36.

each part of *tamas* ten parts of *sattva* and one-tenth part of *rajas*. At the time of the world-dissolution (*vilaya*) ten parts return to *sattva* and one part to *rajas* with one part in *tamas*. The evolution of the *mahat-tattva* takes place immediately after the production of the three *guṇas*, when the entire amount of the produced *rajas* becomes mixed with *tamas*; the *mahat-tattva* is constituted of three parts of *rajas* and one part of *tamas*. With reference to the later derivatives this *mahat-tattva* is called *sattva*¹. In the category *ahamkāra* (that which is derived immediately after *mahat*) there is for every ten parts of *sattva* one part of *rajas* and a tenth part of *tamas*. From the *sattva* of the *tamas* part of it the *manas*, etc., are produced, out of the *rajas* part of it the senses are produced, and out of the *tamas* the elements are produced. They are at first manifested as *tan-mātras*, or the powers inherent in and manifested in the elements. As *ahamkāra* contains within it the materials for a threefold development, it is called *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *tāmasa* accordingly. In the *Tattva-saṃkhyāna buddhi-tattva* and *manas-tattva* are said to be two categories evolving in succession from *ahamkāra*. The twenty-four categories counted from *mahat* are in this enumeration *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, *buddhi*, *manas*, the ten *indriyas* (senses), the five *tan-mātras* and the five *bhūtas*². As *buddhi* is of two kinds, viz., *buddhi* as category and *buddhi* as knowledge, so *manas* is also regarded as being of two kinds, *manas* as category and *manas* as sense-organ. As sense-organ, it is both eternal and non-eternal; it is eternal in God, Lakṣmī, Brahmā and all other souls,

¹ *Bhāgavata-tātparya*, III. 14, by Madhvācārya. In this passage the original *sattva* is spoken of as being the deity *Śrī*, the original *rajas* as *Bhū*, and the original *tamas* as *Durgā*, and the deity which has for her root all the three is called *Mahā-lakṣmī*. The Lord *Janārdana* is beyond the *guṇas* and their roots.

² There seems to be a divergence of opinion regarding the place of the evolution of *buddhi-tattva*. The view just given is found in the *Tattva-saṃkhyāna* (p. 41): *asaṃśṛṣṭam mahān aham buddhir manas khāni daśa mātra-bhūtāni pañca ca*, and supported in its commentary by Satyadharma Yati. This is also in consonance with *Kaṭha*, I. 3. 10. But in the passage quoted from Madhva's *Bhāṣya* in the *Madhva-siddhānta-sāra* it is said that the *vijñāna-tattva* (probably the same as *buddhi-tattva*) arises from the *mahat-tattva*, that from it again there is *manas*, and from *manas* the senses, etc.:

*vijñāna-tattvaṃ mahataḥ samutpannam caturmukhāt,
vijñāna-tattvāc ca mano manas-tattvācca khādikam.*

The way in which Padmanābha Sūri tries to solve the difficulty in his *Padārtha-saṃgraha* is that the *buddhi-tattva* springs directly from the *mahat-tattva*, but that it grows in association with *taijasa ahamkāra* (*taijasāhamkāreṇa upacita*). This explains the precedence of *ahamkāra* as given in the *Tattva-saṃkhyāna*. *Buddhi*, of course, is of two kinds, as knowledge (*jñāna-rūpa*) and as category (*tattva*).

as their own essence (*svarūpa-bhūtam*) or self. The non-eternal *manas*, as belonging to God, *brahma*, individual souls, etc., is of five kinds; *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, *citta* and *cetana*, which may also be regarded as the *vṛttis* or functions of *manas*. Of these *manas* is said to be that to which is due imagination (*saṁkalpa*) and doubt (*vikalpa*); *buddhi* is that to which is due the function of coming to any decision (*niścayātmikā buddhi*); *ahaṁkāra* is that through the functioning of which the unreal is thought of as real (*asvarūpe svarūpa-matīḥ*), and the cause of memory is *citta*. The senses are twelve, including five cognitive, five conative, *manas* and the *sākṣīndriya*, as *buddhi* is included within *manas*. The senses are considered from two points of view, viz., from the point of view of their predominantly *tejas* materials, and as being sense-organs. In their aspects as certain sorts produced in course of the evolution of their materials they are destructible; but as sense-organs they are eternal in God and in all living beings. As regards the bodily seats of these organs, these are destructible in the case of all destructible beings. The internal sense of intuition (*sākṣī*) can directly perceive pleasure and pain, ignorance, time and space. The sense-data of sounds, colours, etc., appearing through their respective sense-organs, are directly perceived by this sense of intuition. All things that transcend the domain of the senses are intuited by the sense of intuition (*sākṣī*), either as known or unknown. To consider the *sākṣī-jñāna* as a special source of intuitive knowledge, indispensable particularly for the perception of time and space, is indeed one of the important special features of Madhva's system. In Śaṅkara Vedānta *sākṣī* stands as the inextinguishable *brahma*-light, which can be veiled by *ajñāna*, though *ajñāna* itself is manifested in its true nature, ignorance, by the *sākṣī*¹. Madhva holds that it is through the intuitive sense of *sākṣī*

¹ *yat-prasādād avidyādi sphuraty eva divā-nisam tam apy apahmūte'vidyā nājñānasyāsti duṣkaram.*

Advaita-brahma-siddhi, p. 312.

As this work also notices, there are in Śaṅkara Vedānta four views on the status of *sākṣī*. Thus the *Tattva-sūddhi* holds that it is the light of Brahman, appearing as if it were in the *jīva*; the *Tattva-pradīpikā* holds that it is Īśvara manifesting Himself in all individual souls; the *Vedānta-kaumudī* holds that it is but a form of Īśvara, a neutral entity which remains the same in all operations of the *jīva* and is of direct and immediate perception, but is also the nescience (*avidyā*) which veils it. The *Kūṭastha-dīpa* considers it to be an unchangeable light of pure intelligence in *jīva*, which remains the same under all conditions and is hence called *sākṣī*.

that an individual observes the validity of his sense-knowledge and of his own self as the ego (*aham*). Our perception of self, on this view, is not due to the activity of mind or to mental perception (*manonubhava*); for, had it been so, one might as a result of mind activity or mental functioning have doubted his own self; but this never happens, and so it has to be admitted that the perception of self is due to some other intuitive sense called *sākṣī*. *Sākṣī* thus always leads us to unerring and certain truths, whereas, wherever in knowledge there is a discriminating process and a chance of error, it is said to be due to mental perception¹.

The *tan-mātras* are accepted in Madhvaism as the subtler materials of the five grosser elements (*bhūtas*). It must be noted that the categories of *ahamkāra* and *buddhi* are considered as being a kind of subtle material stuff, capable of being understood as quantities having definite quantitative measurements (*parimāṇa*)².

Ignorance (*avidyā*) is a negative substance (*dravya*), which by God's will veils the natural intelligence of us all³. But there is no one common *avidyā* which appears in different individuals; the *avidyā* of one individual is altogether different from the *avidyā* of another individual. As such, it seems to denote our individual ignorance and not a generalized entity such as is found in most of the Indian systems; thus each person has a specific (*prāṭisviki*) *avidyā* of his own.

Time (*kāla*) is coexistent with all-pervading space (*avyākṛta ākāśa*), and it is made directly from *prakṛti* stuff having a more primeval existence than any of the derived kinds⁴. It exists in itself

¹ *yat kvacid vyabhicāri syāt darśanam mānasam hi tat. Amuvyākhyana. evam sa devadatto gauro na vā paramāṇuḥ gurutvādhikaraṇam na vā iti saṁśayo mānasah. Madhva-siddhānta-sāra, p. 44.*

² *Manu-byhaspaty-ādayas tu ahamkāraṭ parimāṇato hīnena buddhi-tattvena svocita-parimāṇena parimita-deśa-paryantam avasthitam viṣṇum paśyanti soma-sūryam tu buddhi-tattvāt parimāṇato hīnena manas-tatvena parimita-deśa-paryantam avasthitam viṣṇum paśyataḥ varuṇādayas tu ākāśa-vāyuv-ādi-bhūtaiḥ krameṇa parimāṇato daśāhinaḥ parimita-deśa-paryantam avasthitam viṣṇum yogyatāmusāreṇa paśyanti.*

San-nyāya-ratnāvalī and Madhva-siddhānta-sāra, p. 49.

³ *ataḥ paramēśvara eva sattvādi-gunamay-āvidyāvirodhitvena avidyayā svādhīnayaḥ prakṛtyā acintyādbhutayā svaśaktyā jīvasya sva-prakāśam api svarūpa-caitanyam apy ācchādayati. Nyāya-sudhā on the topic of jīṇāsa.*

⁴ The objection that, if time is made out of *prakṛti* stuff, from whence would *mahat*, etc., be evolved, is not valid; for it is only from some parts of *prakṛti* that time is evolved, while it is from other parts that the categories are evolved: *sarvatra vyāptānām katipaya-prakṛti-sūkṣmānām kālopādānatvam, katipayānām mahad-ādy-upādānatvam katipayānām ca mūla-rūpeṇa avasthānam. Madhva-siddhānta-sāra, p. 64.*

(*sva-gata*) and is, like space, the vehicle (*ādhāra*) of everything else, and it is also the common cause of the production of all objects.

Darkness (*andhakāra*) is also considered as a separate substance and not as mere negation of light. A new conception of *pratibimba* ("reflection") is introduced to denote the *jīvas*, who cannot have any existence apart from the existence of God and who cannot behave in any way independent of His will, and, being conscious entities, having will and feeling, are essentially similar to him; though reflections, they are not destructible like ordinary reflections in mirrors, but are eternal (*pratibimbā tu bimbāvinābhūta-sat-sadrśaḥ*)¹.

The system of Madhva admits the qualities (*guṇa*) more or less in the same way as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does; the points of difference are hardly ever of any philosophical importance. Those which deserve to be mentioned will be referred to in the succeeding sections.

Pramāṇas (ways of valid knowledge).

Pramāṇa is defined as that which makes an object of knowledge cognizable as it is in itself (*yathārtham pramāṇam*)². The function of *pramāṇa* consists both in making an entity object of knowledge through the production of knowledge (*jñāna-jananad vāva jñeyatā-sampādakatvena*), either directly (*sākṣāt*) or indirectly (*asākṣāt*)³. There are two functions in a *pramāṇa*, viz. (1) to render an entity an object of knowledge (*jñeya-viśayīkaraṇa*) and (2) to make it cognizable (*jñeyatā-sampādana*)³. So far as the function of making an entity an object of knowledge is concerned, all *pramāṇas* directly perform it; it is only with reference to the second function that there is the distinction between the two kinds of *pramāṇas*, *kevala* and *anu*, such that it is only the former that performs it directly and only the latter that performs it indirectly (*paramparā-krama*)⁴. These two functions also distinguish a *pramāṇa* from the *pramātā* ("subject") and the *prameya* ("object"), since neither the subject

¹ *Padārtha-saṃgraha*, 193.

² Madhva's definition of *pramāṇa* in his *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa* is elaborated by Jaya-tīrtha in his *Pramāṇa-paddhati* as *jñeyam anatikramya vartamānaṃ yathā-vasthitam eva jñeyam yad viśayīkaroti nānyathā tat pramāṇam* (p. 8).

³ *Jaya-tīrtha-vijaya-ṭīpanī* on the *Pramāṇa-paddhati* by Janārdana.

⁴ *Ibid.* Also *kevalam viśayasya jñeyatvaṃ jñānam upādhitayā karanam tu taj-janakatayā sampādayanti ity etāvantaṃ viśeṣam āsṛitya kevalānu-pramāṇa-bhedaḥ samarthitah. Nyāya-sudhā*, II. 1. 2 (p. 249).

nor the object can be called the instrumental causes of knowledge, though they may in some sense be admitted as causes, and they do not cause an entity to be an object of knowledge either. Our knowledge does not in any way modify an object of knowledge, but an entity becomes known when knowledge of it is produced. Truth, by which is understood exact agreement of knowledge with its object, belongs properly to knowledge alone (*jñānasyaiva mukhyato yāthārtham*). The instruments of knowledge can be called true (*yathārtha*) only in an indirect manner, on the ground of their producing true knowledge (*yathārtha-jñāna-janaka yathārtha*)¹. But yet the definition properly applies to the instruments as well, since they are also *yathārtha* in the sense that they are also directed to the object, just as knowledge of it is. So far as they are directed towards the right object of which we have right knowledge, their scope of activity is in agreement with the scope or extent of the object of knowledge. So it is clear that *pramāṇa* is twofold: *pramāṇa* as true knowledge (*kevala pramāṇa*) and *pramāṇa* as instrument (*sādhana*) of knowledge (*anu pramāṇa*). This *kevala pramāṇa* is again twofold, as consciousness (*caitanya*) and as states (*ṛtti*). This consciousness is described by Jaya-tīrtha as superior, middling and inferior (*uttama-madhyamādhama*), as right, mixed, and wrong; the *ṛtti* is also threefold, as perception, inference, and scriptures (*āgama*). The *anu pramāṇa* also is threefold, as perception, inference and scriptures. A question arises, whether the term *pramāṇa* could be applied to any right knowledge which happens to be right only by accident (*kākatālīya*) and not attained by the proper process of right knowledge. Thus, for example, by a mere guess one might say that there are five shillings in one's friend's pocket, and this knowledge might really agree with the fact that one's friend has five shillings in his pocket; but, though this knowledge is right, it cannot be called *pramāṇa*; for this is not due to the speaker's own certain knowledge, since he had only guessed, which is only a form of doubt (*vaktur jñānasya saṁśayatvena aprasaṅgāt*)². This also applies to the case where one makes an inference on the basis of a misperceived *hetu*, e.g., the inference of fire from steam or vapour mistaken for smoke.

The value of this definition of *pramāṇa* as agreement with objects of knowledge (*yathārtha*) is to be found in the fact that it

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.* p. 250.

includes memory (*smṛti*) of previous valid experience as valid, whereas most of the other systems of Indian philosophy are disposed so to form their definition as purposely to exclude the right of memory to be counted as *pramāṇa*¹. Śālikanāṭha's argument, as given in his *Prakarāṇa-ṣaṅkikā*, on the rejection of memory from the definition of *pramāṇa* is based on the fact that memory is knowledge produced only by the impressions of previous knowledge (*pūrva-vijñāna-samskāra-mātrajam jñānam*); as such, it depends only on previous knowledge and necessarily refers to past experience, and cannot therefore refer independently to the ascertainment of the nature of objects². He excludes recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) from memory, as recognition includes in its data of origin direct sense contact; and he also excludes the case of a series of perceptions of the same object (*dhārā-vāhika jñāna*); for though it involves memory, it also involves direct sense contact, but the exclusion of memory from the definition of *pramāṇa* applies only to pure memory, unassociated with sense contact. The idea is that that which depends on or is produced only by previous knowledge does not directly contribute to our knowledge and is hence not *pramāṇa*.

The reason why Jaya-tīrtha urges the inclusion of memory is that memory may also agree with an object of knowledge and hence may rightly be called *pramāṇa*. It may be that, while I am remembering an object, it may not still be there or it may have ceased to exist, but that does not affect the validity of memory as *pramāṇa*, since the object did exist at the time of previous experience referred to by memory, though it may not be existing at the time when the memory is produced. If it is argued that, since the object is not in the same condition at the time of memory as it was at the time of experience, memory is not valid, in that case all knowledge about past and future by inference or scriptures would be invalid, since the past and future events inferred might not exist at the time of

¹ Here Jaya-tīrtha refers to the definitions of the Mīmāṃsā as *anadhigatārthagantvā pramāṇam* and as *anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam*. The first refers to Kumārila's definition and the second to that of Prabhākara. Kumārila defines *pramāṇa* (as found in the *Codanā-sūtra* 80, *Śloka-vārttika*) as firm knowledge (*dṛḍham vijñānam*) produced (*utpannam*) and unassociated with other knowledge (*nāpi jñānāntareṇa samvādam yacchati*). The second definition is that of Prabhākara as quoted in Śālikanāṭha's *Prakarāṇa-ṣaṅkikā*, p. 42: *pramāṇam anubhūtiḥ*.

² *smṛtir hi tad-ity-upajāyamānā prācīṃ praṭītiṃ anurūḍhyamānā na svātantryeṇa artham paricchinatti iti na pramāṇam*. *Prakarāṇa-ṣaṅkikā*, p. 42.

experience. If it is argued that the object of previous knowledge changes its state and so cannot in its entirety be referred to as the object of memory, then that destroys the validity of all *pramāṇas*; for nothing can be made an object of all the *pramāṇas* in its entirety. Also it cannot be objected that, if the thing does not change its state, then memory should grasp it as an entity which has not changed its state. This is not valid either; for memory does not grasp an object as if it had not changed its state, but as "it was so at that time" (*tadāsan tadṛśa iti*). Memory is absolutely indifferent with regard to the question whether an object has changed its state or not. Since memory agrees with real objective facts it has to be considered valid, and it is the special feature of the present definition that it includes memory as a valid definition, which is not done in other systems. The validity of memory as a *pramāṇa* is proved by the fact that people resort to it as valid knowledge in all their dealings, and only right knowledge is referred to by men (*loka-vyavahāra*). There is no way of establishing the validity of the *pramāṇas* of perception, etc., except the ultimate testimony of universal human experience¹.

Moreover, even the validity of the sacred writings of Manu is based on the remembered purport of the Vedas, and thence they are called *smṛti*². Again, the argument that memory has no validity because it does not bring us any fruit (*niṣphalā*) is not right; for the validity depends on correctness of correspondence and not on fruitfulness. Want of validity (*aprāmāṇya*) is made evident through the defect of the organs or the resulting contradiction (*bādhaka-pratyaya*). It may also be noted that memory is not absolutely fruitless; thus the memory of happy things is pleasant and strengthens the root impressions also (*saṃskāra-patana*). Again, it is argued that that alone could be called *pramāṇa* which involves the knowledge of something new, and that therefore memory, which does not involve new knowledge, cannot be counted as *pramāṇa*. If it is required that an object of knowledge should be *pramāṇa*, then the eternal entities about which there cannot be any new knowledge cannot be the objects of *pramāṇa*. If the require-

¹ na hy asti pratyakṣādi-prāmāṇya-sādhakam anyad loka-vyavahārāt. Nyāya-sudhā, II. 1. 2 adhikaraṇa, p. 251.

² te hi śrutyādināmubhūtārthaṃ smṛtvā tat-pratipādam grantham āracayati. Ibid. p. 252.

ment of new knowledge is not considered to refer to objects of knowledge, but only to the method or process of knowledge, then the knowledge involved in continuous perception of an object (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) could not be considered as *pramāṇa*. The Buddhists might, of course, answer that each new moment a new object is produced which is perceived; the Sāṃkhya might hold that at each new moment all objects suffer a new change or *pariṇāma*; but what would the Mīmāṃsaka say? With him the object (e.g., the jug) remains the same at all successive moments. If it is argued that in the knowledge of an object abiding in and through successive moments we have at each particular moment a new element of time involved in it and this may constitute a newness of knowledge in spite of the fact that the object of knowledge has been abiding all through the moments, the same may be argued in favour of memory; for it manifests objects in the present and has reference to the experience as having happened in the past (*smṛtir api vartamāna-tat-kālatayā anubhūtam artham atīta-kālatayā avagāhate*). Jaya-tīrtha maintains that it is not possible to show any necessary connection between *prāmāṇya* (validity), and the requirement that the object should be previously unacquired (*anadhigatārtha*) either through association (*sāhacārya*), or through that and the want of any contradictory instance; for on the first ground many other things associated with *prāmāṇya* would have to be claimed to be *anadhigata*, which they are not, and the second ground does not apply at least in the case of continuous knowledge (*dhārā-vāhika jñāna*). For in the case of continuous knowledge successive moments are regarded as *pramāṇa* in spite of there being in them no new knowledge.

If it is objected "how could it be the function of *pramāṇa* to make an already-known object known to us" (*adhigatam evārtham adhigamayatā pramāṇena piṣṭam piṣṭam syāt*), what does the objection really mean? It cannot mean that in regard to a known object no further cognition can arise; for neither is knowledge opposed to knowledge, nor is want of knowledge a part of the conditions which produce knowledge. The objection to the rise of a second knowledge of a known object on the ground of fruitlessness has already been answered. Nor can it be said that a *pramāṇa* should not be dependent on anything else or on any other knowledge; for that objection would also apply to inference, which is admitted by all

to be a *pramāṇa*. So *pramāṇa* should be so defined that memory may be included within it. Chāḷari-śeṣācārya quotes an unidentified scriptural text in support of the inclusion of memory in *pramāṇa*¹. Jaya-tīrtha, in a brief statement of the positive considerations which according to him support the inclusion of memory in *pramāṇa*, says that memory is true (*yathārtha*). When an object appears in consciousness to have a definite character in a particular time and at a particular place and has actually that character at that time and at that place, then this knowledge is true or *yathārtha*. Now memory gives us exactly this sort of knowledge; "it was so there at that time." It is not the fact that at that time it was not so. Memory is directly produced by the *manas*, and the impressions (*saṃskāra*) represent its mode of contact with the object. It is through the impressions that mind comes in contact with specific objects (*saṃskāras tu manasas tad-artha-sannikarṣa-rūpa eva*). It may be objected that, the object referred to by memory having undergone many changes and ceased in the interval to exist in its old state, the present memory cannot take hold of its object; the answer is that the objection would have some force if *manas*, unaided by any other instrument, were expected to do it; but this is not so. Just as the sense-organs, which are operative only in the present, may yet perform the operation of recognition through the help of the impressions (*saṃskāra*), so the *manas* also may be admitted to refer by the help of the impressions to an object which has changed its previous state².

The conception of *pramāṇa* is considered a subject of great importance in Indian philosophy. The word *pramāṇa* is used principally in two different senses, (i) as a valid mental act, as distinguished from the invalid or illusory cognitions; (ii) as the instruments or the collocations of circumstances which produce knowledge. Some account of *pramāṇa* in the latter sense has already been given in Vol. I, pp. 330-2. The conflicting opinions regarding the interpretation of *pramāṇa* as instruments of know-

¹ *smṛtiḥ pratyakṣam aitihiyam anumānacatuṣṭayanī
pramāṇam iti vijñeyam dharmādy-arthe mumukṣubhiḥ.*

Pramāṇa-candrikā, p. 4.

² *saṃskāra-sahakṛtām manasā ananubhūtām api nirvṛtta-pūrvāvasthām viṣayī-
kurvat smaraṇam janayet iti ko doṣaḥ; vartamāna-viṣayāṇi api indriyāṇi sahakāri-
sāmarthyāt kālāntara-sambandhitām api gocarayanti; yathā saṃskāra-sahakṛtāni
soyam ity atīta-vartamānatva-viśiṣṭaviṣayapratyabhijñā-sādhanaṇi prākṛtendri-
yāṇi mano-vṛtti-jñānaṇi janayanti. Pramāṇa-paddhati, p. 24.*

ledge is due to the fact that diverse systems of philosophy hold different views regarding the nature and origin of knowledge. Thus the Nyāya defines *pramāṇa* as the collocation of causes which produces knowledge (*upalabdhi* or *pramā*). The causes of memory are excluded from *pramāṇa* simply on verbal grounds, namely that people use the word *smṛti* (memory) to denote knowledge produced merely from impressions (*saṃskāra-mātra-janmanah*) and distinguish it from *pramā*, or right knowledge, which agrees with its objects¹.

The Jains, however, consider the indication of the object as revealed to us (*arthopadarśakatva*) as *pramā*, and in this they differ from the Buddhist view which defines *pramā* as the actual getting of the object (*artha-prāpakatva*). The Jains hold that the actual getting of the object is a result of *pravṛtti*, or effort to get it, and not of *pramāṇa*². Though through an effort undertaken at the time of the occurrence of knowledge and in accordance with it one may attain the object, yet the function of *jñāna* consists only in the indication of the object as revealed by it³. *Pramā* is therefore according to the Jains equivalent to *svārtha-paricchitti*, or the outlining of the object, and the immediate instrument of it, or *pramāṇa*, is the subjective inner flash of knowledge, leading to such objective *artha-paricchitti*, or determination of objects⁴. Of course *svārtha-paricchitti* appears to be only a function of *jñāna* and thus in a sense identical with it, and in that way *pramāṇa* is identical with *jñāna*. But it is because the objective reference is considered

¹ *pramā-sādhanam hi pramāṇam na ca smṛtiḥ pramā lokādhīnāvadhāraṇo hi śabdārtha-sambandhaḥ. lokaś ca saṃskāra-mātra-janmanah smṛter anyām upalabdhim arthavyābhicāriṇīm pramām ācaṣṭe tasmāt tad-dhetuḥ pramāṇam iti na smṛti-hetu-prasaṅgaḥ. Tātparyā-ṭīkā, p. 14.*

² *pravṛtti-mūlā tūpādeyārtha-prāptir na pramāṇādhīnā tasyaḥ puruṣecchādhīna-pravṛtti-prabhavavāt. Prameya-kamala-mārtanda, p. 7.*

³ *yady apy anekasmāt jñāna-kṣaṇāt pravṛtttau artha-prāptiḥ tathāpi paryālocyamānam artha-pradarśakatvam eva jñānasya prāpakatvam nānyat. Ibid.*

The reflection made here against the Buddhists is hardly fair; for by *pravartakatva* they also mean *pradarśakatva*, though they think that the series of activities meant by *pramāṇa-vyāpāra* is finally concluded when the object is actually got. The idea or *viñāna* only shows the object, and, when the object is shown, the effort is initiated and the object is got. The actual getting of the object is important only in this sense, that it finally determines whether the idea is correct or not; for when the object which corresponds exactly to the idea is got the idea can be said to be correct. *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā*, pp. 3, 4.

⁴ *anya-nirapekṣatayā svārtha-paricchittisādhakatamatvād jñānam eva pramāṇam. Prameya-kamala-mārtanda, p. 5.*

here to be the essence of *pramā*, that *jñāna*, or the inner revelation of knowledge, is regarded as its instrument or *pramāṇa* and the external physical instruments or accessories to the production of knowledge noted by the Nyāya are discarded. It is the self-revelation of knowledge that leads immediately to the objective reference and objective determination, and the collocation of other accessories (*sākalya* or *sāmagrī*) can lead to it only through knowledge¹. Knowledge alone can therefore be regarded as the most direct and immediately preceding instrument (*sādhakatama*). For similar reasons the Jains reject the Sāṃkhya view of *pramāṇa* as the functioning of the senses (*aindriya-vṛtti*) and the Prabhākara view of *pramāṇa* as the operation of the knower in the knowing process beneath the conscious level².

It is interesting to note in this connection that the Buddhist view on this point, as explained by Dharmottara, came nearer the Jain view by identifying *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* in *jñāna* ("knowledge"). Thus by *pramāṇa* Dharmottara understands the similarity of the idea to the object, arising out of the latter's influence, and the idea or *jñāna* is called the *pramāṇa-phala*, though the similarity of the idea to the object giving rise to it is not different from the idea itself³. The similarity is called here *pramāṇa*, because it is by virtue of this similarity that the reference to the particular object of experience is possible; the knowledge of blue is possibly only by virtue of the similarity of the idea to the blue.

The Madhva definition of *pramāṇa* as *yathārthaṃ pramāṇam* means that by which an object is made known as it is. The instrument which produces it may be external sense-contact and the like, called here the *anupramāṇa* corresponding to the *sāmagrī* of the Nyāya, and the exercise of the intuitive function of the intuitive sense (*kevala pramāṇa*) of *sākṣī*, which is identical with self. Thus it combines in a way the subjective view of Prabhākara and the Jains and the objective view of the Nyāya.

¹ For other Jain arguments in refutation of the *sāmagrī* theory of *pramāṇa* in the Nyāya see *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, pp. 2-4.

² *etenendriya-vṛttiḥ pramāṇam ity abhidadhānaḥ sāmṅkhyāḥ pratyākhyātāḥ... etena Prabhākaro'py artha-tathātva-prakāśako jñāty-vyāpāro'jñāna-rūpo'pi pramāṇam iti pratipādayan prativyūḍhaḥ patipattavyaḥ. Ibid. p. 6.*

³ *yadi tarhi jñānam pramiti-rūpatvāt pramāṇa-phalam kim tarhi pramāṇam ity āha; arthena saha yat sārūpyam sādṛśyam asya jñānasya tat pramāṇam iha... namu ca jñānād avyatiriktaṃ sādṛśyam: tathā ca sati tad eva jñānam pramāṇam tad eva pramāṇa-phalam. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā, p. 18.*

Svataḥ-prāmāṇya (self-validity of knowledge).

In the system of Madhva the doctrine of self-validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) means the consideration of any knowledge as valid by the intuitive agent (*sākṣī*) which experiences that knowledge without being hindered by any defects or any other sources of obstruction¹. The *sākṣī* is an intelligent and conscious perceiver which can intuitively perceive space and distance, and when the distance is such as to create a suspicion that its defect may have affected the nature of perception, the intelligent intuitive agent suspends its judgment for fear of error, and we have then what is called doubt (*saṃśaya*)². Vyāsa Yati, in his *Tarka-tāṇḍava*, expresses the idea in the language of the commentator of the *Tattva-nirṇaya* by saying that it is the *sākṣī* that is capable of comprehending both the knowledge and its validity, and even when obstructed it still retains its power, but does not exercise it³. When there is an illusion of validity (*prāmāṇya-bhrama*), the *sākṣī* remains inactive and the *manas*, being affected by its passions of attachment, etc., makes a mis-perception, and the result is an illusory perception. The operation of the *sākṣī* comprehending the validity of its knowledge is only possible when there is no obstruction through which its operation may be interfered with by the illusory perceptions of *manas*. Thus, though there may be doubts and illusions, yet it is impossible that the *sākṣī*, experiencing knowledge, should not at the same time observe its validity also, in all its normal operations when there are no defects; otherwise there would be no certainty anywhere. So the disturbing influence, wherever that may be, affects the natural power (*sahaja śakti*) of the *sākṣī*, and the doubts and illusory perceptions are created in that case by the *manas*. But,

¹ *doṣādy-apratiruddhena jñāna-grāhaka-sākṣiṇā
svatastavām jñānamānatvanirṇīti-niyamo hi naḥ.*

Yukti-mallikā, I. 311.

² *yato dūrātva-doṣeṇa sva-grhītena kuñṭhitāḥ,
na niścinoti prāmāṇyaṃ tatra jñāna-grahe'pi sva deśa-stha-viprakarśo
hi dūrātvaṃ
sa ca sākṣiṇāvagra hituṃ śakyate yasmād ākāśavyākṛto hyasau.*

Ibid. I. 313, 314.

³ *sākṣyeṇa jñānaṃ tat-prāmāṇyaṃ ca viśayikartuṃ kṣamaḥ, kintu pratibaddho
jñānamātraṃ grhītvā tat-prāmāṇya-grahaṇāya na kramate. Tarka-tāṇḍava, p. 7.*
Rāghavendra-tirtha, in commenting on this, writes: *prāmāṇyasya sahaja-
śakti-viśayatvaṃ pratibandha-sthale yogyatā asti.*

wherever there are no distracting influences at work, the *sākṣī* comprehends knowledge and also its validity¹.

The problem of self-validity of knowledge in Mimāṃsā and Vedānta has already been briefly discussed in the first volume of the present work². A distinction is made between the way in which the notion that any knowledge is valid arises in us or is cognized by us (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya-jñapti*) and we become aware of the validity of our awareness, and the way in which such validity arises by itself from considerations of the nature of objective grounds (*svataḥ-prāmāṇyotpatti*). The former relates to the subjective and spontaneous intuitive belief that our perceptions or inferences are true; the latter relates to the theory which objectively upholds the view that the conditions which have given rise to knowledge also by its very production certify its truth. The word *prāmāṇya* in *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* is used in the sense of *pramātva* or true certainty.

According to the difference of epistemological position the nature of the subjective apperception of the validity of our knowledge differs. Thus, the followers of Prabhākara regard knowledge as self-luminous, meaning thereby that any moment of the revelation of knowledge involves with it the revelation of the object and the subject of knowledge. Any form of awareness (*jñāna-grāhaka*), such as "I am aware of the jug," would according to this view carry with it also the certainty that such awareness is also true, independent of anything else (*jñāna-grāhakātiriktānapekṣatvam*). The followers of Kumārila, however, regard knowledge (*jñāna*) as something transcendent and non-sensible (*atīndriya*) which can only be inferred by a mental state of cognition (*jñātātā*), such as "I am aware of the jug," and on this view, since the mental state is the only thing cognized, knowledge is inferred from it and the validity attaching to it can be known only as a result of such inference. Since there is a particular form of awareness (*jñātātā*) there must be valid knowledge. The validity attaching to knowledge can only be apparent, when there is an inference; it is, therefore, dependent on an inference made by reason of the awareness (*jñātātā*) of the particular form (*yāvat-svāśrayānumiti-grāhyatvam*).

¹ *manasā kvacid apramāyām api prāmāṇya-graheṇa sarvatra tenaiva prāmāṇya-graheṇa asvarasa-prasaṅgena pramā-rūpeṣu grhīta-tat-tat-prāmāṇye asvarasya niyamena yathārthasya prāmāṇya-grāhakasya sākṣiṇo avāśyam apekṣitatvāt. Bhāva-vilāsinī*, p. 50 (by Surottama-tīrtha on *Yukti-mallikā*).

² *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 268 n., 372-5, 484.

The analysis of the situation produced when we know an object as it appears consists on this view in this, that it distinguishes knowledge as a permanent unit which in association with the proper sense-contact, etc., produces the particular kinds of awareness involving specific and individual objectivity (*viṣayatā* or *karmatā*), such as "I know a jug." In this view objectivity, being the product of knowledge, cannot be identified with knowledge. It should be noted that, objectivity (*viṣayatā*) remaining the same (e.g., "a jug on the ground" is not the same as "ground on the jug," though the objectivity of the connected jug and ground is the same), there may be important differences in the nature of such objectivity through a difference of relations. In such cases the view held is that objectivity is different from knowledge; knowledge is the invariant (*nitya*) entity; objectivity remaining the same, a difference of relations (*prakāratā*) may give rise to a difference in the nature of awareness (*jñātātā*); each *jñātātā* or awareness means therefore each specific objectivity with its specific relations; it is only this *jñātātā* that is directly and immediately perceived. Knowledge is therefore a transcendent entity which cannot be intuited (*atīndriya*), but can only be inferred as a factor conditioning the awareness. The rise of an awareness gives rise to the notion of its validity and the validity of knowledge (*jñāna*) which has conditioned it¹. The necessity of admitting a transcendent existence of *jñāna*, apart from the varying states of awareness, is due probably to the desire to provide a permanent subjective force, *jñāna*, which, remaining identical with itself, may ultimately determine all states of awareness. Another important Mīmāṃsā exponent, Murāri Miśra, thinks that the objective knowledge (e.g., knowledge of a jug) is followed by the subjective self-consciousness, associating the knowledge of the object with the self (*anuvyavasāya*), and it is this *anuvyavasāya* which determines the final form of knowledge resulting in the intuition of its own validity². A general definition to

¹ *Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi*, by Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, pp. 16-18. The inference, however, as Mathurānātha points out in his commentary on the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* on *prāmānya-vāda* (p. 144), is not of the form, as *iyam jñātātā ghaṭatvavati ghaṭatva-prakāra-ka-jñāna-janyā ghaṭatvavati ghaṭatva-prakāra-ka-jñātātātvāt*, but as *ahaṃ jñānavān jñātātātvāt*.

² *jñānasyātīndriyatayā pratyakṣa-sambhavenasva-janya-jñātātā-lingakāmuniti-sāmagrī sva-niṣṭha-prāmānya-niscayitā iti Bhāṭṭāḥ; jñātātā ca jñāta iti pratiti-siddho jñānoqjanya-viśaya-samavetaḥ prakātyāparanāmā atirikta-padārthaviśeṣaḥ*. Mathurānātha on *Pramāṇa-vāda-rahasya* of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, p. 126 (Asiatic Society's edition).

cover all these three types of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* of Prabhākara, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Murāri Miśra is given by Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* as follows: the validity of any knowledge (except in the case where a knowledge is known to be false, e.g., this knowledge of silver is false) is communicated by the entire system of collocations giving rise to that knowledge and by that alone¹. Vyāsa-tīrtha, in discussing the value of this definition, points out several defects in its wording and criticizes it by saying that the condition imposed, that the knowledge should be communicated by the same system of collocating circumstances that produces the validity, is defective in defining the *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* position, since the condition is fulfilled even on the *parataḥ-prāmāṇya* theory; for there also the conditioning circumstances which communicate to us the validity of any knowledge are the same which make the rise of knowledge possible². The definition of self-validity proposed by Vyāsa-tīrtha agrees with the second alternative definition given by Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*: it dispenses with the necessity of admitting the collocating circumstances or conditions as producing knowledge; it defines self-validity of knowledge as that characteristic of it which is not grasped by any knowledge having for its object the matter of which the validity is grasped, i.e., the same knowledge which grasps an object does in the same act, without entering into any further mediate process, grasp its validity as well³. It will be seen that such a view is different from that of the Bhāṭṭa and Miśra views of self-validity; for on the Bhāṭṭa view self-validity is affirmed of knowledge which can be inferred only and not directly taken with a specific awareness (as “I know this jug”), and in the Miśra view self-validity is affirmed only as a result of *anuvyavasāya*, associating the cognition with the self (as “I know”)⁴.

¹ *tad-aprāmāṇya-grāhaka-yāvaj-jñāna-grāhaka-sāmagrī-grāhyatvam. Ibid.* p. 122. The *jñāna-grāhaka-sāmagrī* is, however, different with the three Mīmāṃsā views, viz., self-luminous knowledge in the case of Prabhākara, inference in the case of Bhāṭṭas and self-consciousness as *anuvyavasāya* in the case of Murāri Miśra.

² *tathā ca yāvati prāmāṇyaviśayikā sāmagrī tad-grāhyatvam svatastvam ity uktam syat; tathā ca etādṛśasvatastvasya paratastvapakṣayā sattvāt siddha-sādhnam. Tarka-tāṇḍava*, p. 12.

³ *taj-jñāna-viśayaka-jñānājanya-jñāna-viśayatvam eva svatastvam. Tarka-tāṇḍava*, p. 15, and *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, p. 122.

⁴ The above definition of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*, agreed to by Vyāsa-tīrtha, has been given in the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* as a definition in which there is a general agreement in the views of the three schools of Mīmāṃsā (*mata-traya-sādhāraṇa*); it involves a special interpretation of the word *jñāna-viśaya* in *taj-jñāna-viśayaka* as *jñānāmubandhi-viśayatāśraya* (see Mathurānātha's commentary, p. 144).

Vyāsa-tīrtha emphasizes the view that in the absence of faults and doubts (*doṣa-śaṅkādinā anāskanditaḥ*) the subjective realization of an objective fact carries validity with it. He points out that it is not correct to say that sense-contact with a larger surface of the object can be regarded as the cause why the knowledge so produced is considered as valid; for it is well known that in spite of such sense-contact there may be error, if there are the defects (*doṣa*) which render mal-observation possible. So it is better to hold that the validity of knowledge arises from the datum of knowledge (*jñāna-sāmagrī*) itself. Sense-contact is useful only when there are doubts and other obstructions in the production of knowledge; but it does not by itself produce validity of knowledge¹. Even the absence of defects is not the cause of the validity of knowledge; for the absence of defects is only a negative factor, which is no doubt necessary, but is not by any means the constitutive element of the positive realization of self-validity, which proceeds immediately and directly from the datum of knowledge². Even in spite of the presence of defects there might by chance be true knowledge³. All illusory knowledge, however, is due to the presence of defects (*doṣa*); for in that case the object of which a knowledge is produced is not before us, and there is no actual sense contact with it. So the followers of Madhva hold the theory of *parataḥ-aprāmānya*, which in their view means that all cases of invalid knowledge are due to sources (namely *doṣas* or defects) other than the datum of knowledge⁴. Vādirāja points out in this connection in his *Yukti-mallikā* that the absence of defect, being a qualifying characteristic of the datum of knowledge, cannot by itself be regarded as an independent cause of right knowledge. In most cases of perception under normal conditions we have right knowledge, and it is only in special circumstances that there comes doubt and the necessity of scrutiny is realized. If in every step of knowledge there were doubt regarding its validity, then there would be an infinite regress (*anavasthā*), and hence we could never feel the validity and certainty of any knowledge⁵. Vyāsa-tīrtha also emphasizes the infinite regress on any

¹ *Tarka-tāṇḍava*, pp. 83-90.

² *doṣābhāvasyāpekṣitatve' pi pramā-janana-śaktiḥ sahāyā*. *Ibid.* p. 88.

³ *uktaṃ hi Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya-ṭikāyām doṣābhāvo'pi na prāmānya-kāraṇam, yādyecchika-samvādādiṣu saty apī doṣe pramā-jñānodayāt*. *Ibid.* p. 89.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 98. Also *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya*, p. 2.

⁵ *Yukti-mallikā*, śl. 343-70 and *Bhāva-vilāsinī* of Surottama-tīrtha on the same.

view like that of the Nyāya, where the validity of knowledge has to be determined by subsequent tests from without (*paratastvā-numāna*). He points out that the realization of the validity of our knowledge leads us to action (*prāmānya-niścayasya pravartakatvam*)¹. But, if the validity of each knowledge has to be tested by another, we have naturally an infinite regress². The self-conscious self (*sākṣī*), however, knows its states, its pleasures and pains directly and immediately, and there is no possibility of doubt in such cases of undoubted self-validity of knowledge.

Illusion and Doubt.

The above discussion of self-validity of knowledge naturally leads us to enquire concerning the Madhva theory of illusion and the way in which it refutes the other theories of illusion accepted by other schools of Indian Philosophy. Illusion is in Madhva's system of Philosophy knowing of an object in a manner different from what it is (*anyathā-vijñānam eva bhrāntiḥ*), and the contradiction (*bādha*) of illusion consists in the knowing of the illusory form as false through the rise of the right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*). What this means is that this illusion is a knowledge in which one entity appears as another; that which is non-existent appears as existent, and that which is existent appears as non-existent³. The illusions are produced by the senses affected by the defects. The defects do not only obstruct; they can also cause a wrong representation of the object, so they are not only responsible for non-observation, but also for mal-observation. Now the point arises that that alone can be an object of knowledge which can in some way affect its production; in an illusory knowledge of silver in respect of conch-shell, the silver, being non-existent, cannot have any part in producing the knowledge and therefore cannot be an object of knowledge. To this Jaya-tīrtha replies that even a non-existent entity may be an object of knowledge; we all infer past events and refer things to persons who have long ceased to exist. In such cases the non-existent entities may be said not to have produced the knowledge, but to have determined (*nirūpaka*) it⁴. Such determination, it may be held, does not presuppose the immediate existence of that entity, since it may well be considered as

¹ *Tarka-tāṇḍava*, pp. 41-6.

³ *Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 46.

² *Ibid.* pp. 46-50.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 48.

limited to the idea, concept or knowledge produced, without having reference to the presence or existence of any corresponding objective entity. It may be objected that in the case of the visual perception of an object, it is definite that it is produced by the object through sense-contact; but in the case of illusion of silver in the conch-shell the silver is really absent, and therefore it cannot have any sense-contact, and consequently no visual perception of it is possible. The answer given to this objection is that it is the affected visual organ that, being in contact with conch-shell, causes the rise of a cognition representing it as a piece of silver which did not exist at all¹. It ought not to be argued, says Jaya-tīrtha, that, if there can be knowledge without an object, then no knowledge can be trustworthy; for as a rule knowledge is self-valid (*autsargikam jñānānām prāmāṇyam*). The self-conscious agent (*sākṣī*) perceives and certifies to itself the validity of the mental states without the mediation of any other process or agent. This direct certitude or "belief as true," realized by ourselves in our capacities as conscious perceivers in every case where the knowledge produced is not affected or influenced by defects which cause mal-observation and non-observation, is what is understood as the self-validity of knowledge². In the case of an illusory perception (e.g., of a piece of conch-shell as silver) there is an appearance of one thing as another, and that this is so is directly perceived or felt (*anubhava*); had it not been that a piece of conch-shell was perceived as silver, why should a man who sought silver stoop to pick up the conch-shell? The illusory perception of silver does not differ in appearance from a case of a real perception of silver.

Jaya-tīrtha, in arguing against the Mīmāṃsā view of illusion of conch-shell-silver as consisting of the memory of silver and the perception of conch-shell and the inability to distinguish between them, says that the appearance of silver in such cases has none of the characteristics of memory, and the activity generated by this false belief cannot be explained merely by the supposition of a non-distinction of difference between a memory-image and a visual percept. A mere negation involving the non-distinction of two entities cannot lead anyone to any definite choice. Moreover, if one

¹ *śūktikā-sannikṛṣṭam duṣṭam indriyam tam eva atyantāsadrajatātmena avagrāhamānam jñānam janayati. Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 48.

² *Ibid.* p. 48.

is conscious of the memory-image as what it is and of the percept as what it is, then how is it that their difference is not realized?

Against the explanation of illusion by the Śāṅkara school Jaya-tīrtha urges that the view that conch-shell-silver is indescribable or indefinite (*anirvācya*) is also not correct, for such an indescribable character would mean that it is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor neither existent-nor-existent. Of these the first and the last alternatives are accepted on the Madhva view also. The second view cannot be correct; for it cannot be denied that even the non-existent silver did appear to us as being before us. It can be replied that such an appearance was due to the presence of the defect; for that which was non-existent could not be the object of knowledge, and, as the followers of Śāṅkara think that the knowledge of the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*), the "this," is a true mental state, how can any defect interfere?¹ If it is indescribable, why should conch-shell-silver appear as existent at the time of perception and non-existent later on, and why should it not appear as indescribable at any time? Moreover, the Śāṅkarite will find it immensely difficult to explain what non-existence is.

Vādirāja points out in his *Yukti-mallikā* that in ordinary perception the eye comes into contact with an entity, the "this" before it, which may be regarded as the substantive (*viśeṣya*), and by grasping the substantive, the entity, its character as "jug" is also grasped, because the one is associated in a relation of identity with the other. But in illusory perception the character "silver" is not associated with the substantive "this," and hence through sense-contact with the "this," the conch-shell, the silver cannot be known; and hence such illusory knowledge can only be explained by supposing it to be due to the presence of defects. So the data of knowledge (*jñāna-sāmagrī*) in the case of right knowledge and illusory knowledge are different; in the case of the former we have the ordinary datum of knowledge, whereas in the case of the latter we have an extraneous influence, namely that of *doṣa*. And absence of *doṣa*, being but the natural characteristic of any datum of knowledge, cannot be regarded as an extraneous cause of right knowledge².

¹ *māyā-vādi-mate adhiṣṭhāna-jñānasya antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttitvena satyatvān na doṣa-janyatvam. Ibid. p. 55.*

² *Yukti-mallikā, Guṇa-saurabha, śloka 460-500.*

Right knowledge, it should be observed, is distinguished from two other kinds of knowledge, namely illusory knowledge (*viparyaya*) and doubt (*saṁśaya*), by virtue of the fact that it alone can lead to a definite and settled action¹. Some say that doubt may be considered to be of five kinds². The first is due to the observation of common characteristics of two objects; thus, finding an object at some distance to be as high as a man, one might be led to remember both the stump of a tree and a man, and, not being able to distinguish the special features of each, viz., the holes, the rough and hard surface, etc. (in the case of the tree) and the movement of the head, hands and feet (in the case of a man), one would naturally doubt "is it the stump of a tree, or a man?" Again, seeing that the special characteristic (*asādhāraṇa dharma*) of *ākāśa* is sound, one might doubt if sound (*śabda*) is eternal as sound. Again, seeing that followers of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika quarrel (*vipratipatti*) regarding the physical nature (*bhautikatva*) of the senses, there may be doubt whether the senses are physical or not. Again, when after digging a well we find (*upalabdhi*) water, there may be a doubt whether the water was already there and only manifested by the digging operation, or whether it was non-existent but produced by the digging operation. Again there may be a rumour that a ghost resides in a certain tree, but, when we go to it and do not see (*anupalabdhi*) it, there may be a doubt whether the ghost really was there and was not seen by reason of its power of rendering itself invisible, or whether it did not exist at all in the tree. Others, however, include the fourth and the fifth views, those of finding and not finding (*upalabdhi* and *anupalabdhi*), within the first type, viz., that of the

¹ *avadhāraṇatvaṃ ca niṣkampa-pravṛtti-janana-yogyatvaṃ*. Janārdana's *Jaya-tīrtha-vijaya* (a commentary on the *Pramāṇa-paddhati*), p. 10.

² Vātsyāyana, in interpreting *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 1. 23, thinks that doubt is of five kinds, viz., through *saṁāna-dharma*, *aneka-dharma*, *vipratipatti*, *upalabdhi* and *anupalabdhi*, the first two being objective occurrences of common and uncommon features, and the last two subjective conditions of presence and absence of knowledge. The examples as given by him are the same as have been given below. Uddyotakara, however, interprets the above rule to refer only to the first three types of doubt, viz., *saṁāna-dharmopapatti*, *aneka-dharmopapatti* and *vipratipatti* (*Nyāya-vārttika*, pp. 87, 96-9). Kaṇāda, in his *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, (II. 11. 17, 18, 19, 20) speaks of doubt as being of two kinds, internal¹ (e.g., when anyone doubts whether the predictions of the astrologer, which were found true in some cases and false in others, are likely to be correct in any particular case) and external (e.g., when one doubts whether a stump before him is a tree or a man). External doubt is again of two kinds, (i) when the object is seen in totality, and (ii) when a part of it only is seen. *Nyāya-kandali*, pp. 175-6.

perception of common characteristics (*sādhāraṇa dharma*), and thus hold that there are only three kinds of doubt¹. Jaya-tīrtha, however, thinks that the other two varieties, that of the special characteristics (*asādhāraṇa dharma*) and that of conflicting views (*vipratipatti*) may also be included in the first type; for a special characteristic cannot by itself lead to the remembering of two objects leading to doubt. To know that sound is the special characteristic of *ākāśa* is not to remember any two objects between which there may be doubt, and doubt must be preceded by the remembering of two objects. Common characteristics may either be positive or negative. Thus space (*ākāśa*) has a set of characteristics which are not to be found in eternal things and a set of characteristics which are not to be found in non-eternal things (*nitya-vyāvṛttatva-viśiṣṭam ākāśa-guṇatvam* and *anitya-vyāvṛttatva-viśiṣṭam ākāśa-guṇatvam*). There may be doubt whether sound, which is a special characteristic of *ākāśa*, is one of those qualities which the *ākāśa* has in common with eternal things or with non-eternal things. Thus, this doubt also is to be classed with doubts of the first type, viz., that of the perception of common features. The followers of Madhva, by virtue of their theory of specific particulars (*viśeṣa*), can agree to the existence of two opposite sets of qualities in a thing. So, in the case of conflicting views (*vipratipatti*) also, the doubt may be said to rise through perception of the common qualities in physical and non-physical objects, so that one might very well doubt whether the senses, on account of certain qualities which they have in common with physical objects, are physical or whether, on account of the other qualities which they have in common with non-physical objects, are non-physical. So on Madhva's system doubt is of one kind only. Jaya-tīrtha says that the followers of the Vaiśeṣika think that apart from doubt and illusion (*viparyaya*) there are two kinds of false knowledge, viz., uncertainty (*anādhyavasāya*) and dreams. Uncertainty is different from doubt; for it is not an oscillation between two entities, but between an infinite number of possibilities, e.g., what is this tree called? Jaya-tīrtha says that uncertainty in such cases cannot be called knowledge at all; it is a mere enquiry (*saṃjñā-viśayam jñānāsā-mātram*): thus, though I know that this tree is different from many other trees

¹ This is Uddyotakara's view of *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 1. 23, as has been mentioned before.

which I know, I still do not know its name and enquire about it. Most dreams are due to sub-conscious memory impressions and so far as these are there they are not false; the error consists in our conceiving these, which are mere memory images, as actually existing objectively at the time; and this part is therefore to be considered as illusion (*viparyaya*). Probability (*saṃbhāvanā*, also called *ūha*) is also to be considered as a kind of doubt, in which the chance of one of the entities is greater than that of the other (e.g., "it is very probable that that is the man who was standing outside the house")¹.

It is evident from the above that doubt is here considered only as a mental state of oscillation; its importance in stimulating philosophical enquiry and investigation, its relations to scepticism and criticism are wholly missed. The classifications of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Kaṇāda are of hardly any philosophical importance. This being so, it is much better to take doubt in the way in which Jaya-tīrtha has done.

Defence of Pluralism (Bheda)².

The difference between God and the individual (*jīva*) is perceived on our side by us and on God's side by Him. We know we are different from Him, and He knows that He is different from us; for, even though we may not perceive God, we may perceive our difference in relation to Him; the perception of difference does not necessarily mean that that from which the difference is perceived should also be perceived; thus even without perceiving a ghost one can say that he knows that a pillar is not a ghost³.

Again, the difference of the individuals from Brahman can also be argued by inference, on the ground that the individuals are objects of sorrow and suffering, which the Brahman is not⁴. And, since the Brahman and the individuals are permanent eternal entities, their mutual difference from each other is also eternal and real. It is argued that the suffering of sorrow belongs to the limited

¹ *Pramāṇa-paddhati*, pp. 10-13; also *Jaya-tīrtha-vijaya* thereon.

² The materials of this section are taken from Vyāsa-tīrtha's *Bhedojjīvana* and the *Vyākhyā-śārkārā* of Śrīnivāsa.

³ *sapratyogika-padārtha-pratyakṣe na pratiyogi-pratyakṣaṃ tantram... stambhaḥ piśāco na ity ādau vyabhicārāt. Bhedojjīvana*, p. 13.

⁴ *jīvo brahma-pratiyogika-dharmi-sattā-samāna-sattāka-bhedādhikaraṇaṃ brahmaṇyanusamhita-duḥkḥānusaṃdhātṛtvād vyatirekeṇa brahmavat. Ibid.* p. 15.

soul and not to the pure consciousness; it is this pure consciousness which is the individual (*jīva*), and, since the suffering exists only so long as there is limitation, the difference ultimately vanishes when the limitation vanishes, and cannot therefore be real. But the Madhvas do not consider such individuals, limited in nature, to be false, and hence the difference depending on their nature is also not false. There being an eternal and real difference between the nature of the individuals and that of God, namely that the former suffer pain while the latter does not, the two can never be identical. The individual souls are but instances of the class-concept "soulhood," which is again a sub-concept of substance, and that of being. Though the souls have not the qualities of substances, such as colour, etc., yet they have at least the numerical qualities of one, two, three, etc. If this is once established, then that would at once differentiate this view from the Śāṅkara view of self as pure self-shining consciousness, leading to differenceless monism. The self as a class-concept would imply similarity between the different selves which are the instances or constituents of the concept, as well as difference among them (insomuch as each particular self is a separate individual numerically different from all other selves and also from God). The supposition of the adherents of the Śāṅkara school is that there is no intrinsic difference among the selves, and that the apparent difference is due to the limitations of the immediately influencing entity, the minds or *antahkaraṇas*, which is reflected in the selves and produces a seeming difference in the nature of the selves, though no such difference really exists; but Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that the truth is the other way, and it is the differences of the selves that really distinguish the minds and bodies associated with them. It is because of the intrinsic difference that exists between two individual selves that their bodies and minds are distinguished from each other. The Upaniṣads also are in favour of the view that God is different from the individual souls, and the attempt to prove a monistic purport of the Upaniṣad texts, Vyāsa-tīrtha tries to demonstrate, may well be proved a failure¹.

This defence of difference appears, however, to be weak when compared with the refutations of difference by Citsukha in his *Tattva-pradīpikā*, Nṛsiṃhāśrama muni in his *Bheda-dhikkāra*, and

¹ He refers to the Upaniṣad text *dvā suparṇā*, etc.

others. Citsukha goes directly into the concept of difference and all the different possible ways of conceiving it: difference as the nature of things (*svarūpa*), difference as mutual negation (*anyonyā-bhāva*, e.g., the jug is not cloth, the cloth is not a jug), difference as distinctness (*prthaktva*), difference as separateness of qualities (*vaidharmya*), and difference as manifested in the variety of categories, each of which has its own separate definition (*bhinna-lakṣaṇa-yogitva-bheda*); but Vyāsa-tīrtha does not make any attempt squarely to meet these arguments. A typical example of how the notion of difference is refuted by these writers has already been given in the first volume of the present work¹.

¹ *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 462.

CHAPTER XXVIII

MADHVA LOGIC

Perception.

PRAMĀṆA has already been defined as true correspondence with objects, and it has also been mentioned that it is divided into two kinds, *kevala-pramāṇa* and *anu-pramāṇa*. *Kevala-pramāṇa* is that by which direct and immediate intuition of objects of cognition is made; in fact it is both the intuitive process and the intuition. Four kinds of such direct intuition are admitted in the Madhva school of thought, viz., God's intuition, intuition of His consort *Lakṣmī*, intuition of sages (Yogins), intuition of ordinary persons¹. God's intuition is always correct, independent (*svatantram*), beginningless and eternal, perfectly clear and has its scope or field everywhere (*sarvārtha-viṣayakam*). *Lakṣmī*'s intuition is dependent on *Īśvara* and inferior in clearness to His knowledge; it is equally beginningless, eternal, and correct, and has for its object everything except the entire extent of God Himself.

The specially efficient knowledge attained by *yoga* is that which belongs to Yogins: these are of three kinds. The first is of those straight sages (*ṛju-yogin*) who deserve Brahmahood. Excepting that this kind knows *Īśvara* and *Lakṣmī* only partially, it knows everything; this knowledge increases with the increase of *yoga*, until *mukti* is attained. These sages know of God more than other individual souls can do. Next to these comes the knowledge of Gods (*tāttvika-yogi-jñānam*); it is inferior in scope to the knowledge of Yogins. Next comes the knowledge of ordinary persons, and of these also there are three classes in a descending order of merit; first, those that deserve liberation, secondly those that suffer rebirth, thirdly those who are in a still lower state of existence. *Pramāṇa* as intuition (*kevala*) is to be distinguished from *anu-pramāṇa*, as means of such intuition, which may be of three kinds, perception, inference, and testimony of the scriptures (*āgama*). The contact of any faultless sense-organ with a faultless object.

¹ *īśvara-jñānam lakṣmī-jñānam yogi-jñānam ayogi-jñānam ceti. Nyāya-paddhati*, p. 16.

Objects become faulty through excessive remoteness, excessive nearness, excessive smallness, intervening obstruction, being mixed up with things similar to them, being manifested, and being similar to other things (*sādrśya*). Cognitive senses are of two kinds, the intuitive faculty of the cognitive agent which is identical with himself, and the ordinary cognitive senses of smell, taste, eye, touch, ear and *manas*; by the power of the intuitive faculty are perceived the self and its qualities, ignorance, *manas* and its faculties, and all sense-knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., time and space¹. The visual organ is supposed to perceive large objects having colour, and *manas* is the superintendent of all sense-organs and the faculty of memory. The faults of *manas*, in consequence of which errors are committed, are the passions and attachments, and those of the other senses are diseases like jaundice, etc., and the distracting influence of intervening medium, such as glass, etc. The ordinary cognitive senses produce the states of *manas*. The sense-organs are like so many instruments which have contact with the objects of cognition. The intuitive faculty also by virtue of its functions (existing as identical with itself and yet separately by virtue of *viśeṣa*) may be considered to be in contact. The verdict of intuitive faculty need not necessarily always be objectively valid, though it is always capable of correctly intuiting the contents of sense-observations. In God and Yogins it is both subjectivity and objectivity in agreement with facts; in ordinary persons it may or may not in any particular case be in agreement with the objective parts, or, in other words, its contents may or may not correspond to objective facts, but it is always correct in intuiting what is brought to it by the senses².

Jaya-tīrtha dispenses with the necessity of sixfold contact as advocated by the followers of the Nyāya³. This has to be so, because the *samavāya* relation is not admitted in the system of Madhva, nor is it admitted that there is any difference between things and their qualities (*guṇa-guṇy-abheda*). Sense-contact therefore takes place according to Jaya-tīrtha as one event; on the one

¹ *indriya-śabdena jñānendriyaṃ grhyate, tad dvi-vidhaṃ, pramāṭṛ-svarūpaṃ prākṛtaṃ ca tatra svarūpendriyaṃ sāksity ucyate; tasya viśaya ātma-svarūpaṃ tad-dharmaḥ avidyā-manas-tad-vṛttayah bāhyendriya-jñāna-sukhādayaḥ kālavyā-rtākāśaś ca. Pramāṇa-paddhati, p. 22.*

² *Ibid.* p. 26.

³ See *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (first edition), p. 334.

hand, because there is no difference between qualities and things, on the other because the self and its qualities are directly perceived by the intuitive entity and there is no necessity of admitting the contact of *manas*, and hence no need to admit a sixfold contact as is proposed by the followers of the Nyāya.

Again, we know that the Nyāya draws a distinction between indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*savikalpa*) knowledge; according to this system, indeterminate knowledge means the simple cognition of the object in itself without any of the eightfold conceptual determinations as regards substance-concept (*dravya-vikalpo yathā daṇḍī*), as “the possessor of a stick,” as regards quality-concept (*guṇa-vikalpo yathā śuklah*), as “white”, as regards action-concept (*kriyā-vikalpo yathā gacchati*), as “he goes”, as regards class-concept (*jāti-vikalpo yathā gauḥ*), as “cow”, as regards ultimately distinguishing characteristic (*viśeṣa-vikalpo yathā viśiṣṭaḥ paramāṇuḥ*), as “the atoms have ultimate characteristics by virtue of which the sages can distinguish one atom from another”, as regards the concept of relation of inseparable inherence (*samavāya-vikalpo yathā paṭa-samavāyavantās tantavaḥ*), as “the threads in a piece of cloth”, as regards the concept of name (*nāma-vikalpo yathā Devadatta*), as “the man Devadatta”, as regards the concept of negation (*abhāva-vikalpo yathā ghaṭā-bhāvavad bhū-talam*), as in “there is no jug on the ground”. But Jaya-tīrtha says that none of these distinctions between determinate and indeterminate perceptions can be accepted, as they are based on the assumption of the two categories of specific ultimate characteristics (*viśeṣa*) and the relation of inseparable inherence (*samavāya*), both of which are invalid. The name of a percept is also known by memory operating at a later moment, and the negation of an entity is known to depend on the memory of the entity itself. Though not all these concepts are produced at the first moment of perception, yet, since some of the concepts, such as substance, quality, action, etc., are grasped at the first moment of perception, there is no reason to suppose the existence of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*). All perception is determinate. The Nyāya view that the feeling of usefulness of an object or of its being undesirable is the result of perception is not correct: for these are obtained by inference¹. When a man avoids

¹ *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 67-71.

a thorn, it is because of his past experience that he judges that it would cause him pain; when he turns to something which is desirable, it is from the inference of the experience of it as having felt desirable in the past.

Inference (Anumāna).

The cause of inference is a faultless reason (through which by virtue of its association anything can be ascertained). The nature of this association or concomitance is described by Jaya-tīrtha as being inseparable concomitance (*avinābhāva*). Vyāsa-tīrtha urges in the *Tarka-tāṇḍava* that this inseparable concomitance ought really to mean contradiction of experience leading to inadmissible assumption or implication (*anupapatti*). When anything experienced in a particular space-time relation must be invalid except on the assumption of some other thing, in some other space-time relation, it must be admitted that such a particular relation subsisting between the two is a relation of concomitance (*vyāpti*), leading to the inference of the latter through the former¹.

Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that this view of inference has also been supported by Madhva in his *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa*, where he says that the residual method (*pariśeṣa*) is the essential method in all cases of valid inference². Reduction to absurdity in regard to any valid experience is what necessitates the supposition in an act of inference.³ Jaya-tīrtha in his *Pramāṇa-paddhati* has indeed defined concomitance (*vyāpti*) as inseparability (*avinābhāva*); this inseparable concomitance cannot be described as being in all cases agreement in absence, i.e., the absence of the reason, *hetu*, in all cases of the absence of the *probandum* (*sādhya*), or the inferred entity; for there are cases where, in spite of the absence of such negative instances, inference is possible, e.g., sound is expressible on account of its being an object of knowledge; now here no such negative instance is available where there would be no expression; hence in such cases of impossible-negative (*kevalānvayi*) inferences the above definition of concomitance, which

¹ *yad-deśa-kāla-sambaddhasya yasya yad-deśa-kāla-sambaddhena yena vinā-mupapattis tasyiva tena saha vyāptiḥ. Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., p. 1).

² *pariśeṣo'rthāpattir anumānam ity aviśeṣaḥ. Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa and Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa-tīkā*, p. 27.

³ *anumānam apī āvaśyakānmupapattyaiiva gamakam. Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., p. 2).

requires the existence of negative instances for the ascertainment of concomitance, would not apply. Also no kind of spatial association of the reason and consequence (*sādhya*) can be urged as being an indispensable condition of concomitance: for there can be the inference of rain in the upper part of a country from perceiving a rise of water in the river in the lower part, and there is no spatial contiguity between the reason and consequence. So the main point in concomitance determining inference is the reduction of an incontrovertible experience into an impossibility, which necessitates the assumption of the inferred entity. It is this which has also been described as the law of unconditional and invariable association (*sāhacarya-niyama*). In the well-known example of fire and smoke what is described as the unconditional and invariable coexistence of the absence of smoke in all cases of the absence of fire is also a case of *reductio ad absurdum* (*anupapatti*). It would apply with equal force in the cases of impossible-negatives (*kevalānvayi*); for there also the impossible absence of the consequence would render the reason absurd; and hence the assumption of the consequence is necessary.

Vyāsa-tīrtha refutes at great length the definition of inference given by Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, where he explains concomitance as the coexistence of consequence and reason as qualified by the fact of the absence of the latter in each case of the absence of the former. Had it not been for the fact that in inferences of the type of impossible-negatives (*kevalānvayi*) no negative instances are available where we might have been acquainted with cases of absence of the consequence being also cases of absence of the reason (*sādhyaḥbhāvavad-avṛttitvam*), Gaṅgeśa would have been glad to define concomitance (*vyāpti*) as unconditional and invariable non-existence of the reason in all cases of the non-existence of the consequence (*sādhyaḥbhāvavad-avṛttitvam*). But owing to the above difficulty Gaṅgeśa was forced to define concomitance as coexistence (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of the consequence and reason where the reason is also qualified as the repository of the negation of all possible conditions which could invalidate its unconditional and invariable relation to the consequence (*sādhya*)¹. The insight of Gaṅgeśa in formulating such a definition consists in this, that he

¹ *pratiyogy-asamānādhikaraṇa-yat-samānādhikaraṇāntyantābhāva-pratiyogitā-vacchedakāvachinnam yan na bhavati tena samam tasya sāmānādhikaraṇyam vyāptiḥ. Tattva-cintāmaṇi, Part II, p. 100 (ed. 1888, Bibliotheca Indica).*

thinks that universal existence of the reason in case of the consequence is alone sufficient for an inference of the latter from the former, provided that the reason is pure and unmixed by the presence of any other entity. It is the presence of other entities mixed with the reason that may invalidate its universal coexistence with the consequence; so, if that could be eliminated, then mere universal existence of the reason in cases of the consequence would be sufficient to establish a relation of concomitance between the former and the latter.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, however, points out that the existence of the reason in cases of the consequence is not universally valid in all cases of inference. Thus in the inference of rain in the upper regions from perceiving a rise of water in the river in the lower regions there is no spatial coexistence of the reason in the consequence; so also in the inference that the constellation *Rohiṇī* will shortly rise in the east because the constellation *Kṛttikā* has already risen. In all such cases and in all cases of inference the view of *reductio ad absurdum* (*anupapatti*) can always define concomitance in the best possible way and therefore can also serve as the best ground for all kinds of inference, including the class known as impossible-negatives (*kevalānvayi*). For in the example given of that class, "this is expressible because it is an object of knowledge", we can argue that the denial of non-expressibility is a necessary postulate for the validity of the incontrovertible experience of its being an object of knowledge¹. An objection may be raised that, non-expressibility being as fictitious an entity as a round square, there would be no meaning in further denying it. To this Vyāsa-tīrtha's reply is that negation may apply even to the fictitious and the non-existent (*aprāmāṇika*)².

It is evident that this view of concomitance is a later development of theory by Vyāsa-tīrtha. For Jaya-tīrtha, in his *Pramāṇa-paddhati*, describes concomitance as being inseparable existence (*avinābhāva*), which he explains as invariable coexistence (*sāha-carya-niyama*) and also as invariable relation (*avyabhicaritaḥ sambandhaḥ*)³. Janārdana, however, in his commentary on the

¹ *idaṃ vācyam jñeyatvāt kevalānvayi anumānam.*

² *tatra sādhyābhāvasya asattvād eva sādhyābhāve sati sādhanasya yopapattis tad-abhāva-rūpānupapatteḥ sattvāt; mammate'prāmāṇikasyāpi niṣedha-pratigeyitvāt. Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., p. 6).

³ *Pramāṇa-paddhati*, p. 30.

Pramāṇa-paddhati, holds that this *sāhacarya-niyama* of Jaya-tīrtha must be interpreted to mean the *reductio ad absurdum* of Vyāsa-tīrtha; otherwise it would be evident to all that his view of concomitance has been intended by the above definition of Jaya-tīrtha; and he supports his view by pointing out that both in the *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa* and in his commentary on the *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa* Jaya-tīrtha has included inference by residues (*pariśeṣa*) and implication (*arthāpatti*) within inference, as he thought that the methods of these are practically methods of inference itself¹. But this only proves that *pariśeṣa* and *arthāpatti* are also kinds of inference and not that the method of *anupapatti* involved in them should be regarded as being the only possible form of inference. Had he thought this to be so, he would certainly have mentioned it and would not have limited his definition of concomitance to invariable coexistence (*sāhacarya-niyama*). Chāḷari-śeṣācārya, who faithfully follows the footprints of Jaya-tīrtha, often repeating his language also, explains this invariable coexistence of Jaya-tīrtha as “where there is smoke, there is fire”; but he remarks that this invariable coexistence means only the existence of an invariable relation of the reason to the consequence (*atra sāhacaryam hetoḥ sādhyena sambandha-mātram vivakṣitam*), and not merely existence in the same place (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*). Coexistence therefore is said to mean here unfailing relation to the consequence (*avyabhicarita-sādhya-sambandho vyāptiḥ*), and this is *vyāpti*². He also refers to Gaṅgeśa’s definition of *vyāpti*, noted above, and points out that this definition of *vyāpti* would be inapplicable in those instances of inference where there is no spatial coexistence (e.g., the inference of rain in the upper regions from the rise of water in the river in the lower regions)³. He points out on the strength of such instances that concomitance cannot be defined as coexistence (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), but is an unfailing relation which may hold between a cause and an effect existing in different places. On the strength of these instances Chāḷari-śeṣācārya argues in favour of concomitance without co-

¹ *anupapatter vyāptitvam ca pramāṇa-lakṣaṇe pariśeṣārthāpattiḥ anumā-viśeṣa ity atrārthāpattir iva anumānam api āvaśyakānupapattyaiva gamakam ity uktatvāt. Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., pp. 1-2). Also *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa-ṭīkā*, pp. 5-7.

² Cf. Gaṅgeśa’s alternative definition of *vyāpti* in the section on *Vīśeṣa-vyāpti*: *yat-sambandhitāvacchedaka-rūpavattvam yasya tasya sā vyāptiḥ. Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, Part II, p. 156.

³ *na tu samānādhikaraṇyam eva. Pramāṇa-candrikā*, p. 8a.

existence (*vyadhikaraṇa-vyāpti*) as being possible, and therefore advocates the dropping of the coexistence as a necessary condition of concomitance. Vyāsa-tirtha seems to have profited by these remarks and, instead of remaining content with “unfailing relation” of Chāṭari-śeṣācārya, explained this “unfailing relation” as being the definite relation of *reductio ad absurdum* (*anupapatti*)¹.

Tarka (Ratiocination).

The determining oscillation constituent in a mental process leading to inference is called *tarka* or *ūha*². Gautama, in his *Nyāya-sūtra*, describes it as being ratiocination with a view to knowledge of truth, involving attempt at determination of any fact as possessing a particular character, based on a proper enquiry regarding the cause of such a determination. Thus there is a desire to know the truth about the nature of selves as knowers. Are they produced or are they uncreated? If they were created, they would suffer destruction, like all created things, and would not suffer or enjoy the fruits of their own deeds. If they are uncreated, they may very well continue to exist for ever to suffer or enjoy the fruits of their deeds and undergo rebirth. So the self which undergoes rebirth and enjoys or suffers the fruits of all its deeds must necessarily be uncreated³. Vātsyāyana says that *tarka* is neither included within the accepted *pramāṇas* nor is it a separate *pramāṇa*, but is a

¹ *Pramāṇa-candrikā*, pp. 8a, 9

² *ūhatvaṃ ca mānasatva-vyāpyo jāti-viśeṣaḥ “tarkayāmi” ity anubhava-siddhaḥ. Viśvanātha-vṛtti*, I, p. 40.

Tarka is used in the sense of *ūha* by Jayanta also in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 586. Jayanta says that its function as *ūha* consists in weakening the chances of the weak alternative, thereby strengthening the probability of the stronger alternative and so helping the generation of a valid knowledge of the certainty of the latter alternative. The meaning of *tarka* here must be distinguished from the meaning “inference” (*anumāna*), which it has in *Brahma-sūtra*, II. 1. 12 (*tarkā-pratiṣṭhānāt...*), and also from its use as the science of logic (*ānūṅikī*), one of the fourteen subjects of learning (*vidyā-sthāna*). *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, I. 3; also *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 3-4. *Ūha* is with Sāṃkhya a quality of *buddhi* and with the Mīmāṃsakas it is a process of application of recognized linguistic maxims for the determination of the sense of words or of sentences (*yuktyā prayoga-nirūpaṇam ūhaḥ*), *ibid.* p. 588. Here *ūha* is used practically in the sense of “inference” and is such a *pramāṇa*. But here in the *Nyāya ūha* or *tarka* stands between right knowledge and doubt. Thus Jayanta says: *tad eṣa mīmāṃsaka-kalpyamāno nohaḥ pramāṇa-vyatirekam eti pramāṇa-sandehadaśāntarālavartī tu tarkaḥ kathito'tra śāstre* (p. 590).

³ *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 1. 40 and Vātsyāyana's *Vṛtti* on it.

process which helps the *pramāṇas* to the determination of true knowledge¹. Keśava Miśra, in his *Tarka-bhāṣya*, is inclined to include it under doubt². But Annam Bhaṭṭa, in his *Tarka-dīpikā*, says that, though *tarka* should properly be counted under false knowledge (*viparyaya*), yet, since it helps the *pramāṇas*, it should be separately counted³. The usefulness of *tarka* in inference consists in assuring the mind of the absence of any cases of failure of existence of the reason in the consequence and thereby helping the formation of the notation of the concomitance of the reason and the consequence⁴. Viśvanātha says that *tarka* clears away the doubts regarding the possible cases of failure (*vyabhicāra*) of the reason (e.g., if smoke existed in any instance where there was no fire, then fire would not be the cause of smoke), and thereby renders the knowledge of concomitance infallible and so helps the work of inference not in a direct, but in an indirect way (*pāramparayā*)⁵. Viśvanātha further adds that such a *tarka* is of five kinds, namely consideration of the fallacy of self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*, e.g., if the knowledge of this jug is produced by the knowledge of this jug, then it should be different from it), mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*, e.g., if this jug is the object of the knowledge as produced by the knowledge, then it should be different from this jug), circle (*cakraka*, if this jug is produced by something else produced by this jug, then it should be different from anything produced by something else produced by this jug), vicious infinite (*anavasthā*, e.g., if the class concept "jug" refers to all jugs, it cannot refer to things produced by the jug), contradictory experience (*pramāṇa-bādhitārthaka-prasaṅga*, e.g., if smoke exists where there is no fire, then it could not be produced by fire, or if there was no fire in the hill, there would be no smoke in it)⁶.

¹ *tarko na pramāṇa-saṃgrhīto na pramāṇāntaram;
pramāṇānām anugrahakas tattva-jñānāya parikalpyate.*

Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, I. 1. 1.

² *Tarka-bhāṣya*, p. 44.

⁴ *Tarka-dīpikā*, p. 88.

³ *vyabhicāra-jñānābhāva-saṃpādakatvena tarkasya vyāpti-grahe upayogaḥ.*
Bhavānandi on Didhiti, quoted in *Nyāya-kośa*, footnote, p. 292.

⁵ *tathā ca dhīmo yadi vahni-vyabhicāri syāt vahni-janyo na syāt ity anena
vyabhicāra-śaṅkā-nirāse niraṅkuṣena vyāpti-jñānena anumitir iti paramparayā
evānya upayogaḥ.* *Viśvanātha-vṛtti*, I. 1. 40.

⁶ Each of the first three has three varieties, according as it refers to knowledge (*jñāpti*), production (*utpatti*) and existence (*sthiti*). Thus the threefold example of *ātmāśraya* would be (i) *etat-ghaṭa-jñānam yady etat-ghaṭa-janyaṃ syāt etad-ghaṭa-bhīmanṃ syāt*, (ii) *ghaṭo'yaṃ yady etad-ghaṭa-janakah syāt, etad-ghaṭa-*

Mathurānātha, in explaining the function of *tarka* in the formation of the notion of concomitance (*vyāpti*), says that, even when through noticing the existence of smoke in all known cases of fire and the absence of smoke in all those places where there is no fire, one decides that smoke is produced by fire or not, it is there that *tarka* helps to remove all legitimate doubts. As Gaṅgeśa shows, such a *tarka* would proceed thus: Either smoke is produced by fire or it is not produced there. So, if smoke is produced neither by fire nor by not-fire, it is not produced at all. If, however, there are the doubts whether smoke is from not-fire, or whether it can sometimes be where there is no fire, or whether it is produced without any cause (*ahetuka*), then none of us can have the notion of inseparable existence of fire in all cases of smoke so as to lead us to action (*sarvatva sva-kriyā-vyāghātaḥ*)¹. A course of thought such as is called *tarka* is helpful to the formation of the notion of concomitance only when a large number of positive and negative cases has been actually perceived and a provisional certainty has been reached. Even when the provisional certainty is reached, so long as the mind is not cleared by the above *tarka* the series of doubts (*saṁśaya-dhārā*) might continue to rise². It cannot be urged, says Gaṅgeśa, that, even when by the above method the notion of concomitance has been formed, there might still arise doubts whether fire might not be the cause of smoke or whether smoke might be without any cause; for, had it been so, you would not always (*niyata*) make fire when you wanted smoke, or eat when you wanted to satisfy your hunger, or use words to carry your ideas to

bhinnah syāt, (iii) ayam ghaṭo yady etad-ghaṭa-vṛttiḥ syāt, tathātvena upalabhyeta. Example of anyonyāśraya in jñapti: ayam ghaṭo yady etad-ghaṭa-jñāna-janya-jñāna-viśayaḥ syāt etad-ghaṭa-bhinnah syāt. Example of cakraka in utpatti: ghaṭo'yaṁ yady etad-ghaṭa-janya-janya-janyaḥ syāt tadā etad-ghaṭa-janya-janya-bhinnam syāt. Mādhava, in his Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha, speaking of older Nyāya tradition, adds seven others, vyāghāta (contradiction), pratibandhi-kalpanā (irrelevant thesis), lāghava (minimum postulation), gaurava (too much postulation), utsarga (general rule), apavāda (exception), vaijātya (class-difference). But Viśvanātha, whose list of these varies somewhat from the above, as he drops vyāghāta and has prathamopasthitatva, and vimigamana-viraha for pratibandhi-kalpanā, apavāda and vaijātya, holds that these are not properly tarka, but are so called only because they help as accessories to pramāṇas (pramāṇa-sahakāritva-rūpa-sādharmyāt tathā vyavahārah). Viśvanātha-vṛtti, I. 1. 40.

¹ Gaṅgeśa on *tarka* and Mathurānātha's commentary thereon. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, Part II, pp. 219-28.

² *Ibid.* p. 220; see also Kāmākhyānātha's note, also p. 228.

others. Such regular attempts themselves show that in such cases there are no doubts (*śaṅkā*); for, had there been doubts, these attempts would not be so invariable. It is not possible that you would be in doubt whether fire is the cause of smoke and yet always kindle fire when you try to get smoke. The existence of doubt in such cases would contradict your invariable attempt to kindle fire whenever you wanted smoke; doubts can be admitted only so long as one's actions do not contradict (*sva-kriyā-vyāghātā*) them¹.

Śrīharṣa, however, arguing from the Vedānta point of view, denies the power of *tarka* to dispel doubt. He urges that, if it is said that *tarka* necessarily dispels doubts in all cases and helps the formation of any particular notion of concomitance, then this statement must itself depend on some other notion of concomitance, and so on, leading us to a vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). Moreover, the fact that we know the universal coexistence of fire and smoke, and do not perceive any other element universally abiding in the fire which is equally universally coexistent with fire, does not prove that there is no such element in it which is really the cause of smoke (though apparently fire may appear as its cause). Our perception can certify only the existence or non-existence of all that is visible under the normal conditions of visual perception; it cannot say anything regarding the presence or absence of entities not controlled by these conditions, or we could only say that in the absence of fire there is absence of a specific kind of smoke; we could not say that there would be absence of all kinds of smoke; for it is just possible that there is some other kind of cause producing some special kind of smoke which we have not yet perceived; mere non-perception would not prove that such a special kind of smoke does not exist at all, since perception applies only to entities that are perceptible and is guided by its own conditions, and cannot therefore apply to entities which cannot be brought under those conditions². The *tarka* which is supposed to dispel doubt by the supposition of contradiction of experience and which would thus support conco-

¹ *tad eva hy āśaṅkyate yasmīn āśaṅkyamāne sva-kriyā-vyāghāto na bhavātīti; na hi sambhavati svayaṁ vahnī-ādikaṁ dhumādi-kāryyārthaṁ niyamata upādatte tat-kāraṇaṁ tan netyāśaṅkyate ca.* Ibid. p. 232.

² *tad-adarśanasya āpātato hetu-antara-prayojyāvāntara-jāty-adarśanena ayo-gyatayā avikalpyatvād apy upapatteḥ; yadā tu hetu-antara-prayojyo dhūmasya viśeṣo drakṣyate tadāsau vikalpiṣyate iti sambhāvanāyā durnivāratvāt.*

Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, p. 680.

mitance, not being itself grounded on concomitance, would naturally fail to do its part; for, if such groundless *tarka* could be supposed to establish concomitance, that would itself be contradiction (*vyāghāta*). Udayana had said that, if even when no doubt is present you suppose that doubt might arise in the future, that can only be due to inference, so inference is valid. No doubts need be entertained regarding the concomitance underlying *tarka*, as that would lead to the contradiction of our own actions; for we cannot say that we believe fire to be the cause of smoke and still doubt it. Śrīharṣa had replied to this by saying that, where there is experience of failure of coexistence, that itself makes the supposition of concomitance doubtful; when there is no experience of failure of coexistence, there is no end of indefinite doubts lurking about; for these unknown doubts are only put an end to when a specific failure of coexistence is noticed; so under no circumstances can doubts be dispelled by *tarka*¹. The main point of the dispute consists in this, that, while Śrīharṣa is afraid to trust *tarka* because of the supposed doubts, Udayana thinks that, if we are so pessimistic, then we should have to stop all our actions. None of them, however, discusses the middle course of probability, which may lead us to action and may yet not be considered as proved valid inference. Vardhamāna, however, in commenting on the above verse of Udayana, refers to Gaṅgeśa as holding that *tarka* does not lead to the formation of the notion of concomitance².

Vyāsa-tīrtha, however, in his *Tarka-tāṇḍava*, urges that *tarka* is not an indispensable condition of the notion of concomitance; by faith in trusty persons, or from inherited tendencies, as a result of experiences in past life, or through acquiescence in universally

¹ Udayana's verse ran as follows:

*śaṅkā ced amumāsty eva na cec chaṅkā tatastarām
vyāghātāvadhir āśaṅkā tarkaḥ śaṅkāvadhir mataḥ.*

Kusumāñjali, III. 7.

Śrīharṣa gave his reply to this by slightly changing Udayana's words as follows:

*vyāghāto yadi śaṅkāsti na cec chaṅkā tatastarām
vyāghātāvadhir āśaṅkā tarkaḥ śaṅkāvadhiḥ kutaḥ.*

Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya, p. 693.

Gaṅgeśa suggests that the word *vyāghāta* in Śrīharṣa means failure of coexistence (*sahānavasthāna-niyama*), while in Udayana it means contradiction of one's own actions (*sva-kriyā-vyāghātaḥ*). But, as Vyāsa-tīrtha shows, the word may be taken in the latter sense even in Śrīharṣa. *Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., p. 25).

² *atrāsmatpitṛcaranāḥ, tarko na vyāpti-grāhakaḥ kintu
vyabhicāra-jñānābhāva-sahakṛtām saha-cāra-darśanam.*

Prakāśa, III, p. 26.

accepted views, we may have a notion of concomitance without going through the process of *tarka*. He seems, however, to be largely in agreement with the view of *tarka* as held by Gaṅgeśa according to the above statement of Vardhamāna, in holding that *tarka* does not lead directly to the establishment of concomitance. For he says that *tarka* does not directly lead us to the establishment of concomitance, since concomitance is directly grasped by a wide experience (*bhūyo-darśana*) of coexistence, qualified by a knowledge of absence of failure of coexistence¹. Vācaspati also holds more or less the same view when he says that it is the sense-organ, aided by the memory of wide experience, that grasps this natural relation of concomitance². Vyāsa-tīrtha says that the determination of absence of vitiating conditions (*upādhi*), which is a function of *tarka*, becomes necessary only in some kinds of inference; it is not always awaited. If it were always necessary, then *tarka* being required for all notions of concomitance and concomitance being the basis of *tarka*, there would be a vicious infinite³. If failures of coexistence are not known, then from cases of coexistence the self may immediately form the notion of concomitance⁴. What is necessary therefore is to dispel the doubts as to failure of coexistence (*vyabhicāra-śaṅkā-nivṛtti-dvāra*). But such doubts come only occasionally (*kvacitkaiva*) and not always; and such occasional doubts require to be dispelled by only an occasional recourse to *tarka*. It cannot be argued that the possibility of doubts may remain in all cases and hence in all cases there is necessity for the exercise of the *tarka*; for it may well be asked, do such doubts arise of themselves in our minds or are they raised by others? On the first supposition one may have doubts even as to the perception of one's hands and feet, or one might even have doubts in regard to one's doubts, which would render even the doubts invalid. If it is held that doubts arise only when other possible alternatives are suggested, then it has to be agreed that there will be many cases where no such

¹ *api ca tarko na sākṣād vyāpti-grāhakah bhūyo-darśana-vyabhicārādarśana-sahakṛta-pratyakṣeṇaiva tad-grahaṇāt. Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., p. 20).

² *bhūyo-darśana-janīta-saṃskāra-sahitam indriyam eva svābhāvika-saṃbandha-grāhi. Tātparya-ṭīkā.*

³ This has already been pointed out above in dealing with Śrīharṣa's objections.

⁴ *adrṣte vyabhicāre tu sādhanam tad ati sphuṭam jñāyate sākṣīnavāddhā mānavadho na tad bhavet.*

Tarka-tāṇḍava (MS., p. 21).

alternatives would be suggested or the probability of one of them might be so strongly suggested that there will be no occasion for doubts. So it must be admitted that in many cases we have a natural belief in certain orders of coexistence, where no doubts arise of themselves (*sva-rasika-viśvāsasyāvāśyakatvān na sarvata śaṅkā*)¹; no one is seen going through a never-ending series of doubts all his life (*na cāvīrala-lagna-śaṅkā-dhārā amubhūyate*). On the second supposition also, no one can suggest that doubts may always arise: in the relation of smoke and fire one cannot suggest that there may still be some other entity, different from fire, which causes smoke; for, if this were a sensible entity, it would have been perceived, and, if it were non-sensible, there would be no proof at all that a non-sensible entity existed or could exist. For, if Śrīharṣa should be so doubtful of all things, it might be suggested that in all the proofs in favour of monism (*advaita*) there may be a thousand faults and in the arguments of the dualists there may be a thousand good points, and so in consequence of these doubts you could not come to any conclusion establishing your doctrine of monism². If a belief in a concomitance arises, the mere indefinite possibility of doubt does not shake one off his natural conviction of the concomitance as valid³. If you yourself would eat whenever you had hunger to appease, you cannot say that you have still doubts that eating may not after all be the cause of appeasing of hunger. Moreover, what is gained by urging that possibility of doubts always remains? Is it meant to destroy the validity of all inference or of all notions of concomitance? No one who wishes to admit the usefulness of inference would think of destroying the means—the notion of concomitance—by which it is established. If concomitance is not established, the Vedāntist will find that it is impossible to understand the meanings of those Vedic monistic words by which he wishes to establish monism. Again, if inference is to be valid, that can only be established by inference and not by perception. Without inference the Vedāntist could neither establish anything nor refute any assertions made by his opponents, contradicting his own doctrines. It seems therefore that Śrīharṣa would

¹ *Tarka-tāṇḍava*, pp. 22–3.

² *Ibid.* p. 24.

³ *na hi grāhya-saṁśaya-mātraṁ niścaya-pratibandhakam; na ca utpannasya vyāpti-niścayasya balavad bādhakam asti yena autsargikaṁ prāmāṇyam apodyeta. Ibid.* p. 24.

carry out an inference as if there were no fear of the supposed doubts and yet, merely for the sake of saying it, say that there is a possibility of the existence of doubts in all inferences¹.

The main points that arise from the above discussion are that, while Śrīharṣa would argue that *tarka* cannot remove the doubts threatening the validity of any notion of concomitance and while the Naiyāyikas would hold that *tarka*, on account of its function of removing doubts from notions of concomitance, is a necessary factor of all inferential process, Vyāsa-tīrtha argues that, though the power of *tarka* in removing doubts is admitted, yet, since in many of our inferences no doubts requiring the help of *tarka* would arise, it is not true that *tarka* is a necessary factor in all inferences². From what has been said above it will appear that there is some subtle difference of opinion in the Nyāya school regarding the real function of *tarka*. But the general tendency seems to be to restrict the function of *tarka* to removing doubts and thereby paving the way for the formation of the notion of concomitance; but it does not directly produce the notion of concomitance (*na tu vyāpti-grāhaka*) nor does it verify particular inductions by the application of general principles of uniformity of nature³.

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 25-31.

² It cannot, however, be said that the Nyāya would urge the necessity of *tarka* in all instances of inference. The older Nyāya writers do not say anything explicitly on the subject; but Viśvanātha, in his *Muktāvalī*, states that *tarka* is necessary only in those cases where there are doubts regarding the forming of the notion of concomitance. Where no doubts naturally arise, there is no necessity of *tarka* (*yatra svata eva śaṅkā nāvatarati tatra na tarkāpekṣāpti*). *Muktāvalī*, 137.

Dinakara, however, in his commentary on the *Muktāvalī* 137, thinks that there are two kinds of *tarka*, clearance of doubts and the formation of concomitance (*tarkaś ca divividho saṁśaya-pariśodhako vyāpti-grāhakaś ca*). This however is directly opposed to the view of Vardhamāna cited above.

³ The wording of Dr Seal's brief references to the subject of *tarka* in *A History of Hindu Chemistry* by Dr P. C. Ray (p. 264) is inexact. He says there: "*Tarka* or *Ūha*, then, is the verification and vindication of particular inductions by the application of the general principles of Uniformity of Nature and of Causality, principles which are themselves based on repeated observation (*bhūyo-darśana*) and the ascertainment of innumerable particular inductions of Uniformity or Causality (*bhūyo-darśana-janita-saṁskāra-sahitam indriyam eva svābhāvika-saṁbandha-grāhi* Vācaspati)." Thus *tarka* also helps in dispelling doubt (*saṁdeha*).

On its function in clearing the way to the formation of the notion of concomitance: *mārga-sādhana-dvāreṇa tarkasya tattva-jñānārthatvam iha vivakṣitam*. *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 586. Mathurānātha also points out that the function of *tarka* is to supply such grounds that doubts may not arise, but it is not *vyāpti-grāhaka* (*tarkaḥ śaṅkānutpattau prayojakaḥ...*). Mathurānātha on *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, Part II, p. 240.

So far Vyāsa-tīrtha has been using the word *tarka* in the accepted Nyāya sense and, using it in that sense, he has been showing that the removal of doubts is not indispensable for the formation of the notion of concomitance. *Tarka* consists according to him, however, in the necessary awakening of the knowledge of absence of the reason owing to absence of the consequence; taken from this point of view, it becomes identical with inference (*anumāna*). Jaya-tīrtha also says in his *Pramāṇa-paddhati* that *tarka* means the necessary assumption of something else (consequence), when a particular character or entity (reason) is perceived or taken for granted (*kasyacid dharmasyāṅgikare'rthāntarasyāpādanam tarkaḥ*)¹. Granted that there is no fire in the hill, it must necessarily be admitted that there is no smoke in it; this is *tarka* and this is also inference². *Tarka* is thus the process by which the assumption of one hypothesis naturally forces the conclusion as true. This is therefore a *pramāṇa*, or valid source of knowledge, and should not be considered as either doubt or false knowledge, as some Nyāya writers did, or, as other Nyāya writers considered it to be, different from both doubt and decision (*nirṇaya*). Thus according to Vyāsa-tīrtha *tarka* has a twofold function, one as the dispeller of doubts and a help to other *pramāṇas*, and the other as inference. The main point that Vyāsa-tīrtha urges against Udayana (who holds the function of *tarka* to be merely the removal of undesirable assumptions) and against Vardhamāna (who holds that the function of *tarka* is merely the removal of doubt of the absence of the consequence) is that, if *tarka* does not take account of the material discrepancy or impossibility of facts involved in the assumption of the absence of the consequence (fire) when the smoke is present, then even the doubts or undesirable assumptions will not be removed; and, if it does take account thereof, then it yields new knowledge, is identical with inference, and is a *pramāṇa* itself³. *Tarka* may be treated as a negative inference, e.g., "had it been

¹ *Pramāṇa-paddhati*, p. 36a. *manmate tu āṅgikṛtena sādhyābhāvena saha anāṅgikṛtasya sādhanābhāvasya vyāpakatva-pramā vā sādhyābhāvāṅgikāra-nimittaka-sādhanābhāvasyāṅgikartavyatva-pramā vā tarkyate'nena iti vyutpattyā tarkaḥ. Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., p. 78).

² *parvato nirdhūmatvenāṅgikartavyaḥ niragnikatvena āṅgikṛtatvād hradavat ity anumānam eva tarkaḥ. Ibid.* p. 84.

³ *kiṁ ca para-mate tarkasya kiṁ viśaya-pariśodhane upayogaḥ kiṁ Udayana-riti vā anīṣṭa-prasaṅjanatvamātreṇa upayogaḥ, kiṁ vā Varddhamānādi-riti vā sādhyābhāva-sandeha-nivarttanena. Ibid.* p. 92.

without fire, it would have been without smoke; but it is not so". Being such a negative inference, it stands as an independent inference, and, as it may also be used to strengthen a positive inference, it may also be considered in that case an additional support to it (*pramāṇānām anugrāhaka*), just as what is known by perception may again be strengthened by inference¹. Its function in removing doubts in other cases remains just as it has been shown before; but everywhere the root principle involved in it is necessary supposition rendering other alternatives impossible (*anyathānupapatti*), which is the principle also in inference².

Concomitance (Vyāpti).

The word *vyāpti* in Sanskrit is a noun formed from the root *vyāp*, "to pervade". The consequence (e.g., fire) pervades all cases of smoke, i.e., the circle of the consequence is not smaller than the circle of smoke and encloses it; consequence is therefore called the pervader (*vyāpaka*) and the reason (e.g. smoke) as the object of this action of pervading is called the pervaded (*vyāpya*). Thus in the case of smoke and fire there is an unfailing relation (*avyabhicāritā-sambandha*) between them and the former is called *vyāpya* and the latter *vyāpaka*. This unfailing relation may however be of four kinds. First, the two circles might coincide (*samavṛtti*), in which case the reason may be treated as consequence and inferred from the consequence treated as reason and *vice versa*. Thus one may argue both ways: it is sinful because it is prohibited in the Vedas and it is prohibited in the Vedas because it is sinful; here the two circles coincide. Secondly, when one circle is smaller than the other, as in the case of smoke and fire (*nyūnādhika-vṛtti*); the circle of fire is larger than the circle of smoke and so one could infer smoke from fire, but not fire from smoke—*vyāpya* is smaller than the *vyāpaka*. Thirdly, where the two circles are mutually exclusive (*paraspara-parihāreṇaiva vartate*), e.g., the class-concept cow (*gotva*) and the class-concept horse (*aśvatva*); where there is one, there is not the other. There is a relation of exclusion here, but not the relation of a *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka*. Fourthly, where the two are

¹ *sādhana-numānaṃ vinaiva yadi niragnikaḥ syāt tarhi nirdhūmaḥ syāt tathā cāyaṃ nirdhūma itī tarka-rūpānumānenaiva agnisiddheḥ. Ibid. p. 90.*

² *sākṣād anyathānupapatti-pramāpaka-tarka-viṣaya-kṛta-virodhasya sattvāt. Ibid. p. 89.*

sometimes mutually exclusive, yet sometimes found to be coincident; thus cooking is done by women, yet there are men who cook; cook and males are mutually exclusive, though there may be some males who cook (*kvacit samāviṣṭa api kvacit paraṣpara-parihāreṇaiva vartate*). The circle of cooking is divided between males and females. Here also there is a relation between cooking and males, but it is not unfailing (*avyabhicāritā*); unfailing relation means that, where there is one, there must be the other also.

When a man observes the coexistence of fire and smoke, he naturally revolves in his mind "is it in this place that fire and smoke are seen together, while in other places and at other times the presence of one excludes the presence of the other, or are they always found together"; then by observing in several instances, he finds that, where there is smoke, there is fire, and that, where there is no fire, there is no smoke, and that in some cases at least there is fire, but no smoke. These observations are followed by a consideration such as this: "since, though in many cases fire coexists with smoke, in some cases at least fire is found where there is no smoke, does smoke, although in all the cases known to me it exists with fire, ever remain without it, or does it always coexist with fire?" Then again the consideration arises that the relation of smoke to fire is determined by the presence of wet wood (*ādrendhana*), which may be called a vitiating condition (*upādhi*), i.e., had this condition not been there, there would have been unqualified coexistence of fire with smoke, and *vice versa*. This vitiating condition (*upādhi*) exists in all cases of smoke, but not in all cases of fire¹. Where the coexistence is not determined by any such vitiating condition, the coexistence is universally mutual. There are some qualities which are common to both fire and smoke (e.g., both of them are objects of knowledge: *yathā prameyatvam*), and these cannot determine the connection. There are other qualities which do not belong either to smoke or fire, and these also cannot determine the connection. It is only the vitiating condition of the presence of wet wood which by its absence can dissociate fire from smoke, but cannot dissociate smoke from fire. If there were any such condition which was present in all cases of fire, but not in all cases of smoke, then the inference of fire from smoke would have been faulty as the

¹ This vitiating condition will therefore falsify an inference such as "There is smoke in the hill because there is fire."

inference of smoke from fire is faulty. Now, so far as we have observed, there is no such condition which is present in all cases of fire, but not in all cases of smoke; the fear that there may be some vitiating conditions which are too subtle for our senses is illegitimate; for, if it is neither perceived nor known by any other sources of knowledge (*pramāṇāntara-vedya*), the doubt that it may still somehow exist cannot arise. So, when we are satisfied that there are no vitiating conditions, there arises the notion of invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva-pramitiḥ*)¹. So the invariable concomitance is grasped by perception aided by wide experience, associated with absence of any knowledge of exception to co-existence and ascertainment of absence of vitiating conditions, operating as accessories. When once the mutual invariable relation between smoke and fire is grasped, then, wherever smoke is perceived, fire is inferred². This description of the formation of the notion of concomitance seems to be more or less the same as the Nyāya view; there also the perceiving of coexistence, associated with the knowledge of absence of exception, is said to lead to the formation of the notion of concomitance³.

¹ Vyāsa-tīrtha remarks here that the ascertainment of the absence of vitiating conditions is necessary in most cases where there are doubts as to their possible existence, but should not be insisted upon as indispensable in all cases; for then, this ascertainment of absence of vitiating conditions being dependent on determination of concomitance and that on previous ascertainment of absence of vitiating conditions, there would be infinite regress (*anavasthā*): *yā tu Paddhataḥ upādhi-niścayasya sahakāritvoktiḥ sā tu upādhi-śaṅkāsthābhiḥprāyā na tu sārva-trikābhiḥprāyā anyathā upādhy-abhāva-niścayasya vyāpti-sāpekṣa-tarkādāhātvenānavasthāpātāt. Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., p. 22).

² *Pramāṇa-paddhati*, pp. 31-5.

³ *vyabhicāra-jñāna-viraha-sahakṛtaṃ saha-cāra-darśanaṃ vyāpti-grāhakam. Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, p. 210. Legitimate doubts regarding invariable concomitance may be removed by *tarka*, as has already been described above.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, following the *Nyāya-sūdhā*, defines vitiating conditions (*upādhi*) as *sādhyā-vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhir iti*; and he objects to Udayana's definition of it as *sādhyā-sama-vyāptatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhiḥ* and also to Gaṅgeśa's definition of it as *parāvāsita-sādhyā-vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhiḥ*. But the purport aimed at by these various definitions is the same, as has been explained above. The distinctions are more verbal and scholastic than logical or philosophical; it will therefore be an unnecessary digression to enter into these. See the whole discussion on *upādhi* in Vyāsa-tīrtha's *Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., pp. 44-61).

Epistemological Process in Inference.

The Nyāya holds that, when a person acquainted with the relation of concomitance existing between smoke and fire sees smoke on a hill, he remembers the relation of concomitance (*vyāpti-smaraṇa*), that this smoke is invariably and unconditionally connected with fire¹; then the two ideas are connected, namely, that the smoke which has unconditional invariable relations with fire is in the hill. It is this third synthesis of knowledge that leads us to the inference of fire in the hill. Vyāsa-tīrtha, following the *Nyāya-sudhā*, argues that this view may be true in all those cases where a concomitance (*vyāpti*) is remembered on seeing the reason (*hetu*), but, where the concomitance is remembered without seeing the reason, the threefold synthesis cannot be admitted. Prabhākara, however, holds that all inference proceeds from two distinct propositions, and no synthesis is required. The two propositions are "smoke is pervaded by fire" and "the hill is smoky." Prabhākara holds that, since knowledge as formulated in the above two propositions must invariably and unconditionally precede all inference, there is no necessity for believing their synthesis to be the cause of inference, since no such synthesis really happens. Vyāsa-tīrtha, however, argues that such a synthesis is a real psychological state in inference and other mental operations, such as recognition, etc. Moreover, if the identity of the smoke (with which fire was found invariably present) with the smoke now perceived in the hill were not established by the synthesis of the two propositions, it would be a syllogism of four terms and hence invalid². Moreover, the movement of thought involved in inference requires such a synthesis, without which the two propositions would be unrelated and statical (*nirvyāpaka*) and no inference would follow.

Various Considerations regarding Inference.

Inference is of three kinds: (i) of cause from effect (*kāryānumāna*), as the inference of fire from smoke, (ii) of effect from cause (*kāraṇānumāna*), as the inference of rain from gathering

¹ *ayam dhūmo vahni-vyāpya* or *vahni-vyāpya-dhūmavān ayam iti*. Nyāya view.

² *evam ca kiñcit prameyaṃ vahni-vyāpyaṃ paravataś ca prameyavān iti jñāna-dvayam iva kaścid dharmo vahni-vyāpyaḥ parvataś ca dhūmavān iti viśa-bhūtaṃ paraspara-vartanābhijñān jñāna-dvayam api nānumiti-hetuḥ.*

Tarka-tāṇḍava (MS., p. 68).

clouds, (iii) inference of a different order from cause-effect types (*akārya-kāraṇānumāna*), as the inference of colour from taste (*rāse rūpasya*). From another point of view inference is of two kinds: (i) *dṛṣṭa*, where the inferred object is perceivable (*pratyakṣa-yogyā*), as of fire from smoke, and (ii) *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*, where it is not perceivable (*pratyakṣāyogyā*), as of the existence of the sense of vision from the perception of colours. This division of inference into *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa* may be made from another point of view. Thus, when an inference is made on the basis of the concomitance directly observed between two entities (e.g., fire and smoke), it is called *dṛṣṭa*; but, when an inference is made on the basis of similarity or analogy, it is called *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*, as the inference that, just as ploughing, etc., lead to the production of crops, so sacrifices also produce heavenly enjoyments, since they have this similarity that both are results of effort. Inference may again be considered as being of two kinds: (i) inference of one right knowledge from another right knowledge (*sādhānānumāna*), e.g., of fire from smoke, (ii) the inference of false knowledge (*dūṣaṇānumāna*), e.g., “this cannot prove its conclusion, since it is contradicted by experience.” Again, some hold that inference is of three kinds: (i) by absolute agreement in presence (where no case of absence is possible), (ii) by absolute absence (where no outside positive instance is possible), and (iii) by combination of agreement in presence and absence; in accordance with this it is *kevalānvayi* (impossible-negation), *kevala-vyatireki* (impossible-position) and *anvaya-vyatireki* (joint positive-negative). Thus the proposition “all objects of knowledge are expressible” is an example of the first type of inference, since no negative instance is possible of which we could say that this is not an object of knowledge and is not also expressible; the proposition “all living bodies are endowed with souls, since they have lives” is an example of inference of the second type. This can only be proved by an appeal to negative instances such as “all those who are not endowed with souls are not living”; for, since the proposition comprehends all positive instances, no positive instances apart from the proposition under consideration are available. The third type is the ordinary one of inference where concomitance is experienced through both positive and negative instances.

Inference is said again to be of two kinds: first *svārtha*, where the knowledge of the reason with its concomitance rises in one’s

own mind of itself, and secondly *parārtha*, where such a knowledge is for the instruction of others. As regards the constituent propositions (*avayava*) of inference, Vyāsa-tirtha discusses the ten-proposition view of older Nyāya writers (*jaraṇ-naiyāyika*), also the five-proposition view of the later Nyāya writers¹, the three-proposition view of the Mīmāṃsā, and also the two-proposition view of example and the application of reason (*udāharaṇopanayaṣ*) of the Buddhists. Vyāsa-tirtha urges that, since the value of these constituent propositions consists in reminding persons of a particular concomitance or in rousing an enquiry in those who did not know it before, there is necessity only for as many propositions as are necessary for the purpose, in accordance with the circumstances under which the inference is being made or the state of mind of the person who makes it—so that there may be cases where only the enunciating proposition, reason and example are necessary, there may be cases where only the enunciating proposition combined with the reason is necessary (*agni-vyāpta-dhūmavān parvato'gnimān iti hetu-garbha-pratijñā*), or, when in certain cases the discussion presupposes the enunciating proposition, only the reason may be necessary, and so on². So there is no fixed rule as to the number of constituent propositions necessary for inference; it all depends upon the nature of the case whether two, three or more propositions are necessary.

Both Jaya-tirtha and Vyāsa-tirtha devote a long discussion to the division of fallacies (*upapatti-doṣa*) and criticize the Nyāya division of the same; but, as these have but little philosophical bearing, I feel inclined to omit them³.

Testimony.

Madhva and his followers admitted only three kinds of means of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, and the testimony of the Vedas. All other kinds of means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) admitted in other systems, such as *arthāpatti*, *sambhava*, etc., are shown to be but modes of inference⁴. The Vedas are regarded as having by

¹ *jijñāsā-saṃśaya-śakya-prāptiḥ prayojana-saṃśayanirāsāḥ pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇopanaya-nigamanāni iti daśāvayavā iti jaraṇ-naiyāyikā āhuh. Tarka-tāṇḍava.*

² *vivādenaiva pratijñā-siddhau kutaḥ parvato'gnimān iti praśne agni-vyāpta-dhūmavattvād iti hetu-mātreṇa vā. Tarka-tāṇḍava (MS., p. 10).*

³ See *Pramāṇa-paddhati*, pp. 48–79; also *Tarka-tāṇḍava* (MS., pp. 114 et seq.).

⁴ *Pramāṇa-paddhati*, pp. 86–90.

themselves independent force of knowledge. They are uncreated (*apauruṣeya*) and eternal (*nitya*). They are valid means of knowledge, and yet, since their validity is not derived from the speech of any person, they must be regarded as uncreated¹. No attempt, however, was made to prove that the Vedas were valid means of knowledge; but, as their validity was not questioned by any of the Hindu schools, that was taken as accepted, and then it was argued that, since they were not uttered by anyone, they were uncreated and eternal. It was sought to establish this uncreatedness of the Vedas as against the Nyāya view that they were created by God (*Īśvara*). Vyāsa-tīrtha argues that it is better to accept the direct validity of the Vedas on the ground of their being uncreated, than to do it in an indirect way through the admission of an omniscient being as their author; for there is no certainty that even such authors would not try to deceive mankind by false statements. Buddha himself is an incarnation of God, and yet he deceived the people by false teachings. Tradition also does not ascribe any author to the Vedas. If they had been created, they would be of the same kind as the holy scriptures of the Buddhists or Jains. If the importance of scriptures were to be judged by the number of people who followed them, then the Mahomedan scriptures would have a superior place. God may be regarded as the great teacher of the Vedas, being the first person who uttered and taught them². He did not create them and He remembers them always; so that there is no chance of the Vedic order of words being destroyed. Ordinarily the claim of facts to validity is prior to that of the words which express them, and the latter depends on the former; but in the case of the Vedas the words and passages have a validity which is prior to facts and independent of them. The Madhva view thus combines the Nyāya and the Mimāṃsā views of the Vedas without agreeing with either.

¹ *pauruṣeya-śabdāpramāṇakatve sati sapramāṇakatvāt.*

Tarka-tāṇḍava (MS., p. 100).

² *īśvaro'pi hy asman-mate.... Veda-saṃpradāya-pravartakatvān mahopādhyāya eva. Ibid. p. 122.*

CHAPTER XXIX

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND THE MONISTS

Vyāsa-tīrtha, Madhusūdana and Rāmācārya on the Falsity of the World.

THE Vedāntists urge that the world-appearance is false. But before entering into any discussion about the nature of falsehood it is required that the Vedāntists should give a definition of falsehood. Five principal definitions have been adduced by the old Vedāntists; of these the first is that falsehood is that which is the absence of being as well as the absence of non-being (*sattvātyantā-bhāvattve sati asattvātyantatā-bhāvavattva-rūpaṃ viśiṣṭam*¹). But Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that, since one of these is the negation of the other, joint assertion of them both will be against the Law of excluded middle and therefore will be self-contradictory; the fact that both being and non-being may be admitted independently is no reason for their joint admission (e.g., the hare and horn both exist separately, but the hare's horn exists nowhere). To this the reply of Madhusūdana is that the Law of excluded middle does not apply to every case of the relation between being and non-being. Thus the false-appearances have being so far as they appear and non-being so far as they are non-existent; exclusion of being does not necessarily lead us to non-being, and *vice versa*. To this the retort given by the author of *Taraṅgiṇī* is that the Śāṅkarites themselves say that, if a thing has no being, it cannot appear, which shows that they themselves admit the Law of excluded middle, the force of which can never be denied, as Logic amply demonstrates in the examination of any and every specific relation of being and non-being.

The second definition of falsehood by the Śāṅkarites is that falsehood is that which can be denied at all times even where it appears to exist (*prati-pannopādhu traikālika-niṣedha-prati-yogitvam*). To this Vyāsa-tīrtha says that, if the denial is true, then this true thing would exist side by side with Brahman and thus the

¹ *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 22.

theory of extreme monism would break down (*niṣedhasya tatttrikātve advaita-hāniḥ*); if the denial is false or true only in a limited manner (*vyāvahārika*), then the world-appearance would become true. Again, what does the denial actually mean? These supposed appearances are said to be produced from a material cause, and they are perceived as existing at the time of perception; and, if it is held that even then they have no existence at all as such, then they must be absolutely without being, like the chimerical hare's horn. If it is held that the difference of the world-appearance from chimerical entities like the hare's horn, etc., is that they are absolutely indescribable, then the reply is that the very term "indescribable" describes their nature. Again, that which is absolutely non-existing cannot in any way appear in knowledge (*asataḥ a-pratītav*), and therefore it is not possible to make reference to it or to relate it in any way to anything else. The Śāṅkarites themselves hold that what is non-existing cannot appear in knowledge (*asac cet na pratīyeta*), and thus they themselves deny the possibility of any being-in-knowledge of that which is non-existing. Again, reality is not the same as mere appearance in knowledge, and consequently, if Brahman remained always uncontradicted in knowledge, its reality could not on that ground be affirmed. Again, it is not true that words denoting absolutely non-existing and chimerical things, such as the hare's horn, produce no knowledge; for they also produce some notion; the difference between ordinary illusions and the chimerical entities is this that, while the ground of the ordinary illusions is right and valid, chimerical entities have no ground at all. Therefore, since chimerical entities can also be made objects of awareness they appear in knowledge as non-existing. The Vedic text "non-being alone existed in the beginning" (*asad eva idam agre āsīt*) also testifies to the fact that "non-being" may appear as existent. Also non-being cannot be defined as that which is different from mere "being" (*sat*) and "the indescribable" (*a-nirvācya*); for the latter can only be understood through the concept of non-being and *vice versa*. Thus non-being may be defined as that which is different from that being which cannot at all times be denied at all places (*sārvatrika-traikālika-niṣedha-prati-yogitva-rūpa-sadanyasyaiva tattvāc ca*). If the indescribable (*a-nirvācya*) is defined as that which can be denied at all times, it is the same as non-being itself. Also non-being cannot be defined

as that which is incapable of fulfilling any practical purpose; for even the conch-shell-silver, which is admitted to be false, can serve to rouse an effort to grasp it in the deluded person and thus be considered to have some kind of practical efficiency, and the pure Brahman, which is regarded as ultimately real, is itself unable to serve any practical purpose of any kind. Again, falsehood or non-being cannot be defined as that which has no nature of its own; for, if that were so, then the denial of falsehood could not be said to be directed to its own nature as such; nor could the nature of falsehood be regarded as itself false, since such an interpretation would rest on a mere technical assumption of the meaning of falsehood, and it would not in the least clear the points at issue; for, if the nature of the so-called entity persisted in its own time and place, it would be meaningless to call such a nature false in itself. Such an assumption would also mean that no distinction is made between that which can serve practical efficiency and that which cannot; if that which persists in time and place and can serve a practical purpose could be called false, then there would be no difference between being and non-being, and the absence of the real could be said to be as much a cause of cloth as the thread itself. Thus absolute non-being may be defined as that which can always be denied in all places (*sarvatra traikālika-niṣedha-pratīyogitvam*). Also it cannot be held that "non-being" (*asat*) cannot be the object of an absolute denial simply because it is non-being, as is said in the *Nyāya-makaranda* of Ānandabodha; for, if an absolute denial cannot have any object, then the reason "because it is non-being" as adduced above would have no object itself and would therefore be inapplicable. Moreover, just as positive entities can be denied, so the specific negations referring to positive entities may also be denied and so lead on to their corresponding positive affirmations. Again, it is also agreed that specific positive entities come into being through the negation of their corresponding negations immediately prior to their coming into being (*prāg-abhāva*). This also proves that denial or negation does not necessarily require positive characters or entities for the operation and their function of negation. The whole upshot of this discussion is that, if falsehood means absolute denial of anything where it appears in knowledge, then the implication is that no reality can be affirmed; for what could be affirmed either as false or as true would only apply to

entities as they are known, and in that case even the reality of Brahman would be conditional, namely, so far as it is known. Again, absolute negation (*sarvatra traikālika-niṣedha-pratīyogitvaṃ*) cannot be distinguished from what is known as chimerical entities. And, if the world-appearance could be an object of absolute negation, its status would be no better than that of chimerical entities (e.g., the hare's horn).

In reply to the objections of Vyāsa-tīrtha against the definition of falsehood, that, if falsehood be real, then that implies dualism, and that, if falsehood is false, that implies re-affirmation of the world as real, Madhusūdana says that, since the denial is itself identical (so far as its ultimate ground is concerned) with Brahman, the reality of falsehood does not imply dualism; for the reality of the denial does not imply the reality of the phenomenon, denial of which has been denied by the denial of all phenomena. It has only so much reality as is implied in the ground of all phenomena, which is the Brahman. Again, the falsehood of the falsehood does not imply the affirmation of the reality of the world-appearance; for in the case of the conch-shell-silver, though it is known that not only was it false, but, since it is never existent, it never exists, and never will exist, and the attribution of falsity to it is also false, the conch-shell-silver is not for the matter of that re-affirmed as real. It is wrong to suppose that the falsity of the falsity or the denial of the denial is re-affirmation in all cases; it is only when the reality and the denial have the same status and identically the same scope that the denial of the denial means an affirmation; but, when the scope of their meaning varies, the denial of the denial does not imply an affirmation. It may further be pointed out that, when the denial of the denial is intended to re-affirm the positive entity, the denial of the denial leads to affirmation. But, when a denial denies both the positive entity and the denial (which is itself taken as an independent entity), the second denial does not lead to affirmation¹. The denial of the world-appearance is the denial of the reality of the very world-appearance as such (*svarūpeṇa*), like the denial of the conch-shell-silver. The fact that the world-appearance is

¹ *Tatra hi niṣedhasya niṣedhe pratīyogi-sattvaṃ āyāti, yatra niṣedhasya niṣedha-buddhyā pratīyogisattvaṃ vyavasthāpyate, na niṣedha-mātraṃ niṣedhyate, yathā rajate na idam rajatam iti jñānāntaram idam na arajatam iti jñānena rajatam vyavasthāpyate. yatra tu prati-yogi-niṣedhayor ubhayor api niṣedhas tatra na prati-yogi-sattvaṃ. Advaita-siddhi, pp. 105-6.*

believed to be a product of *ajñāna* does not in the least imply that its very nature cannot be false; for what is by its very nature false would be so, whether produced or not. The denial of the conch-shell-silver ("this is not silver") means that the conch-shell-silver is other than the real market-silver, i.e., the negation here is that of otherness (*anyo-anya-abhāva*). But, when it is said that "here is no silver," the negation is one of non-existence, and the falsity of the appearance is thereby definitely declared (*sā ca purovartti-rajatasyaiva vyāvahārikam atyanta-abhāvam viṣayīkaroti iti kantho-ktam eva mithyātvam*), whereas in the former case falsehood is only implied (*idaṃ śabda-nirdiṣṭe purovarti-prātītika-rajate rajata-śabda-nirdiṣṭa-vyāvahārika-rajata-anyonya-abhāva-pratiter ārthi-kaṃ mithyātvam*)¹. Now, if the world-appearance be denied ("there is no world-appearance here"), then, since there is no world-appearance anywhere else, the denial implies the absolute non-existence of the world-appearance, i.e., world-appearance is as non-existent as any chimerical entity, e.g., the hare's horn. The reply to such an objection, that there is a difference between the absolute negation of the world-experience as indescribable (*anirvācya*) and the absolute negation as chimerical (*tucca*), is that the latter has not even a seeming appearance anywhere, whereas the former appears as really existent until it is contradicted (*kvachid apy upādhanu sattvena pratīty-anarhatvam atyanta-asattvam yāvad bādham pratītyogyatvam prātītika-sattvam*). It must further be noted in this connection that the denial which leads to falsehood must have the same relation and the same extent and scope as the content which is being denied (*yena rūpeṇa yad-adhikaraṇatayā yat pratīpannam tena rūpeṇa tan-niṣṭha-atyanta-abhāva-pratīyogitvasya pratīpanna-padena sūcitatvāt; tac ca rūpaṃ āmbandha-viśeṣo'vacchedakaviśeṣaś ca*)². The Śāṅkarites, moreover, do not admit negation as a separate category, but consider the negation to be identical with the unqualified nature of the locus where the negation appears. Brahman has no qualities, and this does not therefore mean that it has a negative quality; for, there being more separate negations, the negation of all qualities simply means the pure nature of Brahman. The attribution of so-called positive qualities also as infinitude, etc., means the negation of the opposite qualities of falsehood and limitation, which ultimately

¹ *Advaita-siddhi*, pp. 130-1.² *Ibid.* p. 151.

implies a reversion to the pure nature of Brahman, etc. (*adhikaraṇa-atirikta-abhāva-abhyupagameṇa ukta-mithyātva-abhāva-rūpa-satyatvasya Brahma-svarūpa-virodhāt*)¹.

Ramācārya, in his *Taraṅgiṇī*, refuting the view of Madhusūdana, says that, excepting the case of the negation of the negation-prior-to-becoming (*prāg-abhāva*), the negation of negation means positing and therefore, since no third alternative is possible, the denial of the denial of an entity necessarily posits. Again, the assertion of Madhusūdana, that the illusion consists in the appearance of the illusory silver as the real silver of the market, is groundless; for the material cause that produced the illusory silver is different from the material cause of the silver of the market. The illusory silver ceases to exist only when there is true knowledge removing the ignorance which was the material cause of the illusory silver (*prātibhāsikasya svopādāna-jñāna-nivartaka jñāna-viśayeṇaiva vā tādātmya-pratīteṣā*): where the same material cause produces two different appearances (e.g., the cloth and the whiteness) they may be experienced as identical. But, when the material causes are entirely different, their products can never be experienced as identical². Again, it has been urged by Madhusūdana that the denial that constitutes falsehood must be qualified by the same conditions and relations whereby the positive entities were qualified; but this is unmeaning, for no amount of such conditioning can gainsay the truth that the negation of negations means position, until some definite proof of the existence of a third alternative escaping the sphere of the Law of Excluded Middle can be adduced³.

Vyāsa-tīrtha says that falsehood moreover cannot be defined as absolute denial of reality; for, unless the meaning of denial is understood, the meaning of reality cannot be comprehended and *vice versa*. The point at issue here is whether conch-silver is denied in its very nature as such or whether its reality is denied. The former alternative is denied on the ground that, if it were accepted, then it would be difficult to account for the awareness of the conch-silver as existing in front of the perceiver; for, if it was absolutely non-existent, it could not be directly perceived. But it may be pointed out with the same force that the second alternative is also unacceptable, because, when the conch-silver was perceived, it was

¹ *Ibid.* p. 156.

² *Nyāyāmrta-taraṅgiṇī*, p. 16(a).

³ *Taraṅgiṇī*, p. 20.

also perceived to be real, and, if that is so, how can that reality be denied? If in reply to this it is suggested that the reality of the conch-shell-silver is only a relative reality and not an absolute reality, then it may be pointed out that, if once a degree of reality be admitted, then infinite regress will follow; for one may as well ask whether the absolute reality is absolutely absolute or relatively absolute and so on. Again, falsehood is defined as that which is liable to be destroyed by knowledge in its function as knowledge. But Vyāsa-tīrtha does not tolerate such a position and says that knowledge of past events and things, even though false, ceases by itself without waiting to be destroyed by the so-called right knowledge; also it is not felt that the silver is destroyed by the knowledge of the conch-shell. It is further urged that right knowledge of the conch-shell also removes the error which, so far as it was an error, was true, and this shows that knowledge removes not only falsehood, but also true things, and on that account the definition in question cannot be a true definition of falsehood. Moreover, when an illusion is removed, the removal is not due to the function of cognition as such, but is by virtue of its perceptual immediacy (*āparokṣa-adhyāsam prati jñānasya-āparokṣatayā nivartakatvena jñānatvena anivartakatvāc ca*)¹. Again, if a falsehood is defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge which destroys the very material cause of the falsehood (*svopādāna ajñāna-nivartaka jñāna-nivartyatvam*), the objection will be that it does not apply to the beginningless illusion². It may similarly be held that the definition of falsehood as appearance in the place where it does not exist (*svātyanta-abhāva-adhikaraṇe eva pratīyamānatvam*) may also be refuted; for many objections occur, as has already been pointed out, according as we consider the negation to be relatively real or illusory. Again, if falsehood be defined as that which is different both from being and non-being, then, since it has already been pointed out that non-being means absolute denial, the appearances or illusions would be inexplicable. If it be defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge, then that can prove its momentary character, but not its false nature (*dhī-nāśyatve anityatā eva syāt na mṛṣātmatā*)³.

In reply to the objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha concerning the definition of falsehood as that which is liable to be destroyed by know-

¹ *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 39(b).

² *Ibid.* p. 40.

³ *Ibid.* p. 41.

ledge, Madhusūdana says that the real meaning of the definition is that the entity which is destroyed, both in its causal aspect and the aspect as effect, on account of the rise of knowledge is false. The jug though destroyed as effect by the stroke of the club is not destroyed in its causal aspect as the earthy pot. The hare's horn does not exist at all: so its non-existence is not due to knowledge. Again, since the conch-shell-silver appears in consciousness and is destroyed immediately after the rise of true knowledge, its dissolution must be due to knowledge. Also it is not wrong to say that falsehood is negated by knowledge in its function as knowledge; for the later knowledge does not negate the prior knowledge by its function as knowledge, but merely on account of its posteriority; and therefore the definition of falsehood as that which can be negated by knowledge only in its function as knowledge clearly keeps aloof the case of the negation of the prior knowledge by the later, to which it was supposed that the above definition of falsehood could wrongly be extended. It is well, however, to point out that falsehood is negated by knowledge not in an indirect manner, but directly and immediately (*vastutas tu sākṣātkāratvena jñāna-nivartyatvaṃ vivakṣitam*)¹.

To this Rāmācārya replies that it is Madhusūdana who says that the definition of falsehood as that which can be negated by knowledge means the general absence of an entity through the rise of knowledge (*jñāna-prayukta-avasthiti-sāmānya-viraha-pratīyogitvaṃ jñāna-nivartyatvaṃ* (see *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 168, and *Taraṅgiṇī*, p. 22)². It may be asked whether the word "generally" (*sāmānya*) or the negation is qualified by the existence (*avasthityā sāmānyaṃ vā viśiṣyate viraho vā*). The first alternative would mean the negation of the cause of an entity through the rise of knowledge; for the word *avasthiti-sāmānya* means cause. But in that case there would be an illicit extension of the definition of falsehood to the negation of the prior knowledge by the posterior knowledge; for the posterior knowledge destroys the cause of the persistence of the prior knowledge, and it would not apply to the beginningless *avidyā*. In the second alternative, i.e., if the word *sāmānya* is

¹ *jñānatva-vyāpya-dharmeṇa jñānanivartyatvaṃ ityapi sādhu, uttarajñānasya pūrva-jñāna-nivartakatvaṃ na jñānatvavyāpyadharmeṇa kintu icchādi-sādhāraṇenodīcātmaviśeṣaḥ* *uḍīcyatvena uḍīcyatvena veti na siddha-sādhanaḍi*.

Advaita-siddhi, pp. 171-2.

² *Ibid.* p. 178.

qualified by the negation, then it may be pointed out that the Śāṅkarite never admits a general negation as distinguished from the negation of any special entity. Moreover, since the conch-shell-silver is denied in its very nature as false, it cannot be said that its general absence (that is, both as cause and effect) was due to the rise of knowledge; for it is not admitted to be existent at any time¹. Again, as it has been shown by Vyāsa-tīrtha that there ought not to be any difference between the non-existence of the conch-shell-silver and that of the hare's horn, the non-existence of the hare's horn might equally be said to be due to knowledge, if the non-existence of the conch-shell-silver be said to be due to the rise of knowledge.

In supporting the fourth definition of falsehood as "appearance in the locus of its own absence" (*svātyanta-abhāva-adhikaraṇe eva pratiyamānatvaṃ*) or as the "absence in the locus of its own existence" (*svāśraya miṣṭha-atyanta-abhāva-pratīyogitvaṃ*), Madhusūdana says that, since an entity may be both present and absent in one identical time, so it may be both present and absent in one identical space. To this Rāmācārya replies that, if this is admitted, then there is no difference between existence and non-existence, and ordinary experience is inexplicable (*tathā sati bhāvābhāvayor ucchinmakathā syāt iti vyāvahārikyapi vyavasthā na syāt*); consequently dualism and its negation, monism, would be the same, and the monistic knowledge would be unable to dispel the dualistic consciousness.

In support of the fifth definition of falsehood as difference from the real (*sad-viviktatvaṃ mithyātvaṃ*) Madhusūdana defines existence of reality as that which is established by knowledge and not invalidated by defects. The definition of existence is further modified by him as that which appears as existent through proofs not invalidated by defects. By this qualification he excludes chimerical entities and Brahman; for chimerical entities do not appear as existent, and Brahman, though it exists in itself, is never an object to any mind to which it appears as existent (*satvā-prakāra-pratīti-viśayatābhāvāt*).

The existent is defined as that which is established by proof (*pramāṇa-siddha*), and this is again as that which is uncontradicted.

¹ *śukti-rajatāder-avasthity-aṅgikāre svarūpeṇa niṣedhokty-ayogaś-ca.*

Taraṅgiṃ, p. 22.

To this it is objected by Rāmācārya that Brahman is not the object of any proofs, whereas the world, which is established by all proofs, is ultimately contradicted¹.

The question is raised by Vyāsa-tīrtha whether falsehood itself is contradicted or uncontradicted. If it is uncontradicted, then falsehood becomes real, and the doctrine of monism fails. If it is urged in reply that falsehood is identical with the ground of illusion, the Brahman, then the meaning of the phrase "world-appearance is false" (*prapañco mithyā*) is that the world-appearance is identical with Brahman (*mithyā* being identical with Brahman), and this is not disputed by us; for Brahman, being all-pervasive, is in a sense identical with the world-appearance. Moreover, if falsehood be identical with Brahman, the general argument that those things alone are false which are cognizable would be faulty, because falsity, being identical with Brahman, would itself be uncognizable. If falsehood be contradicted, then it is self-false (*bādhya*), and the world would become real. Even if it is again urged that falsehood is not identical with Brahman, but is one with the reality of Brahman as underlying the second denial or the falsehood of the falsehood, to this the reply would be that our very inquiry centres round the question whether the second denial is itself contradicted or uncontradicted, and it is well known that, since the underlying reality is everywhere pure consciousness, the underlying reality of the second falsehood has no separate or independent existence regarding which any affirmation could be made. It is clear that, if in the first case the assertion of falsehood being identical with Brahman be meaningless, the attempt at an extension by making it identical with the pure consciousness underlying the second denial does not in reality lead to any new meaning. If it is again urged that, since the conch-shell-silver is false, the falsehood which is a quality of this conch-shell-silver is necessarily false; if the substance is false, its quality is necessarily false, and therefore the falsehood of this falsehood does not reaffirm the reality of the conch-shell-silver. Since both the falsehoods are based on the falsehood of the substance to which they are attributively associated the negation of negation does not mean a position. The negation of a negation can mean a position only if the substance be real. But this is clearly a confusion; for the absence of qualities follows on the

¹ *Taraṅgiṇī*, p. 23.

absence of the substance only when such qualities are dependent on the nature of the substance; but falsehood is not so, since it is naturally opposed to that to which it refers¹. Moreover, if the falsehood of the conch-shell-silver becomes false merely because it is associated with the illusory silver, though it is affirmed by an experience of contradiction, then it might equally well be real because of its ultimate association with Brahman, the ground reality of all things; or on the other hand the conch-shell might equally well be false because of its association with the illusory silver, and the non-existent would also be existent because of its association with existence, and *vice versa*². Moreover, the conch-shell-silver is not regarded by the Śāṅkarites as absolutely non-existent, like the chimerical hare's horn, and therefore falsehood cannot be considered to be so on account of its association therewith. Again, the argument that falsehood has not the same status of existence as the world-appearance to which it refers and therefore the assertion of falsehood does not hurt extreme monism, is wrong: for, if falsehood has only a relative existence (*vyāvahārikṭve*), the world of our daily experience, which is opposed to it and which is attested by perception, ought to be regarded as ultimately real. Thus our former objection remains valid, that, if falsehood be uncontradicted, the doctrine of monism fails and, if contradicted, the world would be real³.

Madhusūdana has the former reply to the above objection that, when the position and negation have a different order of being, the negation of the negation does not imply affirmation. If the negation refers to a relative existence, then such negation does not take away the assertion of a fanciful existence⁴. Thus an entity may be in different senses both true and false. Madhusūdana further says that, when the denial is due to a specific quality, then the negation of negation cannot be an affirmation. Here both the conch-shell and its quality are denied on account of their common

¹ *dharmy-asattve dharmāsattvaṃ tu dharmi-sattvāsāpekṣa-dharma-viśayam; mithyātvaṃ tu tat-pratikūlam. Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.* p. 45.

³ *mithyātvaṃ yady abādhyam syāt syad advaita-mata-kṣatiḥ mithyātvaṃ yadi bādhyam syāt jagat-satyatvaṃ āpatet.*

Ibid. p. 47.

⁴ *paraśpara-viraha-rūpatve'pi viśama-satvākayor avirodhāt vyāvahārika-mithyātvena vyāvahārika-satyatvāpahāre'pi kālpanika-satyatvānapahārāt.*

Advaita-siddhi, p. 217.

attribute of plausibility. Thus it may be said with impunity that both the horse and the cow may be denied in an elephant¹.

To this Rāmācārya's reply is that existence and non-existence naturally exclude each other, and their denial is therefore not due to any other specific property. That existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive is acknowledged even by the Śāṅkarites when they speak of *māyā* as being different both from existence and non-existence².

An important argument establishing the falsity of the world rests upon the fact that the world is cognizable; all that is cognizable is false, like dream experiences. At this point Vyāsa-tīrtha seeks to analyse what may be meant by the word cognizable. Several alternative meanings are offered, of which the first is termed *ṛtti-vyāpyatva*, i.e., that which is a content of a mental state. The Śāṅkarites are thus supposed to say that all that can be a content of a mental state is false. To this Vyāsa-tīrtha's reply is that Brahman and the self must also be the content of at least some kind of mental state, and therefore, if the thesis of the Śāṅkarites be accepted, Brahman also would be false. If it is said that Brahman in its purity can never be the object of any mental state, and it can be so only when it is associated with *ajñāna*, to this the reply is that, if Brahman in its purity cannot manifest itself in awareness, it can never establish itself, and such a theory directly militates against the self-revealing nature of Brahman. Again, it is urged that, though Brahman is self-revealing, yet it cannot be the content of any mental state; for the very expression "Brahman is pure and self-revealing" would make it the content of that verbal cognition; if the expression carries no sense, then there is no meaning in it. Moreover, if Brahman as associated with *ajñāna* be admitted to be the content of a mental state, it would through such an association be a constituent of that mental content and therefore a content in itself. It cannot, moreover, be said that the objection cannot apply to Brahman because Brahman can be a content only in association and not in its nature; for, since the same conditions apply to eternal and transcendental entities of an indeterminate character which

¹ *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 213.

² *na tāvat paraṣpara-vīraharūpayor ekaṁśedhyatā-avacchedakāvachimmatvaṁ sambhavati tvayāpi satyatvamithyātvaayoḥ paraṣpara-samuccaye virodhāt bibhyatā sad-asad-vailakṣaṇyasārūpye'ṅgikārācca. Taraṅgiṇī*, p. 26.

cannot be contents of consciousness in themselves, but only in later associated forms, Brahman would not be false on that account. Again, it is wrong to suppose that, when an object is known, the content of that mental state has the same form as the object of awareness; for we may know a hare's horn through a verbal cognition without assuming that the mental state has the same form as a hare's horn. The assumption therefore that the content of awareness must have the same form as its object is wholly invalid. It is clearly found to be so in the case of Brahma-knowledge; for no awareness can have an infinitude as its content. So to say that an awareness has content as an object simply means that it refers thereto (*tad-viṣayatvam eva tad-ākāratvam*)¹. Since this is so, the condition of perception that pure consciousness must be reflected in the mental state in superimposition upon the physical object is wholly unnecessary. Thus the objection, that all that is cognizable is on that account false, is invalid.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the pure consciousness, which is always self-revealing, is never the content of any awareness. It only appears to be so in association with the *ajñāna* modifications which alone can become the content of knowledge. Thus in all circumstances the pure consciousness is self-revealing and it can never be the content of itself. Madhusūdana would admit all the suggested interpretations of cognizability offered by Vyāsa-tīrtha, excepting the second (*phala-vyāpyatva*)²; he, however, admits that a stricter criticism would require the definition to be slightly modified by excluding cognizability through verbal cognition (*vastutas tu śābdājanya-vṛtti-viṣayatvam eva dṛśyatvam*); in this way, though one may be aware of chimerical entities through verbal propositions, they would not on that account be called false; for they are absolutely non-existent entities, which cannot be called either false or true³. Madhusūdana further interprets cognizability as that which has a definite formal content (*sva-prakāra-ka-vṛtti-viṣayatvam eva dṛśyatvam*). By the term "formal" (*sva-prakāra-ka*)

¹ *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 57.

² The suggested interpretations of cognizability (*dṛśyatva*) as given by Vyāsa-tīrtha are of seven kinds: *kim idaṁ dṛśyatvam; vṛtti-vyāpyatvam vā; phala-vyāpyatvam vā; sādharmaṇam vā; kadācid-kathamcid-viṣayatvam vā; svavyavahāre svātirikta-saṁvid-antarāpekṣā-mīyatir vā; a-sva-prakāśatvam vā*. *Ibid.* p. 49.

³ *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 268.

he means any describable characteristic (*sopākhyaḥ kaścid dharmah*) and thereby excludes Brahman, which means purity having no describable characteristic: on the other hand, even the cognition of negations may be described as having the character of negativity. The effect of this interpretation is that cognizability is limited to all that comes within the purview of relative and pragmatic experience. In attempting to clear the meaning of cognizability Madhusūdana defines it as that which is somehow in relation with pure consciousness (*cid-viśayatva*). This, being identical with self, is devoid of any such two-term relation. In the attempt to classify the meaning further, cognizability of things is defined as dependence for revelation on an alien consciousness (*sva-vyavahāre svātirikta-samvid-apekṣā-niyati-rūpaṃ dṛśyatvaṃ*) or as the character of being other than the self-revealing (*a-sva-prakāśatva-rūpatvaṃ dṛśyatvaṃ*). It is clear therefore that anything other than pure consciousness depends on pure consciousness for revelation.

Rāmācārya, in attempting to refute Madhusūdana, says that merely from the knowledge of the concomitance of impurity (*aśuddhatva*) and dependent revelation (*a-sva-prakāśatva*) one cannot say that pure consciousness is self-revealed; but such a conclusion can be arrived at only when it is known that pure consciousness has no impurity in it. Again, the concomitance of dependent revelation and impurity can be known only when their opposites, "purity" and "self-revealingness," are known to coexist with pure consciousness; thus the knowledge of concomitance of pure consciousness with self-revealingness and that of impure consciousness with dependent revelation are mutually independent. There is therefore no way in which it can be asserted that only pure consciousness is self-revealing¹. The other reason adduced for falsehood is that the world-appearance is false because it is material. Now what is this materiality? Its character is given as "non-knower" (*ajñātṛtva*), "ignorance" (*ajñānatva*), as "non-self-revealing" (*a-sva-prakāśatva*), or "non-self." If the first meaning of materiality be accepted, then it may be pointed out that according

¹ na tāvad a-sva-prakāśatvāśuddhatvayor vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva-grahamā-trena śuddhe sva-prakāśatā paryavasyati kintu śuddhe asva-prakāśatva-vyāpakasya aśuddhatvasya vyāvṛttāu jñātāyām eva. tathā ca vyāpaka-vyatireka-grahārtham avaiyam śuddha-jñānam. kimcāsva-prakāśatvāśuddhatvayor vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva-graho'pi tadubhayavyatirekayoḥ śuddhatva-svaprakāśatvayor śuddhe saha-cāra-grahe saty eveti ghaṭṭa-kūṭi-prabhāta-ṛttāntaḥ. Taraṅgiṇī, p. 31.

to the Śāṅkarites the ego is false, and yet it is the knower; the pure consciousness, which according to the Śāṅkarites is the only reality, is not itself the knower. If it is suggested that pure consciousness may be regarded as the knower through false assumption, then it may well be said that false assumption would validate any false reasoning, and that would be of no avail. Even the body appears as the knower when one says, "I, the white man, know," yet on that account the body cannot be regarded as the knower. The second interpretation, which defines materiality as ignorance (*ajñāna*), cannot be held; for phenomenal knowledge is partly true and partly false. Again, it may in this connection be asked whether the knowledge of the self (*ātman*) has any content or not. If it has, then that content must necessarily be the object of a cognizing activity, and it is impossible that the cognizing activity of the self should direct its activity towards the self. If it is urged in reply that the self has no activity to be directed to itself, but the fact that it is distinguished as self is its cognition of itself, the obvious reply to this is that the cognition of all things is nothing more than the fact that they are distinguished in their specific characters. If again the knowledge of the self has no content, then it is no knowledge at all. If any knowledge be admitted which does not illuminate any object, then even a jug can be called knowledge. Therefore, if materiality be defined as *ajñāna* or ignorance, then even the self would for the above reasons be *ajñāna*. In this connection it may well be remembered that knowledge requires both the object and the knower: there cannot be any experience without the experiencer and the thing experienced. Again, if the self be regarded as mere knowledge, it may well be asked whether that knowledge is right knowledge or illusion. If the former, then, since the modifications of the *avidyā* are known by the self, these would be true. It cannot be the latter, because there is no defect associated with the self. Neither can the self be regarded as bliss: for the phenomenal enjoyment of worldly objects is not admitted as bliss, and there is no way in which the degrees of pleasure or bliss which may lead ultimately to the highest bliss can be admitted; for, once a degree of pleasure is admitted, an extraneous element naturally creeps in. Thus falsity of the world on the ground that it is material is unacceptable in any sense of the term¹.

¹ This argument that the world is false on account of its materiality is adduced in the *Tattva-sūddhi*.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the second and third interpretations of materiality, i.e., that which is ignorance is material or that which is non-self is material, would be quite suitable. In finding fault with Vyāsa-tīrtha's exposition of knowledge Madhusūdana says that, if knowledge be defined as that which illuminates an object, then even during emancipation objects would be illuminated, which is impossible; the relation of knowledge to objects is extraneous and therefore illusory. If it is objected that, if no objects are revealed during release, then even bliss is not revealed, and in that case no one would care to attain release, the reply is that the emancipated state is itself bliss and there is no separate manifestation of bliss as obtainable therein. The association of an object is perceivable only in sense-knowledge; in the knowledge of the self there is no association with the senses, and it is unreasonable to demand that even then objects should be manifested in knowledge. When it is said that self is of the nature of immediate knowledge, the suggestion that then it must be either valid or erroneous is unacceptable. For the exclusive classification of knowledge as valid or invalid applies to ordinary experienced knowledge. But the self as knowledge is like the indeterminate knowledge that is neither valid nor invalid.

Rāmācārya, however, says that, if the association of knowledge with objects be extraneous, then at the time of the dawn of ultimate knowledge the self should not be regarded as its object. If it is said that this is only so in the case of perceptual knowledge, where pure consciousness is reflected through the *vr̥tti* of the form of the object, then the connection of the knowledge with the object would be false; for in that case the necessity of *vr̥tti* and the reflection of consciousness through it would have to be admitted at the dawn of the knowledge of the self in the ultimate stage. The relation of the object to knowledge therefore cannot be extraneous and therefore false. In reply to Madhusūdana's statement that, just as according to the Naiyāyikas, though universals and individuals are mutually correlated, yet in the state of ultimate dissolution the universals remain even though there are no individuals, so there may be a state where there is knowledge, but no object; for the sphere of knowledge is wider than that of knowledge with objects. Rāmācārya says that even in the state of *pralaya*, where there is no individual, the knowledge of the universals has the individuals within it as its constituents. Again, the association of objects with

knowledge does not mean that the objects produce knowledge, but that knowledge is associated with the objects. Again, if the association with the object be regarded as meaning "necessarily produced by objects," or if it necessarily means "in whichever place or at whichever time this object exists there is knowledge," then the Śāṅkarites would not be able to affirm the unity of the soul. For, since the unity exists in Brahman, it could not be generated by the individual soul. And again, if it is affirmed that, whenever there is unity with Brahman, there is unity with the soul, then, since the Brahman is always one, all individual souls will be emancipated; it will also be impossible to determine the unity of individual souls and the unity of Brahman. So the objects do not generate the determinate knowledge, but are associated with it.

It is argued that whatever is limited and finite is false; now this limitation may be by time or space or by other entities (*paricchinatvam aṇi deśataḥ kālato vastuto vā*). Now as to this Vyāsa-tīrtha says that time and space cannot be limited by time and space and this is so much the case that even the supreme reality, the Brahman, is often spoken of as existing always and everywhere; time and space are thus universal characteristics and cannot be denied of others or of themselves. Thus the observation of Vācaspati, that whatever does not exist in some places and in some time is on that account absent everywhere and always, and that what is existent must always and everywhere be so (*yat sat tat sadā sarvatra sad eva...tathā ca yat kadācit kutracid asat tat sadā sarvatra asadeva*), is wholly invalid; for, if by non-existence at some particular time existence at any other time can be invalidated, then by existence at that time non-existence at other times may also be invalidated. It is as good logic to say that, because it will not exist then, therefore it does not exist now, as to say that, because it exists now, it must exist then¹. Again, what is meant by spatial limitation? If it means non-association with all bodies (*sarva-mūrttāsamyoḡitvam*) or the non-possession of the supreme measure (*parama-mahat-parimāṇānadhikaraṇatvam*), then even Brahman is so; for He is untouchable (*asaṅga*) and He has no measure as His quality; if it means possession of limited measure (*parimāṇa*), then *parimāṇa* or "measure," being a quality, cannot belong to a quality; so qualities would not be limited (*guṇa-karmāḍau guṇānaṅgikārāt*). Again,

¹ *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 79.

temporal limitation cannot be associated with negation as "otherness"; for, if the limitation as otherness be denied at any time, then all things in the world would be one. Now limitation by other entities (which is the third definition of limitation) means "difference" (*bhinnatva*); but such a limitation (according to the Śāṅkarites) is absent in the world of everyday experience; for they deny the reality of difference. Again, difference from falsehood exists also in the self: therefore the argument of Ānandabodha, that whatever things exist divided (*vibhaktatvāt*) are on that account false, is invalid. It is, again, wrong to suppose that the unlimited nature of being consists in the fact that it alone remains universal, whereas everything else changes and must therefore be considered to be imposed upon it, since, when we say "a jug exists," "a jug moves," the jug seems to remain unchanged, while its verb changes, as "exists" and "moves." As "many" is associated with "one," so "one" also is associated with "many"; so nothing can be made of the argument that what remains constant is unlimited and valid and what is changeful is false.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that, since the Śāṅkarites do not admit universals, it is wrong to suppose that in all cases of the existence of a cow there is something like the cow-universal which persists, and, if that is not so, then the only other explanation is that it is the individuals that come and go and are imposed upon the persistent experience of being, which alone is therefore real. Now, again, it may be argued, the Brahman, as being, is always covered by *ajñāna*; it has no distinguishable form, and so it is wrong to think that Brahman is manifested as being in our experience of the world-objects. To this the reply is that Brahman is itself not covered by *ajñāna* (*sad-ātmanā na brahmaṇo mūlājñānenā-vṛtatvaṃ*): it is only by the limitations of the specific forms of world-objects that its nature is hidden; when the obstacles of these specific forms are broken by the function of the *vṛtti* modification of the mind, the Brahman underlying these objects manifests itself as pure being. It cannot be objected that Brahman, as such a pure being, has no visual characteristics and therefore cannot be perceived by the eye; for Brahman is not perceivable by any of the senses or by any specific sense¹.

¹ *na ca rūpādi-hīnatayā cākṣuṣatvādy-anupapattiḥ bādhikā iti vācyaṃ, pratīyatendriya-grāhyeṣv eva rūpādy-apekṣā-niyamāt sarvendriya-grāhyam tu sad-rūpam brahma nāto rūpādi-hīnatve'pi cākṣuṣatvādy anupapattiḥ sattvāyāḥ parair api sarvendriya-grāhyatva-ābhīyupagamāt ca. Advaita-siddhi, p. 318.*

Rāmācārya in reply says that the universal (as "cow") has to be accepted; for otherwise how can the so-called universal as being be sometimes manifested as cow and at other times as other objects? Again, it is wrong to say that Brahman is not in itself covered by the *avidyā*; for it is said that, even when the being-aspect is revealed, the aspect as bliss may still remain covered; then, since being and bliss must be one (for otherwise the monism would fail), the veil must also be over the being-aspect as well. Again, as Brahman has no form and no characteristic, it cannot be said to be grasped by all the senses (*atyantam avyakta-svabhāvasya brahmanaś caṅśur-ādi-sarvendriyagrāhyatve mānābhāvāt*)¹.

The argument that falsehood consists in the non-existence of the whole in the parts is attacked by Vyāsa-tīrtha. He says that, so far as concerns the view that, because part and whole are identical, therefore the whole cannot be dependent on the part, he has no objection. If the whole is not dependent upon anything else and not on its parts either, then it may not be dependent on anything at all; but it cannot on that account be called false. But it may be pointed out that perception shows that the whole *is* dependent on the parts and rests in them, and therefore on the evidence of perception its non-existence in the parts cannot be admitted. The question arises whether "non-existence" or "negation" is valid or invalid: if it is valid, then monism breaks down, and, if it is invalid, then non-existence is denied, which will be in favour of Vyāsa-tīrtha. Now it cannot be urged that the existence of negation cannot be fatal to monism: for negation includes position as a constituent. Again, Brahman is denoted by the term *advitiya* ("devoid of any second"); this involves a negation, and, if negation is invalid, then its demolition of Brahman will also be invalid. Further, the denial of a second to Brahman may mean a denial not only of positive entities, but of negative entities also; positivity itself means the negative of the negative. Also, if negation is admitted, then, since one of its forms is "otherness," its admission means the admission of otherness and hence of duality. Moreover, it would be difficult for the Śāṅkarites to describe the nature of negation; for, if no positive entities can be described, it goes without saying that it will be still more difficult to describe negative entities. Moreover, not only is the non-existence of the whole in

¹ *Taraṅgiṇī*, p. 52.

the parts contradicted by perceptual experience, but it is opposed to reason also; for, since the whole cannot be subsistent anywhere else, if it is not admitted to be subsistent in the parts, its very nature is inexplicable (*anyāsamavetasyāṃśītvam etat-tantu-samavetatvam vinā na yuktam*)¹.

Again, the view that, since without knowledge nothing is revealed, the so-called things are nothing but knowledge, is wrong; for the things are experienced not as being themselves knowledge, but as those things of which we have knowledge (*ghaṭasya jñānam iti hi dhīḥ na tu ghaṭo jñānam iti*).

In reply to the above Madhusūdana says that, since the experience of cause and effect cannot be explained without assuming some difference between them, such a difference must be admitted for practical purposes, in spite of the fact that they are identical. Discussion regarding the validity or invalidity of negation is brushed aside by Madhusūdana as being out of place. Again, the opposition of perception is no objection; for perception is often illusory. Also, the objection that, if the whole, which is not elsewhere, is also not in the parts, its existence is inexplicable, is invalid; for, though the whole may not exist in the parts as an independent entity, it may still be there as identical with the material cause, the parts; for being materially identical (*etat-samavetatva*) with anything does not necessarily follow from a denial of its negation therein; for, if it were so, then all such qualities as are devoid of negative instances (being on that account present in it) would be materially identical with the thing². But what really determines a thing's material identity with another thing is that the former's negation-prior-to-existence (*prāg-abhāva*) must be in it (*kintu etan-niṣṭha-prāg-abhāva-pratīyogitvād aikyam*). The objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha, that a cloth can have its negation in threads only when such threads are not its constituent parts, is invalid, for the very reason that what determines material identity is the existence of the prior-to-existence negation (*prāg-abhāva-pratīyogitva*) of the whole in the part or of the effect in the cause, and therefore it is not proper to say that a cloth can non-exist only in such threads as are not

¹ *tathā ca aṃśītvā-rūpa-hetor etat-tantu-niṣṭhātyantābhāva-pratīyogitva-rūpa-sādhyena virodhaḥ. Nyāyāmṛta-prakāśa, p. 86.*

² *etan-niṣṭhātyantābhāva-pratīyogitvam hi etatsamavetatve prayojakam na bhavati, paramate kevalānvayi-dharma-mātrasya etatsamavetatvāpatteḥ.*

constituents of it: for the condition of the non-existence of the cloth in the threads is not the fact of the threads not being a constituent of the cloth, but the absence of the prior-to-existence negation of the cloth in the threads.

An objection is urged by Vyāsa-tīrtha that for the self-same reasons on account of which the world is called false Brahman as well may be regarded as false; for Brahman is the substratum of all our experience and therefore may be regarded as false. As to this Madhusūdana says that, so far as Brahman is associated with *ajñāna*, it is false, but, so far as it is beyond our practical experience, it is real. Moreover, if no ground-reality be admitted, then, the whole world-appearance being an illusion, we shall be landed in pure nihilism. Again, the objection that Brahman, being different from non-existent entity, is like the conch-shell-silver, which also, though not real, is different from non-existent entity, cannot be maintained. For difference from non-existent entity is difference from that which cannot appear anywhere as existent, and that alone is different from it which appears somewhere as an existent entity; but this cannot apply to Brahman, since pure Brahman does not appear anywhere as an existent entity.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, after adopting a number of tentative definitions of being, finds fault with them all, and says that, in whatever way being may be defined by the Śāṅkarites, that would be applicable in the same manner to the being of the world. Briefly speaking, the definition of being comes to be "that which at all times and in all places cannot be denied" (*sarva-deśa-kāla-sambandhi-niṣedha-pratīyogitvam sattvam*). It may also be defined as that which, being different from non-being, is not a false imposition, or as that which at some time or other is directly and rightly felt as existing (*astitva-prakāra-pramāṇam prati kadācid sākṣād-viśayatvam*).

In reply to the above attempt at a definition of being by Vyāsa-tīrtha, Madhusūdana says that our perceptual experience is absolutely illegitimate in discerning truth as distinguished from falsehood or as opposed to it¹. Truth and falsehood being mutually related, all attempts at defining them by mutual opposition become circular, and therefore illegitimate; definitions of being which refer in some way or other to the experience of being as such are also

¹ *caṅkṣurādy-adhyakṣa-yogya-mithyātva-virodhi-satvānirukteḥ.*

Advaita-siddhi, pp. 333-4.

false, as they involve the very concept of being which is to be defined. It is also wrong to say that the world has as much reality of the same order as that of Brahman; for falsehood and reality cannot have the same order of being. The being of Brahman is of the nature of one pure luminous consciousness, and it is clear that the material world cannot have that order of being. Now falsehood is defined as non-existence at all times and places (*sarva-deśiya-traikālika-niṣedha-pratīyogitvam*); reality is its opposite. Sense-perception can never bring to us such a negation, and therefore it also cannot bring to us the opposite of negation, i.e., reality. The fact that some things are perceived to exist somewhere at some time is irrelevant; for even a false appearance may have such a temporary perceptual existence. There is a Nyāya view to the effect that there is a special mode of presentation of universals (*sāmānya-pratyāsatti*), by which all the individuals that come under such universals are presented in consciousness, and that it is by this means alone that inductive generalization leading to deductive inference is possible. On this view the contention is that, though all negations of an entity at all times and places may not be visually perceived, they may be presented to consciousness by the above means of presentation, and, if they are thus presented to consciousness, their negation, viz., the reality, may also be perceived.

Madhusūdana's reply to this is, that there is no such special mode of presentation of universals by which all the individuals associated with them are also present in consciousness, i.e., there is no such *sāmānya-pratyāsatti* as is admitted by the Nyāyāyikas. He then indulges in a polemic against such a *sāmānya-pratyāsatti* and tries to show that deductive inferences are possible through the association of the special characteristics of the universals as determining the concomitance¹; thus, if there is no *sāmānya-pratyāsatti* and if all the negations at all times and places cannot be presented to consciousness, their opposite, reality, cannot be perceived either.

The reply of Rāmācārya is that, though such negations at all times and all places may not be perceived by the senses, yet there

¹ *vyāpti-smṛti-prakāreṇa vā pakṣadharmatā-jñānasya hetutā; mahānastyā eva dhūmo dhūmatvena vyāpti-smṛti-viśayo bhavati, dhūmatvena parvatīya-dhūma-jñānaṃ cāpi jātam, tac ca sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṃ vinaiva; tāvataiva anumiti-siddheḥ; ...pratīyogitāvaccchedaka-prakāraka-jñānād eva tat-sambhavana tad-arthaṃ sakala-pratīyogi-jñāna-janikāyāḥ sāmānya-pratyāsattya anupayogāt.*

is no reason why their opposite, reality, cannot be perceived; when one sees a jug, one feels that it is there and nowhere else. One perceives the objects negated and not the negation itself¹. He further says that, though *sāmānya-pratyāsatti* may not be admitted, yet the unperceived negations may be known by inference, and thus the objection of Madhusūdana that, unless *sāmānya-pratyāsatti* is admitted, such negations cannot be known and their opposite, reality, cannot be perceived either, is doubly invalid².

Madhusūdana further says that the testimony of the testifying consciousness (*sākṣī*) in experience reveals only present entities, and in that way the world-objects are relatively real. But the testifying consciousness cannot in any way show whether they will be contradicted in future or not; the testifying consciousness is thus incapable of defying a future denial of world-experience, when the Brahma-knowledge is attained.

Vyāsa-tīrtha had objected to the Vedānta thesis that there is one Being, self-identical with pure consciousness, on which all the so-called forms of object and content of knowledge are imposed, pointing out that the mere fact that one experiences that a jug exists does not prove that the jug is imposed upon the pure being; for pure existence can never be perceived and all the characteristics, including false appearances, may also be considered to have the same existential character as existence itself.

Madhusūdana's simple reply is that instead of admitting a number of individual entities it is much better to admit one constant being on which the various forms of objects are imposed. The assertion of Vyāsa-tīrtha that perceptual evidence is by its very nature stronger than inference, which is slow in establishing itself on account of the various conditions that it has to depend on, is objected to by Madhusūdana, who says that, when perceptual evidence is contradicted by inference and scriptural testimony (e.g., as in the perception of the small dimensions of planetary bodies), it is the former that is negated. So perception has also to depend for its validity on its non-contradiction and other means of proof, and the other means of proof have no more to depend on perception than perception on them. So all these means of proof, being relatively dependent, are of inferior validity to the Vedic testimony, which, not being a man-made document, has naturally an inalien-

¹ *Taraṅgiṇī*, p. 61.

² *Ibid.* p. 63.

able claim to validity. It is well known that perception through one sense, say the visual, has often to be woven together with perception through other senses, e.g., the tactile, for arriving at valid experience of facts, as in the perception "fire is hot." Thus perceptual evidence has no right of superior validity by reason of being perceptible, though it may be admitted that in certain spheres perception may dispel an ignorance which is not removed by inference¹. The objection that an inferential evidence, because it establishes itself slowly (on account of its dependence on many facts), is of inferior validity to perception because this comes quicker is invalid; for validity depends upon proper examination and discovery of faultlessness and not on mere quickness. Moreover, since there are many scriptural texts declaring the oneness of all, which cannot be justified except on the assumption of the falsity of the world, and since such an admission would not take away from perception its natural claim to validity in the relative sphere, a compromise may well be effected by allowing perceptual validity to remain uncontrolled in the relative sphere and admitting the scriptural validity of oneness in the absolute sphere.

Again, Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that, since inference and scriptural testimony both depend on visual and auditory perception, it will be wrong to think that the former could invalidate the latter. If perception is not valid in itself, then all inference and scriptural testimony would be invalid, since their data are supplied by perception.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the scriptural testimony does not challenge the data supplied by perception, but challenges their ultimate validity, which can never be supplied by perceptual experience². The bare fact that one knowledge springs up because it was preceded by another is no reason why it is to be less valid; the judgement "this is not silver, but conch-shell" is not less valid because it could not have come into being unless there had been a previous error with the perception of conch-shell as silver. It is said that the validity of sense-evidence is determined by a critical examination depending on correspondence. To this Madhusūdana's

¹ *nāpi anumānādy-anivartita-dimohanādi-nivartakatvena prābalyam; etāvata hi vaidharmya-mātram siddham. Advaita-siddhi, p.355.*

² *yat-svarūpam upayujyate tanna bādhyate, bādhyate ca tātvikatvākāraḥ, sa ca nopajīryate kāraṇatve tasyāpraveśāt. Ibid. p. 363.*

reply is that, so far as concerns the validity of an awareness according to correspondence, the Śāṅkarites have nothing to say against it. What he challenges is that the ultimate validity or ultimate non-contradiction cannot be revealed by any critical examination. It is again argued that, if perception is invalid, the knowledge of concomitance arrived at through it is invalid, and therefore all inference is invalid. This is, however, wrong; for even by a false reasoning a right inference may be possible; from an illusory reflection it is possible to infer the existence of the thing reflected. Moreover, falsity of the evidence (inferential or perceptual) does not imply the falsity of the thing known; so the objection that, if perception is not regarded as valid, then all knowledge becomes invalid, is illegitimate.

Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that, if perceptual testimony can be contradicted in any place by inference, then any and every inference can contradict perception, and fire can be regarded as cold and a hare as having a horn, which is impossible.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that not any and every inference can be regarded as superior to perception, since it is well known that an illegitimate inference leads to no valid conclusion. The instances which have been adduced by Vyāsa-tīrtha are instances of illegitimate inferences, the fallacy of which is apparent. It is never admitted by anyone that an illegitimate inference is stronger than perception; but it also cannot be denied that there are many instances of illegitimate perception which are rightly denounced by right inferences.

Vyāsa-tīrtha further says that the science of *mīmāṃsā* itself admits in various places the superior validity of perception, and recommends a twisting interpretation of such scriptural passages as are not in harmony with perception. The scriptural text, "That art thou," is directly contradicted in perceptual experience, and therefore should be so interpreted as not to come into conflict therewith.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that it is indeed true that certain scriptural passages which deal with ordinary mundane affairs are thus brought into harmony with experience and are sometimes interpreted in accordance with perception; but that is no reason why those texts which refer to ultimate experience and which do not refer to the accessory details of sacrifices should also be subordinate to perception.

Vyāsa-tīrtha says that it is wrong to suppose that perception is invalidated by inference or scriptural testimony; what happens in the case of perceptual illusions is that in both cases perception is vitiated by various types of defects, the presence of which is also known by perception.

To this Madhusūdana's simple reply is that the presence of defects cannot be known by perception itself, and that most cases of illusory perception are invalidated by stronger inference. When it is said that the moon is no bigger than a foot the illusory perception is no doubt due to the defect of the long distance, but that this is so can be known only by an inference based upon the observation of the diminution of sizes in trees on distant hill-tops. Thus, though there are cases in which one perception invalidates another, there are also cases in which an inference invalidates a perception.

A question arises whether the present perception of the world-appearance may ultimately be contradicted; but to this Vyāsa-tīrtha says that such a fear of future contradiction may invalidate even that knowledge which contradicts this perception. Ordinarily the waking experience contradicts dream-experience, and, if waking experience be also contradicted, then there would be nothing to contradict dream-experience. In this way it will be difficult to find an instance of false experience. The knowledge that contradicts the illusory perception comprehends within it things which are not known at the time of illusory perception (e.g., the knowledge of the conch-shell which was not present at the time of perception of illusory shell-silver). But it cannot be urged that the knowledge that would contradict world-experience would have the specific nature of not being comprehended within the knowledge of world-appearance. Again, a knowledge that contradicts another knowledge must have a content; contentless knowledge has no opposition to false cognitions, yet Brahma-knowledge is regarded as contentless. Moreover, contradiction is possible only there, where a defect is, and that defect lies with the Śāṅkarites, who give a monistic interpretation of scriptural texts. Again, if the monistic experience is certified by monistic texts, the dualistic experience is also certified by dualistic texts, and a knowledge that would contradict and negate the world-experience would involve a duality by the very fact of such negation. Moreover, the last experience which would contradict the world-experience, being itself an experience, would

be equally liable to contradiction; and, if uncontradicted experience be also doubted as being liable to contradiction, then there would be no end to such doubts.

Madhusūdana, in reply to the above objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha, emphasizes the point that it is no essential character of a knowledge that contradicts another that it should have a content; what is essential here is that a right knowledge should be grounded in the realization of the reality and thereby negate the false knowledge. It is also wrong to think that, when Brahma-knowledge negates world-appearance, an affirmation of duality is involved; for the Brahma-knowledge is of the very nature of reality, before which the falsehood, which has only appearance and no existence, naturally dissolves away. He further says that doubts regarding validity can only arise when it is known that there are defects; but, since there can be no defects in Brahma-knowledge, no doubts can arise. The assertion of Vyāsa-tīrtha that, if the world-appearance is false, then it is wrong to speak of the self as being of the nature of pure bliss on the ground that the experience of dreamless sleep reveals such a blissful state, is unwarranted, because the nature of self as blissful is known directly from scriptural testimony, and the experience of dreamless sleep is consistent with it.

Nature of Knowledge.

Vyāsa-tīrtha argues that, if the reasons, cognizability, etc., are supposed to indicate the falsity of the world-appearance and if they are applied to the inferential apparatus, then they also are false; and, if they are not false, then all the world-appearance is false, and the argument for the falsity of the world is fallacious. Vyāsa-tīrtha says further that, if the Śāṅkarite be asked to explain the nature of true reality, he will naturally be liable to confusion. It cannot be regarded as an object of awareness, because chimerical entities are also objects of awareness; it cannot be described as direct awareness, because then it would not belong to any eternal and transcendental entities which are unperceiving, and the world-appearance also, which is directly perceived, would not be false, and the inference, e.g., of fire based upon an illusory perception of the reason (e.g., the water-vapour in a lake), would also be true. Knowledge does not contribute to the existence of things all their properties;

even if fire is not known as fire, it can burn all the same. Thus existence does not depend upon any kind of awareness. It is also wrong to define reality as practical behaviour; for, unless the nature of world-appearance is known, the nature of practical behaviour is not known. The world as such must be either existent or non-existent, and there is no other third way of subsistence; the non-existence of the world cannot be proved by any existent proof, because existence and non-existence are opposed to each other; nor can it be proved by non-existent proofs, simply because they *are* non-existent. There cannot be any being such that it exists in common with non-being and ultimate being¹.

Madusūdana says that the false may be distinguished from the true by exactly the same kind of considerations which lead the opponent to distinguish between the perception of the blueness of the sky and the ordinary objects of experience such as a jug, a rope, etc. The nature of reality that has been conceded to the world-appearance is that it is not contradicted by anything other than Brahma-knowledge.

Vyāsa-tīrtha points out that the contention of the Śāṅkarites that there cannot be any relation between knowledge and its contents is borrowed from the Buddhists, who consider awareness and its objects to be the same. The Śāṅkarites hold that, if the objects are considered to be real, then it is difficult to show how there can be any relation between knowledge and the objects revealed by it; for the two accepted relations of contact and inseparable inherence (*samavāya*) cannot hold between them. The relation of objectivity is also too obscure to be defined; and therefore it must be admitted that the relation between knowledge and the objects is wholly illusory.

To this Vyāsa-tīrtha replies that, though all objects are regarded by the Śāṅkarites as illusorily imposed upon the one supreme perceiver, the Brahman, yet for explanation of specific cognitions of specific individuals, sense-contact, leading to the rise of different perceptions of different individuals, is admitted by them. The Śāṅkarites are not idealists to the same extent as the Buddhists are. Even if it be admitted that pure consciousness may appear different under various conditions, yet there is no reason why the world-

¹ *nāpi sat-trayānugataṃ sat-dvayānugataṃ vā satva-sāmānyam tantram. Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 174.

objects should be considered as impositions upon pure consciousness. Even the admission of the world-objects as illusory impositions does not help us very much; for there cannot be any knowledge of these world-objects without the cognitive function (*vr̥tti*) of the mind. Again, if all world-objects are illusory impositions, then it is meaningless to put into the *modus operandi* of the perceptual process a reflection of the pure consciousness through its specific functions, or into the specific cognitive senses the consciousness underlying the objects¹. The mere fact that neither contact nor inseparable relation can be of any avail does not necessarily imply that perceptual forms are all illusory; for, if there is an actual experience, then relations have naturally to be imagined to explain the situation². Again, if it be admitted for argument's sake that there is no way of proving the validity of the assumption of a relation between knowledge and its object, yet that would not prove the falsity of the objects themselves; what it would do at the utmost would be to deny the validity of relations subsisting between knowledge and its objects. Again, if the Śāṅkarite finds no difficulty in admitting the relation of the pure consciousness to the *vr̥tti*, why does he find any difficulty in admitting such a relation to the objects³? Even if the world-objects be regarded as indescribable, yet their existence may be regarded as being indescribable in the same way as that of Brahman. The Śāṅkarite has also to admit the existence of the objective world and to offer explanations for the way in which it is perceived. The only difference of this view from that of the realists is that, while the Śāṅkarite considers the objects to be ultimately false, the realist considers them to be real; and the same reason that leads the Śāṅkarites to consider them as having a higher order of reality than the merely illusory leads the realists to consider them as ultimately real⁴. The Brahman itself is in a sense as indescribable as the world-objects⁵. Things, so far as they

¹ *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 191.

² *Ibid.* p. 193: *pramīta-vastvānusāreṇa hi prakriyā kalpyā na tu sva-kalpita-prakriyāmurodhena pramīta-tyāgaḥ.*

³ *yādṛśaṃ viśayatvaṃ te vr̥ttim prati cidātmanaḥ
tādṛśaṃ viśayatvaṃ me dṛśyasyāpi dṛśaṃ prati.* *Ibid.* p. 205 a.

⁴ *tava sa ākāraḥ sad-vilakṣaṇaḥ mama tu samiti anirucyamāno'pi sa tava
yena mānena aprātibhāsikāḥ tenaiva mama tātviko'stu.* *Ibid.* p. 205.

⁵ *kidyat tat pratyag iti cet tādṛśaḥ dṛg iti dvayaṃ
yatra na prasaraty etat pratyag ity-avadhāraya
iti brahmaṇy api durnirūpatvasya uktatvāc ca.* *Ibid.* p. 206 a.

are known and so far as they have certain common characteristics, can well be described, though in their unique nature each of them has such peculiarities that they cannot be properly defined and expressed. Each human face may be well known by the uncontradicted testimony of our senses; but still it cannot be described with its own specific and peculiar characteristics¹. So it is difficult to describe the specific nature of Brahman as the identity of pure being, bliss and consciousness; yet its reality is not denied. The same is the case with the world-objects, and, though they are indescribable in their specific natures, yet their reality cannot be denied².

Madusūdana generally passes over many of the points of objection raised by Vyāsa-tīrtha; one of these points is that relations are grasped directly and that there is no incongruity in thinking that, if relations cannot be mediated, they can yet be grasped directly by the senses. Madhusūdana's contention is that, if relations be described as self-subsistent, then they cannot be explained and must therefore be regarded as false. Vyāsa-tīrtha now refers to the Śāṅkarite account of perception, and says that in their view the objects are supposed to be there and the veil over them is removed by the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) transforming itself into the form of the object; he says also, that, if this is so, then the objects of perception cannot be regarded as mental. If the objects were merely mental, the application of the sense-organs would be unnecessary for their perception; in dreams mental objects are "perceived," but the visual organs are not exercised. The difference between the ordinary practical experience of the world and that of dreams is only that the former is longer in duration, and so, if in dream-experience the mental objects can be perceived without the exercise of the visual organ, there is no reason why the world-objects also cannot be perceived in the same way. Moreover, in the case of non-perceptual cognition (*parokṣa jñāna*) the Śāṅkarites themselves admit that the objects are illuminated without any direct operation of *antaḥkaraṇa*, in association with the senses, involving an actual

¹ *tasmāt pramitasya ittham iti nirvaktum
aśakyatvaṃ pratipurṣa-mukhaṃ spaṣṭā-vādhita-
dr̥ṣṭidṛṣṭam vilakṣaṇa-samsthāna-viśeṣasya vā
sattve'py adbhutatvād eva yuktaṃ. Ibid. p. 206.*

² *tasmāt nirvacanāyogyasyāpi viśvasya iṣṭukṣīrādi-mādhuryavad brahmavac-
ca prāmāṇikatvād eva sattva-siddheḥ. Ibid. p. 206.*

contact with the objects. There is no reason why the same thing cannot take place in ordinary perception. The difference of the *antaḥkaraṇa* transformation in the two cases might equally well explain the difference between the perceptual (*a-parokṣa*) and non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) cognitions, and for this it is not necessary to assume that in one case the *antaḥkaraṇa* goes out and in another case remains inside. It cannot be held that an immediate intuitive character belongs to the *antaḥkaraṇa*; for the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself being non-intuitive and non-self-illuminating by nature, its modifications also cannot be intuitive or self-illuminating. The mere fact that *antaḥkaraṇa* has fire elements in it does not make it self-illuminating; for then many objects which are supposed to be made up of fire elements would be self-illuminating. Again, it is wrong to suppose that the manifestation of consciousness must be non-transitive by nature; for, though one may speak of the illumination of an object in non-transitive terms, one speaks of knowing in transitive terms. If it is not admitted that the transitive or intransitive character of an action is often of a verbal nature, it would be difficult for a Śāṅkarite to speak of a modification of *antaḥkaraṇa* (which is non-transitive) as equivalent to knowing an object. Moreover, if it is held that it is only the pure consciousness outside the *vytti* that is illuminated, then the past, wherein there is no pure consciousness manifesting it, could not reveal itself to us; so it is wholly unwarrantable to conceive of an intermediary means in order to explain the relation between knowledge and its objects. Even if it be admitted that the *antaḥkaraṇa* goes outside the body, yet it is difficult to conceive of the nature of pure consciousness, which is supposed to illumine the object, either as consciousness reflected in the *vytti* of *antaḥkaraṇa* (as stated by Bhārati-tīrtha), or as the pure consciousness which is the ground of the appearance of objects manifested by the consciousness reflected in the *antaḥkaraṇa-vytti* (*vytti-pratibimbīta-caitanyābhivyaktaṃ viśayādhiṣṭhānaṃ caitanyam*), as supposed by Sureśvara. The question is whether consciousness as manifested in the *antaḥkaraṇa* illumines the object or whether the ground-consciousness underlying the objects manifests the objects. Neither of these views is tenable. The first view is not possible because, the consciousness reflected in the *antaḥkaraṇa-vytti* being false, it is not possible that the world-objects should be imposed on such an illusory entity; the second view is also im-

possible; for, if the consciousness reflected in the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* be supposed to remove the veil of the object, it may as well be held to manifest it, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to suppose that the ground-consciousness illumines the object.

Further, it cannot be admitted that the *vṛtti* assumes the form of the gross physical objects; for then it would be as gross and material as the objects are. Moreover, the existence of an object assumes therewith the existence of the negation of other entities; and, if the *antaḥkaraṇa* is supposed to take the form of an object, it must also assume the negative forms; it is, however, difficult to conceive how the *antaḥkaraṇa* can be supposed to assume the positive and the negative forms at one and the same time. Again, following the same supposition in the case of the final intuition, it has to be assumed that the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* assumes the form of Brahman; this, however, has no form, so that the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* must be supposed to be here both formless and endowed with form—which is absurd.

Moreover, it is not legitimate to suppose that it is the consciousness underlying the finite self (*jīva-caitanya*) that reveals the object; for, on the supposition that the objects are illusory superpositions on pure consciousness or on the consciousness underlying the objects, the Śāṅkarite theory fails; for in this case the perceiving consciousness, being consciousness underlying the *jīva*, would be different either from pure consciousness or from the consciousness underlying the objects, which is supposed to be the basis of the illusory creations. The *jīva* itself, moreover, cannot be regarded as the basis of the creation; for it is itself an illusory creation. For the same reasons also it cannot be asserted that it is the Brahman-consciousness that illumines the object. Thus the Brahman, being itself as underlying the objects, an illusory creation, cannot be regarded as also illuminating the objects. The pure consciousness underlying the objects, being itself veiled by *ajñāna*, should not also be able to manifest itself; and thus all knowledge of objects would be impossible. If it is argued that, though the pure consciousness is veiled, yet the consciousness limited by the object-form may be manifested by the *vṛtti* of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, that is not correct: for it cannot be admitted that the consciousness limited by the object-forms is itself the basis of those object-forms, since that would amount to an admission that the object-forms are their own

basis, which would be a fallacy of self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*), and the original contention of the Śāṅkarites that the objects are illusorily imposed upon pure consciousness fails. Moreover, if the process of knowledge is admitted to be such that the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* manifests the pure consciousness as limited by objective forms, then the case of final intuition (Brahman-knowledge), where objective characteristics are absent, would be inexplicable. Again, the Śāṅkarites hold that in deep dreamless sleep the *antaḥkaraṇa* is dissolved; and, if that were so, the *jīva*, which is the consciousness limited by a particular *antaḥkaraṇa*, would be renewed after each dreamless sleep, and thus the fruits of the *karma* of one *jīva* ought not to be reaped by the new *jīva*. The view that the pure consciousness is reflected through a *vṛtti* is also inadmissible; for reflections can happen only between two visible objects. The view that consciousness is transformed into a particular state is also inadmissible, since by hypothesis consciousness is unchangeable. Consciousness being entirely unsupported by anything else (*anāśritatvāt*), the analogy of the relation of universal and particular as explaining the conditioning of consciousness is also inadmissible. Moreover, if the consciousness underlying the *jīva* be regarded as manifesting the objects, then, since such a consciousness always exists in an unveiled form, there is no meaning in saying that in effecting its spontaneous manifestation the operation of the *vṛtti* is necessary. Also the pure consciousness cannot be regarded as being limited by the *vṛtti* just as limitless space is supposed to be limited by a jug; for the pure consciousness is all-pervading and, as such, it must also pervade the *vṛtti* and cannot therefore be regarded as being inside it. Neither can the pure consciousness be compared with the ray of light manifesting colour; for the ray of light does so only with the help of accessories, whereas pure consciousness manifests things by itself. Again, if things are manifested spontaneously by the unveiled consciousness (*anāvṛta-cit yadi viśaya-prakāśikā*), then, since such a consciousness is in touch with objects not only so far as their forms and colours are concerned, but also with their other characteristics such as weight, these also ought to be illuminated along with qualities such as colour, etc. Moreover, the relation of consciousness to the object cannot be of the nature of eternal contact, but must be of the nature of illusory imposition upon it (consciousness); this being so, the

relation of consciousness to the object is already there, since all things in the world are imposed upon consciousness. The supposition therefore of a *vytti* as an intermediary is quite uncalled for¹. Again, if the Brahma-consciousness stands in need of the help of a *vytti* in order to manifest things, it has no claim to be called by itself omniscient. If it is suggested that Brahman, being the material cause of all, is competent without the help of any conditions to illuminate the world, which is identical with it, then the reply will be that, if Brahman be regarded as transforming itself under the limitation of objective forms, then such a transformation of the limited Brahman does not justify the accepted thesis of the Śāṅkarites that all objects are illusorily imposed on the pure consciousness². It is also not possible to say that it is the pure consciousness, unconditioned by any object-form, that forms the ground cause; for, if that were so, it could not be called omniscient, since omniscience can be affirmed only in relation to object-forms³.

The supposition that the conception of *vytti* is necessary for the removal of the veil is also wrong; for such a veil must attach either to the pure consciousness or to limited consciousness. The former is impossible, since the pure consciousness which forms the basis of all appearances is the intuitive perceiver of all *ajñāna* and its forms, and as such, being self-luminous, cannot have any veil attached to it. The second also is impossible; for without the help of the pure consciousness *ajñāna* itself would be without any *locus standi*, and without the *ajñāna* there would be no limited consciousness and no veil of *ajñāna*. Again, admitting for argument's sake that there is a veil of *ajñāna* over the objects, the conception of its removal by a *vytti* is impossible; for, if the *ajñāna* belongs to the individual perceiver, then, if it is destroyed for one individual, it remains the same for another; if it belongs to the object, as is supposed, then, when it is removed by the *vytti* of one individual, the

¹ cito viṣayoparāgas tāvat saṃyogādi-rūpo nāsty eva. tasya drśyatvā-prayojakatvāt kintu tatrādhyastatva-rūpa eveti vācyaṃ. sa ca vṛttyapekṣayā pūrvam apy astīti kiṃ cito viṣayoparāgārthayā vṛttyā.

Śrīnivāsa's *Nyāyāmṛta-prakāśa* on the *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 226.

² viśiṣṭa-niṣṭhena pariṇāmitva-rūpeṇa sarvopādānatvena viśiṣṭa-brahmaṇaḥ sarvajñatve tasya kalpitatvenādhiṣṭhānatvāyogena tatra jagad-adhyāsasambhavāt ādhyāsika-sambandhena prakāśata iti bhavad-abhimatanyamabhaṅga-prasaṅgaḥ. *Ibid.* p. 227a.

³ nāpi śuddha-niṣṭham adhiṣṭhānatvaṃ sārva-jñyāder viśiṣṭa-niṣṭhatvāt.

Ibid. p. 226a.

object should be manifest to other individuals, so that, when a person sees an object, that object should be visible also to other persons at other places. Again, is the *ajñāna* to be accepted as one, according to the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, or as many, according to the author of the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*? In the former case, when by one right knowledge *ajñāna* is removed, there ought to be immediate emancipation. If the *ajñāna* is not removed, then the silver-appearance of conch-shell should not have been contradicted, and the form of conch-shell could not have been manifested. It cannot be said that in the case of the perception of conch-shell through negation of the silver-appearance the *ajñāna* is merely dissolved (just as a jug is reduced to dust by the stroke of a club, but not destroyed), which can only be done through Brahma-knowledge; for *ajñāna* is directly opposed to knowledge, and without destroying ignorance knowledge cannot show itself. If the *ajñāna* were not removed by the knowledge of the conch-shell, then the manifested consciousness would have no relation to the conch-shell, and it could not have been manifested, and in spite of the contradiction the illusion would have remained. Nor can it be suggested that, though *ajñāna* may be removed in some parts, it might continue in others; for *ajñāna* and consciousness are both partless. Nor can it be suggested that, just as by the influence of certain precious stones the burning capacity of fire can be stopped, so by the knowledge of the conch-shell the veiling power of *avidyā* is suspended; for the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* in the form of the conch-shell, being produced through the agency of the visual organ and other accessories, cannot be in touch with the pure self, which is devoid of all characteristics, and therefore it cannot remove the veiling power. If it is suggested that the *vṛtti* of the form of the conch-shell is in association with the pure consciousness, under the limited form of the conch-shell, and can therefore remove the veil, then the underlying pure consciousness ought to be directly intuited. *Avidyā* cannot have the material objects as its support; for they are themselves the product of *avidyā*. So the veiling power of *avidyā* also can have no reference to the material objects, since a veil can hide only what is luminous; the material objects, not being luminous, cannot be veiled. So there is no meaning in saying that the veil of the objects is removed in perception. If, again, it is said that the veil has reference to the pure self, as modified by the

material characteristic, and not to the material characteristic, then with the knowledge of the conch-shell the veil of the conch-shell underlying it might be removed, and this ought to bring immediate emancipation. If it is suggested that the *ajñāna* which forms the substratum of the illusory silver is but a special modified state of a root *ajñāna* which forms the material of the conch-shell, then that virtually amounts to an assumption of many *ajñānas* independent of one another; and, that being so, it would not necessarily follow that the knowledge of the conch-shell could dispel the illusory appearance of silver.

On the view of the author of the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, if the existence of many *ajñānas* is admitted, then the question is whether by the operation of one *ṛtti* only one *ajñāna* is removed or all the *ajñānas*. In the former view the conch-shell could never remain unmanifested even in the case of illusion, since *ṛtti* manifesting the illusory silver would also manifest silver; and on the second view, there being infinite *ajñānas*, which cannot all be removed, conch-shell would never be manifested. This criticism would apply equally well to the former view that there is only one root *ajñāna* of which there are many states. Again, it is difficult to understand how the conch-shell, which has a beginning in time, can be associated with beginningless *avidyā*. Further, if it is urged in reply that the beginningless *avidyā* limits the beginningless pure consciousness and that later, when other objects are produced, the *ajñāna* appears as the veil of pure consciousness limited by those object-forms, the reply is that, if the veil associated with pure consciousness is the same as the veil associated with consciousness in limited object-forms, then, with the knowledge of any of those objects, the veil of pure consciousness would be removed, and immediate emancipation would result.

Rāmādvaya, the author of the *Vedānta-kaumudī*, suggests that, just as there is an infinite number of negations-precedent-to-production (*prāg-abhāva*), and yet, when anything is produced, only one of them is destroyed, or just as, when there is a thunder-bolt falling upon a crowd, only one of them may be killed, while others may only disperse, so with the rise of knowledge only one *ajñāna* may be removed, while others may persist. Vyāsa-tīrtha replies that the analogy is false, since (according to him) negation-precedent-to-knowledge is not a veil but merely the absence of the

causes of knowledge. Knowledge, moreover, is not the cause of the cessation of such negation, but behaves as an independent entity, so that one knowledge may produce its effects, while the negation-precedent-to-production of other cognitions of its class may remain. The presence of a cause produces the effect, but it does not involve the condition that for the production of the effect the negations-precedent-to-production of all causes of the same class should be removed. In the case of the Vedāntists, since the *ṛtti* removes the veil of one *ajñāna*, there may still be other *ajñāna*-veils to suspend the operation of cognition. On the view that darkness is absence of light, darkness is not a veil of objects, but merely absence of the conditions of light; nor is light supposed in its operation to destroy darkness, but directly to produce illumination. Darkness, also, should not be regarded as negation of individual light, but as absence of light in general; so that, even if there is one light, there is no darkness. The *ajñānas* also possess no constituent material forms; so the analogy of scattering crowds of men cannot apply to them.

Madhusūdana, in replying to the above criticism of Vyāsa-tīrtha, says that the contention of the latter that whatever is imaginary or mental (*kalpita*) necessarily has no other being than the *percipi* (*pratīti-mātra-śarīratva*), is wrong; for in the instance under discussion, when logic shows that the relation between the perceiver and the perceived is so absurd that the perceived entities cannot be anything more than illusory, perception shows that the perceived entities do persist even when they are not perceived. The persistence of the perceived entities is well attested by experience and cannot be regarded as imaginary, like the illusory perception of silver.

But yet it may be objected that, just as in mediate knowledge (*parokṣa*) no necessity is felt for admitting a *ṛtti*, so in immediate perception also there may be an illumination of the object without it. The reply to this is that in mediate knowledge also a mediate (*parokṣa*) *ṛtti* is admitted; for there also the illumination takes place by the manifestation of consciousness through a mediate *ṛtti*¹. It is wrong to contend that, since the pure consciousness is the principle of manifestation in both cases, mediate cognition

¹ *parokṣasthale'pi parokṣa-ṛtity-uparakta-caitanyasya iva prakāśakatvāt. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 480.

should, on our theory, be expected to behave as immediate; for in the case of immediate perception there is a direct identity of consciousness and the object through the *vr̥tti*, and therefore the object behaves as the object of cognition in that specific direct relation. The mediacy or immediacy of cognition depends on the specific nature of the object, and not on the specific modifications of the *vr̥tti* in the two cases, nor can the two be regarded as two different classes of cognition; for on such a supposition such cognition or recognition as "this is the man I knew," where there seems to be a mixture of mediate and immediate cognition, will involve a joint operation of two distinct classes of cognition in the same knowledge; which is obviously absurd.

It must be borne in mind that the *vr̥tti* by itself is merely an operation which cannot constitute conscious illumination; the *vr̥tti* can lead to an illumination only through its association with pure consciousness, and not by itself alone. It is wrong to suppose that there is no difference between a transitive (as when one says "I know a jug") and an intransitive (as when one says "the jug has come into consciousness") operation; for the distinction is well attested in experience as involving a direct and an indirect method. The same *vr̥tti* (operation), however, cannot be regarded as both transitive and intransitive at the same time, though with different and indifferent circumstances an operation may be both transitive and intransitive. Such instances of experience as "the past is revealed" are to be explained on the supposition that the pure consciousness is revealed through a particular modification of the *vr̥tti* as past.

Again, it is contended by the opponents that, though it may be admitted that pure consciousness manifests the object, yet there is no necessity why the *antaḥkāraṇa* should be supposed to go out of the body and be in contact with the object of perception. The difference between mediate and immediate knowledge may well be accounted for on the supposition of different kinds of mediate or immediate operation through which the consciousness is revealed in each case¹: for, just as in mediate knowledge there is no actual contact of the *antaḥkāraṇa-vr̥tti* with the object, but yet the cognition is possible through the presence of adequate causes which

¹ *parokṣa-vailakṣaṇyāya viśayasyābhivṛtyaktāparokṣa-cid-uparāga eva vaktavyaḥ. Ibid. p. 482.*

generate such cognition, the same explanation may be adduced in explaining immediate cognition of objects. To this the reply is that the Śāṅkarites do not consider that the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* must assume the form of the object, but they certainly do consider it to be indispensable. There should be in immediate cognition an actual contact between the object and the *vṛtti*. If the *vṛtti* so acts in any particular case, that does not constitute its essential function in conditioning the awareness. Thus the function of the ray of light in illumination is that it dispels darkness; that it also spreads over the object is only an accidental fact¹. The mere fact that a *vṛtti* may be in contact with an object does not necessarily mean that it assumes its form; thus, though the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* may travel up to the pole star or be in contact with objects having an atomic structure, that does not imply that all objects in the space intermediate between the eye and the star or the atoms should be perceived; such perceptions are baffled through the absence of such accessory causes as might have caused the *vṛtti* to assume their form. In the case of tactile perception the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* comes into contact with the object through the tactile organ; there is no restriction such that the *antaḥkaraṇa* should come out only through the eye and not through other organs². The contention that in the case of other mental operations, such as desire or aversion, there is no assumption of the migration of *antaḥkaraṇa* outside is pointless; for in these cases there is not a removal of a veil as in the case of cognition.

Madhusūdana urges that the basis or the ground-consciousness (*adhiṣṭhāna-caitanya*) which illumines everything is directly connected with the objects through illusory imposition. This self-illuminating entity can, indeed, manifest all that is associated with it; but, as it is, it is in an unmanifested state, like a veiled lamp, and the operation of the *vṛtti* is regarded as necessary for its manifestation. In the case of mediate knowledge this unmanifested consciousness manifests itself in the form of the *vṛtti*; and in the case of immediate perception through the contact of the *vṛtti* the veil of *ajñāna* is removed, since the *vṛtti* extends so as to reach the objects.

¹ *viśayeṣu abhivyakta-cid-uparāge na tad-ākāratva-mātram tantram.*

Advaita-siddhi, p. 482.

² *na ca spārsana-pratyakṣe cakṣurādīvat niyata-golakadvārā-bhāvena antaḥkaraṇa-nirgatya-ayogād āvaraṇābhībhavānupapattir iti vācyam. sarvatra tat-tad-indriyādhiṣṭhānasyaiva dvāratva-sambhavāt. Ibid.* p. 482.

So in the case of mediate cognition the knowledge is of a mental state, and not of an object, whereas in immediate perception the illumination is of the object through the association of the *ṛtti*. In the case of mediate cognition there is no way by which the *antaḥkaraṇa* could go out.

To the objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha that it is absurd to think of the *antaḥkaraṇa* as taking the shape of gross physical objects, Madhusūdana's reply is that "taking the shape of an object" only means the capacity of the *ṛtti* to remove the veil of *ajñāna* which had stood in the way of the affirmation of the existence of the object¹; thus the functioning of the *ṛtti* consists only in the removal of the veil of *ajñāna*.

To the objection that, if the pure consciousness is veiled by *ajñāna*, no cognition is possible, Madhusūdana's reply is that, though *ajñāna* in its extensive entirety may remain intact, yet a part of it may be removed by coming into association with the *ṛtti*, and thus the object may be revealed.

To the objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha that in the last emancipatory intuition one would expect that the *antaḥkaraṇa* should have the form of Brahman as object (which is absurd, Brahman being formless), the reply of Madhusūdana is that the Brahman which forms the object of the last immediate intuition, being absolutely unconditioned, does not shine as associated with any particular form. The manifestation of objects in worldly experience is always with specific condition, whereas, the object of this last manifestation being without any condition, the absence of any form is no objection to it; its cognition results in the absolute cessation of all *ajñāna* and thus produces emancipation. Again, the objection that, if during dreamless sleep the *antaḥkaraṇa* is dissolved, then on re-awakening there will be new *antaḥkaraṇa*, and thus the deeds associated with the former *antaḥkaraṇa* will have no continuity with the new *antaḥkaraṇa*, is invalid; for even in deep sleep the causal *antaḥkaraṇa* remains, what is dissolved being the manifested state of the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

Again, the objection that there cannot be any reflection in the *antaḥkaraṇa* because it has neither manifest colour (*udbhūtā-rūpatvāt*) nor visibility, is invalid; for what may be regarded as the

¹ *astitvādi tad-viśayaka-vyavahāra-pratibandhaka-jñāna-nivartana-yogyatvasya tad-ākāratva-rūpatvāt. Ibid. p. 483.*

necessary qualification for reflection is not visibility or the possession of colour, but transparency, and such transparency is admitted to belong to *antaḥkaraṇa* or its *vr̥tti*. The *ajñāna*, which is regarded as constituted of the three *guṇas*, is also considered to be capable of reflection by virtue of the fact that it contains *sattva* as one of its elements.

The objection that, as a ray of light illuminates not only colours, but also other entities, so the pure consciousness also should illuminate not only the colour of the object, but also its other properties, such as weight, is invalid; for the pure consciousness is not in touch with any quality or characteristic, and therefore can illuminate only those characters which are presented to it through the transparent *vr̥tti*; this is why, in the case of the illusion "this is silver," the *vr̥tti* implied in the cognition "this" does not manifest the illusory silver, for the manifestation of which a separate *vr̥tti* of *avidyā* has to be admitted. The *antaḥkaraṇa-vr̥tti*, however, can directly receive the reflection of the pure consciousness and therefore does not require for such a reflection a further *vr̥tti*, and there is accordingly no vicious infinite. The function of the *vr̥tti* is to manifest the identity of the *jīva*-consciousness and the consciousness underlying the object, without which the relation between the knower and the known as "this is known by me" could not be manifested¹.

Though Brahman is absolutely untouched by anything, yet, since all things are illusorily imposed upon it, it can manifest them all without the aid of *māyā*; this justifies the omniscience of Brahman, and the criticism that the pure Brahman cannot be omniscient is invalid.

Regarding the destruction of the veil of *ajñāna* it may be pointed out that the veiling power of the *ajñāna* pertaining to one individual is destroyed by the functioning of his *vr̥tti*, so that he alone can perceive, and not any other individual in whose case the veiling power has not been destroyed. The difference between the veiling power and darkness is this: the veiling power has relation both to the object and to the perceiver, whereas darkness relates only to the object; so that, when darkness is destroyed, all can see, but not so in the case of the veiling power. This refutes the criticism that, if

¹ *jivacaitanyasyādhiṣṭhāna-caitanyasya vābhedābhivyaktārthatvād vr̥tteh. anyathā mayedam viditam iti sambandhāvabhāso na syāt. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 485.

there is one *ajñāna*, the perception of one object ought to lead to immediate emancipation.

The criticism that, since knowledge must necessarily dispel ignorance, the illusion of silver cannot be destroyed, is invalid; for knowledge destroys ignorance only in the last instance, i.e., only before emancipation. The knowledge of the conch-shell cannot destroy the supreme veiling power of the root *ajñāna* covering the unlimited consciousness, but can only remove the relative *ajñāna* covering the limited consciousness, thereby opening up the consciousness underlying the limited object-forms, and so producing the contradiction of the illusory silver and the intuition of the conch-shell.

The objection that *ajñāna* cannot veil the material objects, because they are not luminous, is quite beside the point; for the Śāṅkarite theory does not assume that the *ajñāna* veils the material objects. Their view is that the veiling relates to the pure consciousness on which all material objects are illusorily imposed. The *ajñāna* veiling the underlying consciousness veils also the material objects the existence of which depends on it, being an imposition upon it. When by the *vṛtti* the ground-consciousness of an object is manifested, the result is not the manifestation of the pure consciousness as such, but of the limited consciousness only so far as concerns its limited form with which the *vṛtti* is in contact. Thus the objection that either the removal of the veil is unnecessary or that in any particular cognition it necessarily implies emancipation is invalid.

Again, the states of the ignorance must be regarded as being identical with it, and the knowledge that is opposed to ignorance is also opposed to them; so the states of *ajñāna* can very well be directly removed by knowledge. The objection that there are many *ajñānas*, and that even if one *ajñāna* is removed there would be others obstructing the manifestation of cognition, is invalid; for, when one *ajñāna* is removed, its very removal is an obstruction to the spread of other *ajñānas* to veil the manifestation, so that, so long as the first *ajñāna* remains removed, the manifestation of the object continues.

An objection is put forward that, the consciousness being itself partless, there cannot be any manifestation of it in part, with reference to certain object-forms only. If it is held that such conditioned manifestation is possible with reference to the conditioning

fact of object-forms, then even previous to the existence of definite object-forms there cannot be any *ajñāna*, or, in other words, *ajñāna* cannot exist as a pre-condition, it being only coterminous with definite object-forms. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the object-forms, being imposition upon pure consciousness and the latter being their ground, the manifestation of consciousness with reference to any object-form depends upon the removal of *ajñāna* with reference to the illusory creation of that object-form imposed upon the ground-consciousness. The *ajñāna* itself does not constitute the object-form; therefore the removal of *ajñāna* has reference not to object-forms as separate and independent entities, but only to the creation of such object-forms imposed upon the ground-consciousness. Thus there is no objection; the existence of *ajñāna* as a pre-condition is such that, when along with itself object-forms are created, the veil on these is removed by the *vr̥tti* contact leading to their cognition. The position is that, though the ground-consciousness reveals the object-forms imposed upon it, yet such a revelation takes place only with reference to that perceiver whose *vr̥tti* comes into contact with the object, and not with reference to others. The condition of the revelation is that the consciousness underlying the perceiver, the *vr̥tti* and the object-form becomes identical, as it were, through the imposition of the *vr̥tti* upon the object. This tripartite union being a condition of the manifestation of an object to a particular perceiver, the object, revealed by the ground-consciousness underlying it, is not manifested to other perceivers.

The World as Illusion.

Vyāsa-tīrtha tried to refute the Śāṅkarite theory that the world is an illusory imposition. He contends that, if the world is an illusory creation, it must have a basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) which in a general manner must be known, and must yet be unknown so far as its special features are concerned. Brahman, however, has no general characteristic, and, since it is devoid of any specific peculiarities, any affirmation that it stands as the entity of which the specific peculiarities are not known would be inadmissible¹. To this

¹ *adhiṣṭhānatva-sāmānyatve jñāte saty ajñāta-viśeṣavattvasya prayojakatvāt. brahmaṇaḥ sāmānya-dharmopetatvādinā tāvat jñātatvaṃ na sambhavati. nissāmānyatvāt. ajñāta-viśeṣavattvaṃ ca na sambhavati nirviśeṣatvāṅgikārāt.* Śrīnivāsa's *Nyāyāmṛta-prakāśa*, on the *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 234.

Madhusūdana's reply is that a knowledge of the general characteristic of the locus of illusion is by no means indispensable; what is necessary is that the true nature of the object should be known without any of its specific details. In the case of Brahman the nature is self-luminous bliss, but the specific characters of such bliss, as greater or less, and any variation in its quality, are not known; so there is no impropriety in considering Brahman as the locus of illusion. But the defence may be made in another way; for Madhusūdana says that an imaginary general characteristic and special features may well be conceived of Brahman without involving the fallacy of the circle (*anyonyāśraya*), if we assume the beginningless character of all such imaginary qualities. The characters of Brahman as being and bliss may be regarded as generic, and the fullness of the bliss may be regarded as specific. So the quality of existence or being that is found in all things may be regarded as a generic quality of Brahman, on the basis of which the illusions take place in the absence of the specific quality of Brahman as fullness of bliss. The inadequacy of the reply is obvious; for the objection was made on the ground that all illusions are psychological in their nature and are possible only through confusion of individual things, which have both universal and specific qualities, whereas the Brahman, being the absolute, is devoid of all characters on the basis of which any illusion is possible.

Vyāsa-tīrtha in this connection further points out that, if it is suggested that an illusion can remain when there is no cognition antagonistic to illusory perception and that the *ajñāna* in itself is opposed not to the illusion of world-appearance, but to its form as *ṛtti*, the reply is that, since the definition of *ajñāna* is "that which is opposed to consciousness," the above view, which considers that the *ajñāna* is not opposed to consciousness, would hardly justify us in speaking of *ajñāna* as *ajñāna*; for, if it is not opposed to knowledge, it has no right to be so called. Moreover, the self and the not-self, the perceiver and the perceived, are so different from each other, that there is no scope for illusion between them. Thus Vedāntists themselves assert that, among entities that are spatially separated or whose essences are entirely different, the speaker and the person spoken to, there cannot be any possibility of doubt about their identity. Moreover, unless the nature of the locus of

illusion is hidden from view, there cannot be an illusion, and the pure consciousness, being always self-manifested, is such that its nature can never be hidden; and so it is difficult to conceive how there can be an illusion. Again, the "self," which is the nature of Brahman, is never associated with the objects of world-appearance, which are always apparent to us as non-self, and, this being so, how can these objects be regarded as an imposition upon the self, as in the case of the illusion of silver, which is always associated with "this" as its locus? The position cannot be justified by saying that all objects of world-appearance are associated with "being," which is the nature of Brahman; for this does not imply that these objects are not imposed upon being as its locus, since in these instances existence appears as a quality of the objects, like colour, but the objects do not appear as illusory qualities imposed upon existence, which should have been the case, if the former are to be regarded as an illusory imposition upon the latter. Nor can it be asserted that the "being" is a self-luminous entity underlying the world-objects; for, if it were so, then these world-objects should have manifested themselves directly through their association with that pure consciousness, and the acceptance of a *vr̥tti* would be wholly unnecessary. It is also wrong to say that the manifestation of an object implies that the object is an imposition upon the fact of manifestation; for the latter appears as being only qualitative in relation to the object¹. It is sometimes suggested that the knowledge of the true basis is not essential for explanation, because even an illusory notion of such a basis is sufficient to explain illusion, and therefore, even if the true basis (Brahman) is not apparent in perception, it is no valid objection to the possibility of illusion. But the reply to such a view is that the infinite occurrences of previous illusion would then be competent to explain present illusion, and there would be no point in admitting the existence of the true Brahman as being the foundation-truth of all illusory appearance; which would land us in Buddhist nihilism².

If the world-appearance, which is supposed to be false, is able to exert causal efficiency and behave as real, a thing well attested by scriptural texts affirming the production of sky from the self,

¹ *ghaṭaḥ sphurati tasya ca sphuraṇānubhavatvena ghaṭānubhavatvāyogāt. Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 236.

² *Ibid.* p. 237a.

then it is clearly different from ordinary illusions, which have no such causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*). Moreover, following the analogy of the conch-shell-silver, which is regarded as false in relation to the silver of the silversmith, one may likewise expect that the world-appearance should be false only in relation to some other real world-appearance; but no such real entities are known.

Again, it is suggested in the *Vivaraṇa* that, though there is no real similarity between Brahman and illusion, yet there is no difficulty in admitting that even without any real similarity there is the world-illusion based upon Brahman through some imaginary similarity. But in reply to these it may be pointed out that such an imaginary similarity can only be supposed to be due to *avidyā*; but *avidyā* itself, being imaginary, will itself depend on some other illusion, and such an illusion would demand another similarity, and thus there would be a vicious circle. It is suggested that illusions are possible even without similarity, as in the case of red crystal; but in reply it may be said, first, that red crystal is a case of a reflection of the red in the crystal and may hence not stand in need of any similarity as the cause of the illusion, whereas in all other cases which are not of this nature an illusion would naturally require some kind of similarity as pre-condition; secondly, here also it may be admitted that the red substance and the crystal substance have this similarity between them, that they are both made up of the same substance, and such a similarity is not admissible between Brahman and the world. Again, it is well known that without the agency of extraneous defect there can be no false knowledge, since otherwise all knowledges may be invalid by themselves. So also there cannot be any illusion without a perceiver able to have both the false knowledge and the right knowledge to contradict it; and for this the presence of the body and the senses are indispensable. In the state of dissolution, though there may be *ajñāna*, yet, there being no body, there cannot be either illusion or right knowledge.

It cannot be suggested that, just as in ordinary illusions of conch-shell-silver, ordinary defects of observation having relative existence are to be admitted, so the world-illusion also is to be explained on the supposition of the existence of such relative defects. The reply to such a suggestion is, that, unless the status of world-illusion is determined, no meaning can be attached to the

status of the defects producing the world-appearance, which has a relative existence. The tables cannot be turned on the dualists by supposing that on their side also the reality of the defects, body and senses, can be affirmed only when the non-illusory nature of the world is known, and that the knowledge of the latter is dependent upon that of the former; for knowledge of the reality of the world is to be obtained directly from experience, and not through such a logical quibble. It may also be pointed out that, if the analogy of the conch-shell-silver be pursued, then, since the defects there have the same status as the locus of the illusion, viz., the "this" of the conch-shell, so in the world-illusion also the defects should have the same status as the locus.

Again, if the defects are not regarded as ultimately real, but only as illusory, then it must be admitted that there are in the world no real defects, which would imply that our world-knowledge is valid. The assumption that defect, the body, the senses, etc., are all illusory demands that this be due to the presence of other defects; these in turn must depend on some other defects, and thus we may have a vicious infinite. If the defects are spontaneously imagined in the mind, then the self-validity of knowledge must be sacrificed. If it is urged that the *avidyā* is either beginningless or self-sustained and immediate (like the concept of difference), there is no vicious infinite, the reply is that, if *avidyā* is self-sustained and beginningless, it ought not to depend upon any locus or ground of world-illusion, Brahman, as its *adhiṣṭhāna*. Again, if the experience of *avidyā* be not regarded as due to some defects, it could not be regarded as invalid. But it would be difficult to imagine how *avidyā* could be due to some defect; for then it would have to exist before itself in order to produce itself. Again, the conception that the world is an illusion because it is contradicted is false, because the contradiction itself is again contradicted; this may lead to a vicious infinite, since it cannot be admitted that the knowledge that contradicts is itself contradicted.

Just as in the silver illusion the locus of the illusion has the same kind of existence as the defect, so in the world-illusion also the locus of the illusion might have the same kind of relative existence as the defects; which would mean that Brahman also is relative. Moreover, it is wrong to say that the knowledge of the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the world-illusion is ultimately real, while the defects have only a

relative existence; for such a different treatment would be unjustifiable, unless the defects should be found to be contradicted, whereas it has been shown above that the very concept of contradiction is illegitimate. It cannot be said that the falsehood of the defects constitutes their contradiction; for the concept of defect is unintelligible without the comprehension of falsehood; moreover, in all illusions the knowledge of the locus seems to have no antagonism to the defects which cause the illusion. Therefore there is no reason why, even if the world-appearance be regarded as illusion, the knowledge of the Brahman as the locus of the illusion should be able to dispel the defect which has produced it. Therefore, just as the Brahman is real, so the defects are also real. If bondage were absolutely false, no one would have tried to be liberated from it; for that which is non-existent cannot come into being. Again, if the bondage itself were an illusory imposition upon Brahman, it could not be expected that the intuitional knowledge of Brahman should be able to dispel it. Moreover, the supposition that the world-appearance is illusion is directly contradicted in most of the *sūtras* of the *Brahma-sūtra*, e.g., the definition of Brahman as "that which causes the birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world." So, from whichever way we can look at it, the supposition that the world-process is illusory is found to be wholly illogical.

Madhusūdana's contention that the position that an illusion is possible only when the locus is hidden only so far as its special features are concerned holds good in the case of world-illusion also; for, though Brahman is manifest so far as its nature as pure being is concerned, it is hidden in regard to its nature as fullness of bliss. The condition that illusion is only possible when there is no knowledge contradicting the illusion holds good in the case of world-illusion; for the knowledge that contradicts the *ajñāna* constituting the world illusion must be of the nature of a *vytti* cognition. Thus, so long as there is no *vytti* cognition of the pure nature of Brahman, there is no cognition contradicting the world-cognition; for the pure consciousness in its own nature is not opposed to *ajñāna*. The objection that the distinction between the perceiver and the perceived, the self and the non-self, is so obvious that one cannot be mistaken for the other, is met by Madhusūdana with the supposition that in the case of the silver-illusion also the difference between the presented "this" and the unrepresented "that" (silver) is known and

yet there is an illusion. Moreover, the difference conceived in a particular manner cannot thwart the imposition of identification of any two entities in other forms; thus, though the opposition between the perceiver and the perceived, self and the not-self, is quite obvious in this particular form, yet the distinction between "being" and "jug" is not at all apparent; for the notion of the jug is permeated through and through by the notion of being, so that there is no difficulty in conceiving the possibility of false identification between the being and the jug¹. Moreover, nature as being is an object of all cognition, so that, though formless like time, it can well be conceived to be an object of visual perception, like time².

The world-illusions occur in a successive series, the later ones being similar to the previous ones. This is all the condition that is needed; it is not at all necessary that the illusory forms that are imposed should also be real. It is sufficient that there should be a cognition of certain forms giving place to certain other forms. What is necessary for a silver-illusion is that there should be a knowledge of silver; that the silver should also be real is quite unimportant and accidental. So the reality of the world-appearance as an entity is never the condition of such an illusion. The objection that, following the same analogy, it may also be contended that the reality of the locus of illusion is quite uncalled-for and that an awareness of such a locus is all that is needed in explaining an illusion, is invalid; for the locus of illusion is not the cause of illusion through awareness of it, but through ignorance of it. Moreover, if the reality of the locus of reality is not demanded as a pre-condition of illusion, contradiction of illusion will be meaningless; for the latter dispels only the illusory notion regarding a real entity.

The objection that, if the world-illusion is capable of practical efficiency and behaviour, it cannot be regarded as invalid, is untenable; for dreams also have some kind of practical efficiency. The story in the scriptural texts of the creation of the sky from the self need not lead us to think of the reality of such scriptural texts; for the scriptures speak of the dream-creations also. The objection

¹ *na hi rūpāntareṇa bheda-grāho rūpāntareṇādhyāsa-virodhī. san-ghaṭa ity-ādi-pratyaye ca sad-rūpasyātmāno ghaṭādy-anuvidhāyatayā bhānūn na tasya ghaṭādy-adhyāsādhiṣṭhānā-nūpapattiḥ. Advaita-siddhi, p. 495.*

² *sad-rūpeṇa ca sarva-jñāna-viśayatopapatter na rūpādi-hīnasyāpy ātmanah kalāsyeva cākṣusatvādy anūpapattiḥ. Ibid. p. 495.*

that, if the root-impression of illusion at the beginning of creation be due to those of other cycles, then the root-impressions of previous birth ought to manifest themselves in each and every experience of this life, is invalid; for not all root-impressions of previous birth are manifested in this life, and the agency of such root-impressions in influencing the experiences of this life, as in the case of the instinctive desire of the baby to suck its mother's breasts, is to be accepted in those cases where they do in fact occur. So also the objection that illusion cannot be due to the root-impressions of one's own wrong imagination, because before the erroneous perception takes place there cannot be root-impressions of illusory perceptions, and therefore the existence of the illusory world existent as a prior fact and a pre-condition of one's illusory perceptions, cannot be regarded as valid; for it is just the nature of things that is responsible for two kinds of illusions such that, though bangles can be made out of the illusory silver in the silversmith's shop, nothing can be done with the illusory silver in the conch-shell. So the root-impressions of one's own illusion may act as constituent stuff of the illusion of the world-appearance, and even before the occurrence of such illusory experience of the world-appearance the stuff of the world-appearance, derived from the root-impression of one's own illusion, may already be objectively there as a pre-condition of the illusory perception. The objection that, since illusory perceptions must have as their pre-condition a similarity between the entities falsely identified, and since also no such similarity can be traced between Brahman and the world-appearance, there cannot be any false identification between them, is invalid; first, because *avidyā*, being beginningless, does not stand in need of any similarity. Secondly, the supposition that similarity is an essential pre-condition of illusion is likewise false; for even in those cases where similarity seems to induce illusion it does so by generating a mental state congenial to production of illusion, and, if such a mental state is produced in other ways, say as a fruit of one's own *karma* and *adṛṣṭa*, the necessity that the similarity should behave as a pre-condition vanishes, and so the indispensable character of similarity as a pre-condition to illusion cannot be admitted. Invalid also is the objection that, if there may be an illusion without defect, then that means that all cognitions are by themselves invalid and that, if illusions be regarded as due to

defects, then defects also are results of illusory impositions, and thus there will be a vicious infinite; for illusion through beginningless *avidyā* does not belong to defects, and, though illusions which have a temporal beginning are due to the beginningless *avidyā*-defect, this does not render all cognitions invalid, since only illusions which have a temporal beginning are due to the defect of *avidyā*, and, since *avidyā* itself is beginningless, it cannot stand in need of any defects, and so there cannot be any vicious infinite. It must be borne in mind that, though illusion in time is due to defects, or *doṣa*, the beginningless defect of *avidyā*, it is not necessarily due to any such defect, and therefore stands directly and spontaneously as an illusory creative agent; and is called illusion, not because it is produced by defects, but because it is contradicted by Brahma-knowledge. Thus the objection that *avidyā* is due to defect, and defect is due to *avidyā*, is invalid; that which is a product of defects is bound to be contradicted; but the converse of this is not necessarily true.

It cannot be urged that, if *avidyā* is independent of *doṣa*, the world-illusion may be regarded as independent of the locus or basis of illusion, viz., the Brahman; for, though the basis of illusion may not be regarded as producing illusion, it has to be regarded as the support and ground thereof and also as its illuminator¹.

Again, the objection that illusion must depend on sense-functioning, on the existence of the body, is invalid; for these are necessary only for intuitive perception. But in the cases of illusion, of the imposition of the *avidyā* upon the pure consciousness, the latter is the spontaneous reflector of the *avidyā* creations, and so for the purpose there is no necessity of the sense-functioning.

Again, it is urged that, since the defects are imaginary impositions, the negation of defects becomes real, and therefore the defects, being unreal, cannot render the knowledge of world-appearance unreal; and, if this is so, the world-appearance being real, this would be our admission of reality (as an illustration of this, it is urged that the criticism of the Buddhists against the Vedas, being invalid and illusory, cannot stultify the validity of the Vedas). To this the reply is that the criticism of the defects pointed out against the Vedas by the Buddhists is illusory, because the defects are only imagined by them; the Vedas are not affected

¹ *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 498

by this, because their truth is affirmed by our practical experience. The defects imagined are not therefore coterminous with the reality of the Vedas; the defect of *avidyā* and the manifold world-appearance have the same kind of existence—one is the effect of the other; and thus, if the defects are illusory, their product (the world) also becomes illusory, and so the illusory nature of defects does not prove the reality of the world. The world-appearance is called relatively true only because it is not contradicted by anything else except the Brahma-knowledge. Its relative character therefore does not depend upon the determination of the nature of falsehood, which in its turn might be conceived to be determinable by the nature of the world as relative, thus involving a vicious nature of dependence¹. It is urged that the reality of the defects is directly grasped by the senses, and that therefore they can behave as the cause of error only if they are ultimately real; to this the reply is that the existence of the defects can be grasped only by the senses, but that they will never be contradicted at any time (*traikālikā-bādhyatva*) can never be ascertained on any intuitive basis, and so the reality of the defects can never be affirmed. It must always be borne in mind that the defects have never the same status as pure consciousness, upon which illusory conch-shell is imposed. Nor can it be said that the knowledge which contradicts the world-appearance is real on the ground that, if it were not real, it would require some other knowledge to contradict it and this would land us in a vicious infinite; for this final contradiction of world-appearance may well be regarded as contradicting itself also, for the very simple reason that the content of this contradiction applies to the whole range of the knowable, and this final contradiction, being itself within the field of the knowable, is included within the contradiction. It is urged that, if bondage is false in the sense that it is at all times non-existent, there is no reason why anyone should be anxious to remove that which is already non-existent; to this the reply is that the true (Brahman) can never cease to exist—the falsity of the bondage means that it is an entity which is liable to cease immediately on the direct intuition of the basic truth. It is like the case of a man who has forgotten that he has his necklace round his neck and is anxiously searching for it, and who the instant he is reminded of it gives up his search. It is wrong to suppose that,

¹ *Ibid.* p. 499.

because no effort could be directed towards the chimerical, which is non-existent at all times, therefore no effort could be made for the removal of the illusory; for, though the illusory and the chimerical may be in agreement so far as their non-existence at all times is concerned, there is no reason why these two should agree in other respects also. The concept of the cessation of the bondage may not have any other content than the intuition of the real, or it may be regarded as indefinable or of an entirely unique nature. The illusory bondage and the world-appearance can cease only when the basic truth, the Brahman, is intuited, just as the silver illusion ceases with the knowledge of the conch-shell on which it is imposed. The objection that some of the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa imply the existence of a realistic world is invalid, if it is remembered that the import of those *sūtras* merely points to the existence of a relative order of things which ceases entirely as soon as the basic truth on which they are imposed is known.

The *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi* view is the supposition that the existence of all things consists in their being perceived. Vyāsātirtha says that, if things existed only so long as they are perceived, then they would be only momentary; and so all the objections against Buddhist momentariness, to the effect that they do not admit the permanence of things as attested by recognition, might equally well be levelled against the Śāṅkarites themselves. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that, though the existence of objects as realities is not admitted, yet their existence in the causal state, as *ajñāna*, is on this view not denied; this would be its difference from the Buddhist position, which does not admit any such causal existence of things.

If the world-objects have no existence outside their perception, then they are plainly independent of definite causes, and, if that is so, then the definite cause-and-effect relation between sacrifices and their fruits, and the import of all the Vedāntic texts regarding definite cause and effect, are meaningless. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the specification of cause-and-effect relation in the scriptures and the experience of them in mundane life is like cause and effect in dreams; these dream-causes and their effects also have a certain order among themselves, known by contradiction in experiences.

It is objected that on the *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi* view (that the objects do not exist prior to perception) world-experience is inexplicable. It would

be difficult also to explain how, if the "this" which forms a basis of illusion is not already there outside us, there can be any sense-relation to it and to the foundation of the illusory image. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the ordinary explanation of illusion depending upon sense-relation and other conditions is only an explanation for people of the lower order. For people of the higher order the definition of illusion would be "the manifestation of a true entity in association with a false one," and such a definition would hold good even on the *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* view. The consciousness underlying the "this" is a substance, and the false silver is manifested in association with it.

It is further objected that at the time of the illusory perception ("this is silver"), if there is no conch-shell as an objective fact, then the illusion cannot be explained, as is generally done, as effect of ignorance about the conch-shell. The reply is that, even if the conch-shell is absent, the *ajñāna* that forms its stuff is there. To the objection that the two perceptions "this is silver" and "this is not silver" are directed to two different perceptions and do not refer to one common objective fact, and that therefore neither of them can be regarded as the contradiction of the other, since such a contradiction is only possible when two affirmations refer to one and the same objective fact—the reply is that on the analogy of dream-experiences the contradiction is possible here also. Vyāsa-tīrtha further says that, since the contradiction of an illusion is not an objective fact, but a mere perception, it has no better status than the illusory perception and therefore cannot be regarded as necessarily truer than the illusion which it is supposed to contradict. He further says that in dreamless sleep and in dissolution, since there is no differential perception as between Brahman and the *jīva*, such a difference between Brahman and the *jīva* ceases in each dreamless sleep and in each cyclic dissolution. Thus in the absence of difference between Brahman and the *jīva* there cannot be at the end of each dreamless sleep and dissolution any return to world-experience. In the case of a person who is sleeping and whose root-impressions on that account are not perceivable (and are therefore non-existent), there is no explanation how the world-experience may again be started. Emancipation also, being only a perception, cannot have a better status of existence than the world-experience; moreover, if the pure consciousness appeared as all the world-

objects, then there could not have been any time when such objects could remain unmanifested.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the relation of *jīva* and Brahman, being beginningless, does not depend upon perception; in dreamless sleep, though the root-impressions vanish as effect, they still remain in their causal character; emancipation also, being of the nature of Brahman, has the pure intuitive character of perception.

An objection is urged that, if pure consciousness is the intuition of objects, then they should always be manifested. To this the reply is that perception here means the manifestation of consciousness through a *vyrtti* which does not stand in need of further *vyrtti* for its relation to consciousness; the possibility of illusion without bodies can well be explained by analogy with dreams. Again, the objection that, since the perception is as much an illusory intuition as the object of which it is conceived to be the essence, the object in itself ceases to have its essence as mere intuition, is invalid; because, though the perception has no other existence than the intuition itself, that is no bar to the conception of the object as having no essence but perception. An objection may again be raised that recognition shows permanent existence of objects; but reply to it may easily be found in the illustration of dream-experiences, and also in the possibility of accidental agreement between the misperception of different perceivers. The objection that the notion of identity of Brahman and *jīva*, being itself mental, cannot contradict duality is invalid; for the notion of such identity is identical with the self and therefore cannot be called mental. Again, the intuition of the ultimate truth cannot itself be called invalid because it is mental; for its validity depends upon the fact that it is never contradicted.

CHAPTER XXX

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND THE MONISTS (CONTINUED)

A Refutation of the definition of Avidyā (nescience).

AVIDYĀ is defined as that beginningless positive entity which is removable by knowledge. The objection to this, as given by Vyāsa-tīrtha, is, first, that, the objects of the world being in time, the ignorance that limits the consciousness underlying it cannot be beginningless. Moreover, since according to the Vedāntist negation has no constituent material stuff as its material cause, *ajñāna* cannot be regarded as its cause. Even on the assumption of illusory negation *ajñāna*, which is regarded as being in its nature positive, cannot be regarded as its cause; for, if negation has for its cause a positive entity, then the unreal may have the real as its cause. Again, if *ajñāna* is not the cause of the negation, then knowledge ought not to be able to dispel it, and the negation of a jug should not be liable to cease on its negation. Again, on the Śāṅkarite view the *ajñāna* is supposed to veil the object; we cannot have any cognition of Brahman, because it is hidden by *ajñāna*. They also hold that the *vytti* knowledge cannot intuit Brahman. If that is so, then in the last emancipatory knowledge through *vytti* there is no intuition of Brahman; without this the *ajñāna* concealing Brahman cannot be removed, and hence emancipation is impossible. Again, if it is supposed that the *ajñāna* is removed, then in the *jīvan-mukti* state the saint ought to have no experience of worldly things.

Again, it must be admitted that knowledge removes *ajñāna* directly and spontaneously, without waiting for the assistance of any accessory cause; for otherwise, when a thing is known, its ignorance would not have vanished spontaneously with it. But, if that were so, then in cases where an *ajñāna* is associated with certain conditions, the removal of the *ajñāna* would not stand in need of the removal of the conditions also together with it. What is to be expected is that the *ajñāna* should be removed irrespective of the removal of the conditions, and this is not admitted. Again, if it is held that the removal of the conditions is awaited, then pure

consciousness cannot be regarded as capable of removing *avidyā* directly. Again, if knowledge can directly and spontaneously remove *ajñāna*, then it is useless to restrict the scope by saying that it removes only the beginningless *ajñāna*. The restriction is imposed in order to distinguish the cosmic *avidyā* from the phenomenal *avidyā* of silver-illusion, and if the spontaneous removal of *ajñāna* serves in both places, there is no utility in restricting the scope. It cannot be said that the epithet "beginningless" is given to *ajñāna* because it is the product of beginningless illusory imposition through defects; for it has already been pointed out that such a view would lead to a vicious infinite, because there can be no defect without *avidyā*. Again, *ajñāna* cannot be beginningless, because whatever is different from knowledge and also from negation cannot be beginningless like the illusory silver. Again, it is wrong to define *ajñāna* as positive; for on the Śāṅkarite view *ajñāna* is different from both positive and negative, and therefore cannot be negative. If an entity is not positive, it must be negative; for, being different from positive, it cannot also be different from negative. Again, if there is an entity which is not a negation and has no beginning, it is not capable of being negated, but has an un-negated existence like the self. The self also cannot be designated by any predicate explaining its positiveness, except that it is not negated. It has been pointed out in the *Vivaraṇa* that it is immaterial whether an entity is beginningless or has a beginning; for in either case it may be destructible, provided that there is sufficient cause for its destruction. The general inference that a beginningless positive entity cannot cease has its exception in the special case of *ajñāna*, which would cease to exist with the dawn of *jñāna*. If it is urged that, since *ajñāna* is both beginningless and different from negation, it ought to persist eternally, like the self, it may also be urged on the opposite side that, since *ajñāna* is different also from "positive," it ought to be liable to destruction, like negation-precedent-to-production. To this the reply is that the inference is that no beginningless positive entity is confronted with anything which can oppose or destroy it. Any refutation of this argument must take the form of citing an instance where the concomitance fails, and not of any mere opposite assertion. No instance can be adduced to illustrate the assertion that the beginningless *ajñāna* can be removed by *jñāna*; for the removal of ignorance by knowledge is always with

reference to such ignorance as has a beginning in time, as in the case of silver-illusion. So all that could be said would be that whatever opposes ignorance destroys it, and such a general statement has no special application to the case of the supposed beginningless *ajñāna*. Again, if *ajñāna* is regarded as different from positive entity, then it is like negation, and its cessation would mean position once more. Again, *ajñāna* (or ignorance) cannot have any existence apart from its perception, and, since *ajñāna* has always as its basis the pure consciousness, its perception can never be negative, so that it can never cease to exist¹. Moreover, if *ajñāna* is false in the sense that it is non-existent in the locus in which it appears, it cannot be destroyed by knowledge. No one thinks that the illusory silver is destroyed by the perception of the conch-shell.

The second alternative definition of *ajñāna* is that it is the material cause of illusion. But according to the Śāṅkarite theory that there are different *ajñānas* corresponding to the different *jñānas*, the knowledge of the conch-shell would remove ignorance of it, and the knowledge of a negation would remove ignorance of it; but in neither of these cases can ignorance be defined as a constituent of illusion. Negation, in itself, has no constituent material cause, and thus it cannot have *ajñāna* as a constituent.

There is a Śāṅkarite view that *māyā* is the material cause of the world and Brahman is its locus. On such a view, *māyā* or *ajñāna* being the material cause of the world, and illusion (*bhrama*) being a part of the world, *ajñāna* becomes a constituent cause of *bhrama*, and not *vice versa*. On the other view, that both Brahman and *māyā* are causes of the world-appearance, *māyā* cannot by itself become the cause of illusion. Moreover, an illusion, being itself different from a positive entity, is more like negation and cannot have any constituent material of its own, and so it cannot itself be the constituent material of *ajñāna*. Moreover, on the Śāṅkarite view, the illusory object, "having no being" (*sad-vilakṣaṇatvena*), has no constituent, and so the illusory cannot be a constituent of *ajñāna*. If anything is to be a constituent of anything, it must be positively existing, and not merely different from non-existents. Again, whenever anything is a material stuff of other things, the former appears as a constant factor of the latter; but neither the illusory

¹ *pratiti-mātra-śarīrasya ajñānasya yāvat sva-viśaya-dhī-rūpa-sākṣi-sattvam anuvṛtti-niyamena nivṛtti-ayogāc ca. Nyāyāmṛta, p. 304.*

silver nor its knowledge appears as *ajñāna*. Thus the two definitions of *ajñāna* fail.

In reply to this Madhusūdana says that the *ajñāna* which forms the stuff of the illusory silver is the beginningless *ajñāna*. The *ajñāna* is called positive in the sense that it is different from the negative. It is for this reason that the *ajñāna* which is regarded as the material stuff of the illusory negation can be regarded as different from negation, and therefore it can be regarded as constituent of the illusory negation. It is by no means true that the effect must be of exactly the same stuff as the cause. Things which are absolutely similar in nature or absolutely dissimilar cannot be related to each other as cause and effect; it is for this reason that truth cannot be the material stuff of untruth. For in that case, since truth never ceases to manifest itself, and never suffers change, untruth also would never cease to manifest itself. The truth, however, can behave as the cause of untruth in the sense that it remains as the basis of the illusory changes of the untruth. It is wrong also to suppose that, since the *ajñāna* of Brahman cannot be removed through a *vṛtti*, which itself is a manifestation of *ajñāna*, Brahman-knowledge itself becomes impossible; for, so far as Brahman is a content, this *ajñāna* (as content) can be removed by a *vṛtti*. In the case of *jīvan-mukti*, though the ultimate cessation may be delayed through absence of the obstructive factors of the right *karmas* of the past and other conditions, these may well be regarded as liable to cessation through knowledge. Certain causes may produce certain effects; but that such production may be delayed for some reason does not invalidate the causal character of the cause. It is well admitted by the Śāṅkarites that knowledge directly removes *ajñāna*, the removal being itself a part of *ajñāna*.

It is wrong to suppose that whatever is imaginary must necessarily be an idea due to defects or must have a temporal beginning; but it must be a product which is simultaneous with the imagination that produces it¹.

It is also wrong to suppose that, if any entity is not positive, it must be negative or that, if it is not negative, it must be positive; for there is always scope for a third alternative, viz., that which is neither positive nor negative. According to the Śāṅkarites the

¹ *kalpitatva-mātram hi na doṣa-janya-dhī-mātra-śarīratve sādītve vā tantram. kimtu prātibhāsa-kalpaka-samānakālīna-kalpakatvaṃ. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 544.

principle of the excluded middle is a false premiss of logic, and thus they admit the possibility of an extra-logical category, that which is neither positive nor negative. The supposed inference that beginningless positive entity must necessarily be permanent, like the self, is false; for it is only in the case of self that beginningless positive entity is found eternally to persist.

It is also wrong to suppose that, since *ajñāna* is always manifested through pure consciousness, it can never cease to exist; for there is no law that whatever is manifested by the *sākṣi*-consciousness must remain during the whole period while the *sākṣi* persists; so there is no incongruity in supposing that the *ajñāna* ceases, while the *sākṣi*-consciousness persists. Moreover, the *avidyā* that becomes manifested is so only through the *sākṣi*-consciousness as modified or limited by it; such a limited consciousness may cease to exist with the cessation of the *avidyā*. It is also wrong to suppose that through the operation of the *vytti* the *avidyā* ceases to exist; for even in such cases it persists in its subtle causal form.

When *avidyā* is defined as being constituted of the stuff of illusion (*bhramopādāna*), what is meant is that it is changing and material. It is not necessary to suppose also that a cause and effect must necessarily be positive; for the self, which is a positive entity, is neither a cause nor an effect. What constitutes the defining characteristic of a material cause is that it is continuous with all its effects (*anvayi-kāraṇatvam upādānatve tantram*); and what is an effect must necessarily have a beginning in time. A negation-precedent-to-production of knowledge cannot be regarded as the material cause of illusion; for such negation can only produce the correlative positive entity with which it is connected. It cannot therefore be the cause of production of illusion; so there is no incongruity in supposing that *ajñāna* or illusion, neither of which is real, are related to each other as cause and effect. It is also not correct to contend that a material cause should always be found to persist as a perceivable continuous constituent of all its effects; the colour of the material cause of a jug is not found in the jug. The fact that, when the *ajñāna* is removed with the knowledge of the conch-shell, no illusion is experienced, is no proof that *ajñāna* is not a constituent of illusion. Not all things that are related as cause and effect are always experienced as such. Thus the definitions of *ajñāna* as *anādi-bhāva-rūpatve sati jñāna-nivartyatvam* or as *bhramopādānatvam* are valid.

Perception of *ajñāna* (ignorance).

The Śāṅkarites urge that *ajñāna* can be directly intuited by perception and that therefore its existence is attested by perception. In regard to this Vyāsa-tīrtha says that what is regarded as perception of ignorance as a positive entity is nothing more than negation of knowledge. Thus the substratum of the ego (*aham-artha*) is not admitted to be a support of the positive entity of ignorance. The apperception "I am ignorant" is to be explained therefore as being the experience of absence of knowledge and not of a positive ignorance (*ajñāna*). Again, since neither pleasure, pain, nor the illusory entities cognized in illusion are directly manifested by the *sākṣi*-consciousness, absence of such knowledge (e.g., "I do not know pleasure," "I do not know pain," "I do not know conch-shell-silver") is to be explained as negation of knowledge and not as due to an experience of positive ignorance. So also, when one says "I do not know what you say," there is only an experience of negation of knowledge and not of positive ignorance. In mediate knowledge also, since the illumination does not proceed by direct removal of the veil of *ajñāna* from the face of the object, the theory that all knowledge which does not involve the removal of *ajñāna* involves an intuition of positive ignorance would land us into the position that, when something is known in mediate knowledge, one should feel as if he did not know it, since no *ajñāna* is directly removed here.

On the Śāṅkarite view it is not admitted that there is any veil covering material objects; consequently the explanation of the experience of ignorance in such cases as "I do not know what you say" is to be found in the supposition, not of a positive ignorance, but of absence of knowledge. It may be contended that, though there may not be any *ajñāna* veiling the objects, yet these very material creations represent the creative (*vikṣepa*) part of *ajñāna* and so the experience of the unknown objects represents an experience of positive *ajñāna*, since *ajñāna* creations do not always arrest knowledge. Thus, for instance, when a jug is known as a jug, if someone says that it is a cloth and not a jug, that does not produce a confusion in the perceiver of the jug, though the delusive words of the speaker must be supposed to produce a false im-

pression—a *vikṣepa* of *ajñāna*. It will be shown later that the experience “I do not know” with reference to a material object does not refer to pure consciousness as limited by material qualities¹. On the view which admits the *vr̥tti* in order to explain the reflection of pure consciousness no *ajñāna* can be admitted as veiling the consciousness under material limitations. Moreover, if the experience “I am ignorant” (*aham ajñāḥ*) is explained as being a direct intuition of *ajñāna* and, as such, different from the experience “there is no knowledge in me” (*māyī jñānaṃ nāsti*), then the two propositions “the ground without the jug” and “there is no jug in the ground” are different in meaning, which is absurd; for certainly the two propositions do not differ in meaning, any more than any other two propositions, e.g., “I have a desire” and “I have no antipathy.” There is no difference between the two concepts of absence of knowledge and ignorance. Again, when one is engaged in Vedāntic discipline for the attainment of Brahma-knowledge, there is at that time the negation-precedent-to-the-production of Brahma-knowledge; for, if it were not so, then there would be the Brahma-knowledge and there would be no necessity for Vedāntic discipline. Now a negation-precedent-to-production cannot be known without the knowledge of the entity to which it refers. If this is admitted, then without the knowledge of Brahman there cannot be any knowledge of its negation-precedent-to-production; and, if there is knowledge, then Brahman becomes known, and, if it is considered that such a negation of Brahma-knowledge is known as a positive entity by direct intuition (as it would be on the theory of the direct intuition of *ajñāna*), then Brahman also would be known directly at the stage of the negation precedent to it, which is self-contradictory.

Moreover, the concept of *ajñāna* is clearly that of negation of knowledge, as in the sentence “I do not know.” Even in cases when one says “I am ignorant” the sense of negation is apparent, though there is no negative particle. The *Vivaraṇa* also admits the opposition of *ajñāna* to knowledge; and, if this were admitted, then with the knowledge of such opposition there would not be knowledge of ignorance as a positive entity, and without such knowledge of opposition there will be no knowledge of *ajñāna*, that being the

¹ *jaḍe na jñānamīty anubhavasya jaḍāvachchinnaṃ caitanyaṃ viśaya iti cen na, nirasiṣyamāṇatvāt. Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 309(c).

essential concept of *ajñāna*. Even a negation of knowledge which has a reference to the object of which there is the negation may also have no such reference when it is taken up as being itself an object of the enquiry of knowledge. Thus there is no way in which *ajñāna* can be regarded as anything but a negation of knowledge; and the supposition that *ajñāna*, though in its analytical concept it involves two constituents—knowledge and its negation—yet is only a name for a positive concept which does not involve these constituents, is wrong¹. If *ajñāna* can be removed by *ṛtti* knowledge, it is unnecessary to suppose that it has any other meaning different from that involved in its constituent negative particle qualifying knowledge. Experience also shows that *ajñāna* has no other meaning than the negation of knowledge; so, unless the entity which is the defining reference of *ajñāna* is known, there cannot be any knowledge of *ajñāna*. But such a defining reference being Brahma-knowledge which has no *ajñāna* associated with it, the inclusion of the defining reference would make the concept impossible: hence there cannot be any knowledge of *ajñāna*².

The reply made by the Śāṅkarites is that the defining reference of *ajñāna* is Brahma-knowledge and this Brahma-knowledge as *sākṣi*-consciousness, being the manifest of *ajñāna*, is not opposed to it; for it is only the *ṛtti* shade mind that is opposed to *ajñāna*. So, there being no opposition between the Brahma-knowledge as *sākṣi*-consciousness and the *ajñāna*, it is quite possible to have a knowledge of *ajñāna* in spite of the fact that Brahma-knowledge becomes in a sense its constituent as a defining reference. But it may be pointed out in reply that the awareness of Brahma-knowledge is the *sākṣi*-consciousness; the experience "I do not know" is a negation of *ṛtti* knowledge and, as such, it may be referred to the *sākṣi*-consciousness even when there is no *ṛtti* knowledge. Thus the solution in the theory that *ajñāna* is nothing but negation of knowledge would be just the same as in the theory of *ajñāna* as positive entity. If it is contended that, though denial of knowledge may be related to the defining reference in a general manner, yet it may, in its specific form, appear as a mere positive ignorance

¹ *jñānābhāvo'pi hi prameyatvādinājñāne pratiyogy-ādi-jñānānapekṣa etena nipuṇe kuśalādi-śabdavat bhāva-rūpa-jñāne ajñānaśabdo rūḍha iti nirastam. Nyāyāmṛta, p. 312.*

² *api ca bhāva-rūpājñānāvachchedaka-viśayasyājñāne ajñāna-jñānāyogāt jñāne ca ajñānaśābhabhāvāt katham bhāva-rūpājñānajñānam. Ibid. p. 313.*

without involving such an explicit relation to the defining reference—to this the reply is that, even if this contention is admitted, it does not lend any support to the admission of a positive ignorance; for even in the case of a negation of knowledge one may well admit that, though it may be generally related to a defining reference, yet in any specific case it may not always involve such a reference. It is further urged by some that an entity may be known directly and that such knowledge may not involve always the specific defining relations of that entity; it is only the latter type of knowledge which makes doubt impossible. But the fact that there may be doubt regarding an object that is known shows clearly that an object may be known without its specific and negative relations being manifested at the same time.

Moreover, if *ajñāna* cannot be grasped by the *vyrtti* knowledge, then there also cannot be any possibility of inference regarding *ajñāna*. When one says “you do not know the secret,” the hearer to whom the secret is presented through a mediate cognitional state would not be able to have the awareness of the *ajñāna*, if the *ajñāna* could not be presented through a *vyrtti* cognition. It cannot be said that the mediate cognitional state is not opposed to *ajñāna*; for, if that were so, then even when an entity was known through a mediate cognition he might have had the experience that he did not know it. It is admitted by the Śāṅkarites that the *vyrtti* of direct intuition through perception is opposed to *ajñāna*; and, if *vyrtti* of mediate cognition also is opposed to *ajñāna*, then there is no mental state through which *ajñāna* can be known.

The experience in deep dreamless sleep, “I did not know anything so long,” also refers to absence of knowledge, and not to any positive ignorance. It cannot be said that, since at that time all other knowledge has ceased (there being no awareness of the perceiver or of any other content), there cannot be any awareness regarding the absence of knowledge; for the objection would be the same with regard to the experience of positive ignorance. If it is urged that in that state *ajñāna* is experienced directly as a positive entity, but its relationing with regard to its special defining reference becomes apparent in the waking state, the same explanation may equally well be given if the experience in the dreamless sleep be regarded as being that of absence of knowledge; for negation of knowledge may also be experienced as a knowable

entity without any relation to its defining reference; or the so-called experience of ignorance may be explained as an inference of the absence of knowledge, in the dreamless state, made from physical and physiological conditions in the waking state. In the Śāṅkarite view also, since the ego cannot be experienced in that state, the experience “I did not know anything” must be regarded as being in some sense illusory. If it is urged that in the dreamless state *ajñāna*, being reflected through a state of *avidyā* (*avidyā-vṛtti*), is intuited by the *sākṣi*-consciousness, then it might equally well be intuited in the same manner in the waking state also. If it is regarded as being intuited directly by the *sākṣi*-consciousness, then, being an eternal cognition, it would have no root-impression (*saṃskāra*) and could not be remembered. Moreover, if it is not agreed that the absence of knowledge in the dreamless state is a matter of inference from conditions in the waking state, then the absence of knowledge in the dreamless state cannot in any other way be proved; for it cannot be inferred from a positive *ajñāna*, since the negation of knowledge, being material (*jaḍa*), has no *ajñāna* associated with it as a veiling factor. Moreover, if from *ajñāna*, a positive entity, the negation of knowledge can always be inferred, then from the negation of attachment in the dreamless state positive antipathy will have to be inferred. Thus the *ajñāna* can never be regarded as being susceptible of direct intuition.

Madhusūdana's reply is that, though the ego perceived cannot be a support of the *ajñāna*, yet, since the *antaḥkaraṇa* in its causal form is falsely identified with the pure consciousness which is the support of the *ajñāna*, the *ajñāna* appears to be associated with the ego perceived. This explains the experience in the dreamless sleep, “I did not know anything.” In the case of the experience “I do not know the jug” also, though there cannot be any veil on the jug, yet, since *ajñāna* has for its support consciousness limited by the jug-form, there is the appearance that the jug-form itself is the object of the veil of *ajñāna*. The objection that in the mediated cognition, there being the veil of *ajñāna* on the object, there ought to be the negation of awareness is also invalid; for, when the *ajñāna* is removed from the knower, the enlightenment of knowledge cannot be obstructed by the presence of the *ajñāna* in the object.

The objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha that *ajñāna* is only a negation of knowledge and that therefore, instead of admitting *ajñāna* as

existing as a positive entity in the perceiver, it is better to admit the negation of knowledge only, is invalid; for the experience of negation of knowledge is invalid in this form, because negation implies the defining reference as a constituent. In order to know that "there is no knowledge in me" there must be a knowledge of knowledge in me, which is self-contradictory. The experience of negation of knowledge in the perceiver without involving any relation to a defining reference can only be valid in the case of positive *ajñāna*. A specific negation can never appear as a universal negation; for, if this were admitted, then even when there is a particular book on the table there may be an experience of there being no book on the table; since according to the proposed theory of the opponent a specific negation of this or that book is to appear as universal negation. Madhusūdana urges that what constitutes the difference between negations is not a difference between negations *per se*, but is due to the difference among the defining references which are a constituent in them. It is thus impossible that the experience of one's ignorance could be explained on the supposition that such an experience referred to experience of negation; for it has already been shown that such negation can be neither specific nor universal. So the experience of ignorance is to be regarded as the experience of a positive entity.

It may however be contended that the concept of *ajñāna* also involves a reference by way of opposition to knowledge and thus implies knowledge as its constituent, so that all the objections raised against the concept of negation apply equally well to the concept of *ajñāna*. The reply is that on the Śāṅkarite view the pure *sākṣi*-consciousness grasps at the same time both *ajñāna* and the object as veiled by it without consequent destruction or contraction of either of them. Thus there is no chance of any self-contradiction; for the awareness of *ajñāna* does not involve any process which negates it¹. If it is contended by the opponent that in the case of the awareness of negation also a similar reply is possible (on the assumption that the object of negation is directly known by the *sākṣi*-consciousness), Madhusūdana's reply is that, since *ajñāna* can be known by *sākṣi*-consciousness, its defining reference is also

¹ *pramāṇa-vṛtti-nivartyasyāpi bhāva-rūpājñānasya sākṣi-vedyasya virodhinirūpaka-jñāna-tad-vyāvartaka-viśaya-grāhakeṇa sākṣiṇā tat-sādhakena tad-anāśād vyāhaty-anupapatteḥ. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 550.

intuited thereby—in the same manner; but, since negations are not intuited directly by the *sākṣi*-consciousness, but only through the *pramāṇa* of non-perception, the defining reference of *ajñāna* also cannot be intuited by the *sākṣi*. It cannot be contended that negation no less than knowledge may be manifested by the *sākṣi*-consciousness; for knowledge implies the non-existence of negation, and so the two cannot be manifested by *sākṣi*-consciousness at the same time; but unproduced knowledge may appear in a qualitative relation to *ajñāna*, since, the relation being qualitative, there is no contradiction between the two, and this explains the possibility of the knowledge of *ajñāna*. The Śāṅkarites do not admit that the knowledge of a qualified entity presupposes the knowledge of the quality; and so the objection that, the entity which forms the defining relation of *ajñāna* not being previously known, *ajñāna* cannot have such defining reference as its adjectival constituent is invalid¹.

An objection may be raised to the effect that, since Brahma-knowledge is to be attained by a definite course of discipline, so long as that is not passed through there is a negation-precedent-to-Brahma-knowledge; and admission of such a negation exposes the Śāṅkarites to all the criticisms which they wished to avoid. The reply is to be found in the view that instead of admitting a negation-precedent here the Śāṅkarites assume that there may either be knowledge of Brahman or *ajñāna* relating to it, i.e., instead of admitting a negation-precedent-to-Brahma-knowledge, they admit a positive ignorance regarding Brahma-knowledge; and thus there is no contradiction.

Vyāsa-tīrtha's contention is that negation of an entity does not necessarily imply the knowledge of any particular entity in its specific relations as a constituent of the knowledge of it, and such knowledge may arise without any specific reference to the particularities of the defining reference. In such experience as "I do not know" no specific defining reference is present to the mind and there is only a reference to entities in general. On such a view, since the knowledge of the defining reference is not a constituent of the knowledge of negation, there is no contradiction on the ground

¹ *na ca avacchedakasya viśayādeḥ prāgajñāne katham tad-viśiṣṭajñāna-jñānam. viśeṣaṇa-jñānādhīnatvād viśiṣṭa-jñānasyeti vācyam viśeṣaṇa-jñānasya viśiṣṭa-jñāna-jñānatve mānābhāvāt. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 550.

that, since negation is affirmed with regard to the defining reference, its presence as a constituent is impossible. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that no negation of any particular entity can appear merely in a general reference without regard to the specific relations of that particular entity. If it is urged that no negation-precedent can appear in association with the specific particularities of the defining reference as a constituent and that all negations-precedent can appear only in a general reference, the criticism is answered by Madhusūdana to the effect that such negations-precedent as are associated only with the general reference to their defining character are impossible¹. The opponent of Madhusūdana is supposed to argue that the nature of the defining reference in a negation involves only that particular content which is a character inherent in the thing or things negated. Such characters, forming the content of the knowledge of negation, may indeed constitute the defining limit as such of a thing or things negated; but such an objective reference is wholly irrelevant for the knowledge of any negation. What is essential in the knowledge of the negation is the content, which, indeed, involves the character associated with the things negated, and so the defining reference involved in the knowledge of negation has reference only to such characters as are psychologically patent in experience and do not imply that they are objectively the defining characters of the things negated. Thus, since on such a view the knowledge of negation does not involve as a constituent the things negated, there is no such contradiction as is urged by the Śāṅkarites. As to this Madhusūdana says that such a reply does not provide any escape from the strictures already made by him; for the opponents seem to think that it is sufficient if the defining reference involved in a negation is regarded as a defining character of the knowledge of negation and does not involve the supposition that at the same time it is also the defining character of the objects negated, and they hold that in a knowledge of negation the particular entity that is negated does not appear in its specific character, but only generically, and, if this were so, then, even when an object is present in a spot as a particular, there may be an experience of negation of it in a general manner, since according to the opponents' supposition particular negations always appear

¹ *pratiyogitāvacchedaka-prakāra-ññānābhāvena prāg-abhāva-pratitir asid-dhāva. Ibid. p. 552.*

only generically. Thus, when one says "I have no knowledge," if knowledge here has only a generic reference, the proposition is absurd, since the knowledge of not having knowledge is itself a knowledge, and in the proposition the negation of knowledge, having a general reference, contradicts the very supposition of not having knowledge.

It may be urged that, if the above criticisms against the knowledge of negation be valid, then the same would apply to negation-precedent also. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that there is no necessity to admit "negation-precedent"; for the real meaning of the so-called negation-precedent is future production, which, again, means nothing more than that time-entity which is not qualified by any object or its destruction—such object being that which is supposed to be the defining reference of the so-called negation-precedent. This is also the meaning of futurity¹. It must be noted in this connection that production must be defined as a specific relation which stands by itself; for it cannot be defined in terms of negation-precedent, since the negation-precedent can be defined only in terms of production, and thus, if negation-precedent is made a constituent of the definition of production, this entails a vicious circle. So, even if negation-precedent be admitted, it would be difficult to show how it could be intuited; and, on the other hand, one loses nothing by not admitting negation-precedent as a separate category. The negation involved in a negation-precedent is equivalent, so far as merely the negation is concerned, to the absence of the negated object at a particular point of time, which, again, has for its content a specific negation limited by a particular time, where the specific object appears only in a generic relation. An analysis of this shows that in negation-precedent (*prāg-abhāva*) there is negation of a specific object as limited by the present, yet that specific object does not appear in its character as specific and particular, but only in a generic manner². The dilemma here is that negation of a specific object (*viśeṣābhāva*) cannot have for the content of its defining reference merely the generic character of the thing negated, without involving any of its particularities; and, if

¹ *bhaviṣyatvaṃ ca pratiyogi-tad-dhvaṃsānādhāra-kāla-sambandhitvaṃ. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 552.

² *ihe dānim ghaṭo nāstīti pratītiḥ tu sāmānya-dharmāvacchinna-pratiyogitāka-tat-kālāvacchinna-yāvad-viśeṣābhāva-viśayā. Ibid.* p. 553.

this is so, then there cannot be any negation-precedent involving this condition. Again, if the possibility of such a contingency be admitted, then general negation (*sāmānyābhāva*) is impossible; for no negation limited by any kind of particularity either of time or of object would be entitled to be called a general negation. Thus both the negation-precedent and the general negation appear to be interdependent in their conception, and so thwart each other that neither of them can be admitted. The main contention of Madhusūdana in all these cases is that no specific object can as defining reference in any negation appear only in a generic nature devoid of relation to particularity. Thus, when one says "I do not know," the experience involved in such a proposition is not that of the negation of a particular object appearing only in a generic aspect. If this contention is admitted, then the experience involved in "I do not know" cannot be interpreted as being one of general negation.

Again, it is a matter of common experience that the mere locus of the negation can itself furnish the awareness of negation; thus the bare spot is also the negation of the jug on it. Looked at from this point of view, even positive entities may yield a comprehension of negation. It is wrong to suggest that the nature of the defining reference defines the nature of the negation; for, if this were so, then it would have been impossible that the different negations, such as negation-precedent, destruction, etc., should be classed as different, since they all have the same defining reference. According to the view of Madhusūdana the differences of negation are due to illusory impositions no less than are differences in positive entities.

Even if it is held that there is only one negation, which under different conditions appears as diverse, the Śāṅkarites will have nothing to object to; for according to them both negation and position are but illusory impositions. But Madhusūdana points out that, since the experience "I am ignorant" does not (even under the trenchant analysis undergone above) disclose as its origin any negation, it must be admitted that it is due to the experience of the positive entity of *ajñāna*.

So Madhusūdana further urges that the apperception in the waking state of the experience of the dreamless sleep, viz., "I did not know anything so long," refers to a positive *ajñāna*. Now, if this apperception be an inference, the opponent points out that it

may be an inference of negation of knowledge and not of positive ignorance. For one may well infer that, since he existed and during the interval between the two waking stages had a state of mind, that state must have been a state of absence of knowledge. The apperception cannot be said to be mere memory; for memory can only be through root-impressions. The intuition of the *sākṣi*-consciousness being eternal, no root-impression can be produced by such knowledge; for the mechanism of root-impressions is only a psychological device for producing memory by such cognitions as are transitory. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the apperception under discussion cannot be called an inference; for the inference is based on the ground that the sleeper had a mental state during the dreamless condition. But, if he had no knowledge at the time, it is impossible for him to say that he was at that time endowed with any specific mental state. It also cannot be said that negation of knowledge during dreamless sleep can be inferred from the fact that at that time there was no cause for the production of knowledge; for the absence of such cause can be known only from the absence of knowledge (and *vice versa*), and this involves a vicious circle. Nor can it be said that absence of cause of knowledge can be inferred from the blissful condition of the senses, which could happen only as a consequence of the cessation of their operation; for there is no evidence that the cessation of the operation of the senses would produce the blissful condition. It must be noted in this connection that intuition of *ajñāna* is always associated with absence of knowledge; so that in every case where there is an intuition of *ajñāna* the inference of absence of knowledge would be valid. The so-called non-perception is really an inference from positive *ajñāna*; thus, when one has perceived in the morning an empty yard, he can infer from the absence of the knowledge of an elephant in it the fact of his positive ignorance of an elephant there. Thus the apperception of absence of knowledge can be explained as inference. It can also be explained as a case of memory. The objection that the intuition of *ajñāna* cannot have any root-impression is also invalid; for the *ajñāna* which is the object of the *sākṣi*-consciousness during dreamless sleep is itself a reflection through a *vṛtti* of *ajñāna*, since it is only under such conditions that *ajñāna* can be an object of *sākṣi*-consciousness. Since a *vṛtti* is admitted in the intuition of *ajñāna*, with the cessation of the *vṛtti*

there must be a root-impression and through that there can be memory of the *ṛtti*, as in the case of the memory of any other cognition¹. It cannot be contended that, if *ajñāna* requires for its cognition a *ṛtti* state, then, if there is no such *ṛtti*, there may be doubt regarding *ajñāna*; for there cannot be any *ajñāna* regarding *ajñāna*, and doubt itself, being a modification of *ajñāna*, has the same scope as *ajñāna*. It cannot be urged that, like *ajñāna*, negation may also be perceived by the *sākṣi*-consciousness; for, since negation is always associated with its defining reference, it cannot be intuitively perceived by the indeterminate intuitive *sākṣi*-consciousness. Though *ajñāna* involves an opposition to knowledge, yet the opposition is not as such intuited in the dreamless state. Madhusūdana says that it is contended that, since there is a continuous succession of *ajñāna* states, from the dreamless condition to the waking stage (for in the waking state also all cognitions take place by reflection through *ajñāna* states), there is no occasion for a memory of the dreamless intuition of *ajñāna*; for through *saṃskāras* memory is possible on the destruction of a *ṛtti* state of cognition. To this the reply is that the *ajñāna* state of dreamless condition is of a specific nature of darkness (*tamasī*) which ceases with sleep, and hence there is no continuity of succession between this and the ordinary cognitive states in the waking condition. From one point of view, however, the contention is right; for it may well be maintained that in the dreamless state *ajñāna* exists in its causal aspect, and thus, since the *ajñāna* is the material for experience of both dreamless sleep and waking state, there is in reality continuity of succession of *ajñāna*, and thus there cannot be any memory of dreamless experience of *ajñāna*. It is for this reason that Sureśvara has discarded this view. The view taken by the author of the *Vivaraṇa* follows the conception of sleep in the *Yoga-sūtras*, where a separate *ṛtti* in the dreamless state is admitted. Thus the experience of the dreamless state may well be described as relating to experience of positive *ajñāna*.

¹ *ajñānasyājñāna-ṛtti-prativimbita-sākṣi-bhāsyatvena ṛtti-nāśād eva saṃskāropapattih. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 557.

Inference of *ajñāna*.

It is held by Prakāśānanda in his *Vivaraṇa* that *ajñāna* can be inferred; the form of the inference that he suggests is: "A valid cognition is associated with a positive veil upon its object, which veil is removable by the cognition itself, and such a veil is different from the negation-precedent of its self."¹ Vyāsa-tīrtha, in refuting this inference, starts by criticizing the concept of the minor term (*pakṣa*, i.e., *pramāṇa-jñāna*). He says that according to the above form of inference consciousness of pleasure, which is a valid cognition, should also appear after removing the veil on itself, but the pleasure-consciousness, being of the nature of *sākṣi*-consciousness, is unable (according to the theory of the Śāṅkarites themselves) to remove *ajñāna*. If the concept of the minor term is narrowed to *ṛtti-jñāna*, or cognitive states in general, then also it is not possible; for, if a mediate cognitive state be supposed to remove the veil upon its object, that would mean that there is a direct revelation of intuitive consciousness through the object, which would be the same as saying that mediate cognition is perception. If the concept of the minor be narrowed down to immediate perception, then the above definition would not apply to mediate cognition, which is a valid cognition. Even in the case of the immediate cognition of error there is an element of the intuition of "being" to which also the above definition would apply; for certainly that does not manifest itself after removing a veil of non-being, since the intuition of being is universal. Moreover, if that could remove the *ajñāna*, then *ajñāna* would have no being and so could not be the material cause of illusion. The *ajñāna* which has "being" for its support is regarded as the material cause of illusion, but is never the object of illusion itself. If the concept of the minor is further narrowed, so as to mean merely the cognitive states, excluding the underlying "being," then in the case of successive awareness of the same entity the awareness at the second and third moments cannot be supposed to remove the veil itself, since that was removed by the first awareness. If the concept of the

¹ *vivāda-gocarāpannam pramāṇa-jñānam sva-prāg-abhāva-vyatirikta-sva-viśayāvaraṇa-sva-nivartya-sva-deśa-gata-vastu-antara-pūrvakam bhavitum arhati aprakāśitārtha-prakāśakatvād andhakāre prathamotpanna-pradīpa-prabhāvad iti. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 13.

minor term is further narrowed, so as to mean merely the direct cognition of the material object, then also, since the Śāṅkarites do not admit that there are veils on the object, the object-cognition cannot be regarded as having removed such a veil. If in answer to this it is held that the mental state, e.g., the cognition of jug, involves a limitation of the pure consciousness by the jug-form and, since the *ajñāna* has the same scope as the above limitation, the removal of the veil on the jug-form limitation means also the removal of the veil of *ajñāna* to that extent, the reply is, first, that on the view that there is only one *ajñāna* the above explanation does not hold; secondly, since the pure consciousness, limited in any form, is not self-luminous, it cannot, according to the Śāṅkarites, be associated with a veil, which can only be associated with the pure self-luminous consciousness. Moreover, if the removal of the veil is spoken of as having reference only to material objects, then, since the verbal proposition "this is a jug" has the same content as the jug itself, the removal of the veil with reference to the material object—the jug—which has the same content as the mediate verbal proposition, ought not to take place.

Again, since on the Śāṅkarite view the *vyrtti*-knowledge is itself false, there cannot be any possibility that illusory objects should be imposed upon it. On the other hand, if the pure consciousness, as manifested by the *vyrtti*, be synonymous with knowledge, then, since such a consciousness is the support of *ajñāna*, it cannot be regarded as removing *ajñāna*. Thus the requirement of the inference that knowledge establishes itself by removing *ajñāna* fails; further, the requirement of the definition that the veil that is removed has the same location as the knowledge fails, since the *ajñāna* is located in pure consciousness, whereas the cognition is always of the conditioned consciousness.

The inference supposes that there is a removal of the veil because there is a manifestation of the unmanifested; but this cannot hold good, since the Brahma-knowledge cannot be manifested by any thing other than pure consciousness, and the self-luminous, which is the basis of all illusions, is ever self-manifested, and thus there is no possibility here of the unmanifested being manifested. Moreover, if the *ajñāna* be a positive entity existing from beginningless time, then it would be impossible that it should be removed. It is also impossible that that which is a veil should be beginning-

less. So it is possible to have such counter-arguments as that beginninglessness can never be associated with veils, since it exists only as beginningless, like the negation-precedent; or that a valid knowledge can never remove anything else than negation, because it is knowledge. The manifestation of the unmanifested does not imply any positive fact of unmanifestation, but may signify only an absence of manifestation. Moreover, the light manifests the jug, etc., by removing darkness, because light is opposed to darkness, but the manifestation of knowledge cannot be opposed to *ajñāna*; for pure consciousness underlying the objects is not opposed to *ajñāna*. The opposition of *ṛtti* to *ajñāna* is irrelevant; for *ṛtti* is not knowledge. What may be said concerning the rise of a new cognition is that it removes the beginningless negation of the knowledge of an object of any particular person.

Madhusūdana in reply says that the term "valid knowledge," which is the minor term, has to be so far restricted in meaning that it applies only to the *ṛtti*-knowledge and not to the *sākṣi*-consciousness which reveals pleasure or bliss; the *ṛtti*-knowledge also has to be further narrowed down in its meaning so as to exclude the substantive part (*dharmy-amśa*) of all cognitions, the "this" or the "being" which is qualified by all cognitive characters. *Pramāṇajñāna*, or valid knowledge, which is inferred as removing a veil, means therefore only the cognitive characters revealed in the *ṛtti*. Even in the case of *parokṣa* (mediate knowledge) there is the removal of its veil, consisting in the fact of its non-existence to the knower; which veil being removed, the object of the mediate cognition is revealed to the knower. Thus the valid cognition includes the cognitive characters as appearing both in mediate and in immediate *ṛttis*. The reason for the exclusion of the substantive part, or the "this," from the concept of valid knowledge under discussion is apparent from the fact that there is no error or illusion regarding the "this"; all errors or doubts can happen only with regard to the cognitive characters. The "this" is as self-existent as the experience of pleasure. There cannot, therefore, be any such objection as that in their case also there is a revelation of the unknown and therefore a removal of the veil. If, however, it is urged that, though there may not be any error or doubt regarding the "this," yet, since there remains the fact that it was first unknown, and then known, and therefore it involves the removal of a

veil, there would be objection on the part of the Śāṅkarites to admitting such a removal, which may well be effected by the cognitive state or the *pramāṇa-vṛtti*. In such a case, however, the removal of the veil is not of the ordinary nature; for this *ajñāna*, which consists only in the fact that the entity is unknown, is different from the *ajñāna* the extent and limit of which can be regarded as a positive ignorance having the same defining reference as the object of cognition. In this view, therefore, the *ajñāna* is to be defined as that which has the capacity of producing errors, since there cannot be any error with regard to the substantive part, the "this." The fact that it remains unknown until cognized involves no *ajñāna* according to our definition. Thus it may well be supposed that in the case of the cognition of the "this" there is, according to the definition contemplated in the scheme of the inference of *ajñāna* under discussion, no removal of *ajñāna*.

In the case of continuous perception, though the object may remain the same, yet a new time-element would be involved in each of the succeeding moments, and the removal of the veil may be regarded as having a reference to this new factor. It is well known that according to the Śāṅkarites time can be perceived by all the *pramāṇas*. Again, the objection that, since material objects can have no veil and since the *ajñāna* cannot be said to hide pure consciousness which is its support, it is difficult to say which of these is veiled by *ajñāna*, is not valid; for, though the pure consciousness exists in its self-shining character, yet for its limited appearance, as "it exists," "it shines," *ajñāna* may be admitted to enforce a limitation or veiling and to that extent it may be regarded as a veil upon that pure consciousness. Madhusūdana further adds arguments in favour of the view that *ajñāna* can be inferred; these are of a formal nature and are, therefore, omitted here.

The theory of Avidyā refuted.

Vyāsa-tīrtha says that it cannot be assumed that an entity such as the *avidyā* must exist as a substratum of illusion, since otherwise illusions would be impossible; for it has been shown before that the definition of *avidyā* as the material cause of illusion is untenable. Moreover, if it is held that illusions such as the conch-shell-silver are made out of a stuff, then there must also be a producer who

works on the stuff to manufacture the illusions. Neither God nor the individual can be regarded as being such a producer; nor can the changeless Brahman be considered to be so. Again, *avidyā*, being beginningless, ought to be as changeless as Brahman. Moreover, if Brahman be regarded as the material cause of the world, there is no necessity for admitting the existence of *avidyā*; for under the Śāṅkarite supposition Brahman, though not changing, may nevertheless well be the basis of the illusions imposed upon it. If that were not so, then *avidyā*, which needs a support, would require for the purpose some entity other than Brahman. It may be suggested that the supposition of *avidyā* is necessary for the purpose of explaining the changing substratum of illusion; for Brahman, being absolutely true, cannot be regarded as the material cause of the false illusion, since an effect must have for its cause an entity similar to it. But, if that is so, then Brahman cannot be regarded as the cause of the sky or other physical elements which are unreal in comparison with Brahman. It cannot be urged that, since the individual and the Brahman are identical in essence, without the assumption of *avidyā* the limited manifestation of bliss in the individual would be inexplicable; for the very supposition that Brahman and the individual are identical is illegitimate, and so there is no difficulty in explaining the unlimited and limited manifestation of bliss, in Brahman and the individual, because they are different.

Madhusūdana in reply to the above says that *antaḥkāraṇa* (or mind) cannot be regarded as the material cause of illusion; first, because the *antaḥkāraṇa* is an entity in time, whereas illusions continue in a series and have no beginning in time; secondly, the *antaḥkāraṇa* is in its processes always associated with real objects of the world, and would, as such, be inoperative in regard to fictitious conch-shell-silver—and, if this is so, then without the supposition of *avidyā* there would be no substratum as the material cause of *avidyā*. Brahman also, being unchangeable, cannot be the cause of such illusion. It cannot be suggested that Brahman is the cause of illusion in its status as basis or locus of illusion; for, unless the cause which transforms itself into the effect be admitted, the unchanging cause to which such effects are attributed itself cannot be established¹, since it is only when certain transformations have

¹ *na ca vivartādhisthānatvena śukty-āder ivopādānatvam avidyām antareṇā-tāttvikaṇyathā-bhāva-lakṣaṇasya vivartasambhavaḥ. Advaita-siddhi, p. 573.*

been effected that they are referred to a certain ground or basis as belonging to it.

Again, if *ajñāna* be itself invalid, as the Śāṅkarites say, it is impossible that it should be amenable to the different valid means of proof. If it is contended that *ajñāna* has only an empirical existence (*vyāvahārika*), then it could not be the stuff of the ordinary illusory experience; for the stuff of the empirical cannot be the cause of the illusory, and there is no evidence that the *avidyā* is illusory. If it is contended that the valid means of proof serve only for negating the non-existence of *avidyā*, then the reply is that, since the *ajñāna* is grasped by the faultless *sākṣi*-consciousness, it must be admitted to be valid. It is wrong also to suppose that the means of proof negate only the non-existence of *ajñāna*; for, unless the nature of *ajñāna* could be known by inference, the negation of its non-existence could also not be known. It must also be noted that, when the valid means of proof reveal the *ajñāna*, they do so as if it were not an illusory conch-shell-silver known by the *sākṣi*-consciousness, but a valid object of knowledge, and they also do not reveal the non-existence of *ajñāna* in the locus of its appearance. Thus the valid means of proof by which *ajñāna* is supposed to be made known indicate its existence as a valid object of knowledge. The *avidyā*, therefore, may be regarded as non-eternal (being removable by knowledge), but not false or invalid. The statement of the Śāṅkarites, therefore, that *avidyā* is invalid by itself and yet is known by valid means of proof, is invalid.

If *avidyā* is apprehended by the pure faultless consciousness, it should be ultimately true, and it ought to persist after emancipation. It cannot be said that it may not persist after emancipation, since, its *esse* being its *percipi*, so long as its perception exists (as it must, being apprehended by the eternal pure consciousness) it also must exist. If it is held that *avidyā* is known through a *vr̥tti*, then the obvious difficulty is that the two conditions which can generate a *vr̥tti* are that of valid cognitive state (*pramāṇa*) or defects (*doṣa*), and in the case of the apprehension of *avidyā* neither of these can be said to induce the suitable *vr̥tti*. There being thus no possibility of a *vr̥tti*, there would be no apprehension of *avidyā* through the reflection of consciousness through it. Again, the *vr̥tti*, being itself an *avidyā* state, would itself require for its comprehension the help of pure consciousness reflected through another *vr̥tti*, and that

another, and so on; and, if it is urged that the comprehension of the *vr̥tti* does not stand in need of reflection through another *vr̥tti*, but is directly revealed by *sākṣi*-consciousness, then such a *vr̥tti* would be experienced even after emancipation. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive how an entity like *avidyā*, whose *esse* is *percipi*, can be regarded as capable of conditioning a *vr̥tti* by the reflection of the consciousness through which it can be known. For there is no *esse* of the thing before it is perceived, and according to the supposition it cannot be perceived unless it has a previous *esse*.

The reply of Madhusūdana is that the above objections are invalid, since the *ajñāna*, being perceived by the *sākṣi*-consciousness, which is always associated with the perceiver, has no such ontological appearance or revelation. In reply to some of the other criticisms Madhusūdana points out that, *avidyā* being a defect and being itself a condition of its own *vr̥tti*, the objections on these grounds lose much of their force.

Vyāsa-tīrtha says that the Śāṅkarites think that, since everything else but the pure consciousness is an imaginary creation of *avidyā*, the *avidyā* can have for its support only Brahman and nothing else. He points out that it is impossible that ignorance, which is entirely opposed to knowledge, should have the latter as its support. It may well be remembered that ignorance is defined as that which is removable by knowledge. It cannot be said that the opposition is between the *vr̥tti*-knowledge and *ajñāna*; for, if that were so, then *ajñāna* should be defined as that which is opposed to knowledge in a restricted sense, since *vr̥tti*-knowledge is knowledge only in a restricted sense (the real knowledge being the light of pure consciousness). If consciousness were not opposed to ignorance, there could not be any illumination of objects. The opposition of ignorance to knowledge is felt, even according to the Śāṅkarites, in the experience "I do not know." It is also well known that there is no ignorance with regard to pleasure or pain, which are directly perceived by the *sākṣi*. This is certainly due to the fact that pure consciousness annuls *ajñāna*, so that whatever is directly revealed by it has no *ajñāna* in it. It is contended that there are instances where one of the things that are entirely opposed to each other may have the other as its basis. Persons suffering from photophobia may ascribe darkness to sunshine, in which case darkness is seen to be based on sunshine; similarly, though knowledge and ignorance are

so much opposed, yet the latter may be supposed to be based on the former. To this the reply is that, following the analogy where a false darkness is ascribed to sunlight, one may be justified in thinking that a false *ajñāna* different from the *ajñāna* under discussion may be based on the pure consciousness. Moreover, the experience "I am ignorant" shows that the ignorance (*avidyā*) is associated with the ego and not with pure consciousness. It cannot be suggested that, both the ego and the ignorance being at the same time illusorily imposed on the pure consciousness, they appear as associated with each other, which explains the experience "I am ignorant"; for without first proving that the *ajñāna* exists in the pure consciousness the illusory experience cannot be explained, and without having the illusory experience first the association of *ajñāna* with pure consciousness cannot be established, and thus there would be a vicious circle. It is also wrong to suppose that the experience "I am ignorant" is illusory. Moreover, the very experience "I am ignorant" contradicts the theory that *ajñāna* is associated with pure consciousness, and there is no means by which this contradiction can be further contradicted and the theory that *ajñāna* rests on pure consciousness be supported. The notions of an agent, knower, or enjoyer are always associated with cognitive states and therefore belong to pure consciousness. If these notions were imposed upon the pure consciousness, the *ajñāna* would belong to it (which, being a false knower, is the same as the individual self or *jīva*), and, so would belong to *jīva*; this would be to surrender the old thesis that *ajñāna* belongs to pure consciousness. It is also not right to say that the *ajñāna* of the conch-shell belongs to the consciousness limited by it; it is always experienced that knowledge and ignorance both belong to the knower. If it is contended that what exists in the substratum may also show itself when that substratum is qualified in any particular manner, and that therefore the *ajñāna* in the pure consciousness may also show itself in the self or *jīva*, which is a qualified appearance of pure consciousness, to this the reply is that, if this contention is admitted, then even the pure consciousness may be supposed to undergo through its association with *ajñāna* the world-cycles of misery and rebirth.

The supposition that the *jīva* is a reflection and the impurities are associated with it as a reflected image and not with the Brahman, the reflector, is wrong; for, if the *ajñāna* is associated

with pure consciousness, it is improper to think that its effects should affect the reflected image and not Brahman. Moreover, the analogy of reflection can hold good only with reference to rays of light, and not with reference to consciousness. Again, if the *jīvas* be regarded as a product of reflection, this will necessarily have a beginning in time. Moreover, the reflection can occur only when that through which anything is reflected has the same kind of existence as the former. A ray of light can be reflected in the surface of water and not in mirage, because water has the same status of existence as the ray of light; but, if Brahman and *ajñāna* have not the same kind of existence, the former cannot be reflected in the latter. Moreover, *ajñāna*, which has no transparency, cannot be supposed to reflect Brahman. Again, there is no reason to suppose that the *ajñāna* should be predisposed to reflect the Brahman, and, if the *ajñāna* is transformed into the form of *ākāśa*, etc., it cannot also at the same time behave as a reflector. Moreover, just as apart from the face and its image through reflection there is no other separate face, so there is also no separate pure consciousness, apart from Brahman and the *jīva*, which could be regarded as the basis of *ajñāna*. Also it cannot be suggested that pure consciousness as limited by the *jīva*-form is the basis of the *ajñāna*; for without the reflection through *ajñāna* there cannot be any *jīva*, and without the *jīva* there cannot be any *ajñāna*, since on the present supposition the *ajñāna* has for its support the consciousness limited by *jīva*, and this involves a vicious circle. Again, on this view, since Brahman is not the basis of *ajñāna*, though it is of the nature of pure consciousness, it may well be contended that pure consciousness as such is not the basis of *ajñāna*, and that, just as the *jīva*, through association with *ajñāna*, undergoes the cycles of birth, so Brahman also may, with equal reason, be associated with *ajñāna*, and undergo the painful necessities of such an association.

The analogy of the mirror and the image is also inappropriate on many grounds. The impurities of the mirror are supposed to vitiate the image; but in the present case no impurities are directly known or perceived to exist in the *ajñāna*, which stands for the mirror; even though they may be there, being of the nature of root-impressions, they are beyond the scope of the senses. Thus, the view that the conditions which are perceived in the mirror are also reflected in the image is invalid.

It cannot be held that, just as in the Nyāya view the soul is associated with pain only through the intermediacy of body, so the pure consciousness may be regarded as associated with *ajñāna* in association with its limited form as *jīva*; for, since pure consciousness is itself associated with the mischievous element, the *ajñāna*, the attainment of Brahmanhood cannot be regarded as a desirable state.

Madhusūdana in reply says that pure consciousness, in itself not opposed to *ajñāna*, can destroy *ajñāna* only when reflected through modification of *ajñāna* as *vṛtti*, just as the rays of the sun, which illuminate little bits of paper or cotton, may burn them when reflected through a lens. It is wrong also to suppose that the ignorance has its basis in the ego; for the ego-notion, being itself a product of *ajñāna*, cannot be its support. It must, therefore, have as its basis the underlying pure consciousness. The experience "I am ignorant" is, therefore, to be explained on the supposition that the notion of ego and ignorance both have their support in the pure consciousness and are illusorily made into a complex. The ego, being itself an object of knowledge and removable by ultimate true knowledge, must be admitted to be illusory. If *ajñāna* were not ultimately based on pure consciousness, then it could not be removable by the ultimate and final knowledge which has the pure consciousness as its content. It is also wrong to suppose that the *ajñāna* qualifies the phenomenal knower; for the real knower is the pure consciousness, and to it as such the *ajñāna* belongs, and it is through it that all kinds of knowledge, illusory or relatively real, belong to it. The criticism that, there being *ajñāna*, there is the phenomenal knower, and, there being the phenomenal knower, there is *ajñāna*, is also wrong; for *ajñāna* does not depend for its existence upon the phenomenal knower. Their mutual association is due not to the fact that *avidyā* has the knower as its support, but that ignorance and the ego-notion are expressed together in one structure of awareness, and this explains their awareness. The unity of the phenomenal knower and the pure consciousness subsists only in so far as the consciousness underlying the phenomenal knower is one with pure consciousness. It is well known that, though a face may stand before a mirror, the impurities of the mirror affect the reflected mirror and not the face. The reflected image, again, is nothing different from the face itself; so,

though the pure consciousness may be reflected through impure *ajñāna*, impurities affect not the pure consciousness, but the *jīva*, which, again, is identical in its essence with the consciousness. It must be noted in this connection that there are two *ajñānas*, one veiling the knower and the other the object, and it is quite possible that in some cases (e.g., in mediate knowledge) the veil of the object may remain undisturbed as also the veil of the subject.

It is wrong to suppose that reflection can only be of visible objects; for invisible objects also may have reflection, as in the case of *ākāśa*, which, though invisible, has its blueness reflected in it from other sources. Moreover, that Brahman is reflected through *ajñāna* is to be accepted on the testimony of scripture. It is also wrong to contend that that which is reflected and that in which the reflection takes place have the same kind of existence; for a red image from a red flower, though itself illusory and having therefore a different status of existence from the reflecting surface of the mirror, may nevertheless be further reflected in other things. Moreover, it is wrong to suppose that *ajñāna* cannot be predisposed to reflect pure consciousness; for *ajñāna*, on the view that it is infinite, may be supposed to be able to reflect pure consciousness in its entirety; on the view that it is more finite than pure consciousness there is no objection that a thing of smaller dimensions could not reflect an entity of larger dimensions; the sun may be reflected in water on a plate. Moreover, it is not a valid objection that, if *ajñāna* has transformation into particular forms, it is exhausted, and therefore cannot reflect pure consciousness; for that fraction of *ajñāna* which takes part in transformation does not take part in reflection, which is due to a different part of *ajñāna*. Again, the criticism that, in contradistinction to the case of reflection of a neutral face appearing as many images, there is no neutral consciousness, apart from the *jīva* and Brahman, is ineffective; for the neutral face is so called only because the differences are not taken into account, so that the pure consciousness also may be said to be neutral when looked at apart from the peculiarities of its special manifestation through reflection.

It must be noted that the function of reflection consists in largely attributing the conditions (such as impurities, etc.) of the reflector to the images. This is what is meant by the phrase

upādheḥ pratibimba-pakṣapātītvaṃ (i.e., the conditions show themselves in the images). It is for this reason that the impurities of *ajñāna* may show themselves in the reflected *jīvas* without affecting the nature of pure consciousness.

Also it cannot be said that *māyā* is associated with Brahman; for, if this *māyā* be *ajñāna*, then the possibility of its association with Brahman has already been refuted. *Māyā*, being *ajñāna*, also cannot be regarded as a magical power whereby it is possible to show things which are non-existent (*aindrajalīkasyeva avidyā-māna-pradarśana-saktiḥ*); for, since *ajñāna* in general has been refuted, a specific appearance of it, as magic, cannot be admitted; also it is never seen that a magician demonstrates his magical feats through *ajñāna*. If *māyā* be regarded as a special power of Brahman by which He creates the diverse real objects of the world, then we have no objection to such a view and are quite prepared to accept it. If it is held that *māyā* is a power of deluding other beings, then, since before its application there are no beings, the existence of *māyā* is unjustifiable. Again, if such a power should be regarded as having a real existence, then it would break monism. If it be regarded as due to the false imagination of the *jīvas*, then it cannot be regarded as deluding these. If it be regarded as due to the false imagination of Brahman, then it must be admitted that Brahman has *ajñāna*, since without *ajñāna* there cannot be any false imagination.

The view of Vācaspati that *avidyā* resides in the *jīva* is also wrong—for, if *jīva* means pure consciousness, then the old objection holds good; if *jīva* means pure consciousness as limited by reflection from *ajñāna* or the *ajñāna*-product, the *buddhi*, then this involves a vicious circle; for without first explaining *avidyā* it is not possible to talk about its limitation. If it is said that *avidyā*, standing by itself without any basis, produces the *jīvas* through its reference to pure consciousness, and then, when the *jīva* is produced, resides in it, then it will be wrong to suppose that *avidyā* resides in the *jīva*; even the production of the *jīva* will be inexplicable, and the old objection of the vicious circle will still be the same. Nor can it be held that, the *jīva* and the *avidyā* being related to each other in a beginningless relation, the criticism of the vicious circle through mutual dependence is unavailing is not correct; for, if they do not depend on each other, they also cannot

determine each other. If the *ajñāna* and the *jīva* are not found to be related to each other in any of their operations, they also cannot depend upon each other; that which is entirely unrelated to any entity cannot be said to depend on it. It is held that the difference between *jīva* and Brahman consists in the fact of the former being a product of *avidyā*, and it is also held that the *avidyā* has the *jīva* as its basis, so that without the knowledge of *jīva* there cannot be *avidyā*, and without the knowledge of *avidyā* there cannot be any *jīva*.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the so-called vicious circle of mutual dependence is quite inapplicable to the case under discussion, since such mutual dependence does not vitiate the production, because such production is in a beginningless series. There is not also a mutual agency of making each other comprehensible; for, though the *ajñāna* is made comprehensible by pure consciousness, yet the latter is not manifested by the former. There is, further, no mutual dependence in existence; for, though the *ajñāna* depends upon pure consciousness for its existence, yet the latter does not depend upon the former. Madhusūdana further points out that according to Vācaspati it is the *ajñāna* of the *jīva* that creates both the *īśvara* and the *jīva*.

The *ajñāna* is supposed to veil the pure consciousness; but the pure consciousness is again supposed to be always self-luminous, and, if this is so, how can it be veiled? The veil cannot be of the *jīva*, since the *jīva* is a product of *ajñāna*; it cannot be of the material objects, since they are themselves non-luminous, so that no veil is necessary to hide them. The veiling of the pure consciousness cannot be regarded as annihilation of the luminosity of the self-luminous (*siddha-prakāśa-lopaḥ*); nor can it be regarded as obstruction to the production of what after it had come into existence would have proved itself to be self-luminous; for that whose essence is self-luminous can never cease at any time to be so. Moreover, since the self-luminosity is ever-existent, there cannot be any question regarding production of it which the *ajñāna* may be supposed to veil. Again, since it is the nature of knowledge to express itself as related to objects, it cannot stand in need of anything else in order to establish its relationing to the objects, and there cannot be any time when the knowledge will exist without relationing itself to the objects. Moreover, on the Śāṅkarite view

the pure consciousness, being homogeneous in its self-luminosity, does not stand in need of any relationing to objects which could be obstructed by the veil. Nor can it be said that the veil acts as an obstruction to the character of objects as known (*prākāṣya-pratibandha*); even according to the Śāṅkarites the *prākāṣya*, or the character of objects as known, is nothing but pure consciousness. It cannot be said that such awareness as "this exists," "it does not shine" cannot be said to appertain to pure consciousness; for even in denying the existence of consciousness we have the manifestation of consciousness. Even erroneous conceptions of the above forms cannot be said to be the veil of *ajñāna*; for error arises only as a result of the veiling of the locus (e.g., it is only when the nature of the conch-shell is hidden that there can appear an illusory notion of silver) and cannot therefore be identified with the veil itself. Citsukha defines self-luminosity as that which, not being an object of awareness, has a fitness for being regarded as immediate (*avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam*). The view that the self-luminosity is the fitness for not being immediate or self-shining as an explanation of the veil of *ajñāna* that exists in it, is wrong, for that is self-contradictory, since by definition it has fitness for being regarded as immediate.

Again, a veil is that which obstructs the manifestation of that which is covered by it; but, if a self-luminous principle can manifest itself through *ajñāna*, it is improper to call this a veil.

Again, if a veil covers any light, that veil does not obstruct the illumination itself, but prevents the light from reaching objects beyond the veil. Thus a light inside a jug illuminates the inside of the jug, and the cover of the jug only prevents the light from illuminating objects outside the jug. In the case of the supposed obstruction of the illumination of the pure consciousness the same question may arise, and it may well be asked "To whom does the veil obstruct the illumination of the pure consciousness?" It cannot be with reference to diverse *jīvas*; for the diversity of *jīvas* is supposed to be a product of the action of the veil, and they are not already existent, so that it may be said that the pure consciousness becomes obstructed from the *jīvas* by the action of the veil. It is also wrong to suppose that the illumination of the Brahman so far differs from that of ordinary light that it does not manifest itself to itself; for, if that were so, it might equally remain unmanifested

even during emancipation and there would be no meaning in introducing *ajñāna* as the fact of veiling. It is held that even while the *sākṣi*-consciousness is manifesting itself the *ajñāna* may still be there, since the *sākṣi*-consciousness manifests the *ajñāna* itself. It is further held that in such experiences as "I do not know what you said" the *ajñāna*, though it may not veil anything, may yet be manifested in pure consciousness, as may be directly intuited by experience. To this the reply is that the conception of the *ajñāna* aims at explaining the non-manifestation of the unlimited bliss of Brahman, and, if that is so, how can it be admitted that *ajñāna* may appear without any veiling operation in the manifested consciousness? Though in the case of such an experience as "I do not know what you said" the *ajñāna* may be an object of knowledge, in the case of manifestation of pleasure and pain there cannot be any experience of the absence of manifestation of these, and so no *ajñāna* can appear in consciousness with reference to these. Moreover, even when one says "I do not know what you say" there is no appearance of *ajñāna* in consciousness; the statement merely indicates that the content of the speaker's words is known only in a general way, excluding its specific details. So far, therefore, there is thus a manifestation of the general outline of the content of the speaker's words, which might lead, in future, to an understanding of the specific details. Anyway, the above experience does not mean the direct experience of *ajñāna*. Just as God, though not subject like ourselves to illusions, is yet aware that we commit errors, or just as we, though we do not know all things that are known by God, yet know of the omniscience of God, so without knowing the specific particularities of *ajñāna* we may know *ajñāna* in a general manner. If the above view is not accepted, and if it is held that there is a specific cognitive form of *ajñāna*, then this cognitive form would not be opposed to *ajñāna*, and this would virtually amount to saying that even the cessation of *ajñāna* is not opposed to *jñāna*, which is absurd. Moreover, if *ajñāna* were an object of knowledge, then the awareness of it would be possible only by the removal of another *ajñāna* veil covering it.

Again, if it is said that *ajñāna* exists wheresoever there is a negation of the *ṛtti-jñāna*, which alone is contradictory to it, then it should exist also in emancipation. But, again, when one says "I do not know," the opposition felt is not with reference to *ṛtti*-

knowledge specifically, but with reference to knowledge in general. Moreover, if *caitanya* (pure consciousness) and *ajñāna* were not opposed to each other, it would be wrong to designate the one as the negation of the other, i.e., as knowledge (*jñāna*) and ignorance (*ajñāna*). Moreover, if cognitions are only possible and ignorances can only be removed through the manifestation of the self-shining pure consciousness, it stands to reason that it is the pure consciousness that should be opposed to *ajñāna*. It is also unreasonable to suppose that the self could have *ajñāna* associated with it and yet be self-luminous. There ought to be no specific point of difference between the *vr̥tti* and the *sākṣi*-consciousness in their relation to *ajñāna*; for they may both be regarded as opposed to *ajñāna*. If the *sākṣi*-consciousness were not opposed to *ajñāna*, then it could not remove ignorance regarding pleasure, pain, etc. There is no reason to suppose that no *ajñāna* can be associated with whatever is manifested by *sākṣi*-consciousness. It is indeed true that there is no *ajñāna* in the knower, and the knower does not stand in need of the removal of any ignorance regarding itself. The self is like a lamp ever self-luminous; no darkness can be associated with it. It is for this reason that, though ordinary objects stand in need of light for their illumination, the self, the knower, does not stand in need of any illumination. It is also wrong to suppose that the pure consciousness is opposed to *ajñāna* only when it is reflected through a *vr̥tti* state, and that in the case of the experience of pleasure the *sākṣi*-consciousness is reflected through a *vr̥tti* of the pleasure-form; for, if this is admitted, then it must also be admitted that the pleasure had a material existence before it was felt, and thus, as in the case of other objects, there may be doubts about pleasure and pain also; and so the accepted view that the perception of pleasure is also its existence must be sacrificed. Thus it has to be admitted that pure consciousness is opposed to ignorance regarding pleasure, pain, etc. There is, therefore, as regards opposition to knowledge no difference between pure consciousness and pure consciousness manifested through a *vr̥tti*. Nor can it be said that pleasure, pain, etc., are perceived by the pure consciousness as reflected through the *vr̥tti* of the *antaḥkaraṇa*; for the *vr̥tti* of the *antaḥkaraṇa* can arise only through sense-functioning, and in the intuition of internal pleasure there cannot be any such sense-function. Nor can it be a reflection through the *vr̥tti* of *avidyā*; for that is possible

only in the presence of a defect or defects. If, like things immersed in darkness, like absence of knowledge, *ajñāna* be utter unmanifestation, then it cannot be manifested by the *sākṣi*-consciousness. Again, if it is held that *ṛtti* is opposed to *ajñāna*, then, since there exists the ego-*ṛtti* forming the *jīva* and the object-formed *ṛtti* representing the knowledge of the material objects, it might well be expected that these *ṛttis* would oppose the existence of *ajñāna* and that there would be immediate emancipation.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the *ajñāna* is called a veil in the sense that it has a fitness (*yogyatā*) by virtue of which it is capable of making things appear as non-existent or unmanifested, though it may not always exert its capacity, with the result that in dreamless sleep the operation of the veil exists, while in emancipation it is suspended. Generally speaking, the veil continues until the attainment of Brahma-knowledge. It may be objected that the concept of a veil, being different from that of pure consciousness, is itself a product of false imagination (*kalpita*), and therefore involves a vicious circle; to this the reply would be that *avidyā* is beginningless, and hence, even if a false imagination at any particular stage be the result of a preceding stage and that of a still further preceding stage, there cannot be any difficulty. Moreover, the manifestation of the *āvaraṇa* does not depend on the completion of the infinite series, but is directly produced by pure consciousness. It must be remembered that, though the pure consciousness in its fulness is without any veil (as during emancipation), yet on other occasions it may through the operation of the veil have a limited manifestation. Against the objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha that pure consciousness, being homogeneous, is incapable of having any association with a veil, Madhusūdana ends by reiterating the assertion that veiling is possible—for which, however, no new reason is given. To the objection that the veil, like the jug, cannot avert the illumination of the lamp inside, and can obstruct only with reference to the things outside the jug, but that in the case of the obstruction of pure consciousness no such external entity is perceivable, Madhusūdana's reply is that the obstruction of the pure consciousness is with reference to the *jīva*. The veiling and the *jīva* being both related to each other in a beginningless series, the question regarding their priority is illegitimate. Madhusūdana points out that, just as in the experience "I do not know what you say" the

ignorance is associated with knowledge, so also, in the manifestation of pleasure, pleasure is manifested in a limited aspect with reference to a particular object, and such limitation may be considered to be due to the association with *ajñāna* which restricted its manifestation. Madhusūdana contends that in such experiences as "I do not know what you say" the explanation that there is a general knowledge of the intention of the speaker, but that the specific knowledge of the details has not yet developed, is wrong; for the experience of *ajñāna* may here be regarded from one point of view as having reference to particular details. If the specific details are not known, there cannot be any ignorance with reference to them. But, just as, even when there is the knowledge of a thing in a general manner, there may be doubt regarding its specific nature, so there may be knowledge in a general manner and ignorance regarding the details. It may also be said that ignorance is directly known in a general manner without reference to its specific details. Vyāsa-tīrtha had contended that the knowledge of ignorance could only be when the particulars could not be known; thus God has no illusion, but has a knowledge of illusion in general. Against this Madhusūdana contends that in all the examples that could be cited by the opponents ignorance in a general manner can subsist along with a knowledge of the constituent particulars. Again, it is argued that, since *ajñāna* is an object of knowledge, it would be necessary that the veil of *ajñāna* should be removed; this is self-contradictory. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that, just as in the case of the knowledge of specific space-relations the presence of an object is necessary, but yet but for the knowledge of its negation presence of the object would be impossible, so also in the case of the knowledge of *ajñāna* the removal of a further veil is unnecessary, as this would be self-contradictory.

It may be urged that *ajñāna* is known only when the object with reference to which the ignorance exists is not known; later on, when such an object is known, the knower remembers that he had ignorance regarding the object; and the difference between such an *ajñāna* and negation of *jñāna* (*jñānābhāva*) lies in the fact that negation cannot be known without involving a relationing to its defining reference, whereas *ajñāna* does not stand in need of any such defining reference. To this supposed explanation of *ajñāna* by Vyāsa-tīrtha Madhusūdana's reply is that the Śāṅkarites virtually

admit the difference between *ajñāna* and *abhāva*, against which they have been contending so long. Moreover, when one says "I do not know what you say," the *ajñāna* with reference to the speech of the speaker is directly known at the present time, and this would be inexplicable if the cognition of *ajñāna* did not involve a cognition of the defining reference. So, since *ajñāna* is cognized along with its object, there is no discrepancy in the object being manifested in its aspect as under the grasp of *ajñāna* as intuited by the *sākṣi*-consciousness. Madhusūdana urges that the pure consciousness can remove *ajñāna* only by being reflected through the *pramāṇa-vṛtti* and not through its character as self-luminous or through the fact of its being of a class naturally opposed to *ajñāna*¹. The difference between the *vṛtti* and the *sākṣi*-consciousness in relation to *ajñāna* consists in the fact that the former is opposed to *ajñāna*, while the latter has no touch of *ajñāna*. The latter, i.e., the *sākṣi*-consciousness, directly manifests pleasures, pains, etc., not by removing any *ajñāna* that was veiling them, but spontaneously, because the veil of *ajñāna* was not operating on the objects that were being directly manifested by it².

Ajñāna and Ego-hood (ahaṃkāra).

The Śāṅkarites hold that, though during dreamless sleep the self-luminous self is present, yet, there being at the time no non-luminous ego, the memory in the waking stage does not refer the experience of the dreamless state to the ego as the self; and the scriptural texts also often speak against the identification of the self with the ego. In the dreamless stage the ego is not manifested; for, had it been manifested, it would have been so remembered.

To this Vyāsa-tīrtha's reply is that it cannot be asserted that in dreamless sleep the self is manifested, whereas the ego is not; for the opponents have not been able to prove that the ego is something different from the self-luminous self. It is also wrong to say that the later memory of sleeping does not refer to the ego; for all memory refers to the self as the ego, and nothing else. Even when

¹ *pramāṇa-vṛtty-upārūḍha-prakāśatvena nīvartakatvaṃ brūmah, na tu jāti-rīṣeṣeṇa, prakāśatra-mātreṇa vā. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 590.

² *sākṣiṇi yad ajñāna-virodhitvaṃ anubhūyate tan nājñāna-nīvartakatva-nibandhanam, kintu sva-viśayecchādaṃ yāvatsattvaṃ prakāśād ajñānāprasakti-nibandhanam. Ibid.* p. 590.

one says "I slept," he uses the "I," the ego with which his self is associated. The *Vivaraṇa* also says that recognition is attributed to the self as associated with the *antaḥkaraṇa*. If the ego were not experienced as the experiencer of the dreamless state, then one might equally well have entertained doubts regarding it. It is wrong also to suppose that the entity found in all perceivers is the self, and not the ego; for, howsoever it may be conceived, it is the ego that is the object of all such reference, and even the *Vivaraṇa* says that the self, being one in all its experiences in separate individuals, is distinct only through its association with the ego. It cannot be said that reference to the ego is not to the ego-part, but to the self-luminous entity underlying it; for, if this be admitted, then even ignorance would have to be associated with that entity. The *ajñāna* also appears in experiences as associated with the ego, and the ego appears not as the sleeper, but as the experiencer of the waking state, and it recognizes itself as the sleeper. Nor can it be denied that in the waking state one remembers that the ego during the sleep has experienced pleasure; so it must be admitted that in dreamless sleep it is the ego that experiences the sleep. The fact that one remembers his dream-experience as belonging to the same person who did some action before and who is now remembering shows that the action before the dream-experience and the present act of remembering belong to the same identical ego, the experiencer; even if the underlying experiencer be regarded as pure consciousness, yet so far as concerns the phenomenal experiencer and the person that remembers it is the ego to which all experience may be said to belong. Moreover, if the ego is supposed to be dissolved in the dreamless sleep, then even the bio-motor functions of the body, which are supposed to belong to the ego, would be impossible. Moreover, since our self-love and our emotion for self-preservation are always directed towards the self as the ego, it must be admitted that the experiences of the permanent self refer to the ego-substratum. It cannot be urged that this is possible by an illusory imposition of the ego on the pure self; for this would involve a vicious circle, since, unless the pure self is known as the supreme object of love, there cannot be any imposition upon it and, unless there is an imposition of the ego upon it, the self cannot be known as the supreme object of love. Moreover, there is no experience of a self-love which could be supposed to be directed to

pure consciousness and not to the phenomenal self. Similar criticisms may also be made in the case of the explanation of such experience as "I shall attain the ultimate bliss," as based on the imposition of the ego upon the pure self¹. Moreover, if the notion of the ego has as a constituent the mind, then such experience as "my mind," where the mind and the ego appear as different, would be impossible, and the experience of mind and ego would be the same. Moreover, all illusions have two constituents—the basis and the appearance; but in the ego no such two parts are experienced. It is also wrong to suppose that in such experiences as "I appear to myself" (*aham sphurāmi*) the appearance in consciousness is the basis and "appear to myself" is the illusory appearance². For, the appearance (*sphurana*) of the ego being different from the ego-substance (*aham-artha*), there is no appearance of identity between them such that the former may be regarded as the basis of the latter. The ego is, thus, directly perceived by intuitive experience as the self, and inference also points to the same; for, if the ego is enjoined to go through the ethical and other purificatory duties, and if it is the same that is spoken of as being liberated, it stands to reason that it is the ego substance that is the self. Vyāsa-tirtha further adduces a number of scriptural texts in confirmation of this view.

To this Madhusūdana's reply is that, if the ego-substance had been present in sleep, then its qualities, such as desire, wish, etc., would have been perceived. A substance which has qualities can be known only through such qualities: otherwise a jug with qualities would not require to be known through the latter. It is true, no doubt, that we affirm the existence of the jug in the interval between the destruction of its qualities of one order and the production of qualities of another order. But this does not go against the main thesis; for though a qualified thing requires to be known through its qualities, it does not follow that a qualityless thing should not be knowable. So it must be admitted that, since no qualities are apprehended during deep sleep, it is the qualityless self that is known in deep sleep; if it had not been perceived, there would have been no memory of it in the waking state. Moreover,

¹ Vyāyāmṛta, p. 283(a).

² *iha tu sphuraṇamātram adhiṣṭhānamiti sphurāmīty eva dhīr iti cen na. Ibid. p. 38(a).*

during dreamless sleep the self is perceived as supporting ignorance (as is testified by the experience “I did not know anything in deep sleep”), and hence it is different from the ego. The memory refers to pure consciousness as supporting *ajñāna*, and not to the ego. It is true that the *Vivaraṇa* holds that recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) can be possible only of pure consciousness as associated with the *antaḥkaraṇa*; but, though this is so, it does not follow that the apprehension (*abhijñā*) of the pure consciousness should also be associated with the *antaḥkaraṇa*. In the dreamless state, therefore, we have no recognition of pure consciousness, but an intuition of it. In the waking stage we have recognition not of the pure consciousness, but of the consciousness as associated with *ajñāna*. The emphasis of the statement of the *Vivaraṇa* is not on the fact that for recognition it is indispensable that the pure consciousness should be associated with the *antaḥkaraṇa*, but on the fact that it should not be absolutely devoid of the association of any conditioning factor; and such a factor is found in its association with *ajñāna*, whereby recognition is possible. The memory of the ego as the experiencer during dreams takes place through the intuition of the self during dreamless sleep and the imposition of the identity of the ego therewith. It is the memory of such an illusory imposition that is responsible for the apparent experience of the ego during dreamless sleep. It is wrong to suggest that there is a vicious circle; for it is only when the ego-substratum is known to be different from the self that there can be illusory identity and it is only when there is illusory identity that, as the ego does not appear during dreamless state, the belief that it is different is enforced. For it is only when the self is known to be different from the ego that there can be a negation of the possibility of the memory of the self as the ego. Vyāsa-tīrtha says that, the ego-substratum (*aḥam-artha*) and the ego-sense (*aḥaṃ-kāra*) being two different entities, the manifestation of the former does not involve as a necessary consequence the manifestation of the latter, and this explains how in the dreamless state, though the ego-substratum is manifested, yet the ego-sense is absent. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the ego-substratum and the ego-sense are co-existent and thus, wherever the ego-substratum is present, there ought also to be the ego-sense, and, if during the dreamless state the ego-substratum was manifested, then the ego-sense should also have

been manifested with it. He adds that the same objection cannot be made in regard to the manifestation of the self during the dreamless state; for the self is not associated with the ego-sense. Vyāsa-tīrtha has said that, just as the Śāṅkarites explain the manifestation of *ajñāna* in the dreamless state as having reference to objective entities only, and not to the pure *sākṣi*-consciousness (as it could not without contradiction be manifested and be at the same time the object of *ajñāna*), so the manifestation of the ego-substratum is not contradicted by the association with *ajñāna*, but may be regarded as having reference to extraneous objective entities. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that there is no contradiction in the appearance of *ajñāna* in the *sākṣi*-consciousness, as it may be in the case of its association with the ego-substratum, and so the explanation of Vyāsa-tīrtha is quite uncalled-for.

Madhusūdana says that the ego-substratum may be inferred to be something different from the self, because, like the body, it is contemplated by our ego-perception or our perception as "I." If it is held that even the self is contemplated by the ego-perception, the reply is that the self, in the sense in which it is contemplated by the ego-perception, is really a non-self. In its essential nature the self underlying the ego-perception cannot be contemplated by the ego-perception. Again, the view of Vyāsa-tīrtha, that the fact of our feeling ourselves to be the supreme end of happiness shows that supreme happiness belongs to the ego-substratum, is criticized by the Śāṅkarites to the effect that the supreme happiness, really belonging to the self, is illusorily through a mistaken identity imposed upon the ego-substratum. This criticism, again, is criticized by the Madhvas on the ground that such an explanation involves a vicious circle, because only when the supremely happy nature of the ego-substratum is known does the illusory notion of identity present itself; and that only when the illusory notion of identity is present is there awareness of that supremely happy nature. To this, again, the reply of Madhusūdana is that the experiencing of the dreamless stage manifests the self as pure consciousness, while the ego-substratum is unmanifest; thus through the testimony of deep sleep the ego-substratum is known to be different from the self. The ego-substratum is by itself unmanifested, and its manifestation is always through the illusory imposition of identity with the pure self. What Madhusūdana wishes to

assert is that the supremely happy experience during deep sleep is a manifestation of the pure self and not of the ego-substratum; the ego is felt to be happy only through identification with the pure self, to which alone belongs the happiness in deep sleep.

The objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha is that in emancipation the self is not felt as the supreme end of happiness, because there is no duality there, but, if such an experience be the nature of the self, then with its destruction there will be destruction of the self in emancipation. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the experience of the self as the end of supreme happiness is only a conditional manifestation, and therefore the removal of this condition in emancipation cannot threaten the self with destruction.

It is urged by the Śāṅkarites that the agency (*kartṛtva*) belonging to the mind is illusorily imposed upon the self, whereby it illusorily appears as agent, though its real changeless nature is perceived in deep sleep. Vyāsa-tīrtha replies that there are two specific illustrations of illusion, viz., (i) where the red-colour of the *japā*-flower is reflected on a crystal, whereby the white crystal appears as red, and (ii) where a rope appears as a dreadful snake. Now, following the analogy of the first case, one would expect that the mind would separately be known as an agent, just as the *japā*-flower is known to be red, and the pure consciousness also should appear as agent, just as the crystal appears as red. If the reply is that the illusion is not of the first type, since it is not the quality of the mind that is reflected, but the mind with its qualities is itself imposed, there it would be of the second type. But even then the snake itself appears as dreadful, following which analogy one would expect that the mind should appear independently as agent and the pure consciousness also should appear so.

Madhusūdana in reply says that he accepts the second type of illusion, and admits that agency parallel to the agency of the mind appears in the pure consciousness and then these two numerically different entities are falsely identified through the identification of the mind with the pure consciousness. As a matter of fact, however, the illusion of the agency of the mind in the pure consciousness may be regarded as being of both the above two types. The latter type, as *nirupādhika*, in which that which is imposed (*adhyasyamāna*, e.g., the dreadful snake), being of the *Vyāvahārika* type of existence, has a greater reality than the illusory knowledge

(the rope-snake which has only a *prātibhāsika* existence), as has been shown above. It may also be interpreted as being a *sopādhika* illusion of the first type, since both that which is imposed (the agency of the mind) and that which is the illusory appearance (the agency of the pure consciousness) have the same order of existence, viz., *Vyāvahārika*, which we know to be the condition of a *sopādhika* illusion as between *japā*-flower and crystal.

Madhusūdana points out that ego-hood (*aham-kāra*) is made up of two constituents, (i) the underlying pure consciousness, and (ii) the material part as the agent. The second part really belongs to the mind, and it is only through a false identification of it with the pure consciousness that the experience "I am the doer, the agent" is possible: so the experience of agency takes place only through such an illusion. So the objection that, if the agency interest in the mind is transferred to the ego-substratum, then the self cannot be regarded as being subject to bondage and liberation, is invalid; for the so-called ego-substratum is itself the result of the false identification of the mind and its associated agency with the pure consciousness. Vyāsa-tīrtha had pointed out that in arguing with Sāṃkhyists the Śāṅkarites had repudiated (*Brahma-sūtra*, II. 3. 33) the agency of the *buddhi*. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that what the Śāṅkarites asserted was that the consciousness was both the agent and the enjoyer of experiences, and not the latter alone, as the Sāṃkhyists had declared; they had neither repudiated the agency of *buddhi* nor asserted the agency of pure consciousness.

Vyāsa-tīrtha says that in such experience as "I am a Brahmin" the identification is of the Brahmin body with the "I" and this "I" according to the Śāṅkarites is different from the self; if that were so, it would be wrong to suppose that the above experience is due to a false identification of the body with the "self"; for the "I" is not admitted by the Śāṅkarites to be the self. Again, if the identity of the body and the self be directly perceived, and if there is no valid inference to contradict it, it is difficult to assert that they are different. Moreover, the body and the senses are known to be different from one another and cannot both be regarded as identical with the self. Again, if all difference is illusion, the notion of identity, which is the opposite of "difference," will necessarily be true. Moreover, as a matter of fact, no such illusory identification of the body and the self ever takes place; for, not to speak of men,

even animals know that they are different from their bodies and that, though their bodies change from birth to birth, they themselves remain the same all through.

Madhusūdana says in reply that the false identification of the body and the ego is possible because ego has for a constituent the pure consciousness, and thus the false identification with it means identification with consciousness. Moreover, it is wrong to say that, if perception reveals the identity between the body and self, then it is not possible through inference to establish their difference. For it is well known (e.g., in the case of the apparent size of the moon in perception) that the results of perception are often revised by well-established inference and authority. Again, the objection that, all difference being illusory, the opposite of difference, viz., false identification, must be true, is wrong; for in the discussion on the nature of falsehood it has been shown that both the positive and the negative may at the same time be illusory. Moreover, the false identification of the body with the self can be dispelled in our ordinary life by inference and the testimony of scriptural texts, whereas the illusion of all difference can be dispelled only by the last cognitive state preceding emancipation. Madhusūdana holds that all explanation in regard to the connection of the body with the self is unavailing, and the only explanation that seems to be cogent is that the body is an illusory imposition upon the self.

Indefinability of World-appearance.

It is urged by Vyāsa-tīrtha that it is difficult for the Śāṅkarites to prove that the world-appearance is indefinable (*anirvācya*), whatever may be the meaning of such a term. Thus, since it is called indefinable, that is in itself a sufficient description of its nature; nor can it be said that there is an absence of the knowledge or the object which might have led to a definition or description; for in their absence no reference to description would be at all possible. Nor can it be said that indefinability means that it is different from both being and non-being; for, being different from them, it could be the combination of them. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the indefinability consists in the fact that the world-appearance is neither being nor non-being nor being-and-non-being. Indefinability may also be said to consist in the fact that the world-

appearance is liable to contradiction in the context wherein it appears. It cannot be said that the above position does not carry us to a new point, since one existent entity may be known to be different from any other existent entity; for the negation here is not of any particular existence, but of existence as such. If it is possible to assert that there may be an entity which is neither existence nor non-existence, then that certainly would be a new proposition. Madhusūdana further points out that “existence” and “non-existence” are used in their accepted senses and, both of them being unreal, the negation of either of them does not involve the affirmation of the other, and therefore the law of excluded middle is not applicable. When it is said that the indefinability consists in the fact that a thing is neither being nor non-being, that means simply that, all that can be affirmed or denied being unreal, neither of them can be affirmed; for what is in itself indescribable cannot be affirmed in any concrete or particularized form¹.

Vyāsa-tīrtha contends that the inscrutable nature of existence and non-existence should not be a ground for calling them indefinable; for, if that were so, then even the cessation of *avidyā*, which is regarded as being neither existent nor non-existent nor existent-non-existent nor indefinable, should also have been called indefinable. The reply of Madhusūdana to this is that the cessation of *avidyā* is called unique, because it does not exist during emancipation; he further urges that there is no incongruity in supposing that an entity as well as its negation (provided they are both unreal) may be absent in any other entity—this is impossible only when the positive and the negative are both real. Madhusūdana further says that being and non-being are not mutual negations, but exist in mutually negated areas. Being in this sense may be defined as the character of non-being contradicted, and non-being as incapability of appearing as being. It may be argued that in this sense the world-appearance cannot be regarded as different from both being and non-being. To this the reply is that by holding the view that being and non-being are not in their nature exclusive, in such a way that absence of being is called non-being and *vice versa*, but that the absence of one is marked by the presence of another, a possibility

¹ *na ca tarhi sad-ādi-vailakṣanyoktiḥ katham tat-tat-pratīyogī-durnirūpatā-mātre prakāṣanāya, na hi svarūpato durnirūpasya kimcid api rūpaṃ vāstavaṃ sambhavati. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 621.

is kept open whereby both may be absent at one and the same time. Thus, if eternity and non-eternity be defined as being-associated-with-destruction and being-unassociated-with-destruction, then they may be both absent in generality, which has no being; and, again, if eternity be defined as absence of a limit in the future, and non-eternity be defined as liability to cessation on the part of entities other than being, then negation-precedent-to-production (*prāg-abhāva*) may be defined as an entity in which there is neither entity nor non-entity; for a negation-precedent-to-destruction has a future and at the same time cannot be made to cease by any other thing than a positive entity, and so it has neither eternity nor non-eternity in the above senses. So the false silver, being unreal, cannot be liable to contradiction or be regarded as uncontradicted. The opponent, however, contends that the illustration is quite out of place, since generality (*sāmānya*) has no destruction and is, therefore, non-eternal, and negation-precedent-to-production is non-eternal, because it is destroyed. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the Śāṅkarites do not attempt to prove their case simply by this illustration, but adduce the illustration simply as a supplement to other proofs in support of their thesis. The reason why the qualities of being and non-being may be found in the world-appearance without contradiction is that, being qualities of imaginary entities (being and non-being), they do not contradict each other¹. If an entity is not regarded as non-eternal in a real sense, there is no contradiction in supposing it to be non-eternal only so long as that entity persists. Madhusūdana puts forward the above arguments to the effect that there is no contradiction in affirming the negation of any real qualities on the ground that those qualities are imaginary², against the criticism of Vyāsa-tīrtha that, if the world-appearance is pronounced by any person for whatever reasons to be indefinable, then that itself is an affirmation, and hence there is a contradiction. To be indefinable both as being and as non-being means that both these are found to be contradicted in the entity under consideration. When it is said that the imaginary world-appearance ought not to be liable to being visible, invisible,

¹ *dharmiṇa eva kalpitatvena viruddhayaḥ api dharmayoḥ abhāvāt. Ibid. p. 622.*

² *atāttvika-hetu-sad-bhāvena tāttvika-dharmābhāvasya sādhanena vyāghātā-bhāvāt. Ibid. p. 623.*

contradicted or uncontradicted, there is a misunderstanding; for it is certainly outside such affirmations in any real sense, but there is no incongruity in the affirmation of these qualities as imaginary appearances, since they are presented in those forms to all experience. The whole point is that, when qualities that are contradictory are in themselves imaginary, there is no incongruity in their mutual negation with reference to a particular entity; if the mutual negation is unreal, their mutual affirmation is equally unreal. Vyāsa-tīrtha argues that indefinability of the world-appearance (*anirvācya*) cannot mean that it is not the locus of either being or non-being; for both non-being and Brahman, being qualityless, would satisfy the same conditions, and be entitled to be called indefinable. It cannot be said that Brahman may be regarded as the locus of imaginary being, for the reply is that the same may be the case with world-appearance. Again, since Brahman is qualityless, if being is denied of it, absence of being also cannot be denied; so, if both being and absence of being be denied of Brahman, Brahman itself becomes indefinable. The reply of Madhusūdana is that the denial of both being and non-being in the world-appearance is indefinable or unspeakable only in the sense that such a denial applies to the world appearance only so long as it is there, whereas in the Brahman it is absolute. Whereas the main emphasis of the argument of Vyāsa-tīrtha is on the fact that both being and non-being cannot be denied at the same time, Madhusūdana contends that, since the denial of being and the affirmation of it are not of the same order (the latter being of the *Vyāvahārika* type), there is no contradiction in their being affirmed at the same time. In the same way Madhusūdana contends that the denial of quality in Brahman (*nirviśeṣatva*) should not be regarded as a quality in itself; for the quality that is denied is of imaginary type and hence its denial does not itself constitute a quality. Vyāsa-tīrtha further urges that, following the trend of the argument of the Śāṅkarites, one might as well say that there cannot be any contradiction of the illusory conch-shell-silver by the experiential conch-shell, the two being of two different orders of existence: to this Madhusūdana's reply is that both the illusory and the experiential entities are grasped by the *sākṣi*-consciousness, and this constitutes their sameness and the contradiction of one by the other; there is no direct contradiction of the illusory by the experiential, and therefore the criticism of Vyāsa-tīrtha fails.

Nature of Brahman.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, in describing the nature of illusion, says that, when the subconscious impression of silver is roused, the senses, being associated with specific defects, take the "thisness" of conch-shell as associated with silver. There is, therefore, no production of any imaginary silver such as the Śaṅkarites allege; the silver not being there, later perception directly shows that it was only a false silver that appeared. Inference also is very pertinent here; for whatever is false knowledge refers to non-existent entities simply because they are not existent. Vyāsa-tīrtha further points out that his view of illusion (*anyathā-khyāti*) is different from the Buddhist view of illusion (*a-sat-khyāti*) in this, that in the Buddhist view the appearance "this is silver" is wholly false, whereas in Vyāsa-tīrtha's view the "this" is true, though its association with silver is false.

Vyāsa-tīrtha further points out that, if the illusory silver be regarded as a product of *ajñāna*, then it will be wrong to suppose that it is liable to negation in the past, present and future; for, if it was a product of *ajñāna*, it was existing then and was not liable to negation. It is also wrong to say that the negation of the illusory appearance is in respect of its reality; for, in order that the appearance may be false, the negation ought to deny it as illusory appearance and not as reality, since the denial of its reality would be of a different order and would not render the entity false.

Vyāsa-tīrtha had contended that, since Brahman is the subject of discussion and since there are doubts regarding His nature, a resolution of such doubts necessarily implies the affirmation of some positive character. Moreover, propositions are composed of words, and, even if any of the constituent words is supposed to indicate Brahman in a secondary sense, such secondary meaning is to be associated with a primary meaning; for as a rule secondary meanings can be obtained only through association with a primary meaning, when the primary meaning as such is baffled by the context. In reply to the second objection Madhusūdana says that a word can give secondary meaning directly, and does not necessarily involve a baffling of the primary meaning. As regards the first objection the reply of Madhusūdana is that the undifferentiated

character of Brahman can be known not necessarily through any affirmative character, but through the negation of all opposite concepts. If it is objected that the negation of such opposing concepts would necessarily imply that those concepts are constituents of Brahma-knowledge, the reply of Madhusūdana is that, such negation of opposing concepts being of the very nature of Brahman, it is manifested and intuited directly, without waiting for the manifestation of any particular entity. The function of ordinary propositions involving association of particular meanings is to be interpreted as leading to the manifestation of an undivided and unparticularized whole, beyond the constituents of the proposition which deal with the association of particular meanings.

Vyāsa-tīrtha contends that, if Brahman is regarded as differenceless, then He cannot be regarded as identical with knowledge or with pure bliss, or as the one and eternal, or as the *sākṣi*-consciousness. Brahman cannot be pure consciousness; for consciousness cannot mean the manifestation of objects, since in emancipation there are no objects to be manifested. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that, though in emancipation there are no objects, yet that does not detract from its nature as illuminating. To Vyāsa-tīrtha's suggestion that Brahman cannot be regarded as pure bliss interpreted as agreeable consciousness (*anukūla-vedanatva*) or mere agreeableness (*anukūlatva*), since this would involve the criticism that such agreeableness is due to some extraneous condition, Madhusūdana's reply is that Brahman is regarded as pure bliss conceived as unconditional desirability (*nirupādhikeṣṭarūpatvāt*). Madhusūdana urges that this cannot mean negation of pain; for negation of pain is an entity different from bliss and in order that the definition may have any application it is necessary that the negation of pain should lead to the establishment of bliss. Vyāsa-tīrtha further argues that, if this unconditional desirability cannot itself be conditional, then the blissful nature of Brahman must be due to certain conditions. Moreover, if Brahman's nature as pure bliss be different from its nature as pure knowledge, then both the views are partial; and, if they are identical, it is useless to designate Brahman as both pure knowledge and pure bliss. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that, though knowledge and bliss are identical, yet through imaginary verbal usage they are spoken of as different. He further urges that objectless

pure knowledge is defined as pure bliss¹; pure bliss is nothing but pure perceiver (*dr̥g-anatirekāt*). On this view again there is no difference between bliss and its consciousness. Vyāsa-tīrtha contends that, if Brahman is regarded as non-dual, then that involves the negation of duality. If such a negation is false, then Brahman becomes dual; and, if such a negation is affirmed, then also Brahman becomes dual, for it involves the affirmation of negation. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the reality of negation is nothing more than the locus in which the negation is affirmed; the negation would then mean nothing else than Brahman, and hence the criticism that the admission of negation would involve duality is invalid.

Regarding the *sākṣi*-consciousness Vyāsa-tīrtha contends that the definition of *sākṣi* as pure being is unacceptable in the technical sense of the word as defined by Pāṇini. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that *sākṣi* may be defined as the pure consciousness reflected either in *avidyā* or a modification of it; and thus even the pure being may, through its reflection, be regarded as the *draṣṭā*. The objection of circular reasoning, on the ground that there is interdependence between the conditions of reflection and the seeing capacity of the seer, is unavailing; for such interdependence is beginningless. The *sākṣi*-consciousness, according to Madhusūdana, is neither pure Brahman nor Brahman as conditioned by *buddhi*, but is the consciousness reflected in *avidyā* or a modification of it; the *sākṣi*-consciousness, though one in all perceivers, yet behaves as identified with each particular perceiver, and thus the experiences of one particular perceiver are perceived by the *sākṣi*-consciousness as identified with that particular perceiver, and so there is no chance of any confusion of the experience of different individuals on the ground that the *sākṣi*-consciousness is itself universal².

¹ *etena viśayānullekhi-jñānam evānandam ity api yuktaṃ. Advaita-siddhi*, p. 75¹.

² *sarva-jīva-sādhāraṇyepi tat-taj-jīva-caitanyābhedanābhivyaktasya tat-tad-duḥkhādi-bhāsakatayā atiprasaṅgābhāvāt. Ibid.* p. 754.

Refutation of Brahman as material and instrumental cause.

Vyāsa-tīrtha says that a material cause always undergoes transformation in the production of the effect; but Brahman is supposed to be changeless, and, as such, cannot be the material cause. There are, however, three views: viz., that Brahman and *māyā* are jointly the cause of the world, just as two threads make a string, or that Brahman with *māyā* as its power is the cause, or that Brahman as the support of *māyā* is the cause. The reconciliation is that the Brahman is called changeless so far as it is unassociated with *māyā* either as joint cause or as power or as instrument. To this Vyāsatīrtha says that, if the permanently real Brahman is the material cause of the world, the world also would be expected to be so. If it is said that the characteristics of the material cause do not inhere in the effect, but only a knowledge of it is somehow associated with it, then the world-appearance also cannot be characterized as indefinable (or *anirvācya*) by reason of the fact that it is constituted of *māyā*. Since only Brahman as unassociated with *māyā* can be called changeless, the Brahman associated with *māyā* cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world, if by such material cause the changeless aspect is to be understood. If it is urged that the changes are of the character (*māyā*), then, since such a character is included within or inseparably associated with the characterized, changes of character involve a change in the characterized, and hence the *vivarta* view fails. If the underlying substratum, the Brahman, be regarded as devoid of any real change, then it is unreasonable to suppose that such a substratum, in association with its power or character, will be liable to real change; if it is urged that the material cause may be defined as that which is the locus of an illusion, then it may be pointed out that earth is never regarded as the locus of an illusion, nor can the conch-shell be regarded as the material cause of the shell-silver.

The reply of Madhusūdana is that Brahman remains as the ground which makes the transformations of *māyā* possible. The Brahman has a wider existence than *māyā* and so cannot participate in the changes of *māyā*. Further, the objection that, if the Brahman is real, then the world which is its effect should also be real is not

valid; for only the qualities of the transforming cause (as earth or of gold) are found to pass over to the effect, whereas, Brahman being the ground-cause, we have no analogy which should lead us to expect that it should pass on to the effect.

Vyāsa-tīrtha further says that, just as one speaks of the being of jugs, so one may speak of the non-being of chimerical entities, but that does not presuppose the assertion that chimerical entities have non-being as their material cause. Again, if the world had Brahman for its material cause, then, since Brahman was pure bliss, the world should also be expected to be of the nature of bliss, which it is not. Again, on the *vivarta* view of causation there is no meaning in talking of a material cause. Moreover, if Brahman be the material cause, then the *antaḥkaraṇa* cannot be spoken of as being the material and transforming cause of suffering and other worldly experiences.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, in examining the contention of the Śāṅkarites that Brahman is self-luminous, says that the meaning of the term "self-luminous" (*svaprakāśa*) must first be cleared. If it is meant that Brahman cannot be the object of any mental state, then there cannot be any dissension between the teacher and the taught regarding the nature of Brahman; for discussions can take place only if Brahman be the object of a mental state. If it is urged that Brahman is self-luminous in the sense that, though not an object of cognition, it is always immediately intuited, then it may be pointed out that the definition fails, since in dreamless sleep and in dissolution there is no such immediate intuition of Brahman. It cannot be said that, though in dreamless sleep the Brahman cannot be immediately intuited, yet it has the status or capacity (*yogyatā*) of being so intuited; for in emancipation, there being no characters or qualities, it is impossible that such capacities should thus exist.

Even if such capacity be negatively defined, the negation, being a category of world-appearance, cannot be supposed to exist in Brahman. Moreover; if Brahman can in no way be regarded as the result of cognitive action, then the fact that it shines forth at the culmination of the final knowledge leading to Brahmahood would be inexplicable. Nor can it be argued that pure consciousness is self-luminous, i.e., non-cognizable, because of the very fact that it is pure consciousness, since whatever is not pure consciousness is not self-luminous; for non-cognizability, being a quality, must

exist somewhere, and, if it is absent everywhere else, it must by reduction be present at least in pure consciousness. But it may be urged that, even if pure consciousness be self-luminous, that does not prove the self-luminosity of the self. The obvious reply is that the self is identical with pure consciousness. To this Vyāsa-tirtha's objection is that, since there cannot be any kind of quality in the self, it cannot be argued that self-luminosity exists in it, whether as a positive quality, or as a negation of its negation, or as capacity. For all capacity as such, being outside Brahman, is false, and that which is false cannot be associated with Brahman. If non-cognizability is defined as that which is not a product of the activity of a mental state (*phala-vyāpyatvaṃ*), and if such non-cognizability be regarded as a sufficient description of Brahman, then, since even the perception of a jug or of the illusory silver or of pleasure and pain satisfies the above condition, the description is too wide, and, since the shining of Brahman itself is the product of the activity of the destruction of the last mental state, the definition is too narrow¹. It cannot be said that *phala-vyāpyatva* means the accruing of a speciality produced by the consciousness reflected through a mental state, and that such speciality is the relationing without consciousness on the occasion of the breaking of a veil, and that such a *phala-vyāpyatva* exists in the jug and not in the self. Nor can it be said that *phala-vyāpyatva* means the being of the object of consciousness of the ground manifested through consciousness reflected through a mental state. For the Śāṅkarites do not think that a jug is an object of pure consciousness as reflected through a *vyrtti* or mental state, but hold that it is directly the object of a mental state. It is therefore wrong to suggest that the definition of *phala-vyāpyatva* is such that it applies to jug, etc., and not to Brahman. By Citsukha pure self-shiningness of consciousness is regarded as an objectivity of consciousness, and, if that is so, Brahman must always be an object of consciousness, and the description of it as non-objectivity to consciousness, or non-cognizability, would be impossible. Citsukha, however, says that Brahman is an object of consciousness (*cid-viśaya*), but not an object

¹ *nāpi phalavyāpyatvaṃ drīyatva-bhaṅge ukta-ṛtīyā prātibhāsike rūpyādaḥ vyāvahārike avidyāntaḥkaraṇa-tad-dharma-sukhādaḥ ghaṭādaḥ ca lakṣaṇasyā-tīryāpteh. tatroktarītyaiva brahmaṇo'pi carama-vṛtti-pratibimbīta-cid-rūpa-phala-vyāpyatvenāsambhavāc ca. Nyāyāmṛta, p. 507(b).*

of cognizing activity (*cid-akarmatva*). If, following Citsukha, *avedyatva* (or non-cognizability) be regarded as the status of that which is not the object of a cognitive operation, and if by cognitive operation one expresses that consciousness is manifested through a particular objective form, as in the case of a jug, then, since Brahman also in the final stage is manifested through a corresponding mental state, Brahman also must be admitted to be an object of cognitive operation; otherwise even a jug cannot be regarded as an object of cognitive operation, there being no difference in the case of the apprehension of a jug and that of Brahman. If it is urged that object of cognizability means the accruing of some special changes due to the operation of cognizing, then also Brahman would be as much an object as the jug; for, just as in the case of the cognition of a jug the cognizing activity results in the removal of the veil which was obstructing the manifestation of the jug, so final Brahma-knowledge, which is an intellectual operation, results in the removal of the obstruction to the manifestation of Brahman. The objectivity involved in cognizing cannot be regarded as the accruing of certain results in the object of cognition through the activity involved in cognizing operation; for, the pure consciousness not being an activity, no such accruing of any result due to the activity of the cognizing operation is possible even in objects (as jug, etc.) which are universally admitted to be objects of cognition. If reflection through a mental state be regarded as the cognizing activity, then that applies to Brahman also; for Brahman also is the object of such a reflection through a mental state or idea representing Brahman in the final state.

Citsukha defines self-luminosity as *aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatva*, i.e., capability of being regarded as immediate. A dispute may now arise regarding the meaning of this. If it signifies "that which is produced by immediate knowledge," then virtue and vice, which can be immediately intuited by supernatural knowledge of Yogins and Gods, has also to be regarded as immediate; and, when one infers that he has virtue or vice and finally has an immediate apprehension of that inferential knowledge, or when one has an immediate knowledge of virtue or vice as terms in inductive proposition (e.g., whatever is knowable is definable, such a proposition including virtue and vice as involved under the term "knowable"), one would be justified in saying that virtue and vice are also

immediate, and thus immediacy of apprehension would be too wide for a sufficient description of Brahman. Thus, though virtue and vice are not cognizable in their nature, it is yet possible in the case of Yogins and of God to have immediate apprehension of them, and so also in our case, so far as concerns the direct apprehension of inference of them.

If immediacy signifies "that which may be the object of immediate knowledge," and if the self be regarded as immediate in this sense, then it is to be admitted that the self is an object of immediate cognition, like the jug¹. Nor can it be urged that the immediacy of an object depends upon the immediacy of the knowledge of it; for the immediacy of knowledge also must depend upon the immediacy of the object. Again, Vyāsa-tīrtha contends that immediacy cannot signify that the content is of the form of immediacy (*āparokṣa-ity-ākāra*); for it is admitted to be pure and formless and produced by the non-relational intuition of the Vedāntic instructions.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, tries to prove that Brahman is possessed of qualities, and not devoid of them, as the Śāṅkarites argue; he contends that most of the scriptural texts speak of Brahman as being endowed with qualities. God (Īśvara) is endowed with all good qualities, for He desires to have them and is capable of having them; and He is devoid of all bad qualities, because He does not want them and is capable of divesting Himself of them. It is useless to contend that the mention of Brahman as endowed with qualities refers only to an inferior Brahman; for, Vyāsa-tīrtha urges, the scriptural texts do not speak of any other kind of Brahman than the qualified one. If the Brahman were actually devoid of all qualities, it would be mere vacuity or *sūnya*, a negation; for all substances that exist must have some qualities. Vyāsa-tīrtha further contends that, since Brahman is the creator and protector of the world and the authorizer of the Vedas, He must have a body and organs of action, though that body is not an ordinary material body (*prākṛtāvayavādi-niṣedha-paratvāt*); and it is because His body is spiritual and not material that in spite of the possession of a body He is both infinite and eternal and His abode is also spiritual and eternal².

¹ *vastuna āparokṣyam āparokṣa-jñāna-viśayatvaṃ ced ātmāpi ghaṭādivad vedyah syāt. Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 511 (a).

² *Ibid.* pp. 496-8.

Again, it is also wrong to say that Brahman is both the material cause and the instrumental cause of the world, as the substance-stuff of the world and as the creator or modeller of the world; for the material cause undergoes modifications and changes, whereas the Brahman is unchangeable. Brahman, again, is always the master, and the individual selves or souls are always His servants: so God alone is always free (*nitya-mukta*), whereas individual souls are always related and bound to Him¹. The *guṇas* belong to *prakṛti* or *māyā* and not to the individual souls; and therefore, since the *guṇas* of *prakṛti* are not in the individual souls, there cannot be any question of the bondage of individual souls by them or of liberation from them. Whatever bondage, therefore, there is by which the *guṇas* tie the individual souls is due to ignorance (*avidyā*). The *guṇas*, again, cannot affect God; for they are dependent (*adhīna*) on Him. It is only out of a part of God that all individual souls have come into being, and that part is so far different from God that, though through ignorance the individual souls, which have sprung forth from this part, may be suffering bondage, God Himself remains ever free from all such ignorance and bondage². The *māyā* or *prakṛti* which forms the material cause of the world is a fine dusty stuff or like fine cotton fibres (*sūkṣma-reṇumayī sā ca tantu-vāyasya tantuvat*), and God fashions the world out of this stuff³. This

¹ *muktāṁ api svāmi-bhṛtya-bhāva-sadbhāvena bhakty-ādi-bandha-sadbhāvāt nitya-baddhatvaṁ jīvasya kṛṣṇasya tu nitya-muktatvaṁ eva. Bhāva-vilāsinī* (p. 179) on *Yukti-mallikā*.

² *ekasyaiva mamāṁśasya jīvasyaivaṁ mahāmata bandhasyāvidyayānādi vidyayā ca tathetarah
sva-bhinnāṁśasya jīvākyā ajasyaikasya kevalam
bandhaś ca bandhān mokṣaś ca na svasyety āha sa prabhuḥ.*

Yukti-mallikā, p. 179.

The *Bhāva-vilāsinī* (p. 185) also points out that, though God has His wives and body and His heavenly abode in *Vaikuṇṭha*, yet He has nothing to tie Himself with these; for these are not of *prakṛti*-stuff, and, as He has no trace of the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, He is absolutely free; only a tie of *prakṛti*-stuff can be a tie or bondage. But *prakṛti* cannot affect Him; for He is her master—*mama guṇā vastūni ca śruti-smṛtiṣu aprakṛtatayā prasiddhāḥ*. It may be noted in this connection that the Madhva system applies the term *māyā* in three distinct senses: (i) as God's will (*harer icchā*); (ii) as the material *prakṛti* (*māyākyā prakṛtir jaḍā*); and (iii) *māyā* or *mahā-māyā* or *avidyā*, as the cause of illusions and mistakes (*bhrama-hetuś ca māyāikā māyeyaṁ trividhā matā*). *Yukti-mallikā*, p. 188. There is another view which supposes *māyā* to be of five kinds; it adds God's power (*śakti*) and influence (*tejas*).

³ This stuff is said to be infinitely more powdery than the atoms of the Naiyāyikas (*tārikābhīmatā-paramānuto'py ananta-guṇita-sūkṣma-reṇumayī*). *Bhāva-vilāsinī*, p. 189. The *Srīmad-bhāgavata*, which is considered by Madhva

prakṛti is eightfold, inasmuch as it has five modifications as the five elements, and three as *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra*. The *māyā*, by the help of which God creates the world, is like the mother of the world and is called, in the theological terminology of the Madhva school, *Lakṣmī*. The creative *māyā*, or the will of God, is also called the *svarūpa-māyā*, because she always abides with the Lord. The *māyā* as *prakṛti*, or as her guiding power (*mayāśrayin*), is outside of God, but completely under His control¹.

God is referred to in the *Gītā* and other sacred texts as possessing a universal all-pervading body, but this body is, as we have already said, a spiritual body, a body of consciousness and bliss (*jñānānandātmako hy asau*). This His universal body transcends the bounds of all the *guṇas*, the *māyā* and their effects. All throughout this universal all-transcending spiritual body of the Lord is full of bliss, consciousness and playful activity². There is no room for pantheism in true philosophy, and therefore Vedic passages which seem to imply the identity of the world and God are to be explained as attributing to God the absolute controlling power³. Again, when it is said that the individual souls are parts of God, it does not mean that they are parts in any spatial sense, or in the sense of any actual division such as may be made of material objects. It simply means that the individual souls are similar to God in certain respects and are at the same time much inferior to Him⁴.

and his followers to be authoritative, speaks of the four wives of Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, as *Māyā*, *Jayā*, *Kṛti* and *Śānti*, which are but the four forms of the goddess Śrī, corresponding to the four forms of Hari as *Vāmadeva*, *Saṅkarṣaṇa*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*. *Yukti-mallikā*, p. 191.

¹ It is curious to note that the *māyā* which produces illusion and which affects only the individual souls, counted in one place referred to above as the third *māyā*, is counted again as the fourth *māyā*, and *prakṛti* (or *jaḍa-māyā* and *māyā-śrī*) as the second and the third *māyās*. *Yukti-mallikā*, p. 192 a, b.

² The *Bhāva-vilāsinī* (p. 198), giving the meaning of the word *śarīra* (which ordinarily means "body," from a root which means "to decay") with reference to God, assigns a fanciful etymological meaning; it says that the first syllable *śa* means bliss, *ra* means "play," and *tra* means "consciousness." In another place Varadarāja speaks of the Lord as being of the nature of the pure bliss of realization and the superintendent of all intelligence: *vidito'si bhavān sāṅśāt puruṣaḥ prakṛteḥ paraḥ kevalānubhāvānandasvarūpas sarva-buddhi-dṛk*. *Yukti-mallikā*, p. 201.

³

ataḥ puruṣa eveti prathamā pañcamī yadā
sadā sarva-nimittatva-mahimā pumsī varnyate.
yadā tu saptaṁ sarvādhāratvaṁ varṇayet tadā
sūktasyaikārthatā caivaṁ satyeva syān na cānyathā. *Ibid.* p. 211.

⁴ *tat-sadṛśatve sati tato nyūnatvaṁ jīvasya aṁśatvaṁ na tu ekadeśatvaṁ*. *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 606.

It may be pointed out in this connection that as God is all-pervasive, so the individual souls are by nature atomic, though by their possession of the quality of consciousness, which is all-pervasive, they can always feel the touch of any part of their body just as a lamp, which, remaining at one place, may have its rays illuminating all places around it¹.

At the end of *pralaya* God wishes to create, and by His wish disturbs the equilibrium of *prakṛti* and separates its three *guṇas*, and then creates the different categories of *mahat*, *buddhi*, *manas* and the five elements and also their presiding deities; and then He permeates the whole world, including the living and the non-living². In all the different states of existence (e.g., the waking, dream, deep sleep, swoon and liberation) it is God who by His various forms of manifestation controls all individual souls, and by bringing about these states maintains the existence of the world³. The destruction or *pralaya* also of the world is effected by His will⁴. Moreover, all knowledge that arises in all individual souls either for mundane experience or for liberation, and whatever may be the instruments employed for the production of such knowledge, have God as their one common ultimate cause⁵.

Liberation (*mokṣa*).

Bondage is due to attachment to worldly objects, and liberation is produced through the direct realization of God (*aparokṣa-jñānam Viṣṇoḥ*). This is produced in various ways, viz.: Experience of the sorrows of worldly existence, association with good men, renunciation of all desires of enjoyment of pleasures, whether in this world

¹ *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 612. The view that the atomic soul touches different parts of the body at different successive moments for different touch-experiences is definitely objected to.

² *Padārtha-saṃgraha-vyākhyāna*, pp. 106-8.

³ The five manifestations of God, controlling the five states above mentioned (waking, dream, etc.), are called *Prājña*, *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, *Bhagavān* and *Turiya Bhagavān* respectively.

⁴ There are two kinds of destruction or *pralaya* in this system: (a) the *mahā-pralaya*, in which everything but *prakṛti* is destroyed, only absolute darkness remains, and *prakṛti* stops all her creative work, except the production of time as successive moments; (b) the secondary destruction, called *avāntara pralaya*, which is of two kinds, one in which along with our world the two imaginary worlds are also destroyed, and one in which only the living beings of this world are destroyed. *Ibid.* pp. 117-19.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 119.

or in some heavenly world, self-control and self-discipline, study, association with a good teacher, and study of the scriptures according to his instructions, realization of the truth of those scriptures, discussions on the proper meaning for strengthening one's convictions, proper respectful attachment to the teacher, respectful attachment to God (*paramātmā-bhakti*), kindness to one's inferiors, love for one's equals, respectful attachment to superiors, cessation from works that are likely to bring pleasure or pain, cessation from doing prohibited actions, complete resignation to God, realization of the five differences (between God and soul, soul and soul, soul and the world, God and the world and between one object of the world and another), realization of the difference between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, appreciation of the difference of stages of advancement among the various kinds of men and other higher and lower living beings, and proper worship (*upāsana*). As regards the teachers here referred to, from whom instructions should be taken, two distinct types of them are mentioned: there are some who are permanent teachers (*niyata guru*) and others who are only occasional teachers (*aniyata guru*). The former are those who can understand the nature and needs of their pupils and give such suitable instructions to them as may enable them to realize that particular manifestation of Viṣṇu which they are fit to realize; the occasional teachers are those who merely instruct us concerning God. In another sense all those who are superior to us in knowledge and religious discipline are our teachers. As regards worship, it is said that worship (*upāsana*) is of two kinds: worship as religious and philosophical study, and worship as meditation (*dhyāna*)¹; for there are some who cannot by proper study of the scriptures attain a true and direct realization of the Lord, and there are others who attain it by meditation. Meditation or *dhyāna* means continual thinking of God, leaving all other things aside², and such a meditation on God as the spirit, as the existent, and as the possessor of pure consciousness and bliss is only possible when a thorough conviction has been generated by scriptural studies and rational thinking and discussions, so that all false ideas have been removed and all doubts have been dispelled.

¹ *upāsana ca dvividhā, satataṃ śāstrābhyāsa-rūpā dhyāna-rūpā ca. Madhva-siddhānta-sara*, p. 500.

² *dhyānaṃ ca itara-tiraskāra-pūrvaka-bhagavad-viṣayakākhaṇḍa-smṛtiḥ. Ibid.* p. 502. This *dhyāna* is the same as *nididhyāsana*.

God alone is the cause of all bondage, as well as of all liberation¹. When one directly realizes the nature of God, there arises in him devotion (*bhakti*) to the Lord; for without personal, direct and immediate knowledge of Him there cannot be any devotion. Devotion (*bhakti*) consists of a continual flow of love for the Lord, which cannot be impaired or affected by thousands of obstacles, which is many times greater than love for one's own self or love for what is generally regarded as one's own, and which is preceded by a knowledge of the Lord as the possessor of an infinite number of good and benign qualities². And when such a *bhakti* arises, the Lord is highly pleased (*atyartha-prasāda*), and it is when God is so pleased with us that we can attain salvation.

Though individual souls are self-luminous in themselves, yet through God's will their self-luminous intelligence becomes veiled by ignorance (*avidyā*). When, as a modification of the mind or inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), direct knowledge of God arises, such a modification serves to dispel the ignorance or *avidyā*; for, though *avidyā* is not directly associated with the mind, yet such a mental advancement can affect it, since they are both severally connected with the individual self. Ordinarily the rise of knowledge destroys only the deeds of unappointed fruition, whereas the deeds of appointed fruition (*prārabdha-karma*) remain and cause pleasure and pain, cognition and want of cognition. So ordinarily the realization of God serves to destroy the association of *prakṛti* and the *guṇas* with an individual, as also his *karmas* and subtle body (*liṅga-deha*),

¹ God maintains or keeps in existence all other entities, which are all wholly dependent on Him. He creates and destroys only the non-eternal and eternal-non-eternal entities. Again, with reference to all beings except Lakṣmī, it is He who holds up the veil of positive ignorance (*bhāva-rūpā avidyā*) of *prakṛti*, either as the first *avidyā*, the *guṇas* of *sattva*, *rajas* and *taṃas*, or as the second *avidyā* of desire (*kāma*), or as the third *avidyā* of actions of appointed fruition (*prārabdha-karma*), or as the subtle body, or finally as His own will. It is the last, the power of Hari, which forms the real stuff of all ignorance; the *avidyā* is only an indirect agent (*parameśvara-śaktir eva svarūpāvaraṇā mukhyā, avidyā tu nimitta-mātram*); for, even if *avidyā* is destroyed, there will not arise supreme bliss, unless God so desires it. It is again He who gives knowledge to the conscious entities, happiness to all except those demons who are by nature unfit for attaining it, and sorrow also to all except Lakṣmī, who is by nature without any touch of sorrow. *Tattva-saṃkhyāna-vivaraṇa* and *Tattva-saṃkhyāna-ṭīppaṇa*, pp. 43-7.

² *parameśvara-bhaktir nāma niravadhikānantānavadya-kalyāṇa-guṇatvā-jñānapūrvakah svātmātmiya-samasta-vastubhyaḥ aneka-guṇādhikah antarāya-sahasreṇāpi apratibaddhaḥ nirantara-prema-pravāhaḥ. Nyāya-sudhā* on *Anuvyākhyāna*.

consisting of the senses, five *prāṇas* and *manas*, until the deeds of appointed fruition are exhausted by suffering or enjoyment¹. During *pralaya* the liberated souls enter the womb of God and cannot have any enjoyment; but again after creation they begin to enjoy. The enjoyment of liberated souls is of four kinds: *sālokya*, *sāmīpya*, *sārūpya* and *sāyujya* (*sārṣṭi* being counted as a species of *sāyujya* and not a fifth kind of liberation). *Sāyujya* means the entrance of individual souls into the body of God and their identification of themselves with the enjoyment of God in His own body; *sārṣṭi-mokṣa*, which is a species of *sāyujya-mokṣa*, means the enjoyment of the same powers that God possesses, which can only be done by entering into the body of God and by identifying oneself with the particular powers of God. Only deities or Gods deserve to have this kind of liberation; they can, of course, at their will come out of God as well and remain separate from Him; *sālokya-mokṣa* means residence in heaven and being there with God to experience satisfaction and enjoyment by the continual sight of Him. *Sāmīpya-mokṣa* means continuous residence near God, such as is enjoyed by the sages. *Sārūpya-mokṣa* is enjoyed by God's attendants, who have outward forms similar to that which God possesses². The acceptance of difference amongst the liberated souls in the states of enjoyment and other privileges forms one of the cardinal doctrines of Madhva's system; for, if it is not acknowledged, then the cardinal dualistic doctrine that all individual souls are always different from one another would fail³. It has already been said that liberation can be attained only by *bhakti*, involving continuous pure love (*sneha*)⁴. Only gods and superior men deserve it, whereas ordinary men deserve only to undergo rebirth, and the lowest men and the demons always suffer in hell. The Gods cannot go to hell, nor can the demons ever attain liberation, and ordinary persons neither obtain liberation nor go to hell⁵.

¹ *Bhāgavata-tātparya*, I. 13, where a reference is made also to *Brahma-tarka*.

² Jaya and Vijaya, the two porters of God, are said to enjoy *Sārūpya-mokṣa*.

³ *muktānām ca na hīyante tāratamyam ca sarvadā. Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya*, p. 4. See also *Nyāyāmṛta*.

⁴ *acchidra-sevā* (faultless attendance) and *niṣkāmatva* (desirelessness) are also mentioned as defining the characteristic *bhakti*. Gifts, pilgrimage, *tapas*, etc., also are regarded as secondary accessories of attendance on, or *sevā* of, God. *Ibid.* p. 5.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 5.

As the imperative duties of all men upwards of eight years and up to eighty years of age, Madhva most strongly urges the fasting on the *Ekādaśī* (eleventh day of the moon), marking the forehead with the black vertical line characteristic of his followers even to the present day. One should constantly worship Lord Kṛṣṇa with great devotion (*bhakti*) and pray to Him to be saved from the sorrows of the world. One should think of the miseries of hell and try to keep oneself away from sins, and should always sing the name of Hari, the Lord, and make over to Him all the deeds that one performs, having no desire of fruits for them¹.

¹ *Kṛṣṇāmṛta-mahārṇava*.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALLABHA

Vallabha's Interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra*.

MOST systems of Vedānta are based upon an inquiry regarding the ultimate purport of the instruction of the text of the Upaniṣads which form the final part of the Vedas. The science of *mīmāṃsā* is devoted to the enquiry into the nature of Vedic texts, on the presumption that all Vedic texts have to be interpreted as enjoining people to perform certain courses of action or to refrain from doing others; it also presumes that obedience to these injunctions produces *dharma* and disobedience *adharma*. Even the study of the Vedas has to be done in obedience to the injunction that Vedas must be studied, or that the teacher should instruct in the Vedas or that one should accept a teacher for initiating him to the holy thread who will teach him the Vedas in detail. All interpreters of *Mīmāṃsā* and Vedānta agree on the point that the study of the Vedas implies the understanding of the meaning by the student, though there are divergences of opinion as to the exact nature of injunction and the exact manner in which such an implication follows. If the *Brahmacārin* has to study the Vedas and understand their meaning from the instruction of the teacher at his house, it may generally be argued that there is no scope for a further discussion regarding the texts of the Upaniṣads; and if this is admitted, the whole of the *Brahma-sūtra*, whose purpose is to enter into such a discussion, becomes meaningless. It may be argued that the Upaniṣad texts are pregnant with mystic lore which cannot be unravelled by a comprehension of the textual meaning of words. But, if this mystic lore cannot be unravelled by the textual meaning of the word, it is not reasonable to suppose that one can comprehend the deep and mystic truths which they profess to instruct by mere intellectual discussions. The Upaniṣads themselves say that one can comprehend the true meaning of the Upaniṣads through *tapas* and the grace of God¹.

¹ *a-laukiko hi vedārtho na yuktyā pratipadyate tapasā
veda-yuktyā tu prasādāt paramātmanah.*

Vallabha's *Bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra*
(Chowkhamba edition, p. 13).

To this Vallabha's reply is that, since there are diverse kinds of *śāstras* offering diverse kinds of instructions, and since Vedic texts are themselves so complicated that it is not easy to understand their proper emphasis, an ordinary person may have legitimate doubt as to their proper meaning, unless there is a *śāstra* which itself discusses these difficulties and attempts to solve them by textual comparisons and contrasts; it cannot be denied that there is a real necessity for such a discussion as was undertaken by Vyāsa himself in the *Brahma-sūtra*¹.

According to Rāmānuja the *Brahma-sūtra* is a continuation of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*; though the two works deal with different subjects, they have the same continuity of purpose. The study of the *Brahma-sūtra* must therefore be preceded by the study of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*. According to Bhāskara the application of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* is universal; all double-born people must study the *Mīmāṃsā* and the nature of *dharma* for their daily duties. The knowledge of Brahman is only for some; a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman can therefore be only for those who seek emancipation in the fourth stage of their lives. Even those who seek emancipation must perform the daily works of *dharma*; the nature of such *dharma* can only be known by a study of the *Mīmāṃsā*. The enquiry regarding Brahman must therefore be preceded by a study of the *Mīmāṃsā*. It is also said by some that it is by a long course of meditation in the manner prescribed by the Upaniṣads that the Brahman can be known. A knowledge of such meditation can only be attained by a knowledge of the due nature of sacrifices. It is said also in the *smṛtis* that it is by sacrifices that the holy body of Brahman can be built (*mahā-yajñaiś ca yajñaiś ca brāhmīyaṃ kriyate tanuḥ*)²; so it is when the forty-eight *saṃskāras* are performed that one becomes fit for the study or meditation on the nature of the Brahman. It is also said in the *smṛtis* that it is only after discharging the three debts—study, marriage, and performance of sacrifices—that one has the right to fix his mind on Brahman for emancipation. According to most

¹ *sandeha-vāraṇam śāstram buddhi-doṣāt tad-udbhavaḥ
viruddha-śāstra-sambhedād aṅgaiś cāśakya-niścayaḥ
tasmāt sūtrānusāreṇa kartavyaḥ sarva-nirṇayaḥ
anyathā bhraśyate svārthān madhyamaś ca tathāvidhaḥ.*

Ibid. p. 20.

² Manu, II. 28.

people the sacrificial duties are useful for the knowledge of Brahman; so it may be held that enquiry about the nature of Brahman must follow an enquiry about the nature of *dharma*¹.

But, even if the theory of the joint-performance of sacrifice and meditation on Brahman be admitted, it does not follow that an enquiry into the nature of Brahman must follow an enquiry about the nature of *dharma*. It can only mean that the nature of the knowledge of Brahman may be held to be associated with the nature of *dharma*, as it is properly known from the *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra*. On such a supposition the knowledge of the nature of the self is to be known from the study of the *Brahma-sūtra*; but since the knowledge of the self is essential even for the performance of sacrificial actions, it may well be argued that the enquiry into the nature of *dharma* must be preceded by an enquiry about the nature of the self from the *Brahma-sūtra*². Nor can it be said that from such texts as require a person to be self-controlled (*śānto dānto*, etc.) it may be argued that enquiry into the nature of *dharma* must precede that about Brahman: the requirement of self-control does not necessarily mean that enquiry about the nature of *dharma* should be given precedence, for a man may be self-controlled even without studying the *Mīmāṃsā*.

Nor can it be said, as Śaṅkara does, that enquiry into the nature of Brahman must be preceded by a disinclination from earthly and heavenly joys, by mind-control, self-control, etc. On this point Bhāskara argues against the Vallabha views, and his reason for their rejection is that such attainments are extremely rare; even great sages like Durvāsa and others failed to attain them. Even without self-knowledge one may feel disinclined to things through sorrows, and one may exercise mind-control and self-control even for earthly ends. There is moreover no logical relation between the attainment of such qualities and enquiry about the nature of Brahman. Nor can it be argued that, if enquiry into the nature of Brahman is preceded by an enquiry into the *Mīmāṃsā*, we can attain all these qualities. Moreover, an enquiry about the nature of Brahman can only come through a conviction of the importance of

¹ Puruṣottama's commentary on Vallabhācārya's *Anubhāṣya*, pp. 25-6.

² *pūrvam vedānta-ricāreṇa tad avagantavyam nānā-balaḥ ātma-svarūpe vipratipanna-vaidikānāṃ veda-vākyaḥ eva tan nirāsaśyāvaśyakatvāt jñāte tayoh sva-rūpe kurmaṇi sukhena pravṛtti-darśanam. Ibid. p. 27.*

the knowledge alone, and for the comprehension of such importance the enquiry about Brahman is necessary: there is thus an argument in a circle. If it is held that, when knowledge of the Vedāntic texts is properly acquired by listening to instruction on the Vedas, one may then turn to an enquiry into the nature of Brahman, that also is objectionable; for, if the meaning of the Vedāntic texts has been properly comprehended, there is no further need for an enquiry about the nature of Brahman. If it is held that the knowledge of Brahman can come only through the scriptural testimony of such texts as "that art thou" or "thou art the truth," that too is objectionable: for no realization of the nature of Brahman can come by scriptural testimony to an ignorant person who may interpret it as referring to an identity of the self and the body. If by the scriptural texts it is possible to have a direct realization of Brahman, it is unnecessary to enjoin the duty of reflection and mediation. It is therefore wrong to suppose that an enquiry into the nature of Brahman must be preceded either by *dharmavicāra* or by the attainment of such extremely rare qualities as have been referred to by Śaṅkara. Again, it is said in the scriptures that those who have realized the true meaning of the Vedānta should renounce the world; so renunciation must take place after the Vedāntic texts have been well comprehended and not before. Again, without an enquiry into the nature of Brahman one cannot know that Brahman is the highest object of attainment; without a knowledge of the latter one would not have the desired and other attainments of the mind and so be led to a discussion about Brahman. Again, if a person with the desired attainments listens to the Vedāntic texts, he would immediately attain emancipation and there would be no one to instruct him.

The enquiry about the nature of Brahman does not require any preceding condition; anyone of the double-born caste is entitled to do it. The Mīmāṃsakas say that all the Vedāntic texts insisting upon the knowledge of Brahman should be interpreted as injunctions by whose performance *dharma* is produced. But this interpretation is wrong; though any kind of prescribed meditation (*upāsana*) may produce *dharma*, Brahman itself is not of the nature of *dharma*. All *dharma*s are of the nature of actions (*dharmāśya ca kriyā-rūpatvāt*); but Brahman cannot be produced, and is therefore not of the nature of action. The seeming injunction for meditation

on Brahman is intended to show the greatness of Brahma-knowledge; such meditations are merely mental operations akin to knowledge and are not any kind of action. This Brahma-knowledge is also helpful for the proper discharge of one's duties; for this reason people like Janaka had it and so were able to discharge their duties in the proper manner. It is wrong to suppose that those who do not have the illusory notion of the self as the body are incapable of performing *karma*; for the *Gītā* says that the true philosopher knows that he does not work and yet is always associated with work; he abnegates all his *karmas* in Brahman and acts without any attachment, just as a lotus leaf never gets wet by water. The conclusion is therefore that only he who knows Brahman can by his work produce the desired results; so those who are engaged in discussing the nature of *dharma* should also discuss the nature of Brahman. The man who knows Brahman and works has no desire for the fruits of his *karma*, for he has resigned all his works to Brahman. It is therefore wrong to say that only those who are desirous of the fruits of *karma* are eligible for their performance; the highest and the most desired end of *karma* is the abnegation of its fruits¹. It is the intention of Vallabha that both the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* and the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* (or the *Brahma-sūtra*) are but two different ways of propounding the nature of Brahman; the two together form one science. This in a way is the view of all the Vedāntic interpreters except Śaṅkara, though they differ in certain details of mode of approach². Thus according to Rāmānuja the two *Mīmāṃsās* form one science and the performance of sacrifices can be done conjointly with continual remembering of Brahman, which (with him) is devotion, meditation and realization of Brahman. According to Bhāskara, though the subject of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* is different from that of the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*, yet they have one end in view and form one science, and the ultimate purport of them both is the realization of the nature of Brahman. According to Bhikṣu the purpose of the *Brahma-sūtra* is to reconcile the apparently contradictory portions of the Vedāntic texts which have

¹ *phala-kāmādy-anupayogāt anenaiva tat-samarpaṇāt nityatvād apy arthajñānasya na phala-preṣur adhikārī*. Puruṣottama's commentary on Vallabhācārya's *Anubhāṣya*, p. 43.

² *prakāra-bhedenāpi kāṇḍa-dvayaśāpi brahma-pratipādatayaikavākyatva-samarthanam mīmāṃsā-dvayaśaika-śāstrasya sūcanena vṛttikāra-virodhato'pi bodhitāḥ*. *Ibid.* p. 46.

not been taken by *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*. The purpose of the *Brahma-sūtra* is the same as that of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, because enquiry into the nature of the Brahman is also due to the injunction that Brahman should be known, and the highest *dharma* is produced thereby. The *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* is a supplement of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*. According to Madhva it is those who have devotion who are eligible for enquiry into the nature of Brahman.

Vallabha combines the second and the third *sūtra* of *Adhyāya* 1, *Pāda* 1, of the *Brahma-sūtra* and reads them as *janmādyasya yataḥ, śāstrayonitvāt*. The commentator says that this is the proper order, because all topics (*adhikaraṇas*) show the objections, conclusions and the reasons; the reasons would be missing if the third *sūtra* (*śāstrayonitvāt*) were not included in the second, forming one *adhikaraṇa*. Brahman is the cause of the appearance and disappearance of the world, and this can be known only on the evidence of the scriptures. Brahman is thus the final and the ultimate agent; but, though production and maintenance, derangement and destruction are all possible through the agency of Brahman, yet they are not associated with Him as His qualities. The *sūtra* may also be supposed to mean that that is Brahman from which the first (i.e., *ākāśa*) has been produced¹.

The view of Śāṅkara that Brahman is the producer of the Vedas and that by virtue of this He must be regarded as omniscient is rejected to-day by Puruṣottama. To say the Vedas had been produced by God by His deliberate desire would be to accept the views of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣikas; the eternity of the Vedas must then be given up. If the Vedas had come out of Brahman like the breath of a man, then, since all breathing is involuntary, the production of the Vedas would not show the omniscience of God (*niḥśvā-sātmaka-vedopādānatvena abuddhi-pūrvaka-niḥśvāsoṣopādāna-puru-ṣaḍrṣṭānta-sanāthena pratisādhanaena apāstam*)². Moreover, if Brahman had produced the Vedas in the same order in which they existed in the previous *kalpa*, He must in doing so have submitted Himself to some necessity or law, and therefore was not independent³. Again, the view of Śāṅkara that the Brahman associated

¹ *Janma ādyasya ākāśasya yataḥ. Anubhāṣya*, p. 61.

² Commentary on *Anubhāṣya*, p. 64.

³ *tādṛśānupūrvā-racanayā asvātantrye rājājñānuvādaka-rāja-dūtavadānu-pūrvā-racanā-mātreṇeśvara-sārvajñāsiddhyā vyākhyeya-grantha-virodhāc ca. Ibid.* p. 64.

with *ajñāna* is to be regarded as the omniscient *Īśvara* can be accepted on his authority alone.

It is no doubt true that the nature of Brahman is shown principally in the Upaniṣads, and from that point of view the word *śāstra-yoni*, "he who is known by the Upaniṣads," may well be applied to Brahman; yet there may be a legitimate objection that other parts of the Vedas have no relevant connection with Brahman. The reply is that it is by actions in accordance with other parts of the Vedas that the mind may be purified, and thus God may be induced to exercise His grace for a revelation of His nature. So in a remote manner other parts of the Vedas may be connected with the Vedas. So the knowledge of the Vedānta helps the due performance of the scriptural injunctions of other parts of the Vedas. The *karma-kāṇḍa* and the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* are virtually complementary to each other and both have a utility for self-knowledge, though the importance of the Upaniṣads must be superior.

We know already that Rāmānuja repudiated the idea of inferring the existence of God as omniscient and omnipotent from the production of the world, and established the thesis that God cannot be known through any means of proof, such as perception, inference, and the like, but only through the testimony of the scriptural texts.

The tendency of the Nyāya system has been to prove the existence of God by inference; thus Udayana gives nine arguments in favour of the existence of God. The first of these is that the word, being of the nature of effect, must have some cause which has produced it (*kāryānumāna*). The second is that there must be some one who in the beginning of the creation set the atoms in motion for the formation of molecules (*āyojanānumāna*). The third is that the earth could not have remained hanging in space if it were not held by God (*dṛṭyanumāna*). The fourth is that the destruction of the world also requires an agent and that must be God (*vināśānumāna*). The fifth is that meanings ascribed to words must have been due to the will of God (*padānumāna*). The sixth is that merit and demerit, as can be known from the prescription of the Vedas, must presume an original acquaintance of the person who composed the Vedas (*pratyanumāna*). The seventh is that the scriptures testify to the existence of God. The eighth (*vākya-numāna*) is the same as the seventh. The ninth is as follows: the accretion of the

mass of atoms depends upon their number, as they are partless; the numerical conception is dependent upon relative mental comparison on the part of the perceiver; at the time of creation there must have been some one by whose numerical conception the accretion of mass is possible. This is the ninth *anumāna* (*samkhyā-numāna*). Though God is regarded as the cause of the world, yet He need not have a body; for cause as producer does not necessarily involve the possession of a body; there are others, however, who think that God produces special bodies, the *avatāra* of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc., by which He acts in special ways.

Vijñāna-bhikṣu, however, thinks that the Sāṃkhya categories of *buddhi*, etc., being products, presume the existence of their previous causes, about which there must be some intuitive knowledge, and whose purpose is served by it; such a person is Īśvara. The procedure consists in inferring first an original cause (the *prakṛti*) of the categories, and God is He who has direct knowledge of the *prakṛti* by virtue of which He modifies it to produce the categories, and thus employs it for His own purpose.

There are some who hold that even in the Upaniṣadic texts there are instances of inferring the nature of Brahman, and though Bādarāyaṇa does not indulge in any inferences himself, he deals with such texts as form their basis. The point of view of the syllogists has been that the inferences are valid inasmuch as they are in consonance with the Upaniṣad texts. But Vallabha agrees with Rāmānuja and Bhāskara that no inference is possible about the existence of God, and that His nature can only be known through the testimony of the Upaniṣadic texts¹.

The nature of Brahman.

Brahman is both the material and instrumental cause of the world. There is no diversity of opinion regarding the Brahman as the instrumental (*nimitta*) cause of the world, but there is difference of opinion whether Brahman is its creator or whether He is its material cause, since the Vedānta does not admit the relation of *samavāya*, the view that Brahman is the inherent (*samavāyi*) cause of the world. The objection against Brahman being the *samavāyi*

¹ The commentator Puruṣottama offers a criticism of the theistic arguments after the manner of Rāmānuja. Commentary on *Anubhāṣya*, pp. 74-8.

kāraṇa is further enhanced by the supposition that, if He were so He must be liable to change (*samavāyitve vikṛtatvasyāpatteh*). Vallabha holds that the *sūtra* “*tat tu samanvayāt*” establishes the view that Brahman is the inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*), because it exists everywhere in His tripartite nature, as being, thought and bliss. The world as such (the *prapañca*) consists of names, forms and actions, and Brahman is the cause of them all, as He exists everywhere in His tripartite forms. The Sāṃkhyaists hold that it is the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* which pervade all things, and all things manifest these qualities; a cause must be of the nature of the effects, since all effects are of the nature of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. So the reply is that there is a more serious objection, because the *prakṛti* (consisting of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) is itself a part of Brahman (*prakṛter api svamate tadaṃśatvāt*)². But yet the Sāṃkhya method of approach cannot be accepted. The pleasure of *prakṛti* is of the nature of ignorance, and is limited by time and space; things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others; they are pleasant at one time and not pleasant at another; they are pleasant in some places and unpleasant in other places. But the bliss of Brahman is unlimited by conditions; the relation of bliss and the self as associated with knowledge is thus different from the pleasure of *prakṛti* (*ātmānandajñānena prakṛtikapriyatvātau bādhadarśanāt*)³. The Brahman therefore pervades the world in His own true nature as knowledge and bliss. It is by His will that He manifests Himself as many and also manifests His three characters—thought, being and bliss—in different proportions in the material world of *antaryāmins*. This pervasion of Brahman as many and all is to be distinguished from the Śāṅkarite exposition of it. According to Śāṅkara and his followers the phenomenal world of objects has the Brahman as its basis of reality; the concrete appearances are only impositions on this unchanging reality. According to this view the concrete appearances cannot be regarded as the effects of Brahman, or, in other words, Brahman cannot be regarded as the *upādāna* or the material cause of the stuff of the concrete objects. We know that among the Śāṅkarites also there are diverse opinions regarding the material cause of the world. Thus the author of the *Padārtha-nirṇaya* thinks that Brahman and *māyā* are jointly the

¹ Vallabha's *Anubhāṣya*, p. 85.

² Puruṣottama's commentary, p. 86.

cause of the world, Brahman being the unchanging cause and *māyā* being the transforming cause. Sarvajñātmamuni, the author of the *Samkṣepa-śāriraka*, thinks that Brahman is the material cause through the instrumentality of *māyā*. Vācaspati Miśra thinks that the *māyā* resting in *jīva* as associated with Brahman jointly produces the world; *māyā* here is regarded as the accessory cause (*sahakāri*). The author of the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* thinks that the *māyā-śakti* is the real material cause and not the Brahman; Brahman is beyond cause and effect¹.

Vallabha, however, disagrees with this view for the reason that according to this the causality of Brahman is only indirect, and as regards the appearances which are illusory impositions according to Śaṅkara no cause is really ascribed; he therefore holds that Brahman by His own will has manifested Himself with preponderance of the elements of being, consciousness, and bliss in His three forms as matter, soul and the Brahman. Brahman is therefore regarded as the *samavāyikāraṇa* of the world².

Bhāskara also holds that Brahman is at once one with the world and different from it, just as the sea is in one sense one with the waves and in another sense different from them. The suggestion that a thing cannot be its opposite is meaningless, because it is so experienced. All things as objects may be regarded as one, but this does not preclude their specific characters and existence; in reality there is no opposition or contradiction, like heat and cold or as between fire and sparks, between Brahman and the world, for the world has sprung out of Him, is maintained in Him and is merged in Him. In the case of ordinary contradiction this is not the case; when the jug is produced out of the earth, though the earth and the jug may seem to be different, yet the jug has no existence without the earth—the former is being maintained by the latter. So, as effect, the world is many; as cause, it is one with Brahman³.

Vallabha's point of view is very close to that of Bhāskara, though not identical; he holds that it is the same Brahman who is present in all His fullness in all objects of the world and in the selves. He only manifested some qualities in their preponderating

¹ See *Siddhāntaleśa* (ed. Lazaras, 1890), pp. 12-13.

² *anāropitānāgantuka-rūpeṇa anuvṛttir eva samavāya iti idam eva ca tādātmīyam*. Puruṣottama's commentary on *Amubhāṣya*, p. 90.

³ *kāryarūpeṇa nānātvam, abhedaḥ kāraṇātmanā hemātmanā yathā'bhedah kuṇḍalādyātmanā bhedaḥ*. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, p. 18.

manner in the different forms; multiplicity therefore does not involve any change. It is for this reason that he prefers the term *samavāyikāraṇa* to *upādānakāraṇa*; according to him the concept of *samavāyikāraṇa* consists in universal and unconditional pervasion. The concept of *upādāna* involves a concept of change, though the effects caused by the change are maintained by the *upādāna* (or the material cause) and though it ultimately merges into it¹. So far as the Brahman may be regarded as being one with all the multiplicity, Vallabha is in agreement with Bhāskara.

Vallabha again denies the relation of *samavāya*, like other Vedāntic thinkers, though he regards Brahman as the *samavāyikāraṇa* of the world. His refutation of *samavāya* follows the same line as that of the other Vedāntic interpreters, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, and need not be repeated here. *Samavāya*, according to Vallabha, is not a relation of inherence such as is admitted by the Nyāya writers; with him it means identity (*tādātmya*). According to the Nyāyīyikas *samavāya* is the relation of inherence which exists between cause and effect, between qualities and substance, between universals and substance; but Vallabha says that there is no separate relation of inherence here to combine these pairs; it is the substance itself that appears in action, qualities and as cause and effect. It is thus merely a manifestation of identity in varying forms that gives us the notion of diversity in contraries; in reality there is no difference between the varying forms which are supposed to be associated together by a relation of inherence².

Puruṣottama, in his *Prasthāna-ratnākara*, says that *māyā* is a power of Brahman, and is thus identical with Him (*māyāyā api bhagavac-chaktitvena śaktimad-abhinnatvāt*)³; *māyā* and *avidyā* are the same. It is by this *māyā* that God manifests Himself as many. This manifestation is neither an error nor a confusion; it is a real manifestation of God in diverse forms without implying the notion of change or transformation. The world is thus real, being a real manifestation of God. Brahman Himself, being of the nature of

¹ *nanv atropādāna-padaṃ parityajya samavāyi-padena kuto vyavahāra iti ced ucyate. loke upādāna-padena kartṛ-kriyayā vyāptasya paricchinmasyaivābhidhāna-darśanāt prakṛtiḥ hy asyopādānam iti.* Puruṣottama's commentary, p. 118.

² *nanu dūṣite samavāye ayuta-siddhayoḥ kaḥ sambandho'ṅgikartavyaḥ iti cet tādātmyam eva iti brūmaḥ. katham iti cet itthaṃ pratyakṣād yad-draṇyam yad-draṇya-samavetaṃ tad tadātmakamiti vyāpteh...kāraṇa-kārya-tādātmyam draṇyayor nirvivādam.* Ibid. p. 627.

³ *Prasthāna-ratnākara*, p. 159.

sat, *cit* and *ānanda*, can manifest Himself in His partial aspects in the world without the help of any instrument. It is possible to conceive Brahman in His aspects or characters as knowledge, bliss, activity, time, will, *māya*, and *prakṛti*. The *kāla* represents the *kriyā-śakti* or power of action. The determination of the creation or dissolution through time (*kāla*) means the limitation of His power of action; determined by this power of action His other parts act consonantly with it. By His will He conceives His selves as different from Him and through different forms thus conceived He manifests Himself; in this way the diverse characters of Brahman manifesting Himself in diverse forms manifest Himself also as differing in diverse ways. Thus, though He is identical with knowledge and bliss, He appears as the possessor of these. The power of God consists in manifesting His nature as pure being, as action and as producing confusion in His nature as pure intelligence. This confusion, manifesting itself as experiential ignorance (which shows itself as egotism), is a part of the *māyā* which creates the world, and which is instrument of God as pure bliss in His manifestation as the world. This *māyā* thus appears as a secondary cause beyond the original cause, and may sometimes modify it and thereby act as a cause of God's will. It must, however, be understood that *māyā* thus conceived cannot be regarded as the original cause; it serves in the first instance to give full play to the original desire of God to become many; in the second place it serves to create the diversity of the grades of existence as superior and inferior. It is in relation to such manifestation of God's knowledge and action that God may be regarded as the possessor of knowledge and action. The aspect of *māyā* as creating confusion is regarded as *avidyā*. This confused apperception is also of the nature of understanding such as we possess it; through this confused understanding there comes a desire for association with the nature of bliss conceived as having a separate existence and through it come the various efforts constituting the life in the living. It is by virtue of this living that the individual is called *jīva*. The nature as being when posited or a product of the action appears as inanimate objects, and is later on associated again with action and goes to manifest itself as the bodies of the living. So from His twofold will there spring forth from His nature as pure being the material *prāṇas*, which serve as elements of bondage for the *jīvas* and are but manifestations of His nature as

being: there also spring forth from His nature as pure intelligence the *jīvas* which are the subject of bondage; and there spring forth like sparks from His nature as pure bliss the *antaryāmins* which control the *jīvas*¹. So among the *jīvas* who are bound there may be some with whom God may be pleased and to whom He may grant the complete power of knowledge; the confusing *māyā* leaves its hold upon such persons; they thus remain in a free state in their nature as pure intelligence, but they have not the power to control the affairs of the Universe.

Brahman may be described in another way from the essential point of view (*svarūpa*) and the causal point of view (*kāraṇa*). From the essential point of view God may be viewed in three aspects, as action, knowledge, and knowledge and action. The causes prescribed in the sacrificial sphere of the Vedas represent His nature in the second aspect. The third aspect is represented in the course of *bhakti* in which God is represented as the possessor of knowledge, action and bliss. In the aspect as cause we have the concept of the *antaryāmins*, which, though they are in reality of the essential nature of Brahman, are regarded as helping the *jīvas* in their works by presiding over them²; the *antaryāmins* are thus as infinite in number as the *jīvas*. But apart from these *antaryāmins*, God is also regarded as one *antaryāmin* and has been so described in the *Antaryāmi-brahman*.

The Categories.

Time is also regarded as a form of God. Activity and nature (*karma-svabhāvam*) are involved in the concept of time or *kāla*. Time in its inner essence consists of being, intelligence, and bliss, though in its phenomenal appearance it is manifest only with a slight tinge of being³. It is supra-sensible and can be inferred only from the nature of effects (*kāryānumeya*). It may also be defined

¹ *evaṃ ca ubhābhyām icchābhyām sac-cid-ānandarūpebhyo yathā-yatham prānādyā jaḍās cid-amśa-jīva-bandhana-parikara-bhūtāḥ sadamśāḥ jīvās cidamśā bandhanīyā ānandamśās tan-niyāmakā antar-yāmināḥ ca viṣṭhulinga-nyāyena vyuccaranti.* Commentary on *Amubhāṣya*, pp. 161-2.

² *antaryāmināṃ sva-rūpa-bhūtatve'pi jīvena saha kārye praveśāt tad-bhedānām ānantye'pi kārāṇi-bhūta-vakṣyamāṇa-tattva-śarīre praviśya tat-sahāyā-karaṇāt kāraṇa-koṭāu eva niveśo na tu sva-rūpa-koṭāu.* Ibid. pp. 164-5.

³ *etasyaiva rūpāntaram kāla-karma-svabhāvāḥ kālasyaṃśa-bhūtau karma-svabhāvau tatra antaḥ-sac-ci-dānando vyavahāre īśat-sattvāmśena prakāṣaḥ kāla iti kālasya svarūpa-lakṣaṇaṃ.* Ibid. p. 165.

as eternally pervasive and the cause and support of all things. Time is the first cause that disturbs the equilibrium of the *guṇas*. The sun, the moon, etc., are its *ādhibhautika* forms, the atoms are its *ādhyatmika* form, and God is its *ādhidāivika* form. The time that the sun takes in passing an atom is the time-atom; being thus too small it cannot be any further divided. It is only by the conglomeration of the smallest time-units that long spans of time are produced; for time is not one whole of an all-pervasive character of which the smaller units of time are parts.

Karma or action of all descriptions is regarded as universal; it only manifests itself in diverse forms and specific conditions as specific actions of this or that individual. Since it is this universal *karma* that manifests itself as different actions of diverse men, it is unnecessary to admit *adṛṣṭa* as a separate category belonging to self, which remains after the destruction of a *karma* and gives its fruit after a remote time; it is also unnecessary to admit *dharma* and *adharma* as important categories; for they are all included in the concept of this universal *karma*, which manifests itself in diverse forms under diverse conditions. The application of the terms *dharma* and *adharma* is thus only the method of logical interest; it thus explains how the specific can produce *svarga* without the intermediary of *adṛṣṭa*, or how the *karma* of one person (*putreṣṭi*, "sacrifice") can produce fruit in another, i.e., the son. How a *karma* should manifest itself in its fruits or with reference to the performer and other persons is determined by the conditions and as explained in the scriptures; the production of a fruit in specific forms in specific centres does not mean its destruction but its disappearance¹.

Svabhāva ("nature") is admitted as a separate category. It also is identified with God; its function consists in the inducement of God's will. It is therefore defined as that which produces change (*parināma-hetutvaṃ tal-lakṣaṇam*); it is universal and reveals itself by itself before all other things. There may, however, be subtle changes which are not at first noticeable; but, when they become manifest, they presume the function of *svabhāva*, without which they could not have come about. It is from this that the twenty-

¹ *tal-lakṣaṇam ca vidhi-niṣedha-prakāreṇa laukika-kriyābhīḥ pradeśato'-bhīvyāñjana-yogyā vyāpikā kriyati... etenaiv-ādṛṣṭasyāpyātma-guṇatvaṃ nirākṛtaṃ veditavyam. evaṃcāpūrv-ādṛṣṭadharmaḍharmāḍipadairapidamevocyate. ataḥ sādharāṇye'pi phala-vyavasthōpatīter na karma-nānātvamity api. dāna-hiṃsādaṁ tu dharmāḍharmāḍi-prayogo' bhīvyāñjakatvopādhiṇā bhāktāḥ. Ibid. pp. 168-9.*

eight categories have evolved: they are called *tattva*, because they are of the nature of "that," i.e., God; all *tattvas* are thus the unfolding of God. The causality involved in the manifestation of *svabhāva* is a specific causality following a definite cause, and is giving rise to the evolutionary series of the *tattvas*; in this sense it is different from the causality of God's will, and is only a cause in the general manner. Of these categories *sattva* may be counted first. *Sattva* is that which, being of the nature of pleasure and luminosity of knowledge and non-obstructive to the manifestation of pleasure, behaves as the cause of attachment to pleasure and knowledge in individuals¹. *Rajas* is that which, being of the nature of attachment, produces clinging or desire for actions in individuals. *Tamas* is that which produces in individuals a tendency to errors, laziness, sleep, etc. There is a difference between the Sāṃkhya conception of these *guṇas* and Vallabha's characterization of them (which is supposed to follow the *Pañcarātra*, *Gītā* and *Bhāgavata*). Thus, according to the Sāṃkhya, the *guṇas* operate by themselves; but this is untenable, as it would lead to the theory of natural necessity and atheism. Nor can *rajas* be defined as being of the nature of sorrow; for the authoritative scriptures speak of its being of the nature of attachment. When these qualities are conceived as being produced from God, they are regarded as being of the nature of *māyā* as the power of intelligence and bliss of God². These (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) should be regarded as identical with *māyā* and products of *māyā*. Nor are these *guṇas* for the sake of others (*parārtha*), as is conceived by the Sāṃkhya; nor are they inextricably mixed up with another, but their co-operation is only for building the *puruṣa*. God thus manifests Himself as the form of the *māyā*, just as cotton spreads itself as threads. God, as unqualified, produces all His qualities by Himself; in His nature as pure being He produces *sattva*, in His nature as bliss He produces *tamas*, in His nature as intelligence He produces *rajas*³.

Puruṣa or *ātman* may be defined from three points of view: it may be defined as beginningless, qualityless, the controller of

¹ *sukhānāvarakatve prakāśakatve sukhātmakatve ca sati sukhāsktyā jñānā-saktyā ca dehino dehādy-āśakti-janakam sattvam.* Commentary on *Anubhāṣya*, p. 170.

² *ete ca guṇā yadā bhagavataḥ sakāśād eva utpadyante tadā māyā cic-chakti-rūpā ānanda-rūpā vijñeyā.* Ibid. p. 171.

³ *sad-aṃśāt sattvam, ānandāṃśāt tamah, cidāṃśāt rajas.* Ibid. p. 172.

prakṛti, and apperceptible as the object of the notion of “I”; it may also be defined as purely self-luminous; and, again, as that which, though not in reality affected by the qualities or defects of the universe, is yet associated with them. In the self-being of a self-luminous and blissful nature there is some kind of consciousness and bliss in the absence of all kinds of objects, as in deep dreamless sleep. It is thus consciousness which represents the true nature of the self, which, in our ordinary experience, becomes associated with diverse kinds of ignorance and limits itself by the objects of knowledge. The *puruṣa* is one, though it appears as many through the confusing power of *māyā* due to the will of God. The notion of the doer and the enjoyer of experiences is thus due to misconception. It is for this reason that emancipation is possible; for, had not the self been naturally free and emancipated, it would not be possible to liberate it by any means. It is because the self is naturally free that, when once it is liberated, it cannot have any further bondage. If the bondage were of the nature of association of external impurities, then even in emancipation there would be a further chance of association with impurities at any time; it is because all bondage and impurities are due to a misconception that, when once this is broken, there is no further chance of any bondage¹. *Prakṛti*, however, is of two kinds: (a) as associated with ignorance, causing the evolutionary series, and (b) as abiding in God and holding all things in God—the Brahman. *Jīva*, the phenomenal individual, is regarded as a part of the *puruṣa*. It may be remembered that the concept of *puruṣa* is identical with the concept of Brahman; for this reason the *jīva* may on the one hand be regarded as a part of the *puruṣa* and on the other as part of the Brahman, the unchangeable. The various kinds of experiences of the *jīva*, though apparently due to *karma*, are in reality due to God’s will; for whomsoever God wishes to raise, He causes to do good works, and, whomsoever He wishes to throw down, He causes to perform bad works. *Prakṛti* is in its primary sense identical with Brahman; it is a nature of Brahman by which He creates the world. As Brahman is on the one hand identical with the qualities of being, intelligence and bliss, and on

¹ *evam tasya kevalatve siddhe yas tasmin kartṛtvādinā saguṇatvapratyayaḥ sa sṛṣṭy-anukūla-bhagavad-icchayā prakṛty-ādy-aviveka-kṛtaḥ...ata eva ca mukti-yogyatvam. anyathā bandhasya svābhāvikatvāpattau mokṣa-sāstra-vaiarthyā-patteḥ svābhāvikasya nāśyogāt pravṛtti-vidhau tu anuṣṭhāna-lakṣaṇāprāmāṇyā-patteḥ ca...so’yaṁ na nānā, kintu-eka eva sarvatra.* Ibid. pp. 175-6.

the other hand regarded as associated with them, so also the *prakṛti* may be regarded as the identity of the *guṇas* and also as their possessor. This is the distinction of Vallabha's conception of *prakṛti* from the Sāṃkhya view of it. The other categories of *mahat*, etc., are also supposed to evolve from the *prakṛti* more or less in the Sāṃkhya fashion: *manas*, however, is not regarded as an *indriya*.

The Pramāṇas.

Puruṣottama says that knowledge (*jñāna*) is of many kinds. Of these, eternal knowledge (*nitya-jñāna*) is of four kinds: the essential nature of God, in which He is one with all beings and the very essence of emancipation (*mokṣa*); the manifestation of His great and noble qualities; His manifestation as the Vedas in the beginning of the creation; His manifestation as verbal knowledge in all knowable forms of the deity. His form as verbal knowledge manifests itself in the individuals; it is for this reason that there can be no knowledge without the association of words—even in the case of the dumb, who have no speech, there are gestures which take the place of language. This is the fifth kind of knowledge. Then there are one kind of sense-knowledge and four kinds of mental knowledge. Of mental knowledge, that which is produced by *manas* is called doubt (*saṃśaya*); the function of *manas* is synthesis (*saṃkalpa*) and analysis (*vikalpa*). The function of *buddhi* is to produce knowledge as decision, superseding doubt, which is of an oscillatory nature. The knowledge of dreams is from *ahaṃkāra* (egoism) as associated with knowledge. *Citta* perceives the self in the state of deep dreamless sleep. There is thus the fourfold knowledge of the *antaḥ-karaṇa*; this and sense-knowledge and the previous five kinds of knowledge form the ten kinds of knowledge. From another point of view will (*kāma*), conceiving (*saṃkalpa*), doubt (*vicikitsā*), faith (*śraddhā*), absence of faith (*āśraddhā*), patience (*dhṛti*), absence of patience (*adṛti*), shame (*hrī*), understanding (*dhi*), fear (*bhī*), are all *manas*. Pleasure and pain also belong to it, because they are not associated with the senses. Knowledge does not stay only for three moments, but stays on until it is superseded by other objects of knowledge, and even then it remains as impression or *saṃskāra*. This is proved by the fact that *manas* can discover it in memory when it directs its attention towards it; it is because the *manas* is

busy with other objects and it ceases to be discovered. Memory can be strengthened by proper exercise, and things can be forgotten or wrongly remembered through diverse kinds of defects; in these cases also knowledge is not destroyed, but only remains hidden through the effect of *māyā*.

The knowledge that is associated with the *pramāṇas* is the *sāttvika* knowledge; the *sattva* is associated with *pramā* (or right knowledge), and when it disappears there is error. *Pramā* is defined as uncontradicted knowledge or knowledge that is not liable to contradiction¹. The increase of the *sattva* by which knowledge is produced may be due to various causes, e.g., scriptures, objects, people, country, time, birth, *karma*, meditation, *mantras*, purifications, *saṃskāras*. The knowledge which is primarily predominant in *sattva* is the notion that one universal essence is present everywhere; this knowledge alone is absolutely valid. The knowledge which is associated with *rajas* is not absolutely valid; it is that which we find in all our ordinary or perceptual scientific knowledge, which is liable to errors and correction. This *rajas* knowledge at the time of its first manifestation is indeterminate in its nature, conveying to us only the being of things. At this stage, however, we have the first application of the senses to the objects which rouse the *sattva* quality, and there is no association with *rajas*; as such this indeterminable knowledge, though it forms the beginning of *rajas* knowledge, may be regarded as *sāttvika*. Later on, when the *manas* functions with the senses, we have the *saṃkalpa* knowledge, and regard it as *rajas*. The pure sensory knowledge or sensation is not regarded as inherent in the senses. The sense-operation in the first instance rouses the *sattva*, and therefore the knowledge produced by the application of the senses in the first instance does not convey with it any of the special qualities of the senses, visual, auditory and the like, but merely the being, which is not the specific quality of any sense, but only a revelation of the nature of *sattva*; such knowledge, though roused by the senses, does not belong to them. It is by the function of the *vikalpa* of the *manas* that this knowledge as pure being assumes distinct forms in association with sense-characteristics. The application of this function is too rapid to be easily apprehended by us, and for this

¹ *a-bādhita-jñānatvaṃ bādha-yogya-vyatiriktatvaṃ vā tal-lakṣaṇam.*

Prasthānaratnākara, p. 6.

reason we often fail to detect the prior existence of the *nirvikalpa* knowledge.

In the case of determinate knowledge, whether it be simple as of a jug, or complex as of a jug on the ground, we have the same procedure of having first through the senses the indeterminate perception of the being, which by a later influence of *rajas* becomes associated with names and forms; it is the being given by the senses, which appears in names and forms through the influence of the *antaḥkaraṇa* as moved by the *rajas* in association with the senses. The principle followed in perception is analogous to the cosmic appearance of Brahman as manifold, in which the pure Brahman by His will and thought shows Himself as the many, though He remains one in Himself all the time; in the case of perception the senses by their first application cause an influx of *sattva*, resulting in the apperception of pure being, which later on becomes associated with diverse names and forms through the *rajas* element of the *antaḥkaraṇa* operating with the senses. The determinate knowledge is of two kinds: *viśiṣṭa-buddhi* and *samūhālambana-buddhi*; the former means associated knowledge ("a man with a stick"), and the latter means knowledge as conglomeration of entities ("a stick and a book"). The knowledge of simple objects (such as a jug) is regarded as an associated knowledge. All these varied types of determinate cognitions are in reality of one type, because they all consist of the simple process of a revelation of being by the senses and an attribution of names and forms by the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

From another point of view the determinate knowledge can be of five kinds: (i) *saṁśaya* (doubt), (ii) *viparyāsa* (error), (iii) *nīścaya* (right knowledge), (iv) *smṛti* (memory), (v) *svapṇa* (dream).

Doubt is defined as the apprehension of two or more opposite attributes or characters in the same object (*ekasmin dharmiṇi viruddha-nānā-koṭy-avagāhi jñānaṃ saṁśayam*). Error is defined as the apprehension of external objects other than those with which the senses are in contact. *Nīścaya* means right apprehension of objects; such an apprehension must be distinguished from memory, because apprehension (*anubhava*) always means the intuition of an object, while memory is purely internal though produced by a previous apprehension. Such a right knowledge can be perception, inference, verbal knowledge, and analogy (*upamiti*, which arises

through the senses associated with a knowledge of similarity: *sādrśyādi-sahakṛtendriyārtha-saṃsargajanya*).

This right knowledge can be of two kinds: perception (*pratyakṣa*) and that which is not perception (*parokṣa*). Perception arises from a real contact of the sense and its objects (*indriyārtha-sat-samprayoga-janyaṃ jñānam*)¹. Memory (*smṛti*) is defined as knowledge which is produced neither by sleep nor by external objects, but by past impressions, which consist of the subtle existence of previous apprehensions. Dream-experiences are special creations, and should therefore be distinguished from the world of things of ordinary experience; they are out of and through *māyā* by God. This is indeed different from the view of Madhva; for according to him the dream-appearances are without any stuff and should not be regarded as creations; they are mere illusions produced by thought. The dream-appearances being creations according to Vallabha, their knowledge is also to be regarded as real. Dreamless sleep is a special class of dream-experience in which the self manifests itself (*tatra ātma-sphuranamtu svata eva*). Reflection (as synthesis or analysis, or by the methods of agreement and difference, or as mental doubt, or meditation) is included within memory. Shame, fear (*hrī*, *bhī*), etc., are the functions of egoism and not cognitive states. Recognition is regarded as right knowledge (*niscaya*). In the case of firm knowledge growing out of habit the impressions of past knowledge act as a determinant (*sahakāri*), and in the case of recognition memory acts as a determinant². Recognition is thus regarded as due to memory rather than past impressions. The reason for this preference is that, even though there may be an operation of past impressions, the function of memory is a direct aid to it. Recognition is distinguished from memory in this, that, while the latter is produced directly from past impressions, the former is produced in association with the present perception, directly through the operation of memory, and indirectly through the operation of past impressions.

¹ *Prasthānaratnākara*, p. 20.

² *abhyāsa-janye dydha-pratīti-rūpe jñāne yathā pūrvānubhava-saṃskārah sahakāri tathā pratyabhijñāyām smṛtiḥ sahakāriṇī, viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka-prakārakamīscayārtham tasyā avāśyam apekṣaṇāt. ato yathā'nugrāhakāntara-praveśe'pi yathārthānubhavatvānapāyād abhyāsajñānam niscaya-rūpaṃ tathā smṛtyā viśayeṇa ca pūrva-sthita-jñānasyoddīpanāt pratyabhijñā'pi iti jñeyam. Ibid.* p. 25.

The distinction between right knowledge and error consists in the fact that the latter contains somewhat more than the former; thus, in the case of conch-shell-silver, right knowledge consists in the perception of conch-shell, but false knowledge consists in the further attribution of silver to it; this additional element constitutes error¹. There may be cases which are partly correct and partly false and in these knowledge may be called right or false according as there is or is not a preponderance of right knowledge. Upon this criterion of Puruṣottama painting, art creations and impersonations in dramatic perceptions have a preponderance of right knowledge, as they produce through imitation such pleasures as would have been produced by the actual objects which they have imitated.

Puruṣottama makes a distinction between *kaṛaṇa* (the instrumental) and *kāraṇa* (the cause). *Kaṛaṇa* is a unique agent, associated with a dynamic agent with reference to the effects that are to be produced (*vyāpāraḥ asādhāraṇam*); *kāraṇa* is that seat of power which may produce appearance and disappearance of forms (*āvirbhāva-śaktyādhāratvaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ*). That which produces particular forms, or works for the disappearance of certain forms, is regarded as corresponding causes; hence the power which can make the effects of a material cause manifest for our operation is regarded as the *āvirbhāva-kāraṇa* of that effect. *Āvirbhāva*, "manifestation of appearances," is that aspect of things by which or in terms of which they may be experienced or may be operated upon, and its negation is "disappearance" (*tirobhāva*)². These powers of manifestation and disappearance belong primarily to God, and secondarily to objects with which He has associated them in specific ways. The Naiyāyika definition of cause as invariable unconditional antecedent of the effect is regarded as invalid, inasmuch as it involves a mutual dependence. Invariable antecedence to an effect involves the notion of causality and the notion of causality involves invariable antecedence; so unconditionality involves the notion of causality and causality involves unconditionality.

Cause is of two kinds: identity (*tādātmya*, also called *samavāyī*), and instrument. This identity however involves the notion of

¹ *bhrama-pramā-samūhālambanaṃ tu, eka-deśa-vikṛtaṃ ananyavad bhavatīti nyāyena bhramādhikye viparyāsa eva. pramādhikye ca niscayaḥ. Prasthānarat-nākara*, pp. 25-6.

² *upādānasya kāryaṃ yā vyavahāra-gocaraṃ karoti sā śaktir āvirbhāvīkā. āvirbhāvaśca vyavahāra-yogyatvaṃ. tirobhāvaśca tadayogyatvaṃ. Ibid.* p. 26.

identity-in-difference, in which difference appears as a mode of the identity which is to be regarded as the essence of causality. Puruṣottama discards the notion of substance and quality, which is explained on the basis of the relation of *samavāya*, and in which substance is regarded as the cause of quality; a quality is only an appearance simultaneous with the substance, and the latter cannot be regarded as the cause of the former. The concept of material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) is of two kinds: unchanging (e.g., the earth unchanging, in jugs, etc.), and changing (e.g., knowledge appearing as a function of the mind, the instrumental cause). The contact of parts or movement involved in the material cause is *not* regarded as a separate cause, as it is by the Naiyāyika, but is regarded as a part of the material cause.

The nature of concomitance that determines the nature of a *hetu* is of two kinds: *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. *Anvaya* means agreement in presence of an element such that to its sole presence (in the midst of many irrelevant elements or conditions present with it) the effect is due¹. *Vyatireka* means the negation of that element which involves the negation of the effect, i.e., that element which does not exist if the effect is absent (*kāryātirekeṇānavasthānam*). The causal movement (*vyāpāra*) is that which exists as a link between the cause and the effect; thus sense-object contact has for its dynamic cause the movement of the senses. In the case of God's will no dynamic movement is regarded necessary for the production of the world.

The *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*, the means of perceptual experience, is defined as the sense-faculties corresponding to the different kinds of perception. There are thus six *pramāṇas*, viz., visual, tactual, gustatory, auditory, olfactory and mental; as opposed to the monistic Vedāntic view of Śaṅkara, *manas* is regarded here as a sense-faculty. All faculties are regarded as being atomic in their nature. The visual organ can perceive colours only when there is a "manifested colour" (*udbhūta-rūpavattva*); the atoms of ghosts are not visible because they have no manifested colour. So for perception of all sense-qualities by the corresponding senses we have to admit that the sense-qualities, of touch, of smell, etc., must be manifested in order to be perceived.

¹ *Tatra sva-sva-vyāpyetara-yāvat-kāraṇa-sattve yat-sattve avaśyaṃ yat-sattvam anvayaḥ. Ibid. p. 32.*

In agreement with the monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkara *tamas* (darkness) is regarded here as a separate category and not as the mere negation of light. Negation itself is regarded as the positive existence of the locus in which the negation appears with specific reference to the appearance or disappearance of the negated object. Thus in the case of negation-precedent-to-production (*prāg-abhāva*) of a jug, the simple material cause which will be helpful to the production or the appearance of the jug is regarded as the negative-precedent-to-production of the jug. In the case of negation of destruction (*dhvaṃsābhāva*) the cause is helpful to the disappearance of the jug, and is thus associated with the special quality that is regarded as the negation of destruction. The concept of negation is thus included in the conception of the cause; negation is thus a specific mode of *samavāyi kāraṇa* and therefore identical with it.

Regarding the manner in which visual cognitions of things are possible, the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta uphold the subsistence of a *vyrtti* (*vyrtti* means mental state). When after looking at a thing we shut our eyes, there is an after-image of the object. This after-image cannot belong to the object itself, because our eyes are shut; it must itself belong to the *ahamkāra* or the *buddhi*. It is supposed by the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta that this *vyrtti* goes to external objects near and far and thereby produces a relation between the *buddhi* and the object. It may naturally be objected that this *vyrtti* is not a substance and therefore cannot travel far and wide. The Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta reply again that, since such travelling is proved by the facts of perception, we have to admit it; there is no rule that only existing substances should be able to travel and that in the absence of substance there should be no travelling. The Naiyāyikas, however, think that certain rays emanate from the eye and go to the object, sense-contact is thereby produced in association with the *manas* and *ātman*, and the result is sense-cognition; they therefore do not admit the existence of a separate *vyrtti*. Puruṣottama, however, admits the *vyrtti*, but not in the same way as the Vedāntists and the Sāṃkhya; according to him this *vyrtti* is a state of the *buddhi* which has been roused through the category of time and has manifested a preponderance of *sattva* quality. Time is hereby admitted as a category existing in the *buddhi* and not in the senses as it is in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara (explained by Dharmarājā-dhvarindra in

the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*). According to him time does not possess any colour, but can yet be perceived by the visual organs. But according to Puruṣottama time is a determinant of the *buddhi* and is the agent responsible, along with other accessories, for mental illumination; he says further that rays from the object penetrate the eye-ball and produce there certain impressions which remain even when the rays are cut off by the shutting of the eye. These retinal impressions are accessory to the production of illumination in the *buddhi* as the manifestation of *sattva-guṇa*¹. *Vṛtti* is thus a condition of *buddhi*.

In the illusory perception of conch-shell-silver it is supposed that by the power of *rajas* the impressions of silver experienced before are projected on to the object of perception, and by *tamas* the nature of conch-shell as such is obscured; in this manner a conch-shell is perceived as silver.

The indeterminate knowledge arises at that stage in which the *buddhi* functions at the first moment of sense-operation; and it becomes determinate when in association with the sense-faculty there is modification in the *buddhi* as *vṛtti*. Though with the rise of one *vṛtti* a previous one disappears, it still persists in the form of impression (*saṃskāra*); when these *saṃskāras* are later roused by specific causes or conditions, we have memory.

The intuition of God is not, however, produced by the ordinary method of perception only by God's grace, which is the seed of *bhakti* in all, can His nature be intuited; in the individual this grace manifests itself as devotion².

¹ *ukta-sannikarṣa-janyam api savikalpakam jñānam cākṣuṣādi-bhedena buddhi-vṛttyā janyata iti vṛttir vicāryate. tatra netra-nimilane kṛte bahir-dṛṣṭa-padārthasyeva kṣīdāḥkṛō netrāntarbhāṣate. sa ākāro na bāhya-vastunaḥ. āśrayam atihāya tatra tasyāśakya-vacanatvāt. atah sa āntarasyaiva kasyacana bhavitum arhatīti...*

yā buddhi-vṛttili saṃskārādhānādyantham janyata ity ucyate sā vṛttir buddher na tattvāntaram nāpy antaḥkaraṇa-parināmāntaram. kintu buddhi-tattvasya kāla-kṣubha-sattvādi-guṇa-kṛto'vasthā-viśeṣa eva. na ca tasyāvasthā-viśeṣatve nirgamābhāvena viśayāsaṃsargāt tad-ākāraakatvam vṛtter durghaṭatvam iti saṅkhyam. māyā-guṇasya rajasāścañcalatvena vikṣepakatvena ca darpaṇe mukhasyeva netra-golake'pi bāhya-viśayākāra-samarpaṇa-tad-ākārasya sughaṭatvāt. sa evaṃ māyika ākāro nayana-kiraṇeṣu netra-mudraṇe pratyāvṛtteṣu golakāntar anubhūyate. Prasthānaratnākara, pp. 123-5.

² *varaṇam cāmugrahaḥ. sa ca dharmāntaram eva, na tu phalāditsā. yasyā-mugraham icchāmūritvākyāt. sa ca bhakti-bīja-bhūtaḥ. ato bhaktyā mām abhijānāti, bhaktyā tvananyayā śakyaḥ bhaktyā'ham ekayā grāhya ity ādiṣu na virodhaḥ. Ibid. p. 137.*

Inference (*anumāna*) as a *pramāṇa* is defined as instrument by which influential knowledge is attained; in other words, inference is the knowledge which is derived through the mediation of other knowledge, a process which is, of course, affected by the knowledge of concomitance (*vyāpti-jñāna*). *Vyāpti* means the unconditioned existence of *hetu* in the *sādhya*, i.e., where there is a *hetu*, there is a *sādhya*, and wherever there is absence of *sādhya*, there is absence of *hetu*; *hetu* is that by which one proceeds to carry on an inference, and *sādhya* is affirmation or denial. Following the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra* Puruṣottama says that, when there is an unconditional existence of one quality or character in another, there may be either a mutual or a one-sided concomitance between them; when the circle of the *hetu* coincides with the circle of the *sādhya*, we have *samavyāpti*, and when the circle of the *hetu* falls within the circle of the *sādhya*, there is *viśama-vyāpti*¹.

Puruṣottama does not admit the *kevalānvayi* form of inference; for in the Brahman there is the absence of the *sādhya*. The objection that such a definition will not hold good in the case of inference (where no negative existences are available), namely, that it is knowledge because it is definable, is invalid; for the Brahman is neither knowable nor definable. Even when an object is knowable in one form, it may be not knowable in another form. So even in the aforesaid inference negative instances are available; therefore the *kevalānvayi* form of inference, where it is supposed that concomitance is to be determined only by agreement, cannot be accepted².

When the co-existence of the *hetu* with the *sādhya* is seen in one instance or in many, it rouses the part-impressions and though in the memory of them necessary co-existence, and, following that, the *hetu* determines the *sādhya*. When we see in the kitchen the co-existence of fire and smoke, the necessary co-existence of the smoke with the fire is known; then later on, when smoke is seen in the hill and the co-existence of the smoke with the fire is remembered, the smoke determines the existence of the fire: this right knowledge is called *anumiti*. It is the *līṅga* that is the cause of the *anumiti*. Two

¹ *niyata-dharma-sāhitye ubhayor ekatarasya vā vyāptir iti. ubhayor samavyāptikayor kṛtakatvānityatvādi-rūpayorekatarasya viśama-vyāptikasya dhūmāder niyata-dharma-sāhitye a-vyabhicarita-dharma-rūpe sāmānādhikaraṇye vyāptih. Prasthānaratnākara, pp. 139-40.*

² *sarvatrāpi kenacid rūpeṇa jñeyatvādi-sattve'pi rūpāntareṇa tad-abhāvasya sarvajānatvāc ca kevalānvayi-sādhya-kānumānasyaivābhāvāt. Ibid. p. 141.*

kinds of *anumāna* are admitted by Puruṣottama, viz., *kevala-vyatireki*, where positive instances are not available and the concomitance is only through negation, and *anvaya-vyatireki*, where the concomitance is known through the joint method of agreement and difference.

Five propositions are generally admitted for convincing others by inference; these are *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya*, and *nigamana*. Thus "the hill is fiery" is the *pratijñā*, "because it is smoky" is the *hetu*, "as in the case in the kitchen" is the *udāharaṇa*, "whatever is smoky is fiery and whatever is not so is not so" is the *upanaya*, "therefore the smoke now visible is also associated with fire" is *nigamana*. But these need not be regarded as separate propositions; they are parts of one synthetic proposition¹. But Puruṣottama in reality prefers these three, viz., *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*.

Puruṣottama does not admit either *upamāna* or *anupalabdhi* as separate *pramāṇas*. *Upamāna* is the *pramāṇa* by which a previous knowledge of similarity between two objects of which one is known enables one to know the other when one sees it; thus a man who does not know a buffalo, but is told that it is similar in appearance to the cow, sees the buffalo in the forest and knows it to be a buffalo. The sight of it makes him remember that a buffalo is an animal which is similar in appearance to the cow, and thus he knows it is a buffalo. Here perception as helped by memory of similarity is the cause of the new apprehension of the animal as a buffalo; what is called *upamāna* thus falls within perception.

Puruṣottama also admits *arthāpatti*, or implication, as separate *pramāṇa*, in the manner of Pārthasārathimiśra. This *arthāpatti* is to be distinguished from inference. A specific case of it may be illustrated by the example in which one assumes the existence of someone outside the house when he is not found inside; the knowledge of the absence of a living person from the house is not connected with the knowledge of the same man's presence outside the house as cause and effect, and yet they are simultaneous. It is by the assumption of the living individual outside the house that his non-existence in the house can be understood; the complex notion of life and non-existence in the house induces the notion of his existence outside the house. It is the inherent contradiction that

¹ *Ibid.* p. 143.

leads us from the known fact to the unknown, and as such it is regarded as a separate *pramāṇa*.

Puruṣottama thinks that in some cases where knowledge is due to the accessory influence of memory its validity is not spontaneous, but is to be derived only through corroborative sources, whereas there may be other cases where knowledge may be self-valid.

Concept of bhakti.

Madhva, Vallabha and Jīva Gosvāmī were all indebted to the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, and held it in high reverence; Madhva wrote *Bhāgavata-tātparyā*, Jīva Gosvāmī *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, and Vallabha wrote not only a commentary on the *Bhāgavata* (the *Subodhinī*) but also a commentary (*Prakāśa*) on his own *kārikās*, the *Tattvadīpa*, based on the teachings of the *Bhāgavata*. The *Tattvadīpa* consists of four books: the *Śāstrārthanirūpaṇa*, the *Sarvanirnaya* of four chapters, *Pramāṇa*, *Prameya-phala*, and the *Sādhana*, of which the first contains 83 verses, the second 100 verses, the third 110 and the fourth 35. The third book, of 1837 verses, contains observations on the twelve *skandhas* of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. The fourth book, which dealt with *bhakti*, is found only in a fragmentary condition. This last has two commentaries on it, the *Nibandha-tippaṇa*, by Kalyāṇarāja, and one by Gotthulal (otherwise called Bālakṛṣṇa). The *Prakāśa* commentary on the *kārikās* was commented upon by Puruṣottama in the *Āvaraṇa-bhaṅga*, but the entire work has not been available to the present writer. According to the *Tattvadīpa* the only *śāstra* is the *Gītā*, which is sung by the Lord Himself, the only God is Kṛṣṇa the son of Devakī, the *mantras* are only His name and the only work is the service of God, the Vedas, the words of Kṛṣṇa (forming the *smṛtis*), the *sūtras* of Vyāsa and their explanations by Vyāsa (forming the *Bhāgavata*) are their four *pramāṇas*. If there are any doubts regarding the Vedas, they are solved by the words of Kṛṣṇa; any doubts regarding the latter are explained by reference to the *sūtras*, and difficulties about the *Vyāsa-sūtras* are to be explained by the *Bhāgavata*. So far as the other *smṛtis* are concerned, such as that of Manu and others, only so much of them is valid as is in consonance with these; but, if they are found contradictory in any part, they are to be treated as invalid. The true object of the *śāstras* is

devotion to Hari, and the wise man who takes to devotion is best of all; yet there have been many systems of thought which produce delusion by preaching creeds other than that of *bhakti*. There is no greater delusion than devoting oneself to *śāstras* and not to God; such devotees are always under bondage and suffer birth and rebirth. The culmination of one's knowledge is omniscience, the culmination of *dharma* is the contentment of one's mind, the culmination of *bhakti* is when God is pleased. With *mukti* there is destruction of birth and rebirth; but the world, being a manifestation of Brahman, is never destroyed except when Kṛṣṇa wishes to take it back within Himself. Wisdom and ignorance are both constituents of *māyā*.

Bhakti consists in firm and overwhelming affection for God with a full sense of His greatness; through this alone can there be emancipation¹. Though *bhakti* is the *sāadhanā* and *mokṣa* is the goal, yet it is the *sāadhanā* stage that is the best. Those who enter into the bliss of Brahman have the experience of that bliss in their selves; but those devotees who do not enter into this state nor into the state of *jīvan-mukti*, but enjoy God with all their senses and the *antaḥkaraṇa*, are better than the *jīvan-muktas*, though they may be ordinary householders².

The *jīva* is atomic in nature, but yet, since the bliss of God is manifested in it, it may be regarded as all-pervasive. Its nature as pure intelligence cannot be perceived by the ordinary senses, but only by *yoga*, or knowledge through that special vision by which one sees God. The views of the monistic Vedānta that the *jīvas* are due to *avidyā* is repudiated on the ground that, if *avidyā* was destroyed by right knowledge, the bodily structure of the individual formed through the illusion of *avidyā* would immediately be destroyed and as *jīvan-mukti* would be possible.

Brahman is described here as *saccidānanda*—all-pervasive, independent, omniscient. He is devoid of any reduplication, either of this class or of a different class or as existing in Him—i.e., *jīvas*,

¹ *māhātmya-jñāna-pūrvas tu sudṛḍhaḥ sarvato'dhikah,
sneho bhaktir iti proktas tayā muktir na cānyathā.*

Tattvārthadīpa, p. 65.

² *sva-tantra-bhaktānām tu gopikādi-tulyānām sarvendriyaiḥ tathā'ntaḥkaraṇaiḥ sva-rūpeṇa cā'nandānubhavaḥ. ato bhaktānām jīvan-muktyapekṣayā bhagavat-kṛpā-sahita-grhāśrama eva viśiṣyate.* Vallabha's commentary on *Tattvādīpana*, p. 77.

the material world and the *antaryāmi*: these are the three forms of God, they are not different from Him¹. He is also associated with a thousand other noble qualities, purity, nobility, kindness, etc.; He is the upholder of the universe, controller of *māyā*. God is on the one hand the *samavāya* and the *nimittakāraṇa* of the world, delights in His creation, and sometimes takes delight in withdrawing it within Himself; He is the repository of all contradictory qualities and causes delusion in various forms and appearances and disappearances of worldly manifestation. He is the changeable as well as the unchangeable². Since the creation is a manifestation of Himself, the diversity of existence and the diversity in the distribution of pleasure and pain cannot make Him liable to the charge of cruelty or partiality. The attempt to explain diversity as due to *karma* leads to the further difficulty that God is dependent on *karma* and is not independent; it also leaves unexplained why different persons should perform different *karmas*. If God as *antaryāmin* Himself makes us perform good or bad actions, He cannot also make us responsible for the same and distribute happiness to some and displeasure to others; but on the view that the whole creation is self-creative and that self-manifestation and the *jīvas* are nothing but God all these difficulties are removed³. God is the creator of the world, yet He is not *saguṇa*, possessed of qualities; for the simple reason that the elements that constitute His qualities cannot stand against Him and deprive Him of His independence. Since He is the controller of the qualities, their existence and non-existence depend on Him. The conception of the freedom of God thus necessarily leads to the concept of His being both *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*. The view of Śāṅkara that Brahman appears as the world through the bondage of *avidyā* is a delusive teaching (*pratāraṇā-śāstra*), because it lowers the dignity of God, and it should be rejected by all devotees.

¹ *sa-jāṭhya-vijāṭhya-sva-gata-dvaita-varjitaṃ. . . sa-jāṭhyā jīvā, vijāṭhyā jaḍāḥ, svā-gatā antar-yāmiṇaḥ. triṣv api bhagavān anusyūtas trirūpāś ca bhavattī tair nirūpitaṃ dvaitaṃ bhedas tad varjitaṃ. Tattvārthadīpa* and the commentary on it, p. 106.

² *sarva-vādānavasaraṃ nānā-vādānurodhi tat. ananta-mūrti tad brahma kūḷasthaṃ calaṃ eva ca. virūddha-sarva-dharmāṇamāśrayaṃ yukty-agocaraṃ. āvirbhāva-tirobhāvair mohanaṃ bahu-rūpataḥ. Ibid. p. 115.*

³ *ātma-sṛṣṭer na vaiṣamyāṃ nairghṛṇyāṃ cāpi vidyate. pakṣāntare'pi karma syān nīyataṃ tat punar brhat.*

Ibid. pp. 129-30.

He who thinks of God as all and of himself as emanating from Him, and who serves Him with love, is a devotee. In the absence of either knowledge or love we have only a lower kind of devotee; but in the absence of both one cannot be a devotee, though by listening to the scriptures one may remove one's sins. The highest devotee leaves everything; his mind is filled with Kṛṣṇa alone; for him there is no wife, no home, no sons, no friends, no riches, but he is wholly absorbed in the love of God. No one, however, can take the path of *bhakti* except through the grace of God. *Karma* itself, being of the nature of God's will, manifests itself as His mercy or anger to the devotee; He approaches with His mercy and relieves him even if he be in a low state, and those who do not obey His commands or proceed in the wrong path He approaches with anger and causes to suffer. It is said that the law of *karma* is mysterious; the reason is that we do not know the manner in which God's will manifests itself; sometimes by His grace He may even save a sinner, who may not have to take the punishment due to him.

In the *Śāṇḍilya-sūtra* *bhakti* is defined as the highest attachment (*parānurakti*) to God. *Anurakti* is the same as *rāga*; so the *sūtra* "*parānuraktir īśvare*" means highest attachment to the object of worship (*ārādhya-viśayaka-rāgatvam*)¹. This attachment is associated with pleasure (*sukha-niyato rāga*). We remember that in the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* Prahlaḍa expresses the wish that he may have that attachment to God that is experienced with regard to sense-objects². One must find supreme pleasure in God; it is this natural and spontaneous attachment to God that is called *bhakti*³. Even if there is no notion of worship, but merely love, there also we can apply the term *bhakti*, as in the case of *gopīs* towards Kṛṣṇa. But ordinarily it arises from the notion of the greatness of God. This devotion, being of the nature of attachment, is associated with will and not with action; just as in the case of knowledge no action is necessary, but the only result is enlightenment, so the will that tends

¹ *Śāṇḍilya-sūtra*, 1. 2. (commentary by Svapneśvara).

² *yā prītir a-vivekānām viśayeṣu anapāyinī,
tām anusmarataḥ sā me hṛdayān māpasarpātu.*

Viṣṇu-purāṇa, 1. 20. 19.

³ Compare *Gītā*, x. 9:

*mac-cittā mad-gata-prāṇā bodhayantaḥ paras-param
kathayantaś ca mām nityam tuṣyantica ran-anti ca...*

to God is satisfied with devotion or attachment¹. *Bhakti* cannot also be regarded as knowledge: *jñāna* and *bhajana* are two different concepts. Knowledge may be only indirectly necessary for attachment, but attachment does not lead to knowledge. A young woman may love a young man; this love does not lead to any new knowledge, but finds its fulfilment in the love itself. In the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* we hear of the *gopīs*' attachment of emancipation through excess of love; so attachment may lead to emancipation without any knowledge². *Yoga*, however, is accessory both to knowledge and to *bhakti*. *Bhakti* is different also from *śraddhā* (or faith), which may be an accessory even to *karma*. According to Kasya *bhakti* with the notion of the majesty of God leads to emancipation. According to Bādarāyaṇa this emancipation consists in the nature of self as pure intelligence. According to Śāṇḍilya emancipation is associated with the notion of transcendence, immanence in the self. Through an excess of devotion understanding of the *buddhi* is dissolved in the bliss of God; it is this *buddhi* which is the *upādhi* or condition through which God manifests Himself as the *jīva*.

Gopeśvaraji Mahārāja, in his *Bhakti-mārtaṇḍa*, follows the interpretation of *bhakti* in the *Śāṇḍilya-sūtra* and enters into a long discussion regarding its exact connotation. He denies that *bhakti* is a kind of knowledge or a kind of *śraddhā* (or faith); nor is *bhakti* a kind of action or worship. Rāmānuja defines *bhakti* as *dhruvām smṛti*, and regards it as only a kind of knowledge. Various forms of worship or prescribed ritual connected therewith lead to *bhakti*, but they cannot themselves be regarded as *bhakti*. In the *Bhakti-cintāmaṇi*, *bhakti* has been defined as *yoge viyogavṛttiprema*, i.e., it is that form of love in which even when the two are together they are afraid of being dissociated and when they are not together they have a painful desire for union³. Śāṇḍilya, Haridāsa and Guptācārya also follow the same view. Govinda Chakravarti, however, defines

¹ *na kriyākṛty-apekṣanā jñānavat. Śāṇḍilya-sūtra, 1. 1. 7. sā bhaktir na kriyātmikā bhavitum arhati prayatnānuvedhābhāvāt.* Commentary on Svapneśvara.

² *tathāpi brahma-viṣayiṇyāḥ rater brahma-viṣaya-jñānopakāraikatvaṃ na pratyakṣa-gamyam. kintu tarūṇyādeḥ ratau tathādarśanena brahmagocarāyām apy anumātavyam.* Svapneśvara's commentary on—1. 2. 15, *ibid.*

³ *A-dṛṣṭe darśanotkanthā dṛṣṭe viśleśa-bhīrutā nādrṣṭena na dṛṣṭena bhavatā labhyate sukhaṃ.*

Bhakti-mārtaṇḍa, p. 75.

this love as the yearning which never ceases even in spite of many difficulties and dangers¹, and Paramārtha Ṭhakkuna, in his *Premalakṣaṇa-candrikā*², as an unspeakable yearning referring to an object. Viśvanātha, in his *Premarasāyina*, defines it as a loving yearning or desire. Guṇakara supplements the view of the *Bhakti-cintāmaṇi* and defines it as that which culminates in intense enjoyment³.

Gopeśvarajī Mahārāja differs from all these definitions of *bhakti* that regard yearning and desire as its principal element. No desire can be an object of desire (*puruṣārtha*); in the love of a son or any other dear relation we do not find any kind of desire playing a part; moreover desire refers to an unattained object, while *bhakti*, attachment, is not so.

Some say that *bhakti* is the cause of the melting of the mind; that is not acceptable either, for it has no reference to the object. There are others who define it as the object or condition with reference to which the amorous sentiment called love flows⁴. This definition is too wide, because all *bhakti* must have a reference to God, and according to it *bhakti* becomes a part of sex-sentiment. Gopeśvarajī, however, refers to the *Tattvadīpa-prakāśa* of Vallabha and accepts the view there adopted, according to which *bhakti* is composed of the root *bhaj* and suffix *kti*; the suffix means "love" and the root "service." It is the general rule that root and suffix together form a complete meaning in which the meaning of the suffix is dominant; *bhakti* thus means the action of *bhaj*, i.e., service (*sevā*). *Sevā* (service) is a bodily affair (e.g., *strīsevā*, *auśadhasevā*). Service, in order that it may be complete, implies love, and without love the service would be troublesome, but not desirable; love also for its completion requires service. This view has been objected to by Puruṣottama in his *Bhakti-haṃsa-vivṛti*.

Referring to the *Tattva-dīpa-prakāśa* Gopeśvarajī Mahārāja thinks that according to Vallabha *bhakti* means *sneha* or affection, but, if we take the word analytically, it means *sevā* or service; he thinks that both *prema* and *sevā* form the connotative meaning of

¹ *gāḍha-vyāsana-sāhasra-sampāte'pi nir-antaraṃ na hīyate yadīheti svādu tat prema-lakṣaṇam. Ibid.*

² *vastu-mātra-viṣayiṇī vacanānarhā samīhā prema. Ibid.*

³ *yathā yoge viyoga-vṛttiḥ prema tathā viyoge yoga-vṛttiḥ api prema. Ibid.*

⁴ *yam upādhiṃ samāsṛitya rasa ādyaḥ nigadyate tam upādhiṃ budhottamaṣaḥ premeti paricakṣata. Ibid. p. 76.*

*bhakti*¹. He, however, develops further the concept of *bhakti*, and says that the idea of *sevā* forming the connotation of *bhakti* means the state of mind which slowly lowers down and merges itself into God².

One of the results of *bhakti* or rather one of its characteristics has been described as the oneness of all with the self (*sarvātma-bhāva*). Through the deep notion of love one sees everywhere one's beloved, and even in separation one always perceives one's beloved round one; but, God being all, it is natural that through intense attachment to Him one should perceive Him in all things; for these are all manifestations of God³. This identity of the self with all cannot be regarded as an illustration of Vedāntic monism, as is explained by the followers of *maryādā-marga*; it is associated with intense love. This view of the *puṣṭi-mārga* (Vallabha school) is also shared by Haricaraṇa, who is quoted by Gopeśvara in support of his own view⁴.

Bhakti is regarded as parallel to the other *rasas* described in the *alambkāra-śāstra*; as such, it affects the *manas* and the body with intense delight, coalescing with God, as it were⁵; affection is thus the dominant phase (*sthāyī-bhāva*) of the *bhakti-rasa*. Some have defined it as a reflection of God in the melted heart; this has been objected to both by Puruṣottama in his *Pratibimba-vāda* and by Gopeśvara on the ground that formless God cannot have His reflection, and also on the ground that this would

¹ *prema-ṇ, ūrvakaṃ kāyika-vyāpāratvaṃ bhaktitvaṃ...athavā śrī-kṛṣṇa-viśayaka-prema-pūrvaka-kāyika-vyāpāratvaṃ. Bhakti-mārtanda, p. 79.*

² *tasmin kṛṣṇe pūrvam āvarjitaṃ tata āyattaṃ tadadhīnaṃ tataḥ krameṇa bhagavad-ekatānam...gambhīratām prāptam yac cetas tad eva sevārūpaṃ. samādhāu iva bhagavati layaṃ prāptam iti yāvat. Ibid. p. 82.*

He further quotes a passage from Vallabha's *Bhakti-vardhinī* in support of his statement:

*tataḥ prema tathā śaktir vyasanañca yadā bhaved iti,
yadā syād vyasanaṃ kṛṣṇe kṛtārthaḥ syāt tadaivahi. Ibid. p. 82.*

³ *viśāda-bhāvena sarvatra tathānubhava-rūpaṃ yat kāryaṃ tādṛśapriya-tvānubhavaḥ, iti sarvātma-bhāvo lakṣitaḥ. Bhāṣya-prakāśa on Brahma-sūtra, quoted in Bhakti-mārtanda, p. 85.*

⁴ *ataḥ sarvātma-bhāvo hi tyāgātmāpekṣayā yutaḥ bhāva-svarūpaphalakah sva-sambandha-prakāśakah.
dehādi-sphūrti-rahito viśaya-tyāga-pūrvakah
bhāvātma-kāma-sambandhi-ramaṇādi-kriyāḥ.
sva-tantra-bhakti-śabdākhyāḥ phalātmā jñāyatām janaiḥ.*

Ibid. p. 86.

⁵ *yatra manaḥsarvendriyāṇāṃ ānanda-mātra-kara-pāda-mukhodarādi-bhagavad-rūpatā tatra bhakti-rasa eva. Ibid. p. 102.*

make *bhakti* identical with God, and it is difficult to identify affection with the melting of the heart¹. If *ātmānubhava* be understood merely as the comprehension of identity with the self, in the fashion of Śāṅkara monism, then there would be no pleasure in the attachment of God².

The assertion of the philosophic identity of the self and the Brahman is only for the purpose of strengthening the nature of *bhakti*; it merely shows that the oneness that is felt through attachment can also be philosophically supported. In the intensity of love there is revealed a feeling of oneness with Kṛṣṇa which is to be regarded as one of the transitory phases (*vyābhicāri bhāva*) of the emotion of *bhakti*, of which affection is the dominant phase (*sthāyi bhāva*); the feeling of oneness is thus not the culminating result, but only a transitory phase. Thus *bhakti* does not result finally in knowledge; knowledge is an *aṅga* of *bhakti*³. As God is spiritual, so also is *bhakti* spiritual; as by the measures of fire objects become more or less heated, so relative proximity to God gives an experience of greater or less intensity of *bhakti*⁴.

Bhakti may be classified as *phala-rūpa* ("fruit"), as *sādhana-rūpa* ("means"), and as *saguṇa*. The *saguṇa-bhakti* is of three kinds, as forming part of different kinds of meditation, as part of knowledge, and as part of *karma*. These again may be of eighty-one kinds, as associated with different kinds of quality. *Bhakti* as a *phala* is of one kind, and as *sāadhanā* ("means") is of two kinds, viz., as part of knowledge (*jñānāṅgabhūta*), and as directly leading to emancipation (*bhaktiḥ svāntantryena muktidātrī*). The *jñānāṅgabhūta-bhakti* is itself of two kinds, as *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*, of which the former is of three kinds, *jñāna-miśra*, *vairāgya-miśra* and *karma-*

¹ It is interesting to refer here to the definition of *bhakti* as given by jīva in the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha* (p. 274), where *bhakti* is described as a dual existence in God, and, the *bhakta* being itself of the nature of blissful experience, *sva-rūpaśakteḥ sārabhūtā hlādinī nāma yā vṛttis tasyā eva sārabhūta-vṛttiviśeṣo bhaktiḥ sā ca ratyaparaparyāyā. bhaktir bhavati bhakteṣu ca nikṣipta-nijābhayaakoṭiḥ sarvadā tiṣṭhati. ata evoktaṃ bhagavān bhakto bhaktimān.*

² *kena kaṃ paśyet iti śruteḥ bheda-vilopakatvena bhajanānandāntarāya-bhūtaṃ yadi svātmatvena jñānaṃ sampādayed bhajanāṇḍaṃ nādadyāt.*

Bhakti-mārtanḍa, p. 136.

³ *ati-gāḍha-bhāvo' bhedasphūrtir api ek ovyābhicāribhāvaḥ. na tu sāravadika-stadā svātmānaṃ tattvena viśiṃsanti. Ibid.* p. 139.

⁴ *yathā bhagavān mānasīyas tadvad bhagavatsambandha-naikatyaṭ mana-syāvīrbhavanti bhaktir api mano-dharmatvena vyavahriyate. yathā vahni-naikatya-tāratamyena bhaktyanubhava-tāratamyam. Ibid.* p. 142.

miśra. The *jñāna-miśra* ("mixed with knowledge") may be of three kinds, high, middling and lower. The *vairāgya-miśra* ("mixed with detachment") is only of one kind. The *karma-miśra* ("mixed with action") is of three kinds.

The principal means by which *bhakti* is attained through the grace of God is purity of heart. There are sixteen means prescribed for attaining purity of heart, of which some are external and some internal. The three externals are ablutions, sacrifices and image-worship. The practice of meditation of God in all things is the fourth. The development of the *sattva* character of the mind is the fifth. Abnegation of all *karmas* and cessation of attachment is the sixth; showing reverence to the revered is the seventh. Kindness to the poor is the eighth. To regard all beings as one's equals and friends is the ninth. *Yamas* and *niyamas* are the tenth and eleventh respectively. Listening to the scriptures from teachers is the twelfth, and listening to and chanting of God's name is the thirteenth. Universal sincerity is the fourteenth. Good association is the fifteenth. Absence of egoism is the sixteenth.

There is however a difference of view between two important schools of the *bhakti*-path. Those who follow the *maryādā-bhakti* think that *bhakti* is attainable by one's own efforts in following specific courses of duties and practices; the followers of the *puṣṭi-bhakti* think that even without any effort *bhakti* can be attained by the grace of God alone¹.

The Vallabhas belong to the *puṣṭi-bhakti* school and therefore do not admit the absolute necessity of personal effort. The followers of the *maryādā* school also agree that the *sādhana*s are to be followed only so long as affection does not show itself; when once that has manifested itself, the *sādhana*s can no longer be regarded as determining it, for it manifests itself spontaneously. For the followers of the *puṣṭi* school the *sādhana*s can at no stage determine the *bhakti*; for it is generated through the grace of God (*puṣṭimārge varaṇam eva sādhanam*). According to the *maryādā* school sins are destroyed by the practice of the *sādhana*s and emancipation attained through the rise of affection. To the followers of the *puṣṭi* school the grace of God is sufficient to destroy obstructions of sins, and there is no definite order about the practices following affection or

¹ *kṛti-sādhya-sādhana-sādhya-bhaktir maryādā-bhaktiḥ tadrahitānām bhagavad-anugrahaika-prāpya-puṣṭi-bhaktiḥ. Bhakti-mārtanda, p. 151.*

affection following the practices¹. In the *Pañcarātra bhakti* is defined as affection associated with the majesty of God; but the association of the majesty of God is not a necessary part of *bhakti*. Puruṣottama defines *bhakti* as attachment to God with detachment from all fruits. Purity of mind can be attained both by knowledge and *bhakti* as produced by *puṣṭi* or the grace of God; so the only condition that can be attached to the rise of affection is the grace of God.

It is impossible to say for what reason God is pleased to extend His grace; it cannot be for the relief of suffering, since there are many sufferers to whom God does not do so. It is a special character of God, by which He adapts certain people for manifesting His grace through them.

As regards the fruit of *bhakti*, there are diverse opinions. Vallabha has said in his *Sevāphala-vivṛti* that as a result of it one may attain a great power of experiencing the nature of God (*a-laukika-sāmarthyā*), or may also have the experience of continual contact with God (*sājujya*), and also may have a body befitting the service of God (*sevopayogi deha*). This is his description of the *puṣṭi-mārga*. He has also described two other *mārgas*, the *pravāha* and the *maryādā*, in his *Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā*. The *pravāha-mārga* consists of the Vedic duties which carry on the processes of birth and rebirth. Those however who do not transgress the Vedic laws are said to belong to the *maryādā-mārga*. The *puṣṭi-mārga* differs from the other two *mārgas* in this, that it depends upon the grace of God and not on Vedic deeds²; its fruits are therefore superior to those of other *mārgas*³.

Vallabha, in his *Bhakti-vardhinī*, says that the seed of *bhakti* exists as *prema* or affection due to the grace of God, and, when it is firm, it increases by renunciation, by listening to the *bhakti-śāstra*, and by chanting God's name. The seed becomes strong when in

¹ *maryādāyām hi śravaṇādibhiḥ pāpakṣaye premopattis tato muktih. puṣṭi-mārgāṅgikṛtes tu atyanugraha-sādhyatvena tatra pāpāder aprati-bandhakatvāc chraṇādīritipā premarūpā ca yugapat paurevāparyeṇa vā vaiparityeṇa vā bhavati. Ibid. p. 152.*

² *ato vedoktatve'pi veda-tūtparya-gocaratve'pi jīva-kṛtāvaidha-sādhaneṣvapraveśāt tad-asādhya-sādhanāt phala-vailakṣanyāc ca sva-rūpataḥ kāryataḥ phalataḥ cotkarṣāc ca vedokta-sādhanebhyo'pi bhinnaiḥ tat tadākarikā puṣṭirastītyato hetoḥ siddham iti mārga-trayo'tra na sandeha ityarthah.*

Commentary on *Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā-bhedaḥ*, p. 8.

³ *yeṣu sādhana-dvārā bhaktiyabhivyaktiḥ teṣu sā anudbhūtā bhāva-rūpeṇa manasi tiṣṭhati, tataḥ pūjādīṣu sādhanaiḥ ranuṣṭhiyamāneṣu premādi-rūpeṇa kramād udbhūtā bhuvati. Bhakti-vardhinī-vivṛti (by Puruṣottama), śloka 5.*

the householder's state one worships Kṛṣṇa, following one's caste-duties with a complete absorption of mind. Even when engaged in duties one should always fix one's mind on God; in this way there grows the love which develops into attachment or passion. The firm seed of *bhakti* can never be destroyed; it is through affection for God that other attachments are destroyed, and by the development of this affection that one renounces the home. It is only when this affection for God grows into a passion (*vyasana*) that one attains one's end easily. The *bhakti* rises sometimes spontaneously, sometimes in association with other devotees, and sometimes through following favourable practices¹. Gradual development of *bhakti* is described through seven stages in an ascending order; these are *bhāva*, *prema*, *pranaya*, *sneha*, *rāga*, *anurāga*, and *vyasana*. The passion or *vyasana* for God, which is the deepest manifestation of affection, is the inability to remain without God (*tadvināna sthātum aśaktiḥ*); it is not possible for a man with such an attachment to stay at home and to carry on his ordinary duties. In the previous stages, though one may try to remain at home like a guest in the house, yet he always feels various obstructions in the proper manifestation of his emotion; worldly attachments are always obstacles to the divine attachment of worldly ties which helps the development of *bhakti*².

Vallabha, however, is opposed to renunciation after the manner of monistic *saṁnyāsa*, for this can only bring repentance, as being inefficacious³. The path of knowledge can bring its fruit in hundreds of births and it depends upon various other practices; the path of *bhakti* therefore should be taken up instead of the path of knowledge⁴. Renunciation in the *bhakti-mārga* proceeds only out of the necessity of the *bhakti* and for its proper maintenance, and not as a matter of duty.

The fruits of *bhakti* have already been described as *a-laukika-sūmarthya*, *sāyujya* and *sevopayogī-deha*, and are further discussed

¹ See note 3, p. 355.

² *snehāśakti-vyasanānām vināśanam. tathā sati kṛtam-api sarvaṁ vyartham syāt. tena tat-tyāgam kṛtvā yateta.* Bālakṛṣṇa's commentary on *Bhakti-vardhini*, śloka 6.

³ *ataḥ kalau sa san-nyāsaḥ pascāt tūpāya nānyathā. pāṣaṇḍitaṁ bhavet cāpi tasmāt jñāne na saṁ-nyaset.*

Vallabha's *San-nyāsa-nirṇaya*, śloka 16.

⁴ *jñānārtham uttaraṅgam ca siddhir janmaśataiḥ, jñānam ca sādhanāpekṣam yajñādi-śravaṇān matam param.* *San-nyāsa-nirṇaya* of Vallabha, with Gokulānātha's *Vivaraṇa*, śloka 15.

in Vallabha's *Sevāphala*, upon which various commentators have written with their several differences. Thus Devakīnandana and Puruṣottama think that *a-laukika-sāmarthyā* means that God has a special *āveśa* or that He favours the devotee with a special inspiration, enabling him to experience the nature of the full bliss of God. Harirāja, however, thinks that it means the capacity for experiencing the separation of God; Kalyāṇarāja thinks that it means participation in divine music in heaven with God. Gopīśa thinks that it means special fitness (*svarūpa-yogyatā*) for experiencing the supernatural joy of worshipping God¹. The second fruit of *bhakti* (*sāyujya*) is considered by Puruṣottama, Bācā Gopīśa, and Devakīnandana to be the merging of the devotee in the nature of God; Harirāja, however, regards it as a capacity for continual association with God.

The obstacles to *bhakti* are regarded as *udvega*, *pratibandha*, and *bhoga*. *Udvega* means fear caused by evil persons or unsteadiness of mind through sins; *pratibandha* means obstacles of a general nature, and *bhoga* means ordinary experiences of pleasures and pains of body and mind. These obstacles can be removed by comprehending the false nature of causes that give rise to them; but if on account of the transgressions of the devotee God is angry and does not extend His mercy, then the obstacles cannot be removed². The true knowledge, by which the false comprehension giving rise to the obstacles can be removed, consists in the conviction that everything is given by God, everything is Brahman, that there is no *sādhana*, no *phala* and no enjoyer³. He who tries to enjoy the blessed nature of God easily removes the obstacles. The experiencing of God's nature as a devotee is better than the bliss of Brahman itself and the pleasure of sense-objects (*viśayānandabrahmānandāpekṣayā bhajanānandasya māhāt̥tvāt*). Mental unsteadiness as a result of

¹ *tatra alaukika-sāmarthyam nāma para-prāpti-vivarāṇa-śrutyukta-bhagavat-sva-rūpāmubhave pradiṭṭapavādāveśa iti sūtrokta-rītika-bhagavadāveśajā yogyatā yayā rasātmakasya bhagavataḥ pūrṇa-sva-rūpānandāmubhavaḥ. śrī-devakīnandanādāvapyevam āhuḥ. śrī-hari-rāyās tu bhagavad-virahānubhava-sāmarthyam ity āhuḥ. śrī-kalyāṇa-rāyās tu bhagavatā saha gānādī-sāmarthyam mukhyānām evetyāhuḥ. tathā gopīnāntvalaukika-bhajanānandāmubhave sva-rūpa-yogyatā ityāhuḥ.* Puruṣottama's commentary on *Sevāphala*, śloka 1.

² *kadācit duḥsaṅgādīnā ati-pakṣapāti-prabhu-priya-pradveśeṇa taddrohe prabhor atikrodhena prārthanayāpi kṣamā-saṁ-bhāvanā-rahiteṇa tasmin prabhuḥ phala-pratibandham karottīti sa bhagatat-kyta-pratibandhaḥ.*

Harirāja's commentary on *Sevāphala*, śloka 3.

³ *vivekas tu mamaīd eva prabhunā kṛtaṁ sarvaṁ brahmātmakam ko'ham kiñca sādhanam kiṁ phalam 'o dātā ko bhoktā ityādi-rūpaḥ.* Ibid.

attachment to worldly things stands in the way of extension of God's grace; it can be removed by abnegating the fruits of *karma*. The emancipation that has been spoken of before as a result of *bhakti* is to be interpreted as the three-fold *Sevāphala*, superior, middling and inferior, viz., *a-laukika-sāmarthyā* (*uttama-sevā-phala*), *sāyujya* (*madhyama-sevāphala*) and *bhajanopayogi deha* (*adhama-sevā-phala*)¹.

Topics of Vallabha Vedānta as explained by Vallabha's followers.

A number of papers, which deserve some notice, were written by the followers of Vallabha on the various topics of the Vedānta. According to the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (III. 7, 10-11), as interpreted by Vallabha in his *Subodhinī*, error is regarded as wrong attribution of a quality or character to an entity to which it does not belong². Taking his cue from Vallabha, Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa (otherwise called Dallū Bhaṭṭa) tries to evolve a philosophic theory of illusion according to the Vallabha school. He says that in the first instance there is a contact of the eye (as associated with the *manas*) with the conch-shell, and thereby there arises an indeterminate knowledge (*sāmānyajñāna*), which is prior to doubt and other specific cognitions; this indeterminate cognition rouses the *sattvaguna* of the *buddhi* and thereby produces right knowledge. It is therefore said in the *Sarvanirṇaya* that *buddhi* as associated with *sattva* is to be regarded as *pramāṇa*. In the *Bhāgavata* (III. 26. 30) doubt, error, definite knowledge, memory and dream are regarded as states of *buddhi*; so the defining character of cognition is to be regarded as a function of *buddhi*. Thus it is the *manas* and the senses that produce indeterminate knowledge, which later on becomes differentiated through the function of *buddhi*. When through the *tamas* quality of *māyā* the *buddhi* is obscured, the conch-shell with which the senses are in contact is not perceived; the *buddhi*, thus obscured, produces the notion of silver by its past impression of silver, roused by the shining characteristic of the conch-shell, which is similar to

¹ *bhakti-mārgē sevāyā uttama-madhyama-sādhāraṇādihikārakrameṇa etat phala-trayam eva, no mokṣādih*. Harirāja's commentary on *Sevāphala*, śloka 6.

² *yathā jale candramasaḥ pratibimbitasya tena jalena kṛto guṇaḥ kāmṇādi-dharmāḥ āsanno vidyamāno mithyaiva dṛśyate na vastutaścandrasya evam anātmano dehader dharmo janma-bandha-duḥkhādirūpo dṛaṣṭur ātmano jīvasya na īśvarasya*. *Subodhinī*, III. 7. 11.

silver. In the Śāṅkara school of interpretation the false silver is created on the conch-shell, which is obscured by *avidyā*. The silver of the conch-shell-silver is thus an objective creation, and as such a relatively real object with which the visual sense comes in contact. According to Vallabha the conch-shell-silver is a mental creation of the *buddhi*¹. The indefinite knowledge first produced by the contact of the senses of the *manas* is thus of the conch-shell, conch-shell-silver being a product of the *buddhi*; in right knowledge the *buddhi* takes in that which is grasped by the senses. This view of illusion is called *anyakhyāti*, i.e., the apprehension of something other than that with which the sense was in contact. The Śāṅkara interpretation of illusion is false; for, if there was a conch-shell-silver created by the *māyā*, it is impossible to explain the notion of conch-shell; for there is nothing to destroy the conch-shell-silver which would have been created. The conch-shell-silver having obscured the conch-shell and the notion of conch-shell-silver not being destructible except without the notion of the conch-shell, nothing can explain how the conch-shell-silver may be destroyed. If it is suggested that the conch-shell-silver is produced by *māyā* and destroyed by *māyā*, then the notion of world-appearances produced by *māyā* may be regarded as destructible by *māyā*, and no effort can be made for the attainment of right knowledge. According to Vallabha the world is never false; it is our *buddhi* which creates false notions, which may be regarded as intermediate creation (*antarālīkī*). In the case of transcendental illusion—when the Brahman is perceived as the manifold world—there is an apprehension of Him as being, which is of an indefinite nature. It is this being which is associated with characters and appearances, e.g., the jug and the pot, which are false notions created by *buddhi*. These false notions are removed when the defects are removed, and not by the intuition of the locus of the illusion; the intellectual creation of a jug and a pot may thus be false, though this does not involve the denial of a jug or a pot in the actual world². So the notion of world-creation and world-destruction are false notions created by us. The *jīva*, being a part of God, is true; it is false only

¹ *iad idaṃ bauddham eva rajataṃ buddhyā viṣayi-kriyate. na tu sāmānya-jñāne cakṣur-viṣayi-bhūtaṃ iti vivekaḥ. Vādāvali, p. 3.*

² *atrāpi bauddha eva ghaṭo mithyā, na tu prapañcāntar-vartti niṣkarṣaḥ. Ibid. p. 6.*

in so far as it is regarded as the subject of the cycle of birth and rebirth. The falsity of the reality of the world thus depends on the manner in which it is perceived¹; so, when one perceives the world and knows it as Brahman, his intellectual notion of the real diversity of the world vanishes, though the actually perceived world may remain as it is². The creation of *māyā* is thus not external, but internal. The visible world, therefore, as such is not false; only the notion of it as an independent reality, apart from God, is false. The word *māyā* is used in two senses, as the power of God to become all, and as the power of delusion; and the latter is a part of the former.

Puruṣottama, however, gives a different interpretation in his *Khyātivāda*. He says that the illusion of conch-shell-silver is produced by the objective and the external projection of knowledge as a mental state through the instrumentality of *māyā*; the mental state thus projected is intuited as an object³. This external projection is associated with the rising of older impressions. It is wrong to suppose that it is the self which is the basis of illusion; for the self is the basis of self-consciousness and in the perception of the conch-shell-silver no one has the notion "I am silver."

Speaking against the doctrine of the falsity of the world, Giridhara Gosvāmī says in his *Prapañcavāda* that the illusoriness of the world cannot be maintained. If the falsity of the perceived world is regarded as its negation in past, present and future, then it could not have been perceived at all; if this negation be of the nature of *atyantābhāva*, then, since that concept is dependent on the existence of the thing to be negated and since that thing also does not exist, the negation as *atyantābhāva* does not exist either. If the negation of the world means that it is a fabrication of illusion, then again there are serious objections; an illusion is an illusion only in comparison with a previous right knowledge; when no comparison with a previous right knowledge is possible, the world cannot be an illusion.

¹ *tathā ca siddham viśayatā-vaiśiṣṭyena prapañcasya satyatvam mithyātvañ-ca. evam svamate prapañcasya pāramārthika-vicāre brahmātmakatvena satyatvam. Vādāvali*, p. 8.

² *tathātra cakṣuḥ-samyukta-prapañca-viśayake brahmatva-jñāne utpanne bauddha eva prapañco māsyati. na tu cakṣur-grhīto'yam ity arthaḥ. Ibid.* p. 8.

³ *ataḥ śukti-rajatādi-sthale māyayā bahiḥ-kṣipta-buddhi-vṛtti-rūpaṃ jñānam eva arthākāreṇa khyāyata iti mantavyam. Ibid.* p. 121.

If the nature of the world be regarded as due to *avidyā*, one may naturally think, to whom does the *avidyā* belong? Brahman (according to the Śāṅkarites) being qualityless, *avidyā* cannot be a quality of Brahman. Brahman Himself cannot be *avidyā*, because *avidyā* is the cause of it. If *avidyā* is regarded as obscuring the right knowledge of anything, then the object of which the right knowledge is obscured must be demonstrated. Again, the Śāṅkarites hold that the *jīva* is a reflection of Brahman on *avidyā*. If that is so, then the qualities of the *jīva* are due to *avidyā* as the impurities of a reflection are due to the impurity of the mirror. If that is so, the *jīva* being a product of the *avidyā*, the latter cannot belong to the former. In the Vallabha view the illusion of the individual is due to the will of God.

Again, the *avidyā* of the Śāṅkarites is defined as different from being and non-being; but no such category is known to anybody, because it involves self-contradiction. Now the Śāṅkarites say that the falsity of the world consists in its indefinableness; in reality this is not falsity—if it were so, Brahman Himself would have been false. The *śruti* texts say that He cannot be described by speech, thought or mind. It cannot be said that Brahman can be defined as being; for it is said in the text that He is neither being nor non-being (*na sat tan nāsad ity ucyate*). Again, the world cannot be regarded as transformation (*vikāra*); for, if it is a *vikāra*, one must point out that of which it is a *vikāra*; it cannot be of Brahman, because Brahman is changeless; it cannot be of anything else, since everything except Brahman is changeable.

In the Vallabha view the world is not false, and God is regarded as the *samavāyi* and *nimitta-kāraṇa* of it, as has been described above. *Samavāyi-kāraṇa* is conceived as pervading all kinds of existence, just as earth pervades the jug; but, unlike the jug, there is no transformation or change (*vikāra*) of God, because, unlike the earth, God has will. The apparent contradiction, that the world possessed of quality and characters cannot be identified with Brahman, is invalid, because the nature of Brahman can only be determined from the scriptural texts, and they unquestionably declare that Brahman has the power of becoming everything.

In the *Bhedābheda-svarūpa-nirṇaya* Puruṣottama says that according to the *satkāryavāda* view of the Vedānta all things are existent in the Brahman from the beginning. The *jīvas* also, being

the parts of God, exist in Him. The difference between the causal and the effect state is that in the latter certain qualities or characters become manifest. The duality that we perceive in the world does not contradict monism; for the apparent forms and characters which are mutually different cannot contradict their metaphysical character of identity with God¹. So Brahman from one point of view may be regarded as partless, and from another point of view as having parts.

There is a difference, however, between the *prapañca* and the manifold world and *saṃsāra*, the cycle of births and rebirths. By the concept of *saṃsāra* we understand that God has rendered Himself into effects and the *jīvas* and the notion of their specific individuality as performers of actions and enjoyers of experience. Such a notion is false; there is in reality no cause and effect, no bondage and salvation, everything being of the nature of God. This idea has been explained in Vallabha Gosvāmī's *Prapañca-saṃsāra-bheda*. Just as the sun and its rays are one and the same, so the qualities of God are dependent upon Him and identical with Him; the apparent contradiction is removed by the testimony of the scriptural texts².

Regarding the process of creation Puruṣottama, after refuting the various views of creation, says that Brahman as the identity of *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda* manifests Himself as these qualities and thereby differentiates Himself as the power of being, intelligence and action, and He is the delusive *māyā*. These differentiated qualities show themselves as different; they produce also the notion of difference in the entities with which they are associated and express themselves in definite forms. Though they thus appear as different, they are united by God's will. The part, as being associated with the power of action, manifests itself as matter. When the power of intelligence appears as confused it is the *jīva*³. From the point of view of the world the Brahman is the *vivartakāraṇa*; from the point of view of the self-creation of God, it is *pariṇāma*⁴.

¹ *sṛṣṭi-dasāyām jagad-brahmanoḥ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvāj jagajjīvayor aṃśāmsi-bhāvāc ca upacāriko bhavan nāpi na vāstavābhedaṃ nihanti. tenedānīm api bheda-sahiṣṇur evā'bhedaḥ. Vādāvali*, p. 20.

² *vādukathā* of Gopeśvarasvāmī in *Vādāvali*, p. 31.

³ See Puruṣottama's *Sṛṣṭibhedavāda*, p. 115.

⁴ *evaṃ ca antarā-sṛṣṭiṃ prati vivartopādānatvam ātma-sṛṣṭiṃ prati pariṇāmyupādānatvam brahmaṇaḥ. Ibid.* p. 113.

Viṭṭhala's Interpretation of Vallabha's Ideas.

Viṭṭhala, the son of Vallabha, wrote an important treatise called *Vidvanmaṇḍana* upon which there is a commentary, the *Suvarṇa-sūtra*, by Puruṣottama. The central ideas of this work may now be detailed.

There are many Upaniṣadic texts which declare that Brahman is without any determinate qualities (*nirviśeṣa*) and there are others which say that He is associated with determinate qualities, i.e., He is *saviśeṣa*. The upholders of the former view say that the *guṇas* or *dharma*s which are attributed by the other party must be admitted by them as having a basis of existence somewhere. This basis must be devoid of qualities, and this qualityless being cannot be repudiated by texts which declare the Brahman to be endowed with qualities; for the latter can only be possible on the assumption of the former, or in other words the former is the *upajīvyā* of the latter. It may, however, be argued that the *śruti* texts which declare that the Brahman is qualityless do so by denying the qualities; the qualities then may be regarded as primary, as the ascertainment of the qualityless is only possible through the denial of the qualities. The reply is that, since the *śruti* texts emphasize the qualityless, the attempt to apprehend the qualityless through qualities implies contradiction; such a contradiction would imply the negation of both quality and qualityless and lead us to nihilism (*śūnya-vāda*). If, again, it is argued that the denial of qualities refers only to ordinary mundane qualities and not to those qualities which are approved by the Vedas, then there is also a pertinent objection; for the *śruti* texts definitely declare that the Brahman is absolutely unspeakable, indefinable. But it may further be argued that, if Brahman be regarded as the seat of certain qualities which are denied of it, then also such denial would be temporarily qualified and not maintained absolutely. A jug is black before being burnt and, when it is burnt, it is no longer black, but brown. The reply proposed is that the qualities are affirmed of Brahman as conditioned and denied of Brahman as unconditioned. When one's heart becomes pure by the worship of the Brahman as conditioned he understands the nature of Brahman as unconditioned. It is for the purpose of declaring the nature of such a Brahman that the texts declare Him to be qualityless: they declare Him to be endowed

with qualities when He is conditioned by *avidyā*. To this Viṭṭhala says that, if Brahman is regarded as the Lord of the world, He cannot be affirmed as qualityless. It cannot be argued that these qualities are affirmed of Brahman as conditioned by *avidyā*; for, since both Brahman and *avidyā* are beginningless, there would be a continuity of creation; the creation, being once started by *avidyā*, would have nothing else to stop it. In the Vedāntic text it is the Brahman associated with will that is regarded as the cause of the world; other qualities of Brahman may be regarded as proceeding from His will. In the Śāṅkarite view, according to which the will proceeds from the conditioned Brahman, it is not possible to state any reason for the different kinds of the will. If it is said that the appearance of the different kinds of will and qualities is the very nature of the qualities of the conditioned, then there is no need to admit a separate Brahman. It is therefore wrong to suppose that Brahman exists separately from the *guṇas* of which He is the seat through the conditions. In the *Brahma-sūtra* also, immediately after launching into an enquiry about Brahman, Bādarāyaṇa defines His nature as that from which the creation and destruction of the world has proceeded; the *Brahma-sūtra*, however, states that such creative functions refer only to a conditioned Brahman. It is wrong to say that, because it is difficult to explain the nature of pure Brahman, the *Brahma-sūtra* first speaks of the creation of the world and then denies it; for the world as such is perceived by all, and there is no meaning in speaking of its creation and then denying it—it is as if one said “My mother is barren”. If the world did not exist, it would not have appeared as such. It cannot be due to *vāsanā*; for, if the world never existed, there would be no experience of it and no *vāsanā*. *Vāsanā* also requires other instruments to rouse it, and there is no such instrument here.

It cannot be said that the *avidyā* belongs to the *jīvas*, because the *jīvas* are said to be identical with Brahman and the observed difference to be due to false knowledge. If knowledge destroys *avidyā*, then the *avidyā* of the *jīva* ought to be destroyed by the *avidyā* underlying it. Again, if the world is non-existent, then its cause, the *avidyā*, ought also to be non-existent. What is *jīva*? It cannot be regarded as a reflection of Brahman; for only that which has colour can have reflection; it is not the formless sky that is reflected in the sky, but the rays of the sun hovering above.

Moreover, *avidyā* is all-pervasive as Brahman: how can there be reflection? Again such a theory of reflection would render all our moral efforts false, and emancipation, which is their result, must also be false; for the means by which it is attained is very false. Moreover, if the Vedas themselves are false, as mere effects of *avidyā*, it is wrong to suppose that the nature of Brahman as described by them is true. Again, in the case of reflections there are true perceivers who perceive the reflection; the reflected images cannot perceive themselves. But in the case under discussion there are no such perceivers. If the Paramātman be not associated with *avidyā*, He cannot perceive the *jīvas*, and if He is associated with *avidyā*, He has the same status as the *jīvas*. Again, there is no one who thinks that *jīva* is a reflection of the Brahman or the *antaḥkaraṇa*; upon such a view, since the *jīvanmukta* has an *antaḥkaraṇa*, he cannot be a *jīvanmukta*. If the *jīva* is a reflection on *avidyā*, then the *jīvanmukta* whose *avidyā* has been destroyed can no longer have a body. Since everything is destroyed by knowledge, why should there be a distinction in the case of the *prārabdha karma*? Even if by the *prārabdha karma* the body may continue to exist, there ought not to be any experience. When one sees a snake his body shakes even when the snake is removed; this shaking is due to previous impressions, but *prārabdha karma* has no such past impressions, and so it ought to be destroyed by knowledge; the analogy is false. It is therefore proved that the theory of the *jīva* as reflection is false.

There is another interpretation of the Śāṅkara Vedānta, in which it is held that the appearance of the *jīva* as existing separate from Brahman is a false notion; impelled by this false notion people are engaged in various efforts for self-improvement¹. On this explanation too it is difficult to explain how the erroneous apprehension arises and to whom it belongs. The *jīva* himself, being a part of the illusion, cannot be a perceiver of it, nor can the nature of the relation of the *avidyā* and the Brahman be explained; it cannot be contact, because both *avidyā* and Brahman are self-pervasive; it cannot be illusory, since there is no illusion prior to illusion; it cannot

¹ *asmin pakṣe jīvasya vastuto brahmatve bheda-bhānasya jīva-pada-vācya-tāyās ca duṣṭatvaṃ na tu svarūpātirekatvaṃ na vā mokṣasya apuruṣārthatvaṃ na vā pāralaukika-prayātna-pratirodhaḥ*. Puruṣottama's *Suvarṇa-sūtra* on *Vidvan-maṇḍana*, p. 37.

be unique, since in that case even an emancipated person may have an error. Again, if *avidyā* and its relation are both beginningless and *jīva* be also beginningless, then it is difficult to determine whether *avidyā* created *jīva* or *jīva* created *avidyā*.

It must therefore be assumed that the bondage of the *jīvas* or their existence as such is not beginningless. Their bondage is produced by *avidyā*, which is a power of God, and which operates only with reference to those *jīvas* whom God wishes to bind. For this reason we have to admit a number of beings, like snakes and others, who were never brought under the binding power of *avidyā*¹. All things appear and disappear by the grace of God as manifesting (*āvirbhāva*) and hiding (*tirobhāva*). The power of manifesting is the power by which things are brought within the sphere of experience (*anubhava-viśayatva-yogyatāvirbhāvaḥ*), and the power of hiding is the power by which things are so obscured that they cannot be experienced (*tad-aviśaya-yogya tātirobhāvaḥ*). Things therefore exist even when they are not perceived; in the ordinary sense existence is defined as the capacity of being perceived, but in a transcendental sense things exist in God even when they are not perceived. According to this view all things that happened in the past and all that may happen in the future—all these exist in God and are perceived or not perceived according to His will².

The *jīva* is regarded as a part of God; this nature of *jīva* can be realized only on the testimony of the scriptures. Being a part of God, it has not the fullness of God and therefore cannot be as omniscient as He. The various defects of the *jīva* are due to God's will: thus, in order that the *jīva* may have a diversity of experience, God has obscured His almighty power in him and for securing his moral efforts He has associated him with bondage and rendered him independent. It is by obscuring His nature as pure bliss that the part of God appears as the *jīva*. We know that the followers of Madhva also regard the *jīvas* as parts of God; but according to them they are distinct from Him, and the identity of the Brahman and the *jīva* is only in a remote sense. According to the Nimbārka

¹ *yad-bandhane tad-icchā tam eva sa badhnāti.* Puruṣottama's *Suvarṇa-sūtra*, p. 35.

² *asmin kāle asmin deśe idam kāryam idam bhavatu iti icchā-viśayatvam āvir-bhāvaḥ tadā tatra tat mā bhavatu iti icchā-viśayatvam tirobhāvaḥ.* *Ibid.* p. 56.

jīvas are different from God, and are yet similar to Him: they too regard *jīvas* as God's parts, but emphasize the distinctness of the *jīvas* as well as their similarity to Him. According to Rāmānuja God holds the *jīvas* within Himself and by His will dominates all their functions, by expanding or contracting the nature of the *jīva's* knowledge. According to Bhāskara *jīva* is naturally identical with God, and it is only through the limiting conditions that he appears as different from Him. According to Vijñāna-bhikṣu, though the *jīvas* are eternally different from God, because they share His nature they are indistinguishable from Him¹.

But the Vallabhas hold that the *jīvas*, being parts of God, are one with Him; they appear as *jīvas* through His function as *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*, by which certain powers and qualities that exist in God are obscured in the *jīva* and certain other powers are manifested. The manifestation of matter also is by the same process; in it the nature of God as intelligence is obscured and only His nature as being is manifested. God's will is thus the fundamental determinant of both *jīva* and matter. This also explains the diversity of power and character in different individuals, which is all due to the will of God. But in such a view there is a serious objection; for good and bad *karmas* would thus be futile. The reply is that God, having endowed the individual with diverse capacities and powers for his own self-enjoyment, holds within His mind such a scheme of actions and their fruits that whoever will do such actions will be given such fruits. He does so only for His own self-enjoyment in diverse ways. The law of *karma* is thus dependent on God and is dominated by Him². Vallabha, however, says that God has explained the goodness and badness of actions in the scriptures. Having done so, He makes whoever is bent upon following a particular course of conduct do those actions. *Jīva's* will is the cause of the *karma* that he does; the will of the person is determined by his past actions; but in and through them all God's will is the ultimate dispenser. It is here that one distinguishes the differences between the *maryādā-mārga* and the *puṣṭi-mārga*: the *maryādā-*

¹ *jīvānāṃ nitya-bhinnatvam aṅgīkṛtya avibhāga-lakṣaṇam aṅgīkṛtya sajātiyātve sati avibhāga-pratīyogitvam aṁśatvam tad-anuyogitvam ca aṁśitvam. Suvārṇa-sūtra, p. 85.*

² *kṛdāiva muktyā anyat sarvaṃ upasarjaṃbhūtaṃ tathā ca tadapekṣyā bhagavān vicitra-rasānubhavārtham evaṃ yāḥ kariṣyati tam evaṃ kariṣyāmīti svayam eva kāryādau cakāra. Vidvan-maṇḍana, p. 91.*

mārga is satisfied that in the original dispensation certain *karmas* should be associated with certain fruits, and leaves the individual to act as he pleases; but the *puṣṭi-mārga* makes the playful activity of God the cause of the individual's efforts and also of the law of *karma*¹.

The Upaniṣad says that, just as sparks emanate from fire, so the *jīvas* have emanated from Brahman. This illustration shows that the *jīvas* are parts of God, atomic in nature, that they have emanated from Him and may again merge in Him. This merging in God (*Brahma-bhāva*) means that, when God is pleased, He manifests His blissful nature as well as His powers in the *jīva*². At the time of emancipation the devotees merge in God, become one with Him, and do not retain any separate existence from Him. At the time of the incarnation of God at His own sweet will He may incarnate those parts of Him which existed as emancipated beings merged in Him. It is from this point of view that the emancipated beings may again have birth³.

It is objected that the *jīvas* cannot be regarded as atomic in nature, because the Upaniṣads describe them as all-pervasive. Moreover, if the *jīvas* are atomic in nature, they would not be conscious in all parts of the body. The analogy of the sandal-paste, which remaining in one place makes the surrounding air fragrant, does not hold good; for the surrounding fragrance is due to the presence of minute particles. This cannot be so with the souls; consciousness, being a quality of the soul, cannot operate unless the soul-substance is present there. The analogy of the lamp and its rays is also useless; the lamp has no pervasive character; for the

¹ *ācāryas tu yathā putram yatamāna-valaṃ vā padārtha-guṇa-doṣau varṇayan api yat-prayatnābhiniवेशं paśyati tathaiiva kārayati. phala-dānārthaṃ śrutau karmāpekṣā-kathanāt phaladāne karmāpekṣaḥ karma-karane jīva-kṛta-prayatnāpekṣaḥ, prayatne tat-karmāpekṣaḥ, svargādi-kāme ca lokapravāhūpekṣaḥ kārayatīti na brahmaṇo doṣagandho'pi, na caivam anīśvaratvam. mār्याdāmārgasya tathaiiva nirmāṇāt. yatra tvanyathā tatra puṣṭi-mārgāṅgikāra ityāhuḥ. ayamapi pakṣaḥ svakṛtamār्याdayā eva hetutvena kathanān mār्याdhākarane nīrūpaṇād rte hetvantarasya sambhavād asmaduktānnātīricyate. Vidvan-maṇḍana, p. 92.*

² *brahma-bhāvasca bhagavad-ukta-sāadhanakaraṇena santuṣṭāt bhagavata ānanda-prākṛtyāt svaguṇa-svarūpaśvār्याdi-prākṛtyāc ceti jñeyam.... Ibid. p. 96.*

³ *mokṣe jīva-brahmaṇor abhinnavād abhinnavabhāvenaiiva nīrūpaṇād ityarthah. tenādi-madhyāvasāneṣu śuddha-brahmaṇa evopādānatvāt....svāvatārasamayē kṛdārthaṃ sākṣād yogyās ta eva bhavanti tīnāpyavatārayatīti punar nīrgama-yogyatvam, idameva, muktānupasṛpya vyapadeśādītisūtreṇoktam....muktā api līlā-vigrahaṃ kṛtvā bhajanti iti. Ibid. p. 97.*

illumination is due to the presence of minute light-particles. To this Viṭṭhala replies that Bādarāyaṇa himself describes the nature of the *jīvas* as atomic. The objection that qualities cannot operate in the absence of the substance is not valid either. Even the Naiyāyikas admit that the relation of *samavāya* may exist without the relata. The objection that the fragrance of a substance is due to the presence of minute particles of it is not valid; for a piece of musk enclosed in a box throws its fragrance around it, and in such cases there is no possibility for the minute particles of the musk to come out of the box; even when one touches garlic, the smell is not removed even by the washing of the hand. It must therefore be admitted that the smell of a substance may occupy a space larger than the substance itself. There are others who think that the soul is like fire, which is associated with heat and light, the heat and light being comparable to consciousness; they argue that, being of the nature of consciousness, the soul cannot be atomic. This is also invalid; for the Upaniṣad texts declare that knowledge is a quality of the soul, and it is not identical with it. Even heat and light are not identical with fire; through the power of certain gems and *mantras* the heat of the fire may not be felt; warm water possesses heat, though it has no illumination. Moreover, the Upaniṣad texts definitely declare the passage of the soul into the body, and this can only be possible if the soul is atomic. The objection that these texts declare the identity of souls with Brahman cannot be regarded as repudiating the atomic nature of the *jīvas*; because this identification is based on the fact that the qualities of knowledge or intuition that belong to the *jīvas* are really the qualities of God. The *jīvas* come out of Brahman in their atomic nature and Brahman manifests His qualities in them, so that they may serve Him. The service of God is thus the religion of man; being pleased with it God sometimes takes man within Himself, or at other times, when He extends His highest grace, He keeps him near Himself to enjoy the sweet emotion of his service¹.

The Śāṅkarites think that Brahman is indeterminate (*nirviśeṣa*) and that all determination is due to *avidyā*. This view is erroneous;

¹ *ata eva sahaja-hari-dāsya-tadaṃśatvena brahma-svarūpaśya ca nijaṇisarga-prabhu-śrīgokula-nātha-caraṇa-kamala-dāsyam eva sva-dharmāḥ. tena cātisaṃtuṣṭaḥ svayaṃ prakāṣībhuṃ nija-guṇāṃś tasmai dattā svasmin praveśayati svarūpānandānubhavārtham. athavā'tyanugrahe nīkate sthāpayati tato'dhikarasa-dāsya-karaṇārtham iti. Ibid. p. 110*

for the supposed *avidyā* cannot belong to the *jīvas*; if it did, it could not affect the nature of Brahman. Nor can it belong to Brahman, because Brahman, being pure knowledge, is destructive of all *avidyā*; again, if the *avidyā* belonged to the Brahman from beginningless time, there would be no *nirviṣeṣa* Brahman. It must therefore be admitted that Brahman possesses the power of knowledge and action and that these powers are natural to and identical with Him. Thus God, in association with His powers, is to be regarded as both determinate and indeterminate; the determinate forms of Brahman are, however, not to be regarded as different from Brahman or as characters of Him; they are identical with Brahman Himself¹.

If *māyā* is regarded as the power of Brahman, then Vallabha is prepared to admit it; but, if *māyā* is regarded as something unreal, then he repudiates the existence of such a category. All knowledge and all delusion come from Brahman, and He is identical with so-called contradictory qualities. If a separate *māyā* is admitted, one may naturally enquire about its status. Being unintelligent (*jaḍā*), it cannot of itself be regarded as the agent (*kartr*); if it is dependent on God, it can be conceived only as an instrument—but, if God is naturally possessed of infinite powers, He cannot require any such inanimate instrument. Moreover, the Upaniṣads declare that Brahman is pure being. If we follow the same texts, Brahman cannot be regarded as associated with qualities in so far as these *guṇas* can be considered as modifications of the qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *taṃas*. It is therefore to be supposed that the *māyā* determines or modifies the nature of Brahman into His determinate qualities. To say that the manifestation of *māyā* is effected by the will of God is objectionable too; for, if God's will is powerful in itself, it need not require any *upādhi* or condition for effecting its purpose. In reality it is not possible to speak of any difference or distinction between God and His qualities.

¹ *brahmanyapi mūrtāmūrtarūpe sarvataḥ veditavye evaṃ tvānena prakāreṇa veditavye brahmaṇa eṭe rūpe iti; kintu brahmaiva iti veditavye. Vidvan-maṇḍana*, p. 138.

Life of Vallabha (1481-1533).

Vallabha was born in the lineage of Yajñanārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa; his great-grandfather was Gaṅgādhara Bhaṭṭa, his grandfather Gaṇapati Bhaṭṭa, and his father Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa. It is said that among themselves they performed one hundred *somayāgas* (soma sacrifices). The family was one of Telugu Brahmins of South India, and the village to which they belonged was known as Kamkar Khamlh; his mother's name was Jllamagaru. Glasenapp, following N. G. Ghosh's sketch of Vallabhācārya, gives the date of his birth as A.D. 1479; but all the traditional accounts agree in holding that he was born in Pampāraṇya, near Benares, in *Samvat* 1535 (A.D. 1481), in the month of *Vaiśākha*, on the eleventh lunar day of the dark fortnight. About the time of his birth there is some discrepancy of opinion; but it seems very probable that it was the early part of the night, when the Scorpion was on the eastern horizon. He was delivered from the womb in the seventh month underneath a tree, when Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa was fleeing from Benares on hearing of the invasion of that city by the Moslems; he received initiation from his father in his eighth year, and was handed over to Viṣṇucitta, with whom he began his early studies. His studies of the Vedas were carried on under several teachers, among were them Tirammalaya, Andhanārāyaṇadīkṣita and Mādhavayatīndra. All these teachers belonged to the Madhva sect. After his father's death he went out on pilgrimage and began to have many disciples, Dāmodara, Śambhū, Svabhū, Svayambhū and others. Hearing of a disputation in the court of the king of Vidyānagara in the south, he started for the place with his disciples, carrying the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and the symbolic stone (*śālagrāma śilā*) of God with him. The discussion was on the problem of the determinate nature of Brahman; Vallabha, being of the Viṣṇusvāmī school, argued on behalf of the determinate nature of Brahman, and won after a protracted discussion which lasted for many days. He met here Vyāsa-tīrtha, the great Madhva teacher. From Vidyānagara he moved towards Pampā and from there to the Ṛṣyamukha hill, from there to Kāmākāṣṇī, from there to Kāncī, from there to Cidambaram and from there to Rāmeśvaram. Thence he turned northwards and, after passing through many places, came to Mahiṣapuri and was well received by the king of that place; from there he came

to Molulakota (otherwise called Yādavādri). From there he went to Udipi, and thence to Gokarṇa, from where he again came near Vidyānagara (Vijayanagara) and was well received by the king. Then he proceeded to Pāṇḍuraṅga, from there to Nāsik, then by the banks of the Revā to Mahiṣmatī, from there to Viśāla, to a city on the river Vetravati to Dhalalāgiri, and from there to Mathurā. Thence he went to Vṛndāvana, to Siddhapura, to the Arhatpattana of the Jains, to Vṛddhanagara, from there to Viśvanagara. From Viśvanagara he went to Guzerāt and thence to the mouth of the river Sindh through Bhāruch. From there he proceeded to Bhamkṣetra, Kapilakṣetra, then to Prabhāsa and Raivata, and then to Dvārakā. From there he proceeded to the Punjab by the banks of the river Sindh. Here he came to Kurukṣetra, from there to Hardwar and to Hṛṣīkeśa, to Gaṅgottri and Yamunottri. After returning to Hardwar he went to Kedāra and Badarikāśrama. He then came down to Kanauj, then to the banks of the Ganges, to Ayodhyā and Allāhābad, thence to Benares. From there he came to Gayā and Vaidyanātha, thence to the confluence of the Ganges and the sea. He then came to Purī. From there he went to Godāvarī, proceeded southwards and came again to Vidyānagara. Then he proceeded again to Dvārakā through the Kathiāwād country; from there he came to Puṣkara, thence again to Bṛndāvana and again to Badarikāśrama. He then came again to Benares; after coming again to the confluence of the Ganges he returned to Benares, where he married Mahā-lakṣmī, the daughter of Devaṇṇa Bhaṭṭa. After marriage he started again for Vaidyanātha and from there he again proceeded to Dvārakā, thence again to Badarikāśrama; from there he came to Bṛndāvana. He again returned to Benares. He then came to Bṛndāvana. From there he came to Benares, where he performed a great *somayāga*. His son Viṭṭhalanātha was born in 1518 when he was in his thirty-seventh year. For his later life he renounced the world and became a *sannyāsin*. He died in 1533. He is said to have written eighty-four works and had eighty-four principal disciples.

Works of Vallabha and his Disciples.

Of the eighty-four books (including small tracts) that Vallabha is said to have written we know only the following; *Antaḥkaraṇa-prabodha* and commentary, *Ācārya-kārikā*, *Anandādhikaraṇa*, *Āryā*, *Ekānta-rahasya*, *Kṛṣṇāśraya*, *Catuḥśloki bhāgavata-ṭikā*, *Ḥalabheda*, *Ḥaiminisūtra-bhāṣya-mīmāṃsā*, *Tattvadīpa* (or more accurately *Tattvārthadīpa* and commentary), *Trividhalilānāmāvalī*, *Navaratna* and commentary, *Nibandha*, *Nirodha-lakṣaṇa* and *Vivṛti*, *Patrāvalambana*, *Padya*, *Parityāga*, *Parivṛddhāṣṭaka*, *Puruṣottamasahasranāma*, *Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādābheda* and commentary, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-kārikā*, *Premāmṛta* and commentary, *Praudhacaritanāma*, *Bālacaritanāman*, *Bālabodha*, *Brahma-sūtrāṇubhāṣya*, *Bhakti-vardhinī* and commentary, *Bhakti-siddhānta*, *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya*, *Bhāgavata-tattvadīpa* and commentary, *Bhāgavata-purāṇa-ṭikā* *Subodhinī*, *Bhāgavata-purāṇa-daśamaskandhānukramaṇikā*, *Bhāgavata-purāṇa-pañcamaskandha-ṭikā*, *Bhāgavata-purāṇa-ikādaśaskandhārthanirūpaṇa-kārikā*, *Bhāgavatasāra-samuccaya*, *Maṅgalavāda*, *Mathurā-māhātmya*, *Madhurāṣṭaka*, *Yamunāṣṭaka*, *Rājāvilānāma*, *Vivekadhairyaśraya*, *Vedastutikārikā*, *Śraddhāprakaraṇa*, *Śrutisāra*, *Sannyāsanirṇaya* and commentary, *Sarvottamastotra-ṭippaṇa* and commentary, *Sākṣātpuruṣottamavākya*, *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, *Siddhānta-rahasya*, *Sevāphala-stotra* and commentary, *Svāmīnyaṣṭaka*¹.

The most important of Vallabha's works are his commentary on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (the *Subodhinī*), his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, and his commentary *Prakāśa* on his own *Tattvadīpa*. The *Subodhinī* had another commentary on it called the *Subodhinī-lekha* and the *Subodhinī-yojana-nibandha-yojana*; the commentary on the *Rasapañcādhyāya* was commented upon by Pitāmbara in the *Rasapañcādhyāyī-prakāśa*. Vallabha's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, the *Āṇubhāṣya*, had a commentary on it by Puruṣottama (the *Bhāṣya-prakāśa*), another by Giridhara (*Vivaraṇa*), another by Icchārama (the *Brahma-sūtrāṇubhāṣya-pradīpa*), and another, the *Balāprabodhinī*, by Śrīdhara Śarma. There was also another commentary on it, the *Āṇubhāṣya-nigūḍhārtha-dīpikā* by Lalu Bhaṭṭa, of the seventeenth century; another by Muralidhara, the pupil of Viṭṭhala (the *Āṇubhāṣya-vyākhyā*), and the *Vedānta-candrikā* by an

¹ See Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum*.

anonymous writer. Vallabha's own commentary *Prakāśa* on the *kārikās* he had written had a commentary on the first part of it, the *Āvaraṇa-bhaṅga* by Pitāmbaraji Mahārāja. The *Tattvārthadīpa* is divided into three sections, of which the first, the *Śāstrārtha-prakarāṇa*, contains 105 *kārikās* of a philosophical nature; the second section, the *Sarvanirṇaya-prakarāṇa*, deals with eschatology and matters relating to duties; the third, the *Bhāgavatārtha-prakarāṇa*, containing a summary of the twelve chapters of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, had a commentary on it, also called the *Āvaraṇa-bhaṅga*, by Puruṣottamaji Mahārāja. There was also another commentary on it by Kalyāṇarāja, which was published in Bombay as early as 1888.

Coming to the small tracts of Vallabha, we may speak first of his *Sannyāsa-nirṇaya*, which consists of twenty-two verses in which he discusses the three kinds of renunciation: the *sannyāsa* of *karma-mārga*, the *sannyāsa* of *jñāna-mārga* and the *sannyāsa* of *bhakti-mārga*. There are at least seven commentaries on it, by Gokulanātha, Raghunātha, Gokulotsava, the two Gopeśvaras, Puruṣottama and a later Vallabha. Of these Gokulanātha (1554–1643) was the fourth son of Viṭṭhalanātha; he also wrote commentaries on *Śrī Sarvottama-stotra*, *Vallabhāṣṭaka*, *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, *Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā*, *Siddhānta-rahasya*, *Catuḥśloki*, *Dhairyyāśraya*, *Bhakti-vārdhinī* and *Sevāphala*. He was a great traveller and preacher of Vallabha's views in Guzerat, and did a great deal to make the *Subodhinī* commentary of Vallabha popular. Raghunātha, the fifth son of Viṭṭhalanātha, was born in 1557; he wrote commentaries on Vallabha's *Ṣoḍaśa-grantha* and also on *Vallabhāṣṭaka*, *Madhurāṣṭaka*, *Bhakti-hamsa* and *Bhakti-hetu*; also a commentary on *Puruṣottama-nāma-sahasra*, the *Nāma-candrikā*. Gokulotsava, the younger brother of Kalyāṇarāja and uncle of Harirāja, was born in 1580; he also wrote a commentary on the *Ṣoḍaśa-grantha*. Gopeśvara, the son of Ghanaśyāma, was born in 1598; the other Gopeśvara was the son of Kalyāṇarāja and the younger brother of Harirāja. Puruṣottama, also a commentator, was born in 1660. Vallabha, son of Viṭṭhalarāja, the other commentator, great-great-grandson of Raghunātha (the fifth son of Vallabhācārya) was born in 1575, and wrote a commentary on the *Aṇubhāṣya* of Vallabhācārya. He should be distinguished from the earlier Vallabha, the son of Viṭṭhaleśvara.

The *Sevāphala* of Vallabha is a small tract of eight verses which discusses the obstacles to the worship of God and its fruits; it was commented upon by Kalyāṇarāja. He was the son of Govindarāja, the second son of Viṭṭhalanātha, and was born in 1571; he was the father of Harirāja, and wrote commentaries on the *Śoḍaśa-grantha* and also on the rituals of worship. This work was also commented on by Devakīnandana, who was undoubtedly prior to Puruṣottama. One Devakīnandana, the son of Raghunātha (the fifth son of Viṭṭhalanātha), was born in 1570; a grandson of the same name was born in 1631. There was also a commentary on it by Haridhana, otherwise called Harirāja, who was born in 1593; he wrote many small tracts. There was another commentary on it by Vallabha, the son of Viṭṭhala. There were two other Vallabhas—one the grandson of Devakīnandana, born in 1619, and the other the son of Viṭṭhalarāja, born in 1675; it is probable that the author of the commentary of the *Sevāphala* is the same Vallabha who wrote the *Subodhinī-lekha*. There are other commentaries by Puruṣottama, Gopeśa, and Lālu Bhaṭṭa, a Telugu Brāhmin; his other name was Bālakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita. He probably lived in the middle of the seventeenth century; he wrote *Aṇubhāṣya-nigūḍhārtha-prakāśikā* on the *Aṇubhāṣya* of Vallabha and a commentary on the *Subodhinī* (the *Subodhinī-yojana-nibandha-yojana Sevākaumudī*), *Nirṇayārṇava*, *Prmeṃya-ratnārṇava*, and a commentary on the *Śoḍaśa-grantha*. There is another commentary by Jayagopāla Bhaṭṭa, the son of Cintāmaṇi Dīkṣita, the disciple of Kalyāṇarāja. He wrote a commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, on the *Kṛṣṇa-karṇāmṛta* of Bilvamaṅgala, and on the *Bhakti-vardhinī*. There is also a commentary by Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa, grandson of Śrinātha Bhaṭṭa and son of Gopinātha Bhaṭṭa, and also two other anonymous commentaries.

Vallabha's *Bhakti-vardhinī* is a small tract of eleven verses, commented upon by Dvārakeśa, Giridhara, Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa (son of the later Vallabha), by Lālu Bhaṭṭa, Jayagopāla Bhaṭṭa, Vallabha, Kalyāṇarāja, Puruṣottama, Gopeśvara, Kalyāṇarāja and Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa; there is also another anonymous commentary.

The *Sannyāsa-nirṇaya*, the *Sevāphala* and the *Bhakti-vardhinī* are included in the *Sixteen Tracts* of Vallabha (the *Śoḍaśa-grantha*); the others are *Yamunāṣṭaka*, *Bālabodha*, *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*,

Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā, *Siddhānta-rahasya*, *Navaratna*, *Antaḥkaraṇaprabodha*, *Vivekadhairyāśraya*, *Kṛṣṇāśraya*, *Catuḥśloki*, *Bhakti-vardhinī*, *Īalabheda* and *Pañcapādyā*. The *Yamunāṣṭaka* is a tract of nine verses in praise of the holy river Yamunā. *Bālabodha* is a small tract of nineteen verses, in which Vallabha says that pleasure (*kāma*) and extinction of sorrow (*mokṣa*) are the two primarily desirable things in the world; two others, *dharma* and *artha*, are desirables in a subsidiary manner, because through *artha* or wealth one may attain *dharma*, and through *dharma* one may attain happiness. *Mokṣa* can be attained by the grace of *Viṣṇu*. *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* is a small tract of twenty-one verses dealing with *bhakti*, which emphasize the necessity of abnegating all things to God. *Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā* is a small tract of twenty-five verses, in which Vallabha says that there are five kinds of natural defects, due to egotism, to birth in particular countries or times, to bad actions and bad associations. These can be removed by offering all that one has to God; one has a right to enjoy things after dedicating them to God. *Navaratna* is a tract of nine verses in which the necessity of abnegating and dedicating all things to God is emphasized. *Antaḥkaraṇa-prabodha* is a tract of ten verses which emphasize the necessity of self-inspection and prayer to God for forgiveness, and to convince one's mind that everything belongs to God. The *Vivekadhairyāśraya* is a small tract of seventeen verses. It urges us to have full confidence in God and to feel that, if our wishes are not fulfilled by Him, there must be some reason known to Him; He knows everything and always looks to our welfare. It is therefore wrong to desire anything strongly; it is best to leave all things to God to manage as He thinks best. The *Kṛṣṇāśraya* is a tract of eleven verses explaining the necessity of depending in all matters on Kṛṣṇa, the Lord. *Catuḥśloki* is a tract of four verses of the same purport. The *Bhakti-vardhinī* is a tract of eleven verses, in which Vallabha says that the seed of the love of God exists in us all, only it is obstructed by various causes; when it manifests itself, one begins to love all beings in the world; when it grows in intensity it becomes impossible for one to be attached to worldly things. When love of God grows to this high intensity, it cannot be destroyed. The *Īalabheda* contains twenty verses, dealing with the different classes of devotees and ways of devotion. The *Pañcapādyā* is a tract of five verses.

Viṭṭhaladikṣita or Viṭṭhaleśa (1518-88), the son of Vallabha, is said to have written the following works: *Avatāra-tāratamya-stotra*, *Āryā*, *Kṛṣṇa-premāmṛta*, *Gīta-govinda-prathamāṣṭapadī-vivṛti*, *Gokulāṣṭaka*, *Janmāṣṭamī-nirṇaya*, *Ḥalabheda-ṭikā*, *Dhruvāpada-ṭikā*, *Nāma-candrikā*, *Nyāsādeśavivarāṇa-prabodha*, *Premāmṛta-bhāṣya*, *Bhakti-ḥaṁsa*, *Bhakti-hetu-nirṇaya*, *Bhagavata-svatantratā*, *Bhagavadgītā-tātparya*, *Bhagavad-gītā-hetu-nirṇaya*, *Bhāgavata-tattva-dīpikā*, *Bhāgavata-daśama-skandha-vivṛti*, *Bhujāṅga-prayātāṣṭaka*, *Yāmunaṣṭaka-vivṛti*, *Rasasarvasva*, *Rāma-navamī-nirṇaya*, *Vallabhāṣṭaka*, *Vidvan-maṇḍana*, *Viveka-dhairyyāśraya-ṭikā*, *Śikṣā-patra*, *Śṛṅgārārasa-maṇḍana*, *Ṣaṭpadī*, *Samyāsa-nirṇaya-vivarāṇa*, *Samaya-pradīpa*, *Sarvottama-stotra* with commentary, commentary on *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, *Sevākaumudī*, *Svatantrālekhana* and *Svāmistotra*¹. Of these *Vidyā-maṇḍana* is the most important; it was commented on by Puruṣottama and has already been noticed above in detail. A refutation of the *Vidyā-maṇḍana* and the *Śuddhādvaita-mārtaṇḍa* of Giridhara was attempted in 1868 in a work called *Sahasrākṣa* by Sadānanda, a Śāṅkarite thinker. This was again refuted in the *Prabhañjana* by Viṭṭhalanātha (of the nineteenth century) and there is a commentary on this by Govardhanaśarmā of the present century. From the *Sahasrākṣa* we know that Viṭṭhala had studied Nyāya in Navadvīpa and the Vedas, the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Brahma-sūtra*, that he had gone to different countries carrying on his disputations and conquering his opponents, and that he was received with great honour by Svarūpasimha of Udaypur. Viṭṭhala's *Yāmunaṣṭakavivṛti* was commented on by Harirāja; his commentary on Vallabha's *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* was commented on by Brajanātha, son of Raghunātha. The *Madhurāṣṭaka* of Vallabha was commented on by Viṭṭhala, and his work was further commented on by Ghanaśyāma. The *Madhurāṣṭaka* had other commentaries on it, by Harirāja, Bālakṛṣṇa, Raghunātha and Vallabha. Viṭṭhala also wrote commentaries on the *Nyāsadesa* and the *Puṣṭipravāha-maryādā* of Vallabha. His *Bhakti-hetu* was commented on by Raghunātha; in this work Viṭṭhala discusses the possible course of the rise of *bhakti*. He says that there are two principal ways; those who follow the *maryādā-mārga* follow their duties and attain God in course of time, but those who follow the *puṣṭi-mārga* depend entirely on the grace of God. God's grace is not conditioned by

¹ See Aufrechts' *Catalogus Catalogorum*.

good deeds, such as gifts, sacrifices, etc., or by the performance of the prescribed duties. The *jīvas* as such are the natural objects to whom God's grace is extended when He is pleased by good deeds. But it is more appropriate to hold that God's grace is free and independent of any conditions; God's will, being eternal, cannot be dependent on conditions originated through causes and effects. The opponents' view—that by good deeds and by prescribed duties performed for God, *bhakti* is attained, and through *bhakti* there is the grace of God and, through that, emancipation—is wrong; for though different persons may attain purity by the performance of good deeds, yet some may be endowed with knowledge and others with *bhakti*; and this difference cannot be explained except on the supposition that God's grace is free and unconditioned. The supposition that with grace as an accessory cause the purity of the mind produces *bhakti* is also wrong; it is much better to suppose that the grace of God flows freely and does not require the co-operation of other conditions; for the scriptures speak of the free exercise of God's grace. Those whom God takes in the path of *maryādā* attain their salvation in due course through the performance of duties, purity of mind, devotion, etc.; but those to whom He extends His special grace are accepted in the path of *puṣṭi-bhakti*; they attain *bhakti* even without the performance of any prescribed duties. The prescription of duties is only for those who are in the path of *maryādā*; the inclination to follow either the *maryādā* or the *puṣṭi* path depends on the free and spontaneous will of God¹, so that even in the *maryādā-mārga bhakti* is due to the grace of God and not to the performance of duties². Viṭṭhala's view of the relation of God's will to all actions, whether performed by us or happening in the course of natural and material causes, reminds us of the doctrine of occasionalism, which is more or less of the same period as Viṭṭhala's enunciation of it; he says that whatever actions happened, are happening or will happen are due to the immediately preceding will of God to that effect; all causality is thus due to God's spontaneous will at the preceding

¹ *yeṣu jīveṣu yathā bhagavadicchā tathāiva teṣāṃ pravṛtter āvaśyakatvāt. Bhakti-hetu-nirṇaya*, p. 7.

² In the *Bhakti-haṃsa* (p. 56) of Viṭṭhala it is said that *bhakti* means affection (*sneha*): *bhaktipadasya śaktiḥ sneha eva*. Worship itself is not *bhakti*, but may lead to it; since *bhakti* is of the nature of affection, there cannot be any *vidhī* or injunction with reference to it.

moment¹. The causality of so-called causes and conditions, or of precedent-negations (*prāg-abhāva*), or of the absence of negative causes and conditions, is thus discarded; for all these elements are effects, and therefore depend upon God's will for their happening; for without that nothing could happen. God's will is the ultimate cause of all effects or happenings. As God's will is thus the only cause of all occurrences or destructions, so it is the sole cause of the rise of *bhakti* in any individual. It is by His will that people are associated with different kinds of inclinations, but they work differently and that they have or have not *bhakti*. Viṭṭhala is said to have been a friend of Akbar. His other works were commentaries on *Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā* and *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, *Aṇubhāṣya-pūrtti* (a commentary on the *Aṇubhāṣya*), *Nibandha-prakāśa*, *Subodhini-ṭippanī* (a commentary on the *Subodhini*), otherwise called *Sannyāsāvachheda*. Vallabhācārya's first son was Gopināthaji Mahārāja, who wrote *Sādhana-dīpaka* and other minor works, and Viṭṭhala was his second son. Viṭṭhala had seven sons and four daughters.

Pitāmbara, the great-grandson of Viṭṭhala, the pupil of Viṭṭhala and the father of Puruṣottama, wrote *Avatāravādāvalī*, *Bhakti-rasatvavāda*, *Dravya-śuddhi* and its commentary, and a commentary on the *Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā*. Puruṣottama was born in 1670; he wrote the following books; *Subodhini-prakāśa* (a commentary on the *Subodhini* commentary of Vallabha on the *Bhāga-vata-purāṇa*), *Upaniṣad-dīpikā*, *Āvaraṇa-bhaṅga* on the *Prakāśa* commentary of Vallabha on his *Tattvāttha-dīpikā*, *Prārthanā-ratnākara*, *Bhakti-haṃsa-viveka*, *Utsava-pratāna*, *Suvarṇa-sūtra* (a commentary on the *Vidvanamaṇḍana*) and *Ṣoḍaśa-grantha-vivṛti*. He is said to have written twenty-four philosophical and theological tracts, of which seventeen have been available to the present writer, viz., *Bhedābheda-svarūpa-nirṇaya*, *Bhagavat-pratikṛti-pūjanavāda*, *Sṛṣṭi-bheda-vāda*, *Khyāti-vāda*, *Andhakāra-vāda*, *Brāhmaṇatvādi-devatādi-vāda*, *Jīva-pratibimbatva-khaṇḍana-vāda*, *Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva-vāda*, *Pratibimba-vāda*, *Bhaktiyutkarṣa-vāda*, *Ūrdhva-puṇḍra-dhāraṇa-vāda*, *Mālādhāraṇa-vāda*, *Upadeśa-viśaya-śaṅkā-nirāsa-vāda*, *Mūrti-pūjana-vāda*, *Śaṅkha-cakra-dhāraṇa-vāda*. He

¹ *yadā yadā yat yat kāryaṃ bhavati bhāvi abhūd vā tat-tatkāloṣādhau kramikenaiva tena tena hetunā tat tat kāryaṃ kariṣye iti tataḥ pūrvaṃ bhagavad-icchā asty āsīd vā iti mantāryam. Ibid. p. 9.*

also wrote commentaries on *Sevāphala*, *Sannyāsa-nirṇaya* and *Bhakti-vardhinī*, the *Bhāṣya-prakāśa* and the *Utsava-pratāna*. He wrote these commentaries also; *Nirodha-lakṣaṇa*, *ḥalabheda*, *Pañcapādyā*, and the *Tīrtha* commentary on the *Bhakti-haṃsa* of Viṭṭhala on the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* and the *Bāla-bodha*. He also wrote a sub-commentary on Viṭṭhala's *Bhāṣya* on the *Gāyatrī*, a commentary on *Vallabhāṣṭaka*, the *Vedānta-karaṇamāla* and the *Śāstrārtha-prakaraṇa-nibandha*, and a commentary on the *Gītā*. He is said to have written about nine hundred thousand verses, and is undoubtedly one of the most prominent members of the Vallabha school.

Muralīdhara, the pupil of Viṭṭhala, wrote a commentary on Vallabha's *Bhāṣya* called the *Bhāṣya-tīkā*; also the *Paratattvāñjana*, *Bhakti-cintāmaṇi*, *Bhagavannāma-darpaṇa*, *Bhagavannāma-vaibhava*. Viṭṭhala's great-grandson Vallabha, born in 1648, wrote the *Subodhinī-lekha*, a commentary on the *Sevāphala*, a commentary on the *Śoḍaśa-grantha*, the *Gītā-tattva-dīpanī*, and other works. Gopeśvaraji Mahārāja, the son of Kalyāṇarāja and the great-grandson of Viṭṭhala, was born in 1595, and wrote the *Raśmī* commentary on the *Prakāśa* of Vallabha, the *Subodhinī-bubhutra-bodhinī*, and a Hindi commentary on the *Śikṣāpatra* of Harirāja. The other Gopeśvara, known also as Yogi Gopeśvara, the author of *Bhakti-mārtanda*, was born much later, in 1781. Giridharji, born in 1845, wrote the *Bhāṣya-vivaraṇa* and other works.

Muralīdhara, the pupil of Viṭṭhala, wrote a commentary on Vallabha's *Aṇubhāṣya*, a commentary on the *Śāṇḍilya-sūtra*, the *Paratattvāñjana*, the *Bhakti-cintāmaṇi*, the *Bhagavannāma-darpaṇa* and the *Bhagavannāma-vaibhava*. Raghunātha, born in 1557, wrote the commentary *Nāma-candrikā* on Vallabha's *Bhakti-haṃsa*, also commentaries on his *Bhakti-hetu-nirṇaya* and *Vallabhāṣṭaka* (the *Bhakti-taraṅginī* and the *Bhakti-hetu-nirṇaya-vivṛti*). He also wrote a commentary on the *Puruṣottama-stotra* and the *Vallabhāṣṭaka*. Vallabha, otherwise known as Gokulanātha, son of Viṭṭhala, born in 1550, wrote the *Prapañca-sāra-bheda* and commentaries on the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, *Nirodha-lakṣaṇa*, *Madhurāṣṭaka*, *Sarvottamastotra*, *Vallabhāṣṭaka* and the *Gāyatrī-bhāṣya* of Vallabhācārya. Kalyāṇarāja, son of Govindarāja, son of Viṭṭhala, was born in 1571, and wrote commentaries on the *ḥalabheda* and the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*. His brother Gokulastava, born in 1580,

wrote a commentary called *Trividhānāmāvalī-vivṛti*. Devakinandana (1570), son of Raghunātha and grandson of Viṭṭhala, wrote the *Prakāśa* commentary on the *Bāla-bodha* of Vallabhācārya. Ghanaśyāma (1574), grandson of Viṭṭhala, wrote a sub-commentary on the *Madhurāṣṭaka-vivṛti* of Viṭṭhala. Kṛṣṇacandra Gosvāmi, son of Brajanātha and pupil of Vallabhācārya, wrote a short commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, the *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, in the fashion of his father Brajanātha's *Marīcikā* commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. This Brajanātha also wrote a commentary on *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*. Harirāja (1593), son of Kalyāṇarāja, wrote the *Śikṣā-patra* and commentaries on the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, the *Nirodha-lakṣaṇa*, *Pañcapādyā*, *Madhurāṣṭaka*, and a *Parīṣiṣṭa* in defence of Kalyāṇarāja's commentary on the *Ķalabheda*. Gopeśa (1598), son of Ghanaśyāma, wrote commentaries on the *Nirodha-lakṣaṇa*, *Sevāphala* and *Sannyāsanirṇaya*. Gopeśvaraji Mahārāja (1598), brother of Harirāja, wrote a Hindi commentary on Harirāja's *Śikṣāpatra*. Dvārakeśa, a pupil of Viṭṭhala, wrote a commentary on *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*. Jayagopāla Bhaṭṭa, disciple of Kalyāṇarāja, wrote commentaries on the *Sevāphala* and the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. Vallabha (1648), great-grandson of Viṭṭhala, wrote commentaries on the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, *Nirodha-lakṣaṇa*, *Sevāphala*, *Sannyāsa-nirṇaya*, *Bhakti-varḍhinī*, *Ķalabheda* and the *Madhurāṣṭaka*. Brajarāja, son of Śyāmala, wrote a commentary on the *Nirodha-lakṣaṇa*. Indiveśa and Govardhana Bhaṭṭa wrote respectively *Gāyatriyārtha-vivaraṇa* and *Gāyatriyārtha*. Śrīdharasvāmi wrote the *Bāla-bodhinī* commentary on the *Aṇubhāṣya* of Vallabha. Giridhara, the great-grandson of Viṭṭhala, wrote the *Siddhādvaita-mārtaṇḍa* and the *Prapañca-vāda*, following *Vidvāna-maṇḍana*. His pupil Rāmakṛṣṇa wrote the *Prakāśa* commentary on the *Siddhādvaita-mārtaṇḍa*, and another work, the *Śuddhādvaita-parikṣkāra*. Yogi Gopeśvara (1787) wrote the *Vādakathā*, *Ātmavāda*, *Bhakti-mārtaṇḍa*, *Caturthādhikaraṇamālā*, the *Rasmi* commentary on the *Bhāṣya-prakāśa* of Puruṣottama, and a commentary on Puruṣottama's *Vedāntādhikaraṇamālā*. Gokulotsava wrote a commentary on the *Trividhānāmāvalī* of Vallabha. Brajeśvara Bhaṭṭa wrote the *Brahmavidyā-bhāvana*, Haridāsa the *Haridāsa-siddhānta*, Icchārāma the *Pradīpa* on Vallabha's *Aṇubhāṣya* and Nirbhaya-rāma, the pupil of the *Adhikaraṇa-saṃgraha*.

Viṣṇusvāmin.

Viṣṇusvāmin is regarded by tradition as being the earliest founder of the *viśuddhādvaita* school which was regenerated by Vallabha. Śrīdhara, in his commentary on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, also refers to Viṣṇusvāmin, and it is possible that he wrote a commentary on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*; but no such work is available. A brief account of Viṣṇusvāmin's views is available in the *Sakalacaryā-mata-saṃgraha* (by an anonymous writer), which merely summarizes Vallabha's views; there is nothing new in it which could be taken up here for discussion. This work, however, does not contain any account of Vallabha's philosophy, from which it may be assumed that it was probably written before the advent of Vallabha, and that the view of Viṣṇusvāmin contained therein was drawn either from the traditional account of Viṣṇusvāmin or from some of his works not available at the present time. It is unlikely, therefore, that the account of Viṣṇusvāmin in the *Sakalacaryā-mata-saṃgraha* is in reality a summary statement of Vallabha's views imposed on the older writer Viṣṇusvāmin. Vallabha himself, however, never refers to Viṣṇusvāmin as the originator of his system; there is a difference of opinion among the followers of Vallabha as to whether Vallabha followed in the footsteps of Viṣṇusvāmin. It is urged that while Vallabha emphasized the pure monistic texts of the Upaniṣads and regarded Brahman as undifferentiated, as one with himself, and as one with his qualities, Viṣṇusvāmin emphasized the duality implied in the Vedāntic texts¹. Vallabha also, in his *Subodhinī* commentary on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (III. 32. 37) describes the view of Viṣṇusvāmin as propounding a difference between the Brahman and the world through the quality of *taṃas*, and distinguishes his own view as propounding Brahman as absolutely qualityless². The meagre account of Viṣṇusvāmin given in *Sakalacaryā-mata-saṃgraha* does not lend us any assistance in discovering whether his view differed from that of Vallabha, and, if it did, in what points. It is

¹ Thus Nirbhayarāma, in *Adhikaraṇa-saṃgraha* (p. 1), says: *tasyāpi durbo-dhatvena vyākhyāna-sāpekṣatayā tasya vyākhyātāro Viṣṇusvāmi-madhva-pra-bhṛtayo brahmādvaita-vādasya sevya-sevaka-bhāvasya ca virodham manvānā abheda-bodhaka-śrutiṣu lakṣaṇayā bheda-paratvam śuddham bhedaṃ aṅgicakruḥ.*

² *te ca sāmpratam Viṣṇusvāmyanusāriṇaḥ tattva-vādino Rāmānujaś ca tamora-jah-sattvair bhīmā asmat-pratipādītā ca nairguṇvādasya. Ibid. p. 1.*

also not impossible that the author of *Sakalacaryā-mata-saṃgraha* had not himself seen any work of Viṣṇusvāmin and had transferred the views of Vallabha to Viṣṇusvāmin, who, according to some traditions, was the originator of the Śuddhādvaita system¹.

According to the *Vallabha-dig-vijaya* there was a king called Vijaya of the Pāṇḍya kingdom in the south. He had a priest Devasvāmin, whose son was Viṣṇusvāmin. Śukasvāmin, a great religious reformer of North India, was his fellow-student in the Vedānta; it is difficult to identify him in any way. Viṣṇusvāmin went to Dvārakā, to Bṛndāvana, then to Purī, and then returned home. At an advanced age he left his household deities to his son, and having renounced the world in the Vaiṣṇava fashion, came to Kāñcī. He had many pupils there, e.g., Śrīdevadarśaṇa, Śrīkaṇṭha, Sahasrārcci, Śatadhṛti, Kumārapada, Parabhūti, and others. Before his death he left the charge of teaching his views to Śrīdevadarśaṇa. He had seven hundred principal followers teaching his views; one of them, Rājaviṣṇusvāmin, became a teacher in the Andhra country. Viṣṇusvāmin's temples and books were said to have been burnt at this time by the Buddhists. Vilva-maṅgala, a Tamil saint, succeeded to the pontifical chair at Śrīraṅgam, Vilva-maṅgala left the pontifical chair at Kāñcī to Deva-maṅgala and went to Bṛndāvana. Prabhāviṣṇusvāmin succeeded to the pontifical chair; he had many disciples, e.g., Śrīkaṇṭhagarbha, Satyavatī Paṇḍita, Somagiri, Narahari, Śrāntanidhi and others. He installed Śrāntanidhi in his pontifical chair before his death. Among the Viṣṇusvāmin teachers was one Govindācārya, whose disciple Vallabhācārya is said to have been. It is difficult to guess the date of Viṣṇusvāmin; it is not unlikely, however, that he lived in the twelfth or the thirteenth century.

¹ This tradition is found definitely maintained in the *Vallabha-dig-vijaya*, written by Jadunāthajī Mahārāja.

CHAPTER XXXII

CAITANYA AND HIS FOLLOWERS

Caitanya's Biographers.

CAITANYA was the last of the Vaiṣṇava reformers who had succeeded Nimbārka and Vallabha. As a matter of fact, he was a junior contemporary of Vallabha. So far as he is known to us, he did not leave behind any work treating of his own philosophy, and all that we can know of it is from the writings of his contemporary and later admirers and biographers. Even from these we know more of his character and of the particular nature of his devotion to God than about his philosophy. It is therefore extremely difficult to point out anything as being the philosophy of Caitanya. Many biographies of him were written in Sanskrit, Bengali, Assamese and Oriya and a critical study of the materials of Caitanya's biography in Bengali was published some time ago by Dr Biman Behari Mazumdar. Of the many biographies of Caitanya those by Murārigupta and Vṛndāvanadāsa deal with the first part of Caitanya's life, and the latter's work is regarded as the most authoritative and excellent treatment of his early life. Again, Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja's *Life*, which emphasizes the second and third parts of Caitanya's life, is regarded as the most philosophical and instructive treatment of his most interesting period. Indeed, Vṛndāvanadāsa's *Caitanya-bhāgavata* and Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja's *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* stand out as the most important biographical works on Caitanya. We have already mentioned Murārigupta, who wrote a small work in Sanskrit, full of exaggerations, though he was a contemporary. There are also biographies by Jayānanda and Locanadāsa, entitled *Caitanya-maṅgala*. Some Govinda and Svarūpa Dāmodara, supposed to have been personal attendants of Caitanya, were said to have kept notes, but these are apparently now lost. Kavi Karṇapūra wrote the *Caitanya-candrodaya-nāṭaka*, which may be regarded as the principal source of Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja's work. Vṛndāvanadāsa was born in śaka 1429 (A.D. 1507); he had seen Caitanya during the first fifteen years of his life. Caitanya died in śaka 1455 (A.D. 1533) and the *Caitanya-bhāgavata*

was written shortly after. Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja's work, *Caitanya-caritāmṛta*, was written long afterwards. Though there is some dispute regarding the actual date of its completion, it is well-nigh certain that it was in śaka 1537 (A.D. 1616). The other date, found in *Prema-vilāsa*, is śaka 1503 (A.D. 1581), and this had been very well-combated by Professor Rādhā Govinda Nath in his learned edition of the work. The *Caitanya-candrodaya-nāṭaka* was written by Kavi Kārṇapūra in śaka 1494 (A.D. 1572). It would thus appear that for the most authentic account of Caitanya's life one should refer to this work and to Vṛndāvanadāsa's *Caitanya-bhāgavata*. Kavirāja Kṛṣṇadāsa's *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* is, however, the most learned of the biographies. There was also a *Caitanya-sahasra-nāma* by Sārvabhauma Bhaṭṭācārya, the *Govinda-vijaya* of Paramā-nandapurī, songs of Caitanya by Gauridāsa Paṇḍita, the *Gauḍarāja-vijaya* of Paramānanda Gupta, and songs of Caitanya by Gopāla Basu.

The Life of Caitanya.

I shall attempt here to give only a brief account of Caitanya's life, following principally the *Caitanya-bhāgavata*, *Caitanya-candrodaya-nāṭaka* and *Caitanya-caritāmṛta*.

There lived in Navadvīpa Jagannātha Miśra and his wife Śacī. On a full-moon day in Spring (the month of *Phālguna*), when there was an eclipse of the moon, in śaka 1407 (A.D. 1485), Caitanya was born to them. Navadvīpa at this time was inhabited by many Vaiṣṇavas who had migrated from Sylhet and other parts of India. Thus there were Śrīvāsa Paṇḍita, Śrīrāma Paṇḍita, Candraśekhara; Murārigupta, Puṇḍarīka Vidyānidhi, Caitanya-vallabha Datta. Thus the whole atmosphere was prepared for a big spark of fire which it was the business of Caitanya to throw into the combustible material. In Śāntipura, Advaita, a great Vaiṣṇava very much senior to Caitanya, was always regretting the general hollowness of the people and wishing for someone to create new fire. Caitanya's elder brother Viśvarūpa had gone out as an ascetic, and Caitanya, then the only son left to his parents, was particularly cherished by his widowed mother Śacī Devī, the daughter of Nilāmbara Chakravartī.

Navadvīpa was at this time under Moslem rulers who had grown tyrannical. Sārvabhauma Bhaṭṭācārya, son of Viśārada

Paṇḍita and a great scholar, had gone over to Orissa to take refuge under the Hindu king there, Pratāparudra.

Caitanya studied in the Sanskrit school (*tol*) of Sudarśana Paṇḍita. His study in the school was probably limited to the Kalāpa grammar and some *kāvya*s. Some later biographers say that he had also read Nyāya (logic); there is, however, no proper evidence in support of this. He had, however, studied at home some *Purāṇas*, notably the great devotional work, *Śrīmad-bhāgavata*. As a student he was indeed very gifted; but he was also very vain, and always took special delight in defeating his fellow-students in debate. From his early days he had shown a strong liking for devotional songs. He took a special delight in identifying himself with Kṛṣṇa. Among his associates the names of the following may be mentioned: Śrīnivāsa Paṇḍita and his three brothers, Vāsudeva Datta, Mukunda Datta and Jagai, the writer, Śrīgarbha Paṇḍita, Murārigupta, Govinda, Śrīdhara, Gaṅgādāsa, Dāmodara, Candrasekhara, Mukunda, Sañjaya, Puruṣottama, Vijaya, Vakreśvara, Sanātana, Hṛdaya, Madana and Rāmānanda. Caitanya had received some instruction in the Vedas also from his father. He had also received instruction from Viṣṇu Paṇḍita and Gaṅgādāsa Paṇḍita. At this period of his life he became intimately acquainted with Haridāsa and Gadādhara.

Caitanya's first wife, Lakṣmī Devī, daughter of Vallabha Miśra, died of snake-bite; he then married Viṣṇupriyā. After his father's death he went to Gayā to perform the post-funeral rites; there he is said to have met saintly persons like Paramānanda Purī, Īśvara Purī, Raghunātha Purī, Brahmānanda Purī, Amara Purī, Gopāla Purī, and Ananta Purī. He was initiated by Īśvara Purī and decided to renounce the world. He came back, however, to Navadvīpa and began to teach the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* for some time.

Nityānanda, an ascetic (*avadhūta*), joined him in Navadvīpa. His friendship further kindled the fire of Caitanya's passion for divine love, and both of them, together with other associates, began to spend days and nights in dancing and singing. It was at this time that through his influence and that of Nityānanda, two drunkards, Jagai and Madhai, were converted to his Vaiṣṇava cult of love. Shortly after this, with his mother's permission, he took the ascetic life and proceeded to Katwa, and from there to Śantipur to meet Advaita there. From this place he started for Purī with his followers.

Such is the brief outline of Caitanya's early life, bereft of all interesting episodes, and upon it there is a fair amount of unanimity among his various biographers.

Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja's Bengali work, *Caitanya-caritāmṛta*, is probably one of the latest of his biographies, but on account of its recondite character has easily surpassed in popularity all other biographies of Caitanya. He divides Caitanya's life into three parts: *Ādilīlā* (the first part), *Madhya-līlā* (the second part) and *Antyalīlā* (the last part). The first part consists of an account of the first twenty-four years, at the end of which Caitanya renounced the world. He lived for another twenty-four years, and these are divided into two sections, the second and the last part of his life. Of these twenty-four years, six years were spent on pilgrimage; this marks the middle period. The remaining eighteen years were spent by him in Purī and form the final period, of which six years were spent in preaching the cult of holy love and the remaining twelve years in deep ecstasies and suffering pangs of separation from his beloved Kṛṣṇa, the Lord.

After his renunciation in the twenty-fourth year of his life, in the month of *Māgha* (January), he started for Bṛndāvana and travelled for three days in the Rāḍha country (Bengal). He did not know the way to Bṛndāvana and was led to Śāntipura by Nityānanda. Caitanya's mother, along with many other people, Śrīvāsa, Rāmai, Vidyānidhi, Gadādhara, Vakreśvara, Murāri, Śuklāmbara, Śrīdhara, Vyaya, Vāsudeva, Mukunda, Buddhimanta Khan, Nandana and Sañjaya, came to see him at Śāntipur. From Śāntipur Caitanya started for Purī with Nityānanda, Paṇḍita Jagadānanda, Dāmodara Paṇḍita and Mukunda Dutta by the side of the Ganges, by way of Bāleśvar (in Orissa). He then passed by Yājpur and Sākṣigopāla and came to Purī. Having arrived there, he went straight to the temple of Jagannātha, looked at the image and fell into a trance. Sārvabhauma Bhaṭṭācārya, who was then residing at Purī, brought him to his house; Nityānanda, Jagadānanda, Dāmodara all came and joined him there. Here Caitanya stayed for some time at the house of Sārvabhauma and held discussions with him, in the course of which he refuted the monistic doctrines of Śāṅkara¹.

¹ There is considerable divergence about this episode with Sārvabhauma; the Sanskrit *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* and the *Caitanya-candrodaya-nāṭaka* do not agree with the description in the *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* in Bengali of Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja as given here.

After some time Caitanya started for the South and first came to Kūrmasthāna, probably a place in the Ganjam district (South Orissa); he then passed on by the banks of the Godāvarī and met Rāmānanda Ray. In a long conversation with him on the subtle aspect of the emotion of *bhakti* Caitanya was very much impressed by him; he passed some time with him in devotional songs and ecstasies. He then resumed his travel again and is said to have passed through Mallikārjuna-tīrtha, Ahobala-Nṛsiṃha, Skanda-tīrtha and other places, and later on came to Śrīraṅgam on the banks of the Kāverī. Here he lived in the house of Veṅkaṭa Bhaṭṭa for four months, after which he went to the Rṣabha mountain, where he met Paramānanda Purī. It is difficult to say how far he travelled in the South, but he must have gone probably as far as Travancore. It is also possible that he visited some of the places where Madhvācārya had great influence, and it is said that he had discussions with the teachers of the Madhva school. He discovered the *Brahma-saṃhitā* and the *Kṛṣṇa-karnāmṛta*, two important manuscripts of Vaiṣṇavism, and brought them with him. He is said to have gone a little farther in the East up to Nāsika; but it is difficult to say to what extent the story of these tours is correct. On his return journey he met Rāmānanda Ray again, who followed him to Purī.

After his return to Purī, Pratāparudra, then King of Purī, solicited his acquaintance and became his disciple. In Purī Caitanya began to live in the house of Kāśī Miśra. Among others, he had as his followers Janārdana, Kṛṣṇadāsa, Śikhī Māhiti, Pradyumna Miśra, Jagannātha Dāsa, Murārī Māhiti, Candaneśvara and Siṃheśvara. Caitanya spent most of his time in devotional songs, dances and ecstasies. In A.D. 1514 he started for Bṛndāvana with a number of followers; but so many people thronged him by the time he came to Pāṇihāṭī and Kāmārahāṭī that he cancelled his programme and returned to Purī. In the autumn of the next year he again started for Bṛndāvana with Bālabhadra Bhaṭṭācārya and came to Benares; there he defeated in a discussion a well-known teacher, Prakāśānanda, who held monistic doctrines. In Bṛndāvana he met Śrī-rūpa Gosvāmī, Uddhavadāsa Mādhava, and others. Then he left Bṛndāvana and Mathurā and went to Allahabad by the side of the Ganges. There he met Vallabha Bhaṭṭa and Raghupati Upādhyāya, and gave elaborate religious instruction to

Śrī-rūpa. Later on Caitanya met Sanātana and imparted further religious instruction to him. He returned to Benares, where he taught Prakāśānanda; then he came back to Puri and spent some time there. Various stories are narrated in the *Caitanya-caritāmṛta*, describing the ecstatic joy of Caitanya in his moods of inspiration; on one occasion he had jumped into the sea in a state of ecstasy and was picked up by a fisherman. It is unfortunate, however, that we know nothing of the exact manner in which he died.

Emotionalism of Caitanya.

The religious life of Caitanya unfolds unique pathological symptoms of devotion which are perhaps unparalleled in the history of any other saints that we know of. The nearest approach will probably be in the life of St Francis of Assisi; but the emotional flow in Caitanya seems to be more self-centred and deeper. In the beginning of his career he not only remained immersed as it were in a peculiar type of self-intoxicating song-dance called the *kīrtana*, but he often imitated the various episodes of Kṛṣṇa's life as told in the *Purāṇas*. But with the maturity of his life of renunciation his intoxication and his love for Kṛṣṇa gradually so increased that he developed symptoms almost of madness and epilepsy. Blood came out of the pores of his hair, his teeth chattered, his body shrank in a moment and at the next appeared to swell up. He used to rub his mouth against the floor and weep, and had no sleep at night. Once he jumped into the sea; sometimes the joints of his bones apparently became dislocated, and sometimes the body seemed to contract. The only burden of his songs was that his heart was aching and breaking for Kṛṣṇa, the Lord. He was fond of reading the dramas of Rāmānanda Ray, the poems of Caṇḍidāsa and Vidyāpati, the *Kṛṣṇa-karṇāmṛta* of Vilva-maṅgala and the *Gīta-govinda* of Jayadeva; most of these were mystic songs of love for Kṛṣṇa in erotic phraseology. Nowhere do we find any account of such an ecstatic *bhakti* in the *Purāṇas*, in the *Gītā* or in any other religious literature of India—the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* has, no doubt, one or two verses which in a way anticipate the sort of *bhakti* that we find in the life of Caitanya—but without the life of Caitanya our storehouse of pathological religious experience would have been wanting in one of the most fruitful harvests of pure emotionalism

in religion. Caitanya wrote practically nothing, his instructions were few and we have no authentic record of the sort of discussions that he is said to have held. He gave but little instruction, his preaching practically consisted in the demonstration of his own mystic faith and love for Kṛṣṇa; yet the influence that he exerted on his contemporaries and also during some centuries after his death was enormous. Sanskrit and Bengali literature during this time received a new impetus, and Bengal became in a sense saturated with devotional lyrics. It is difficult for us to give any account of his own philosophy save what we can gather from the accounts given of him by his biographers. Jīva Gosvāmī and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa are probably the only persons of importance among the members of his faith who tried to deal with some kind of philosophy, as we shall see later on.

Gleanings from the Caitanya-Caritāmṛta on the subject of Caitanya's Philosophical Views.

Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja, otherwise known as Kavirāja Gosvāmī, was not a contemporary of Caitanya; but he came into contact with many of his important followers and it may well be assumed that he was in possession of the traditional account of the episodes of Caitanya's life as current among them. He gives us an account of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma's discussion with Caitanya at Purī, in which the latter tried to refute the monistic view. The supposed conversation shows that, according to Caitanya, Brahman cannot be indeterminate (*nirviśeṣa*); any attempt to prove the indeterminateness of Brahman would only go the other way, prove His determinate nature and establish the fact that He possesses all possible powers. These powers are threefold in their nature: the *Viṣṇu-śakti*, the *kṣetrajña-śakti*, and the *avidyā-śakti*. The first power, as *Viṣṇu-śakti*, may further be considered from three points of view, the *hlādinī*, *saudhinī* and *saṃvit*. These three powers, bliss, being, and consciousness, are held together in the transcendent power (*parā-śakti* or *Viṣṇu-śakti*) of God. The *kṣetrajña-śakti* or *jīva-śakti* (the power of God as souls of individuals) and the *avidyā-śakti* (by which the world-appearances are created) do not exist in the transcendent sphere of God. The Brahman is indeed devoid of all *prākṛta* or phenomenal qualities, but He is indeed full of non-

phenomenal qualities. It is from this point of view that the Upaniṣads have described Brahman as *nirguṇa* (devoid of qualities) and also as devoid of all powers (*niḥśaktika*). The individual souls are within the control of *māyā-śakti*; but God is the controller of the *māyā-śakti* and through it of the individual souls. God creates the world by His unthinkable powers and yet remains unchanged within Himself. The world thus is not false; but, being a creation, it is destructible. The Śāṅkarite interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* is wrong and is not in consonance with the purport of the Upaniṣads.

In chapter viii of the *Madhya-līlā* of the *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* we have the famous dialogue between Caitanya and Rāmānanda regarding the gradual superiority of the ideal of love. Rāmānanda says that devotion to God comes as the result of the performance of caste-duties. We may note here that according to the *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu bhakti* consists in attaching oneself to Kṛṣṇa for His satisfaction alone, without being in any way influenced by the desire for philosophic knowledge, *karma* or disinclination from worldly things (*vairāgya*), and without being associated with any desire for one's own interests¹.

The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, as quoted in the *Caitanya-caritāmṛta*, holds the view that it is by the performance of caste-duties and *āśrama*-duties that God can be worshipped. But the point is whether such performance of caste-duties and *āśrama*-duties can lead one to the attainment of *bhakti* or not. If *bhakti* means the service of God for His sake alone (*ānukūlyena Kṛṣṇānusevanam*), then the performance of caste-duties cannot be regarded as a necessary step towards its attainment; the only contribution that it may make can be the purification of mind, whereby the mind may be made fit to receive the grace of God. Caitanya, not satisfied with the reply of Rāmānanda, urges him to give a better account of *bhakti*. Rāmānanda in reply says that a still better state is that in which the devotee renounces all his interests in favour of God in all his performance of duties; but there is a still higher state in which one renounces all his duties through love of God. Unless one can renounce all thoughts about one's own advantage, one cannot proceed in the path of love. The next higher stage is that in which devotion is

¹ *anyābhilāṣitāśūnyaṃ jñāna-karmādy-anāvṛtam.
ānukūlyena Kṛṣṇānusevanam bhaktiruttamā.*

Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu, 1. 1. 9.

impregnated with knowledge. Pure devotion should not have, however, any of the obstructive influences of knowledge; philosophical knowledge and mere disinclination obstruct the course of *bhakti*. Knowledge of God's nature and wisdom regarding the nature of the intimate relation of man with God may be regarded as unobstructive to *bhakti*. The natural and inalienable attachment of our mind to God is called *prema-bhakti*; it is fivefold: *śānta* (peaceful love), *dāśya* (servant of God), *sakhya* (friendship with God), *vātsalya* (filial attitude towards God), and *mādhurya* (sweet love, or love of God as one's lover). The different types of love may thus be arranged as above in a hierarchy of superiority; love of God as one's bridegroom or lover is indeed the highest. The love of the *gopīs* for Kṛṣṇa in the love-stories of Kṛṣṇa in Bṛndāvana typifies this highest form of love and particularly the love of Rādhā for Kṛṣṇa. Rāmānanda closes his discourse with the assertion that in the highest altitude of love, the lover and the beloved melt together into one, and through them both one unique manifestation of love realizes itself. Love attains its highest pitch when both the lover and the beloved lose their individuality in the sweet milky flow of love.

Later on, in *Madhya-līlā*, chapter XXIX, Caitanya, in describing the nature of *śuddhā bhakti* (pure devotion), says that pure devotion is that in which the devotee renounces all desires, all formal worship, all knowledge and work, and is attached to Kṛṣṇa with all his sense-faculties. A true devotee does not want anything from God, but is satisfied only in loving Him. It shows the same symptoms as ordinary human love, rising to the highest pitch of excellence.

In chapter XXII of *Madhya-līlā* it is said that the difference in intensity of devotion depends upon the difference of the depth of emotion. One who is devoted to Kṛṣṇa must possess preliminary moral qualities; he must be kind, truthful, equable to all, non-injurious, magnanimous, tender, pure, selfless, at peace with himself and with others; he must do good to others, must cling to Kṛṣṇa as his only support, must indulge in no other desires, must make no other effort than that of worshipping Kṛṣṇa, must be steady, must be in full control of all his passions; he should not be unmindful, should be always prepared to honour others, be full of humility and prepared to bear with fortitude all sorrows; he should indulge in association with true devotees—it is by such a course

that love of Kṛṣṇa will gradually dawn in him. A true Vaiṣṇava should give up the company of women and of all those who are not attached to Kṛṣṇa. He should also give up caste-duties and *āśrama*-duties and cling to Kṛṣṇa in a helpless manner. To cling to Kṛṣṇa and to give oneself up to Him is the supreme duty of a Vaiṣṇava. Love of Kṛṣṇa is innate in a man's heart, and it is manifested under encouraging conditions. Love for God is a manifestation of the *hlādinī* power of God, and by virtue of the fact that it forms a constituent of the individual soul, God's attraction of individual souls towards Him is a fundamental fact of human life; it may remain dormant for a while, but it is bound to wake under suitable conditions.

The individual souls share both the *hlādinī* and the *samvit śakti* of God, and the *māyā-śakti* typified in matter. Standing between these two groups of power, the individual souls are called the *taṭastha-śakti*. A soul is impelled on one side by material forces and attractions, and urged upwards by the *hlādinī-śakti* of God. A man must therefore adopt such a course that the force of material attractions and desires may gradually wane, so that he may be pulled forward by the *hlādinī-śakti* of God.

Some Companions of Caitanya.

A great favourite of Caitanya was Nityānanda. The exact date of his birth and death is difficult to ascertain, but he seems to have been some years older than Caitanya. He was a Brahmin by caste, but became an *avadhūta* and had no caste-distinctions. He was a messenger of Caitanya, preaching the Vaiṣṇava religion in Bengal during Caitanya's absence at Purī; he is said to have converted to Vaiṣṇavism many Buddhists and low-caste Hindus of Bengal. At a rather advanced stage of life, Nityānanda broke the vow of asceticism and married the two daughters of Sūrjadās Sarkhel, brother of Gaurdāsa Sarkhel of Kalna; the two wives were Vasudhā and Jāhnavi. Nityānanda's son Vīrachand, also known as Virabhadra, became a prominent figure in the subsequent period of Vaiṣṇava history.

Pratāparudra was the son of Puruṣottamadeva, who had ascended his throne in 1478, and himself ascended the throne in 1503. He was very learned and took pleasure in literary disputes.

Mr Stirling, in his *History of Orissa* (published in 1891), says of him that he had marched with his army to Rameśwaram and took the famous city of Vijayanagara; he had also fought the Mahomedans and prevented them from attacking Purī. Caitanya's activities in Purī date principally between 1516 and 1533. Rāmānanda Ray was a minister of Pratāparudra, and at his intercession Caitanya came into contact with Pratāparudra, who became one of his followers. The influence of Caitanya together with the conversion of Pratāparudra produced a great impression upon the people of Orissa, and this led to the spread of Vaiṣṇavism and the collapse of Buddhism there in a very marked manner.

During the time of Caitanya, Hussain Shaha was the Nawab of Gaur. Two Brahmins, converted into Islam and having the Mahomedan names Sakar Malik and Dabir Khas, were his two high officers; they had seen Caitanya at Ramkeli and had been greatly influenced by him. Later in their lives they were known as Sanātana and Rūpa; they distributed their riches to the poor and became ascetics. Rūpa is said to have met Caitanya at Benares, where he received instruction from him; he wrote many Sanskrit works of great value, e.g., *Lalita-mādhava*, *Vidagdhamādhava*, *Ujjvalanīlamanī*, *Utkalikā-vallarī* (written in 1550), *Uddhava-dūta*, *Upadeśāmṛta*, *Kārpaṇya-puñjikā*, *Gaṅgāśṭaka*, *Govindavirudāvali*, *Gaurāṅgakalpataru*, *Caitanyāśṭaka*, *Dāna-keli-kaumudī*, *Nāṭaka-candrikā*, *Padyāvali*, *Paramārtha-sandarbhā*, *Pṛīti-sandarbhā*, *Pre-mendu-sāgara*, *Mathurā-mahimā*, *Mukundamuktā-ratnāvalī-stotra-tīkā*, *Yāmunāśṭaka*, *Rasāmṛta*, *Vilāpa-kusumāñjali*, *Brajavilāsa-stava*, *Śikṣādaśaka*, *Samkṣepa Bhāgavatāmṛta*, *Sādhana-paddhati*, *Stavamālā*, *Haṃsa-dūta-kāvya*, *Harināmāmṛta-vyākaraṇa*, *Hare-kṛṣṇa-mahāmantrārtha-nirūpaṇa*, *Chando'sṭādaśaka*.

Sanātana wrote the following works: *Ujjvala-rasa-kaṇa*, *Ujjvalanīlamanī-tīkā*, *Bhakti-bindu*, *Bhakti-sandarbhā*, *Bhāgavata-krama-sandarbhā*, *Bhāgavatāmṛta*, *Yoga-śataka-vyākhyāna*, *Viṣṇu-toṣiṇī*, *Haribhakti-vilāsa*, *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu*. Sanātana had been put in prison by Hussain Shah when he heard that he was thinking of leaving him, but Sanātana bribed the gaoler, who set him at liberty. He at once crossed the Ganges and took the ascetic life; he went to Mathurā to meet his brother Rūpa, and returned to Purī to meet Caitanya. After staying some months in Purī, he went to Br̥ndāvana. In the meanwhile Rūpa had also gone to Purī and he also

returned to Bṛndāvana. Both of them were great devotees and spent their lives in the worship of Kṛṣṇa.

Advaitācārya's real name was Kamalākara Bhaṭṭācārya. He was born in 1434 and was thus fifty-two years older than Caitanya; he was a great Sanskrit scholar and resided at Śāntipur. He went to Nabadvīpa to finish his studies. People at this time had become very materialistic; Advaita was very much grieved at it and used to pray in his mind for the rise of some great prophet to change their minds. Caitanya, after he had taken to ascetic life, had visited Advaita at Śāntipur, where both of them enjoyed ecstatic dances; Advaita was then aged about seventy-five. It is said that he had paid a visit to Caitanya at Purī. He is said to have died in 1539 according to some, and in 1584 according to others (which is incredible).

Apart from Advaita and Nityānanda there were many other intimate companions of Caitanya, of whom Śrīvāsa or Śrīnivāsa was one. He was a brahmin of Sylhet who settled at Navadvīpa; he was quite a rich man. It is not possible to give his exact birth-date, but he had died long before 1540 (when Jayānanda wrote his *Caitanya-maṅgala*); he was probably about forty when Caitanya was born. As a boy Caitanya was a frequent visitor to Śrīvāsa's house. He was devoted to the study of the *Bhāgavata*, though in his early life he was more or less without a faith. He was also a constant companion of Advaita while he was at Navadvīpa. When Caitanya's mind was turned to God after his return from Gayā, Śrīvāsa's house was the scene of ecstatic dances. Śrīvāsa then became a great disciple of Caitanya. Nārāyaṇī, the mother of Bṛndāvanadāsa, the biographer of Caitanya, was a niece of Śrīvāsa.

Rāmānanda Ray, the minister of Pratāparudra and author of the *Ṣaṅgannātha-vallabha*, was very much admired by Caitanya. He was a native of Vidyānagara, in Central India. The famous dialogue narrated in the *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* shows how Caitanya himself took lessons from Rāmānanda on the subject of high devotion. Rāmānanda Ray on his part was very fond of Caitanya and often spent his time with him.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JĪVA GOSVĀMĪ AND BALADEVA VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA, FOLLOWERS OF CAITANYA

Ontology.

JĪVA GOSVĀMĪ flourished shortly after Caitanya. He wrote a running commentary on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* which forms the second chapter (*Bhāgavata-sandarbhā*) of his principal work, the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*. In this chapter he says that, when the great sages identify themselves with the ultimate reality, their minds are unable to realize the diverse powers of the Lord. The nature of the Lord thus appears in a general manner (*sāmānyena lakṣitam tathaiṣa sphurat*, p. 50), and at this stage the powers of Brahman are not perceived as different from Him. The ultimate reality, by virtue of its essential power (*svarūpasthhitayā eva śaktyā*), becomes the root support of all its other powers (*parāsām api śaktīnām mūlā-śrayarūpam*), and through the sentiment of devotion appears to the devotees as the possessor of diverse powers; He is then called Bhagavān. Pure bliss (*ānanda*) is the substance, and all the other powers are its qualities; in association with all the other powers it is called *Bhagavān* or God¹. The concept of Brahman is thus the partial appearance of the total personality denoted by the word Bhagavān; the same Bhagavān appears as Paramātmān in His aspect as controlling all beings and their movements. The three names Brahman, Bhagavān and Paramātmān are used in accordance with the emphasis that is put on the different aspects of the total composite meaning; thus, as any one of the special aspects of God appears to the mind of the devotee, he associates it with the name of Brahman, Bhagavān or Paramātmān².

The aspect as Brahman is realized only when the specific qualities and powers do not appear before the mind of the devotee.

¹ *ānanda-mātraṃ viśeṣyaṃ samastāḥ śaktayaḥ viśeṣaṇāni viśiṣṭo Bhagavān. Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, p. 50.

² *tatraikasyaiva viśeṣaṇa-bhedena tad avīṣiṣṭatvena ca pratipādanāt tathaiṣa tat-tad-upāsakapuruṣānubhava-bhedāc ca āvirbhāva-nāmnor bhedaḥ. Ibid.* p. 53.

In realizing the pure consciousness as the nature of the devotee's own self the nature of the Brahman as pure consciousness is also realized; the realization of the identity of one's own nature with that of Brahman is effected through the special practice of devotion¹. In the monistic school of Vedānta, as interpreted by Śāṅkara, we find that the identity of the self with the Brahman is effected through the instruction in the Vedāntic maxim: "that art thou" (*tat tvam asi*). Here, however, the identity is revealed through the practice of devotion, or rather through the grace of God, which is awakened through such devotion.

The abode of Bhagavān is said to be *Vaikuṇṭha*. There are two interpretations of this word; in one sense it is said to be identical with the very nature of Brahman as unobscured by *māyā*²; in another interpretation it is said to be that which is neither the manifestation of *rajas* and *tamas* nor of the material *sattva* as associated with *rajas* and *tamas*. It is regarded as having a different kind of substance, being the manifestation of the essential power of Bhagavān or as pure *sattva*. This pure *sattva* is different from the material *sattva* of the Sāṃkhyists, which is associated with *rajas* and *tamas*, and for this reason it is regarded as *aprākṛta*, i.e., transcending the *prākṛta*. For this reason also it is regarded as eternal and unchanging³. The ordinary *guṇas*, such as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, are produced from the movement of the energy of *kāla* (time); but the *sattva-Vaikuṇṭha* is not within the control of *kāla*⁴. The *Vaikuṇṭha*, thus being devoid of any qualities, may in one sense be regarded as *nirviśeṣa* (differenceless); but in another sense differences may be said to exist in it also, although they

¹ *Ibid.* p. 54. *namu sūkṣma-cid-rūpatvaṃ padārthānubhave katham pūrṇa-cid-ākāra-rūpa-madīya-brahma-svarūpaṃ sphuratu tatrāha, ananyabodhyā-tmatayā cid-ākārata-sāmyena śuddha-tvaṃ padārthaikyabodhya-svarūpatayā. yady api tādrg-ātmānubhāvānantaram tad-ananya-bodhyatā-kṛtau sādha-śaktir nāsti tathāpi pūrvam tadartham eva kṛtayā sarvatrā'pi upajīvyayā sādhanabhaktyā āradhitasya śrī-bhagavataḥ prabhāvād eva tad api tatrodayate. Ibid.* p. 54.

² *yato vaikuṇṭhāt param Brahmakhyam tattvaṃ param bhinnam na bhavati. svarūpa-śakti-viśeṣāviśkāreṇa māyayā nāvṛtam tad ev tad-rūpam. Ibid.* p. 57.

³ *yatra vaikuṇṭhe rajas tamaś ca na pravartate. tayoṛ miśram saha-caram jaḍam yat sattvaṃ na tad api. kintu anyad eva tac ca yā suśṭhu sthāpayiṣyamāṇā māyātāḥ parā bhagavat-svarūpa-śaktiḥ tasyāḥ vṛttitvena cid-rūpaṃ śuddha-sattvākhyam sattvam. Ibid.* p. 58.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 59. This view, that the *guṇas* are evolved by the movement of *kāla*, is not accepted in the ordinary classical view of Sāṃkhya, but is a theory of the Pāñcarātra school. Cf. *Ahīrbudhnya-saṃhitā*, chs. 6 and 7.

can only be of the nature of the pure *sattva* or the essential power of God¹.

The essential power (*svarūpa-śakti*) and the energy (*māyā-śakti*) are mutually antagonistic, but they are both supported in God². The power of God is at once natural (*svābhāvika*) and unthinkable (*acintya*). It is further urged that even in the ordinary world the powers of things are unthinkable, i.e., neither can they be deduced from the nature of the things nor can they be directly perceived, but they have to be assumed because without such an assumption the effect would not be explainable. The word "unthinkable" (*acintya*) also means that it is difficult to assert whether the power is identical with the substance or different from it; on the one hand, power cannot be regarded as something extraneous to the substance, and, on the other, if it were identical with it, there could be no change, no movement, no effect. The substance is perceived, but the power is not; but, since an effect or a change is produced, the implication is that the substance must have exerted itself through its power or powers. Thus, the existence of powers as residing in the substance is not logically proved, but accepted as an implication³. The same is the case in regard to Brahman; His powers are identical with His nature and therefore co-eternal with Him. The concept of "unthinkableness" (*acintyatva*) is used to reconcile apparently contradictory notions (*durghaṭa-ghaṭakatvaṃ hy acintyatvam*). The internal and essential power (*antaraṅga-svarūpa-śakti*) exists in the very nature of the Brahman (*svarūpeṇa*) and also as its various manifestations designated by such terms as *Vaikuṇṭha*, etc. (*vaikuṇṭhādi-svarūpa-vaibhava-rūpeṇa*)⁴. The second power (*taṭasthaśakti*) is represented by the pure selves. The third power (*bahiraṅga-māyā-śakti*) is represented by the evolution of all cosmical categories and their root, the *pradhāna*. The analogy offered is that of the sun, its rays and the various

¹ *nanu guṇādy-abhāvān nirvīṣeṣa evāsau loka ity āsamkya tatra viśeṣas tasyāḥ śuddha-sattvātmikāyāḥ svarūpānatirikta-śakter eva vilāsa-rūpa iti. Śaṭ-sandarbhā, p. 59.*

² *te ca svarūpa-śakti-māyā-śakti paraśpara-viruddhe, tathā tayor vṛttayaḥ sva-sva-gaṇa eva paraśpara-viruddhā api bahvyaḥ tathāpi tāsām ekaṃ nidhānaṃ tad eva. Ibid. p. 61.*

³ *loke hi sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ maṇi-mantrādināṃ śaktayaḥ acintya-jñāna-gocarāḥ acintyaṃ tarkāsahaṃ yaj-jñānaṃ kāryānyathānupapatti-pramāṇakaṃ tasya gocarāḥ santi. Ibid. pp. 63-4.*

⁴ *Ibid. p. 65.*

colours which are manifested as the result of refraction. The external power of *māyā* (*bahiraṅga-śakti*) can affect the *jīvas* but not Brahman.

The *māyā* is defined in the *Bhāṅgavata* (as interpreted by Śrīdhara) as that which is manifested without any object and is not yet perceivable in its own nature, like an illusory image of darkness¹. This is interpreted in a somewhat different form in the *Bhāṅgavata-sandarbhā*, where it is said that *māyā* is that which appears outside the ultimate reality or Brahman, and ceases to appear with the realization of Brahman. It has no appearance in its own essential nature, i.e., without the support of the Brahman it cannot manifest itself; it is thus associated with Brahman in two forms as *jīva-māyā* and *guṇa-māyā*. The analogy of *ābhāsa*, which was explained by Śrīdhara as "illusory image," is here interpreted as the reflection of the solar light from outside the solar orb. The solar light cannot exist unless it is supported by the solar orb. But though this is so, yet the solar light can have an independent rôle and play outside the orb when it is reflected or refracted; thus it may dazzle the eyes of man and blind them to its real nature, and manifest itself in various colours. So also the analogy of darkness shows that, though darkness cannot exist where there is light, yet it cannot itself be perceived without the light of the eyes. The *prakṛti* and its developments are but manifestations or appearances, which are brought into being outside the Brahman by the power of the *māyā*; but the movement of the *māyā*, the functioning of the vital *prāṇas*, *manas* and the senses, the body, are all made possible by the fact that they are permeated by the original essential power of God (*antaraṅga-śakti*)². Just as a piece of iron which derives its heat from the fire in which it is put cannot in its turn burn the fire or affect it in any manner, so the *māyā* and its appearances, which derive their essence from the essential power of God, cannot in any way affect God or His essential power.

The selves can know the body; but they cannot know the ultimate reality and the ultimate perceiver of all things. It is through *māyā* that different things have an apparently independent existence and

¹ *ṛte'rtham yat pratīyeta na pratīyeta cātmani
tad vidyād ātmano māyām yathā bhāsam yathā tamah.*

² *svarūpa-bhūtākhyām antaraṅgām śaktim sarvasyāpi pravṛtty-anyathā-
mupapattiyā. Ibid. p. 69.*

are known by themselves; but the true and essential nature of Brahman is always one with all things, and, since in that state there is no duality, there is nothing knowable and no form separate from it. The ultimate reality, which reveals all things, reveals itself also—the heat rays of fire, which derive their existence from the fire, cannot burn the fire itself¹. The *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—belong to the *ġīva* and not to Brahman; for that reason, so long as the selves (*ġīva*) are blinded by the power of *māyā*, there is an appearance of duality, which produces also the appearance of knower and knowable. The *māyā* is again described as twofold, the *guṇa-māyā*, which represents the material forces (*jaḍātmikā*), and the *ātma-māyā*, which is the will of God. There is also the concept of *ġīva-māyā*, which is, again, threefold—creative (*Bhū*), protective (*Śrī*), and destructive (*Durgā*). The *ātma-māyā* is the essential power of God². In another sense *māyā* is regarded as being composed of the three *guṇas*. The word *yoga-māyā* has also two meanings—it means the miraculous power achieved through the practice of the *yoga* when it is used as a power of the Yogins or sages; when applied to God (*paramēśvara*), it means the manifestation of His spiritual power as pure consciousness (*cic-chakti-vilāsa*). When *māyā* is used in the sense of *ātma-māyā* or God's own *māyā*, it has thus three meanings, viz., His essential power (*svarūpa-śakti*), His will involving knowledge and movement (*ġñāna-kriye*), and also the inner dalliance of His power as consciousness (*cic-chakti-vilāsa*)³. Thus, there is no *māyā* in *Vaikuṇṭha*, because it itself is of the nature of *māyā* or *svarūpa-śakti*; the *Vaikuṇṭha* is, thus, identical with *mokṣa* (emancipation).

Once it is admitted that the unthinkable power of God can explain all contradictory phenomena and also that by *yoga-māyā* God can directly manifest any form, appearance or phenomena, it was easy for the Vaiṣṇavas of the Gaudīya school to exploit the idea theologically. Leaving aside the metaphysical idea of the non-Vaiṣṇava nature of the relation of God with His powers, they tried

¹ *svarūpa-vaibhava tasya ġīvasya raśmi-sthānīyasya maṇḍalasthūniyo ya ātmā paramātmā sa eva svarūpa-śaktiā sarvaṃ abhūt, anādita eva bhavaṃ āste, na tu tat-praveśena, tat tatra itarāḥ sa ġīvaḥ kenetareṇa karaṇa-bhūtena kaṃ padārthaṃ paśyet, na kenāpi kaṃ api paśyet ity-arthaḥ; na hi raśmayāḥ svaśaktiā sūrya-maṇḍalāntargata-vaibhavaṃ prakāśayeyuh, na cārciṣo vahnīm nirduheyuh. Śaṭ-sandarbhā, p. 71.*

² *mīyate anayā iti māyā-śabdena śakti-mātram api bhanyate. Ibid. p. 73.*

³ *Ibid. pp. 73-4.*

by an extension of the metaphysical formula to defend their religious belief in the theological nature of the episodes of Kṛṣṇa in Vṛndāvana, as related in the *Bhāgavata*. Thus they held that Kṛṣṇa, including His body and all His dress and ornaments and the like, the *Gopīs*, with whom He had dalliance, and even the cows and trees of Vṛndāvana, were physically existent in limited forms and at the same time unlimited and spiritual as a manifestation of the essential nature of God. The Vaiṣṇavas were not afraid of any contradiction, because in accordance with the ingeniously-devised metaphysical formula the supra-logical nature of God's power was such that through it He could manifest Himself in all kinds of limited forms, and yet remain identical with His own supreme nature as pure bliss and consciousness. The contradiction was only apparent; because the very assumption that God's power is supra-logical resolves the difficulty of identifying the limited with the unlimited, the finite with the infinite¹. The author of *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* takes great pains to prove that the apparent physical form of Kṛṣṇa, as described in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, is one with Brahman. It is not a case in which the identity is to be explained as having absolute affinity with Brahman (*atyanta-tādātmya*) or as being dependent on Brahman: if the Brahman reveals itself in pure mind, it must appear as one, without any qualitative difference of any kind; if, in associating Brahman with the form of Kṛṣṇa, this form appears to be an additional imposition, it is not the revelation of Brahman. It cannot be urged that the body of Kṛṣṇa is a product of pure *sattva*; for this has no *rajas* in it, and therefore there is no creative development in it. If there is any *rajas* in it, the body of Kṛṣṇa cannot be regarded as made up of pure *sattva*; and, if there is any mixture of *rajas*, then it would be an impure state and there can be no revelation of Brahman in it. Moreover, the text of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* is definitely against the view that the body of Kṛṣṇa is dependent only on pure *sattva*, because it asserts that the body of Kṛṣṇa is itself one and the same as pure *sattva* or pure

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 70-92. *satya-jñānānantānandaika-rasa-mūrtitvād yugapad eva sarvaṃ api tat-tad-rūpaṃ vartata eva, kintu yūyaṃ sarvadā sarvaṃ na paśyatheti* (p. 87). *tataśca yadā tava yatrāmśe tat-tad-upāśanā-phalasya yasya rūpasya prakāśaneccā tadaiva tatra tad-rūpaṃ prakāśate iti. iyaṃ kadety asya yuktiḥ. tasmāt tat tat sarvaṃ api tasmīn śrī-kṛṣṇa-rūpe'ntarbhūtaṃ ity evam atrāpi tātparyam upasaṃharati* (p. 90). *tad ittham madhyamākāra eva sarvādhāratvāt bibhṛtaṃ sādhitam. sarva-gatatvād api sādhyate. citraṃ vataitad ekena vapuṣā yugapad prthuk grheṣu deyaṣṭa-sāhasraṃ striya eka udāvahat.*

consciousness¹. Again, since the body of Kṛṣṇa appears in diverse forms, and since all these forms are but the various manifestations of pure consciousness and bliss, they are more enjoyable by the devotee than the Brahman².

In the *Paramātma-sandarbha* the *jīva* or individual is described as an entity which in its own nature is pure and beyond *māyā*, but which perceives all the mental states produced by *māyā* and is affected by them. It is called *Kṣetrajña*, because it perceives itself to be associated with its internal and external body (*kṣetra*)³. In a more direct sense God is also called *Kṣetrajña*, because He not only behaves as the inner controller of *māyā* but also of all those that are affected by it and yet remains one with Himself through His essential power⁴. The *Kṣetrajña* should not be interpreted in a monistic manner, to mean only a pure unqualified consciousness (*nirviśeṣam cid-vastu*), but as God, the supreme inner controller. The view that unqualified pure consciousness is the supreme reality is erroneous. Consequently a distinction is drawn between the *vyāṣṭi-kṣetrajña* (the individual person) and the *samaṣṭi-kṣetrajña* (the universal person)—God, the latter being the object of worship by the former. This form of God as the inner controller is called Paramātmān.

God is further supposed to manifest Himself in three forms: first, as the presiding lord of the totality of selves and the *prakṛti*, which have come out of Him like sparks from fire—Saṅkarṣaṇa or Mahāviṣṇu; secondly, as the inner controller of all selves in their totality (*samaṣṭi-jīvāntaryāmī*)—*Pradyumna*. The distinction between the first and the second stage is that in the first the *jīva* and the *prakṛti* are in an undifferentiated stage, whereas in the second the totality of the *jīvas* has been separated outside of *prakṛti* and stands independently by itself. The third aspect of God is that in which He resides in every man as his inner controller.

The *jīvas* are described as atomic in size; they are infinite in number and are but the parts of God. *Māyā* is the power of God,

¹ *tasya śuddha-sattvasya prakṛtatvaṃ tu niṣiddham eva tasmāt na te prakṛta-sattva-pariṇāmā na vū tat-pracurāḥ kintu sva-prakāśatā-lakṣaṇa-suddha-sattva-prakāśitā. Śaṭ-sandarbha*, p. 148, also pp. 147–8.

² *Ibid.* p. 149.

³ *Ibid.* p. 209.

⁴ *māyāyāṃ māyike'pi antar-yāmitayā praviṣṭo'pi svarūpa-śaktyā svarūpa-stha eva na tu tat-samsakta ity arthaḥ, vāsudevatvena sarva-kṣetra-jñātytvāt so'paraḥ kṣetrajña ātmā paramātmā. tad evaṃ api mukhyaṃ kṣetrajñatvaṃ paramātmāny eva. Ibid.* p. 210.

and the word is used in various senses in various contexts; it may mean the essential power, the external power, and it has also the sense of *pradhāna*¹.

The author of the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* denies the ordinary Vedāntic view that the Brahman is pure consciousness and the support (*āśraya*) of the objects (*viśaya* or *māyā* or *ajñāna*). He regards the relation between *māyā* and Brahman as transcendental and supra-rational. Just as various conflicting and contradictory powers may reside in any particular medicine, so also various powers capable of producing manifold appearances may reside in Brahman, though the manner of association may be quite inexplicable and unthinkable. The appearance of duality is not due to the presence of *ajñāna* (or ignorance) in the Brahman, but through His unthinkable powers. The duality of the world can be reconciled with ultimate monism only on the supposition of the existence of the transcendent and supra-rational powers of God. This fact also explains how the power of God can transform itself into the material image without in any way affecting the unity and purity of God². Thus both the subtle *jīvas* and the subtle material powers of the universe emanate from Paramātman, from whom both the conscious and the unconscious parts of the universe are produced. Paramātman, considered in Himself, may be taken as the agent of production (*nimitta-kāraṇa*), whereas in association with His powers He may be regarded as the material cause of the universe (*upādāna-kāraṇa*)³. Since the power of God is identical with the nature of God, the position of monism is well upheld.

On the subject of the relation between the parts and the whole the author of the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* says that the whole is not a conglomeration of the parts, neither is the whole the transformation of the parts or a change induced in the parts. Nor can the whole be regarded as different from the parts or one with it, or as associ-

¹ *tadevaṃ sandarbha-dvaye śakti-traya-vivṛtiḥ kṛtā. tatra nāmābhinnatā-janīta-bhrānti-hānāya saṃgraha-ślokaḥ māyā syād antarāṅgāyāṃ bahiraṅgā ca sā smṛtā*

*pradhāne'pi kvacid dṛṣṭā tad-vṛttir mohinī ca sā,
ādye traye syāt prakṛtiś cic-chaktis tvantarāṅgikā
śuddha-jīve'pi te dṛṣṭe tatheśa-jñāna-vīryayoḥ.
cinmayā-śakti-vṛtyo tu vidyā-śaktir udīryate
cic-chakti-vṛttau māyāyāṃ yoga-māyā samā smṛtā
pradhānāvyaṅkṛtā-vyaktaṃ traiguṇye prakṛteḥ paraṃ
na māyāyāṃ na cic-chaktāu ityādyūhyam vivekibhiḥ. Ibid. p. 245.*

² *Ibid.* p. 249.

³ *Ibid.* p. 250.

ated with it. If the whole were entirely different from the parts, the parts would have nothing to do with the whole; if the parts were inherent in the whole, then any part would be found anywhere in the whole. Therefore the relation between the parts and the whole is of a supra-logical nature. From this position the author of the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha* jumps to the conclusion that, wherever there is an appearance of any whole, such an appearance is due to the manifestation of Paramātmān, which is the ultimate cause and the ultimate reality (*tasmād aikya-buddhyā lambana-rūpaṃ yat pratīyate tat sarvatra paramātmā-lakṣaṇaṃ sarvakāraṇaṃ asty eva*, p. 252). All manifestations of separate wholes are, therefore, false appearances due to similarity; for wherever there is a whole there is the manifestation of God. In this way the whole universe may be regarded as one, and thus all duality is false¹.

Just as fire is different from wood, the spark and the smoke (though the latter two are often falsely regarded as being identical with the fire), so the self, as the separate perceiver called Bhagavān or Brahman, is also different from the five elements (the senses, the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the *pradhāna*) which together pass by the name of *jīva*².

Those who have their minds fixed on the Supreme Soul (Paramātmān) and look upon the world as its manifestation thereby perceive only the element of ultimate reality in it; whereas those who are not accustomed to look upon the world as the manifestation of the supreme soul perceive it only as the effect of ignorance; thus to them the Paramātmān, who pervades the world as the abiding Reality, does not show Himself to be such. Those who traffic in pure gold attach no importance to the various forms in which the gold may appear (bangles, necklaces and the like), because their chief interest lies in pure gold; whereas there are others whose chief interest is not pure gold, but only its varied unreal forms. This world is brought into being by God through His inherent power working upon Himself as the material cause; as the world is brought

¹ *tasmāt sarvaikya-buddhi-nidānāt prthag dehaikya-buddhiḥ sādṛśyabhramah syāt, pūrvāparāvaya-vānusandhāne sati paraśparam āśayaikatva-sthitatvenā'vaya-vatvāsādhāranyena caikyāsādṛśyāt praty-avayavam ekatayā pratiteh, so'yaṃ deha iti bhrama eva bhavati'ty arthaḥ, prati-vṛkṣaṃ tad idaṃ vanaṃ itivat.*

Ṣaṭ-sandarbha, p. 253.

² *yatholmukāt viṣphuliṅgād dhūmād api svasambhavaḥ apy ātmatvena vimatād yathāgniḥ prthag ulmukāt bhūtendriyāntaḥkaraṇāt pradhānā-jīva-samjñitāt ātmā tathā prthag draṣṭā bhagavān brahma-samjñitāḥ. Ibid. p. 254.*

into being, He enters into it, controls it in every detail, and in the last stage (at the time of *pralaya*) He divests Himself of various forms of manifestation and returns to Himself as pure being, endowed with His own inherent power. Thus it is said in the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* that the ignorant, instead of perceiving the world as pure knowledge, are deluded by perceiving it as the visible and tangible world of objects; but those who are pure in heart and wise perceive the whole world as the nature of God, as pure consciousness.

Status of the World.

Thus in the Vaiṣṇava system the world is not false (like the rope-snake), but destructible (like a jug). The world has no reality; for, though it is not false, it has no uninterrupted existence in past, present and future; only that can be regarded as real which is neither false nor has only an interrupted existence in time. Such reality can only be affirmed of Paramātman or His power¹. The Upaniṣads say that in the beginning there existed ultimate Reality, *sat*; this term means the mutual identity of the subtle potential power of Brahman and the Brahman. The theory of *satkāryavāda* may be supposed to hold good with reference to the fact that it is the subtle power of God that manifests itself in diverse forms (*sūkṣmāvasthā-lakṣaṇa-tac-chaktiḥ*). Now the question arises, whether, if the world has the ultimate *sat* as its material cause, it must be as indestructible as that; if the world is indestructible, then why should it not be false (like the conch-shell-silver) and, consequently, why should not the *vivarta* theory be regarded as valid? The reply to such a question is that to argue that, because anything is produced from the real (*sat*), therefore it must also be real (*sat*) is false, since this is not everywhere the case; it cannot be asserted that the qualities of the effect should be wholly identical with the qualities of the cause; the rays of light emanating from fire have not the power of burning². Śrīdhara, in his commentary on the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, asserting that Brahman has an unchangeable and a changeable form, explains the apparent incongruity in the possibility of the changeable coming out of the unchangeable on the

¹ *tato vivarta-vādinām iva rajju-sarpa-van na mithyātvam kintu ghaṭa-van naśvaratvam eva tasya. tato mithyātvābhāve api tri-kālavyabhicārā-bhāvāj jagato na sattvam vivarta-pariṇāmāsiddhatvena tad-doṣa-dvayābhāvavaty eva hi vastuni sattvam vidhīyate yathā paramātmāni tacchaktau vā. Ibid. p. 255.*

² *Ibid. p. 256.*

basis of the above analogy of fire and the rays emanating from it. Again, in other cases an appearance like that of silver manifesting itself from the conch-shell is wholly false, as it has only appearance, but no utility; so there are many other things which, though they are believed to have a particular nature, are in reality quite different and have entirely different effects. Thus some wood poison may be believed to be dry ginger, and used as such; but it will still retain its poisonous effects. Here, in spite of the illusory knowledge of one thing as another, the things retain their natural qualities, which are not affected by the illusory notion.

The power a thing has of effecting any change or utility cannot be present at all times and places, or with the change of object, and so the power of effecting any change or utility, not being an eternal and all-abiding quality, cannot be regarded as the defining character of reality; so a false appearance like the conch-shell-silver, which has merely a perceivable form, but no other utility or power of effecting changes, cannot be regarded as real. Only that is real which is present in all cases of illusory objects or those which have any kind of utility; reality is that which lies as the ground and basis of all kinds of experience, illusory or relatively objective. The so-called real world about us, though no doubt endowed with the power of effecting changes or utility, is yet destructible. The word “destructible,” however, is used only in the sense that the world returns to the original cause—the power of God—from which it came into being. The mere fact that we deal with the world and that it serves some purpose or utility is no proof that it is real; for our conduct and our dealings may proceed on the basis of blind convention, without assuming any reality in them. The currency of a series of conventions based on mutual beliefs cannot prove either their reality or their nature as knowledge (*vijñāna*) without any underlying substratum. Thus the currency of conventions cannot prove their validity. The world thus is neither false nor eternal; it is real, and yet does not remain in its apparent form, but loses itself in its own unmanifested state within the power of Brahman; and in this sense both the *satkārya* and the *pariṇāma* theories are valid¹.

It is wrong to suppose that originally the world did not exist at all and that in the end also it will absolutely cease to exist; for, since

¹ *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, p. 259.

absolute reality is altogether devoid of any other kind of experience, and is of the nature of homogeneous blissful experience, it is impossible to explain the world as an illusory imposition like the conch-shell-silver. It is for this reason that the world-creation is to be explained on the analogy of *pariṇāma* (or evolution) and not on the analogy of illusory appearances like the conch-shell-silver or the rope-snake. Through His own unthinkable, indeterminable and inscrutable power the Brahman remains one with Himself and yet produces the world¹; thus it is wrong to think of Brahman as being the ground cause. If the world is eternally existent as it is, then the causal operation is meaningless; if the world is absolutely non-existent, then the notion of causal operation to produce the absolutely non-existent is also impossible. Therefore, the world is neither wholly existent nor wholly non-existent, but only existent in an unmanifested form. The jug exists in the lump of clay, in an unmanifested form; and causal operation is directed only to actualize the potential; the world also exists in the ultimate cause, in an unmanifested form, and is actualized in a manifest form by His natural power operating in a definite manner. It is thus wrong to suppose that the *māyā* of the *jīva*, from which comes all ignorance, is to be regarded as the cause of the majesty of God's powers; God is independent, all-powerful and all-creator, responsible for all that exists in the world. It is thus wrong to suppose that the *jīva* creates the world either by his own powers or by his own *ajñāna*; God is essentially true, and so He cannot create anything that is false².

The Vaiṣṇava theory thus accepts the doctrine of ultimate dissolution in *prakṛti* (*prakṛti-laya*). In the time of emancipation the world is not destroyed; for being of the nature of the power of God it cannot be destroyed; it is well known that in the case of *jīvan-mukti* the body remains. What happens in the stage of emancipation is that all illusory notions about the world vanish, but the world, as such, remains, since it is not false; emancipation is thus a state of subjective reformation, not an objective disappearance of the world. As the objective world is described as identical with

¹ *ato acintya-saṅkhyā-svarūpād acyutaśyaiva tava pariṇāma-svikāreṇa draviṇa-jātinām dravya-mātrānām mṛl-lohādīnām vikalpā vedā ghaṭa-kunḍalādayas teṣāṃ panthāno mārgāḥ prakārās tair eva asmābhir upamīyate na tu kutrāpi bhṛama-rajatādibhiḥ. Ibid. p. 260.*

² *satya-svābhāvīkacintya-śaktiḥ parameśvaras tuccha-māyikam api na kuryāt. Ibid. p. 262.*

God's powers, so also are the senses and the *buddhi*. When the Upaniṣad says that the *manas* is created by God, this merely means that God is identical with the cosmic *manas*, the *manas* of all beings, in His form as *Aniruddha*¹. The ultimate cause is identical with the effect; wherever the effect is new (*apūrva*), and has a beginning and an end, it is illusory; for here the concept of cause and effect are mutually interdependent and not separately determinable. Until the effect is produced, nothing can be regarded as cause, and, unless the cause is determined, the effect cannot be determined²; so to validate the concept of causality the power as effect must be regarded as already existent in the cause. It is this potential existence of effect that proves its actual existence; thus the world exists as the natural energy of God, and as such it is eternally real. Even the slightest change and manifestation cannot be explained without reference to God or independently of Him; if such explanation were possible, the world also would be self-luminous pure consciousness.

It has been said that the *jīvas* are indeed the energy of God, but that still they may suffer from the defect of an obscuration of their self-luminosity. The *jīvas*, being of the nature of *taṭastha śakti*, are inferior to the essential power of God, by which their self-luminosity could be obscured³. This obscuration could be removed by God's will only through the spirit of enquiry regarding God's nature on the part of the *jīvas*. According to the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* the world is a real creation; but it refers with some approval to another view, that the world is a magical creation which deludes the *jīvas* into believing in a real objective existence of the world. This view, however, must be distinguished from the monistic view of Śaṅkara (which is that the real creator by His real power manifests the world-experience to a real perceiver)⁴, and it also differs from the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* in that the latter regards the world as a real creation.

¹ *atas tan-mano'sṛjata manaḥ prajāpatim ity ādau manaḥ-śabdena samaṣṭi-mano'dhiṣṭhātā śrīmān aniruddha eva. Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, p. 262.

antaḥ-karaṇa-bahih-karaṇa-viśaya-rūpeṇa paramātmā-lakṣaṇam jñānam eva bhāti tasmād ananyad eva buddhyādi-vastu ity-arthaḥ. Ibid. p. 263.

² *yāvat kāryam na jāyate tāvat kāraṇatvam mrt-śuktyāder na siddhyati kāraṇatvasiddhau ca kāryam na jāyate eveti paraspara-sāpekṣatva-doṣāt. Ibid.* p. 265.

³ *Ibid.* p. 266.

⁴ *satyeṇaiva kartā satyam eva draṣṭāram prati satyaiva tayā śaktyā vastunaḥ sphuraṇāt loka upi tathaiva drśyata iti. Ibid.* p. 268.

It must, however, be maintained that the main interest of the Vaiṣṇavas is not in these hair-splitting dialectical discussions; theirs is professedly a system of practical religious emotionalism, and this being so it matters very little to a Vaiṣṇava whether the world is real or unreal. His chief interest lies in the delight of his devotion to God¹. It is further held that the ordinary experience of the world can well be explained by a reference to world-analogies; but the transcendental relation existing between God, the individual, the souls and the world can hardly be so explained. The Upaniṣad texts declare the identity of the *jīva* and *parameśvara*; but they only mean that *parameśvara* and the *jīva* alike are pure consciousness.

God and His Powers.

Returning to the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha*, one stumbles over the problem how the Brahman, who is pure consciousness and unchangeable, can be associated with the ordinary *guṇas* of *prakṛti*. The ordinary analogy of play cannot apply to God; children find pleasure in play or are persuaded to play by their playmates; but God is self-realized in Himself and His powers, He cannot be persuaded to act by anybody, He is always dissociated from everything, and is not swayed by passions of any kind. As He is above the *guṇas*, they and their actions cannot be associated with Him. We may also ask how the *jīva*, who is identical with God, can be associated with the beginningless *avidyā*. He being of the nature of pure consciousness, there ought not to be any obscuration of His consciousness, either through time or through space or through conditions or through any internal or external cause. Moreover, since God exists in the form of the *jīvas* in all bodies, the *jīvas* ought not to be under the bondage of afflictions or *karma*. The solution of such difficulties is to be found in the supra-rational nature of the *māyā-śakti* of God, which, being supra-logical, cannot be dealt with by the apparatus of ordinary logic. The fact that the power of God can be conceived as internal (*antaraṅga*) and external (*bahiraṅga*) explains why what happens in the region of God's external power cannot affect His own internal nature; thus, though God in the form of *jīvas* may be under the influence of *māyā* and the world-experience arising therefrom, He remains all the time unaffected in His own internal

¹ *satyaṃ na satyaṃ naḥ kṛṣṇa-pādābjāmodaṃ antaraṃ jagat satyaṃ asatyaṃ vā ko'yaṃ tasmin durāgrahaḥ. Ibid. p. 269.*

nature. The supra-logical and supra-rational distinction existing between the threefold powers (*svarūpa* or *antaraṅga*, *bahiraṅga*, and *taṭastha*) of God and their relation to Him explains difficulties which ordinarily may appear insurmountable. It is this supra-logical conception that explains how God can be within the sway of *māyā* and yet be its controller¹. The *jīva* in reality is not under the sway of afflictions, but still he appears to be so through the influence of God's *māyā*; just as in dreams a man may have all kinds of untrue and distorted experiences, so also the world-experiences are imposed on the self through the influence of God's *māyā*. The appearance of impurity in the pure *jīva* is due to the influence of *māyā* acting as its *upādhi* (or condition)—just as the motionless moon appears to be moving on the ripples of a flowing river. Through the influence of *māyā* the individual *jīva* identifies himself with the *prakṛti* and falsely regards the qualities of the *prakṛti* as his own².

God's Relation to His Devotees.

The incarnations of God are also to be explained on the same analogy. It is not necessary for God to pass through incarnations or to exert any kind of effort for the maintenance of the world; for He is omnipotent; all the incarnations of God recounted in the *Purāṇas* are for the purpose of giving satisfaction to the devotees (*bhaktas*). They are effected by the manifestation of the essential powers of God (*svarūpa-śaktyāviśkaraṇa*), out of sympathy for His devotees. This may naturally be taken to imply that God is affected by the sorrows and sufferings of His devotees and that He is pleased by their happiness. The essential function of the essential power of God is called *hlādinī*, and the essence of this *hlādinī* is *bhakti*, which is of the nature of pure bliss. *Bhakti* exists in both God and the devotee, in a dual relation³. God is self-realized, for

¹ *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, p. 270.

² *yathā jale pratibimbītasya eva candramaso jalopādhiḥ kṛtāḥ kampādī-guṇo dharmo dṛśyate na tvākāśa-sthitasya tadvad anātmanah prakṛti-rūpopādher dharmah ātmanah śuddhasyāsanm api aham eva so'yam ity āveśān māyayā upādhi-tādātmyāpannāhamkārahābhāsasya pratibimba-sthāntyasya tasya draṣṭur ādhyātmikāvasthasya eva yady api syāt tathāpi śuddhaḥ asau tad-abhedābhimānena tam paśyati. Ibid. p. 272.*

³ *parama-sāra-bhūtāyā api svarūpa-śakteḥ sāra-bhūtā hlādinī nāma yā vṛttis tasya eva sāra-bhūto vṛtti-viśeṣo bhaktiḥ sā ca raty-apara-paryāyā. bhaktir bhagavati bhakteṣu ca nikṣipta-nijabhaya-koṭiḥ sarvadā tiṣṭhati. Ibid. p. 274.*

the *bhakti* exists in the *bhakta*, and being a power of God it is in essence neither different from nor identical with Him. *Bhakti* is only a special manifestation of His power in the devotee, involving a duality and rousing in God a special manifestation of delight which may be interpreted as pleasure arising from the *bhakti* of the devotee. When God says that He is dependent on the *bhakta*, the idea is explicable only on the supposition that *bhakti* is the essence of the essential power of God; the devotee through his *bhakti* holds the essential nature of God within him. Now the question arises whether God really feels sorrow when the devotees feel it, and whether He is moved to sympathy by such an experience of sorrow. Some say that God, being all-blissful by nature, cannot have any experience of sorrow; but others say that He has a knowledge of suffering, not as existing in Himself, but as existing in the devotee. The writer of *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, however, objects that this does not solve the difficulty; if God has experience of sorrow, it does not matter whether He feels the pain as belonging to Himself or to others. It must therefore be admitted that, though God may somehow have a knowledge of suffering, yet He cannot have experience of it; and so, in spite of God's omnipotence, yet, since He has no experience of the suffering of men, He cannot be accused of cruelty in not releasing everyone from his suffering. The happiness of devotees consists in the experience of their devotion, and their sorrow is over obstruction in the way of their realization of God. God's supposed pity for His devotee originates from an experience of his devotion, expressing itself in forms of extreme humility (*dainyātmaka-bhakti*), and not from experience of an ordinary sorrow. When God tries to satisfy the desires of His devotee, He is not actuated by an experience of suffering, but by an experience of the devotion existing in the devotee. If God had experience of the sorrows of others and if in spite of His omnipotence He had not released them from them, He would have to be regarded as cruel; so also, if He had helped only some to get out of suffering and had left others to suffer, He would have to be regarded as being only a partial God. But God has no experience of the sorrows of others; He only experiences devotion in others. The efficacy of prayer does not prove that God is partial; for there is no one dear to Him or enemy to Him; but, when through devotion the devotee prays for anything to Him, He being present in his heart in one through the

devotion, grants him the object of his desire; so it is not necessary for God to pass through stages of incarnation for the protection or maintenance of the world; but still He does so in order to satisfy prayers to God. All the incarnations of God are for the fulfilment of the devotee's desires. The inscrutability of God's behaviour in the fulfilment of His devotee's desires is to be found in the inscrutability of the supra-rational nature of the essential power of God. Though all the works of God are absolutely independent and self-determined, yet they are somehow in accord with the good and bad deeds of man. Even when God is pleased to punish the misdeeds of those who are inimical to his devotees, such punishment is not effected by the rousing of anger in Him, but is the natural result of His own blissful nature operating as a function of His *hlādinī*¹. But the writer of the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* is unable to explain the fact why the impartial and passionless God should destroy the demons for the sake of His devotees, and he plainly admits that the indescribable nature of God's greatness is seen when, in spite of His absolute impartiality to all, He appears to be partial to some. Though He in Himself is beyond the influence of *māyā*, yet in showing mercy to His devotees He seems to express Himself in terms of *māyā* and to be under its sway. The transition from the transcendent *sattva* quality of God to His adoption of the ordinary qualities of *prakṛti* is supra-rational and cannot be explained. But the writer of the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* always tries to emphasize the facts that God is on the one hand actuated by His purpose of serving the interest of His devotees and that on the other hand all His movements are absolutely self-determined—though in the ordinary sense self-determination would be incompatible with being actuated by the interest of others. He further adds that, though it may ordinarily appear that God is moved to action in certain critical happenings in the course of world-events or in the life of His devotee, yet, since these events of the world are also due to the manifestation of His own power as *māyā*, the parallelism that may be noticed between world-events and His own efforts cannot be said to invalidate the view that the latter are self-determined. Thus

¹ *atha yadi kecit bhaktānām eva dviṣanti tadā tadā bhakta-pakṣa-pātāntaḥ-pātitvād bhagavatā svayaṁ tadvreṣe api na doṣaḥ pratyuta bhakta-viṣayaka-tad-rateḥ poṣakatvena hlādinī-vṛtti-bhūtānandollāsa-viśeṣa evāsau. Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā. p. 278.*

His own efforts are naturally roused by Himself through the impulsion of *bhakti*, in which there is a dual manifestation of the essential power of God, as existing in Himself and in the heart of the devotee. It has already been said that *bhakti* is the essence of the essential power of God which has for its constituents the devotee and God. The prompting or rousing of God's powers through world-events is thus only a mere appearance (*pravṛtyā bhāsa*), happening in consonance with the self-determining activity of God. It is further said that God's activity in creating the world is also motivated by His interest in giving satisfaction to His devotees. Time is the defining character of His movement, and, when God determines Himself to move forward for creation through time-movement, He wishes to create His own devotees, merged in the *prakṛti*, out of His mercy for them. But in order to create them He must disturb the equilibrium of the *prakṛti*, and for this purpose His spontaneous movement as thought separates the power (as *jīva-māyā*) from His essential power (*svarūpa-śakti*); thus the equilibrium of the former is disturbed, and *rajas* comes into prominence. The disturbance may be supposed to be created in an apparent manner (*taccheṣatātmakaprabhāvenaivoddīpta*) or by the dynamic of *kāla*¹. When God wishes to enjoy Himself in His manifold creation, He produces *sattva*, and, when He wishes to lie in sleep with His entire creation, He creates *tamas*. Thus all the creative actions of God are undertaken for the sake of His devotees. The lying in sleep of God is a state of ultimate dissolution. Again, though God exists in all as the internal controller, yet He is not perceived to be so; it is only in the mind of the devotee that He really appears in His true nature as the inner controller.

The author of the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* is in favour of the doctrine of three *vyūhas* as against the theory of four *vyūhas* of the Pañcārātras. He therefore refers to the *Mahābhārata* for different traditions of one, two, three and four *vyūhas*, and says that this discrepancy is to be explained by the inclusion of one or more *vyūhas* within the others. The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* is so called from the fact that it accepts Bhagavān as the principal *vyūha*². The enquiry (*jijñāsā*) concerning this Brahman has been explained by Rāmānuja as *dhyāna*, but according to the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā* this *dhyāna* is nothing

¹ *Ibid.* p. 283.

² *Ibid.*

but the worship of God in a definite form; for it is not easy to indulge in any *dhyāna* (or worship of God) without associating it with a form on which one may fix his mind. Brahman is described as unchanging ultimate truth, and, as sorrow only is changeable, He is also to be regarded as wholly blissful. Brahman is also regarded as *satyam*, because He is the self-determiner, and His existence does not depend on the existence or the will of anything else. He, by his power as self-luminosity, dominates His other power as *māyā*, and is in Himself untouched by it. This shows that, though *māyā* is one of His powers, yet in His own nature He is beyond *māyā*. The real creation coming out of *māyā* consists of the three elements of fire, water and earth partaking of each other's parts. The Śāṅkarites say that the world is not a real creation, but an illusory imposition like the silver in the conch-shell; but such an illusion can only be due to similarity, and, if through it the conch-shell can be conceived as silver, it is also possible that the silver may also be misconceived as conch-shell. It is by no means true that the ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of illusion should be one and the illusion manifold; for it is possible to have the illusion of one object in the conglomeration of many; the collocation of many trees and hills and fog may produce the combined effect of a piece of cloud. The world of objects is always perceived, while the Brahman is perceived as pure self-luminosity; and, if it is possible to regard Brahman also as illusory, that will practically mean that Brahman cannot any longer be regarded as the ground of the world. The world therefore is to be regarded as real. The monistic view, that the Brahman is absolutely devoid of any quality, is false; for the very name Brahman signifies that He is supremely great. The world also has not only come out of Him, but stays in Him and will ultimately be dissolved in Him. Moreover, the effect should have some resemblance to the cause, and the visible and tangible world, of which God is the cause, naturally signifies that the cause itself cannot be absolutely devoid of quality¹. Even on the supposition that Brahman is to be defined as that from which the world-illusion has come into being, the point remains, that this in itself is a distinguishing quality; and, even if Brahman be regarded as self-luminous, the self-luminosity itself is a quality which distinguishes

¹ *sādhyā-dharmāvyabhicāri-sādhana-dharmānvita-vastu-viṣayatvān na tattvāpramāṇam. Śaṭ-sandarbhā. p. 27.*

Brahman from other objects. If self-luminosity is a distinguishing quality, and if Brahman is supposed to possess it, He cannot be regarded as qualityless¹.

Nature of bhakti.

The author of the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha* discusses in the *Kṛṣṇa-sandarbha* the then favourite theme of the Vaiṣṇavas that Lord Kṛṣṇa is the manifestation of the entire Godhood. The details of such a discussion cannot pertinently be described in a work like the present one, and must therefore be omitted.

In the *Bhakti-sandarbha* the author of the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha* deals with the nature of *bhakti*. He says that, though the *jīvas* are parts of God's power, yet through beginningless absence of true knowledge of the ultimate reality their mind is turned away from it, and through this weakness their self-knowledge is obscured by *māyā*; they are habituated to looking upon the *pradhāna* (the product of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) as being identical with themselves, and thereby suffer the sorrows associated with the cycles of birth and re-birth. Those *jīvas*, however, who by their religious practices have inherited from their last birth an inclination towards God, or those who through a special mercy of God have their spiritual eyes opened, naturally feel inclined towards God and have a realization of His nature whenever they listen to religious instruction. It is through the worship of God that there arise the knowledge of God and the realization of God, by which all sorrows are destroyed. In the Upaniṣads it is said that one should listen to the Upaniṣadic texts propounding the unity of Brahma and meditate upon them. Such a course brings one nearer God, because through it the realization of Brahma is said to be possible. The processes of *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* may also be regarded as leading one near to God's realization. Even the performance of *karma* helps one to attain the proximity of God; by performing one's duties one obeys the commands of God, and in the case of obligatory duties the performer derives no benefit, as the fruits of those actions are naturally dedicated to God. Knowledge associated with *bhakti* is also

¹ *jagaj-janmādi-bhramo yatas tad brahmeti svotprekṣā-pakṣe ca na nir-viśeṣa-vastu-siddhiḥ bhrama-mūlam ajñānam ajñāna-sākṣi brahmeti upagamāt. sākṣitvaṁ hi prakāśaikarasatayā ucyate. prakāśatvaṁ tu jaḍād vyāvartakam svasya parasya ca vyavahāra-yogyatāpādana-svabhāvena bhavati. tathā sati saviśeṣatvaṁ tad-abhāve prakāśataiva na syāt tucchataiva syāt. Ibid. p. 291.*

negatively helpful by detaching one's mind from objects other than God; yet *bhakti* alone, exhibited in chanting God's name and in being intoxicated with emotion for God, is considered to be of supreme importance. The two forms of *bhakti* have but one objective, namely, to afford pleasure to God; they are therefore regarded as *ahetukī*. The true devotee finds a natural pleasure in chanting the name of God and absorbing himself in meditation upon God's merciful actions for the sake of humanity. Though the paths of duty and of knowledge are prescribed for certain classes of persons, yet the path of *bhakti* is regarded as superior; those who are in it need not follow the path of knowledge and the path of disinclination from worldly things¹. All the various duties prescribed in the *śāstras* are fruitful only if they are performed through the inspiration of *bhakti*, and, even if they are not performed, one may attain his highest only through the process of *bhakti*.

Bhakti is also described as being itself the emancipation (*mukti*)². True philosophic knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*) is the secondary effect of *bhakti*. True *tattva-jñāna* consists in the realization of God in His three-fold form, as Brahman, Paramātmā and Bhagavān in relation to His threefold powers, with which He is both identical and different. This reality of God can only be properly realized and apperceived through *bhakti*³. Knowledge is more remote than realization. *Bhakti* brings not only knowledge, but also realization (*jñāna-mātrasya kā vārttā sākṣād api kurvanti*); it is therefore held that *bhakti* is much higher than philosophic knowledge, which is regarded as the secondary effect of it. The true devotee can realize the nature of God either in association with His Powers or as divested of them, in His threefold form or in any one of His forms, according as it pleases him. The effect of one's good deeds is not the attainment of Heaven, but success in the satisfaction of God through the production of *bhakti*. The *nīdīdhya-sana* of the Upaniṣads means the worship of God (*upāsana*) by reciting the name and glory of God; when one does so with full attachment to God, all the bonds of his *karma* are torn asunder. The real difficulty however lies in the generation in one's mind of

¹ *bhajatām jñāna-vairagyābhyāseṇa prayojanaṃ nāsti. Śaṭ-sandarbha*, p. 481.

² *nīśalā tvayi bhaktir yā saiva muktir janārdana* (quotation from *Skanda-purāṇa*, Revākhanda). *Ibid.* p. 451.

³ *Ibid.* p. 454.

a natural inclination for turning to God and finding supreme satisfaction in reciting His name and glories. By association with true devotees one's mind gradually becomes inclined to God, and this is further intensified by the study of religious literature like the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. As an immediate result of this, the mind becomes dissociated from *rajas* and *tamas* (desires and afflictions), and by a further extension of the attachment to God there dawns the wisdom of the nature of God and His realization; as a result, egoism is destroyed, all doubts are dissolved, and all bondage of *karma* is also destroyed. Through reciting God's name and listening to religious texts describing His nature one removes objective ignorance regarding the nature of God, by deep thought and meditation one dispels one's own subjective ignorance through the destruction of one's illusory views regarding God, and by the realization and direct apprehension of God the personal imperfection which was an obstacle to the comprehension of the nature of God is destroyed. The following of the path of *bhakti* is different from the following of the path of duties in this, that, unlike the latter, the former yields happiness both at the time of following and also when the ultimate fulfilment is attained¹. Thus one should give up all efforts towards the path of obligatory or other kinds of duties (*karma*), or towards the path of knowledge or of disinclination (*vairāgya*)². These are fruitless without *bhakti*; for, unless the works are dedicated to God, they are bound to afflict one with the bondage of *karma*, and mere knowledge without *bhakti* is only external and can produce neither realization nor bliss; thus neither the obligatory (*nitya*) nor the occasional (*naimittika*) duties should be performed, but the path of *bhakti* should alone be followed. If the ultimate success of *bhakti* is achieved, there is nothing to be said about it; but, even if the path of *bhakti* cannot be successfully followed in the present life, there is no punishment in store for the devotee; for the follower of the path of *bhakti* has no right to follow the path of knowledge or of duties (*bhakti-rasikasya karmā-nādhikārat*)³. God manifests Himself directly in the conscious processes of all men, and He is the world-soul⁴; and He alone is

¹ *karmānuṣṭhānavan na sādhana-kāle sādhyā-kāle vā bhaktyanuṣṭhānaṃ duḥkha-rūpaṃ pratyuta sukha-rūpaṃ eva. Ibid. p. 457.*

² *Ibid. p. 457.*

³ *Ibid. p. 460.*

⁴ *sarveṣāṃ dhī-vṛttibhiḥ anubhūtaṃ sarvaṃ yena sa eka eva sarvāntarātmā. Ibid. p. 460.*

to be worshipped. Since *bhakti* is in itself identical with emancipation, our ultimate object of attainment is *bhakti* (*bhaktir evābhidheyam vastu*). A man who is on the path of *bhakti* has no need to undergo troublous efforts for self-concentration; for the very devotion would by itself produce self-concentration in a natural and easy manner through the force of the devotional emotion. The place of *bhakti* is so high that even those who have attained saintliness or the stage of *ġivan-mukti* and whose sins have been burnt away may have their fall, and their sins may re-grow through the will of God, if they are disrespectful to God¹. Even when through *bhakti* the bondage of *karma* has been destroyed, there is scope for a still higher extension of *bhakti*, through which one attains a still purer form of his nature. Thus *bhakti* is a state of eternal realizations which may subsist even when the impurities of bondage are entirely removed. God is the supreme dispenser of all things; through His will even the lowest of men may be transformed into a god, and the gods also may be transformed into the lowest of men. The existence of *bhakti* is regarded as the universal dispeller of all evils; thus *bhakti* not only removes all kinds of defects, but even the impending evils of *karmas* which are on the point of fructification (*prārabdha-karma*) are destroyed through its power². A true devotee therefore wants neither ordinary emancipation nor anything else, but is anxious only to pursue the path of *bhakti*.

To a devotee there is nothing so desired as God. This devotion to God may be absolutely qualityless (*nirguṇa*). The true knowledge of God must be the knowledge of the qualityless (*nirguṇa*), and therefore true devotion to Him must also be qualityless (*nirguṇa*); for, in whatever way *bhakti* may manifest itself, its sole object is the qualityless God. The meaning of the word “qualityless” (or *nirguṇa*) is that in itself it is beyond the *guṇas*. It has been explained before that *bhakti* is nothing but a manifestation of God’s essential power, and as such it has God only as its constituent, and it must therefore be regarded as beyond the *guṇas*; but in its expression *bhakti* may appear both as within or without the *guṇas*. Knowledge of Brahman may also be regarded as occurring in a twofold form;

¹ *ġivan-muktā api punar bandhanam yānti karmabhiḥ
yady acintya-mahā-śaktau bhagavatya aparādhinah.*

Ṣaṭ-sandarbha, p. 505.

as identity between the self and God, as in the case of the so-called Brahma-vādins; and with a certain kind of duality, as in the case of devotees. For this reason, though *bhakti* consists of knowledge and action, it is to be regarded as *nirguṇa*, because it refers to God alone, who is beyond all *guṇas*. *Bhakti* is thus obviously a transcendental process. It is no doubt true that sometimes it is described as being associated with *guṇas* (*sagūṇa*); but in all such cases such a characterization of *bhakti* can only be on account of its association with intellectual, volitional or emotional qualities of the mind¹. *Bhakti* really means "to live with God"; since God Himself is beyond the *guṇas*, residence with or in God must necessarily mean a state beyond the *guṇas*. There are others, however, who distinguish *bhakti* as worshipful action and as God-realizing knowledge, and according to them it is only the latter that is regarded as being beyond the *guṇas* (*nirguṇa*). But, though the actual worshipping action is manifested in and through the *guṇas*, the spiritual action determining it must be regarded as outside the material influences².

A question may here naturally arise, that if God is always of the nature of pure bliss, how is it possible for the devotee to please Him by his *bhakti*? This has already been explained, and it may further be added that *bhakti* is a mode of the self-realization of God's own blissful nature; its mode of operation is such that here the *hlāḍinī* power of God works itself by taking in the devotee as its constituent and its nature is such that it is blissful not only to God, but also to the devotee³. The appearance of *bhakti* in a devotee is due to God's will manifesting His self-realizing power in him, and such a manifestation of His will is to be interpreted as His mercy. So God is the real cause of the appearance of *bhakti* in any individual. It is to be remembered that not only the rise of *bhakti* but even the functioning of the sense-powers is due to the influence of God; thus God realizes Himself through men in all their conduct, though in *bhakti* alone His highest and most blissful nature expresses itself for the highest satisfaction of the devotee, and this must therefore be regarded as an act of His special grace. It is said in the scriptures that even a short recitation of God's name is

¹ *yat tu śrī-kapila-devena bhakter api nirguṇa-sagūṇāvasthāḥ kathitās tat punaḥ puruṣāntaḥkaraṇa-guṇā eva tasyām upacaryante iti sthitam. Ibid. p. 520.*

² *Ibid. p. 522.*

³ *Ibid. p. 523.*

sufficient to satisfy God, and those who consider these texts as exaggeration (*arthavāda*) are punished by God. But the true devotee does not cease from reciting the name of God because a single recital has been sufficient to please Him; for the very recital of God's name fills him with thrills of great joy. But still there are cases in which a single recital is not sufficient to produce the realization of God; in such cases it is to be presumed that the devotee is a great sinner. To those who are great sinners God is not easily inclined to extend His mercy; such persons should continually recite the name of God until their sins are thereby washed away and the desired end is attained. The recital of God's name is by itself sufficient to destroy even the worst of sins; but insincerity of mind (*kaūṭilya*), irreligiosity (*aśraddhā*), and attachment to those things which impede our attachment to God are the worst vices; for through their presence the revelation of the process of *bhakti* in the mind is obstructed, and such persons cannot attach themselves to God¹. Thus much learning and consequent crookedness of heart may prove to be a much stronger impediment to the rise of *bhakti* than even the commission of the deadliest of sins or submersion in deep ignorance; for God is merciful to the latter but not to the former; such attitudes of mind can only be due to the existence of very grave long-standing sins. A single recital is sufficient for success only when there are no previous sins and when no serious offences are committed after the recital of the name²; but, if at the time of death one recites the name of God, then a single recital is sufficient to dispel all sins and bring about intimate association with God³.

Without religious faith (*śraddhā*) it is not possible for a man to follow the path either of knowledge or of duties; but still religious faith is an indispensable condition for those who wish to follow the path of *bhakti*. Once the religious *bhakti* is roused one should give up the path of knowledge and of duties. *Bhakti* does not require for its fulfilment the following of any ritual process. Just as fire naturally by itself burns the straw, so the recital of God's name and His glories would by itself, without the delay of any intermediary process, destroy all sins. Religious faith is not in itself a part of *bhakti*, but it is a pre-condition which makes the

¹ *Śaṭ-sandarbhā*, pp. 532-4.

² *Ibid.* p. 536.

³ *Ibid.* p. 536.

rise of *bhakti*¹ possible. In following the path of *bhakti* one should not try to follow also the path of knowledge or of duties; such a course will be a strong impediment to the acceleration of *bhakti*.

If *bhakti* produces proximity to God, then, since God has three powers—Brahman, Paramātman, and Bhagavān—it is possible to have three kinds of proximity; of these the third is better than the second, and the second is better than the first. The realization of God as endowed with forms is superior to His realization without any forms. The true devotee prefers his position as the servant of God to any other so-called higher position of power and glory²; he therefore wishes for pure *bhakti*, unassociated with any other so-called beneficial results. It is these devotees, who want God and God alone, that are called the *ekāntins*, who are superior to all other types of devotees; this kind of *bhakti* is called *ākiñcana-bhakti*. It may be argued, that since all individuals are parts of God, and since they are naturally attached to Him as parts to wholes, the *ākiñcana-bhakti* should be natural to them all; but to this the reply is that man is not a part of God so far as He is in His own essential nature, but he is a part of Him so far as He is endowed with His diverse powers, including His neutral powers (*taṭastha-śakti*). Man is a part of God in the sense that both externally and internally he is in direct connection with God; but still he has his own instincts, tendencies, habits and the like, and it is these that separate him from God. For this reason, though man shares in the life of God and has the same life as He, yet, being hidden in his own sheath of ideas and tendencies, he cannot indulge in his natural truth-right of devotion to God except through the grace of God³. When a man is not under the sway of great obstructive sins such as crookedness and the like, association with other devotees gives an occasion to God for extending His grace in rousing devotion in his mind. It cannot be said that all beings must necessarily attain salvation; the number of souls is infinite, and only those will attain salvation who may happen to awaken His grace. Man from beginningless time is

¹ *bhakti* is said to have nine characteristics, as follows:

*śravaṇam kīrtanam viśṇoḥ smaraṇam pāda-sevanam
arccanam vandanam dāsyam saukhyam ātma-nivedanam.*

Ibid. p. 541.

But it is not necessary that *bhakti* should be pursued in all these ninefold forms.

² *ko mūḍho dāsātām prāpya prābhavam padam icchati.* *Ibid.* p. 551.

³ *Ibid.* p. 553.

ignorant of God and is disinclined from Him; and this natural impediment can only be removed by association with true devotees (*sat-saṅga*); God descends into men through the grace of good devotees who have at some time or other suffered like other ordinary people and are therefore naturally sympathetic to them¹. God Himself cannot have sympathy with men, for sympathy presupposes suffering; God is of the nature of pure bliss and could not have experienced the suffering of ordinary beings.

The best devotee is he who perceives God in all beings, and also perceives all beings as parts of himself and of God as He reveals Himself in him². The second type of devotee is he who has love for God, friendship for His devotees, mercy for the ignorant and indifference with reference to his enemies³. The lower type of devotee is he who worships the image of God with faith and devotion, but has no special feeling for the devotees of God or other persons⁴. There are other descriptions also of the nature of the best devotee: thus it is said in the *Gītā* that he whose heart is pure and unafflicted by the tendencies of desire and deeds, and whose mind is always attached to God, is to be regarded as the best devotee⁵; it is further said that the best devotee is he who makes no distinction between himself and others, or between his own things and those of others, and is the friend of all persons and at absolute peace with himself⁶; and, further, that the best devotee is he whose heart is held directly by God and holds within it in bonds of love the lotus-feet of God⁷.

From another point of view *bhakti* is defined as service (*sevā*) or as that by which everything can be attained; the former is called *svārūpa-lakṣaṇa* and the latter *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*. *Bhakti* is again regarded as being of a threefold nature: as merely external (*āropa-*

¹ *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha*, p. 557.

² *sarva-bhūteṣu yaḥ paśyed bhagavad-bhāvam ātmanah. bhūtāni bhagavatya ātmany eṣa bhāgavatottamaḥ. Ibid.* p. 561.

³ *īṣvare tad-adhīneṣu bālīṣeṣu dviṣatsv api prema-maitrī-kṛpopekṣā yaḥ karoti sa madhyamaḥ. Ibid.* p. 562.

⁴ *arcçyām eva haraye pūjām yaḥ śraddhayeate na tad-bhakteṣu cānyeṣu sa bhaktaḥ prākṛtaḥ smṛtaḥ. Ibid.* p. 564.

⁵ *na kāma-karma-bījānām yasya cetasi sambhavaḥ vāsudevaika-nilayaḥ sa vai bhāgavatottamaḥ. Ibid.* p. 564.

⁶ *na yasya svaḥ para iti vitteṣv ātmani vā bhīdā sarva-bhūta-suhṛc chāntaḥ sa vai bhāgavatottamaḥ. Ibid.* p. 565.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 565.

siddha), as due to association with other devotees (*saṅga-siddha*), and as due to a sincere spirit of natural affection for God (*svarūpa-siddha*). In the first two cases the *bhakti* is called fictitious (*kitava*), and in the last it is called real (*akitava*)¹. The most direct action to be performed in the path of *bhakti* is to listen to and recite the names and glories of God, but indirectly associated with it there is also the dedication of all actions to God. In doing this one includes even his bad deeds; a devotee not only dedicates the fruits of his religious duties, ordinary duties of life, but also those which are done through the prompting of passions. He confesses to God all the imperfections of his nature and all the bad deeds that he has performed, and prays to Him for His grace by which all his sins are washed away. The devotee prays to God that he may be intoxicated by love for Him in the same manner that a young woman is smitten with love for a young man or *vice versa*². When a man performs an action through motives of self-interest, he may suffer through failures or through deficient results; but, when one dedicates his actions to God, he no longer suffers any pains through such failures. All actions and their fruits really belong to God; it is only through ignorance or false notions that we appropriate them to ourselves and are bound by their ties. But, if those very actions are performed in the true perspective, we cannot in any way be bound down by their effects; thus those actions which are responsible for our births and rebirths can destroy that cycle and free us from their bondage, when it is realized they belong not to us, but to God³. If it is argued that the performance of mandatory actions produces a new and unknown potency (*apūrva*) in the performer, then also it may be argued that the real performer in the man is his inner controller (*antar-yāmin*), which impels him to do the action, and so the action belongs to this inner controller—God; and it is wrong to suppose that the performer of the action is the real agent⁴. Thus all the Vedic duties can be performed only by God as the supreme agent, and so the fruits of all actions can belong only to Him.

The dedication of our actions to God may again be of a twofold nature: one may perform an action with the express object of

¹ *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, pp. 581-2.

² *yuvatīnām yathā yūni yūnāṅca yuvatau yathā
mano'bhiramate tadvaṅ mano me ramatām tvayi.*

Viṣṇu-purāṇam, *ibid.* p. 58

³ *Ibid.* p. 584.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 585.

pleasing God thereby, or he may perform the action without any desire to reap their fruits, and may dedicate them to God—one is *karma-sannyāsa* and the other *phala-sannyāsa*. Actions may be motivated either through desires or for the sake of God, i.e., leaving the effects to God or for pleasing God, and this last is said to be due to pure *bhakti*. These three types of actions are classified as *kāmanā-nimitta*, *naiṣkarmya-nimitta* and *bhakti-nimitta*. True devotees perform all their actions for the sake of pleasing God and for nothing else¹. *Bhakti* again may be regarded as associated with *karma*, and as such it may be regarded as *sakāma*, *kaivalya-kāma* and *bhakti-mātra-kāma*. When one becomes devoted to God for the fulfilment of ordinary desires, this is regarded as *sakāma-bhakti*. *Kaivalya-kāma-bhakti* may be regarded as associated with *karma* or with *karma* and knowledge (*jñāna*); this is to be found in the case of one who concentrates upon God and enters into the path of *yoga*; practises detachment, and tries to conceive of his unity with God, and through such processes frees himself from the bondage of *prakṛti*; through knowledge and action he tries to unify the *jīvātman* with the *paramātman*. The third type may be associated either with *karma* or with *karma* and *jñāna*. Of these the first class expresses their devotion by reciting God's name and glories, by continually worshipping Him, and by dedicating all their actions to God. The second class of devotees add to their duties of worship to God the continual pursuit of an enlightened view of all things; they think of all people as manifestations of God; they are patient under all exciting circumstances and detach themselves from all passions; they are respectful to the great and merciful to the humble and the poor, and friendly to their equals; they practise the virtues included within *yama* and *niyama*, destroy all their egotism, and continue to think of the glory of God and to recite His name. He who, however, has the highest type of *bhakti*—the *akiñcana-bhakti*—in him it is such that simply on hearing the name of God his mind flows to Him just as the waters of the Ganges flow into the ocean. Such a one does not accept anything that may be given to him; his only pleasure exists in being continuously immersed in God.

From another point of view *bhakti* can be divided into two classes, *vaidhī* and *rāgānuga*. The *vaidhī-bhakti* is of two kinds, leading him to devote himself to God, and to worship without any

¹ *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, p. 586.

ulterior motive. It is *vaidhī* because here the prompting to the course of *bhakti* comes from scriptural sources (otherwise called *vidhī*, or scriptural injunctions). The *vaidhī-bhakti* is of various kinds, such as seeking of protection (*śaraṇāpatti*), association with good teachers and devotees, to listen to God's name and to recite His name and glories¹. Of these *śaraṇāgati* is the most important; it means seeking protection of God upon being driven to despair by all the dangers and sufferings of life. Thus in *śaraṇāgati* there must be a driving cause which impels one to seek the protection of God as the sole preserver. Those who turn to God merely out of deep attachment for Him are also impelled by their abhorrence of their previous state, when their minds were turned away from God. It also implies a belief either that there is no other protector, or a renunciation of any other person or being to whom one had clung for support. One should leave all hope in the Vedic or *smṛti* injunctions, and turn to God as the only support. *Śaraṇāpatti* may be defined as consisting of the following elements: (i) to work and think always in a manner agreeable to God, (ii) to desist from anything that may in any way displease God, (iii) strong faith that He will protect, (iv) clinging to Him for protection, (v) to throw oneself entirely into God's hands and to consider oneself entirely dependent on Him, and (vi) to consider oneself a very humble being waiting for the grace of God to descend on him². Of all these the main importance is to be attached to the adoption of God alone as sole protector, with whom the other elements are only intimately associated. But next to the solicitation of the protection of God is the solicitation of help from one's religious teacher (*guru*) and devotion to his service, as well as to the service of great men, by whose association one may attain much that would be otherwise unattainable³. One of the chief forms in which the *vaidhī-bhakti* manifests itself is in regarding oneself as the servant of God, or in considering God as our best friend. The sentiments of service and friendship should be so deep and intense as to lead one to renounce

¹ *atha vaidhī-bhedāḥ śaraṇāpatti-śrī-gurv-ādi-sat-sevā-śravaṇa-kīrtanā-dayaḥ. Śaṭ-sandarbhā*, p. 593.

² *śaraṇāpatter lakṣaṇaṃ vaiṣṇava-tantre, āmukūlyasya saṃkalpaḥ prātikūlya-vivarjanam rakṣiṣyati viśvāso goptṛtve varaṇaṃ tathā ātma-nikṣepa-kārpaṇye śaḍvidhā śaraṇāgatiḥ. Ibid.* p. 593.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 595-604.

one's personality entirely to God; this complete renunciation of oneself to God is technically called *ātma-nivedana*. The *rāgānuga*, or purely emotional type of *bhakti*, must be distinguished from *vaidhī-bhakti*; since the *rāgānuga-bhakti* follows only the bent of one's own emotions, it is difficult to define its various stages. In this form of *bhakti* the devotee may look upon God as if He were a human being, and may turn to Him with all the ardour and intensity of human emotions and passions; thus one of the chief forms in which this type of *bhakti* manifests itself is to be found in those cases where God is the object of a type of deep love which in human relation would be called sex-love. Sex-love is one of the most intense passions of which our human nature is capable, and, accordingly, God may be loved with the passionate intensity of sex-love. In following this course of love the devotee may for the time being forget the divinity of God, may look upon Him as a fellow-being, and may invest Him with all the possibilities of human relations and turn to Him as if He were his intimate friend or a most beloved husband. He may in such circumstances dispense entirely with the ritualistic formalities of worship, meditation, recital of His names or glories, and simply follow his own emotional bent and treat God just as may befit the tendency of his emotion at the time. There may however be stages where the *rāgānuga* is mixed up with *vaidhī*, where the devotee follows some of the courses of the *vaidhī-bhakti* and is yet passionately attached to God. But those who are simply dragged forward by passion for God are clearly above the range of the duties of *vaidhī-bhakti*; not only through such passionate attachment to God, but even when one's mind is filled with a strong emotion of anger and hatred towards God, so as to make one completely forget oneself and to render oneself entirely pervaded by God's presence—even as an object of hatred—one may, by such an absorption of one's nature in God, attain one's highest. The process by which one attains one's highest through *rāgānuga-bhakti* is the absorption of the nature of the devotee by God through an all-pervading intense emotion. For this reason, whenever the mind of a man is completely under the sway of a strong emotion of any description with reference to God, he is absorbed, as it were, in God's being and thus attains his highest through a complete disruption of his limited personality.

In the sixth section, the *Prīti-sandarbha*, the author of the *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha* deals with the nature of bliss (*prīti*) as the ultimate reality and object of the best of our human efforts. The ultimate object or end of man is the attainment of happiness and the destruction of sorrow; only when God is pleased can one secure the ultimate extinction of sorrow and the attainment of eternal happiness. God, the ultimate reality, is the ultimate and infinite bliss, though He may show Himself in diverse forms. The individual or the *jīva*, not having any true knowledge of God and being obscured by *māyā*, fails to know His true nature, becomes associated with many subjective conditions, and undergoes the sorrow of beginningless cycles of births and rebirths. The realization of the highest bliss consists in the realization of the ultimate reality; this can happen only through the cessation of one's ignorance and the consequent ultimate cessation of one's sorrows. Of these the former, though expressed in a negative form, is in reality positive, being of the nature of the self-luminosity of the ultimate reality and the self-manifestation of the same. The latter, being of the nature of a negation through destruction, is eternal and unchangeable—such that, when sorrows are once ultimately uprooted, there cannot be any further accretion of sorrow. The realization of God is thus the only way of attaining the highest happiness or bliss¹. Emancipation (*mukti*) is the realization of God, accompanied as a consequence by that cessation of the bondage of egoism which is the same thing as existence in one's true nature. This existence in one's own nature is the same thing as the realization of one's own nature as the supreme soul (*Paramātman*). But in this connection it must be noted that the *jīva* is not identical with the supreme soul; for it is only a part of it; its nature as bliss is thus to be affirmed only because of the fact that its essence is derived from the essence of the supreme soul. The realization of God, the absolute whole, is only through the realization of His part as the supreme soul (*aṁśena aṁśi-prāpti*). This can be attained in two ways, first, as the attainment of Brahmahood by the revelation of His knowledge as constituting only His essential powers along with the destruction of individual ignorance (which is a state or function of *māyā* only);

1

*nīrastātīśayāhlāda-sukha-bhāvaika-lakṣaṇā
bheṣajam bhagavat-prāptir ekāntātyantikā matā.*

Vīṇu-purāṇa, Ṣaṭ-sandarbha, p. 674.

secondly, as the realization of God in His personal nature, as associated with His supra-rational powers in a personal manner. Emancipation (*mukti*) may be achieved both in life and after death; when one realizes the true nature of God, one's false apprehension of His nature vanishes and this is one's state of *mukti*; at death also there may be a revelation of God's true nature, and a direct and immediate realization of His nature as God.

Ultimate Realization.

The realization of the nature of ultimate reality may again be of a twofold nature: abstract, i.e., as Brahman, and concrete, i.e., as personal God or the supreme soul (Paramātman). In the latter case the richness of the concrete realization is further increased when one learns to realize God in all His diverse forms¹. In this stage, though the devotee realizes the diverse manifold and infinite powers of God, he learns to identify his own nature with the nature of God as pure bliss. Such an identification of God's nature manifests itself in the form of the emotion of *bhakti* or joy (*prīti*); the devotee experiences his own nature as joy, and realizes his oneness with God through the nature of God as bliss or joy. It is through the experience of such joy that the ultimate cessation of sorrow becomes possible, and without it the devotee cannot realize God in association with all His diverse and infinite powers. By the intimate experience of the joyous nature of God His other attributes, characters and powers can also be revealed to him. Man naturally seeks to realize himself through joy; but ordinarily he does not know what is the true object of joy, and thus he wastes his energies by seeking joy in diverse worldly objects. He attains his true end when he realizes that God is the source of all joy, that He alone should be sought in all our endeavours, and that in this way alone can one attain absolute joy and ultimate liberation in joy. The true devotee wishes to attain *kaivalya*; but *kaivalya* means "purity," and, as the true nature of God is the only ultimate purity, *kaivalya* would mean the realization of God's nature. The joy of the realization of God and God alone should therefore be regarded as the true *kaivalya*, the ultimate nature of God.

In the state of *jīvan-mukti* the individual, through a true knowledge of himself and his relation to God, comes to realize that the

¹ *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, p. 675.

world is both being and non-being, and has therefore no real existence in its own true nature, but is only regarded as part of himself through his own ignorance (*avidyā*). The mere negation of the world is not enough; for there is here also the positive knowledge of the true nature of the individual as dependent on God. In this stage the individual realizes the falsity of associating world-experiences with his own nature, and learns to identify the latter as a part of God. In this state he has to experience all the fruits of his deeds which are on the point of yielding fruits, but he feels no interest in such experiences, and is no longer bound by them¹. As a further culmination of this stage, the functioning of *māyā* in its individual form as ignorance (*avidyā*) ceases with the direct and immediate revelation of the true nature of God and with participation in His true nature as joy; the complete cessation of *māyā* should therefore be regarded as the final state of *mukti*².

It should be borne in mind that the *jīva* is a part of the ultimate reality in association with the energy of God as represented in the totality of the *jīvas*. The ultimate reality is like the sun and the *jīvas* are like the rays which emanate from it. From their root in God they have sprung out of Him, and, though seemingly independent of Him, are yet in complete dependence on Him. Their existence outside of Him also is not properly to be asserted; for in reality such an appearance of existence outside Him is only the effect of the veil of *māyā*. The comparison of the *jīvas* with the rays merely means that they have no separate existence from that body whose rays they are, and in this sense they are entirely dependent on God. When the *jīvas* are regarded as the power or energy of God, the idea is that they are the means through which God expresses Himself. As God is endowed with infinite powers, it is not difficult to admit that the *jīvas*, the manifestations of God's power, are in themselves real agents and enjoyers, and the suggestion of the extreme monist, that to assert agency or enjoyability of them is illusory, is invalid; for agency in an individual is a manifestation of God's power. It is through that that the *jīvas* pass through the cycle of *saṃsāra*, and it is through the operation of the essential power of God that they learn to perceive the identity of their own nature with God and immerse themselves in emotion towards Him. The view that there is

¹ *asya prārabdha-karma-mātrāṇām anabhiniveśeṇaiva bhogaḥ. Ibid. p. 678.*

² *Ibid. p. 678.*

no experience of joy in the state of emancipation is invalid; for in that case the state of emancipation would not be desirable. Moreover, the view that in the state of emancipation one becomes absolutely identical with Brahman, which is of the nature of pure joy, is also wrong; for no one wishes to become identical with joy, but to experience it. The extreme form of monism cannot therefore explain why the state of emancipation should be desirable; if emancipation cannot be proved to be an intensely desirable state, there will be no reason why anyone should make any effort to attain it. It may further be added that, if the ultimate reality be of the nature of pure bliss and knowledge, there is no way of explaining why it should be subject to the obscuring influence of *māyā*. The conception of whole and part explains the fact that, though the *jīvas* are not different from God, yet they are not absolutely identical, being indeed entirely dependent on Him. The proper way of regarding God is to recognize Him as presiding over all beings as they are associated with their specific conditions and limitations—as varied personalities and yet as one; this is the way to unify the concept of Paramātmān with that of Bhagavan¹.

The Joy of bhakti.

Joy in God may be of a twofold nature. By an extension of meaning joy may be that attachment to God which produces the realization of the true conception of God (*bhagavad-viṣayānukūlyātmakas tad-anugata-sprhā dimayo jñāna-viśeṣas tat-prītiḥ*). But there is a more direct experience of joy in God which is directly of an intensely emotional nature; this type of *bhakti* is also called *rati*. This is also described as *bhakti* as love (*preman*). Just as one is attracted to physical objects by their beauty, apart from any notion of utility, so one may also be attracted by divine beauty and the diverse qualities of God, and fall into intense love with Him. It has already been said above that the joy of God manifests itself in the hearts of His devotees and produces their joyful experience of God.

¹ Apart from the higher kind of *mukti* reserved for the most superior type of *bhaktas* there are other kinds of inferior liberation described as *sālokya* (co-existence with God), *sārṣṭi* (the advantage of displaying the same miraculous powers as God), *sārūpya* (having the same form as that of God), *sāmīpya* (having the privilege of always being near God), *sāyujya* (the privilege of entering into the divine person of God). A true *bhakta*, however, always rejects these privileges, and remains content with his devotion to God. *Ṣaṭ-sandarbhā*, p. 691.

This may be regarded as an active phase of God's joy as distinguished from His nature as pure joy. God's joy is said to be of two kinds: His nature as pure joy (*svarūpānanda*), and His nature in the active phases of the joy of His own powers (*svarūpa-śaktyānanda*). This last is again of two kinds, viz., *mānasānanda* and *aiśvaryānanda*, i.e., joy as the active operation of *bhakti*, and joy in His own majesty¹. When a devotee is attached to God by a sense of His greatness or majesty, such a state of mind is not regarded as an instance of joy or *prīti*; but, when the *bhakti* takes a purely emotional form as the service of God, or as immediately dependent on Him, or as attached to Him through bonds of intense love (like those of a bride for her lover, of a friend for his friend, of a son for his father or of the father for his child), we have *bhakti* as *prīti*. *Prīti* or "joy" manifests itself in its most intense and elevated form when the attraction has all the outward appearance of physical love, and all the well-known exciting factors and modes of enjoyment of that emotion; but, as this emotion is directed towards God and has none of the biological or physiological accompaniments of physical love, it should be sharply distinguished from that love; but it has all the external expressions of erotic love. For this reason it can be properly described only in terms of the inward experience and the outward expressions of erotic love. Joy (*prīti*) is defined as an emotional experience constituting an inclination and attraction towards its object². In ordinary emotions the objects to which they have reference are worldly objects of sense or ideas associated with them, but in godward emotions God is their only object. Such a joy in God flows easily (*svābhāviki*) through God's grace, and is not the result of great efforts; it is superior to emancipation³. This joy may grow so much in intensity that the devotee may forget himself

¹ *Ibid.* p. 722

² *tatra ullāsātmaṇo jñāna-viśeṣaḥ sukham; tathā viśayānukūlyātmakas tad - ānukūlyānugata - tat - sprhā-tad-anubhava-hetukollāsa-maya - jñāna-viśeṣa-priyatā. Ibid.* p. 718.

³ The yearning implied in *bhakti* is almost a distressing impulse and is not only erotic in type. Thus it is said:

*ajāta-pakṣā iva mātaram khagāḥ
stanyaṃ yathā vatsatarāḥ kṣudhārtāḥ
priyaṃ priyeṇa vyūṣitaṃ viṣaṇṇo
mano'raṇḍāḥśa didṛkṣate tvām. Ibid.* p. 726.

Two stages are sometimes distinguished according to the intensity of the development of joy, viz., *udaya*, *iśad-udgama*; the latter has again two stages. The culminating stage is called *prakaṭodayāvasthā*.

completely and feel himself as one with God; this is technically called *mahābhāva*¹. In a general sense *bhakti* may be said to produce a sense of unique possession (*mamatā*), and consequently great attachment of heart; this emotion may express itself in various forms. But there is also the other quieter form (*śānta*) of devotion, in which the devotee feels himself to be of God, but not that God is his, like Sanaka and other devotees of his type². Here also there is a remote sense of God's possession, i.e., as master—as looking forward for His grace as a master (*bhṛtyatva*), protector (*pālyatva*), or as a fond parent (*lālyatva*). One may also enjoy God in himself, assuming the rôle of a parent and looking upon God as a dear child; this kind of emotion is called *vātsalya*. But, as has been said above, the most intense joy in God takes the conjugal form; the difference between eroticism (*kāma*) and this type of love (*rati*) is that the former seeks self-satisfaction, while the latter seeks the satisfaction of the beloved God; yearning is the common element in both. These devotees, through their dominant emotion of love, restrict their relation to God solely to His aspect of sweetness (*mādhurya*), as a great lover. The affection of Rādhā for Kṛṣṇa is said to illustrate the highest and intensest form of this love. The Vaiṣṇava writers frequently explain this love in accordance with the analysis of ordinary mundane love current in books of rhetoric (*alaṃkāra-śāstra*).

In treating of the subject of *bhakti* it is impossible not to make a short reference to the well known work of Rūpa Gosvāmī, *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu*. This work is divided into four books, *pūrva*, *dakṣiṇa*, *paścima*, and *uttara*, and each of these is divided into chapters called *laharīs*. In writing out the chapters of the *Bhakti-sandarbha* and the *Prīti-sandarbha* Jīva Gosvāmī, the nephew of Rūpa, was much indebted to the above work of the latter, on which he had also written a commentary, *Durgama-saṅgamana*, after the

¹ *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha*, p. 732. There occurs here a quotation from *Ujjvala-nīlamanī* to illustrate the situation:

*rādhāyā bhavataśca citta-jatunī svedair vilāpya kramād
yuniṇam adri-nikunja-kuṇjara-puter nirdhūta-bheda-bhramam
citraya svayam anvaranajayad iha brahmāṇḍa-harmyodare
bhūyobhir nava-rāga-hiṅgula-phalair śṛṅgāra-cāruḥ kṛtiḥ.*

² *saty api bhedāpagame nātha tavāham na māmakīnas tvam samudro hi tarāṅgaḥ kvacana samudro na tāraṅgaḥ. Ibid. p. 735. harer guṇā dvividhāḥ bhakta-citta-saṃskāra-hetavas tadabhimāna-viśeṣya-hetavas'cānye... (p. 733). jñāna-bhaktir bhaktir vātsalyam maitrī kānta-bhāvaśca (p. 738).* Though all these different varieties of *bhakti* are mentioned, it is admitted that various other forms may arise from these simply by their mutual mixture in various degrees.

completion of the *Bhāgavata-sandarbhā*. Superior (*uttama*) *bhakti* is here defined as the mental state and the associated physical actions for yielding satisfaction to Kṛṣṇa (*ānukūlyena kṛṣṇā-nuśīlanam*) without any further desire, motive or object of any description; such a *bhakti* must not be associated with any monistic philosophical wisdom, such as that of extreme monists like Śāṅkara, or the philosophical wisdom of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and other systems, nor with the performance of any obligatory or occasional duties as enjoined in the *smṛti* literature¹. Such a *bhakti* has six characteristics. First, it destroys sins, their roots and ignorance. Sins are of two kinds, those which are not in a state of fruition (*aprārabdha*), and those which are (*prārabdha*); and *bhakti* removes them both. The roots of sins are evil tendencies of the mind, otherwise called the *karmāśayas*, and these too are destroyed by *bhakti*, which, as it is concrete wisdom, also destroys ignorance (*avidyā*). Secondly, it is described as holy or good (*śubhada*). Through *bhakti* one renders happiness to the world and is attached by bonds of friendship and love to all people; as a devotee is a friend of all, all beings are also his friends. Thirdly, a devotee is so much satisfied with his joy in *bhakti* that emancipation has no attractions for him. Fourthly, the attainment of *bhakti* is extremely difficult; for even with the utmost effort one may not attain it without the grace of God. Fifthly, the joy of *bhakti* is infinitely superior to the joy of emancipation through Brahma-knowledge. Sixthly, *bhakti* overcomes God to such an extent that He is completely drawn to the service of His devotee. Even a little *bhakti* is superior to much philosophical learning; philosophical and logical discussions lead to no certainty, and the thesis established by an able reasoner may easily be disproved by another who is abler; such logical discussions are only barren and ineffectual for true realization.

Rūpa distinguishes three kinds of *bhakti*: *sādhana*, *bhāva* and *preman*². The *sādhana-bhakti* stands for the different means whose

¹ *anyābhilāsītā-śūnyaṃ jñāna-karmādy-anāvṛtam
ānukūlyena kṛṣṇānuśīlanam bhaktir uttamā.*

² *Ibid.* 1. 2. 1: *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu*, 1. 1. 9.

sā bhaktiḥ sādhanam bhāvaḥ premā ceti tridhohitā.

In commenting upon this passage Jīva Gosvāmī says that *bhakti* is of two kinds, *sādhana* and *sādhya*; of these the second is of pure emotionalism and consists of five varieties: *bhāva*, *prema*, *prāṇaya*, *sneha* and *rāga*. The author of *Ujjvala-nīla-maṇi* adds three more, *māna*, *anurāga* and *mahā-bhāva*. Rūpa has not mentioned these last because they are but variant forms of *prema*.

adoption enables the mental emotion to emerge in a natural way as *bhāva-bhakti* (also called *sādhya-bhakti*). But Rūpa further adds that the natural devotional emotion cannot be produced by any course of conduct or any effort; for *bhakti* is the highest good and as such is eternal. Nothing that is eternal can be produced; the true devotional emotion therefore cannot be created—it already exists in the heart, and the function of the *sādhana-bhakti* is merely to manifest it in the heart in the enjoyable form¹. This *sādhana-bhakti* is of two kinds, *vaidhī* and *rāgānuga*²: these have already been described above. One is within the sphere of *vaidhī-bhakti* only so long as natural attachment to God does not reveal itself within one's heart. It is said that one who has a logical mind and is well read in the *śāstras*, and is also a man of firm conviction with a great faith in the Vaiṣṇava religion, is best fitted for *vaidhī-bhakti*³. Desire for worldly happiness or for emancipation is the greatest obstacle to the rise of *bhakti*. One following the path of *bhakti* incurs no demerit if he does not perform the obligatory and other duties as enjoined in the Vedas; but he is at fault if he does not perform the true duties of a Vaiṣṇava; but even in such cases a Vaiṣṇava need not perform any expiatory duties; for the mere recital of God's name is sufficient to remove all his sins. No injunctions of the *śāstras* have any reference to a devotee. The complete code of moral virtues and many ritualistic duties are counted as preliminary conditions for a person following the path of *bhakti*⁴. In many undeserving pupils too much learning or indulgence is regarded as a great obstruction of the path of *bhakti*⁵. A devotee of the *vaidhī* type should meditate upon the beauty of God and all His qualities and glories, and learn to regard himself as His servant; one of the conditions of meditation upon God as master is to train oneself in dedicating all one's actions to God. He should also try

¹ *kr̥ti-sādhya bhavet sādhyā-bhāvā sā sādhanābhidhā
nitya-siddhasya bhāvasya prākāṣaṇaṁ hr̥di sādhyatā.*

Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu, 1. 2. 2.

² *Ibid.* 1. 2. 4.

³ *śāstre yuktau ca nipuṇaḥ sarvathā dṛḍha-niścayaḥ
pṛauḍha-śraddho' dhikāri yaḥ sa bhaktāvuttamaḥ mataḥ.*

Ibid. 1. 2. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1. 2. 42, etc.

⁵ *na śiṣyān anubadhr̥ta granthān naivābhyased bahūn
na vyākhyāṁ upayuj̥ita nārambhān ārabhet kvacit.*

Ibid. 1. 2. 52.

to generate in himself the firm conviction that God is the greatest friend of His devotees; one should try to look upon God as one's best friend. The Śāstric duties should be performed only so long as there is no real inclination of the mind towards God, to recite His name, to listen to His glories, and to say them with joy. As soon as this stage comes, one is on the path of *vaidhī-bhakti* and must follow its specific duties, so that it may continually grow into a truly natural and irresistible emotion. Here begins the stage of *sādhya-bhakti* with *bhāva*. Even before we come to this there is another stage of *sādhana-bhakti*, the *rāgānuga*. It is only when one transcends this stage that one can come to a still higher stage of the *sādhya-bhakti* with its successive developments. *Rāgānuga-bhakti* is said to be an imitation of the *rāgātmikā*¹. The *rāgātmikā-bhakti* is the *bhakti* as natural attachment; *rāga* means "attachment". This *rāgātmikā-bhakti* may be of the type of erotic emotion (*kāma*) or the assumption of other relationships², such as friendship, parenthood, etc. The *rāgānuga-bhakti* is that where there is no natural attachment, but where there is an effort to imitate the forms of natural emotional attachment, and it may be associated with the diverse steps taken for the furtherance of *vaidhī-bhakti*. The distinction of *prema* (spiritual love) and *kāma* has already been explained above. Though *kāma* is often used in connection with the intoxicating love of God, yet it is used in the sense of *prema*³. The *rāgānuga-bhakti* thus following the two kinds of subdivision of *rāgātmikā-bhakti* is itself also of two kinds, *kāmānuga* and *sambandhānuga*.

From the second stage of *sādhana-bhakti* as *rāgānuga* we come to the stage of *bhāva-bhakti*, which also evolves itself into ever more

¹ *virājantīm abhivyaktāṃ vraja-vāsi-janādiṣu
rāgātmikāṃ anusṛtā yā sā rāgānugocyate. Ibid. 1. 2. 131.*

² It is said that in the case of natural attachment, even when it takes the form of an inimical relationship to God, it is superior to any type of *vaidhī-bhakti* where there is no such natural attachment. Thus it is said in Jiva's *Durgama-saṅgama*, 1. 2. 135: *yathā vairānubandhena martyas tanmayatām iṣṭā na tathā bhakti-yogena iti me nīcitā matiḥ tad api rāgamaya-kāmādy-apekṣayā vidhimaya-yaśya cittāveśa-hetuve'tyanta-nyūnatvam iti vyañjanārtham eva. yeṣu bhāva-mayeṣu mindito'pi vairānubandho vidhimaya-bhakti-yogāc chreṣṭhāḥ*. The natural feeling of enmity towards God can be regarded as *bhāvātmikā* (or emotional) but not as *rāgātmikā*. It cannot also be regarded as *bhakti*, for there is no desire here to please God; it therefore stands on a separate basis; it is inferior to *rāgātmikā-bhakti* but superior to *vaidhī-bhakti*.

³ *premaiva gopa-rāmāṇām kāma ityagamāt prathām. Ibid. 1. 2. 142, 143.*

intense forms until it reaches the stage of *mahā-bhāva* already described. It is regarded as the manifestation of the pure transcendent *sattva* (the blissful nature of God). *Bhakti* has already been defined as behaviour that is intended to please God and which has no further object or end in view; as such it would involve some kind of effort (*ceṣṭā-rūpa*) on the part of the devotee. But here the meaning is modified to denote only the emotional condition of mind, including physiological and physical changes produced in the body by it, and as roused by emotive conditions such as the object of love, excitants of love, the feeding emotions, external manifestation determining and increasing the original dominant emotion¹. The first stage of natural attachment to God as love is called *bhāva* and is associated with slight physiological effects like shedding tears or the rising of the hair on the body and the like². This emotion is of a transcendental nature and of the nature of the power of God, involving consciousness and bliss; therefore it is on the one hand self-revealing (*svaprakāśa*) and self-enjoying, and on the other hand it reveals the nature of God, whose power it is, and to whom it refers. Being a power of God it appears in the mental states of the devotee, becomes identified with them, and manifests itself in identity with them. *Bhakti*, as it appears in the devotee, is thus an identity of the transcendent and the phenomenal, and reveals the dual function of enjoying the sweetness of the nature of God and the self-revealing sweet enjoyable nature of its own. It is thus cognitive with reference to its object, and involves a dual enjoyment of God's sweet nature as well as the sweet nature of *bhakti* itself. It is the root of all *rati* (or enjoyment) and is therefore also called *rati*³. An inferior amount of it is generally common to all,

¹ *śarīrendriya-vargasya vikārāṇām vidhāyikāḥ
bhāva-vibhāva-janitās' citta-vṛttayah tritāḥ.*

Durgama-saṅgamaṇa, 1. 3. 1.

² *premas tu prathamāvasthā bhāva ity abhidhīyate
sāttvikāḥ svalpa-mātrāḥ syuryatrāśru-pulakādayaḥ.*

Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu, 1. 3. 3.

³ *asau śuddha-sattva-viśeṣarūpa-rati-mūla-rūpatvena mukhya-vṛttyā tac-
chabda-vācya sā ratiḥ śrī-kṛṣṇādi-sarva-prakāśakatvena hetunā svayam-prakāśa-
rūpā'pi prapañcika-tat-priya jananaṁ mano-vṛttau āvir-bhūya tat-tādātmyam
vrajanti tad-vṛttyā prakāśyavad bhāsamānō brahmavat tasyāḥ sphuranti, tathā
svasatkṛtena purvottarāvasthābhyām kāraṇa-kārya-rūpeṇa śrī-bhagavadādi-
mādhuryānubhavaṇa svāmsena svāda-rūpā'pi yāni kṛṣṇādirūpāni teṣāṁ
āsvādasya hetutām samvidamśena sādhakatamatām pratipadyate hlādinīyamśe tu
svayam hlādīyanti tiṣṭhati. *Durgama-saṅgamaṇa*, 1. 3. 4.*

but the superior appearance which continues to grow is rare and comes only through the grace of God or His devotees. So even in the *vaidhī* and the *rāgānuga* also there is, no doubt, some amount of *bhāva* of the inferior type. The natural attachment to God of the superior type which arises without going through the ordinary prescribed path of *bhakti* (the *sādhana-bhakti*), is generally due to the grace of God.

In the first stage of the *bhāva-bhakti* the devotee manifests in himself a nature which remains absolutely unperturbed, even though there may be causes of perturbation; he always spends his time in reciting God's name with strong emotion; he is unattached to sense-objects, and, though great, he is always extremely humble, and has always the strong conviction of attaining the ultimate realization of God. He is also always extremely anxious to attain his end and always finds pleasure in the name of God¹. The internal characteristic of *bhāva*, as *rati*, is extreme smoothness and liquidity of heart, but, wherever such a state is associated with other desires, even be it of emancipation, it should not be regarded as signifying the true state, and is called *ratyābhāsa*; for this is a state of absolute self-contentment, and it cannot be associated with any other desire of any kind.

When *bhāva* deepens, it is called *prema*; it is associated with a sense of possession in God and absolute detachment from all other things. This may rise from a direct development of *bhāva*, or through the immediate grace of God; it may be associated with a notion of the greatness of God or may manifest itself merely as an enjoyment of the sweetness of God. The development of *bhakti* depends on a special temperament derived in this life as a result of previous good deeds, and also on the efforts of this life. There is an elaborate description of the various characteristics of different kinds of joyous emotion with reference to God, and the various kinds of relationships on the assumption of which these may grow, but these can hardly be treated here.

Rūpa Gosvāmī wrote another work, *Samkṣepa-Bhāgavatāmṛta* which is a well recognized book in the Vaiṣṇava circle. It has at least two commentaries, one by Jīva Gosvāmī, and another, a later one, by Brindāvana Candra Tarkālaṅkāra; the latter was the pupil of Rādhācaraṇa Kavindra. In this book Rūpa describes the various

¹ *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu*, 1. 3. 11-16.

types of God's incarnation in accordance with the testimony of the *Purāṇas*: Kṛṣṇa is, of course, regarded as the highest God. His elder brother Sanātana also wrote a work, *Bṛhad-bhāgavatā-mṛta*, with a commentary on it, the *Dig-darśana*, in which he narrates the episodes of certain devotees in quest of God and their experiences.

The Philosophy of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa.

Baladeva was Vaiśya by caste and born in a village near Remuna in the Balesvar subdivision of Orissa; he was a pupil of *vairāgī* Pītāmvara Dāsa, and was generally known as Govinda Dāsa. He was the disciple of a Kanouj Brahmin, Rādhā Dāmodara Dāsa, the author of *Vedānta-Syamantaka*. Rādhā Dāmodara was a disciple of Nayanānanda, the son of Rādhānanda, and a pupil of his grandfather, Rasikānanda Murāri, who was a disciple of Śyāmānanda, a junior contemporary of Jīva Gosvāmī. Śyāmānanda was a disciple of Hṛdaya Caitanya, who in his turn was a disciple of Gauridāsa Paṇḍita, a disciple of Nityānanda. Baladeva himself had two well known disciples, Nanda Miśra and Uddhava Dāsa; he wrote his commentary on Rūpa Gosvāmī's *Stava-mālā* in the Śaka era 1686 (or A.D. 1764). He is known to have written at least the following fourteen works: *Sāhitya-kaumudī* and its commentary, *Kṛṣṇānandī*; *Govinda-bhāṣya*; *Siddhānta-ratna*; *Kāvya-Kaustubha*; *Gītā-bhūṣaṇa*, a commentary on the *Gītā*; a commentary on Rādhā Dāmodara's *Chandaḥ-Kaustubha*; *Prameya-ratnāvalī* and its commentary, *Kānti-mālā*; a commentary on Rūpa's *Stava-mālā*; a commentary on Rūpa's *Laghu-bhāgavatā-mṛta*; *Nāmārtha-śuddhikā*, a commentary on *Sahasra-nāma*; a commentary on Jaya Deva's *Candrāloka*; *Siddhānta-darpaṇa*; a commentary on *Tattva-sandarbhā*; a commentary on Rūpa's *Nātaka-candrikā*. He also wrote commentaries on some of the important Upaniṣads¹.

Baladeva's most important work is his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, otherwise known as *Govinda-bhāṣya*. This has a sub-commentary on it called *Sūkṣma*; the name of the author of this commentary is not known, though it has been held by some to be a work of Baladeva himself. Baladeva has also summarized the

¹ M. M. Gopinath Kavirāja's introduction to *Siddhānta-ratna*, Part II. A. K. Sastri, in his introduction to *Prameya-ratnāvalī*, strongly criticizes the view that Baladeva was a *Vaiśya*. No satisfactory proofs are available on either side.

contents of his *Govinda-bhāṣya* in the *Siddhānta-ratna*, to which also there is a commentary. M. M. Gopinath Kavirāja says that the *Siddhānta-ratna* was written by Baladeva himself. There is nothing to urge in support of this assertion; the natural objection against it is that a Vaiṣṇava like Baladeva should not speak in glowing terms of praise of his own work¹. *Siddhānta-ratna* is regarded by Baladeva not as a summary of *Govinda-bhāṣya*, but as partly a supplementary work and partly a commentary². It is probable that the writer of the *Sūkṣma* commentary on the *Govinda-bhāṣya* is also the writer of the commentary on *Siddhānta-ratna*; for there is one introductory verse which is common to them both³. The *Siddhānta-ratna* contains much that is not contained in the *Govinda-bhāṣya*.

The eternal possession of bliss and the eternal cessation of sorrow is the ultimate end of man. This end can be achieved through the true knowledge of God in His essence (*svarūpataḥ*) and as associated with His qualities by one who knows also the nature of his own self (*sva-jñāna-pūrvakam*). The nature of God is pure consciousness and bliss. These two may also be regarded as the body of God (*na tu svarūpād vighrahasya atirekaḥ*). His spirit consists in knowledge, majesty and power⁴. Though one in Himself, He appears in many places and in the forms of His diverse devotees. These are therefore but modes of His manifestation in self-dalliance, and this is possible on account of His supra-logical powers, which are identical with His own nature⁵. This, however, should not lead us to suppose the correctness of the *bhedābheda* doctrine, of the simultaneous truth of the one and the many, or that of difference

¹ *sāndrānanda-syandi govinda-bhāṣyaṃ
jīyād etat sindhu-gāmbhīryya-sambhṛt
yasmin sadyaḥ saṁśrute mānavānām
mohocchedī jāyate tattva-bodhaḥ.*

Commentary on *Siddhānta-ratna*, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*

³ *ālasyād apravṛttiḥ syāt
pūṁsām yad grantha-vistare
govinda-bhāṣye saṁkṣipte
ṭīppaṇī kriyate'tra tat.*

Sūkṣma commentary, p. 5, and the commentary on *Siddhānta-ratna*, p. 1.

⁴ *Siddhānta-ratna*, pp. 1-13.

⁵ *ekam eva sva-rūpam acintya-śaktyā yugapat sarvatrāvabhāty eko'pi san;
sthānāni bhagavad-āvirbhāvāspadāni tad-vividha-līlā-śraya-bhūtāni vividha-
bhāvavanto bhaktāś ca. Govinda-bhāṣya*, III. 2. 11.

and unity¹; just as one actor, remaining one in himself, shows himself in diverse forms, so God also manifests Himself in diverse forms, in accordance with diverse effects and also in accordance with the mental plane and the ways in which diverse devotees conceive of Him². On account of His supra-logical powers the laws of contradiction do not apply to Him; even contradictory qualities and conceptions may be safely associated in our notion of Him. So also His body is not different in nature from Him: He is thus identical with His body. The conception of a body distinct from Him is only in the minds of the devotees as an aid to the process of meditation; but, though this is imagination on their part, such a form is not false, but as a matter of fact is God Himself (*deha eva dehī or vighraha evātmā ātmaiva vighrahaḥ*). On account of the transcendent nature of God, in spite of His real nature as pure consciousness and bliss He may have His real nature in bodily form, as Kṛṣṇa. This form really arises in association with the mind of the devotee just as musical forms show themselves in association with the trained ears of a musician³. In this connection it may be observed that according to Baladeva even dream-creations are not false, but real, produced by the will of God and disappearing in the waking stage through the will of God⁴. These forms appearing in the minds of the devotees are therefore real forms, manifested by God through His will working in association with the minds of the devotees. In this connection it may also be pointed out that the *jīvas* are different from God. Even the imagined reflection of Brahman in *avidyā*, introduced by the extreme monists to explain *jīva* as being only a reflection of Brahman and as having no real existence outside it, is wrong; for the notion of similarity or reflection involves difference. The *jīvas* are atomic in nature, associated with the qualities of *prakṛti*, and absolutely dependent on God. Though Brahman is all-pervasive, yet He can be grasped by knowledge and devotion. A true realization of His nature and even a sensuous perception of Him is possible only through *sādhya-bhakti*,

¹ The *Sūktma* commentary on III. 2. 12 says that God's *māyā-śakti* has three functions: *hlādinī*, *sandhinī*, and *saṁvit*; it is through His *māyā-śakti*, i.e., the power as *māyā*, that He can manifest Himself in diverse ways.

² *dhyātr-bhedāt kārya-bhedāt ca anekatayā pratīto'pi hariḥ svarūpaikyam svasmin na muñcati. Govinda-bhāṣya*, III. 2. 13.

³ *tan-mūrtatvaṁ khalu bhakti-vibhāvitena hṛdā grāhyaṁ gāndharvānūsilitena śrotreṇa rāga-mūrtatvaṁ iva. Ibid.* III. 2. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.* III. 2. 1-5.

not through *sādhana-bhakti*. The consciousness and bliss of God may be regarded either as the substance of God or as His attributes. This twofold way of reference to God is due to the admission of the category of *viśeṣa*, by which, even in the absence of difference between the substance and the quality, it is possible to predicate the latter of the former as if such a difference existed. *Viśeṣa* is spoken of as the representative of difference (*bheda-pratinidhi*); that is, where no difference exists, the concept of *viśeṣa* enables us to predicate a difference; yet this *viśeṣa* is no mere *vikalpa* or mere false verbal affirmation. The ocean can be spoken of as water and waves by means of this concept of *viśeṣa*. The concept of *viśeṣa* means that, though there is no difference between God and His qualities, or between His nature and His body, yet there is some specific peculiarity which makes it possible to affirm the latter of the former; and by virtue of this peculiarity the differential predication may be regarded as true, though there may actually be no difference between the two. It is by virtue of this concept that such propositions as "Being exists," "Time always is," "Space is everywhere," may be regarded as true; they are neither false nor mere verbal assumption; if they were false, there would be no justification for such mental states. There is obviously a difference between the two propositions "Being exists" and "Being does not exist"; the former is regarded as legitimate, the latter as false. This proves that though there is no difference between "being" and "existence" there is such a peculiarity in it that, while the predication of existence to being is legitimate, its denial is false. If it were merely a case of verbal assumption, then the latter denial would also have been equally possible and justifiable. This peculiarity is identical with the object and does not exist in it in any particular relation. For this reason a further chain of relations is not required, and the charge of a vicious infinite also becomes inadmissible. If the concept of *viśeṣa* is not admitted, then the notion of "qualified" and "quality" is inexplicable¹. The concept of *viśeṣa* in this sense was first introduced by Madhva; Baladeva borrowed the idea from him in interpreting the relation of God to His powers and qualities. This interpretation is entirely different from the view of Jīva and others who preceded Baladeva; we have already seen how Jīva interpreted the situation merely by the doctrine of the supra-logical

¹ *Ibid.* III. 2. 31.

nature of God's powers and the supra-logical nature of the difference and identity of power and the possessor of power, or of the quality and the substance. Baladeva, by introducing the concept of *viśeṣa*, tried to explain more clearly the exact nature of supra-logicality (*acintyatva*) in this case; this has been definitely pointed out in the *Sūkṣma* commentary¹.

The bliss of God is different from the bliss of the *jīvas*, both in nature and in quantity, and the nature of their knowledge is different. Brahman is thus different in nature both from the world and from the *jīvas*. All the unity texts of the Upaniṣads are to be explained merely as affirming that the world and the *jīvas* belong to God (*sarvatra tadīyatva-jñānārthaḥ*). Such a way of looking at the world will rouse the spirit of *bhakti*. The revelation of God's nature in those who follow the path of *vaidhī-bhakti* is different from that in those who follow the *ruci-bhakti*; in the former case He appears in all His majesty, in the latter He appears with all His sweetness. When God is worshipped in a limited form as Kṛṣṇa, He reveals Himself in His limited form to the devotee, and such is the supra-logical nature of God that even in this form He remains as the All-pervasive. It is evident that the acceptance of *viśeṣa* does not help Baladeva here and he has to accept the supra-logical nature of God to explain other parts of his religious dogmas.

God is regarded as being both the material cause of the world and as the supreme agent. He has three fundamental powers: the supreme power, *viṣṇu-śakti*, the power as *kṣetrajñā*, the power as *avidyā*. In His first power Brahman remains in Himself as the unchangeable; His other two powers are transformed into the *jīvas* and the world. The Sāṃkhyist argues that, as the world is of a different nature from Brahman, Brahman cannot be regarded as its material cause. Even if it is urged that there are two subtle powers which may be regarded as the material cause of the world and the *jīvas*, their objection still holds good; for the development of the gross, which is different from the subtle, is not explained. To this the reply is that the effect need not necessarily be the same as or similar to the material cause. Brahman transforms Himself into the world, which is entirely different from Him. If there were absolute oneness between the material cause and the effect, then

¹ *tenaiva tasya vastvabhinnatvaṃ sva-nirvāhakatvaṃ ca svasya tādṛśe tad-bhāvōjjyirnbhakam acintyatvaṃ sidhyati. Sūkṣma on Govinda-bhāṣya, III. 2. 31.*

one could not be called the cause and the other the effect; the lumpy character of the mud is not seen in the jug, which is its effect; in all cases that may be reviewed the effect must necessarily be different from the material cause. Such a modification does not in any way change the nature of Brahman. The changes are effected in His powers, while He remains unchanged by the modification of His powers. To turn to an ordinary example as an illustration, it may be pointed out that "a man with the stick" refers to none other than the man himself, though there is a difference between the man and the stick; so though the power of the Brahman is identical with Brahman in association with His powers, yet the existence of a difference between Brahman and His powers is not denied¹. Moreover, there is always a difference between the material cause and the effect. The jug is different from the lump of clay, and the ornaments from the gold out of which they are made; also they serve different purposes and exist in different times. If the effect existed before the causal operation began, the application of the causal operation would be unnecessary; also the effect would be eternal. If it is held that the effect is a manifestation of that which was already existent, then a further question arises, whether this manifestation, itself an effect, requires a further manifestation, and so on; thus a chain of manifestations would be necessary, and the result would be a vicious infinite. Still, Baladeva does not deny the *pariṇāma* or the *abhivyakti* theory; he denies the Sāṃkhya view that even before the causal operation the effect exists, or that a manifestation (*abhivyakti*) would require a chain of manifestations. He defines effect as an independent manifestation (*svatantrābhivyaktimattvaṃ kila kāryatvaṃ*), and such an effect cannot exist before the action of the causal operatives. The manifestation of the world is through the manifestation of God, on whom it is dependent. Such a manifestation can only happen through the causal operation inherent in God and initiated by His will. Thus the world is manifested out of the energy of God, and in a limited sense the world is identical with God; but once it is separated out of Him as effect, it is different from Him. The world did not exist at any time before it was manifested in its present form; therefore it is wrong to suppose that the world was at any stage identical with God, though God may always be regarded as the material cause of the

¹ *Ibid.* II. 1. 13.

world¹. Thus after all these discussions it becomes evident that there is really no difference of any importance between Baladeva's views and the Sāṃkhya view. Baladeva also admits that the world exists in a subtle form in God as endowed with His energies. He only takes exception to the verbal expression of the *kārikā* that the effect exists in the cause before the action of the causal operatives; for the effect does not exist in the cause *as effect* but in a subtle state. This subtle state is enlarged and endowed with spatio-temporal qualities by the action of the causal operatives before it can manifest itself as effect. The Sāṃkhya, however, differs in overstressing the existence of the effect in the cause, and in asserting that the function of the causal operatives is only to manifest openly what already existed in a covered manner. Here, however, the causal operatives are regarded as making a real change and addition. This addition of new qualities and functions is due to the operation of the causal will of God; it is of a supra-logical nature in the sense that they were not present in the subtle causal state, and yet have come into being through the operation of God's will. But, so far as the subtle cause exists in God as associated with Him, the world is not distinct and independent of God even in its present form². The *jīvas* too have no independence in themselves; they are created by God, by His mere will, and having created the world and the *jīvas* He entered into them and remained as their inner controller. So the *jīvas* are as much under natural necessity as the objects of the physical world, and they have thus no freedom of action or of will³. The natural necessity of the world is but a manifestation of God's will through it. The spontaneous desire and will that is found in man is also an expression of God's will operating through man; thus man is as much subject to necessity as the world, and there is no freedom in man. Thus, though the cow which gives milk may seem to us as if it were giving the milk by its own will, yet the vital powers of the cow produce the milk, not the cow; so, when a person is perceived as doing a particular action or behaving in a particular manner or willing something, it is not he who is the

¹ *Govinda-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 14.

² *tasmād ekam eva jīva-prakṛti-śaktimad brahma jagad-upādānam tadātmakam ca iti siddham evam kāryāvasthatve'py avicintyatva-dharma-yogād apracyuta-pūrvāvastham cāvatiṣṭhate. Ibid.* II. 1. 20.

³ *cetanasyāpi jīvasyāśma-kāṣṭha-loṣṭravad asvātantryāt svataḥ kartṛtvārūpānāptiḥ. Ibid.* II. 1. 23.

agent, but the supreme God, who is working through him¹. But the question may arise, if God is the sole cause of all human willing and human action, then why should God, who is impartial, make us will so differently? The answer will be that God determines our action and will in accordance with the nature of our past deeds, which are beginningless. A further objection may be made, that if God determines our will in accordance with our past deeds, then God is dependent in His own determining action on the nature of our *karmas*; which will be a serious challenge to His unobstructed freedom. Moreover, since different kinds of action lead to different kinds of pleasurable and painful effects God may be regarded as partial. The reply to these objections is that God determines the *jīvas* in accordance with their own individual nature; the individual *jīvas* are originally of a different nature, and in accordance with their original difference God determines their will and actions differently. Though God is capable of changing their nature, He does not do so; but it is in the nature of God's own will that He reserves a preferential treatment for His devotee, to whom He extends His special grace². God's own actions are not determined by any objective end or motive, but flow spontaneously through His enjoyment of His own blissful nature. His special grace towards His devotees flows from His own essential nature; it is this special treatment offered to His devotees that endears Him to them and that rouses others to turn towards Him³.

Bhakti is also regarded as a species of knowledge (*bhaktir api jñāna-viśeṣo bhavati*)⁴. By *bhakti* one turns to God without any kind of objective end. *Bhakti* is also regarded as a power which can bind God to us⁵; this power is regarded as the essence of the *hlādinī* power of God as associated with consciousness. The consciousness here spoken of is identical with the *hlāda*, and its essence consists in a favourable outflow of natural inclination⁶. This is thus identical with God's essential nature as consciousness and bliss; yet it is not regarded as identical with Him, but as a power of

¹ *Ibid.* II. 1. 24.

² *na ca karma-sāpekṣatvena iṣyarsya asvātantryam;...anādi-jīva-svabhāvā-nusāreṇa hi karma kārayati śva-bhāvam anyathā-kartuṃ samartho'pi kasyāpi na karoti.* *Ibid.* II. 1. 35.

³ *Ibid.* II. 1. 36.

⁴ Commentary on *Siddhānta-ratna*, p. 29.

⁵ *bhagavad-vaśikāra-hetu-bhūta śaktiḥ.* *Ibid.* p. 35.

⁶ *hlāda-bhinnā samvid, yas tadānukūlyamaṣaḥ sa tasyāḥ sārāḥ.* *Ibid.* p. 37.

Him¹. Though *bhakti* exists in God as His power, yet it qualifies the devotee also, it is pleasurable to them both, and they are both constituents of it². It will be remembered that, of the three powers, *samvit* is superior to *sandhinī* and *hlādinī* is superior to *samvit*. God not only is, but He extends His being to everything else; *sandhinī* is the power by which God extends being to all. He is Himself of the nature of consciousness; *samvit* is the power by which His cognitive action is accomplished and by which He makes it possible for other people to know. Though He is of the nature of bliss, He experiences joy and makes it possible for others to have joyous experiences; the power by which He does this is called *hlādinī*.³ True *bhakti* cannot have any object outside itself, simply for the reason that it is itself an experience of God as supreme bliss. That there is a kind of bliss other than sensuous pleasure is proved by our experience of our own nature as bliss during deep sleep. But, since we are but atoms of God's energy, it is necessarily proved that God's nature is supreme and infinite bliss; once that bliss is experienced, people will naturally turn away from worldly sensuous pleasure to God, once for all.

True knowledge destroys all merit and demerit, and so in the *ġivan-mukti* man holds his body only through the will of God. The effect of obligatory duties is not destroyed, except in so far as it produces meritorious results—admission to Heaven and the like—and it helps the rise of true knowledge; when the true knowledge dawns, it does not further show itself. It is also stated in the Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad that the merits of a wise man go to his friends and his demerits to his foes; so in the case of those devotees who are anxious to enter communion with God the meritorious effects of their deeds are distributed to those who are dear to Him, and the effects of their sinful actions are distributed to His enemies⁴. So, as the effects of the fructifying *karma* are distributed to other persons, the principle that all fructifying *karmas* must produce

¹ *svārūpānātrekīnyāpi tad-viśeṣatayā ca bhāṣate'nyathā tasya śaktir iti vyapedeṣa-siddheḥ. Siddhānta-ratna, p. 38.*

² *bhagavat-svārūpa-viśeṣa-bhūta-hlādinīyādi-sārātmā bhaktir bhagavad-viśeṣaṇatayā bhakte ca prthag-viśeṣaṇatayā siddhā tayoṛ ānandātīṣayayo bhavati. Ibid. p. 39.*

³ *tatra sadātmā'pi yayā satṭam dhatte dadāti ca sā sarva-deśa-kāla-dravya-vyāpti-hetuh sandhinī, samvid-ātmā'pi yayā samve'tti samvedayati ca sā samvit, hlādātmā'pi yayā hlādate hlādayati ca sā hlādinī. Ibid. pp. 39-40.*

⁴ *Govinda-bhāṣya, IV. 1. 17.*

their effects is satisfied, and the devotee of God is released from them. The best way for true advancement can only be through the association of saintly devotees. Our bondage is real, and the destruction of the bondage is real and eternal. Even in the state of ultimate emancipation the *jīvas* retain their separate individuality from God.

In the sixth and seventh chapters of the *Siddhānta-ratna* Baladeva tries to refute Śaṅkara's doctrine of extreme monism; but as these arguments contain hardly anything new but merely repeat the arguments of the thinkers of the Rāmānuja and the Madhva Schools, they may well be omitted here. In his *Prameya-ratnāvalī* Baladeva gives a general summary of the main points of the Vaiṣṇava system of the Gauḍīya School. If one compares the account they give of Vaiṣṇava philosophy in the *Bhāgavata-sandarbhā* with that given in Baladeva's *Govinda-bhāṣya* and *Siddhānta-ratna*, one finds that, though the fundamental principles are the same, yet many new elements were introduced by Baladeva into the Gauḍīya school of thought under the influence of Madhva, and on account of his personal predilections. The stress that is laid on the aspect of difference between Īśvara and the *jīva* and the world and the concept of *viśeṣa*, are definite traces of Madhva influence. Again, though Baladeva admires the *ruci-bhakti* as the best form of *bhakti*, he does not lay the same emphasis on it as is found in the works of Rūpa, Sanātana or Jīva. His concept of *bhakti* is also slightly different from that of Jīva; he does not use the older terminologies (*antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga śakti*), and does not seek the explanation of his system on that concept. His *Prameya-ratna-mālā* has an old commentary, the *Kānti-mālā*, by one Kṛṣṇadeva Vedānta Vāgīśa. In the *Prameya-ratna-mālā* he pays his salutation to Ānanda-tīrtha or Madhva, whom he describes as his boat for crossing the ocean of *saṃsāra*. He gives also a list of the succession of teachers from whom he derived his ideas, and he thinks that by a meditation upon the succession of *gurus* one would succeed in producing the satisfaction of Hari. He further says that four *sampradāyas* or schools of Vaiṣṇavas, the *Śrī*, *Brahma*, *Rudra*, and *Sanaka*, will spring forth in Orissa (Utkala) in the Kali yuga, which may be identified with Rāmānuja, Madhva, Viṣṇusvāmin, and Nimbāditya. He enumerates the succession of his teachers, in the following order: Śrīkṛṣṇa, Brahmā, Devarṣi-

Bādarāyaṇa, Madhva, Padmanābha, Nṛhari, Mādhava, Akṣobhya, Jaya-tīrtha, Jñāna-sindhu, Vidyānidhi, Rājendra, Jayadharmā, Puruṣottama, Brāhmaṇya, Vyāsa-tīrtha, Lakṣmīpati, Mādhavendra, Śvara, Advaita, Nityānanda and also Śrī Caitanya¹. The system of thought represented by Baladeva may well be styled the Madhva-Gauḍīya system; we have had recently in Bengal a school of Vaiṣṇavas which calls itself Madhva-Gauḍīya.

¹ See an earlier list by Kavi-Karṇapūra, in his fanciful or legendary treatise *Gaura-gaṇodeśa-dīpikā*.

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A HISTORY
OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY THE LATE
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

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SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

A MEMOIR

THE late Surendranath Dasgupta was born in Kusthia, a subdivision of Bengal, in October 1885 (10th of Āśvina). He came from a well-known family in Goila, District Barishal, East Bengal. This family was particularly known for its great tradition of Sanskrit learning and culture. His great-grandfather was a distinguished scholar and also a Vaidya (physician of the Ayurvedic school of medicine). He was known by his title “Kavindra”, and was running a Sanskrit institution known as “Kavindra College”, which continued in existence up to the time of the partition of India in 1947. This institution maintained about 150 students with free board and lodging, and taught Kāvya, Grammar, Nyāya, Vedānta and Āyurveda in traditional Indian style. Professor Dasgupta’s father, Kaliprasanna Dasgupta, was the only member of the family who learnt English and took up the job of a surveyor.

In his early years, between five and eight, while he did not know any Sanskrit, he showed certain remarkable gifts of answering philosophical and religious questions in a very easy and spontaneous manner. He could demonstrate the various Yogic postures (*āsanas*); and used to pass easily into trance states, while looking at the river Ganges or listening to some Kirtan song. He was visited by hundreds of learned men and pious saints at his father’s residence at Kalighat and was styled “Khoka Bhagawan” (Child God). Mention may particularly be made of Srimat Bijay Krishna Goswami, Prabhu Jagat Bandhu and Sivanarayan Paramhansa. He was sometimes taken to the Theosophical Society, Calcutta, where a big audience used to assemble, and the boy was put on the table and questioned on religious and theological matters. The answers that he gave were published in the Bengali and English newspapers along with the questions. Some of these are still preserved.

He was educated at Diamond Harbour for a time, and then for seven years in the Krishnagar Collegiate School and College. He was interested in Sanskrit and science alike, and surprised the professor of chemistry by his proficiency in the subject so much that he never taught in the class unless his favourite pupil was

present. He took his M.A. degree from Sanskrit College, Calcutta, in 1908. His fellow-students noticed with interest his habits and peculiarities. He took no care of his clothes and hair; he studied on a mat with a pillow for his table; and his place was littered with books and papers. Though he did not talk very much, he already had a reputation for scholarship when he was an M.A. student at the Sanskrit College. His scholarship in Pāṇini was so great that when even his teachers had differences of opinion about a grammatical matter, he was called out of his class to solve it. His first research work on Nyāya, which was written while he was in the Sanskrit College, was read out before the Pandits, and was very highly appreciated by them and the then Principal, the late Mahamahopadhyaya H. P. Sastri. Incidentally it may be noted that Nyāya was not one of the subjects of his M.A. curriculum. After his childhood, both as a student and as a young man, he had many striking religious and spiritual experiences, which were known to a group of his intimate friends and admirers.

One of the peculiar traits of Dasgupta was that he seldom wished to learn anything from others. He had an inner pride that led him to learn everything by his own efforts. He never wanted any stimulus from outside. Whenever he took up any work, he threw his whole soul and being into it. He passed his M.A. in Philosophy in 1910, as a private candidate, summarising all the prescribed books in his own way. He was twice offered a state scholarship to study Sanskrit in a scientific manner in Europe, but as he was the only child of his parents, he refused out of consideration for their feelings. He began his service at Rajshahi College as an officiating lecturer in Sanskrit. He was soon provided with a permanent professorship at Chittagong College, where he worked from 1911 to 1920 and from 1922 to 1924.

Chittagong was to him like a place of banishment, being far away from the great libraries of Calcutta. The College was newly started and had none of the facilities that it possesses now. But Dasgupta had taken the resolution that he would dedicate himself to the study of the Indian “Śāstras” in their entirety. For him to take a resolution was to accomplish it, and while many of his colleagues enjoyed club life in an easy-going manner, he continued his studies for fourteen hours or more a day, in spite of the teasing of his friends. At this time Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandi of

Cassimbazar made an offer of 300 rupees a month for Dasgupta to start his library; this is now one of the best of its kind, containing many unpublished manuscripts and over 15,000 printed books. It was given by him as a gift to the Benares Hindu University on his retirement from the Calcutta University. Love of knowledge seems to have been the guiding passion of the professor's life. He never sought position or honour, though they were showered upon him in quick succession in his later days. He had a unique sincerity of purpose and expression, and the light that came from his soul impressed kindred souls.

When Lord Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, came to visit Chittagong College, he had a long talk with Professor Dasgupta in his classroom, and was so much impressed by it that he expressed the desire that the first volume of the *History of Indian Philosophy* might be dedicated to him. Originally Dasgupta's plan was to write out the history of Indian systems of thought in one volume. Therefore he tried to condense the materials available within the compass of one book. But as he went on collecting materials from all parts of India, a huge mass of published and unpublished texts came to light, and the plan of the work enlarged more and more as he tried to utilise them. As a matter of fact, his was the first and only attempt to write out in a systematic manner a history of Indian thought directly from the original sources in Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit. In a work of the fourteenth century A.D., the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* of Mādhavācārya, we find a minor attempt to give a survey of the different philosophical schools of India. But the account given there is very brief, and the work does not give an exhaustive survey of all the different systems of philosophy. In the present series the author traced, in a historical and critical manner, the development of Indian thought in its different branches from various sources, a considerable portion of which lies in unpublished manuscripts. He spared no pains and underwent a tremendous amount of drudgery in order to unearth the sacred, buried treasures of Indian thought. He revised his original plan of writing only one volume and thought of completing the task in five consecutive volumes constituting a series. He shouldered this gigantic task all alone, with the sincerest devotion and unparalleled enthusiasm and zeal.

Dasgupta had taken the Griffith Prize in 1916 and his doctorate

in Indian Philosophy in 1920. Maharaja Sir Manindra Chandra Nandi now urged him to go to Europe to study European philosophy at its sources, and generously bore all the expenses of his research tour (1920-22). Dasgupta went to England and distinguished himself at Cambridge as a research student in philosophy under Dr McTaggart. During this time the Cambridge University Press published the first volume of the *History of Indian Philosophy* (1921). He was also appointed lecturer at Cambridge, and nominated to represent Cambridge University at the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris. His participation in the debates of the Aristotelian Society, London, the leading philosophical society of England, and of the Moral Science Club, Cambridge, earned for him the reputation of being an almost invincible controversialist. Great teachers of philosophy like Ward and McTaggart, under whom he studied, looked upon him not as their pupil but as their colleague. He received his Cambridge doctorate for an elaborate thesis on contemporary European philosophy. The impressions that he had made by his speeches and in the debates at the Paris Congress secured for him an invitation to the International Congress at Naples in 1924, where he was sent as a representative of the Bengal Education Department and of the University of Calcutta; later on, he was sent on deputation by the Government of Bengal to the International Congress at Harvard in 1926. In that connection he delivered the Harris Foundation lectures at Chicago, besides a series of lectures at about a dozen other Universities of the United States and at Vienna, where he was presented with an illuminated address and a bronze bust of himself. He was invited in 1925 to the second centenary of the Academy of Science, Leningrad, but he could not attend for lack of Government sanction. In 1935, 1936 and 1939 he was invited as visiting professor to Rome, Milan, Breslau, Königsberg, Berlin, Bonn, Cologne, Zürich, Paris, Warsaw and England.

While in Rome he delivered at the International Congress of Science in 1936 an address on the Science of Ancient India with such success that shouts of "Grand' uomo" cheered him through the session of the day. This led eventually to the conferment of the Honorary D.Litt. upon him by the University of Rome in 1939. He was on that occasion a state guest in Rome and military honours were accorded to him. At this time he read out before many

cultured societies English translations of his own Bengali verses called *Vanishing Lines*. The appreciation that these verses received secured for him a special reception and banquet at the Poets' Club. Before this, only two other Indian poets had been accorded this reception: Tagore and Mrs Naidu. Laurence Binyon spoke of his poems in the following terms: "I am impressed by the richness of imagination which pervades the poems and the glow of mystic faith and fervent emotion—reminding me of one of William Blake's sayings: 'Exuberance is beauty'. It would be a great pity if the poems are not published in English."

The University of Warsaw made him an honorary Fellow of the Academy of Sciences. He was elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature. The Société des Amis du Monde of Paris offered him a special reception, and M. Renou, Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Paris, wrote to him afterwards: "While you were amongst us, we felt as if a Śāṅkara or a Patañjali was born again and moved amongst us." Kind and simple and gentle as he was, Dasgupta was always undaunted in challenging scholars and philosophers. In the second International Congress of Philosophy in Naples, the thesis of his paper was that Croce's philosophy had been largely anticipated by some forms of Buddhism, and that where Croce differed he was himself in error. On account of internal differences Croce had no mind to join the Congress, but the fact that Dasgupta was going to challenge his philosophy and prove it to be second-hand in open congress, induced him to do so. In the same way he challenged Vallée Poussein, the great Buddhist scholar, before a little assembly presided over by McTaggart. In the meetings of the Aristotelian Society he was a terror to his opponents, his method of approach being always to point out their errors. He inflicted this treatment on many other scholars, particularly Steherbatsky and Levy.

Disinterested love of learning and scientific accuracy were his watchwords. He had to make a most painstaking tour of South India to collect materials for his great *History*. Though he was well known as a scholar of Sanskrit and philosophy, his studies in other subjects, such as physics, biology, anthropology, history, economics, political philosophy, etc. are very considerable. Above all, he developed a new system of thought which was entirely his own. A brief account of this appeared in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*

edited by Radhakrishnan and Muirhead and published by Allen and Unwin.

In 1924, as a mark of recognition of his scholarship, he was admitted to I.E.S. service in Calcutta Presidency College and was posted as Head of the Department of Philosophy. In 1931 he became Principal of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, and *ex-officio* Secretary of the Bengal Sanskrit Association. In the latter capacity he had to arrange about 218 papers in Sanskrit for Sanskrit Title Examinations for about ten thousand candidates coming from all parts of India. During the eleven years of his principalship in Sanskrit College he had worked in various ways for the advancement of Sanskrit learning and culture in India.

In 1942 he retired from Sanskrit College and was appointed King George V Professor of Mental and Moral Science in the University of Calcutta. He worked there for three years and delivered the Stephanos Nirmalendu lectures on the history of religions. He had been suffering from heart trouble since 1940, but was still carrying on his various activities and research work. In 1945 he retired from the Calcutta University and was offered the Professorship of Sanskrit at Edinburgh which had fallen vacant after the death of Professor Keith. The doctors also advised a trip to England. On his arrival in England he fell ill again. In November 1945 he delivered his last public lecture on Hinduism in Trinity College, Cambridge. Since then he was confined to bed with acute heart trouble. He stayed in England for five years (1945-50). Even then he published the fourth volume of his *History of Indian Philosophy* at the Cambridge University Press, the *History of Sanskrit Literature* at Calcutta University, *Rabindranath the Poet and Philosopher* with his Calcutta publishers, and a book on aesthetics in Bengali. In 1950 he returned to Lucknow.

In 1951, through friendly help given by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, he started writing the fifth and final volume of the *History of Indian Philosophy*. He had also planned to write out his own system of philosophy in two volumes. His friends and students requested him several times to complete the writing of his own thought first. But he looked upon his work on Indian philosophy as the sacred mission of his life, and thought himself to be committed to that purpose. His love of his mother country and all that is best in it always had precedence over his personal aspirations.

With strong determination and unwavering devotion he brought his life's mission very near its completion. Till the last day of his life he was working for this, and completed one full section just a few hours before his passing away, on 18 December 1952. Even on this last day of his life, he worked in the morning and afternoon on the last chapter of the section of Southern Śaivism. He passed away peacefully at eight in the evening while discussing problems of modern psychology. All his life he never took rest voluntarily and till his end he was burning like a fire, full of zeal and a rare brightness of spirit for the quest of knowledge.

His plan of the fifth volume was as follows:

- (1) Southern Schools of Śaivism.
- (2) Northern Schools of Śaivism.
- (3) Philosophy of Grammar.
- (4) Philosophy of some of the Selected Tantras.

Of these the first was to be the largest section and covers more than a third of the proposed work according to his own estimate. He collected manuscripts from various sources from Southern India and completed his survey of the different schools of Southern Śaivism. This is now being published by the Cambridge University Press.

Another aspect of his life, which showed itself in trances and in deep unswerving devotion and faith in his Lord, never left him. These were manifest in him even as a child, and continued all through his life. In trials and troubles and sorrows he was fearless and undaunted. In difficulties he had his indomitable will to conquer; he bore all his sufferings with patience and fortitude. His faith in God sustained him with an unusual brightness and cheerfulness of spirit. He never prayed, as he thought there was no need of it since his dearest Lord was shining in his heart with sweetness, love and assurance. That is why in different critical stages of his illness he never gave up hope, and tried to cheer up his worried wife and attending doctors. It was through sheer determination and unshaken faith that he carried out his life's mission nearly to completion when God took him away—maybe for some purpose known to him alone.

It now remains to thank the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for the very kind interest that they have shown in the

publication of this fifth volume of the *History of Indian Philosophy* by my husband. The Indian Government have permitted me to complete the remaining portion of the work as planned by the author. It is a great task and a very sacred obligation that I owe to my husband, both as his disciple and wife, and I do not know how far I shall be able to fulfil it. It all depends on God's will. But the work as it stands now is self-complete and will serve the need of enquiring minds about the different important schools of Śaivism from the beginning of the Christian era. The references to texts and manuscripts have been duly checked. I beg the forgiveness of readers for any mistake that might remain.

SURAMA DASGUPTA

University of Lucknow, India

19 June 1954

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LITERATURE OF SOUTHERN ŚAIVISM

The Literature and History of Southern Śaivism.

THE earliest Sanskrit philosophical literature in which we find a reference to Śaivism is a *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara (eighth century) on *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 37. In the commentary on this *sūtra*, Śaṅkara refers to the doctrines of the Siddhāntas as having been written by Lord Maheśvara. The peculiarity of the teachings of the Siddhāntas was that they regarded God as being only the instrumental cause of the world. Here and elsewhere Śaṅkara has called the upholders of this view Īśvara-kāraṇins. If Śiva or God was regarded as both the instrumental and the material cause of the world, according to the different Siddhānta schools of thought, then there would be no point in introducing the *sūtra* under reference, for according to Śaṅkara also, God is both the instrumental and the material cause of the world. Śaṅkara seems to refer here to the Pāśupata system which deals with the five categories, such as the cause (*kāraṇa*), effect (*kārya*), communion (*yoga*), rules of conduct (*vidhi*) and dissolution of sorrow (*duḥkḥānta*)¹. According to him it also holds that Pāśupati (God) is the instrumental cause of the world. In this view the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas also attribute the same kind of causality to God, and offer the same kind of arguments, i.e. the inference of the cause from the effect.

Vācaspati Miśra (A.D. 840), in commenting on the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, says that the Maheśvaras consist of the Śaivas, Pāśupatas, the Kāruṇika-siddhāntins and the Kāpālikas. Mādhava of the fourteenth century mentions the Śaivas as being Nakuliśa-pāśupatas who have been elsewhere mentioned as Lākuliśa-pāśupatas or Lakuliśa-pāśupatas, and they have been discussed in another section of the present work. Mādhava also mentions the *Śaiva-darśana* in which he formulates the philosophical doctrines found in the *Śaivāgamas* and their cognate literature. In addition to this he devotes a section to *pratyabhijñā-darśana*, commonly

¹ The skeleton of this system has already been dealt with in another section as *Pāśupata-śāstras*.

called Kāśmīr Śaivism. This system will also be dealt with in the present volume. Vācaspati mentions the Kāruṇika-siddhāntins and the Kāpālikas. Rāmānuja in his *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 37 mentions the name of Kāpālikas and Kālamukhas as being Śaiva sects of an anti-Vedic character. But in spite of my best efforts, I have been unable to discover any texts, published or unpublished, which deal with the special features of their systems of thought. We find some references to the Kāpālikas in literature like the *Mālatī-mādhava* of Bhavabhūti (A.D. 700–800) and also in some of the Purāṇas. Ānandagiri, a contemporary of Śaṅkara and a biographer, speaks of various sects of Śaivas with various marks and signs on their bodies and with different kinds of robes to distinguish themselves from one another. He also speaks of two schools of Kāpālikas, one Brahmanic and the other non-Brahmanic. In the Atharva-veda we hear of the Vrātyas who were devotees of Rudra. The Vrātyas evidently did not observe the caste-rules and customs. But the Vrātyas of the Atharva-veda were otherwise held in high esteem. But the Kāpālikas, whether they were Brahmanic or non-Brahmanic, indulged in horrid practices of drinking and indulging in sex-appetite and living in an unclean manner. It is doubtful whether there is any kind of proper philosophy, excepting the fact that they were worshippers of Bhairava the destroyer, who also created the world and maintained it. They did not believe in *karma*. They thought that there are minor divinities who perform various functions in world creation and maintenance according to the will of Bhairava. The Śūdra Kāpālikas did not believe also in the caste-system and all these Kāpālikas ate meat and drank wine in skulls as part of their rituals. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar thinks on the authority of *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* that the Kālamukhas were the same as the Mahāvratadharas. But the present author has not been able to trace any such passage in the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, and Bhandarkar does not give any exact reference to the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* containing this identification. The *Mahāvrata*, meaning the great vow, consists in eating food placed in a human skull and smearing the body with the ashes of human carcasses and others, which are attributed to the Kālamukhas by Rāmānuja. Bhandarkar also refers to the commentary of Jagaddhara on the *Mālatī-mādhava*, where the *Kāpālika-vrata* is called *Mahāvrata*. Bhandarkar further points out that the ascetics dwelling in the temple of

Kāpāleśvara near Nasik are called the Mahāvratins¹. Be that as it may, we have no proof that the Kāpālikas and Kālamukhas had any distinct philosophical views which could be treated separately. Members of their sects bruised themselves in performing particular kinds of rituals, and could be distinguished from other Śaivas by their indulgence in wines, women, and meat and even human meat. Somehow these rituals passed into Tāntric forms of worship, and some parts of these kinds of worship are found among the adherents of the Tāntric form of worship even to this day. Tāntric initiation is thus different from the Vedic initiation.

Frazer in his article on Śaivism in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* says that, in some well-known temples in South India, the ancient blood-rites and drunken orgies are permitted to be revived yearly as a compromise with the aboriginal worshippers, whose primitive shrines were annexed by Brahmin priests acting under the protection of local chieftains. These chieftains, in return for their patronage and countenance, obtained a rank as Kṣatriyas with spurious pedigrees. Frazer further gives some instances in the same article in which non-Brahmins and outcastes performed the worship of Śiva and also offered human sacrifices, and one of the places he mentions is Śrīśaila, the Kāpālika centre referred to by Bhavabhūti. These outcaste worshippers were ousted from the temple by some of the Buddhists, and thereafter the Buddhists were thrown out by the Brahmins. By the time of Śaṅkara, the Kāpālikas developed a strong centre in Ujjain. We, of course, do not know whether the South Indian cult of blood-rites as performed by Brahmins and non-Brahmins could be identified with the Kāpālikas and Kālamukhas; but it is quite possible that they were the same people, for Śrīśaila, mentioned by Bhavabhūti, which is described as an important Kāpālika centre, is also known to us as a centre of bloody rites from the *Sthala-māhātmya* records of that place as mentioned by Frazer. The Kāpālikas and Kālamukhas were anti-Vedic according to the statement of Rāmānuja in *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 37. Śaṅkara also, according to Ānandagiri, did not hold any discussion with the Kāpālikas, as their views were professedly anti-Vedic. He simply had them chastised and whipped. The Kāpālikas, however, continued in their primitive

¹ *Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*, by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar (1913), p. 128.

form and some of them were living even in Bengal, as is known to the present writer. The habit of smearing the body with ashes is probably very old in Śaivism, since we find the practice described in the *Pāśupata-sūtra* and in the *bhāṣya* of Kaunḍinya.

The Kāruṇika-siddhāntins mentioned by Vācaspati have not been referred to by Mādhava (fourteenth century) in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, and we do not find a reference to these in any of the *Śaivāgamas*. But from the statement of Śaiva philosophy in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā* of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, as discussed in another section (pp. 106–29), it is not difficult for us to reconstruct the reasons which might have led to the formation of a special school of Śaivism. We find that the doctrine of grace or *karuṇā* is not always found in the same sense in all the Āgamas, or in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā*, which was in all probability based on the Āgamas. Ordinarily the idea of grace or *karuṇā* would simply imply the extension of kindness or favour to one in distress. But in the *Śaivāgamas* there is a distinct line of thought where *karuṇā* or grace is interpreted as a divine creative movement for supplying all souls with fields of experience in which they may enjoy pleasures and suffer from painful experiences. The *karuṇā* of God reveals the world to us in just the same manner as we ought to experience it. Grace, therefore, is not a work of favour in a general sense, but it is a movement in favour of our getting the right desires in accordance with our *karma*. Creative action of the world takes place in consonance with our good and bad deeds, in accordance with which the various types of experience unfold themselves to us. In this sense, grace may be compared with the view of Yoga philosophy, which admits of a permanent will of God operating in the orderliness of the evolutionary creation (*pariṇāmakramanīyama*) for the protection of the world, and supplying it as the basis of human experience in accordance with their individual *karmas*. It is again different from the doctrine of *karuṇā* of the Rāmānuja Vaiṣṇavas, who introduce the concept of Mahālakṣmī, one who intercedes on behalf of the sinners and persuades Nārāyaṇa to extend His grace for the good of the devotees.

The word ‘*śiva*’ is supposed to have been derived irregularly from the root ‘*vaś kāntan*’. This would mean that Śiva always fulfils the desires of His devotees. This aspect of Śiva as a merciful Lord who is always prepared to grant any boons for which prayers

are offered to Him is very well depicted in the *Mahābhārata* and many other Purāṇas. This aspect of Śiva is to be distinguished from the aspect of Śiva as *rudra* or *śarva* or the god of destruction.

We have seen that we know practically nothing of any importance about the Kāpālikas and the Kālamukhas. The other doctrines of Śaivism of the South are those of the Pāśupatas, the Śaiva doctrines derived from the Āgamas and the Vaiṣṇavas. The other schools of Śaivism that developed in Kāśmīr in the ninth and tenth centuries will be separately discussed. The *Pāśupata-sūtra* with the *Pañcārtha bhāṣya* of Kauṇḍinya was first published from Trivandrum in 1940, edited by Anantakriṣṇa Śāstri. This *bhāṣya* of Kauṇḍinya is probably the same as the *Rāśīkara-bhāṣya* referred to by Mādhava in his treatment of *Nakuliśa-pāśupata-darśana* in *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*. Some of the lines found in Kauṇḍinya's *bhāṣya* have been identified by the present writer with the lines attributed to Rāśīkara by Mādhava in his treatment of the *Nakuliśa-pāśupata* system. Nakuliśa was the founder of the Pāśupata system. Aufrecht in the *Catalogus Catalogorum* mentions the *Pāśupata-sūtra*¹. The *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā* II. 24. 169, also mentions the *Pāśupata-śāstra* as the *Pañcārtha-vidyā*². Bhandarkar notes that in an inscription in the temple of Harṣanātha which exists in the Śīkar principality of the Jaipur State, a person of the name of Viśvarūpa is mentioned as the teacher of the *Pañcārthā-lākulāmnāya*. The inscription is dated v.E. 1013 = A.D. 957. From this Bhandarkar infers that the Pāśupata system was attributed to a human author named Lakulin and that the work composed by him was called *Pañcārtha*. This inference is not justifiable. We can only infer that in the middle of the tenth century Lakuliśa's doctrines were being taught by a teacher called Viśvarūpa, who was well reputed in Jaipur, and that Lakuliśa's teachings had attained such an authoritative position as to be called *āmnāya*, a term used to mean the Vedas.

In the *Pāśupata-sūtra* published in the Trivandrum series, the first *sūtra* as quoted by Kauṇḍinya is *athātaḥ paśupateḥ paśupataṃ*

¹ Bhandarkar notes it in his section on the Pāśupatas, *op. cit.* p. 121 n.

² The present writer could not find any such verse in the edition of *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* printed by the Venkatesvara Press, as II. 24 contains only seventy-two stanzas.

yogavidhiṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ. Here the *yoga-vidhi* is attributed to Paśupati or Śiva. In the *Sūtasamhitā* iv. 43. 17, we hear of a place called Nakula and the Śiva there is called Nakuliśa. The editor of the *Pāśupata-sūtra* mentions the names of eighteen teachers beginning with Nakuliśa¹. These names are (1) Nakuliśa, (2) Kauśika, (3) Gārgya, (4) Maitreya, (5) Kauruṣa, (6) Īśāna, (7) Paragārgya, (8) Kapilāṇḍa, (9) Maṇuṣyaka, (10) Kuśika, (11) Atri, (12) Piṅgalākṣa, (13) Puṣpaka, (14) Bṛhadārya, (15) Agasti, (16) Santāna, (17) Kauṇḍinya or Rāśikara, (18) Vidyāguru. The present writer is in agreement with the view of the editor of the *Pāśupata-sūtra*, that Kauṇḍinya the *bhāṣyakāra* lived somewhere from the fourth to the sixth century A.D. The style of the *bhāṣya* is quite archaic, and no references to the later system of thought can be found in Kauṇḍinya's *bhāṣya*. We have already seen that according to the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* there were twenty-eight yogācāryas and that each of them had four disciples so that there were 112 yogācāryas. Out of these twenty-eight yogācāryas the most prominent were Lokākṣī, Jaigīṣavya, Ṛṣabha, Bhṛgu, Atri and Gautama. The last and the twenty-eighth ācārya was Lakuliśa, born at Kāyā-vatarana-tīrtha. Among the 112 yogācāryas, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Kapila, Āsuri, Pañcaśikha, Parāśara, Garga, Bhārgava, Aṅgira, Śuka, Vaśiṣṭha, Bṛhaspati, Kuṇi, Vāmadeva, Śvetaketu, Devala, Śālihotra, Agniveśa, Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, Kumāra and Ruru are the most prominent².

¹ These names are taken from Rājasekhara's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* composed during the middle of the fourteenth century. Almost the same names with slight variations are found in Guṇaratna's commentary on *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*.

² See *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, *Vāyavīya Samhitā* II. 9, and also *Kūrma-purāṇa* I. 53. The *Vāyu-purāṇa* describes in the twenty-third chapter the names of the four disciples of each of the twenty-eight ācāryas. Viśuddha Muni mentions the name of Lakuliśa in his work called *Ātma-samarpaṇa*. See also Introduction to the *Pāśupata-sūtra*, p. 3 n.

The list of twenty-eight teachers given in the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* does not always tally with the list collected by other scholars, or with that which is found in the *Ātma samarpaṇa* by Viśuddha Muni. It seems therefore that some of these names are quite mythical, and as their works are not available, their names are not much used. Viśuddha Muni summarises the main items of self-control, *yama*, from the *Pāśupata-śāstra*, which are more or less of the same nature as the *yamas* or measures of self-control as found in the *Yogaśāstra* introduced by Patañjali. It is not out of place here to mention that the concept of God in *Yogaśāstra* is of the same pattern as that of the Paśupati in the *Pāśupata-sūtra* and *bhāṣya*.

Mr Dalal in his introduction to *Gaṇakārikā* says that the *Lākuliśa-pāśupata-darśana* is so called from Lakuliśa, who originated the system. *Lakuliśa* means "a lord of those bearing a staff". Lakuliśa is often regarded as an incarnation of God Śiva with a citron in the right hand and a staff in the left. The place of the incarnation is Kāyārohaṇa in Bhṛgu-kṣetra which is the same as Kāraṇa, a town in the Dabhoi Taluka of the Baroda State. In the *Kāraṇa-māhātmya* it is said that a son of a Brahmin in the village Ulkāpurī appeared as Lakuliśa and explained the methods and merits of worshipping and tying a silken cloth to the image of the God Lakuliśa. This work is divided into four chapters; the first is from the *Vāyu-purāṇa*, the remaining three are from the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*. At the commencement of the work, there is obeisance to Maheśvara, who incarnated himself as Lakūṭa-pānīśa. There is a dialogue there between Śiva and Pārvatī, in which the latter asks Śiva of the merits of tying a silken cloth. Śiva then relates the story of his incarnation between the Kali and Dvāpara yugas as a Brahmin named Viśvarāja in the family of the sage Atri. His mother was Sudarśana. Some miraculous myths relating to this child, who was an incarnation of Śiva, are narrated in the *Kāraṇa Māhātmya*, but they may well be ignored here.

We have already mentioned the name of Atri as being one of the important teachers of the Pāśupata school. But according to the account of these teachers as given above, Nakuliśa should be regarded as the first founder of the system. We have seen also that by the middle of the tenth century there was a teacher of the *Pañcārtha-lākulāmnāya*, which must be the same as the doctrine propounded in the *Pāśupata-sūtra*. It is difficult to say how early the concept of Paśupati might have evolved. From the Mohenjodaro excavations we have a statuette in which Śiva is carved as sitting on a bull, with snakes and other animals surrounding Him. This is the representation in art of the concept of the lord of *paśus* or *paśupati*, which is found in pre-Vedic times. The concept of Śiva may be traced through the Vedas and also through the Upaniṣads and particularly so in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. The same idea can be traced in the *Mahābhārata* and many other Purāṇas. The religious cult of Śiva, which defines the concept of Śiva in its various mythological bearings, has to be given up here, as the interest of the present work is definitely restricted to

philosophical ideas and the ethical and social attitude of the followers of Śiva¹.

It must, however, be said that the Śaiva philosophy and the worship of Śiva had spread itself far and wide throughout the whole of the peninsula long before the eighth century A.D. We have the most sacred temples of Śiva in the north in Badrikāśrama, in Nepal (Paśupati-nātha), in Kāśmīr, in Prabhāsa, in Kathiawar (the temple of Somanātha), in Benaras (the temple of Viśvanātha), the Nakuliśvara temple in Calcutta, and the temple of Rāmeśvaram in extreme South India. This is only to mention some of the most important places of Śiva-worship. As a matter of fact, the worship of Śiva is found prevalent almost in every part of India, and in most of the cities we find the temples of Śiva either in ruins or as actual places of worship. Śiva is worshipped generally in the form of the phallic symbol and generally men of every caste and women also may touch the symbol and offer worship. The Śaiva forms of initiation and the Tāntric forms of initiation are to be distinguished from the Vedic forms of initiation, which latter is reserved only for the three higher castes. But as the present work is intended to deal with the philosophy of Śaivism and Tāntricism, all relevant allusions to rituals and forms of worship will be dropped as far as possible.

The Jaina writer Rājaśekhara of the middle of the fourteenth century mentions the name of Śaiva philosophy in his *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* and calls it a *yoga-mata*². He describes the Śaiva ascetics as holding staves in their hands and wearing long loin cloths (*praudha-kaupīna-paridhāyinah*). They had also blankets for covering their bodies, matted locks of hair, and their bodies were smeared with ashes. They ate dry fruits, bore a vessel of gourd (*tumbaka*), and generally lived in forests. Some of them had wives, while others lived a lonely life. Rājaśekhara further says that the Śaivas admitted eighteen incarnations of Śiva, the Overlord, who creates and destroys the world. We have already mentioned the names of the teachers that are found in *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*. These teachers were particularly adored and among

¹ Those who are interested in the study of the evolution of the different aspects of God Śiva, may consult Bhandarkar's *Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism*, and also the article on Śaivism by Frazer in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

² *atha yoga-mataṃ brumāḥ, śaivism-ity-aparā-bhidham*. Rājaśekhara's *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, p. 8 (2nd edition, Benares).

them it was Akṣapāda who enunciated a system of logic in which he discussed the *pramāṇas*, perception, inference, analogy and testimony and also described the sixteen categories that are found in the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama or Akṣapāda. Rājāśekhara mentions the names of Jayanta, Udayana, and Bhāsarvajña. Thus according to Rājāśekhara the Naiyāyikas were regarded as Śaivas. It does not seem that Rājāśekhara had made any definite study of the Nyāya system, but based his remarks on the tradition of the time¹. He also regards the Vaiśeṣikas as Pāśupatas. The Vaiśeṣika saints wore the same kind of dress and the marks as the Naiyāyikas and admitted the same teachers, but they held that the perception and inference were the only two *pramāṇas* and that the other *pramāṇas* were included within them. He also mentions the six categories that we find in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. Rājāśekhara calls the Naiyāyikas Yaugas. The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya are more or less of the same nature and both of them regard the dissolution of sorrow as ultimate liberation. Guṇaratna, the commentator of Haribhadra Suri's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* was a Jaina writer like Rājāśekhara and he was in all probability a later contemporary of him. Many of his descriptions of the Naiyāyikas or Yaugas seem to have been taken from Rājāśekhara's work, or it may also have been that Rājāśekhara borrowed it from Guṇaratna, the descriptions being the same in many places. Guṇaratna says that there were found kinds of Śaivas such as the Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Mahāvratadharas and the Kālamukhas². In addition to these both Guṇaratna and Rājāśekhara speak of those who take the vow (*vrātas*) of service to Śiva and they are called Bharatas and Bhaktas. Men of any caste

¹ *śrūtānusārataḥ proktaṁ naiyāyika-mataṁ mayā. Ibid. p. 10.*

² *śaivaḥ pāśupataścaiva mahāvratā-dharas tathā,
turyāḥ kālamukhā mukhyā bheda ete tapasvinām.*

Guṇaratna's commentary on Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*, p. 51 (Suali's edition, Calcutta, 1905).

According to Guṇaratna, therefore, the Mahāvratadharas and the Kālamukhas are entirely different. The Kāpālikas are not mentioned by Guṇaratna. These four classes of Śaivas were originally Brahmins and they had the sacred thread. Their difference was largely due to their different kinds of rituals and behaviour (*ācāra*):

*ādihāra-bhasma-kaupīna-jaṭā-yajñopavītināḥ,
sva-svācārādi-bhedena caturdhā syus tapasvināḥ.*

Rāmānuja mentions the names of Kāpālikas and Kālamukhas as being outside the pale of the Vedas (*veda-bāhya*). In *Saṅkara-vijaya* of Ānandagiri also the Kāpālikas are represented as being outside the pale of the Vedas. But the Kālamukhas are not mentioned there.

could be included in the class of Bharatas (servants) and Bhaktas (devotees) of Śiva. The Naiyāyikas were always regarded as devotees of Śiva and they were called Śaivas. The Vaiśeṣika philosophy was called Pāśupata¹. Haribhadra also says that the Vaiśeṣikas admitted the same divinity as the Naiyāyikas².

Excluding the Kāpālikas and the Kālamukhas, about whom we know very little except the traditional imputations against their rituals and non-Vedic conduct, we have the text of the Pāśupata system and the Śaiva philosophy as described in the Śaiva Āgamas. We have also the *Pāśupata-śāstra* as described in the *Vāyaviya saṃhitā*, the Śaiva philosophy of Śrīkaṇṭha as elaborated by Appaya Dikṣita, and the Śaiva philosophy as expounded by King Bhoja of Dhāra in his *Tattva-prakāśa* as explained by Śrīkumāra and Aghora-śivācārya. We have also the Vīra-śaivism which evolved at a later date and was explained in a commentary on *Brahma-sūtra* by Śrīpati Paṇḍita who is generally placed in the fourteenth century³. Śrīpati Paṇḍita was posterior to the Pāśupatas and Rāmānuja, and also to Ekorāma and the five ācāryas of the Vīra-śaiva religion. Śrīpati was also posterior to Mādhavācārya. But it is curious that Madhava seems to know nothing either of Vīraśaivism or of Śrīpati Paṇḍita. He was of course posterior to Basava of the twelfth century, who is generally regarded as being the founder of Vīra-śaivism. As Hayavadana Rao points out, Śrīpati was posterior to Śrīkaṇṭha, who wrote a *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*⁴. We have treated in a separate section the philosophy of Śrīkaṇṭha. Śrīkaṇṭha lived somewhere in the eleventh century and may have been a junior contemporary of Rāmānuja. Śrīkaṇṭha in his treatment of *Brahma-sūtra* III. 3. 27-30, criticises the views of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. Hayavadana Rao thinks on inscriptional grounds that Śrīkaṇṭha was living in A.D. 1122⁵.

Meykaṇḍadeva, the most famous author of the Tamil translation of the Sanskrit work *Śiva-jñāna-bodha* belonged to Tiru-

¹ See Guṇaratna's commentary, p. 51.

² *devatā-viśayo bhedo nāsti naiyāyikair samam,
vaiśeṣikānām tattve tu vidyate'sau nidarśyate.*

Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*, p. 266.

³ C. Hayavadana Rao's *Śrīkara-bhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 31.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 36.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 41.

venneyllur near the South Arcot district. There is an inscription in the sixteenth year of the Chola King Rājārāja III (A.D. 1216-48) which records a gift of land to an image set up by Meykaṇḍa. This fixes the date of Meykaṇḍadeva, the disciple of Parañjoti muni to about the middle of the thirteenth century. Hayvadana Rao after a long discussion comes to the view that Meykaṇḍa actually lived about A.D. 1235, if not a little earlier¹. From inscriptional sources it has been ascertained that Śrīkaṇṭha, the commentator of *Brahma-sūtra* lived about A.D. 1270. It is quite possible that Meykaṇḍa and Śrīkaṇṭha were contemporaries. The philosophical difference between Meykaṇḍa and Śrīkaṇṭha is quite remarkable, and the two persons cannot therefore be identified as one². Śrīkaṇṭha thinks that the world is a transformation of the *cicchakti* of the Lord. It does not provide for the creation of the material world, does not speak of the *āṇava-mala*, and is apparently not in favour of *jīvan-mukti*. Further Śrīkaṇṭha appears to establish his system on the basis of the *śruti*. Meykaṇḍa, however, tries to establish his system on the basis of inference, and there are many other points of difference as will be easily seen from our treatment of Meykaṇḍadeva. It does not seem that Śrīkaṇṭha had any relation with Meykaṇḍadeva.

Śrīpati quotes from Haradatta in very reverential terms. Hayvadana Rao refers to an account of the life of Haradatta as given in the *Bhaviṣyottara-purāṇa*, and to the writings of his commentator Śiva-liṅga-bhūpati, which would assign Haradatta to the Kali age 3979, corresponding roughly to A.D. 879. In the *Śiva-rahasya-dīpikā*, however, Kali age 3000 is given as a rough approximation of the date of Haradatta. Professor Shesagiri Śāstrī accepts the former date as a more correct one and identifies the Haradatta quoted in *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* as being the same as the author of *Harihara-tāratamya* and the *Caturveda-tātparyasaṃgraha*. As we have mentioned elsewhere, Haradatta was the author of the *Gaṇakārikā*. Mr Dalal in all probability had confused the two in his introduction to the *Gaṇakārikā*, in which he says that Bhāsarvajna was the author of *Gaṇakārikā*. In reality Haradatta wrote only the *Kārikā*, and the Nyāya author Bhāsar-

¹ *Ibid.* p. 48.

² *Ibid.* p. 49. The systems of Śrīkaṇṭha and of Meykaṇḍa have been dealt with in separate sections of the present work.

vajña wrote a commentary on it called the *Ratnaṭīkā*¹. Śrīpati also quotes from *Siddhānta śikhāmaṇi*, a Viraśaiva work written by Revanārya.

It is curious to note that though Vira-śaivism was founded at least as early as the time of Basava (A.D. 1157-67), Mādhava in the fourteenth century does not know anything of Vira-śaivism. It is, however, doubtful if Basava was really the founder of Vira-śaivism in India. We have got some sayings in Canarese known as the *vacanas* of Basava, but we find that his name is seldom mentioned as a teacher of any articles of the Vira-śaiva faith. There is a semi-mythical account of Basava in a work called *Basava-purāṇa*. It is said there that Śiva asked Nandin to incarnate himself in the world for the propagation of the Vira-śaiva faith. Basava was this incarnation. He was a native of Bāgevāḍi from where he went to Kalyāṇa where Vijjala or Vijjana was reigning (A.D. 1157-67). His maternal uncle, Baladeva, was the minister, and he himself was raised to that position after his death. Basava's sister was given away to the king. He was in charge of the treasury and spent large sums in supporting and entertaining the Liṅgayat priests or mendicants called Jaṅgamas. When the king came to know of this, he became angry and sent troops to punish him. Basava collected a small army and defeated these troops. The king brought him back to Kalyāṇa and there was apparently some reconciliation between them. But Basava later on caused the king to be assassinated. This depicts Basava more as a scheming politician than as a propounder of new faith.

Returning to our treatment of the literature of the Pāśupatas, we see that between the Vaiṣṇavas and the monists like the Śaṅkarites we have a system of thought representing the monotheistic point of view. This view appears in diverse forms in which God is sometimes regarded as being established as upholding the universe, but beyond it; sometimes it is held that God is beyond the world and has created it by the material of His own energy; at other times it

¹ The colophon of the *Gaṇakārikā* runs as follows:
ācārya-bhāsarvajña-viracitāyāṃ gaṇakārikāyāṃ
ratnaṭīkā parisamāptā.

This led to the confusion that the *Gaṇakārikā* was the composition of Bhāsarvajña, who only wrote the commentary. This Haradatta must be distinguished from the Haradatta of the *Padamañjarī* on the *Kāśikā-vṛtti*, and also from the commentator of the *Āpastamba-sūtra*.

has been held that God and energy are one and the same. Sometimes it has been held that God has created the world by His mercy or grace and that His grace is the inner dynamic force which follows the course of creation and maintenance. It is in this way that a compromise has been made between the theory of grace and the theory of *karma*. There are others, however, who think that we do not as of necessity have a right to reap the fruits of our actions, but we have to be satisfied with what is given to us by God. The Pāsupatas hold this view, and it is important to notice that the Nyāya which admits the doctrine of *karma* also thinks that we are only entitled to such enjoyments and experiences as are allotted to us by God. The fact that both the Nyāya and the Pāsupatas think that God can be established by inference, and that the grace of God is ultimately responsible for all our experiences, naturally leads us to link together the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view with the Pāsupata view. The tradition is preserved in the two *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccayas* of Rājaśekhara and Haribhadra with Guṇaratna, which, as well as the benedictory verses in most Nyāya works until the tenth and eleventh centuries, justify the assumption that the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika was a school of Pāsupatas which paid more emphasis to evolving a system of logic and metaphysics. The Pāsupata system generally accepted the caste-division, and only those belonging to higher castes could claim to attain spiritual liberation. Yet as time rolled on we find that men of all castes could become devotees or servants of God and be regarded as Śaivas. We find the same kind of gradual extension and withdrawal of caste system among the Vaiṣṇavas also. Both in Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism, *bhakti* or devotion to God came to be regarded as the criterion of the faith.

We have already referred to the statement in the *Kāraṇa-māhātmya* about how the Lord incarnated Himself as a descendant of Atri. He is said to have walked to Ujjain and taught a Brahmin there called Kuśika who came from Brahmāvarta. These teachings were in the form of the present *sūtras* called the *Pañcārtha*, the main substance of which has already been described. It is generally believed that the original *sūtras*, divided into five chapters (*pañcārtha*), were composed somewhere in the first or the second century A.D. The *bhāṣya* of Kauṇḍinya is probably the same as the *Rāṣikara bhāṣya*. Kauṇḍinya does not mention the name of any writer contemporary to him. He refers to the *Sāṃkhya-yoga* but

not to Vedānta or the Upaniṣads. It is interesting to note therefore that this system does not pretend to claim the authority of the Upaniṣads or its support. The authority of the *sūtras* is based on the assumption that they were composed by Paśupati himself. There are many quotations in the work of Kauṇḍinya, but it is not possible to identify their sources. The style of Kauṇḍinya's *bhāṣya* reminds one of the writings of Patañjali the grammarian, who probably lived about 150 B.C. Kauṇḍinya is generally believed to have lived between A.D. 400-600, though I do not know why he could not be placed even a century or two earlier. The date of *Gaṇakārikā* is rather uncertain. But Bhāsarvajña wrote a commentary on it called *Ratnaṭīkā*. He seems to have lived in the middle of the tenth century A.D. It is interesting to note that the temple of Somanātha is also mentioned in the *Kāraṇa-māhātmya* as one of the most important Pāśupata centres.

In the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* of Mādhava of the fourteenth century, we find a treatment of Nakuliśa-pāśupata system, the Śaiva system and the Pratyabhijñā system of Kāśmīr. The Nakuliśa-pāśupata system is based upon the *Pāśupata-sūtra* and the *bhāṣya* of Kauṇḍinya called also the *Rāśīkara-bhāṣya*. The Śaiva system is based on the various *Śaivāgamas* and also on the *Tattva-prakāśa* of Bhoja. Thus Mādhava mentions about ten Śaiva works which, with many others, have been available to the present writer either in whole manuscripts or in fragments¹. Śaṅkara, in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 37, speaks of the Māheśvaras along with others who regarded God as the instrumental cause, but not the material cause. He does not seem to distinguish the subdivisions of the Maheśvaras. But Vācaspati speaks of four subdivisions of the Maheśvaras. Mādhava, however, treats the two types of the Śaiva school as Nakuliśa-pāśupata and Śaiva in two different sections. From Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* it appears that he was familiar only with the *Pañcārtha* of the *Pāśupata-sūtra*. But Ānandagiri in his *Śaṅkara-vijaya* refers to six different kinds of Śaiva sects such as Śaiva, Raudra, Ugra, Bhaṭṭa, Jaṅgama and Pāśupata. These different sects bore different kinds of marks on

¹ The works mentioned by Mādhava in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* are as follows: *Mygendrāgama*, *Paṣkarāgama*, *Tattva-prakāśa* of Bhoja, Soma-sambhu's *bhāṣya*, Aghora-śivācārya's commentary on *Tattva-prakāśa*, *Kālotta-rāgama*, Rāmakaṇḍa's commentary on *Kālottarā*, *Kiraṇāgama*, *Saurabheyāgama* and *Jñāna-ratnāvalī*.

their bodies and distinguished themselves from one another by various rituals. But most of their specific religious literature now in all probability has long disappeared. The Pāśupatas have a literature, and the sect is still living. But the external signs of the Pāśupatas as found in *Śaṅkara-vijaya* are entirely different from those which are found in Guṇaratna's commentary. Guṇaratna (fourteenth century) regards the Kāṇādas as Pāśupatas. He also regards the Naiyāyikas, called also the Yaugas, as being Śaivites of the same order as the Kāṇādas, and behaving in the same manner, and bearing the same kind of marks as the Kāṇādas. From the description of the Śaiva sects by Ānandagiri very little can be made out of the doctrines of those Śaiva sects. One can only say that some of those Śaivas believed that God was the instrumental cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*), besides the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*). Śaṅkara refuted this type of Śaivism in his commentary on *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 37. Both Pāśupatas and the followers of the *Śaivāgama* held the instrumentality of God, while Śaṅkara regarded God as being both the instrumental and material cause. In the *Śaṅkara-vijaya* we also find reference to some schools of Śaivism, the members of which wore the stone phallic symbols on their bodies. They held a doctrine similar to the *ṣaṭ-sthala* doctrine of the Vīra-śaivas, though we find the proper formulation of the Vīra-śaiva system at least five hundred years after Ānandagiri. We have seen that Vācaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmati* speaks of four types of Śaivas. Mādhava of the fourteenth century describes only two sects of Śaivas as Nakulīśa-pāśupata and the Śaivas of the Āgamas, excluding the separate treatment of the *Pratyabhijñā* system generally known as the Kāśmīr school of Śaivism.

The *Śaivāgamas* or Siddhāntas are supposed to have been originally written by Maheśvara, probably in Sanskrit. But it is said in *Śiva-dharmottara* that these were written in Sanskrit, Prākṛt and the local dialects¹. This explains the fact that the Āgamas are available both in Sanskrit and some Dravidian languages such as Tamil, Telegu, and Kanarese. It also explains the controversy as to whether the Āgamas or Siddhāntas were originally written in

¹ *saṃskṛtaiḥ prākṛtaiḥ vākyaair yaśca śiṣyānurūptāḥ
deśa-bhāṣā-dyupāyaś ca bodhayet sa guruḥ smṛtaḥ.*

Śiva-dharmottara quoted in *Śiva-jñāna-siddhi*. (MS. no. 3726, Oriental Research Institute, Mysore.)

Sanskrit or in the Dravidian tongue. The present writer had the good fortune to collect a large number of the Āgamas either as complete wholes or in fragmentary portions. Many of the manuscripts are in a decaying state and some of them have been completely lost. The Sanskrit manuscripts on which our present attempt is founded are available in the big manuscript libraries at Triplicane, Adyar and Mysore. It is curious to note that Benares, the principal seat of Śaivism, has but few manuscripts of importance. The important Siddhāntas and Āgamas are quite numerous and most of them are in manuscripts mainly in South India¹. The same works may be found also in many cases in the whole Dravidian language; but the inspiration and the thought are almost always taken from Sanskrit. The essence of Dravidian culture is therefore almost wholly taken from Sanskrit, at least so far as philosophy is concerned.

The study of old Tamil is fairly difficult, and those who had made a lifelong study of Tamil, like Pope or Schomercus, had but little time to dig into Sanskrit to any appreciable extent. The present writer, being unacquainted with the Dravidian languages, had to depend almost wholly on the Sanskrit literature, but has taken good care to ascertain that the works in Dravidian, pertinent to the subject, are well represented in the Sanskrit manuscripts.

It is difficult to ascertain the respective dates of the Āgamas. We only feel that most of the Āgamas mentioned above were completed by the ninth century A.D. Some of them were current in the time of Śaṅkarācārya, who lived some time in the eighth or

¹ Some of the Āgamas are as follows: *Kāmika*, *Yogaja*, *Cintya*, *Kāraṇa*, *Ajita*, *Dīpta*, *Sūkṣma*, *Aṃsumāna*, *Suprabhedha*, *Vijaya*, *Niḥśvāsa*, *Svāyambhuva*, *Vīra*, *Raurava*, *Makuta*, *Vimala*, *Candra-jñāna*, *Bimba*, *Lalita*, *Santāna*, *Sarvokta*, *Pārameśvara*, *Kiraṇa*, *Vātula*, *Śiva-jñāna-bodha*, *Anala*, *Prodgīta*.

In the *Śiva-jñāna-siddhi* we find extensive quotations from other Āgamas and Tantras as illustrating the philosophical and religious position of Siddhāntas. The works from which the quotations have been taken are as follows: *Hima-saṃhitā*, *Cintya-viśva*, *Śiva-dharmottara* (*purāṇa*), *Paṇḍara*, *Siddha-tantra*, *Sarva-matopanyāsa*, *Parā*, *Ratna-traya*, *Nivāsa*, *Mr̥gendra*, *Jñāna-kārikā*, *Nāda-kārikā*, *Kālottara*, *Viśva-sārottara*, *Vāyavya*, *Mātāṅga*, *Suddha*, *Sarva-jñānottara*, *Siddhānta-rahasya*, *Jñāna-ratnāvali*, *Meru-tantra*, *Svacchanda* and *Devī-kālottara*.

Most of the above Āgamas are written in Sanskrit characters in about half a dozen Dravidian languages, such as Tamil, Telegu, Kanarese, Grantha and Nandi-nāgri. Several Tantras based on these Āgamas are also found as Sanskrit compositions in Dravidian scripts. So far as the knowledge of the present writer goes, there is hardly anything of philosophical value or systematic thought which is available in Dravidian, and not available in Sanskrit.

ninth century A.D. Some of the Purāṇas also mention the names of some of the Āgamas referred to above. The *bhāṣya* of Kaunḍinya on the *Pāśupata-sūtras* has many untraceable quotations, but there is no mention of the names of the Āgamas referred to above, though one might have expected reference to the names of some of these Āgamas, as they carry on the same faith in different fashions. On the other hand, the Āgamas do not mention the name of the *Pāśupata-sūtras* or the *bhāṣya* of Kaunḍinya. It seems, therefore, that though later writers sometimes mixed up the Pāśupata and the Āgamic systems, as for example the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā*, or in later times Appayadiḥṣita, Śaṅkara himself speaks only of the Siddhāntas written by Maheśvara. Vācaspati refers to four schools of Śaivism, and Mādhava refers to two schools of southern Śaivism, Nakuliśa-pāśupata and the Śaivas. In still later times, in the Jaina tradition as kept by Rājaśekhara and Guṇaratna, we find the names of a long list of teachers of the Pāśupata school. We find also the names of twenty-eight yogācāryas, each having four disciples, in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā*.

We have already discussed in a separate section the essence of the Āgamic system as preserved in the *Tattva-prakāśa* of Bhoja with the commentary of Śrīkumāra and Aghora-śivācārya. Mādhava in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* also mentions the names of some of the Āgamas and Āgamic writers referred to above.

Schomerus in his *Der Śaiva Siddhānta*, in which he describes the particular form of Śaiva monism, speaks of the names of various other schools of Śaivism as he picks them up on a commentary on *Śiva-jñāna-bodha*¹. The Śaiva-siddhānta view dealt with by Schomerus is one of the many trends of Śaiva thought that was prevalent in the country. Schomerus thinks that they are more or less the same except the Pāśupata, the Virāśaiva and the Pratyabhijñā. Schomerus does not seem to utilise the texts of the Āgamas and to show in what way they proceeded with the subject. We have, however, in our treatment of Āgamic Śaivism, tried to utilise the materials of the Āgamas that are still available as complete wholes or in fragments. But a large part of the Āgamas deals

¹ He puts them in two groups: (i) Pāśupata, Māvratā-vāda (possibly Mahāvratā), Kāpālika, Vāma, Bhairava, Aikya-vāda; (ii) Ūrdha-śaiva, Anādi-śaiva, Ādi-śaiva, Mahā-śaiva, Bheda-śaiva, Abheda-śaiva, Antara-śaiva, Guṇa-śaiva, Nirguṇa-śaiva, Adhvan-śaiva, Yoga-śaiva, Jñāna-śaiva, Aṇu-śaiva, Kriyā-śaiva, Nālu-pāda-śaiva, Suddha-śaiva.

with rituals, forms of worship, construction of the places of worship and *mantras*, and the like. These have no philosophical value and could not, therefore, be taken account of and had simply to be ignored.

The Āgamic Śaivism belongs principally to the Tamil country, the Pāśupata to Gujarat and Pratyabhijñā to Kāśmīr and the northern parts of India. The Vīra-śaiva is found mostly among the Kanarese-speaking countries. Schomerus points out that it is sometimes claimed that the Āgamas were written in the Dravidian languages in prehistoric times, and that they owe their origin to revelation by Śiva, to Nandiperuman in the form of Śrīkaṇṭha-rudra in the Mahendra Parbata in Tinivelly District. Owing to a great flood much of these twenty-eight Āgamas were lost. The rest is now available in the Sanskrit translations and even the Dravidian texts abound with Sanskrit words. But this claim cannot be substantiated in any way. The reference to the Āgamas is found in the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā* of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* and the *Sūta-saṃhitā*¹. The references show that the *Kāmika* and other Āgamas were written in Sanskrit, as they formed a cognate literature with the Vedas. Portions of the *Kāmika* in Sanskrit quotations have been available to the present writer; similarly *Mṛgendra*, which formed a part of the *Kāmika*, is wholly available in Sanskrit. In the section on the Āgamic Śaivism the present writer has drawn his materials from these Āgamas. It has already been noted that there is a definite text in the *Svāyaṃbhuvāgama* that these Sanskrit works were translated into Prākṛt and other local dialects. We are, therefore, forced to think that the assertion that these Āgamas were originally written in Dravidian and then translated into Sanskrit, seems only to be a mythical patriotic belief of the Tamil people.

Schomerus mentions the names of twenty-eight *Śaivāgamas*, though he sometimes spells them wrongly². He further mentions

¹ In *Sūta-saṃhitā*, part 1, ch. 2, we find that the Vedas, Dharmasāstras, Purāṇas, Mahābhārata, Vedāṅgas, Upavedas, the Āgamas such as *Kāmika*, etc. the *Kāpāla* and the *Lākula*, the *Pāśupata*, the *Soma* and the *Bhairavāgamas* and such other Āgamas are mentioned in the same breath as forming a cognate literature. *Sūta-saṃhitā* is generally regarded as a work of the sixth century A.D.

² *Kāmika*, *Yogaja*, *Cintya*, *Kāraṇa*, *Ajita*, *Dipta*, *Sūkṣma*, *Sāhasraka*, *Aṇsumān*, *Suprabhedha*, *Vijaya*, *Niḥśvāsa*, *Svāyaṃbhuvā*, *Anila*, *Vīra*, *Raurava*, *Makūṭa*, *Vimala*, *Candrahāsa*, *Mukha-jug-bimba* or *Bimba*, *Udgīta* or *Prodgīta*, *Lālita*, *Siddha*, *Santāna*, *Nārasīṃha*, *Pārameśvara*, *Kīraṇa* and *Vātula*. Most of these have been already mentioned by the present writer and some of them are in his possession. Schomerus says that these names are found in Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya*, but the present writer is definite that they are not to be found there.

the names of fourteen canonical texts forming the materials of the *Śaiva-siddhānta Śāstra*. They are written in Tamil and the present writer only has the privilege of having the Sanskrit texts of the most important of them called the *Śiva-jñāna-bodha* of Meykaṇḍadeva¹.

Meykaṇḍadeva's *Śiva-jñāna-bodha* is a brief summary in twelve verses of an argumentative character taken from *Rauravāgama*. These twelve verses have also commentaries called *Vārtika* and a number of other sub-commentaries. Meykaṇḍadeva's real name was Svetabana, and there are a number of mythical statements about him. A great scholar Aruḷ-nanti Śivācārya became the disciple of Meykaṇḍadeva. Namaḥ-śivāya-deśika was the fifth disciple in succession of Meykaṇḍadeva, and Umāpati, who was the third successor of Meykaṇḍadeva, lived in A.D. 1313. It is held, therefore, that Meykaṇḍa lived in the first third of the thirteenth century. Umāpati was also the author of the *Pauṣkarāgama*.

The earliest Tamil author of Śaiva-siddhānta is Tirumular, who probably lived in the first century A.D. Only a part of his writings has been translated in the *Siddhānta-dīpikā* by N. Pillai. The later four Ācāryas of Śaiva-siddhānta are Mānikka-vāchakar, Appar, Jñāna-sambandha and Sundara, who flourished probably in the eighth century. Later on we have two important Śaiva-siddhānta writers, Nampiyāṇḍār and Sekkilar. The former has a collection of works which passed by the name of *Tamil-veda*. He flourished probably towards the end of the eleventh century.

This Tamil-veda is even now recited in Śaivite temples of the south. It consists of eleven books; the first seven are of the nature of hymns. Of three Ācāryas, Appar, Jñāna-sambandha and Sundara, the eighth book is *Tiru-vāchaka*, the ninth again consists of hymns. In the tenth book we find again some hymns of Tirumular. A part of the eleventh book contains mythological legends which form the groundwork of *Periya-purāṇa*, the basis of the most important Tamil legends of the Tamil saints. The book was completed by the eleventh century. The Śaiva-siddhānta

¹ The Tamil works referred to by Schomerus as forming the group of the *Śaiva-siddhānta Śāstra* are as follows: *Śiva-jñāna-bodha*, *Śiva-jñāna-siddhi*, *Irupavirupathu*, *Tiruvuntiyar*, *Tirukkalirrupadiyar*, *Unmaiivilakka*, *Śiva-prakāśa*, *Tiruvāruḍpayan*, *Vinā-veṇba*, *Porripakrodai*, *Kodikkavi*, *Nencuvitūtū*, *Uṇ-maineriivilakka* and *Sanḥkalpa-nirākaraṇa*. The *Śiva-jñāna-bodha* of twelve verses is supposed to be a purport of the *Rauravāgama* and it has eight commentaries.

school sprang forth as a school of Śaivism in the thirteenth century with Meykaṇḍadeva and his pupils Aruṇanti and Umāpati.

The account of Śaivism, as can be gathered from the Tamil sources, may be found in Pope's translation of *Tiru-vāchaka*, *Der Śaiva-siddhānta* by Schomerus, and in the writings of N. Pillai. The present writer is unfamiliar with the Tamil language and he has collected his account from original Sanskrit manuscripts of the Āgamas of which the Tamil treatment is only a replica.

The Āgama Literature and its Philosophical Perspective.

The philosophical views that are found in the Āgama literature had been briefly summarised in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* under Śaivism and have also been treated fairly elaborately in some of the sections of the present work. The Āgama literature is pretty extensive, but its philosophical achievement is rather poor. The Āgamas contain some elements of philosophical thought, but their interest is more on religious details of the cult of Śaivism. We find therefore a good deal of ritualism, discussion of the architectural techniques for the foundation of temples, and *mantras* and details of worship connected with the setting up of the phallic symbol of Śiva. Yet in most of the Āgamas there is a separate section called the *Vidyā-pāda* in which the general philosophical view underlying the cult is enunciated. There are slight differences in the enunciation of these views as we pass on from one Āgama to another. Most of these Āgamas still lie unpublished, and yet they form the religious kernel of Śaivism as practised by millions of people in different parts of India. There may thus be a natural inquiry as to what may be the essential tenets of these Āgamas. This, however, cannot be given without continual repetitions of the same kind of dogmatic thought. The present work is, of course, mainly concerned with the study of philosophy, but as the study of Śaiva or Śākta thought cannot be separated from the religious dogmas with which they are inseparably connected, we can only take a few specimens of the Āgamas and discuss the nature of thought that may be discovered there. In doing this we may be charged with indulging in repetitions, but we have to risk it in order to be able to give at least a rapid survey of the contents of

some of the most important Āgamas. In what follows, the reader will have the opportunity of judging the literary contents of the philosophical aspects of some of the important Āgamas, thereby getting a comprehensive view of the internal relation of Śaivism to other branches of Indian philosophy.

The *Mṛgendrāgama* has often been quoted in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*. This work is said to be a subsidiary part of *Kāmikāgama*, supposed to be one of the oldest of the Āgamas, and has been referred to in the *Sūta-saṃhitā* which is regarded as a work of the sixth century. The *Sūta-saṃhitā* refers to the *Kamikāgama* with the reverence that is due to very old texts.

*Mṛgendrāgama*¹ opens the discussion of how the old Vedic forms of worship became superseded by the Śaiva cult. It was pointed out that the Vedic deities were not concrete substantial objects, but their reality consisted of the *mantras* with which they were welcomed and worshipped, and consequently Vedic worship cannot be regarded as a concrete form of worship existing in time and space. But devotion to Śiva may be regarded as a definite and concrete form of worship which could, therefore, supersede the Vedic practices. In the second chapter of the work, Śiva is described as being devoid of all impurities. He is omniscient and the instrumental agent of all things. He already knows how the individual souls are going to behave and associates and dissociates all beings with knots of bondage in accordance with that.

The *Śaivāgama* discusses the main problem of the production, maintenance, destruction, veiling up of the truth and liberation. These are all done by the instrumental agent, God Śiva. In such a view the creation of the world, its maintenance and destruction are naturally designed by the supreme Lord in the beginning, yet things unfold in the natural course. The changes in the world of our experiences are not arranged by the later actions of beings. But yet the attainment of liberation is so planned that it cannot take place without individual effort.

Consciousness is of the nature of intuitive knowledge and spontaneous action (*caitanyaṃ dyk-kriyā-rūpaṃ*). This conscious-

¹ Since writing this section on the basis of the original manuscript the present writer has come across a printed text of the *Vidyā* and *Yogapāda* of *Mṛgendrāgama* published in 1928 by K. M. Subrahmaṇya Śāstri, with a commentary by Bhaṭṭa-nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha called *Mṛgendrar-vṛtti*, and a sub-commentary by Aghora-śivācārya called *Mṛgendrar-vṛtti-dīpikā*.

ness always abides in the soul, and some of the categories for the application of this consciousness are discussed along with the various religio-moral conducts called *caryā*. There is also a brief criticism for refuting Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism and Jainism.

The *Śaivāgama* holds that, from perceiving our bodies and other embodied things, we naturally infer that there is some instrumental agent who must be premised as the cause of the world. A difference of effects naturally presumes a difference in the cause and its nature. Effects are accomplished through particular instruments. These instruments are all of a spiritual nature. They are also of the nature of energy. In the case of inference the concomitance is generally perceived in some instances. But in the case of attributing creation to Śiva we have no datum of actual experience, as Śiva is bodiless. But it is held that one can conceive the body of Śiva as being constituted of certain *mantras*. When anyone is to be liberated, the quality of *tamas* as veiling the consciousness of the individual is removed by God. Those whose *tamas* is removed naturally ripen forth for the ultimate goal of liberation. They have not to wait any longer for Śiva to manifest their special qualities. We have already seen that Śiva is the manifesting agent or *abhiv-yañjaka* of all our activities.

The source of all bondage is *māheśvarī śakti* which helps all people to develop and grow in their own pattern (*sarvānugrāhikā*). Though there may be many cases in which we suffer pain, yet the *māheśvarī śakti* is regarded as being of universal service. The explanation is to be found in the view that often it is only through the way of suffering that we can attain our good. Śiva is always directing the *śakti* for our own good, even though we may seem to suffer in the intervening period (*dharmiṇo'nugraho nāma yat-taddharmānuvartanam*). All actions of the Lord are for the sake of the individual souls, that is, for making them wise and act forward, so that ultimately they may be purged of their *malas*.

The different causal chains manifest different kinds of chains in the effects. The Śaiva view accepts *sat-kārya-vāda* and so admits that all the effects are there. It is only in the manner in which the causal chains manifest that different kinds of chains are effected. Thus the same *malas* appear in diverse forms to different kinds of persons and indicate different stages of progress. The *mala* is

regarded as the unholy seed that pervades the whole world and manifests through it and is ultimately destroyed. It is through these manifestations that one can infer the existence of God, the instrumental cause (*kartā'-numīyate yena jagad-dharmeṇa hetunā*). This *mala* is inanimate, for such a theory suits the nature of effects. It is easier to assume preferably one cause of *mala* than many. The cloth is manifested by the action of the weaving spindles. The substance of the cloth would have been manifested in other forms according to the action of the various accessories, for all the effects are there, though they can only be manifested through the operation of accessories. It is difficult to imagine the concept of productive power. It is better to assume that the things are already there and are revealed to us by the action of the different kinds of causes¹.

The individual souls are all-pervasive and they possess eternal power by the Power of God. The only trouble is that on account of the veils of *mala* they are not always conscious of their nature. It is through the action of Śiva that these veils are so far removed that the individual souls may find themselves interested in their experiences. This is done by associating the individual minds with the thirty-six *kalās* produced from the disturbance of *māyā*. We have already discussed the nature of these thirty-six *tattvas* or categories in our treatment of the philosophy of *Tattva-prakāśikā* of Bhoja. It is through these categories that the veils are torn asunder and the individual becomes interested in his experiences. *Kalā* means that which moves anybody (*prasāraṇaṃ preraṇaṃ sākurvati tamasaḥ kalā*). The individual soul has to await the grace of God for being associated with these *kalās* for all his experiences, as he is himself unable to do so on his own account. The *karma* done by a man also remains embedded in Prakṛti and produces effects by the category of *niyati*.

¹ *sānvaya-vyatirekābhyāṃ ruḍhito vā 'vasīyate,
tadvyakti-jānaṇaṃ nāma tat-kāraka-samāśrayāt.
tena tantu-gatākāraṃ paṭākārā'barodhakaṃ,
vemādinā 'paṇīyātha paṭavyaktiḥ prakāśyate.*

Śiva-jñāna-bodha.

By Meykaṇḍadeva

This is a brief work of twelve *kārikās* (sometimes called *sūtras*), and taken from *Rauravāgama*, as has already been pointed out. It has a number of commentaries. Its Tamil translation forms the basic work of the *Śiva-jñāna-siddhi* school of thought, and has been elaborated by many capable writers. The general argument of the *Śiva-jñāna-siddhi* is as follows:

This world, consisting of males, females and other neutral objects, must have a cause. This cause is not perceivable, but has to be inferred. Since it has come into being in time, it may be presumed that it has a creator. Moreover the world does not move of itself and it may, therefore, be presumed that there must be an agent behind it.

The world is destroyed by God and is re-created by Him to afford proper facilities to the *malas* for their proper expression. The position, therefore, is that though the material cause (*upādāna*) is already present, yet there must be a *nimitta-kāraṇa* or instrumental agent for the creation and the maintenance of the world. At the time of dissolution the world-appearance becomes dissolved in the impurities or *malas*. After a period, the world again reappears through the instrumentality of Śiva. Śiva thus on the one hand creates the world, and on the other hand destroys it. It is said that as in the summer all roots dry up and in the rains they shoot up again into new plants, so though the world is destroyed the impressions of the old *malas* remain inlaid in the *prakṛti*, and when the proper time comes they begin to show themselves in diverse forms of world creation according to the will of God. The creation has to take a definite order in accordance with the good and bad deeds of persons. This creation cannot take place spontaneously by compounding the four elements.

God is the instrumental agent through which the functions of creation, maintenance and destruction take place. The Śaiva view of Meykaṇḍadeva is entirely opposed to the purely monistic theory of Śaṅkara. The *jīva* cannot be regarded as identical with Brahman. It is true that in the Upaniṣads the individual soul (or *jīva*) and Brahman are both regarded as self-luminous and inner-controlled, but that does not mean that the self and the Brahman are identical.

The instrumental agent is one. The individual souls being bound by bondage or *pāśa* cannot be regarded as being identical with the ultimate agent or Brahman.

The deeds of a person do not automatically produce effects. The effects are associated with the person in accordance with the will of God. The deeds themselves are inanimate and they cannot therefore produce effects spontaneously. All effectuation is due to God, though it does not imply any change of state in the nature of God. An analogy is taken to illustrate how changes can be produced without any effort or change in the changeless. Thus the sun shines far away in the sky and yet without any interference on its part, the lotus blooms in the lake on the earth. So God rests in His self-shiningness, and the changes in the world are produced apparently in a spontaneous manner. God lives and moves in and through all beings. It is only in this sense that the world is one with God and dependent on Him.

The very denial of the different assertions that the self is this or that proves the existence of the self through our self-consciousness. We thereby assume the existence of an unconditioned self, because such a self cannot be particularised. It is easily seen that such a self is not the same as any of the visible organs or internal organs or the *manas*.

The self is different from the inner organs, the mind and the senses; but yet they can be taken as forming a joint view of reality, as in the case of the sea. The waves and billows and the foam and the wind form one whole, though in reality they are different from one another. The *malas* which are supposed to be mainly embedded in the *māyā*, naturally stick to our bodies which are the products of *māyā*, and being there they pollute the right perspective as well as the right vision of all things. The commentator, whose name is untraceable, adduces the example of the magnet and iron filings to explain the action of God on the world without undergoing any change. It is the power of Śiva working in and through us by which we can act or reap the fruits of our action according to our deeds.

Śiva is to be known through inference as the cause which is neither visible nor invisible. His existence thus can only be known by inference. The *acit* or unconscious material passes before Śiva, but does not affect it, so that Śiva is quite unconscious of the world-appearance. It is only the *jīvas* that can know both the

world and Śiva¹. When a saint becomes free from impurities of three kinds, the *āṇava*, *māyika* and *kārmaṇa-mala*, the world appearance vanishes from before his eyes, and he becomes one with the pure illumination.

Suradantācārya in his *Vyākhyāna-kārikā* repeats the above ideas, but holds that Śiva through His omniscience knows all about the world and the experiences of all beings, but He is not affected by them². Another fragmentary commentary of an unknown author, who had written a commentary on *Mṛgendra* called *Mṛgendra-vṛtti-dīpikā*, which sometimes refers to the *Svāyambhuvāgama* and the *Mātāṅga-parameśvara-āgama*, discusses some of the main topics of *Śiva-jñāna-bodha* in the work called *Pāśupati-pāśa-vicāra-prakarana*.

Paśu is defined as pure consciousness (*cinmātra*) covered with impurities. The *paśu* goes through the cycle of birth and rebirth, and it goes also by the name *ātman*. It is all-pervading in space and time. The pure consciousness is of the nature of *jñāna* and *kriyā*. The Āgamas do not believe that the soul is one. It is pure consciousness that appears as distinct from one another by their association of different kinds of *mala* which are integrated with them from beginningless time³.

Its body consists of all the categories, beginning with *kalā* and running up to gross matter. The soul is called *anīśvara* because it may have a subtle body, but not the gross one, so that it is unable to enjoy its desire. The soul is regarded as *akriya* or devoid of action. Even when through knowledge and renunciation it avoids all action, the body may go on by the successive impulses of previous actions (*tiṣṭhati saṃskāra-vaśāt cakra-bhramavad-dhṛta-śarīrah*). Though there are many souls, they are spoken of in the singular number as *paśu* in the universal sense.

The *mala* is regarded as being included within *pāśa*. It is not therefore a different category. The pure self-consciousness is entirely different from the impurity or *mala*. How can then the *mala* affect the purity of the pure consciousness? To this the reply

¹ *nācīt-cit sannidhau kintu na vittaṣu te ubhe mithaḥ,
prapañca-śivayor vettā yaḥ sa ātmā tayoḥ pṛthak.*

² *... śivo jñānāti viśvakam,
sva-bhogyatvena tu param naiva jñānāti kiñcana.*

³ *anena mala-yukto vijñāna-kevala uktāḥ. saṃmūḍha ityanena pralayena kalāder upasaṃhṛtatvāt samyak mūḍhaḥ. Pāśupati-pāśa-vicāra-prakarana* (Adyar Library manuscript).

is that as pure gold may be associated with dross without affecting its nature, so the pure consciousness that constitutes the Śiva within us may remain pure, even though it may be covered with *mala* from beginningless time. The *mala* thus does not affect the nature of the self as Śiva.

It is by the grace of Śiva, attained through proper initiation in Śaivism by a proper preceptor, that the impurities can be removed, and not by mere knowledge as such. The *mala* being the nature of substance, it can be removed only by an action on the part of God. Mere knowledge cannot destroy it. The *malas* being beginningless are not many but one. According to different kinds of *karma*, the *malas* have distinct and different kinds of bondage. The different distinctive powers and obscurations made by the *mala* serve to differentiate the different selves, which basically are all Śiva. Liberation does not mean any transformation, but only the removal of particular *malas* with reference to which different individual entities as *jīvas* were passing through the cycle of birth and rebirth. This removal is effected by Śiva when the Śaiva initiation is taken with the help of proper preceptors¹.

The *malas* consist of *dharma* and *adharma*, and may be due to *karma* or *māyā*; they also constitute the bondage or the *pāśas*. This Āgama refers to *Mrgendrāgama*, the doctrines of which it follows in describing the nature of *pāśa*, *mala*, etc. The *pāśa* is really the *tirodhānaśakti* of Śiva. The *pāśas* are threefold: (1) *sahaja*, those *malas* with which we are associated from beginningless time and which stay on until liberation; (2) *āgantuka*, meaning all our senses and sense-objects; and (3) *sūmsargika*, that is those which are produced by the intercourse of *sahaja* and the *āgantuka mala*.

The creation and the manifestation of our experiences take place in accordance with our *karma* as revealed by God. Just as a field sown with seeds does not produce the same kind of crop for every peasant, so in spite of same kinds of actions we may have different kinds of results manifested to us by God. The *karmas* and other things are all inanimate, and thus it is only by the will of God that different kinds of results are manifested to us. The Śaiva view thus upholds the *satkārya-vāda* theory and regards God as *abhivyañjaka* or manifestor of all our experiences and *karmas*.

¹ *evañ ca pāśa-panayanad ātmanah sarva-jñatva-sarva-kartṛtvātmaka-śivatvābhivyañjaktir eva mukti-daśāyām, na tu pariṇāma-svarūpa-vināśah.*

Mātaṅga-parameśvara-tantra.

The *Śaiva śāstra* is described as *ṣaṭ-padārtha* and *catuṣ-pāda* and not as *tri-padārtha* and *catuṣ-pāda*; formerly it was written by Sadā-śiva in ten million verses and Ananta summarised it in one lakh verses, which has been further summarised in 3500 verses. The six categories are (1) *pati*; (2) *śakti*; (3) *triparvā*; (4) *paśu*; (5) *bodha*; and (6) *mantra*.

Śakti or energy is the means by which we can infer *pati*, the possessor of *śakti*. In inference we sometimes infer the possessor of the quality by its quality, and sometimes the cause from the effect or the effect from the cause. Sometimes the existence of a thing is taken for granted on the authority of the Vedas. From the body of Śiva, which is of the nature of *mantras*, the *śakti* emanates downwards in the form of *bindu*, which later on develops into the world¹. Śiva enters into the *bindu* and unfolds it for various types of creation. The diversity in the world is due to a difference in *karma* and *guṇa* of the individual souls, where the individual souls may be regarded as the container and the *karma* as contained. The individual souls are responsible for their actions and have to enjoy their good or bad fruits. God is the controller of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. It is He who is the instrumental cause of the world, and the energies are the material cause and are regarded as the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the world. This world is the production of *māyā*. As the rays of the sun or the moon induce the blooming of flowers spontaneously without any actual interference, so the Śiva manifests the world by His mere proximity.

Seven *sahaṣa-malas* have been enumerated as follows: (1) *moha*, (2) *mada*, (3) *rāga*, (4) *viṣāda*, (5) *śoṣa*, (6) *vaicitta* and (7) *harṣa*.

The *kalās* are produced from *māyā*, and it is in association with *māyā* that they carry on their work, just as paddy seeds can produce shoots in association with the husk in which they are enclosed.

The souls as they are driven through the world, become attached to worldly things through *kalā*. This association is further

¹ It is traditionally believed that the *mantras* or hymns constitute the body of a deity.

tightened by *vāsanā*; so the souls become attached to all enjoyments, and this is called *rāga*. With all attachments there is sorrow, and therefore non-attachment to all sense-pleasures leads to the best attainment of happiness.

The nature of *kāla* and *niyati* are discussed in the same way as in other books of Śaiva-siddhānta.

Māyā comes out from God as an expression of His subtle energy, and from *māyā* there evolves the *pradhāna*, which in its first stage is only pure being or *sattā*. Later on other categories evolve out of it and they supply the materials for the experience of *puruṣa*. The *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* thus mutually support each other in the development of categories and experience.

The *ahankāra* infuses the self in and through the sense-organs and operates as their functions. The same may be said regarding the application of *ahankāra* in and through the *tanmātras*. The *ahankāra* thus represents the entire psychic state in a unity. The *ahankāra* is present also in dormant state in trees, plants, etc.

Pauṣkarāgama.

In the *Pauṣkarāgama jñāna* is defined as consisting of the energy inherent in Śiva. Six categories described are “*patiḥ kuṇḍalinī māyā paśuḥ pāśaś ca kārakah.*” *Laya*, *bhoga* and *adhikāra* are the three functions of *śakti*. *Māyā* as generated by the actions of men, supplies the elements by which the objects of experience and experience are made. *Paśu* is that which experiences and reacts. The categories beginning from *kalā* to earth (*kṣiti*) are real entities. *Laya* is called bondage and is regarded as the fifth category. The sixth category is equal to *bhukti*, *mukti*, *vyakti*, *phala*, *kriyā* and *dīkṣā* taken together. *Bindu* and *aṇus* are the real entities. When the manifold creation shrinks into the *bindu*, we have that stage in Śiva which is called dissolution (*laya*). In the original state actions of the type of *sadṛśa pariṇāma* go on. Śiva is described as *viśpaṣṭa cīnmātra* and *vyāpaka*. His energies only can operate, while He remains unmoved. When the energies begin to operate in the *bindu*, the *bindu* becomes fit for being the data of experience. This state of *bindu* with Śiva reflected in it is called the *sadū-śiva*. Even in this stage there is really no change in Śiva. When the energies

are in the state of operation, we have the state of creation, and the experience of it is called *bhoga*.

The point arises that if the *bindu* is itself active in creation, then its relation with Śiva becomes redundant. On the other hand, if the *bindu* is moved by Śiva to active operation, Śiva becomes changeable. The reply is that an agent can affect any material in two ways, either by his simple desire or by his organised effort, as in the case of the making of a pot by the potter. Śiva moves the *bindu* simply by His *saṃkalpa*, and therefore He does not suffer any change. In the case of the action of the potter also, it is by the wish of Śiva that the potter can act. Therefore, Śiva is the sole agent of all actions performed by animate beings or by inanimate matter.

It may be said that Śiva is wholly unconditioned, and therefore He can remain the sole agent without undergoing any change. Another tentative answer is that in the presence of Śiva, the *bindu* begins to work without any causal efficiency (compare the movement of *prakṛti* in the presence of *puruṣa*).

The *bindu* has sometimes been described as *śāntyatīta* and other times as the material cause of the creation. This difficulty is explained on the assumption that part of the *bindu* is *śāntyatīta* and the other part is responsible for being the material cause of the world. The third category including the *bindu* and Śiva is called *Īśvara*. Śiva produces commotion in *bindu* merely by His presence. In this way Śiva is not only the instrumental agent of all happenings in the inanimate, but He also is responsible for all actions of the human body which are seemingly produced by the human will.

Knowledge and activity are in essence identical, and for that reason, when there is action (*vyāpāra*), we may feel as if we are the agents of those actions. The element of action that seems to express itself is thus something more than the action, and it is called the *adhikāra-kriyā*. The action and that which is acted upon is the result of *guṇa-saṃkalpa*. Śiva stands as the *citi-śakti* which makes all energies dynamic, as the sun makes the lotus bloom from a distance without any actual interference.

In further explaining the philosophical situation Śiva says that a part of the *bindu* is in the transcendental (*śāntyatīta*) state, while the other part is responsible for the creative action. This second category, that is, the lower half of the *bindu*, is supposed to be moved by Śiva. The energies are often classified under different

names as performing different functions. *Śakti* and *śaktimān* are the same. They are only differently classified according to their diverse functions.

The inanimate world is inoperative without the action or the interference of a conscious being. That conscious being is God Śiva; even the milk in the udder of the cow flows by the active affection of the cow for the calf. The illustration of the magnet drawing the iron filings does not fit in, for there also is the person who brings the magnet near the iron filings.

It cannot, however, be urged that the *puruṣas* themselves could be regarded as active agents, for according to the scriptural texts they are also moved to activity by the will of God¹.

The world-appearance cannot be proved to be false or illusory. It is made up of the stuff of one common object called *māyā*, which is later on conceived as functioning in different ways called *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The *māyā* stuff is the repository of all *karmas*. But yet not all persons gain the fruits of all their *karmas*. They have to depend upon some other being for the proper fruition of their *karmas*. This is where God comes in as the ultimate bestower of the fruits of *karma*.

Mala or impurity is always associated with all souls. The Āgama tries to refute the epistemological view of other systems of thought like the Cārvāka and the monism of Śaṅkara. The Āgama holds that since the souls are eternal, their knowledge must also be eternal due to eternal unchanging cause. The difference of knowledge in individuals is due to the obscuration of their knowledge by the various veils of *mala*. The original cause of knowledge is all-pervading and is the same in all persons².

The self is realised as revealing itself and others. If it is supposed that the self is reflected through *buddhi*, then even *buddhi*

¹ *vivādādhyāsitam viśvaṃ viśva-vit-karṭṭ-pūrvakam,
kāryatvād āvayoḥ siddham kāryaṃ kumbhādikaṃ yathā.*

First paṭala.

² *tac ceha vibhu-dharmatvān na ca kvācitkam iṣyate,
nityatvam iva tenātmā sthitaḥ sarvārtha-dṛk-kriyāḥ.
jñātytvam api yadyasya kvācitkam vibhutā kutaḥ,
dharmiṇo yāvati vyāptis tāvad-dharmasya ca sthitiḥ,
yathā paṭa-sthitaṃ śauklyam paṭam vyāpyākhilam sthitaṃ,
sthitaṃ vyāpyaivam ātmānam jñātytvam api sarvadā,
na ca nirviṣayaṃ jñānam parāpekṣam svarūpataḥ.*

Fourth paṭala.

also may be regarded as conscious self. So the idea of explaining the situation as being the reflection of consciousness in *buddhi*, also fails. Again this reflection of consciousness in *buddhi* cannot be regarded as conscious entity. It may also be pointed out that the consciousness as spirit cannot be reflected in *buddhi* which is known as spiritual. The view of mutual reflection of consciousness into *buddhi* and *buddhi* into consciousness is also untenable. It has, therefore, to be admitted that the soul as an eternal being can perceive all things and act as it likes. If the qualities inhere permanently or temporarily in an entity, then that inherence in the entity must be of a permanent or of a temporary nature as the case may be. The consciousness of the soul should, therefore, be regarded as co-extensive with its being. The selves are atomic in size and cannot therefore pervade the whole body. We have already said that the self in revealing itself also reveals other things. We must remember in this connection that an entity like the fire cannot be distinguished from the energy that it has.

Again the objects perceived cannot be regarded as mere ignorance (*ajñāna*), for one cannot deal with mere *ajñāna*, just as one cannot bring water without a pitcher. The things we perceive are real entities. This *ajñāna* cannot be taken in the sense of *prāgabha*, for then that would imply another origination of knowledge; or it could be explained as wrong knowledge. This wrong knowledge may be regarded as accidental or natural. If it is accidental or natural, then it must be due to some causes and cannot, therefore, be regarded as wrong knowledge. If it is wrong knowledge only arising occasionally, then it cannot contradict right knowledge. Ordinarily one cannot expect the illusoriness of silver to contradict the knowledge of conch-shell¹. For this reason the self, which is intuitively realised as all-consciousness, cannot be regarded as having only limited knowledge. That appearance of the souls possessing limited knowledge must be due to its association with impurities. The energy of consciousness is eternal, and therefore its nature cannot be disturbed by the association of impurities which may constitute experience, as arising from *dharma* and *adharma*. The *malas* are regarded as sevenfold, and include within them the passions of *mada*, *moha*, etc. These *malas* are

¹ *kiñ caitad anyathā-jñānaṃ na samyag jñāna-bādhakam.*

Fourth *paṭala*.

regarded as being natural to the souls. The *mala* of *moha* appears in various forms, as attachment to wife, son, money, etc.

It is only the spiritual that can contradict the non-spiritual. Two spiritual entities or the non-spiritual entities cannot contradict each other. One soul cannot be contradicted by another soul.

If the association of *malas* with the souls is regarded as beginningless, then how can they veil the nature of the self, and what must be the nature of this veil? It cannot be said that this veiling means the covering of what was already illuminated; for in that case, this obscuration of illumination of an entity, which is of the nature of light, must mean its destruction. The reply is that the energy of consciousness (*cicchakti*) cannot be veiled by the *malas*. The *malas* can only arrest its function.

Śakti is defined as being of the nature of immediate intuition and action. If that is so, the *śakti* is associated with knowable objects. How can then the objects be different from the energy? In reply it is said that the intuitive knowledge and action (*dr̥kkriyā*), the *śakti*, as such remains united as *dr̥k* and *kriyā*. They are indivisibly connected as one, and it is for us to think of them as divided into *dr̥k* and *kriyā*¹. All words denoting particular objects are for others and are under the veil of *mala*. By the suppression of *mala*, the energy is turned away from sense objects. In this way the *mala* operates against the *cicchakti*, and thereby *malas* obscure the omniscient character of the souls.

In the fifth chapter, the Āgama deals with the different kinds of *pāśas* or bonds. These bonds are *kalā*, *avidyā*, *rāga*, *kāla* and *niyati*. These five categories are regarded as proceeding from *māyā*. The consciousness shows itself through these *kalās*. The consciousness is associated with both intuitive knowledge and the power of work. The *kalās* reflect the consciousness of the soul only partially. This reflection is effected in accordance with one's *karma*.

All experience is due to the functioning of the power of knowledge and of the objects to be known. This is technically called *grāhaka* and *grāhya*. It is by the association of consciousness that the *kalās* appear to be functioning for the apprehension of things. From *kalā* comes *vidyā*. *Kalā* supplies the basis of experience as time and space. Later on other categories of the intellect also

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avibhāgasya bhāgoktau tad-vibhāga upādhitah.

evolve and we have the concept of *buddhi* as deliberate decision. In this way the different categories such as *ahaṅkāra* or *abhīmāna* are produced. They in themselves would not be conscious except through the consciousness which impregnates them.

The *buddhi* manifests itself through diverse forms according to their *vāsanās*. A full enumeration of them is given in the texts, but we omit them as they are not philosophically important. They, however, include the various instinctive tendencies and delusions which are enumerated in *Sāṃkhya* and other places.

The difficulty is that the *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra* seem to cover the same ground. How is it then possible to distinguish *buddhi* from *ahaṅkāra*? To this the reply is that when something is deliberately known as this or that, we have the stage of *buddhi*. But in the stage of *ahaṅkāra* we seem to behave as knowers, and all objects that come to our purview are labelled as parts of our knowledge. There is no means by which the ego-consciousness of any individual can be confused with the ego-consciousness of another. They are thus realised as different from one another¹.

The Āgama describes the three kinds of creation as *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa* as proceeding from three kinds of *ahaṅkāra*, and describes the origination of *jñānendriyas*, *karmendriyas*, *tanmātras* and *manas*. When things are perceived by the senses and their value as this or that is attested by an inner function, so that the red can be distinguished from the blue, that inner function is called *manas*².

When we perceive an animal having certain peculiarities, then we can extend the use of the word to denote another animal having the same kind of features. The inner function by which this is done is *manas*.

The Āgama gives an elaborate description of the cognitive senses and particularly of the organ of the eye. The mere proximity of consciousness cannot generate the activity. This can only be generated by the association of the consciousness with the sense organs.

The Āgama criticises the Buddhist position and supposes that the Buddhist doctrine of *artha-kriyā-kāritā* can hold good only if the entities are not momentary, but have extensive existence.

¹ *yady abhinnaṃ ahaṅkṛt syāu devadatto 'pyahaṃ matiḥ,*
anyasyām upajāyeta nātmaikatvaṃ tataḥ sthitam. Sixth paṭala.

² *cakṣuṣā locite hy arthe tamarthaṃ buddhi-gocaram,*
vidadhātīha yad viprās tanmanāḥ paripaṭhyate. Sixth paṭala.

Speaking of the *guṇas*, the Āgama refuses to admit their substantive nature. It is only when certain *guṇas* are in a collocated state that we call them *guṇa* reals.

Our senses can only perceive certain objective qualities, but they cannot perceive any substratum behind them. Therefore it is logically incorrect to infer any substratum, which may be called *guṇas* as reals. After a discussion about what may be the original material cause either as partless atoms or as immaterial *prakṛti*, the Āgama decides in favour of the latter. But this *prakṛti* is not the state of equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*) of the *guṇas* as the Sāṃkhya holds.

The Āgama discusses the *prāpya-kāritva* and *aprāpya-kāritva* of the different senses. It also says that movement does not belong originally to every atom, but it belongs only to the living atoms, the souls. It cannot also be due to the mere presence of other things.

When the *manas* is associated with *cicchakti*, then it attains the knowledge of all things by the exercise of the internal organs. At the first moment this knowledge is indeterminate. Later on various determinations become associated with it. The perception of things at different times becomes synthetised and concretised, otherwise the various memory images might arise before the mind and prevent the formation of a synthetic image, as we find in the case of a concrete perception.

It is only the ego-consciousness or the *abhimāna* that produces in us the sense agency (*katṛtva*). Without this sense of *abhimāna* there would be no difference between the self and other material objects. From ego-consciousness there proceeds the deliberate consciousness of decision (*niścaya*).

Knowledge of things cannot arise merely from *buddhi*, for the stuff of *buddhi* is material. Consciousness can only arise occasionally in consequence of its relation with *cicchakti*. If the mental states are always changing, then they cannot be perceived as constant, though they may appear to be so, like the flame of a lamp which changes from moment to moment, but yet appears to be the same.

Turning to the doctrine of *artha-kriyā-kāritā* of the Buddhists, the Āgama says that if the doctrine of *artha-kriyā-kāritā* be accepted, then the existence of things cannot properly be explained. The proper view is that of *pariṇāma-vāda*. If the things are momentary, then effects cannot be produced, for a thing must remain for at least two moments in order to produce an effect. If

the two moments are separate entities, then one cannot be the cause of the other. The causal change can only be with reference to the existing things, but not with regard to the entities which are momentary. In order that there may be a production, the thing must remain for two moments at least. Things that are existent need not always be productive. The production of an effect may depend on accessory causes. A jug cannot be produced by threads, but the threads may produce a piece of cloth. This shows that the effect is always already in the cause.

It cannot also be held that our mental states are identical with the external objects, for in that case it would be difficult to explain the multiplicity of our cognitive states in accordance with their objects. We would not be able to explain how one entity assumes so many diverse forms. The only course left is to admit some external objects with which our senses come into contact. These objects consist of a conglomeration of *tanmātras*. It is in and through this conglomeration of *tanmātras* that new qualities arise to which we give the names of different *bhūtas*. The difference between *tanmātras* and *bhūtas* is that the former are more subtle and the latter more gross. This view is somewhat different from the Sāṃkhya view, for here the *bhūtas* are not regarded as different categories, but only as a conglomeration of *tanmātras*. The idea that the *guṇas* are certain objective entities is again and again repudiated. It is held that it is the conglomeration of *guṇas* that is regarded by us as substantive entity.

The Āgama then criticises the theory of atoms which are partless. It is held that the partless atoms cannot have sides in which other atoms could be associated. The question is raised that *tanmātras* being formless (*amūrta*) cannot themselves be the causes of all forms. The world of forms thus leads us to infer some material as its cause. To this Śiva replies that the *prakṛti* can be regarded as being endowed with form and also as formless¹.

Śiva in further replying to the questions says that things having form must have other entities endowed with forms as their causes. Therefore one may infer that the atoms are the causes of the world. In that case one cannot deny the fact that the atoms have forms. In further discussing the subject Śiva says that the atoms are many

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*māyā tu paramā mūrta nityānityasya kāraṇam,
ekāneka-vibhāgādhyā vastu-rūpā śivātmikā.*

Sixth *paṭala*.

and they have parts. So they are of the same type as other effects, such as jug, etc. As such the cause of the world must be regarded as being something which is formless. All effects are *anitya*, dependent on others (*āśrita*), and have parts and are many. The Śaivism, therefore, holds that their cause must be different, it must be one, independent and partless. Therefore it discards the view that the atoms are the material cause of the world¹. The gross elements gradually evolved from the five *tanmātras*.

The Āgama refutes the view that *ākāśa* is mere vacuity. Had it been a vacuity, it would have been a negation, and a negation always belongs to the positive entity. The Āgama also refutes the possibility of *ākāśa* being regarded as any kind of negation. *Śabda* is regarded as the specific quality of *ākāśa*.

The Āgama says that it admits only four *pramāṇas*: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda*, and *arthāpatti*. In reality it is pure consciousness devoid of all doubts that constitutes the truth underlying the *pramāṇas*. Doubt arises out of the oscillation of the mind between two poles. Memory refers to objects experienced before. In order that any knowledge may attain to the state of proper validity, it must be devoid of memory and doubt.

Pure consciousness is the real valid part in knowledge. *Buddhi* being itself a material thing cannot be regarded as constituting the valid element of knowledge. It is in and through the *kalās* that the pure consciousness comes into contact with the objective world. This perception may be either *nirvikalpa* or *savikalpa*. In the *nirvikalpa* perception there is no reference in the mind to class concepts or names. By the *nirvikalpa* perception one can perceive things as they are without any association of names, etc.

Perception is of two kinds: (1) as associated with the senses, and (2) as unassociated with the senses as in the case of intuitive knowledge by *yoga*. When associated with senses the perceptive function removes the veil between the objects and the self, so that the objects can be directly perceived. In explaining the nature of perception the Āgama follows the Nyāya technique of *saṃyukta-samavāya*, etc., for explaining the situation. It believes like Nyāya in five types of propositions, namely *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*.

*Vātulāgama*¹.

Vātulāgama from Adyar with commentary seems to be almost identical with the *Vātulāgama* of the Mysore Oriental Research Institute, only with this difference that the *Vātulāgama* of Mysore contains more verses in the concluding tenth chapter in which the Vira-śaiva doctrine is praised above other Śaiva doctrines. But the original beginning is more or less like the general Śaiva doctrine as may be found in *Tattva-prakāśikā* with Aghora-śivācārya's commentary. There is also the tendency to derive the existence of Śiva as the ultimate reality on the basis of inference, as may be found in the Siddhānta systems of Śaivism, such as the *Mṛgendrāgama* or in the Lākuliśa-Pāśupata system. The supplementary portion of *Vātulāgama* introduces the doctrine of *līṅga-dhāraṇa* of the Vira-śaivas, but does not say anything about its specific philosophy or about its other doctrines associated with *ṣaṭ-sthala*.

*Vātula-tantram*².

Śiva-tattva is of three kinds: (1) *niṣkala*, (2) *sakala* and (3) *niṣkala-sakala*. Śiva may be distinguished in ten ways: (1) *tattva-bheda*, (2) *varṇa-bheda*, (3) *cakra-bheda*, (4) *varga-bheda*, (5) *mantra-bheda*, (6) *praṇava*, (7) *brahma-bheda*, (8) *aṅga-bheda*, (9) *mantra-jāta*, (10) *kīla*. Though previously it has been said to be of three kinds, it has three forms again: (1) *subrahmanya-śiva*, (2) *sadā-śiva* and (3) *maheśa*.

Śiva is called *niṣkala* when all His *kalās*, that is parts or organs or functions, are concentrated in a unity within Him. In further defining the nature of *niṣkalatva*, the author says that when the pure and impure elements that contribute to experience are collected together and merged in the original cause, and remain there as the budding cause of all powers that are to develop the universe, we have the *niṣkala* stage. The commentator supports this idea by quotations from many texts. The *sakala-niṣkala* is that in which the deeds of persons are in a dormant state, and when the time of creation comes it associates itself with the *bindu* state for

¹ Oriental Research Institute, Mysore.

² Adyar Library manuscript.

the formation of the world. The *bindu* represents the *māyopādāna* with which Śiva associates Himself for the creation¹. These different names of *sakala* and *niṣkala* and *sakala-niṣkala* of Śiva are but different moments in Śiva and do not constitute any actual transformation in Him, for He always remains unchanged in Himself. In Śiva, therefore, there is no change. The changes are to be found in the *bindu* and the *amus*².

God can only be proved by *anumāna* as being the instrumental cause of the world. This is taking the old Śaiva view of the Siddhānta, like the *Mṛgendrāgama*. The agency of God is to be explained by the supposition that by His desire everything is accomplished. He does not take to any instrument or organs for accomplishing any act. Thus when the potter makes his pot, it is through the infusion of God's power that he can do so. In the case of the potter, the agency is different, because he works with his instruments and organs. Śiva through His energy can know and do all things.

Śiva creates all things by His simple *saṃkalpa* and this creation is called the *śuddhādhva*. The author refers to *Tattva-prakāśika* of Bhoja and the commentary on it by Aghora-sivācārya.

Śakti is the will of God and that is called *bindu*. From that arises *nāda* which is a source of all speech³.

We have given some analysis of some of the important Āgamas just to show the nature of the subjects that are dealt with in these Āgamas. A more comprehensive account of the Āgamas could easily have been given, but that would have involved only tiresome repetition. Most of the Āgamas deal with the same sort of subjects more or less in the same manner with some incidental variations as

¹ *maheṣaḥ sakalaḥ bindu-māyopādāna-jamita-tanu-karaṇādibhiḥ ātmānaṃ yadā śuddhāśuddha-bhogaṃ prayacchati tadā śiva-saṅgakaḥ sa eva bhogavān sakala ity ucyate.*

² *laya-bhogādhikārānāṃ na bhedo vāstavaḥ śive, kintu vindor aṇūnāṃ ca vāstava eva te matāḥ.*

³ *śaktir iccheti vijñeyā śabdo jñānaṃ ihocyate, vāgbhavaṃ syāt kriyā-śaktiḥ kalā vai śoḍaśa smṛtaḥ. yā parameśvarasya icchā sā śaktir iti jñeyā, śaktestu jāyate śabdaḥ. Yat parameśvarasya jñānaṃ tadeva śabdaḥ. śabdāt jāyate vāgbhavaḥ. yā parameśvarasya kriyā sā tu vāgbhavaḥ. śoḍaśa svarāḥ kalā ity ucyante.*

Quoted from *Pauṣkarāgama*:

*acetanaṃ jagad viprāś cetana-prerakaṃ vinā,
pravṛttau vā nivṛttau vā na svatantraṃ rathādivat.*

regards their emphasis on this or that subject. They also sometimes vary as regards their style and mode of approach. Thus the Āgama called *Śiva-jñāna-siddhi* deals with the various subjects by quotations from a large number of Āgamas. This shows that there was an internal unity among the various Āgamas. From these collective works we can know much of the contents of the different Āgamas. This is important as some of these Āgamas are scarcely available even as a single manuscript.

The date of these Āgamas cannot be definitely fixed. It may be suggested that the earliest of them were written sometime in the second or third century A.D., and these must have been continued till the thirteenth or fourteenth century. In addition to the theological or religious dogmatics, they contain discussions on the nature of the various ducts or *nāḍis* in connection with the directions regarding the performance of *yoga* or mental concentration. There are some slight disputations with rival systems of thought as those of the Buddhists, Jains and the Sāṃkhya. But all this is very slight and may be practically ignored. There is no real contribution to any epistemological thought. We have only the same kind of stereotyped metaphysical dogma and the same kind of argument that leads to the admission of a creator from the creation as of the agent from the effects. Thus apparently the material cause, the *upādāna kāraṇa*, described as *prakṛti* and sometimes atoms, is different from the instrumental cause, God. But in order to maintain the absolute monistic view that Śiva alone is the ultimate reality, this material cause is often regarded as the *śakti* or energy which is identical with God. Sometimes the entire creation is described as having an appearance before the individuals according to their *karma* through God's power of bondage. The individual souls are all infected by various impurities derived from *māyā* or *karma*. These impurities are ultimately destroyed by the grace of God, when the Śaiva initiation is taken.

These Āgamas are also full of directions as regards various religious practices and disciplines, and also of various kinds of rituals, *mantras*, directions for the building of temples or of setting up of various kinds of phallic symbols, which, however, have to be entirely omitted from the present treatment of Śaivism. But it is easy to see that the so-called Śaiva philosophy of the Āgamas is just a metaphysical kernel for upholding the Śaiva religious life and

practices. These consist largely in inspiring the devotees to lead an absolutely moral life, wholly dedicated to Śiva, and full of intoxicating fervour of devotion, as one may find in *Tiru-vāchaka* of Māṇikka-vāchakar. This devotion is the devotion of service, of a life entirely dedicated to Lord Śiva.

CHAPTER XXXV

VĪRA-ŚAIVISM

History and Literature of Vīra-śaivism.

THE name 'Vīra-śaiva' as applied to a particular Śaiva sect appears to be of a later date. Mādhava in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* of the fourteenth century A.D., who mentions the Pāśupatas and the Āgamic Śaivas, does not seem to know anything about the Vīra-śaivas. Śaṅkara and Vācaspati and Ānanda-giri of the eighth and the ninth centuries do not seem to know anything of the Vīra-śaivas. Neither are they alluded to in any of the *Śaivāgamas*. The *Vātula-tantra* seems to have two editions (in manuscript), and in one of them the *ṣaṭ-sthala* doctrine is mentioned in the form of an appendix, which shows that this introduction was of the nature of an apocrypha. The doctrine of *līṅga-dhāraṇa* in the manner in which it is done by the Līṅgāyats of the Vīra-śaivas can hardly be traced in any early works, though later Vīra-śaiva writers like Śrīpati and others have twisted some of the older texts which allude to *līṅga* to mean the specific practices of *līṅga-dhāraṇa* as done by the Līṅgāyats.

There is a general tradition that Basava, a Brahmin, son of Mādirāja and Mādāmba was the founder of the Vīra-śaiva sect. From his native place Bāgevaḍi, he went to Kalyān near Bombay, at a comparatively young age, when Vijjala was reigning there as king (A.D. 1157–67). His maternal uncle Baladeva having resigned on account of illness, Basava was appointed as the minister in complete charge of Vijjala's treasury and other administrative functions. According to another tradition Basava succeeded in deciphering an inscription which disclosed some hidden treasure, and at this, King Vijjala was so pleased that he gave Basava the office of prime minister. According to the *Basava-purāṇa*, which narrates the life of Basava in a mythical purāṇic manner, Basava, on assuming the office, began to distribute gifts to all those who professed themselves to be the devotees of Śiva. This led to much confusion and heart-burning among the other sects, and it so happened that King Vijjala cruelly punished two of the devotees

of Śiva. At this, by the instigation of Basava, one of his followers murdered Vijjala. Bhandarkar gives some other details, which the present writer has not been able to trace in the *Basava-purāṇa* (the source, according to Bhandarkar himself)¹.

The *Basava-purāṇa* was written after the time of Śrīpati Paṇḍita. It is said there that at one time Nārada reported to Śiva that, while other religions were flourishing, the Śaiva faith was with few exceptions dying out among the Brahmins, and so it was decaying among other castes also. Lord Śiva then asked Nandi to get himself incarnated for taking the Vira-śaiva faith in consonance with the *Varṇāśrama* rites². If this remark is of any value, it has to be admitted that even after the time of Śrīpati Paṇḍita the Vira-śaiva faith had not assumed any importance in the Carnatic region. It also indicates that the Vira-śaiva faith at this time was not intended to be preached in opposition to the Hindu system of castes and caste duties. It has been contended that Basava introduced social reforms for the removal of castes and caste duties and some other Hindu customs. But this claim cannot be substantiated, as, in most of the Vira-śaiva works, we find a loyalty to the Hindu caste order. There is, of course, a tendency to create a brotherhood among the followers of Śiva who grouped round Basava, as he was both politically and financially a patron of the followers of Śiva. The *Basava-purāṇa* also says that Basava was taken before the assembly of paṇḍits for the performance of the rite of initiation of the holy thread at the age of eight, according to the custom of compulsory initiation among the Brahmins. Basava, however, at that early age protested against the rite of initiation, on the grounds that the holy thread could purify neither the soul nor body, and that there were many instances in the purāṇic accounts where saints of the highest reputation had not taken the holy thread. We find no account of Basava as preaching a crusade against Hindu customs and manners, or against Brahmanism as such.

Basava's own writings are in Canarese, in the form of sayings or musings, such as is common among the devotees of other sects of Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, etc. The present writer had the occasion to go through a large mass of these sayings in their English translations. On the basis of these it can be said that they contain a

¹ See Bhandarkar's *Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism*, p. 132.

² *varṇācārāmurodhena śaivācāran pravartaya*. *Basava-purāṇa*, ch. II, verse 32.

rapturous enthusiasm for the God Śiva, who to Basava appeared as the Lord Kudala Saṅgama. These sayings referred to Śiva as the supreme Lord, and to Basava himself as his servant or slave. They also contain here and there some biographical allusions which cannot be reconstructed satisfactorily without the help of other contemporary evidence. So far as can be judged from the sayings of Basava, it is not possible to give any definite account of Vīra-śaiva thought as having been propounded or systematised by Basava. According to *Basava-purāṇa*, the practice of *līṅga-dhāraṇa* seems to have been in vogue even before Basava. Basava himself does not say anything about the doctrine of *śaṭ-sthala*, and these two are the indispensably necessary items by which Vīra-śaivism can be sharply distinguished from the other forms of Śaivism, apart from its philosophical peculiarity. On this also Basava does not seem to indicate any definite line of thought which could be systematised without supplementing it or reconstructing it by the ideas of later Vīra-śaiva writers. Though the kernel of the Vīra-śaiva philosophy may be traced back to the early centuries of the Christian era, and though we find it current in works like *Sūta-saṃhitā* of the sixth century A.D., yet we do not know how the name Vīra-śaiva came to be given to this type of thought.

In the work *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*, written by Revaṇācārya some time between Basava and Śrīpati, we find the name 'Vīra-śaiva' associated with the doctrine of *sthala*, and this is probably the earliest use of the term in available literature. *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* refers to Basava and is itself referred to by Śrīpati. This shows that the book must have been written between the dates of Basava and Śrīpati. The *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* gives a fanciful interpretation of the word, 'vīra' as being composed of 'vi' meaning knowledge of identity with Brahman, and 'ra' as meaning someone who takes pleasure in such knowledge. But such an etymology, accepting it to be correct, would give the form 'vira' and not 'vīra.' No explanation is given as to how 'vi' standing for 'vidyā,' would lengthen its vowel into 'vī.' I therefore find it difficult to accept this etymological interpretation as justifying the application of the word 'vīra' to Vīra-śaiva. Moreover, most systems of Vedāntic thought could be called vīra in such an interpretation, for most types of Vedānta would feel enjoyment and bliss in true knowledge of identity. The word 'vīra' would thus not

be a distinctive mark by which we could distinguish Vira-śaivas from the adherents of other religions. Most of the Āgamic Śaivas also would believe in the ultimate identity of individuals with Brahman or Śiva. I therefore venture to suggest that Vira-śaivas were called Viras or heroes for their heroic attitude in an aggressive or defensive manner in support of their faith.

We have at least two instances of religious persecution in the Śaiva context. Thus the Chola King Koluttunga I, a Śaiva, put out the eyes of Mahāpūrṇa and Kureśa, the Vaiṣṇava disciples of Rāmānuja, who refused to be converted to Śaivism. The same sort of story comes in the life of Basava where the eyes of two of his disciples were put out by Vijjala, and Vijjala got himself murdered by Basava's followers. These are but few instances where violence was resorted to for the spread of any religion, or as actions of religious vengeance. I suppose that the militant attitude of some Śaivas, who defied the caste rules and customs and were enthusiasts for the Śaiva faith, gave them the name of Vira-śaiva or Heroic Śaiva. Even the *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* refers to the view of Basava that those who decried Śiva should be killed¹. Such a militant attitude in the cause of religion is rarely to be found in the case of other religions or religious sects. In the above context *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* points out in the ninth chapter that, though Vira-śaivas are prohibited from partaking in the offerings made to a fixed phallic symbol *sthāvara-līṅga*, yet if there is a threat to destroy or disturb such a symbol, a Vira-śaiva should risk his life in preventing the aggression by violent means.

So far our examination has not proved very fruitful in discovering the actual contribution to Vira-śaiva philosophy or thought, or even the practice of *ṣaṭ-sthala* and *līṅga-dhāraṇa*, made by Basava. He must have imparted a good deal of emotional enthusiasm to inspire the Śaivas of different types who came into contact with him, either through religious fervour or for his

¹ *atha vira-bhadrācara-basaveśvaracāraṇi sūcayan bhaktā-cāra-bhedaṇi prati-pādayati—*

*śiva-nindākaraṇi dṛṣṭvā ghātayed athavā śaṭet,
sthānaṇi vā tat-parityajya gacched yady-akṣamo bhavet.*

Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi, ch. 9, verse 36.

It is further introduced in the context:

*nanu prāṇa-tyāge durmaraṇam kiṃ na syāt,
śivārthaṇi mukta-jīvaś cecchiva-sāyujyam āpnuyāt.*

financial and other kinds of patronage. It seems from the *Basava-purāṇa* that his financial assistance to the devotees of Śiva was of rather an indiscriminate character. His money was poured on all Śaivas like showers of rain. This probably made him the most powerful patron of the Śaivas of that time, with the choicest of whom he founded a learned assembly where religious problems were discussed in a living manner, and he himself presided over the meetings.

The present writer is of opinion that the kernel of Vīra-śaiva thought is almost as early as the Upaniṣads, and it may be found in a more or less systematic manner by way of suggestion in the writings of Kālidāsa who lived in the early centuries of the Christian era¹. The *Sūta-saṃhitā*, a part of the *Skanda-purāṇa*, seems to teach a philosophy which may be interpreted as being of the same type as the Vīra-śaiva philosophy propounded by Śrīpati, though the commentator interprets it in accordance with the philosophy of Śaṅkara. The *Sūta-saṃhitā* gives a high place to the Āgama literature such as the *Kāmika*, and others, which shows that it was closely related with the Āgamic Śaivism².

But it is difficult to say at what time the Vīra-śaiva sect was formed and when it had this special designation. Vīra-śaivism differs from the Āgamic Śaivism and the Pāsupata system in its philosophy and its doctrine of *sthala*, the special kind of *liṅga-dhāraṇa* and also in some other ritualistic matters which are not quite relevant for treatment in a work like the present one. It is unfortunate that *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*, a work probably of the thirteenth century, should contain the earliest reference to Vīra-śaivism in literature. A small manuscript called *Vīra-śaiva-guru-paramparā* gives the names of the following teachers in order of priority: (1) Viśveśvara-guru, (2) Ekorāma, (3) Vīreśārādhyā, (4) Vīra-bhadra, (5) Viraṇārādhyā, (6) Māṇikyārādhyā, (7) Buccayārādhyā, (8) Vīra-malleśvarārādhyā, (9) Deśikārādhyā, (10) Vṛṣabha, (11) Akṣaka and (12) Mukha-liṅgeśvara. In the *Vīra-śaivāgama*³, eighth *paṭala*, it is said that in the four *pīṭhas* or pontifical seats, namely *yoga-pīṭha*, *mahā-pīṭha*, *jñāna-pīṭha* and

¹ See author's *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, Vol. I, pp. 728 et seq.

² *Sūta-saṃhitā*, *yajña-vaibhava-khaṇḍa*, ch. 22, verses 2 and 3. See also ch. 20, verse 22; ch. 39, verse 23.

³ Madras manuscript.

soma-pīṭha, there were four teachers of different priority, Revāṇa, Marula, Vāmadeva¹, and Paṇḍitārādhyā. These names are of a mythical nature, as they are said to be referred to in the different Vedas. But the names that we have quoted above from the *Vīra-śaiva-guru-paramparā* form a succession list of teachers up to the time of the teacher of the author of the manuscript². On studying the succession list of teachers, we find that we know nothing of them either by allusion or by any text ascribed to them, excepting Vīra-bhadra, who has been referred to in the *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*³. We cannot say how much earlier Vīra-bhadra was than the author of the *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*. But since Vīra-bhadra is mentioned along with Basava in the same context, we may suppose that this Vīra-bhadra could not have been much earlier than Basava. So if we are safe in supposing that Vīra-bhadra lived somewhere in the twelfth century, we have only to compute the time of the three Ācāryas who lived before Vīra-bhadra. According to ordinary methods of computation we can put a hundred years for the teaching period of the three teachers. This would mean that Vīra-śaivism as a sect started in the eleventh century. It is possible that these teachers wrote or preached in the Dravidian tongue which could be understood by the people among whom they preached. This would explain why no Sanskrit books are found ascribed to them. Basava was probably one of the most intelligent and emotional thinkers, who expressed his effusions in the Kāuṇḍa language.

But about our specification of the succession list of Vīra-śaiva teachers much remains yet to be said. It does not explain anything about the other lines of teachers, of whom we hear from stray allusions. Thus we hear of Agastya as being the first proponent of the Śaiva faith. We find also that one Reṇukācārya wrote the work, *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* based upon the verdict of other Vīra-śaiva works and giving us the purport of the mythical dialogue that took place between Reṇuka-siddha and Agastya some time in the past. The Reṇuka-siddha was also called Revāṇa-siddha, and it is supposed that he expounded the Vīra-śaiva Śāstra to Agastya in the beginning of the Kali age. We find at a much later date one Siddha-rāmeśvara, who was impregnated with

¹ Another reading is Rāma-deva (eighth and sixteenth *paṭalas*).

² *asmad-ācārya-paryantam bande guru-paramparām*. (Madras manuscript.)

³ *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*. *avataraṇikā* of the 36th verse, ch. 9.

the doctrine of Vīra-śaivism; it is in his school of thought that we have a person called Śiva-yogīśvara, who gives us the supposed purport of the dialogue between Raṇuka and Agastya, as it had traditionally come down to him, supplementing it with the teachings of other relevant literature. In the family of Siddha-rāmeśvara there was born one Mudda-deva, a great teacher. He had a son called Siddha-nātha, who wrote a work called *Śiva-siddhānta-nirṇaya* containing the purport of the Āgamas. The other teachers of the time regarded him as the most prominent of the Vīra-śaiva teachers (*Vīra-śaiva-śikhā-ratna*) and Reṇukācārya, who called himself also Śiva-yogin, wrote the work, *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*. We thus see that there was a long list of Vīra-śaiva teachers before Reṇukācārya, who probably lived somewhere in the thirteenth century. Even if we do not take this into account, Reṇukācārya, the author of *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* says that he had written the work for the elucidation of the nature of Śiva by consulting the Śaiva Tantras beginning from the *Kāmikāgama* to the *Vātulāgama* and also the Purāṇas. He further says that the *Vīra-śaiva Tantra* is the last of the Śaiva Tantras and therefore it is the essence of them all¹.

But what is exactly the content of the Vīra-śaiva philosophy as explained in the *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*? It is said that Brahman is the identity of 'being,' 'bliss' and 'consciousness,' and devoid of any form or differentiation. It is limitless and beyond all ways of knowledge. It is self-luminous and absolutely without any obstruction of knowledge, passion or power. It is in Him that the whole world of the conscious and the unconscious remains, in a potential form untraceable by any of our senses, and it is from Him that the whole world becomes expressed or manifest of itself, without the operation of any other instrument. It implies that when it so pleases God, He expands Himself out of His own joy, and thereby the world appears, just as solid butter expands itself into its liquid state. The qualities of Śiva are of a transcendent nature (*aprākṛta*). The character of being, consciousness and bliss is power (*śakti*). It is curious, however, to note that side by side with this purely ultra-monistic and impersonal view we find God Śiva as being endowed with will by which He creates and destroys the

¹ *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*, ch. I, verses 31-2.

world. As we shall have occasion to notice later on, the whole doctrine of *ṣaṭ-sthala*, which forms the crux of Vīra-śaiva thought, is only an emphasis on the necessity on the part of every individual to look upon him and the world as being sustained in God and being completely identified with God. There are, indeed, many phrases which suggest a sort of *bhedābheda* view, but this *bhedābheda* or difference in unity is not of the nature of the tree and its flowers and fruits, as such a view will suggest a modification or transformation of the nature of Śiva. The idea of *bhedābheda* is to be interpreted with the notion that God, who is transcendent, appears also in the form of the objects that we perceive and also of the nature of our own selves.

The *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* was based on the Āgamas and therefore had the oscillating nature of philosophical outlook as we find in the different Āgamas. Thus in *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*, ch. v, verse 34, it is said that the Brahman is without any form or quality, but it appears to be the individual souls (*jīvas*) by its beginningless association with *avidyā* or nescience. In that sense *jīva* or the individual soul is only a part of God. *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* further says that God is the controller, the mover (*preraka*) of all living beings. In another verse it says that Brahman is both God and the souls of beings at the same time. In pure Śiva there are no qualities as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*¹. Again *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* oscillates to the Vedānta view that the individual souls, the objects of the world as well as the Supreme Controller, are all but illusory imposition on the pure consciousness or Brahman². The *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* admits both *avidyā* and *māyā* after the fashion of Śāṅkarites. It is in association with *avidyā* that we have the various kinds of souls and it is with the association of *māyā* that Brahman appears as omniscient and omnipotent. It is on account of the *avidyā* that the individual soul cannot realise its identity with Brahman, and thus goes through the cycle of births and rebirths.

Yet there is another point to note. In the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali, it is said that the nature of our birth, the period of life

¹ *guṇa-trayātmikā śaktir brahma-niṣṭhā-sanātani,
tad-vaiṣamyāt samutpannā tasmin vastu-trayābhidhā.*

Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi, ch. v, verse 39.

² *bhoktā bhojyaṃ prerayitā vastu-trayaṃ smṛtaṃ,
akhaṇḍe brahma-caitanya kalpitam guṇa-bhedataḥ.*

Ibid. ch. v, verse 41.

and the nature of our experiences, are determined by our *karma*, and that the law of the distribution of the fruits of *karma* is mysterious. But the effects of *karma* take place automatically. This view is only modified by the Pāsupatas and the Naiyāyikas who belong to their fold. It is interesting to notice that the *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* borrows this idea of *karma* from the Pāsupatas, who hold that the distribution of *karma* is managed and controlled by God. *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* thus seems to present before us an eclectic type of thought which is unstable and still in the state of formation. This explains the author's ill-digested assimilation of elements of thought on Pāsupata doctrine, the varying Āgama doctrines, the influence of Sāṃkhya, and ultimately the Vedānta of the Śaṅkarites. This being so, in the thirteenth century we cannot expect a systematic Vira-śaiva philosophy in its own individual character as a philosophical system in the time of Basava. It will be easy for us to show that Allama-prabhu, the teacher of Basava, was thoroughly surcharged with the Vedāntism of the Śaṅkara school.

In the *Śaṅkara-vijaya* Ānandagiri, a junior contemporary and a pupil of Śaṅkara gives a long description of the various types of the devotees of Śiva who could be distinguished from one another by their outward marks. Śaṅkara himself only speaks of the Pāsupatas and the Śaivas who followed the Siddhāntas or the Āgamas, in which God Śiva has been described as being the instrumental cause, different from the material cause out of which the world has been made. Vācaspati in his *Bhāmatī*, a commentary on the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara on the *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 37, speaks of four types of the followers of Śiva. Of these we have found ample literature of the Śaivas and the Pāsupatas, and had ventured to suggest that the Kāruṇika-siddhāntins were also the followers of the Āgamic Śaiva thought. But we could find no literature of the Kāpālikas or of the Kālamukhas referred to in the *bhāṣya* of the same *sūtra* by Rāmānuja. In the *Sūta-saṃhitā* we find the names of the *Kāmika* and other Āgamas, the Kāpālikas, the Lākulas, the Pāsupatas, the Somas, and the Bhairavas, who had also their Āgamas. These Āgamas branched off into a number of sections or schools¹. In our investigation we have found that the Lākulas and the Pāsupatas were one and the same, and we have the testimony of Mādhava, the author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, to the same effect.

¹ *Sūta-saṃhitā* IV, *Vajña-vaibhava-khaṇḍa*, ch. XXII, verses 2-4.

Sūta-saṃhitā was probably a work of the sixth century A.D., while Mādhava's work was of the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, it seems that the Pāsupatas were earlier than the Lākulas. Neither Śaṅkara nor Vācaspati speaks of the Lākuliśas as being the same as the Pāsupatas. But some time before the fourteenth century the Lākuliśas and Pāsupatas had coalesced and later on they remained as one system, as we find them regarded as one by Appaya Dikṣita of the sixteenth century in his commentary, *Vedānta-kalpataru-parimala* on *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 37. But there can be but little doubt that the Lākulas had their own Āgamas long before the sixth century A.D., which is probably the date of *Sūta-saṃhitā*. We find references to the Bhairavas, and the name Bhairava is given to Śiva as the presiding male god wherever there is the Śakti deity representing the limbs of Śakti, the consort of Śiva and the daughter of Dakṣa. But we have not been able to secure any Āgamas containing an account of the philosophical doctrine of this creed of Bhairavism, though we have found ritualistic references to Bhairava. The *Sūta-saṃhitā* also refers to the Āgamic *ṛsis* such as Śveta, etc.; each of these twenty-eight *ṛsis* had four disciples, thus making the number one hundred and twelve. They are also referred to in the *Sūta-saṃhitā* (Book IV, ch. XXI, verses 2-3), where they are described as smearing their bodies with ashes and wearing the necklaces of *rudrākṣa*. We have noticed before that *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* also refers to them. The existence of so many Śaiva saints at such an early date naturally implies the great antiquity of Śaivism. These Śaiva saints seem to have been loyal to the *Varṇāśrama dharma* or duties of caste and the stages of life.

A later Āgama probably of the thirteenth century called the *Vira-śaivāgama* speaks of the four schools of thought, Śaiva, Pāsupata, Vāma and Kula. Śaiva is again divided into Saumya and Raudra. The Saumya is of five kinds including demonology and magic as antidote to poison. The Śaiva school is called Dakṣiṇa, and the cult of Śakti is called Vāma. The two can be mixed together as Vāma and Dakṣiṇa, and regarded as one school. The *Siddhānta śāstra* is called pure Śaiva belonging only to Śiva. There is, however, another sect, or rather three schools of a sect, called Dakṣiṇa, Kālamukha and Mahāvratā¹. Bhandarkar has suggested that the Kāla-mukhas and the Mahāvratadhārins are

¹ See Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* (*Śrī-bhāṣya*), II. 2. 37.

one and the same. The Siddhāntas again are divided into three sects: Ādi-śaiva, Mahā-śaiva and Anta-śaiva. These subdivisions of Śaivism have sprung from the Pāsupata-śaivism. The writer of the *Vīra-śaivāgama* says that Śaivism scattered itself into infinite variety of schools of thought or bands of devotees and had a huge literature for supplementing their position¹. All these sects have now practically vanished with their literature if they had any.

From the testimony of the same Āgama it appears that Vīra-śaivism was not a part of the older Śaivas, but it originated as a doctrinal school which accepted four *līngas* in the four pontifical seats, the worship of Śiva as *ṣaṭ-sthala* and their special rites and customs. This view may be correct, as we cannot trace the Vīra-śaiva as a system of thought in any of the earlier works on Śaivism. We have a number of *Vīra-śaivāgamas* such as *Makutāgama*, *Suprabhedāgama*, *Vīra-śaivā'-gama* and the like in manuscript. But none of them, excepting the *Basava-rājīya* called also *Vīra-śaiva-sāroddhāra* (manuscript) with the *bhāṣya* of Somanātha, make any reference to Basava or even the Vīra-śaiva philosophy. The *Basava-rājīya* also speaks of Basava as being the incarnation of the bull of Śiva and the patron of Śaivas. But the author of the work does not say anything about the philosophical doctrine of Basava, but only describes the idea of *ṣaṭ-sthala* in an elaborate manner.

Professor Sakhare in his introduction to *Līnga-dhāraṇa-candrikā* of Nandikeśvara quotes a passage from *Svāyaṃbhuvāgama* in which the mythical origins of Revāṇa-siddha from *Someśa-līnga*, of Marula-siddha from *Siddheśa-līnga*, of Paṇḍitārya from *Mallikārjuna-līnga*, of Ekorāma from *Rāmanātha-līnga*, and of Viśvārādhyā from the *Viśveśa-līnga*, are described. We have no further evidence of these teachers or the nature of their teachings. We do not even know if they called themselves Vīra-śaivas. This account does not tally with the description found in the *Vīra-śaiva-guru-paramparā*, or with the other Vīra-śaiva texts published or unpublished with which we are familiar.

The *gotras* and the *pravaras* of the Vīra-śaivas, given in the *Suprabhedāgama* as emanating from the unknown past, are quite

¹ *samudra-sikatāsaṃkhyās samayās santi kotīśaḥ. Vīra-śaivāgama* (Madras manuscript).

fanciful and need not further be discussed. Such a discussion could shed no historical light on the origin and development of the Vira-śaiva philosophy and dogmatics.

We have seen before that there is a tradition which links Agastya, Reṇuka or Revaṇa-siddha, Siddha-rāma and Reṇukā-cārya, the author of the *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*. Śrīpati mainly bases his arguments on the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas, but he also refers to *Agastya-sūtra* and Reṇukācārya. He does not, however, refer to Basava and the contemporaries who were associated with him, such as Allama-prabhu, Cannabasava, Mācaya, Goga, Siddha-rāma and Mahādevī¹. This seems to show that the Vira-śaivism had two or more lines of development which later on coalesced and began to be regarded as one system of Vira-śaiva thought. From Basava's *vacanas* it is difficult to assess the real philosophical value of the faith that was professed by Basava. In the *Prabhu-līṅga-līlā* and the *Basava-purāṇa* we find a system of thought which, in the absence of other corroborating materials, may be accepted as approximately outlining the system of thought which was known as Vira-śaivism in Basava's time.

We find that the doctrines of *sthala* and *līṅga-dhāraṇa* were known to the author of the *Prabhu-līṅga-līlā*. But though in one place, where instruction was being given to Basava by Allama-prabhu, *ṣaṭ-sthala* is mentioned, yet the entire emphasis throughout the book is on the doctrine of unity of the self with Śiva, the ground of the reality². In the above passage it is held that there are double knots associated with the gross, the subtle and the cause, in accordance with which we have the six *sthalas* in three groups of a pair of each. Thus the two knots associated with the gross go by the name of *bhakta* and *maheśvara*; those with the subtle as associated with *prāṇa* are called *prāṇa* and *prasāda-līṅgi sthalas*;

¹ Thus it appears from Śrīpati's statement in the *Śrīkara-bhāṣya* II. 2. 37, p. 234, and III. 3. 3, p. 347, that Revaṇa-siddha, Marula-siddha, Rāma-siddha, Udbhaṭārādhya, Vemaṇārādhya were real teachers who had expressed their views or articles of faith in some distinctive works. But unfortunately no trace of such works can be discovered, nor is it possible to enunciate the actual views propounded by them. Whether Śrīpati had himself seen them or not is merely a matter of conjecture. He does not quote from the works of those teachers, and it is just possible that he is only making statements on the strength of tradition. In another passage (II. 1. 4) Śrīpati mentions the names of Manu, Vāmadeva, Agastya, Durvāsā, Upamanyu, who are quite mythical purāṇic figures along with Revaṇa-siddha and Marula-siddha.

² See *Prabhu-līṅga-līlā*, ch. 16, pp. 132-4.

those with the cause are of an emotional nature, and are called *śarana* and *aikya sthalas*. In other works such as *Basava-rājīya*, *Vira-śaivāgama* and *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi* the names of *sthalas* extend to one hundred and one. But in none of those works is the idea of these different *sthalas* explained to show their philosophical importance. In *Prabhu-liṅga-līlā* we hear that Cannabasava knew the mystery of *ṣaṭ-sthala*, but we do not know exactly what that mystery was. In this connection *guru*, *liṅga*, *cara*, *prasāda* and *pādodaka* are also mentioned. The whole emphasis of the book is on the necessity of realising the unity of the self and, indeed, of anything else with Śiva. Allama decries the external ritualism and lays stress on the necessity of realising the ultimate reality of the universe and the self with Śiva. He vehemently decries all forms of injury to animal life, and persuades Goga to give up ploughing the ground, as it would involve the killing of many insects. Allama further advised Goga to surrender the fruits of all his actions to God and carry on his duties without any attachment. As a matter of fact the Vira-śaiva thought as represented by Allama can hardly be distinguished from the philosophy of Śaṅkara, for Allama accepted one reality which appeared in diverse forms under the condition of *māyā* and *avidyā*. In that sense the whole world would be an illusion. The *bhakti* preached by Allama was also of an intellectual type, as it consisted of a constant and unflinching meditation and realisation of the ultimate reality of all things with Śiva. This view of *bhakti* seems to have influenced Reṇukācārya, the author of *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*, who describes inner devotion (*āntara-bhakti*) in almost the same type of phraseology¹.

In his teachings to Mukṭāyī, Allama says that just as the sucking babe is gradually weaned from the mother's milk to various kinds of food, so the real teacher teaches the devotee to concentrate his

¹ *liṅge prāṇaṃ samādhāya prāṇe liṅgaṃ tu sām̐bhavam,
svasthaṃ manas tathā kṛtvā na kiñcic cintayed yaśi.
sābhyanāntarā bhaktir iti procyate śiva-yogibhiḥ,
sā yasmin vartate tasya jīvanam̐ bhraṣṭa-vijāvat.*

Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi, ch. 9, verses 8-9.

*tataḥ sāvadhānena tat-prāṇa-liṅge,
samākṛtya kṛtyāni viśmṛtya matyā,
mahā-yoga-sāmrājya-paṭṭābhīṣikto,
bhajed ātmano liṅga-tādātmya-siddhim.*

Prabhu-liṅga-līlā, ch. 16, verse 63.

mind on external forms of worship and later on makes him give them up, so that he ultimately becomes unattached to all kinds of duties, and attains true knowledge by which all his deeds are destroyed. There is not much use in learning or delivering speeches, but what is necessary, is to realise the unity of all with Śiva¹.

In his conversation with Siddha-rāma and Gorakṣa, he not only demonstrates the non-existence of all things but Śiva, but he also shows his familiarity with a type of magical *yoga*, the details of which are not given and cannot be traced in the *Yogaśāstra* of Patañjali. In the instruction given by Allama to his pupil Basava, the former explains briefly the nature of *bhakti*, *ṣaṭ-sthala* and *yoga*. It seems that the restful passivity that is attained by *yoga* is nothing but complete and steady identification of the ultimate truth, Śiva, with all the variable forms of experience, and our life and experience as a complete person. This *yoga* leading to the apperception of the ultimate unity can be done by arresting all the vital processes in the nervous centres of the body at higher and higher grades, until these energies become one with the supreme reality, God Śiva. It is in this way that the *cakras* are traversed and passed over till the Yogin settle down in Śiva. The entire physical processes being arrested by the peculiar *yoga* method, our mind does not vacillate or change, but remains in the consciousness of the pure Lord, Śiva.

The teacher of Basava, Allama, says that without a strong effort to make the mind steady by the complete arrest of the vital forces, the *Vāyu*, there can be no *bhakti* and no cessation to bondage. It is by the arrest of these vital forces or *Vāyu*, that the *citta* or the mind of the Vira-śaiva becomes arrested and merged in the elemental physical constituents of the body, such as fire, water, etc. The *māyā* is a product of *manas*, and *vāyu* also is regarded as a product of *manas*, and this *vāyu* becomes the body through the activity of the *manas*. The existence of the body is possible only by the activity of the vital forces or *vāyu*, which keep us away from realising the unity of all things with Śiva, which is also called *bhakti*. The Vira-śaiva has, therefore, to take recourse to a process opposite to the normal course of activity of the *vāyus* by concentrating them on one point, and by accepting the mastery of the *vāyus* over the different *cakras* or nerve plexuses (technically

¹ See *Prabhu-līnga-līlā*, ch. 12, pp. 57-8.

known as the control of the six *cakras*), which would in their own way be regarded as the six stages or stations of the process of the control of the *vāyus*, the *ṣaṭ-sthalas*¹. It is thus seen that according to the description given in *Prabhu-līṅga-līlā* of the doctrine of *ṣaṭ-sthala*, the process of *ṣaṭ-sthala* is to be regarded as an upward journey through a hierarchy of stations, by which alone the unity with Śiva can be realised. The instruction of this dynamic process of *yoga* is a practical method of a semi-physiological process by which the ultimate identity of God and soul can be realised. In Śaṅkara's monistic philosophy it is said that the realisation of the ultimate identity of the self with Brahman is the highest attainable goal of life. It is, however, said that such an enlightenment can be realised by proper intuition of the significance of the monistic texts such as "thou art that." It refuses to admit any practical utility of any dynamic course of practice which is so strongly advised in the Vīra-śaiva doctrine of *ṣaṭ-sthala* as taught by Allama.

Allama had met Gorakṣa in one of his travels. Gorakṣa, who was also probably a Śaiva, had by his yogic processes attained such miraculous powers that no stroke of any weapon could produce an injury on him. He made a demonstration of it to Allama. Allama in reply asked him to pass a sword through his body. But to Gorakṣa's utter amazement he found that when he ran through Allama's body with his sword, no sound of impact was produced. The sword passed through Allama's body as if it were passing through vacant space. Gorakṣa wanted humbly to know the secret by which Allama could show such miraculous powers. In reply Allama said that the *māyā* becomes frozen, as does the body, and when the body and the *māyā* both become frozen, shadow forms appear as real², and the body and the mind appear as one. When the body and the *māyā* are removed in the heart, then the shadow is destroyed. At this, Gorakṣa further implored Allama to initiate him into those powers. Allama touched his body and blessed him, and by that produced an internal conversion. As an effect of this, attachment vanished and with the disappearance of attachment, antipathy, egotism and other vices also disappeared. Allama further said that unless the self could realise that the association with the body was false, and the two were completely separated, one could

¹ *Prabhu-līṅga-līlā*, part III, pp. 6-8 (1st edition).

² *Ibid.* p. 25 (1st edition).

not realise the true identity with the Lord Śiva, devotion to whom was the cause of all true knowledge. It is only by the continual meditation of Śiva and by the proper processes of breath control, that it is possible to realise the ultimate unity.

There is a subtle difference between the proper and practical adoption of the dynamic process of *ṣaṭ-sthala* and the realisation of unity as taught by the *Śāṅkara Vedānta*. In the *Śāṅkara Vedānta*, when the mind is properly prepared by suitable accessory processes, the teacher instructs the pupil or the would-be saint about the ultimate knowledge of the unity of the self and the Brahman, and the would-be saint at once perceives the truth of his identity with Brahman as being the only reality. He also at once perceives that all knowledge of duality is false, though he does not actually melt himself into the nothingness of pure consciousness or the Brahman. In the Vira-śaiva system the scheme of *ṣaṭ-sthala* is a scheme of the performance of yogic processes. By them the vital processes as associated with the various vital forces and the nerve plexuses, are controlled, and by that very means the yogin gets a mastery over his passions and is also introduced to new and advanced stages of knowledge, until his soul becomes so united with the permanent reality, Śiva, that all appearance and duality cease both in fact and in thought. Thus a successful Vira-śaiva saint should not only perceive his identity with Śiva, but his whole body, which was an appearance or shadow over the reality, would also cease to exist. His apparent body would not be a material fact in the world, and therefore would not be liable to any impact with other physical bodies, though externally they may appear as physical bodies.

A similar philosophical view can be found in the work called *Siddha-siddhānta-paddhati* attributed to Gorakṣa-nāth, who is regarded as a Śaiva saint, an incarnation of Śiva Himself. Many legends are attributed to him and many poems have been composed in vernaculars of Bengali and Hindi, extolling the deeds and miraculous performances of his disciples and of himself. His date seems to be uncertain. References to Gorakṣa are found in the works of writers of the eighth to fifteenth centuries, and his miraculous deeds are described as having taken place in countries ranging from Gujarat, Nepal and Bengal and other parts of northern and western India. One of his well-known disciples was called Matsyendra-nātha. Śiva is called Paśupati, the lord of animals,

and the word *gorakṣa* also means the protector of the cattle. In the lexicons the word *go* means the name of a *ṛṣi* and also the name of cattle. There is thus an easy association of the word *gorakṣa* with the word *paśupati*. Gorakṣa's views are also regarded as the views of Siddhānta. This reminds us of the fact that the Śaiva doctrines of the South were regarded as having been propounded by Maheśvara or Śiva in the Siddhāntas, an elaboration of which has elsewhere been made in this work as the Āgama philosophy of the Siddhāntas. Only a few Sanskrit books on the philosophical aspects of the teachings of Gorakṣa-nāth have come down to us. There are, however, quite a number of books in the vernaculars which describe the miraculous powers of the Kānpḥāṭā Yogis of the school of Gorakṣa-nāth, also called Gorākḥ-nāth.

One of these Sanskrit works is called *Siddha-siddhānta-paddhati*. It is there that the ultimate reality of the unmoved, and the immovable nature of the pure consciousness which forms the ultimate ground of all our internal and external experiences, are to be sought. It is never produced nor destroyed, and in that sense eternal and always self-luminous. In this way it is different from ordinary knowledge, which is called *buddhi*. Ordinary knowledge rises and fades, but this pure consciousness which is identified as being one with Śiva is beyond all occurrence and beyond all time. It is, therefore, regarded as the ground of all things. It is from this that all effects, for example, the bodies, the instruments or the *karāṇas* (senses, etc.), and the agents, for example, the souls or the *jīvas*, shoot forth. It is by its spontaneity that the so-called God as well as His powers are manifested. In this original state Śiva shows itself as identical with His *śakti*. This is called the *sāmarasya*, that is, both having the same taste. This ultimate nature is the original ego, called also *kula*, which shows itself in various aspects. We should distinguish this ultimate nature of reality, which is changeless, from the reality as associated with class concepts and other distinguishing traits. These distinguishing traits are also held up in the supreme reality, for in all stages of experience these distinguishing features have no reality but the ultimate reality, which holds them all in the oneness of pure consciousness. Since the distinguishing characteristics have no further reality beyond them than the unchangeable ground-consciousness, they ulti-

mately have to be regarded as being homogeneous (*sama-rasa*) with ubiquitous reality.

The concept of *sama-rasa* is homogeneity. A thing which appears as different from another thing, but is in reality or essence the same, is said to be *sama-rasa* with the first one. It is also a way in which the *bhedābheda* theory of the reality and the appearance is explained. Thus a drop of water is in appearance different from the sheet of water in which it is held, but in fact it has no other reality and no other taste than that sheet of water. The ultimate reality, without losing its nature as such, shows itself in various forms, though in and through them all it alone remains as the ultimately real. It is for this reason that though the ultimate reality is endowed with all powers, it does not show itself except through its various manifesting forms. So the all-powerful Śiva, though it is the source of all power, behaves as if it were without any power. This power therefore remains in the body as the ever-awaking *kuṇḍalinī* or the serpentine force, and also as manifesting in different ways. The consideration of the body as indestructible is called *kāya-siddhi*.

We need not go into further detail in explaining the philosophical ideas of Gorakṣa as contained in *Siddha-siddhānta-paddhati*, for this would be to digress. But we find that there is a curious combination of Haṭha-yoga, the control of the nerve plexuses, the idea of the individual and the world as having the same reality, though they appear as different, as we find in the lecture attributed to Allama in *Prabhu-linga-līlā*. It also holds a type of *bhedābheda* theory and is distinctly opposed to the monistic interpretation of the Upaniṣads as introduced by Śaṅkara.

The idea of *ṣaṭ-sthala* must have been prevalent either as a separate doctrine or as a part of some form of Śaivism. We know that there were many schools of Śaivism, many of which have now become lost. The name *ṣaṭ-sthala* cannot be found in any of the sacred Sanskrit works. We have no account of Vira-śaivism before *Siddhānta-śikhāmaṇi*. Descriptions of it are found in many works, some of the most important of which are *Prabhu-linga-līlā* and *Basava-purāṇa*. We also hear that Canna-basava, the nephew of Basava, was initiated into the doctrine of *ṣaṭ-sthala*. In *Prabhu-linga-līlā* we hear that Allama instructed the doctrine of *ṣaṭ-sthala* to Basava. We also find the interesting dialogue between Allama

and Gorakṣa in the *Prabhu-līṅga-līlā*. We have also examined briefly some of the contents of *Siddha-siddhānta-paddhati* of Gorakṣa, and we find that the *ṣaṭ-sthala* doctrine preached by Allama was more or less similar to the *Yoga* doctrine found in the *Siddha-siddhānta-paddhati*. If we had more space, we could have brought out an interesting comparison between the doctrines of Allama and Gorakṣa. It is not impossible that there was a mutual exchange of views between Gorakṣa and Allama. Unfortunately the date of Gorakṣa cannot be definitely known, though it is known that his doctrines had spread very widely in various parts of India, extending over a long period in the Middle Ages.

The interpretation of *ṣaṭ-sthala* is rather different in different works dealing with it. This shows that, though the *ṣaṭ-sthala* doctrine was regarded as the most important feature of Vīra-śaivism after Basava, we are all confused as to what the *ṣaṭ-sthala* might have been. As a matter of fact we are not even certain about the number. Thus in *Vīra-śaiva-siddhānta* (MS.) we have a reference to 101 *sthalas*, and so also in *Siddhānta-sikhāmaṇi*. But elsewhere in Śrīpati's *bhāṣya*, *Anubhava-sūtra* of Māyī-deva, and in *Prabhu-līṅga-līlā* and *Basava-purāṇa* we find reference to six *sthalas* only.

In the same way the *sthalas* have not been the same in the various authoritative works. The concepts of these *sthalas* are also different, and they are sometimes used in different meanings. In some works *sthala* is used to denote the six nerve plexuses in the body or the six centres from which the power of God is manifested in different ways; sometimes they are used to denote the sixfold majestic powers of God and sometimes to denote the important natural elements, such as earth, fire, air, etc. The whole idea seems to be that the macrocosm and microcosm being the same identical entity, it is possible to control the dissipated forces of any centre and pass on to a more concentrated point of manifestation of the energy, and this process is regarded as the upward process of ascension from one stage to another.

Anubhava-sūtra of Māyi-deva¹.

Upamanyu, the first teacher, was born in Aaipura. The second teacher was Bhīma-nātha Prabhu. Then came Mahā-guru Kalesvara. His son, well versed in *śrauta* and *smārta* literature and their customs and manners, was Śrī Boppa-nātha. Boppa-nātha's son was Śrī Nāka-rāja Prabhu, who was well versed in Vīra-śaiva rites and customs of religion. The disciple of Nāka-rāja was Saṅgameśvara. Saṅgameśvara's son was Māyi-deva. He is well versed in the knowledge of *Śivādvaita*, and he is a *ṣaṭ-sthala-Brahma-vādī*. The *Śaivāgamas* begin with *Kāmika* and end with *Vātula*. *Vātula-tantra* is the best. Its second part, called *Pradīpa*, contains the *Śiva-siddhānta-tantra*. *Ṣaṭ-sthala* doctrine is based on the principles of the *Gītā* together with the older views. It is supported by the instructions of teachers and self-realisation by *anubhūti* and by arguments. In the *Anubhava-sūtra* there are (1) the *guru-paramparā*; (2) the definition of *sthala*; (3) the *līṅga-sthala*; (4) the *aṅga-sthala*; (5) the *līṅga-samyoga-vidhī*; (6) the *līṅgārpaṇa-sadbhāva*; (7) the *sarvāṅga-līṅga-sāhitya*; and (8) the *kriyā-viśrānti*.

Sthala is defined as one Brahman identically the same with *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, which is called the ultimate category of Śiva—the ground of the manifestation of the world and dissolution. He is also the category from which the different categories of *mahat*, etc. have sprung forth. '*Stha*' means *Sthāna* and '*la*' means *laya*. It is the source of all energies and all beings have come from it and shall return into it. It is by the self-perturbation of the energy of this ultimate category that the various other *sthalas* are evolved. This one *sthala* may be divided into the *līṅga-sthala* and the *Aṅga-sthala*. As the empty space can be distinctively qualified as the space inside the room or inside the jar, so the dual bifurcation of *sthala* may appear as the object of worship and the worshipper.

Śiva remaining unchanged in Himself appears in these two forms. It is the same Śiva which appears as pure consciousness and also as the part of *līṅga*. The part of *līṅga*, *līṅgāṅga* is also called *jīva* or the individual souls.

¹ *Anubhava-sūtra* forms the second part of *Śiva-siddhānta-tantra*, which is complete in two parts. The first part is *Vīśeṣārtha-prakāśaka*. *Anubhava-sūtra* is written by Māyi-deva; it is evident from the colophons of *Anubhava-sūtra*. It is also mentioned in the last colophon of *Śiva-siddhānta-tantra*.

As *sthala* is of two parts, Brahma and jīva, so His *śakti* is also twofold. It is indeterminate and is called Maheśvara. It assumes two forms by its own pure spontaneity. One part of it may be regarded as associated with *līṅga*, the Brahman, and the other with *aṅga*, the *jīva*. In reality *śakti* and *bhakti* are the same¹. When the energy moves forward for creation it is called *śakti* as *pravṛtti*, and as cessation *nivṛtti* is called *bhakti*². On account of the diverse nature of *bhakti* its indeterminateness disintegrates into various forms. The twofold functions of *śakti* as the upper and the lower show themselves in the fact that the upper one tends to manifest the world and the lower one, appearing as *bhakti*, tends to return to God. In these twofold forms the same *śakti* is called *māyā* and *bhakti*. The *śakti* in the *līṅga* appears as the *bhakti* in the *aṅga*, and the unity of *līṅga* and *aṅga* is the identity of Śiva and *jīva*.

The *līṅga-sthala* is threefold, as: (1) *bhāva-līṅga*; (2) *prāṇa-līṅga*; and (3) *iṣṭa-līṅga*. The *bhāva-līṅga* can only be grasped through inner intuition as pure Being, and this *bhāva-līṅga* is called *niṣkala*. *Prāṇa-līṅga* is the reality as grasped by thought and as such it is both indeterminate and determinate. The *iṣṭa-līṅga* is that which fulfils one's good as self-realisation or adoration, and it is beyond space and time.

The ultimate *śakti* as being pure cessation and beyond all, is *śāntyatīta*; the next one is *icchā-śakti*, called also *vidyā* as pure knowledge. The third one is called the *kriyā-śakti* which leads to cessation. The three *śaktis* of *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā* become sixfold.

The six *sthalas* are again described as follows:

(1) That which is completely full in itself, subtle, having no beginning nor end, and is indefinable, but can be grasped only by the intuition of the heart as the manifestation of pure consciousness, is called the *mahātma-līṅga*.

(2) That in which we find the seed of development as consciousness beyond the senses, called also the *sādākhya-tattva*, is called *prasāda-ghana-līṅga*.

(3) The pure luminous *puruṣa*, which is without inward and outward, without any form, and known by the name Ātman, is called the *cara-līṅga*.

1

2

Śakti-bhaktyor na bhedo 'sti. Anubhava-sūtra, p. 8.
śaktiā prapañca-sṛṣṭiḥ syāu,
bhaktiā tad-vīlayo mataḥ. Ibid.

(4) When this by the *icchā-śakti* manifests itself as the ego, we have what is called *Śiva-līṅga*.

(5) When it by its own knowledge and power and omnipotence assumes the role of an instructor for taking all beings beyond the range of all pleasures, it is called *guru-līṅga*.

(6) The aspect in which by its action it upholds the universe and holds them all in the mind, is called the *ācāra-līṅga*.

There are further divisions and sub-divisions of these *sthalas*, *aṅga-sthala*.

‘*Aṃ*’ means Brahma and ‘*ga*’ means that which goes. *Aṅga-sthala* is of three kinds as *yogāṅga*, *bhogāṅga* and *tyāgāṅga*. In the first, one attains the bliss of union with Śiva. In the second, *bhogāṅga*, one enjoys with Śiva, and in *tyāgāṅga* one leaves aside the illusion or the false notion of the cycle of births and rebirths. *Yogāṅga* is the original cause, the *bhogāṅga* is the subtle cause and *tyāgāṅga* is the gross one. *Yogāṅga* is the dreamless state, *bhogāṅga* is the ordinary state of sleep, and *tyāgāṅga* is the waking state. *Yogāṅga* is the state of *prajñā*, *bhogāṅga* is *taijas* and *tyāgāṅga* is *viśva*. *Yogāṅga* is called the unity with Śiva and *śaraṇa-sthala*. *Bhogāṅga* is twofold, *prāṇa-līṅgi* and *prasādi*. The gross is twofold, *bhakta-sthala* and *māheśvara sthala*. Again *prajñā* is *aikya-sthala* and *śaraṇa-sthala*. The *taijas* is *prāṇa-līṅgi* and *prasādi*. *Viśva* again is twofold as *māheśvara* and *bhakta-sthala*. The unity, the *śaraṇa*, the *prāṇa-līṅgi*, the *prasādi*, the *māheśvara* and the *bhakta* may be regarded as the successive of the six *sthalas*.

Again omnipotence, contentment, and beginningless consciousness, independence, unobstructedness of power and infinite power—these are the parts of God, which being in *ṣaṭ-sthala* are regarded as six types of *bhakti* depending on various conditions. The *bhakti* manifests itself in diverse forms, just as water manifests in various tastes in various fruits. The *bhakti* is of the nature of Śiva. Then it is of the nature of *ānanda* or bliss. Then it is of the nature of *anubhava* or realisation. Then it is of the nature of adoration (*naiṣṭhikī*) and the sixth is of the nature of *bhakti* among good men. It is further said that all those classifications are meaningless. The truth is the identity of myself and everything, all else is false—this is *aikya-sthala*. By the self-illumination of knowledge, the body and senses appear as having no form, being united with God; when everything appears as pure, that is called the *śaraṇa-sthala*.

When one avoids all illusions or errors about body, etc., and conceives in the mind that one is at one with the *līṅga*, that is called the *prāṇa-līṅga*, or *cara-sthala*. When one surrenders all objects of gratification to God, it is called the *prasāda-sthala*, and when one fixes one's mind on God as being one with Him—it is called *māheśvara-sthala*. When the false appears as true and the mind is detached from it by the adorative action of *bhakti*, and the person becomes detached from the world—this is called *bhakti-sthala*. Thus we have another six kinds of *ṣaṭ-sthala*.

Again from another point of view we have another description of *ṣaṭ-sthala*, such as from Ātman comes *ākāśa*, from *ākāśa* comes *vāyu*, from *vāyu* comes *agni*, from *agni* comes water and from water—earth. Again the unity of Ātman with Brahman is called *vyomāṅga*. *Prāṇa-līṅga* is called *vāyuvāṅga*, and *prasāda* is called *analāṅga*, and *maheśvara* is called *jalāṅga* and the *bhakta* is called *bhūmyāṅga*. Again from *bindu* comes *nāda*, and from *nāda* comes *kalā*, and reversely from *kalā* to *bindu*.

Unlike the Vaiṣṇavas, the *Anubhava-sūtra* describes *bhakti* not as attachment involving a sense-duality between the worshipper and the worshipped, but as revealing pure oneness or identity with God in the strongest terms. This implies, and in fact it has been specifically stated, that all ceremonial forms of worship involving duality are merely imaginary creations. In His sportive spirit the Lord may assume diverse forms, but the light of *bhakti* should show that they are all one with Him.

CHAPTER XXXVI

PHILOSOPHY OF ŚRĪKAṆṬHA

**Philosophy of Śaivism as expounded by Śrīkaṇṭha in his
Commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and the Sub-
commentary on it by Appaya Dīkṣita.**

INTRODUCTORY

IT has often been stated in the previous volumes of the present work that the *Brahma-sūtra* attributed to Bādarāyaṇa was an attempt at a systematisation of the apparently different strands of the Upaniṣadic thought in the various early Upaniṣads, which form the background of most of the non-heretical systems of Indian philosophy. The *Brahma-sūtra* had been interpreted by the exponents of different schools of thought in various ways, for example, by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Mādhva, Vallabha, and others, and they have all been dealt with in the previous volumes of the present work. Vedānta primarily means the teachings of the Upaniṣads. Consequently the *Brahma-sūtra* is supposed to be a systematisation of Upaniṣadic wisdom; and its various interpretations in diverse ways by the different exponents of diverse philosophical views, all go by the name of the Vedānta, though the Vedānta philosophy of one school of thinkers may appear to be largely different from that of any other school. Thus while the exposition of the *Brahma-sūtra* by Śaṅkara is monistic, the interpretation of Mādhva is explicitly pluralistic. We have seen the acuteness of the controversy between the adherents of the two schools of thought, extending over centuries, in the fourth volume of the present work.

As Śrīkaṇṭha expounded his views as an interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* and accepted the allegiance and loyalty to the Upaniṣads, the work has to be regarded as an interpretation of the Vedānta. Like many other interpretations of the Vedānta (for example, by Rāmānuja, Mādhva, Vallabha, or Nimbārka), the philosophy of Śrīkaṇṭha is associated with the personal religion, where Śiva is regarded as the highest Deity, being equated with

Brahman. It can, therefore, be claimed as an authoritative exposition of Śaivism. Śaivism, or rather Śaiva philosophy, also had assumed various forms, both as expressed in Sanskrit works and in the vernacular Dravidian works. But in the present work, we are only interested in the exposition of Śaiva philosophy in Sanskrit works. The present writer has no access to the original Dravidian literature such as Tamil, Telegu and Canarese, etc., and it is not within the proposed scheme of the present work to collect philosophical materials from the diverse vernacular literature of India.

In introducing his commentary, Śrīkaṇṭha says that the object of his interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* is the clarification of its purport since it has been made turbid by previous teachers¹. We do not know who were these previous teachers, but a comparison between the commentary of Śaṅkara and that of Śrīkaṇṭha shows that at least Śaṅkara was one of his targets. Śaṅkara's idea of Śaiva philosophy can briefly be gathered from his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 35-8, and his view of the Śaiva philosophy tallies more with some of the Purāṇic interpretations which were in all probability borrowed by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* called *Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya*, and his commentary on the *Īśvara-gītā* of the *Kūrma-purāṇa*. Śaṅkara lived somewhere about the eighth century A.D., and his testimony shows that the sort of Śaiva philosophy that he expounded was pretty well known to Bādarāyaṇa, so that he included it as a rival system for refutation in the *Brahma-sūtra*. This shows the great antiquity of the Śaiva system of thought, and in a separate section we shall attend to this question.

Śaṅkara came from the Kerala country in the South, and he must have been acquainted with some documents of Śaiva philosophy or the *Śaivāgamas*. But neither Śaṅkara nor his commentators mention their names. But obviously Śrīkaṇṭha followed some *Śaivāgamas*, which were initiated in early times by one called Śveta, an incarnation of Śiva, who must have been followed by other teachers of the same school, and according to Śrīkaṇṭha's own testimony, twenty-eight of them had flourished before

¹ *Vyāsa-sūtram idaṃ netraṃ viduṣāṃ brahma-darśane.
pūrvācāryaiḥ kaluṣitaṃ śrīkaṇṭhena prasādyate.*

Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya*, introductory verse, 5.

Śrīkaṇṭha and had written *Saivāgama* works. The original teacher Śveta has also been mentioned in the *Vāyavīya saṃhitā* of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*¹.

In the initiatory adoration hymn Śrīkaṇṭha adores Śiva, the Lord, as being of the nature of ego-substance (*aham-padārtha*). The sub-commentator Appaya Dikṣita (A.D. 1550), in following the characterisation of Śiva in the *Mahābhārata*, tries to give an etymological derivation in rather a fanciful way from the root *vaśa*, 'to will.' This means that the personality of Śiva, the Lord, is of the nature of pure egohood and that his will is always directed to the effectuation of good and happiness to all beings. This egohood is also described as 'pure being' (*sat*), 'pure consciousness' (*cit*) and 'pure bliss' (*ānanda*). Śrīkaṇṭha further says that his commentary will expound the essence of the teachings of the Upaniṣads or the Vedānta and will appeal to those who are devoted to Śiva². Śrīkaṇṭha describes Śiva on the one hand as being the category of *aham* or egohood which forms the individual personality, and at the same time regards it as being of the nature of 'pure being,' 'pure consciousness,' and 'pure bliss.' He thinks that this individual personality can be regarded only in unlimited sense to be identified with the infinite nature of Śiva. Appaya Dikṣita in commenting on this verse quotes the testimony of some of the Upaniṣads to emphasise the personal aspect of the God Śiva as a personal God. Ordinarily the word '*sac-cid-ānanda-rūpāya*' would be used in the writings of monistic Vedānta of the school of Śaṅkara, in the sense of a concrete unity of 'pure being,' 'pure consciousness,' and 'pure bliss.' But that kind of interpretation would not suit the purposes of a purely theistic philosophy. For this reason Appaya says that the words '*sac-cid-ānanda*' are the qualities of the supreme God Śiva and that this is indicated by the terminal word '*rūpāya*,' because Brahman as such is *arūpa* or formless. The expansion of the limited individual into the infinite nature of Śiva also implies that the individual enjoys with Him qualities of bliss and consciousness. In a Śaṅkarite interpretation the person who attains liberation becomes one with Brahman, that

¹ *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, *Vāyavīya saṃhitā* 1. 5. 5 *et seq.* (Veṅkaṭeśvara Press, Bombay, 1925).

² *om namo'ham-padārthāya lokānāṃ siddhi-hetave,*
saccidānanda-rūpāya śivāya paramātmāne. 1.

Preliminary adoration to Śiva by Śrīkaṇṭha.

is, with the unity of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. He does not enjoy consciousness or bliss but is at once one with it. The Brahman in the system of Śaṅkara and his school is absolutely qualityless and differenceless (*nirviśeṣa*). Rāmānuja in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* tries to refute the idea of Brahman as qualityless or differenceless and regards the Brahman as being the abode of an infinite number of auspicious and benevolent characters and qualities. This is called *saguṇa-brahman*, that is, the Brahman having qualities. The same idea is put forward in a somewhat different form by Śrīkaṇṭha. Except in the Purāṇas and some older Sanskrit literature, the idea of a Brahman with qualities does not seem to be available in the existent philosophical literature outside Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja is said to have followed the *Bodhāyana-vṛtti* which, however, is no longer available. It may, therefore, be suggested that Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* was inspired by the *Bodhāyana-vṛtti*, or by Rāmānuja, or by any of the *Śaivāgamas* following a simple theistic idea.

On the one hand Lord Śiva is regarded as the supreme and transcendent Deity, and on the other he is regarded as the material cause of this material universe, just as milk is the material cause of curd. This naturally raises some difficulties, as the supreme God cannot at the same time be regarded as entirely transcendent and also undergoing changes for the creation of the material universe which is to be regarded as of the nature of God Himself. To avoid this difficulty Appaya summarises the view of Śrīkaṇṭha and tries to harmonise the texts of the Upaniṣads, pointing to monistic and dualistic interpretations. He thus says that God Himself is not transformed into the form of the material universe, but the energy of God which manifests itself as the material universe is a part and parcel of the entire personality of God. The material universe is not thus regarded either as illusion or as an attribute of God (in a Spinozistic sense), nor is the universe to be regarded as a part or a limb of God, so that all the activities of the universe are dependent on the will of God, as Rāmānuja holds in his theory of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*; nor does Śrīkaṇṭha regard the relation between the universe and God as being of the same nature as that between the waves or foam and the sea itself. The waves or foam are neither different from nor one with the sea; this is called the *bhedābheda-vāda* of Bhāskara. It may also be noted that this view of Śrīkaṇṭha

is entirely different from the view of Vijñāna Bhikṣu as expressed in the *Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya*, a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* in which he tries to establish a view well known in the Purāṇas, that the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* are abiding entities outside God and are co-existent with Him; they are moved by God for the production of the universe, for the teleological purposes of enjoyment and experience of the *puruṣas*, and ultimately lead the *puruṣas* to liberation beyond bondage. It may not be out of place here to refer to the commentary of Śaṅkara on the *Brahma-sūtra* (II. 2. 37 *et seq.*) where he tried to refute a Śaiva doctrine which regards God as the instrumental cause that transforms the *prakṛti* to form the universe, a view somewhat similar to that found in the *Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya* of Vijñāna Bhikṣu. This Śaiva view seems to have been entirely different from the Śaiva view expressed by Śrīkaṇṭha, expressly based on the traditions of the twenty-eight yogācāryas beginning with Śveta. Lord Śiva, the supreme personal God, is regarded as fulfilling all our desires, or rather our beneficent wishes. This idea is brought out by Appaya in his somewhat fanciful etymology of the word 'śiva,' a twofold derivation from the root *vaśa* and from the word 'śiva' meaning good.

Śrīkaṇṭha adores the first teacher of the Śaiva thought and regards him (Śveta) as having made the various Āgamas. But we do not know what these Āgamas were. Appaya in his commentary is also uncertain about the meaning of the word '*nānāgama-vidhāyine*.' He gives two alternative interpretations. In one he suggests that the early teacher Śveta had resolved the various contradictions of the Upaniṣadic texts, and had originated a system of Śaiva thought which may be properly supported by the Upaniṣadic texts. In the second interpretation he suggests that the word '*nānāgama-vidhāyine*,' that is, he who has produced the various Āgamas, only means that the system of Śveta was based on the various *Śaivāgamas*. In such an interpretation we are not sure whether these Āgamas were based on the Upaniṣads or on other vernacular Dravidian texts, or on both.¹ In commenting upon the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara on the *Brahma-sūtra* (II. 2. 37), Vācaspati says in his *Bhāmatī* that the systems known as Śaiva,

¹ *asmin pakṣe 'nānāgama-vidhāyina' ity
asya nānāvidha-pāśupatādy-āgama-nirmātrā ity arthaḥ.*

Appaya's commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* (Bombay, 1908), Vol. I, p. 6.

Pāsupata, Kāruṇika-siddhāntin, and the Kāpālikas are known as the fourfold schools called the Māheśvaras¹. They all believe in the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *prakṛti*, *mahat*, etc., and also in some kind of Yoga on the syllable *om*; their final aim was liberation and end of all sorrow. The individual souls are called *paśus* and the word 'pāśa' means bondage. The Maheśvaras believe that God is the instrumental cause of the world as the potter is of jugs and earthen vessels.

Both Śāṅkara and Vācaspati regard this Maheśvara doctrine, based upon certain treatises (*Siddhānta*) written by Maheśvara, as being opposed to the Upaniṣadic texts. None of them mentions the name of the teacher Śveta, who is recorded in Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* and the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*. It is clear therefore that, if Śāṅkara's testimony is to be believed, this word '*nānāgama-vidhāyine*' cannot mean the reconciliatory doctrine based on the Upaniṣads as composed by Śveta and the other twenty-seven Śaiva teachers². We have already pointed out that the Śaiva doctrine, that we find in Śrīkaṇṭha, is largely different from the Maheśvara school of thought which Śāṅkara and Vācaspati wanted to refute. There Śāṅkara had compared the Maheśvara school of thought as being somewhat similar to the Nyāya philosophy.

What the Siddhānta treatises, supposed to have been written by Maheśvara, were, is still unknown to us. But it is certain that they were composed in the beginning of or before the Christian era, as that doctrine was referred to by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahma-sūtra*.

¹ Rāmānuja, however, in his commentary on the same *sūtra* mentions as the fourfold schools the Kāpālas, the Kālamukhas, the Pāsupatas, and the Śaivas.

² The *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā* section mentions the names of the twenty-eight yogācāryas beginning with Śveta. Their names are as follows:

*Śvetah sūtāro madanaḥ suhotraḥ kaṅka eva ca,
laugākṣīś ca mahāmāyo jaigīṣavyas tathaiṣa ca. 2.
dadhivāhaś-ca ṛṣabho munir ugro 'trir eva ca,
supūlako gautamaś ca tathā vedaśirā muniḥ. 3.
gokarṇaś-ca guhāvāśī śikhaḍī cāparaḥ smṛtaḥ,
jaṭmālī cāṭṭahāso dāruko lāṅgulī tathā. 4.
mahākālāś ca śūlī ca daṇḍī muṇḍīśa eva ca,
saviṣṇus soma-śarmā ca lakuliśvara eva ca. 5.*

Vāyavīya-saṃhitā II. 9, verses 2-5 (compare *Kūrma-purāṇa* I. 53, 4 *et seq.*). The names of their pupils are given from II. 9, verses 6-20 (compare *Kūrma-purāṇa* I. 53, 12 *et seq.*).

Each one of the yogācāryas had four disciples. The better known of them are as follows (*Vāyavīya-saṃhitā* II. 9, 10 *et seq.*): Kapila, Asuri, Pañcaśikha, Parāśara, Bṛhadaśva, Devala, Śālihotra, Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, Ulūka, Vatsa.

Śrīkaṇṭha definitely says that the souls and the inanimate objects, of which the universe is composed, all form materials for the worship of the supreme Lord. The human souls worship Him directly, and the inanimate objects form the materials with which He is worshipped. So the whole universe may be regarded as existing for the sake of the supreme Lord. Śrīkaṇṭha further says that the energy or the power of the Lord forms the basis or the canvas, as it were, on which the whole world is painted in diverse colours. So the reality of the world lies in the nature of God Himself; the universe, as it appears to us, is only a picture-show based on the ultimate reality of God who is regarded as definitely described and testified in the Upaniṣads¹. On the testimony of Śrīkaṇṭha, the philosophy of Śaivism as interpreted by him follows an interpretation of the Upaniṣads and is based on them. It is unfortunate that most of the scholars who have contributed articles to the study of Śaivism or written books on it, have so far mostly ignored the philosophy propounded by Śrīkaṇṭha, although his work had been published as early as 1908.

We have already seen that Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 37, had attributed the instrumentality of God as being the doctrine of the Siddhānta literature supposed to have been written by Maheśvara. Appaya, in commenting upon the same topic dealt with by Śrīkaṇṭha, says that this is the view which may be found in the *Śaivāgamas* when they are imperfectly understood. But neither he nor Śrīkaṇṭha mentions the names of any of the *Śaivāgamas* which have come down to us, which describe the instrumentality of God. So Śrīkaṇṭha also undertakes to refute the view of Śaivism which holds that God is only the instrumental cause of the world. We may therefore infer that some of the *Śaivāgamas* were being interpreted on the line of regarding God as being the instrumental cause of the world.

Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 37 and the commentary of Appaya on it bring out some other important points. We know from these that there were two types of Āgamas, one meant for the three castes (*Varṇa*) who had access to the Vedic

¹ *nija-śakti-bhitti-nirmīta-nikhila-jagajjālā-citra-nikurumbāḥ,
sa jayati śivāḥ parātmā nikhilāgama-sāra-sarvasvam. 2.
bhavatu sa bhavatām siddhyai paramātmā sarva-maṅgalo-petaḥ,
cidacinnmayāḥ prapañcaḥ śeṣo' śeṣo' pi yasyaiśaḥ. 3.*

Introductory verses, Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya*.

literature, and the other for those that had no access to the Vedic literature. These latter Āgamas might have been written in the Dravidian vernaculars, or translated into the Dravidian vernaculars from Sanskrit manuals. Śrīkaṇṭha's own interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* is based mainly on the views propounded in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā* section of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*. In the *Kūrma-purāṇa* and the *Varāha-purāṇa* also we hear of different types of Śaivāgamas and Śaiva schools of thought. Some of the Śaiva schools, such as Lakuliśa or Kāpālikas, are regarded in those Purāṇas (*Kūrma* and *Varāha*) as being outside the pale of Vedic thought, and the upholders of those views are regarded as following delusive Śāstras or scriptures (*mohā-śāstra*). In reply to this it is held that some of those schools follow some impure practices, and have on that account been regarded as *moha-śāstra*. But they are not fully opposed to the Vedic discipline, and they encourage some kinds of adoration and worship which are found in the Vedic practice. The Āgamas of this latter type, that is, which are for the Śūdras and other lower castes, are like the well-known Āgamas such as *Kāmika*, *Mṛgendra*, etc. It is urged, however, that these non-Vedic Āgamas and the Vedic Śaivism as found in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā* are essentially authoritative, and both of them owe their origin to Lord Śiva. Their essential doctrines are the same, as both of them regard Śiva as being both the material and the instrumental cause of the world. It is only that some superficial interpreters have tried to explain some of the Āgamas, emphasising the instrumentality of the supreme Lord, and the above topic of the *Brahma-sūtra* is intended to refute such a view of the supreme Lord as being only the efficient or instrumental cause.

It is curious to note that the two systems of Śaiva philosophy called *Lākuliśa-pāśupata* and the *Śaiva-darśana* as treated in the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, deal mainly with the aspect of God as the efficient cause of the universe; they lay stress on various forms of ritualism, and also encourage certain forms of moral discipline. It is also surprising to note that the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* should not mention Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya*, though the former was written somewhere about the fourteenth century A.D. and Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* must have been written much before that time, though it is not possible for us as yet to locate his time exactly. Neither does the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* refer to any Purāṇic materials as

found in the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, the *Kūrma-purāṇa* and the *Varāha-purāṇa*. But we shall treat of the systems later on in other sections and show their relation with the philosophy as propounded in Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya*, so far as manuscript material and other published texts are available.

In interpreting the first *sūtra* of the *Brahma-sūtra* '*athāto-brahma-jijñāsā*,' Śrīkaṇṭha first introduces a long discussion on the meaning of the word '*atha*.' The word '*atha*' generally means 'after,' or it introduces a subject to a proper incipient. Śrīkaṇṭha holds that the entire *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* by Jaimini, beginning with "*athāto dharma-jijñāsā*" to the last *sūtra* of the *Brahma-sūtra* IV. 4. 22 "*anāvṛttiḥ śabdād anāvṛttiḥ śabdāt*," is one whole. Consequently the *brahma-jijñāsā* or the inquiry as to the nature of Brahman must follow the inquiry as to the nature of *dharma*, which forms the subject-matter of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* of Jaimini. We have seen in our other volumes that the subject-matter of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* starts with the definition of the nature of *dharma*, which is regarded as being the beneficial results accruing from the dictates of the Vedic imperatives "*codanā-lakṣaṇor̥tho dharmah*"). The sacrifices thus are regarded as *dharma*, and these sacrifices are done partly for the attainment of some desired benefits such as the birth of a son, attainment of prosperity, a shower of rain, or long residence in heaven after death; partly also as obligatory rites, and those which are obligatory on ceremonial occasions. Generally speaking these sacrificial duties have but little relation to an inquiry about the nature of Brahman. Śaṅkara, therefore, had taken great pains in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* as well as in his commentary on the *Gītā*, to show that the sacrificial duties are to be assigned to persons of an entirely different character from those who are entitled to inquire about the nature of Brahman. The two parts of sacrifices (*karma*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) are entirely different and are intended for two different classes of persons. Again, while the result of *dharma* may lead to mundane prosperity or a residence in heaven for a time and will, after a time, bring the person in the cycle of transmigratory birth and death, the knowledge of Brahman once attained or intuited directly, would liberate the person from all bondage eternally. So, these two courses, that is the path of *karma* and the path of knowledge, cannot be regarded as complementary to each other. It is

wrong to regard them as segments of the same circle. This is what is known as the refutation by Śaṅkara of the joint performance of *karma* and *jñāna*, technically called the *jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda*.

Śrīkaṇṭha here takes an entirely opposite view. He says that the Brāhmin who is properly initiated with the holy thread has a right to study the Vedas, has even an obligatory duty to study the Vedas under a proper teacher, and when he has mastered the Vedas he also acquaints himself with their meaning. So the study of the Vedas with a full comprehension of their meaning must be regarded as preceding any inquiry or discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. As *dharma* can be known from the Vedas, so the Brahman has also to be known by the study of the Vedas. Consequently, one who has not studied the Vedas is not entitled to enter into any discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. But then it cannot be said that merely after the study of the Vedas one is entitled to enter into a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. For such a person must, after the study of the Vedas, discuss the nature of *dharma*, without which he cannot be introduced into a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. So the discussion about the nature of Brahman can only begin after a discussion on the nature of *dharma*¹. He further says that it may be that the principles and maxims used in the interpretation of Vedic injunctions as found in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* were necessary for the understanding of the Upaniṣadic texts leading to a discussion on the nature of Brahman. It is for this reason that a discussion of the nature of *dharma* is indispensably necessary for the discussion of the nature of Brahman.

It cannot, however, be said that if sacrifices lead to an understanding of the nature of Brahman, what is the good of any discussion on its nature. One might rather indulge in a discussion of the nature of *dharma*, because when the Vedic duties are performed without desire for the fulfilment of any purpose, that itself might purify the mind of a man and make him fit for inquiring into the nature of Brahman, for, by such a purposeless performance of

¹ *tarhi kiṃ anantaram asyārambhaḥ. dharma-vicārānantaram. Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya* I. 1. 1, Vol. I, p. 34.

na vāyam dharma-brahma-vicāra-rūpayoś śāstrayor atyanta-b-hedavādinah. kintu ekatva-vādinah. Ibid.

Vedic sacrifices, one may be purified of one's sins, and this may lead to a proper illumination of the nature of Brahman¹. He also makes references to Gautama and other *smṛtis* to establish the view that only those who are initiated in the Vedic ceremonial works are entitled to abide with Brahman, and get commingled with him. The most important point is that only those Vedic sacrifices which are done without any idea of the achievement of a purpose lead finally to the cessation of sins, and thereby making the Brahman-illumination possible. In the case of such a person the result of *karma* becomes the same as the result of knowledge. The *karmas* are to be performed until true knowledge dawns. Consequently one can say that the discussion on the nature of Brahman must be preceded by the discussion on the nature of *dharma* accruing from the prescribed Vedic duties. The inquiry after the nature of Brahman is not meant as the carrying out of any Vedic mandate, but people turn to it for its superior attraction as being the most valued possession that one may have, and one can perceive that only when one's mind is completely purified by performing the Vedic duties in a disinterested manner, can one attain the knowledge of Brahman. It is only in this way that we can regard the discussion on the nature of *dharma* as leading to the discussion of the nature of Brahman. If the mind is not purified by the performance of the Vedic duties in a disinterested manner, then the mere performance of the Vedic duties does not entitle anyone to inquire about the nature of Brahman.

Appaya Dikṣita, in commenting on the above *bhāṣya* of Śrīkaṇṭha, says that the discussion on the nature of Brahman means a discussion on the texts of the Upaniṣads. Such discussions would naturally lead to the apprehension of the nature of Brahman. The word '*brahman*' is derived from the root '*br̥ṇhati*' meaning 'great' which again is not limited by any qualification of time, space, or quality, that is, which is unlimitedly great. We have to accept this meaning because there is nothing to signify any limitation of any kind (*saṃkocakābhāvāt*). The Brahman is different from all that is animate (*cetana*) and inanimate (*acetana*). There are two kinds of energy: that which is the representative of the material power or energy (*jaḍa-śakti*), which transforms itself in the form of

¹ *tasya phalābhisandhi-rahitasya pāpāpanayana-rūpacitta-suddhi-sampādana-dvārā bodha-hetuvāt. Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya* I. 1. 1, Vol. I, p. 39.

the material universe under the direction or instrumentality of the Brahman; and there is also the energy as consciousness (*cicchakti*), and this consciousness energy, as we find it in animate beings, is also controlled by the Brahman¹. The Brahman Himself is different from the phenomenal world consisting of inanimate things and conscious souls. But as the conscious souls and unconscious world are both manifestations of the energy of God called Brahman or Śiva or any other of His names, God Himself has no other instrument for the creation and maintenance of the world. So the greatness of Brahman is absolutely unlimited as there is nothing else beyond Him which can lend Him any support. The two energies of God representing the material cause and the spiritual force may be regarded somehow as the qualities of God.

Just as a tree has leaves and flowers, but still in spite of this variety is regarded as one tree, so God also, though He has these diversified energies as his qualities, is regarded as one. So, when considered from the aspect of material and spiritual energies, the two may be differentiated from the nature of Brahman, yet considered internally they should be regarded as being one with Brahman. These two energies have no existence separate from the nature of God. The word 'brahman' means not only unlimitedness, it also means that He serves all possible purposes. He creates the world at the time of creation and then leading the souls through many kinds of enjoyment and sorrow, ultimately expands them into His own nature when the liberation takes place.

Appaya Dikṣita, after a long discussion, conclusively points out that not all persons who had passed through the discipline of sacrificial duties are entitled to inquire about the nature of Brahman. Only those who, by reason of their deeds in past lives, had had their minds properly purified could further purify their minds in this life by the performance of the Vedic duties without any desire for fruit, and can attain a discriminative knowledge of what is eternal and non-eternal, and have the necessary disinclination (*vairāgya*), inner control and external control of actions and desire for liberation, thereby qualifying themselves for making an

¹ *tasya cetanācetana-prapañca-vilakṣanatvā-bhyupagameṇa vastu-paricchīnat-vād ity āśaṅkāṃ niraśitum ādya-viśeṣaṇam. sakala-cetanācetana-prapañcā-kāryayā tadrūpa-pariṇāmīnyā parama-śaktyā jaḍa-śakter māyāyā niyāmakatvena tata utkrīṣṭayā cicchaktyā viśiṣṭasya. Śivārkaṇṭha-dīpikā, Appaya's commentary, Vol. I, p. 68.*

inquiry about the nature of Brahman. Appaya Dikṣita thus tries to bridge over the gulf between the standpoint of Śrīkaṇṭha and the standpoint of Śaṅkara. With Śaṅkara it is only those inner virtues and qualities, desire for liberation and the like that could entitle a person to inquire about the nature of Brahman. According to Śaṅkara the discussion on the nature of Vedic duties or their performance did not form an indispensable precedent to the inquiry about the nature of Brahman. But Appaya Dikṣita tries to connect Śrīkaṇṭha's view with that of Śaṅkara by suggesting that only in those cases where, on account of good deeds in past lives, one's mind is sufficiently purified to be further chastened by the desireless performance of Vedic duties, that one can attain the mental virtues and equipments pointed out by Śaṅkara as an indispensable desideratum for inquiry into the nature of Brahman.

Appaya Dikṣita tries to justify the possibility of a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman by pointing out that in the various texts of the Upaniṣads the Brahman is variously described as being the ego, the food, the bio-motor force (*prāṇa*), and the like. It is necessary, therefore, by textual criticism to find out the exact connotation of Brahman. If Brahman meant only the ego, or if it meant the pure differenceless consciousness, then there would be no scope for discussion. No one doubts his own limited ego and nothing is gained by knowing Brahman, which is pure differenceless consciousness. For this reason it is necessary to discuss the various texts of the Upaniṣads which give evidence of a personal God who can bestow on His devotee eternal bliss and eternal consciousness.

The Nature of Brahman.

Śrīkaṇṭha introduces a number of Upaniṣadic texts supposed to describe or define the nature of Brahman. These apparently are in conflict with one another, and the contradiction is not resolved either by taking those definitions alternately or collectively, and for this reason it is felt necessary to enter into a textual and critical interpretation of those texts as yielding a unified meaning. These texts describe Brahman as that from which everything has sprung into being and into which everything will ultimately return, and

taht, it is of the nature of pure bliss, pure being and pure consciousness. Appaya Dikṣita says that, such qualities being ascribed to various deities, it is for us to find out the really ultimate Deity, the Lord Śiva, who has all these qualities. He also introduces a long discussion as to whether the ascription of these diverse epithets would cause any reasonable doubt as to the entity or person who possesses them. He further enters into a long discussion as to the nature of doubt that may arise when an entity is described with many epithets, or when an entity is described with many contradictory epithets, or when several objects are described as having one common epithet. In the course of this discussion he introduces many problems of doubt with which we are already familiar in our treatment of Indian philosophy¹. Ultimately Appaya tries to emphasise the fact that these qualities may be regarded as abiding in the person of Śiva and there can be no contradiction, as qualities do not mean contradictory entities. Many qualities of diverse character may remain in harmony in one entity or person.

Lord Śiva is supposed to be the cause of the creation of the world, its maintenance, and its ultimate dissolution, or the liberation of souls, through the cessation of bondage. All these qualities of the production of the world, its maintenance, etc., belong to the phenomenal world of appearance, and cannot therefore be attributed to the Lord Śiva as constituting His essential definition. It is true that a person may, by his good deeds and his disinclination to worldly enjoyments and devotion, attain liberation automatically. But even in such cases it has to be answered that, though the person may be regarded as an active agent with reference to his actions, yet the grace of God has to be admitted as determining him to act. So also, since all the epithets of creation, maintenance, etc., belong to the world of appearance, they cannot be regarded as in any way limiting the nature of Lord Śiva. They may at best be regarded as non-essential qualities by which we can only signify the nature of Brahman, but cannot get at His own true nature. The application of the concept of agency to individual persons or inanimate things is only one of emphasis; for, from certain points of view, one may say that a person attains liberation by his own action, while from another point of view the whole action of the individual may be

¹ See especially the third volume of the present work dealing with the problem of doubt in Venkaṭa.

regarded as being due to the grace of God. So, from one point of view the laws of the world of appearance may be regarded as natural laws, while from another all the natural laws may be regarded as being the manifestations of the grace of God.

It may be urged that if Lord Śiva is all-merciful why does He not remove the sorrows of all beings by liberating them? To this question it may be said that it is only when, by the deeds of the persons, the veil of ignorance and impurity is removed that the ever-flowing mercy of God manifests itself in liberating the person. Thus there is a twofold action, one by the person himself and the other by the extension of mercy on the part of God in consonance with his actions.

Again, the dissolution of the world of appearance is not a magical disappearance, but rather the return of the grosser nature of the *prakṛti* or primal matter into its subtle nature of the same *prakṛti*. The world as a whole is not illusion, but it had at one time manifested itself in a grosser form of apparent reality, and in the end it will again return into the subtle nature of the cosmic matter or *prakṛti*. This return into the nature of the subtle *prakṛti* is due to the conjoint actions of all animate beings as favoured by the grace of God.

The second *sūtra*, which describes or defines Brahman as that from which all things have come into being, into which all things will ultimately return, and wherein all things are maintained, regards these qualities of production, maintenance, and dissolution of all things, according to Śrīkaṇṭha as interpreted by Appaya, as being the final determinant causal aspect, both material and instrumental, by virtue of which the nature of Brahman as God or Īśvara can be inferred. So according to Śrīkaṇṭha and Appaya this *sūtra* '*janmādy-asya yataḥ*' should be regarded as a statement of infallible inference of the nature of Brahman. Śaṅkara in his commentary had definitely pointed out that those who regard Īśvara or God as the cause of all things and beings interpret this *sūtra* as an example of inference, by which the unlimited nature of Brahman could be directly argued; and that such a definition, in that it points out the reasons, is sufficient description, not too wide nor too narrow. Therefore, by this argument one can understand the Brahman as being the supreme and unlimited Lord of the whole of the material and spiritual universe. Śaṅkara definitely

refuses to accept such an interpretation, and regards it as merely stating the general purport of the Upaniṣadic texts, which say that it is from Brahman that everything has come into being, and that it is in and through Brahman that everything lives, and that ultimately everything returns into Brahman. The main point at issue between Śaṅkara and Śrīkaṇṭha is that, while Śaṅkara refuses to accept this *sūtra* as establishing an argument in favour of the existence of Brahman, and while he regards the purpose of the *Brahma-sūtra* as being nothing more than to reconcile and relate in a harmonious manner the different texts of the Upaniṣads, Śrīkaṇṭha and the other Śaivas regard this *sūtra* as an inferential statement in favour of the existence of the unlimited Brahman or the supreme Lord Śiva¹.

Rāmānuja also does not interpret this *sūtra* as being an inferential statement for establishing the nature and existence of Brahman. He thinks that by reconciling the apparently contradictory statements of the Upaniṣadic texts, and by regarding Brahman as the cause of the production, maintenance, and dissolution of the world, it is possible to have an intuition or apprehension of the nature of Brahman through the Upaniṣadic texts².

Śrīkaṇṭha tries to interpret the various epithets of Brahman such as *ānanda* or bliss, *sat* or being, *jñāna* or consciousness, and the fact that in some texts Śiva is mentioned as the original cause of the world in the sense that Śiva is both the original and ultimate cause of the universe. He raises the difficulty of treating these epithets as applying to Brahman either alternately or collectively. He also further raises the difficulty that in some of the Upaniṣadic texts *prakṛti*, which is inanimate, is called the *māyā* and the cause of the inanimate world. If Brahman is of the nature of knowledge or consciousness then He could not have transformed Himself into the material world. The transformation of pure consciousness into the material universe would mean that Brahman is changeable and this would contradict the Upaniṣadic statement that the Brahman is absolutely without any action and in a state of pure passivity.

¹ *etad evānumānam saṃsāriṇo-vyatirikte-śvarāstitvādi-sādhanaṃ manyanta īśvara-kāraṇinaḥ. nanu ihāpi tad evopanyastam jannmādi-sūtre, na; vedānta-vākya-kusuma-grathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām. Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra 1.*

1. 2.

² Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* 1. 1. 2.

From this point of view the objector might say that all the epithets that are ascribed to Brahman in the Upaniṣads cannot be applied to it at the same time, and they may not be taken collectively as the defining characteristics of the nature of Brahman. Śrīkaṇṭha, therefore, thinks that the abstract terms as truth, consciousness, bliss, etc., that are applied to Brahman, are to be taken as personal qualities of the Supreme Lord. Thus, instead of regarding Brahman as pure consciousness, Śrīkaṇṭha considers the Supreme Lord as being endowed with omniscience, eternally self-satisfied, independent, that is, one who always contains his power or energy, and one who possesses omnipotence. He is eternally self-efficient (*nitya aparokṣa*) and never depends on any external thing for the execution of his energy or power (*anaṣṭhita-bāhya-karaṇa*). Lord Śiva, thus being omniscient, knows the deeds of all animate beings and the fruits of those deeds to which they are entitled, and He also knows the forms of bodies that these animate souls should have in accordance with their past deeds, and He has thus a direct knowledge of the collocation of materials with which these bodies are to be built up¹. The fact that the Brahman is described as *ānanda* or bliss is interpreted as meaning that Lord Śiva is always full of bliss and self-contented².

In the Upaniṣads it is said that the Brahman has the *ākāśa* as his body (*ākāśa-śarīram brahma*). It is also said in some of the Upaniṣads that this *ākāśa* is bliss (*ānanda*). Śrīkaṇṭha says that this *ākāśa* is not the elemental *ākāśa* (*bhūtākāśa*); it merely means the plane of consciousness (*cidākāśa*), and in that way it means the ultimate material (*para-prakṛti*), which is the same as the ultimate energy. Appaya points out that there are people who think that the energy of consciousness is like an instrument for creating this universe, as an axe for cutting down a tree. But Appaya denies this view and holds that the ultimate energy is called the *ākāśa*³. It is this energy of consciousness

¹ *anena sakala-cetana-bahu-vidha-karma-phala-bhogānu-kūla-tat-tac-charīra-nirmāṇopāya-sāmagrī-viśeṣa jñam brahma nimittam bhavati*. Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* I. 1. 2, p. 121.

² *parabrahma-dharmatvena ca sa eva ānando brahmeti pracuravād brahmat-venopacaryate. tādṛśānanda-bhoga-rasikaṃ brahma nitya-triptam ity ucyate*. *Ibid.* p. 122.

³ *yasya sā paramā devī śaktir ākāśa-saṃjñitā*. Appaya's commentary, Vol. I, p. 123.

(*cicchakti*) that is regarded as pervading through all things and it is this energy that undergoes the transformations for the creation of the universe. It is this *cicchakti* that is to be regarded as the original force of life that manifests itself in the activities of life. All kinds of life functions and all experiences of pleasure are based on the lower or on the higher level of this ultimate life force, called also the *cicchakti* or *ākāśa*.

Again, Brahman is described as being of the nature of being, consciousness and bliss (*ānanda*). In this case, it is held that Brahman enjoys His own bliss without the aid of any external instrumentality. And it is for this reason that the liberated souls may enjoy bliss of a superlative nature without the aid of any external instruments. The truth as consciousness is also the truth as pure bliss which are eternal in their existence not as mere abstract qualities, but as concrete qualities adhering to the person of Lord Śiva. Thus, though the Brahman or Lord Śiva may be absolutely unchangeable in Himself, yet His energy might undergo the transformations that have created this universe. Brahman has thus within Him both the energy of consciousness and the energy of materiality which form the matter of the universe (*cid-acit-prapañca-rūpa-śakti-viśiṣṭatvam svābhāvikam eva brahmaṇaḥ*). As the energy of Brahman is limitless, he can in and through those energies form the material cause of the universe. As all external things are said to have 'being' as the common element that pervades them all, it represents the aspect of Brahman as 'being,' in which capacity it is the material cause of the world. The supreme Lord is called *Śarva*, because all things are finally absorbed in Him. He is called *Īśāna*, because He lords over all things, and He is hence also called *Paśupati*. By the epithet *paśupati* it is signified that He is not only the Lord of all souls (*paśu*), but also all that binds them (*pāśa*). The Brahman thus is the controller of all conscious entities and the material world¹.

It has been said that the *māya* is the primal matter, *prakṛti*, which is the material cause of the universe. But God or the Lord Śiva is said to be always associated with the *māyā*, that is, He has no separate existence entirely apart from the *māyā*. In such a view, if the *māyā* is to be regarded as the material cause of the universe,

¹ *anena cid-acit-niyāmakaṃ brahmeti vijñāyate. Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra* 1. 1. 2, p. 127.

then the Lord Śiva, who is associated with the *māyā*, has also to be, in some distant sense, regarded as the material cause of the universe. So the final conclusion is that the Brahman as associated with subtle consciousness and subtle materiality is the cause, and the effect is the universe which is but gross consciousness as associated with gross matter¹. It is true, indeed, that the facts of production, maintenance, and dissolution are epithets that can only apply to the phenomenal world, and therefore they cannot be regarded as essential characteristics determining the nature of Brahman as an inferential statement. Yet the production, maintenance, and dissolution of the world of phenomena may be regarded as a temporary phase (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*) of the nature of Brahman. It should also be noted that when *māyā* transforms itself into the world by the controlling agency of God, God Himself being eternally associated with *māyā*, may in some sense be regarded as being also the material cause of the world, though in His supreme transcendence He remains outside the *māyā*. The difference between this view and that of Rāmānuja is that, according to the latter, the Brahman is a concrete universal having the entire materiality and the groups of souls always associated with Him and controlled directly by Him, as the limbs of a person are controlled by the person himself. The conception is that of an entire organisation, in which the Brahman is the person and the world of souls and matter are entirely parts of Him and dominated by Him. The position of Śaṅkara is entirely different. He holds that the central meaning of the *sūtra* is just an interpretation of the texts of Upaniṣads which show that the world has come out of Brahman, is maintained in Him, and will ultimately return into Him. But it does not declare that this appearance of the world is ultimately real. Śaṅkara is not concerned with the actual nature of the appearance, but he has his mind fixed on the ultimate and

¹ 'māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyād' iti māyāyāḥ prakṛtitvam īśvarātmikāyā eva 'māyīnaṃ tu maheśvaram' iti vākya-śeṣāt. sūkṣma-cid-acid-viśiṣṭam brahma kāraṇaṃ sthūla-cid-acid-viśiṣṭaṃ tat-kāryam bhavati. Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya on *Brahma-sūtra* 1. 1. 2, pp. 134 et seq.

satyaṃ māyopādānam iti brahmāpy upādānam eva. aprthak-siddha-kāryā-vasthā śrayatva-rūpaṃ hi māyāyā upādānatvam samarthānāyaṃ. tat-samarthyamānam eva brahma-paryantam āyāti. nitya-yoge khalu māyīnam iti māyā-śabdādi-nipratyayaḥ. tatas ca māyāyāḥ brahmā-prthak-siddhyaiva tad-aprthak-siddhāyāḥ kāryāvasthāyā api brahmāprthak-siddhisiddhyati.

Appaya Dikṣita's commentary, Vol. 1, p. 134.

unchangeable ground which always remains true and is not only relatively true as the world of appearance¹.

We have said above that Śrīkaṇṭha regarded the second *sūtra* as indicating an inference for the existence of God. But in the course of later discussions he seems to move to the other side, and regards the existence of Brahman as being proved by the testimony of the Vedas. The general argument from the unity of purpose throughout the universe cannot necessarily lead to the postulation of one creator, for a house or a temple which shows unity of purpose is really effected by a large number of architects and artisans. He also thinks that the Vedas were produced by God. That is also somehow regarded as additional testimony to His existence. The nature of Brahman also can be known by reconciling the different Upaniṣadic texts which all point to the supreme existence of Lord Śiva. In *Brahma-sūtra* II. 1. 18, 19 Śrīkaṇṭha says that the Brahman as contracted within Himself is the cause while, when by His inner desire He expands Himself, He shows Himself and the universe which is His effect². This view is more or less like the view of Vallabha, and may be regarded as largely different from the idea of Brahman as given by Śrīkaṇṭha in I. 1. 2. Śrīkaṇṭha, in further illustrating his views, says that he admits Brahman to be the ultimate material cause of the universe only in the sense that the *prakṛti*, from which the world is evolved, is itself in Brahman. So as Brahman cannot remain without His *śakti* or energy, He can be regarded as the material cause of the world, though He in Himself remains transcendent, and it is only His *māyā* that works as an immanent cause of the production of the world. He thus says that there is a difference between the individual souls and the Brahman, and there is a difference between the *prakṛti* and the Brahman. He would not admit that the world of appearance is entirely different from Brahman; neither would he admit that they are entirely identical. His position is like that of the modified

¹ For the view of Śaṅkara and his school, see Vols. I and II. For the view of Rāmānuja and his school see Vol. III.

² “*cidātmaiva hi devo*” *ntaḥ-sthūtam icchā-vaśād bahiḥ. yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prkāśayed’ iti. nirupādānam iti anapekṣitopādānāntaram svayam upādānam bhūtvety arthaḥ. tataḥ parama-kāraṇāt parabrahmaṇaḥ śivād abhinnaṃ eva jagat kāryam iti. . . yathā saṃkucitaḥ sūkṣma-rūpaḥ paṭaḥ prasārito mahāpaṭa-kuṭi-rūpeṇa kāryaṃ bhavati, tathā brahmāpi saṃkucita-rūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ prasārita-rūpaṃ kāryaṃ bhavati.* Śrīkaṇṭha’s *bhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 29.

monists, like that of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda* of Rāmānuja. Brahman exists in quite a transcendent manner, apart from the individual souls and the inanimate world. But yet, since the individual souls and the material universe are emanations from His energy, the world of souls and matter may be regarded as parts of Him, though they are completely transcended by Himself¹.

Moral Responsibility and the Grace of God.

The question is, why did the supreme Lord create the whole universe? He is always self-realised and self-satisfied, and He has no attachment and no antipathy. He is absolutely neutral and impartial. How is it, then, that He should create a world which is so full of happiness to some (e.g. the gods) and so full of sorrow and misery to others? This will naturally lead us to the charge of partiality and cruelty. Moreover, since before the creation there must have been destruction, it will necessarily be argued that God Himself is so cruel as to indulge in universal destruction out of simple cruelty. So one may naturally argue that what purpose should God have in creating a world which is not a field for the attainment of our own desires and values. The reply given to this is that God indulges in the creation and destruction of the world in accordance with the diversity of human deeds and their results (*karma* and *karmaphala*).

It cannot be argued that before the creation there were no souls, for we know from the Upaniṣadic texts that the souls and God both exist eternally. As the souls have no beginning in time, so their deeds also are beginningless. This may lead to an infinite regress, but this infinite regress is not vicious. The series of births and deaths in the world in different bodies is within the stream of beginningless *karma*. Since God in His omniscience directly knows by intuition the various kinds of deeds that the individual

¹ *bhedābheda-kalpanaṃ viśiṣṭādvaitaṃ sādhayāmaḥ na vayaṃ brahma-prapañcayor atyantam eva bheda-vādināḥ ghaṭa-paṭayor iva. tad-ananyatva-para-śruti-virodhāt. na vā'tyantā-bheda-vādināḥ śukti-rajatayor iva. ekatara-mūhyātvena tat-svābhāvika-guṇa-bheda paraśruti-virodhāt. na ca bhedābheda-vādināḥ, vastu-virodhāt. kin tu śarīra-śarīrīṇor iva guṇa-guṇīṇor iva ca viśiṣṭādvaita-vādināḥ. prapañca-brahm aṇor ananyatvam nāma mṛd-ghaṭayor iva guṇa-guṇīṇor iva ca kārya-kāraṇatvena viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatvena ca vinābhāva-rahitatvam. Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra II. 1. 22, Vol. II, p. 31.*

would perform, He arranges suitable bodies and circumstances for the enjoyment or suffering of such deeds already anticipated by Him. So the difference in creation is due to the diversity of one's deeds. The time of destruction comes when the souls become tired and fatigued by the process of birth and death, and require some rest in dreamless sleep. So the effectuation of dissolution does not prove the cruelty of God.

Now, since the pleasures and sorrows of all beings depend upon their deeds (*karma*), what is the necessity of admitting any God at all? The reply is that the law of *karma* depends upon the will of God and it does not operate in an autonomous manner, nor does it curb the freedom or independence of God. This, however, would lead us in a circular way to the same position, for while the pleasures and sorrows of men depend upon the deeds of men and the law of *karma*, and since the law of *karma* depends upon the will of God, it actually means that the pleasures and sorrows of beings are due indirectly to the partiality of God.

Again, since the *karma* and the law of *karma* are both unintelligent, they must be operated by the intelligence of God. But how could God before the creation, when beings were devoid of the miseries of death and birth, were not endowed with any bodies, and were therefore in a state of enjoyment, associate them with bodies, lead them to the cycle of birth and rebirth, and expose them to so much sorrow? The reply is that God extends His grace to all (*sarvānugrāhaka paramēśvara*); and thus, since without the fruition of one's deeds (*karmapākaṁ antareṇa*) there cannot be pure knowledge, and since without pure knowledge there cannot be the liberation of enjoying bliss in a superlative manner, and since also without the fruition of *karma* through enjoyment and suffering there cannot be the relevant bodies through which the souls could enjoy or suffer the fruits of *karma*, bodies have necessarily to be associated with all the souls which were lying idle at the time of the dissolution. So when in this manner the deeds of a person are exhausted through enjoyment or suffering, and the minds of beings become pure, it is only then that there may arise self-knowledge leading to the supreme bliss of liberation.

It may again be asked that, if God is absolutely merciful, why could not He arrange for the fruition of the deeds of all persons at one and the same time and allow them to enjoy the bliss of

liberation? The reply is that, even if God would have extended His grace uniformly to all persons, then those whose impurities have been burnt up would be liberated and those whose impurities still remained could only attain salvation through the process of time. Thus, though God is always self-contented, He operates only for the benefit of all beings.

From the interpretation of Appaya it appears that the word grace (*annugraha*) is taken by him in the sense of justice. So God does not merely extend His mercy, but His mercy is an extension of justice in accordance with the deeds of persons, and therefore He cannot be regarded as partial or cruel¹. Appaya anticipates the objection that in such a view there is no scope for the absolute lordship of God, for He only awards happiness and misery in accordance with the law of *karma*. It is therefore meaningless to say that it is He, the Lord, that makes one commit sins or perform good deeds merely as He wishes to lower a person or to elevate him. For God does not on His own will make one do bad or good deeds, but the persons themselves perform good or bad actions according to their own inclinations as acquired in past creations, and it is in accordance with those deeds that the new creation is made for the fulfilment of the law of *karma*². Appaya further says that the good and bad deeds are but the qualities of the mind (*antahkaraṇa*) of the persons. At the time of dissolution these minds are also dissolved in the *māyā* and remain there as unconscious impressions or tendencies (*vāsānā*), and being there they are reproduced in the next creation as individual bodies and their actions in such a way that, though they were dissolved in the *māyā*, they do not commingle, and each one is associated with his own specific mind and deeds at the next birth³. In the Āgamas, where thirty-six categories

¹ *evam ca yathā narapatih prajānām vyavahāra-darśane taditya-yuktāyukta-vacanānusāreṇa annugraha-nigraha-viśeṣam kurvan pakṣapātītva-lakṣaṇam vaiṣamyam na pratipadyate evam īśvaro'pi taditya-karma-viśeṣā-nusāreṇa viśama-sṛṣṭim kurvan na tatpratipadyate*. Appaya Dikṣita's commentary, Vol. II, p. 47.

² *parameśvaras tu svayam sādhu-sādhūni karmāni kārayati, tair sukha-duḥkhādini ca notpādayati, yenatasya vaiṣamyam āpatet. kin tu prāṇina eva tathābhūtāni karmāni yāni sva-sva-rucyanusāreṇa pūrva-sargeṣu kurvanti tāny eva punas-sargeṣu viśama-sṛṣṭi-hetavo bhavanti*. Ibid. Vol. II, p. 48.

³ *parameśvarastu pūrva-sarga-kṛtānām tat-tad-antahkaraṇa-dharmarūpānām sadhu-asādhū-karmaṇām pralaye sarvāntah-karaṇānām viltnatayā māyāyām eva vāsānā-rūpatayā lagnānām kevalam asaṅkareṇa phala-vyavasthāpakam. anyathā māyāyām saṅkirṇeṣu karma-phalam anyo gṛhṇīyāt*. Appaya Dikṣita's commentary, Vol. II, p. 48.

(*tattva*) are counted, the law of *karma* called *niyati* is also counted as one of the categories. Though the category of *niyati* is admitted, it cannot operate blindly, but only under the superintendence of God, so that the actions or fruits of action of one may not be usurped by another. Pure *niyati* or the law of *karma* could not have done it. The view supported here is that when, at the time of dissolution, all *karmas* are in a state of profound slumber, God awakens them and helps the formation of bodies in accordance with them, and associates the bodies with the respective souls, and makes them suffer or enjoy according to their own deeds.

The problem still remains unexplained as to how we are to reconcile the freedom of will of all persons with the determinism by God. If God is regarded as being responsible for making us act in the way of good or of evil, then deferring God's determination to beginningless lives does not help the solution of the difficulty. If God determines that we shall behave in a particular manner in this life, and if that manner is determined by the actions of our past lives *ad infinitum*, then when we seek for the original determination we are bound to confess that God is partial; for He must have determined us to act differently at some distant period and He is making us act and suffer and enjoy accordingly. So the ultimate responsibility lies with God. In reply to this it is held by Appaya, interpreting the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha, that we were all born with impurities. Our bondage lies in the veil that covers our wisdom and action, and God, who possesses infinite and manifold powers, is always trying to make us act in such a manner that we may ultimately purify ourselves and make ourselves similar to Him. The dissolution of our impurities through natural transformation is like that of a boil or wound in the body which disappears only after giving some pain. The Vedic duties which are obligatory and occasional help to cure us of these impurities, just as medicine helps to cure a wound, and this may necessarily cause misery of birth and death. It is only when our deeds fructify that knowledge can spring from them. So also by the performance of obligatory and occasional deeds as prescribed in the Vedas, our *karmas* become mature and there arises in us a spirit of disinclination (*vairāgya*), devotion to Śiva and an inquiry after Him, which ultimately produces in us the wisdom that leads to liberation. The fruition of one's *karma* cannot take place without the environment

of the world such as we have it. Thus, for the ultimate liberation we must perform certain actions. God makes us perform these actions, and according to the manifold character of our deeds He creates different kinds of bodies, making us do such actions as we may suffer from, and thereby gradually advance towards the ultimate goal of liberation. In accordance with the diversity of our original impurities and actions, we are made to perform different kinds of deeds, just as a medical adviser would prescribe different kinds of remedies for different diseases. All this is due to the supreme grace of God. Śrīkaṇṭha's usage of the word *karma* means that by which the cycle of birth and death is made possible through the agency of God¹. In the dissolution, of course, there cannot be any process for the fulfilment or fruition of action, so that state is supposed to be brought about only for giving a rest to all beings.

In *Brahma-sūtra* II. 3. 41 Śrīkaṇṭha seems to make it definitely clear that the individual souls themselves do things which may be regarded as the cause of their acting in a particular way, or desisting from a particular way of action, in accordance with the nature of the fruition of their past deeds. It is further said that God only helps a person when he wishes to act in a particular way, or to desist from a particular action. So a man is ultimately responsible for his own volition, which he can follow by the will of God in the practical field of the world. The responsibility of man rests in the assertion of his will and the carrying of the will into action, and the will of God helps us to carry out our will in the external world around us. Man performs his actions in accordance with the way in which he can best satisfy his interests. He is therefore responsible for his actions, though in the actual carrying out of the will he is dependent on God. God thus cannot be charged with partiality or cruelty, for God only leads the individual souls to action in accordance with His own will and inner effort².

¹ *bhāṣye* "karma-pākam antareṇetyādi-vākyeṣu karma-śabdaḥ kriyate" *nena saṃsāra iti karaṇa-vyutpattiyā vā parameśvareṇa pakvaḥ kriyata iti karma-vyutpattiyā vā malāvarenaṇa paro draṣṭavyaḥ*. Appaya Dikṣita's commentary, Vol. II, p. 50.

² *ato jīva-kṛta-prayātñāpekṣatvāt karmasu jīvasya pravartaka īśvaro na vaiṣamyabhāk. tasyāpi svādhāna-pravṛtti-sadbhāvāt vidhi-niṣedhādi-vaiyartham ca na sambhavaatīti siddham*. Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* II. 3. 41, p. 157.

It is curious to note, however, that Appaya thinks that, even allowing for the inner human effort of will, the individual is wholly dominated by God. Appaya thus leaves no scope for the freedom of the will¹.

In *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 36-8 Śrīkaṇṭha makes a special effort to repudiate the view of Śaṅkara, that the Śaivas believed in a doctrine that God was the instrumental cause of the world, and could be known as such through inference. He also repudiates the view that the Brahman or Śiva had entered into the *prakṛti* or the primal matter, and thereby superintended the course of its evolution and transformation into the universe. For in that case He should be open to the enjoyment and suffering associated with the *prakṛti*. Śrīkaṇṭha therefore holds that according to the Śaiva view the Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe, and that He cannot be known merely by reason, but by the testimony of the Vedic scriptures. There is here apparently an oscillation of view on the subject as propounded by Śrīkaṇṭha. Here and in the earlier parts of his work, as has been pointed out, Śrīkaṇṭha asserts that, though God is the material cause of the universe, He is somehow unaffected by the changes of the world². The ultimate Brahman or Śiva is associated with a subtle energy of consciousness and materiality which together are called *cicchakti*, and as associated with the *cicchakti*, God Śiva is one and beyond everything. When in the beginning of creation there comes out from this supreme *māyā* or *cicchakti* the creative *māyā* which has a serpentine motion, then that energy becomes the material cause of the entire world. It is from this that four categories evolve, namely as *śakti*, *Sadāśiva*, *Maheśvara*, and *Śuddha-vidyā*. After that comes the lower *māyā* of a mixed character, which is in reality the direct material cause of the world and the bodies. Then comes time (*kāla*), destiny (*niyati*), knowledge (*vidyā*), attachment (*rāga*), and the souls. In another line there comes from the impure *māyā* the entire universe and the bodies of living beings. From that comes intelligence (*buddhi*), egotism (*ahaṅkāra*), *manas*, the fivefold cognitive senses, the fivefold conative senses, the fivefold subtle

¹ *tathā ca paramēśvara-kārita-pūrva-karma-mūla-svecchādhāne yatne, paramēśvarādhīnatvaṁ na hīyate*. Appaya's commentary, Vol. II, p. 156.

² *jagad-upādāna-nimitta-bhūtasya'pi paramēśvarasya "niṣkalam niṣkriyam" ityādi-śrutiḥ nirvikāratvaṁ apy upapadyate*. Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2. 38, p. 109.

causes of gross matter called *tanmātra*, and also the fivefold elements of matter. Thus are the twenty-three categories. Counting the previous categories, we get thirty-six categories altogether. These are well known in the Śaiva texts and they have been established there both logically and by reference to the testimony of the scriptural texts. A distinction is made, as has been shown above, between the pure *māyā* and the impure *māyā*. The impure *māyā* includes within itself all the effects such as time and the impure souls. The word *vyakta* is used to denote the material cause or the purely material world, including the mental psychosis called *buddhi*.

The category of Śiva is also sometimes denoted by the term *śakti* or energy¹. The word *śiva-tattva* has also been used as merely Śiva in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā*.

We have seen before that Śaṅkara explained this topic of the *Brahma-sūtra* as refuting the view of the different schools of Śaivas or Maheśvaras who regard God as being the instrumental cause of the universe. Śrīkaṇṭha has tried to show that God is both the material cause and the instrumental cause of the universe. In his support he addresses texts from the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā* of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* to show that, according to the Vedic authority, God is both the material and the instrumental cause of the universe. But Śrīkaṇṭha says that, though the Āgamas and the Vedic view of Śaivism are one and the same, since both of them were composed by Śiva, in some of the Āgamas, such as the *Kāmika*, the instrumental side is more emphasised; but that emphasis should not be interpreted as a refutation of the view that God is also the material cause of the universe. It is true that in some sects of Śaivism, such as the Kāpalikas or Kālamukhas, some of the religious practices are of an impure character and so far they may be regarded as non-Vedic; and it is possible that for that reason, in the *Mahābhārata* and elsewhere, some sects of Śaivism have been described as non-Vedic. Yet from the testimony of the *Varāha-purāṇa* and other Purāṇas, Śaivism or the *Pāśupata-yoga* has been regarded as Vedic. Śrīkaṇṭha and Appaya took great pains to bridge the gulf between the vernacular Śaivism and the

¹ *śiva-tattva-śabdena tu śiva evocyate. na tu atra śiva-tattva-śabdaḥ para-śaktiparaḥ. śakti-śabdas tat-kārya-dvītiya-tattva-rūpa-śaktiparaḥ.* Appaya Dīkṣita's commentary, Vol. II, p. 110.

Sanskritic, that is, those forms of Śaivism which were based on the authority of the Vedas and were open to the first three castes (*varṇa*), and those which are open to all castes. Both try to make out that the present topic was not directed against the views propounded in the *Śaivāgamas* as Śāṅkara explained, but against other views which do not form any part of the Śaiva philosophy.

In some texts of the *Kalpa-sūtras* we hear of objections against the valid authority of some of the texts, but these objections do not apply to the Āgamas composed by Śiva. It is said that Śiva cannot be the material cause of the universe, because the Upaniṣads hold that the Brahman is changeless, and in this way an attempt is made to refute the *pariṇāma* doctrine. *Pariṇāma* means "change from a former state to a latter state." It is further held that *śakti* or energy is in itself changeless. Even if that *śakti* be of the nature of consciousness, then such a change would also be inadmissible. Against this view it is held that there may be change in the spiritual power or energy (*cicchakti*) on the occasion of a desire for creation or a desire for destruction. The *cicchakti* which is within us goes out and comes into contact, in association with the senses, with the external objects, and this explains our perception of things. So, since we have to admit the theory of the functional expansion (*vyrtti*) of the *cicchakti*, it is easy to admit that the original *śakti* has also its functional expansion or contraction¹.

According to the Śaiva school as propounded by Śrīkaṇṭha, the individual souls have not emanated from God, but they are co-existent with Him. The apparent scriptural texts that affirm that souls came out of Brahman like sparks from a fire are interpreted as meaning only the later association of souls with *buddhi* and *manas*, and also with the different bodies. It must also be said that the souls are the conscious knowers, both by way of senses and by the *manas*. The *manas* is explained as a special property or quality of knowledge which the soul possesses and by virtue of which it is a knower. This *manas* must be differentiated from a lower type of *manas* which is a product of *prakṛti*, and which becomes associated with the soul in the process of birth and rebirth through association

¹ *teṣvapi sisṛkṣā-saṃjihīrṣādi-vyavahāreṇa śiva-cicchakṭeḥ "cicchaktir artha-saṃyogo-'dhyakṣam indriya-mārgata" iti cicchakti-vyrtti-nīrgama-vyavahāreṇa jīva-cicchakṭeḥ ca pariṇāmitvam āviṣkṛtam eveti bhāvaḥ*. Appaya Dikṣita's commentary, Vol. II, p. 112.

with the power of *māyā*. This power gives it a special character as a knower, by which it can enjoy or suffer pleasure and pain, and which is limited to the body and the egoism. It is by virtue of this *manas* that the soul is called a *jīva*. When through Brahma-knowledge its threefold association with impurities is removed, then it becomes like Brahman, and its self-knowledge in a liberated state manifests itself. This knowledge is almost like Brahma-knowledge. In this state the individual soul may enjoy its own natural joy without the association of any of the internal organs, merely by the *manas*. The *manas* there is the only internal organ for the enjoyment of bliss and there is no necessity of any external organs. The difference between the individual soul and God is that the latter is omniscient and the former knows things only particularly during the process of birth and rebirth. But in the actual state of liberation the souls also become omniscient¹. Śrīkaṇṭha also holds that the souls are all atomic in size, and that they are not of the nature of pure consciousness, but they all possess knowledge as their permanent quality. In all these points Śrīkaṇṭha differs from Śaṅkara and is in partial agreement with Rāmānuja. Knowledge as consciousness is not an acquired quality of the soul as with the Naiyāyikas or the Vaiśeṣikas, but it is always invariably co-existent in the nature of the selves. The individual souls are also regarded as the real agents of their actions, and not merely illusory agents, as some philosophical theories hold. Thus Sāṃkhya maintains that the *prakṛti* is the real agent and also the real enjoyer of joys and sorrows, which are falsely attributed to the individual souls. According to Śrīkaṇṭha, however, the souls are both real agents and real enjoyers of their deeds. It is by the individual will that a soul performs an action, and there is no misattribution of the sense of agency as is supposed by Sāṃkhya or other schools of thought. The souls are ultimately regarded as parts of Brahman, and Śrīkaṇṭha tries to repudiate the monistic view that God falsely appears as an individual soul through the limitations of causes and conditions (*upādhi*)².

¹ *tat-sadṛśa-guṇatvāt apagata-saṃsārasya jīvasya svarūpānandānubhava-sādhanaṃ manorūpam antaḥ-karaṇam anapekṣita-bāhya-karaṇam asti iti gamyate. jñājñau iti jīvasya ajñatvam kiñcij jñatvam eva. asaṃsāriṇaḥ paramēśvarasya tu sarvajñatvam ucyate. ataḥ saṃsāre kiñcij jñatvam muktau sarvajñatvam iti jñātā eva ātmā. Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, II. 3. 19, pp. 142-3.*

² Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, II, 3. 42-52.

Regarding the view that *karmas* or deeds produce their own effects directly, or through the intermediary of certain effects called *apūrvā*, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that the *karmas* being without any intelligence (*acetana*) cannot be expected to produce the manifold effects running through various births and various bodies. It has therefore to be admitted that, as the *karmas* can be performed only by the will of God operating in consonance with the original free will of man, or as determined in later stages by his own *karma*, so the prints of all the *karmas* are also distributed in the proper order by the grace of God. In this way God is ultimately responsible on the one hand for our actions, and on the other for the enjoyment and suffering in accordance with our *karmas*, without any prejudice to our moral responsibility as expressed in our original free inclination or as determined later by our own deeds.¹

In the state of liberation the liberated soul does not become one with the Brahman in its state of being without any qualities. The Upaniṣadic texts that affirm that the Brahman is without any qualities do so only with the view to affirm that Brahman has none of the undesirable qualities, and that He is endowed with all excellent qualities which are consistent with our notion of God. When in the state of liberation the liberated souls become one with the Brahman, it only means that they share with God all His excellent qualities, but they never become divested of all qualities, as the monistic interpretation of Śaṅkara likes to explain. It has been pointed out before that God may have many attributes at one and the same time, and that such a conception is not self-contradictory if it is not affirmed that he has many qualities of a contradictory character at one and the same time. Thus, we can speak of a lotus as being white, fragrant and big, but we cannot speak of it as being both blue and white at the same time.²

Śrīkaṇṭha holds that only those *karmas* which are ripe for producing fruits (*prārabdha-karma*) will continue to give fruits, and will do so until the present body falls away. No amount of knowledge or intuition can save us from enjoying or suffering the fruits of *karma* that we have earned, but if we attain true knowledge by continuing our meditation on the nature of Śiva as being one with ourselves, we shall not have to suffer birth and rebirth of the

¹ Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra*, III. 2. 37-40.

² Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra*, III. 3. 40.

accumulated *karmas* which had not yet ripened to the stage of giving their fruits of enjoyment or suffering¹.

When all the impurities (*mala*) are removed and a person is liberated, he can in that state of liberation enjoy all blissful experiences and all kinds of powers, except the power of creating the universe. He can remain without a body and enjoy all happiness through his mind alone, or he can at one and the same time animate or recreate many spiritual bodies which transcend the laws of *prakṛti*, and through them enjoy any happiness that he wishes to have. In no case, however, is he at that stage brought under the law of *karma* to suffer the cycles of birth and rebirth, but remains absolutely free in himself in tune with the Lord Śiva, with whom he may participate in all kinds of pleasurable experiences. He thus retains his personality and power of enjoying pleasures. He does this only through his mind or through his immaterial body and senses. His experiences would no longer be of the type of the experiences of normal persons, who utilise experiences for attaining particular ends. His experience of the world would be a vision of it as being of the nature of Brahman².

¹ Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra*, IV. 1. 19.

² Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra*, IV. 4. 17-22.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY IN THE PURĀṆAS

The Śaiva Philosophy in the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*.

WE shall discuss the antiquity of the Śaiva religion and philosophy in a separate section. It is a pity that it is extremely difficult, nay, almost impossible, to trace the history of the continuous development of Śaiva thought from earliest times. We can do no more than make separate studies of different aspects of Śaiva thought appearing in different contexts, and then try to piece them together into an unsatisfactory whole. This is largely due to various factors. First, the Śaiva thought was expressed both in Sanskrit and also in Dravidian languages. We do not yet know definitely if the Dravidian texts were but translations from Sanskrit sources, or were only inspired by Sanskrit writings. Later writers, even in the Purāṇas, hold that Śiva was the author of all Śaiva scriptures either in Sanskrit or in Dravidian. This, of course, refers to the earliest writings, the Āgamas.

We do not know the exact date of the earliest Āgamas. The word 'āgama' needs a little explanation. It means "texts that have come down to us", and which are attributed either to God or to some mythical personage. We have a list of twenty-eight Śivācaryas in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā* of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, and these have been referred to as late as the tenth century A.D. But there is nothing to prove the historical existence of these Śaiva teachers, nor do we know what Āgamas we owe to each of them. We have no direct knowledge of any Dravidian philosophical culture before the Aryan culture had penetrated into the South. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine how there could be Dravidian works of philosophy which ran parallel to the Sanskrit works.

The other difficulty is that most of these supposed Āgamas of the past are not now available. Most of the Āgamas that we get now are written in Sanskrit in various Dravidian scripts. The records of the schools of Śaiva philosophy mentioned by Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* must have been written in Sanskrit, but the present writer is quite unable to identify all the

schools referred to in the seventh or eighth centuries with the existing records of Śaiva thought. There was a great upheaval of Śaiva thought from the twelfth century, contemporaneously with the revival of Vaiṣṇava thought in Rāmānuja, but Rāmānuja himself does not refer to all the schools of Śaivism referred to by Śaṅkara and Vācaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmātī* commentary. Rāmānuja only mentions the Kālamukhas and the Kāpālikas, and no literature about their philosophical views is now available. The Kāpālika sect probably still exists here and there, and one may note some of their practices, but so far we have not been able to discover any literature on the practices of the Kālamukhas. But we shall revert again to the problem when we discuss the antiquity of Śaiva thought and its various schools. The three schools of Southern Śaivism that are now generally known are the Viraśaivas, the Śivajñāna-siddhi school and the school of Śaivism as represented by Śrīkaṇṭha. We have dealt with the Śaivism of Śrīkaṇṭha in two sections. The school of Pāśupata-Śaivism is mentioned in the fourteenth century in Mādhava's *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* and the Pāśupata school is referred to in the *Mahābhārata* and many other Purāṇas. In the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, particularly in the last section called the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā*, we have a description of the Pāśupata philosophy. I shall, therefore, now try to collect the description of the Pāśupata system of thought as found in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā* of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*.

The *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, according to the testimony of the Purāṇa itself, is supposed to have been a massive work of one hundred thousand verses divided into seven sections, written by Śiva Himself. This big work has been condensed into twenty-four thousand verses by Vyāsa in the Kaliyuga. We know nothing about the historicity of this Vyāsa. He is supposed to have written most of the Purāṇas. The present *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, however, contains seven sections, of which the last section called the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā* is divided into two parts and is supposed to elucidate the view of the different schools of Śaivism. According to our interpretation it shows only one school of Śaivism, namely the Pāśupata-Śaivism in two variant forms. None of the works that we have been able to discover so far have been attributed to Śiva or Maheśvara, though Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2, 37 refers to Siddhānta works written by Maheśvara. We have traced some of

the Āgamas, but these Āgamas are not called Siddhānta, nor are they supposed to owe their authorship to Maheśvara. On the evidence of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, we have quite a number of Śaiva teachers who are regarded as incarnations of Śiva and also many of their disciples, but we know nothing about these mythical teachers. One teacher called Upamanyu is often referred to in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā* section as instructing the principles of Śaivism. The account of Śaivism given by Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* referred to above, is very meagre, but it seems to indicate that the Śaivas regarded *prakṛti* as the material cause and Śiva as the instrumental or efficient cause; and it is this latter view that Śaṅkara mainly criticises as the school of Īśvara-kāraṇins, implying thereby the view that the Upaniṣads cannot tolerate the idea of a separate efficient cause as Īśvara. Vācaspati also points out that the *prakṛti* being the material cause could not be identified with the efficient cause, the Īśvara. In Śaivism we are faced with the problem of solving the issue between Śaṅkara and the Śaivas. Our treatment of Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* has shown the direction in which the Śaivas want to solve the difficulty, but Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* is probably a work not earlier than the eleventh century, and many other works of Śaivism can be traced only as far back as the twelfth century A.D. On the testimony of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, which must have been written before the time of Śaṅkara, we know that Śaiva works by great Śaiva teachers were written both for those who adhered to the *Varṇāśrama dharma* and for those who did not care for the *Varṇāśrama dharma* and were not privileged to study the Vedas. The latter class of works must therefore have been the Dravidian works of the South, many of which are now lost, and of which only some traditions are available in the Sanskrit Āgamas. We have already dealt with these in another section. We shall have occasion to show that the Kāśmīr form of Śaivism was more or less contemporaneous with Śaṅkara.

In the second section of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* called the *Rudra-saṃhitā*, we are told that at the time of the great dissolution, when all things were destroyed, there was only darkness, no sun, no planets, no stars, no moon, and no day and night; there is only pure vacuity devoid of all energy. There was no sensibility of any kind; it was a state when there was neither being nor non-being; it was beyond all mind and speech, beyond all name and form. But yet

in that neutral state there existed only the pure being, the pure consciousness, infinite and pure bliss, which was immeasurable and a state in itself; it had no form and was devoid of all qualities¹. This was purely of the nature of pure consciousness, without beginning and end and without any development. Gradually there arose a second desire or will by which the formless was changed into some form by its own playful activities. This may be regarded as the all-creating pure energy, of which there is no parallel. The form created by this energy is called *sadāśiva*. People also call Him Īśvara, or God. The lone energy, spontaneously moving, created from itself its own eternal body, which is called *pradhāna*, *prakṛti*, or *māyā*, and which generates the category of *buddhi*. This *māyā* or *prakṛti* is the creator of all beings and is regarded as coming into contact with the supreme *puruṣa*, the Śiva, called *Sambhu*, who is different from God. This *śakti* or energy is also regarded as *kāla* or time.

From *prakṛti* came the *mahat* or *buddhi* and from *buddhi* came the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and from them the three-fold *ahaṅkāra*. From *ahaṅkāra* came the *tanmātras*, the five *bhūtas*, the five conative senses, and the five cognitive senses, and *manas*.

In the *Kailāsa-saṃhitā* of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* the view of Śaivism is described as being the Śivādvaita system or the monistic theory of Śaivism². It is said here that since all living beings are constituted of a male and a female part, the original cause must also be represented by a male and a female principle united. As a matter of fact, the Sāṃkhya had taken that idea from this statement, and had regarded the original cause as being *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. But they tried to establish it merely on rational grounds; they were not disposed to establish it in a theistic sense. For that reason, though some of the Sāṃkhya categories may be accepted, yet the Sāṃkhya philosophy as a whole, being a purely rationalistic system, ought to be abandoned. The Brahman is regarded in the Vedas as being the unity of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, and it is in the neuter gender. The

¹ *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ ca parānandaṃ paraṃ-mahaḥ.
āprameyam anādhāram avikāram anākṛti,
nirguṇaṃ yogigamyaṃ ca sarva-vyāpyeka-kāraṇam.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa, II. I. 6, 11 c, d-12.

² *utpātya ajñāna-sambhūtaṃ saṃśayākhyaṃ viṣa-drumanam,
śivādvaita-mahā-kalpa-vṛkṣa-bhūmir yathā bhavet.*

Ibid. VI. 16. 11.

being represented in Brahman means that all negation of being is excluded. The neuter character of the being represents the fact that it is the *puruṣa*, and this *puruṣa* also is of an illuminating nature. The pure consciousness in the unity of *sat-cid-ānanda* represents the female part. So the two parts that are regarded as male and female are the illuminating part (*prakāśa*) and the pure consciousness, and these two together are the generating causes of the world. So in the unity of *sac-cid-ānanda* we have the unity of Śiva and Śakti. This illumination is also sometimes impeded, as the flame of a wick is impeded by smoke and other impurities. These are the *malas* which do not belong to Śiva, but are seen in the fire of pure consciousness. It is on this account that the *cicchakti* or the energy of pure consciousness is seen in an impure state in human souls. It is for the expulsion of this *mala* that the pervasiveness of *śakti* or energy is to be assumed as existing in all time. *Śakti* thus is the symbol of *bala* or strength. In the *paramātmān* there is both the Śiva-aspect and the *śakti*-aspect. It is by the connection of Śiva and Śakti that there is *ānanda* or bliss. The Ātman is pure consciousness and this consciousness holds within it all knowledge and all energy; it is independent and free, and that is its nature. In the *Śiva-sūtra*, *jñāna* or knowledge has been described as a bondage, but the word *jñāna* there means only finite, limited or turbid knowledge which all human beings have, and in this way alone can knowledge be regarded as bondage.

The Śakti or energy is also called *spanda* or vibration. Knowledge, movement and will are like the three sides of Śiva, and human beings get their inspiration from between these. As we have said above, the Śiva and Śakti combined gives the supreme *śakti* called *parāśakti*, and from this *parāśakti* there evolves the *cicchakti* or power of consciousness. From this comes the *śakti* or bliss or *ānanda-śakti*, from this the will-power or *icchā-śakti*, and from this come *jñāna-śakti*, or power of knowledge, and the power of motivation, or *kriyā-śakti*. The first category of vibration in the category of Śiva is called *śiva-tattva*. The world and the souls are entirely identical with Śiva, and such a knowledge leads to liberation.

The supreme Lord contracts Himself and manifests Himself as the individual *puruṣas* or souls who enjoy the qualities of the *prakṛti*. This enjoyment takes place through the function of fivefold *kalā*,

such as that which leads the individual to action; that which leads him to discover the true reality of twofold *vidyā*; that which attaches him to the objects of sense (*rāga*); *kāla* or time which makes things happen in succession; *niyati*, which is used in a peculiar sense, not of destiny but of conscience, that is, it is the factor by which one decides what one should do or not do¹.

The *puruṣa* or the individual souls possess in a cumulative way the qualities of knowledge, will, etc. The so-called *citta* or the psychic plane is constituted of the various qualities existent in the *prakṛti*. From *buddhi* come the various senses and subtle matter.

The system of thought referred to above, the Śivādvaita system, is arranged in rather a clumsy manner. The points that emerge from the above statements can be briefly summarised. First, it regards the Brahman as being an undifferentiated Being or Non-being, when there is nothing but void in the universe. From this Being-and-Non-being, the Brahman, there sprang forth an entity which represents within it the two principles of male and female energy which pervades all living beings. It is out of this principle, the Śiva, that we have, on the one hand the individual selves which are but contractions of the nature of the supreme Lord, and on the other we have the world evolving out of the female energy side, the *prakṛti*, more or less in the Sāṃkhya fashion. The *puruṣa* is supposed to have within him fivefold categories, through which he can experience joys and sufferings of his intercourse with the world as such. These individuals, on account of the contraction that they suffered, show themselves as impure as a flame in a wick appears smoky. Thus the whole system tends towards a sort of monism without being purely idealistic. The closeness or its affinity with Śrīkaṇṭha's philosophy will be immediately apparent, though there are differences in the mode of expression. There are certain passages which remind us of some form of Kāśmīr Śaivism, which though a monism, is largely different from the monism as expressed herein. We also find here a reference to the *spanda* theory of Kāśmīr Śaivism. But in spite of this we need not think that the monistic Śaivism was first enunciated in this Purāṇa or in this chapter. We shall have occasion to show that some form of distinctly monistic Śaivism with relative

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*idaṃ tu mama kartavyam idaṃ neti niyāmikā,
niyatis syāt...*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa, vi. 16. 83.

bias could be traced to the beginnings of the Christian era. The Kāśmīr Śaivism flourished probably from the seventh to the eleventh century A.D. It may, therefore, be thought that the chapter under reference of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* was probably written somewhere about the ninth or the tenth century A.D., which may also be regarded as the time of Śrīkaṇṭha, though we are not sure if he flourished somewhere at the eleventh century A.D. after Rāmānuja. We discuss these matters further in the appropriate sections.

In the second chapter of the *Rudra-saṃhitā* of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*¹, Śiva is supposed to say that the highest reality, the knowledge of which brings liberation, is pure consciousness, and in that consciousness there is no differentiation between the self and the Brahman². But strangely enough Śiva seems to identify *bhakti* or devotion with knowledge. There can be no knowledge without *bhakti*³. When there is *bhakti* or devotion, there is no distinction of caste in the way of attaining the grace of God. Śiva then classifies the different types of *bhakti*. The nature of devotion, as described in this chapter under consideration, shows that *bhakti* was not regarded as an emotional outburst, as we find in the Caitanya school of *bhakti*. Here *bhakti* is regarded as listening to the name of Śiva, chanting it, and meditating on Him as well as worshipping Him and regarding oneself as the servitor to Śiva, and also to develop the spirit of friendship through which one can surrender oneself to God Śiva. The chanting of the name of Śiva is to be associated with the legendary biography of Śiva as given in the Purāṇas. The meditation on Śiva is regarded as amounting to the development of the idea that Śiva is all-pervasive and is omnipresent. And this makes the devotee fearless. It is through *bhakti* that true knowledge and the disinclination to worldly things can occur.

In IV. 41 four types of liberation are described as *sārūpya*, *sālokya*, *sānnidhya*, and *sāyujya*. We have already discussed in the fourth volume the nature of those types of liberation which are also

¹ *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* II. 2. 23.

² *paratattvaṃ vijānīhi vijñānaṃ parameśvārī
dvītyaṃ smaraṇaṃ yatra nāhaṃ brahmeti śuddhadhiḥ.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa II. 2. 23. 13.

bhaktau jñāne na bhedo hi...

vijñānaṃ na bhavaty eva sati bhakti-virodhinaḥ.

Ibid. II. 2. 23. 16.

admitted by the followers of the Mādhva school of Vaiṣṇavas. And this liberation is only granted by Śiva who is beyond all the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*.

The ultimate nature of Śiva is described here (iv. 41) as being changeless (*nirvikārin*) and beyond *prakṛti*. He is of the nature of pure knowledge, unchangeable, all-perceiving. The fifth kind of liberation called the *kaivalya* can be attained only by the knowledge of Śiva and His ultimate nature. The whole world springs out of Him and returns to Him and is always pervaded by Him. He is also designated as being the unity of being, consciousness, and bliss (*sac-cid-ānanda*); He is without any qualities or conditions, pure, and cannot be in any way made impure. He has no colour, no form and no measure. Words cannot describe Him and thoughts cannot reach Him. It is the Brahman which is also called Śiva. Just as space (*ākāśa*) pervades all things, so He pervades all things. He is beyond the range of *māyā* and beyond conflict (*dvandvātīta*). He can be attained either through knowledge or through devotion, but the way of devotion is easier to follow than the way of knowledge. In the next chapter (iv. 42) it is said that it is from Śiva, the ultimate Brahman, that *prakṛti* as associated with *puruṣa* (individual souls) is produced¹. This evolution of *prakṛti* as associated with *puruṣa* is called the category of *Rudra*, which is only a transformation of Śiva, the highest Brahman, just as golden ornaments may be regarded as transformations of gold. The formless Śiva is considered as having a form only for the advantage of meditation.

All that one can know or see in the universe, in the highest or the lowest, is only Śiva, and the character of things in their plurality is formed from Him. Śiva alone remains the same unchangeable reality before the creation, and at the dissolution of the creation. The pure Śiva is regarded as qualified only when one considers Him as being the possessor of *śakti* or energy with which in reality He is identical. It is through the will of Śiva that all operations in the world can go on. He knows them all, but no one knows Him. Having created the world He remains away from it and is not involved with it. But it is in His form as pure consciousness that He is seen in and through the world, as the sun is seen in

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*tasmāt prakṛtir utpannā puruṣeṇa samamcitā.**Ibid.* iv. 42. 3.

his reflections. In actuality Śiva does not enter into this world of change. In reality Śiva is the whole of the world, though the world appearances seem to occur in a time series of discontinuity. *Ajñāna* or nescience only means misunderstanding, it is not a substance that stands by Brahman and could be regarded as a dual entity¹.

According to the Vedāntins the reality is one, and the individual soul (*jīva*), which gets deluded by *avidyā* or nescience and thinks itself to be different from the Brahman, is only a part of it. But when released from the grasp of nescience it becomes one with Śiva, and Śiva, as we have already said, pervades all things without being actually in them. One can attain liberation by following the path indicated by the Vedānta. As fire, which exists in the wood, can be manifested by the constant rubbing of the wood, so by the various processes of devotion one can attain Śiva, but one must be convinced of the fact that whatever exists is Śiva, and it is only through illusion that various names and forms appear before us². Just as the ocean, or a piece of gold, or a piece of mud may appear in various shapes, though actually they remain the same, so it is only by various conditions through which we look at things that they appear so different, though they are actually nothing but Śiva. There is actually no difference between the cause and the effect³, yet through illusion one thinks of something as cause and something else as effect. From the seed comes the shoot, appearing as different from the seed, but ultimately the shoot grows into a tree and fructifies and thereby reduces itself into fruit and seed. The seed stays on and produces other shoots and the original tree is destroyed. The true seer is like the seed from which there are many transformations, and when these have ceased we have again the true seer. With the removal of nescience (*avidyā*) a person is dissociated from egoism and becomes pure, and then through the grace of God Śiva he becomes what he really is, that is, Śiva. Just

¹ *ajñānaṃ ca mater bhedo nāsty anyacca dvayaṃ punaḥ.*
9: *darśaneṣu ca sarveṣu mati-bhedaḥ pradarśyate.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa IV. 43. 8c, d.

² *bhrāntīyā nānā-svarūpo hi bhāsate śaṅkaras sadā.*

Ibid. IV. 43. 15c, d.

³ *kārya-kāraṇayor bhedo vastuto na pravartate,*
kevalaṃ bhrānti-buddhyaiva tad-abhāve sa naśyati.

Ibid. IV. 43. 17.

as in a mirror one can see one's body reflected, so one can see one-self reflected in one's pure mind, that is Śiva, which is one's real character.

We thus see that in this school of Śaivism as described in the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* iv. 43, we have a monistic system of Śaivism which is very much like the monistic system of Śaṅkara. It believes that the plurality of appearance is false, and that the only reality is Brahman or Śiva. It also believes that this false appearance is due to the interference of nescience. It does not admit any difference between cause and effect, but yet it seems to adhere to the monotheistic faith that God Śiva can bestow liberation on those who are devoted to Him, though it does not deny that the Brahman can be attained by the way indicated in the Upaniṣads. It says that *jñāna* comes from *bhakti* or devotion, from *bhakti* comes love (*prema*), and from *prema* one gets into the habit of listening to episodes about the greatness of Śiva, and from that one comes into contact with saintly people, and from that one can attain one's preceptor. When in this way true knowledge is attained, one becomes liberated. The practice of the worship of the preceptor is also introduced here. It is said that if one gets a good and saintly preceptor, one should worship him as if he were Śiva Himself, and in this way the impurities of the body will be removed, and it will be possible for such a devotee to attain knowledge.

We thus see that in this chapter, though Śaivism is interpreted purely on Vedāntic lines, the doctrine of theism and the doctrine of preceptor worship are somehow grafted into it, though such doctrines cannot fit in with the monism of the Upaniṣads as interpreted by Śaṅkara. This system, therefore, seems to present a specimen of Śaivism different from what we had in the second book of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, and different also from the philosophy of Śaivism as presented by Śrīkaṇṭha and Appaya Dīkṣita.

Śaiva Philosophy in the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā* of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*.

§ 1

The *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* seems to be a collection of seven treatises, called Saṃhitās, dealing with different aspects of the worship of Śiva, myths of Śiva, and philosophy of Śaivism. Though there is a general agreement on the fundamental patterns of Śaiva thought in the various systems of Śaivism, yet these patterns often present marked differences, which ought to be noted for the sake of a detailed study of Śaivism. This is particularly so, as no other system of thought which had spread so far and wide all over India from the days of the hoary past has suffered so much mutilation and destruction of its literature as did Śaivism. We have some older records in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, and also in the Indus Valley Civilization period, but the systematic Śaiva thought has lost most of its traces from pre-Christian times, until we come to the ninth or tenth centuries A.D. Most of the Āgama works written in Sanskrit and in Dravidian are not now available, and it is even difficult to identify the systems of Śaiva thought as referred to by Śaṅkara in the eighth century A.D. Our treatment of Śaivism can therefore be only gleanings from here and there, and it will not have any proper historical perspective. Even writers in the eleventh or the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are unable to indicate the proper texts and their mutual relations, at least so far as Sanskrit works are concerned. Much of what is written about the Dravidian texts and their authors is either mythological or largely unhistorical. Even the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* seems to be a composite work written at different times. It consists of collections of thought more or less different from each other, and points to different levels of attitude of Śaiva thought. It is not therefore possible to give a consistent account of the whole work of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*; I have accordingly attempted to give an estimate of Śaivism as delineated in Chapters II, IV, VI and VII. But as the philosophical level of the seventh Saṃhitā, the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā*, seems to be somewhat different from that of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, I shall try briefly to review the contents of the

Vāyavīya-saṃhitā, which may be regarded as a school of Pāsupata Śaivism. I shall try later on to give estimates of other forms of Śaivism so far as they have been available to me.

In VII. 1. 2. 19 of the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā*, the ultimate God is regarded as being the original cause, the cause of maintenance, as the ground, and also as the cause of destruction of all things. He is called the ultimate *puruṣa*, the Brahman, or the *paramātman*. The *pradhāna* or the *prakṛti* is regarded as His body, and He is also regarded as the agent who disturbs the equilibrium of *prakṛti*¹. He manifests Himself in twenty-three different categories and yet remains absolutely undisturbed and unchanged. Though the world has been created and maintained by the supreme Lord, yet people do not know him under the delusion of *māyā* or nescience.

In VII. 1. 3 it is said that the ultimate cause is that which is unspeakable and unthinkable, and it is that from which the gods Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra have sprung forth, together with all gross matter and sense faculties. He is the cause of all causes and is not produced from any other cause. He is omnipotent and the Lord of all. The supreme Lord stands silent and rooted in one place like a tree and yet He pervades the whole universe. Everything else in the universe is moving excepting their final cause, the Brahman. He alone is the inner controller of all beings, but yet He Himself cannot be recognised as such, though He knows all. Eternal power, knowledge, and action belong naturally to Him. All that we know as destructible (*kṣara*) and indestructible (*akṣara*) have sprung from the supreme Lord, by whose ideation they have come into being. In the end of the *māyā*, the universe will vanish with the disappearance of the individual souls². The supreme Lord, like an omnipotent artist, has painted the canvas of world appearance, and this appearance will ultimately return to Him. Every being is under His control and He can only be realised through supreme devotion (*bhakti*). Only the true devotees can have any real communication with Him. The creation is gross and subtle, the former is visible to all, and the latter only to the yogins, but beyond that there is a supreme Lord of eternal knowledge and

¹ *namaḥ pradhāna-dehāya pradhāna-kṣobha-kāriṇe,
trayo-viṃśati-bhedena vikṛtāy-āvikāriṇe.*

Vāyavīya-saṃhitā VII. 1. 2. 19.

² *bhūyo yasya paśor ante viśva-māyā nivartate.*

Ibid. VII. 1. 3. 13.

bliss, and unchangeable. Devotion to God is also due to the extension of grace by God. As a matter of fact, the grace is produced out of devotion and the devotion is produced out of grace, just as the tree grows out of a seedling and a seedling grows out of a tree.

When one tries to think oneself as being of the nature of the supreme Lord, then His grace is extended to such a person and this increases his merit and his sins are attenuated. By a long process of attenuation of sins through many births, there arises devotion to God, as the supreme Lord with the proper consciousness of it. As a result of that there is a further extension of grace, and in consequence of that one can leave off all desires for the fruits of one's action, though one may be working all the same.

By the renunciation of the fruits of *karma*, one becomes associated with the faith in Śiva. This can be either through a preceptor or without a preceptor. The former is much preferable to the latter. Through knowledge of Śiva one begins to discover the sorrows of the cycles of birth and rebirth. In consequence of that there is a disinclination to all sense-objects (*vairāgya*). From this comes emotion (*bhāva*) for the supreme Lord, and through this emotion one is inclined to meditation, and one is then naturally led to renounce actions. When one thus concentrates and meditates on the nature of Śiva one attains the state of *yoga*. It is through this *yoga* again that there is a further increase of devotion, and through that a further extension of the grace of God. At the end of this long process the individual is liberated, and he then becomes equal to Śiva (*śiva-sama*), but he can never become Śiva. The process of the attainment of liberation may be different in accordance with the fitness of the person concerned.

In VII. 1. 5 Vāyu is supposed to say that the knowledge of *paśu*, the individual souls, *pāśa* or the bondage, and *pati*, the supreme Lord, is the ultimate object to all knowledge and faith, and this only can lead to supreme happiness. All sorrows proceed from ignorance, and they are removed through knowledge. Knowledge means limitation by objectivity. This objectivisation through knowledge may be with reference to material objects and non-material things (*jada* and *ajada*). The supreme Lord controls them both. The individual souls are indestructible and are therefore called *akṣara*; the bondage (*pāśa*) is destructible and therefore

called *kṣara*; and that, which is beyond these two, is the supreme Lord.

Vāyu, in further explaining the subject, says that *prakṛti* can be regarded as *kṣara*, and *puruṣa* as the *akṣara*, and the supreme Lord moves them both to action. Again *prakṛti* is identified with *māyā* and *puruṣa* is supposed to be encircled by *māyā*. The contact between *māyā* and the *puruṣa* is through one's previous deeds by the instrumentality of God. The *māyā* is described as the power of God. The impurity or *mala* consists in its power to veil the nature of consciousness of the souls. When divested of this *mala* the *puruṣa* returns to its original natural purity. The association of the veil of *māyā* with the soul is due, as we have said before, to previous deeds and this gives the opportunity for enjoying the fruits of our actions. In connection with this, one should also note the category of *kalā* which means knowledge, attachment, time, and *nīyati* or destiny. The individual person enjoys all this through his state of bondage. He also enjoys and suffers the fruits of his good and bad deeds. The association with the impurities (*mala*) is without a beginning, but it may be destroyed with the attainment of liberation. All our experiences are intended for experiencing the fruits of our *karma* through the gates of our external and internal senses and our body.

Vidyā or knowledge is here defined as that which manifests space and action (*dik-kriyā-vyañjakā vidyā*). Time or *kāla* is that which limits or experiences (*kālo'vacchedakah*), and *nīyati* is that which determines the order of things, and *rāga* or attachment impels one to do actions. The *avyakta* is the cause consisting of the three *guṇas*; from it come all objects and to it everything returns. This *prakṛti*, called also *pradhāna* or *avyakta*, manifests itself in the form of pleasure, pain, and numbness. The method of the manifestation of the *prakṛti* is called *kalā*. The three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* come out of *prakṛti*. This is distinctively a new view, different from the classical Sāṃkhya theory. In the classical Sāṃkhya theory, *prakṛti* is merely the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas*, and there *prakṛti* is nothing but that which is constituted of the equilibrium between the three *guṇas*. These *guṇas* permeate through the *prakṛti* in a subtle state as oil permeates through the seeds of sesamum. It is out of the modification of the *avyakta* or *pradhāna* that the five *tanmātras* and five gross matter-elements, as well as five cognitive and five conative senses and the

manas, come into being. It is the causal state as such that is called the unmanifested or the *avyakta*. The effects as transformations are called the *vyakta* or the manifested; just as a lump of clay may be regarded as the unmanifested and the earthen vessels made out of it are regarded as the manifested. The manifold world of effects find their unity in the unmanifested *prakṛti*, and all bodies, senses, etc. are regarded as being enjoyed through *puruṣa*.

Vāyu, in further explaining the subject, says that, though it is difficult to find out any proper reason for admitting a universal soul, yet one is forced to admit a universal entity which experiences the enjoyments and sufferings, and which is different from intellect, the senses, and the body. This entity is the permanent enjoyer of all human experiences, even when the body perishes (*ayāvad-deha-vedanāt*). It is this universal entity to which all objects of experience appeal, it is called the inner controller in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. It pervades all things, yet it manifests itself here and there under certain circumstances and is itself unperceivable. It cannot be seen by the eye nor by any of the senses. It is only by the right wisdom of the mind that this great soul or Ātman can be realised. It is unchangeable in all changes and it is the perceiver of all things, though it cannot be perceived itself. Such a great soul is different from the body and the senses, and those who consider it as being identical with the body cannot perceive it. It is by being associated with the body that it undergoes all impurities and suffering, and is drawn to the cycles of births and rebirths by its own deeds. As a field that is flooded with water soon generates new shoots, so in the field of ignorance the *karma* begins to shoot up and produce bodies which are the source of all miseries. Through the cycle of birth and rebirth one has to experience the fruits of one's *karma* and so the process goes on. This universal entity appears as many and manifests various intellectual shades in different persons¹. All our human relations are accidental and contingent, like two pieces of floating wood drawn together by the waves and then separated again. All beings, from the plants to Brahma, are the *paśus* or manifestations of this

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*chādītaś ca viyuktaś ca śarīrair eṣu lakṣyate,
candra-bimba-vad ākāśe taralair abhra-sāñcayaiḥ,
aneka-deha-bhedena bhinnā vṛttir ihātmanah.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa VII. 1. 5. 56 et seq.

puruṣa. It is the *puruṣa* that is bound by the ties of pleasure and pain, and is like the plaything of the great Lord. It is ignorant and impotent, and cannot provide for its pleasure or arrange for the dispelling of sorrow.

We have already seen the nature of the *paśu* and the *pāśa*. The *pāśa* is the energy or *śakti* of Śiva manifesting itself as *prakṛti*; it evolves the material world, the subjective world, as well as pleasures and pains, which fetter the universal soul, the *paśu*, appearing as many under different conditions and circumstances. We cannot fail to note that the *puruṣa* or *Ātman* here is not many as the *puruṣas* of the Sāṃkhya or the *Ātmans* of the Nyāya, or of some other systems of Śaiva thought. The idea of the Vedāntic monism is eclectically introduced here, and we are faced with the conception of one *puruṣa* which appears as many in different bodies under different conditions. This one *puruṣa* is all-pervading, and it is on account of its being reflected through various conditions that it appears in various divergent forms of things, ranging from Brahma to a blade of grass.

But the supreme Lord who possesses an infinite number of excellent and attractive qualities is the creator of both the *paśu* and the *pāśa*. Without Him there could not be any creation of the universe, for both the *paśu* and the *pāśa* are inanimate and without knowledge. We must remember that according to Sāṃkhya the *puruṣas* are nothing but pure consciousness, but here they are regarded as the reflection of one conscious entity appearing as many through its being reflected in various conditions or environments. Beginning from the *prakṛti* down to the atoms, we have only the inanimate things entering into various modifications. This could not have been if they were not created and moulded by an intelligent creator. This world consisting of parts is an effect, and must therefore have an agent to fashion it. The agency as the supreme Lord, the Creator, belongs to Śiva and not to the soul or to the bondage. The soul itself is moved into activity by the motivity of God. When an individual thinks of himself as the agent of his action, it is only a wrong impression of the nature of causality (*ayathā-karaṇa-jñāna*). It is only when one knows oneself to be different from the true motivating agent that one may ultimately attain immortality. The *kṣara* and *akṣara*, that is, the *pāśa* and the *paśu*, are all associated with each other and they are both main-

tained by the supreme Lord in their manifested and unmanifested forms. The so-called plurality itself is pervaded by the supreme Lord. God alone is the Lord of all and the refuge of all. Though one, He can uphold the universe by His manifold energies.

This sixth chapter of the first part of the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā* deals mostly with the contents derived from the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad and may be regarded as an expansion of the philosophy of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. The Lord Himself pervades all things and there is no tinge of impurity in Him. Various other texts of the Upaniṣad are also collated with it for the same purpose, and the Brahman is identified with Śiva. In the previous volumes of the present work, attempts have been made to show that the Upaniṣads were interpreted in the *Brahma-sūtras*, in the *Gītā*, and also in the commentaries of the various schools of interpreters of the *Brahma-sūtras* in accordance with the specific views of the relevant authors. In the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* we find also the same attempt to adapt the Upaniṣadic texts for the promulgation of the Śaiva view of philosophy. It is again and again emphasised that there is only one Lord and there is no one second to Him, yet the idea of *māyā* or *prakṛti* is introduced to explain the transformation of the world of appearance. We have seen before that *māyā* is regarded as the energy or *śakti* of Brahman. But we do not find much discussion about the relationship of this energy with God. It is said also in accordance with the Upaniṣads that God is naturally endowed with knowledge and power. But we have not the philosophical satisfaction to know what is exactly the nature of knowledge and power, and how this power is exerted, and what knowledge can mean in relation to the supreme Lord, who has no senses and no *manas*.

In VII. 1. 6. 67 the Lord is described as one who produces time and is the Lord of all the *guṇas* and the liberator of all bondage. A question is raised as regards the nature of *kāla* or time. In reply to such a question Vāyu says that *kāla* appears before us in the form of successive moments and durations. The real essence of *kāla* is the energy of Śiva. *Kāla* therefore cannot be outstripped by any being whatsoever. It is, as it were, the ordering power of God¹. The *kāla* thus is an energy of God that emanates from Him

1

*nīyogarūpaṃ īśasya balaṃ viśva-nīyāmakam.**Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* VII. 1. 7. 7.

and pervades all things. For this reason everything is under the domination of time. But Śiva is not fettered by time; He is the master of all time. The unrestricted power of God is manifested through time, and for this reason no one can transcend the limits of time. No amount of wisdom can take us beyond time, and whatever deeds are done in time cannot be outstripped. It is time which decides the fates and destinies of persons in accordance with their deeds, yet no one can say what is the nature of the essence of time.

We have so far seen that the *prakṛti* as superintended by *puruṣa* evolves as the world before us by the inexorable will and order of God. The order of the evolution of the *prakṛti* or the *avyakta* into different categories is more like what we have in the classical Sāṃkhya. The creation is a process of emanation or emergence from the state of *avyakta* in the well-known classical line of Sāṃkhya, and the dissolution takes place by a process of retrogression, in which the same process is reversed until the whole world of appearance returns to *avyakta* or *prakṛti*.

Turning again to the nature and function of Śiva, the supreme Lord, it is said that there is nothing but the tendency for helping others that may be regarded as the essential nature of Śiva. He has nothing to do but help all beings to attain their best through their actions. He is otherwise without any specific character, except to be of service to the world consisting of the *paśu* and the *pāśa*. This extension of the grace of the Lord is often described as His ordering will. It is for the fulfilment of the function of the Lord's will that one has to admit the existence of something for the good of which the will of the Lord goes forward. For this reason God may not be said to be dependent on others for the exercise of His will. It is in and through the function of His will that things come into being and move forward in an orderly process in accordance with *karma*. The independence of God means that He is not dependent on anything else; dependence means the condition in which one thing depends on another¹.

The whole world is supposed to be dependent on *ajñāna* or nescience, there is nothing of reality in the visible appearance of the world. All the characters of Śiva as described in the scriptures

¹ *ataḥ svāntantrya-śabdārthān anaṇḍaśatva-lakṣaṇaḥ.*

Ibid. VII. 1. 31. 7.

are only conditional assumptions; in reality there is no form that one can ascribe to Śiva¹.

All that has been said so far about the evolution of the world is based upon logical assumptions, while the transcendental reality of God is beyond all logic. It is by imagining God to be something of the nature of our *Ātman* that we attribute the supreme lordship to Him. Just as fire is different from the wood but cannot be seen without it, so we ascribe the lordship to Śiva, in and through the persons in whom He is manifested. It is by a similar extension of thought that the image of Śiva is also regarded as Śiva and is worshipped.

Śiva always helps all beings and never does harm to anyone. When it may seem apparent that he has punished somebody, it is only for the good of others. In many cases the punishment awarded by Śiva is for purging the impurities of the beings concerned. The basis of all good and evil deeds is to be found in the ordinance of God, that one must behave in this way and not in the other way. Goodness means abidance in accordance with His will. He who is engaged always in doing good to others is following the commandment of God, and he cannot be made impure. God only punishes those who could not be brought to the right path by any other course, but his punishment is never due to any spirit of anger or resentment. He is like the father who chastises the son to teach him the proper course. He who tyrannises over others deserves to be chastened. God does not injure others to cause them pain, but only to chasten them and make them fitter for the right path. He is like a doctor who gives bitter medicine for curing a malady. If God remained indifferent to the vices and sins of beings, then that would also be improper for Him, for that would be a way of encouraging people to follow the wrong path; and that also would be denying the proper protection to persons who ought to be protected and whom God is able to protect. The Lord Śiva is like fire; on contact with Him all impurities are resolved. When a piece of iron is put into fire, it is the fire that burns and not the iron; so all the inanimate objects of the world are pervaded by Śiva, the supreme Lord, and He alone shines through all the appearances.

1

*ajñānādhiṣṭhitam sambhor na kiñcid iha vidyate,
yenopalabhyate 'smābhīs sakalenāpi niṣkalaḥ.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa VII. 1. 31. 9 et seq.

The grace of Śiva is not like the ordinary good qualities of friendship, charity, etc., but it cannot be regarded as a good or a bad quality. It means only the will of God leading to the benefit of all beings. Obedience to His commandments may be regarded as identical with the highest good, and the highest good is the same as obedience to His commandments. God, therefore, may be regarded as doing good to all and not merely to one individual. In this manner the individual good is associated with the good of humanity at large, and this can only be effected when all beings follow the commandments of God. The things in the world would behave in their own manners according to their specific nature. It is the function of God to make them grow in consonance with one another as far as their nature should permit. The natural character of things is an important limitation to the scope of this development. One can only melt gold by fire, but not charcoal, so God can only liberate those whose impurities have been purged, but not those who are still in an impure condition. Things which naturally can evolve into some other thing can be made to do so by the will of God. So God's will is only effective when it acts in co-operation with the natural tendency and the effective limits of the things. The individual souls are naturally full of impurities, and it is for that reason that they pass through the cycle of birth and rebirth. The association of the souls with *karma* and illusion is really what is called *saṃsāra*, the passage through the cycle of birth and rebirth. Since Śiva is not associated with any such *karma* and is absolutely pure, He can be the real agent for the motivation for the development of the animate and inanimate world. The impurity of the soul is natural to the soul and not accidental.

In the theory of the classical Sāṃkhya as represented in the *kārikā* of Īśvarakṛiṣṇa or the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, the teleology is made to abide in the *prakṛti*, which out of its own necessity impels the *prakṛti* to evolve in the twofold scheme of the psychical and the physical world for serving the *puruṣas* in twofold ways of the experience of pleasure and pain, and the attainment of liberation through knowledge. In this sense *prakṛti* is supposed to move for the fulfilment of the purpose of the *puruṣas*. In the Pātañjala school of Sāṃkhya, called also the *Yoga-sūtra* as explained by Vyāsa and Vācaspati, the *guṇas* forming the *prakṛti* have a natural obstruction which limits their scope of development. It is admitted

that there is the permanent will of God, that things would evolve in particular directions in accordance with the *karma* of the individuals. The energy of the *prakṛti* or the *guṇas* flows naturally in the direction from which the obstruction has been removed. God does not of Himself push the *prakṛti* to move in a particular direction. The function lies in the removal of obstructions in the way of the development in particular channels. Had there been no such obstruction or if all obstructions were removed, then every thing could have become every other thing. There would be no definite order of evolution and no limitation to various conditions and by time and place. In the system that we are now dealing with the natural obstructions of individuals are frankly admitted as being due to the existence of impurities, and it is held that by the all-pervading nature of God the souls can be emancipated only when the natural obstructions are washed off. For this purpose the individual persons have to exert themselves and through the near proximity of God, the process of pacification is held; this is called the grace of God, not grace in the ordinary sense of the term, but a cosmic operation which helps all things and persons to develop in accordance with their respective deserts. The commandment of God is not like the commandment of a Mosaic god, but it simply means the carrying on of the cosmic process for the good of all. In the carrying out of this process some people must suffer for their own good and some people may attain rewards according to their merits. God Himself transcends all the appearances of the world; He does not actually exert His will to effect anything, but the very fact that all things are pervaded by Him produces the removal of such impurities as are consistent with the development of the cosmos as a whole.

Though the soul is the same, yet some of the souls are in bondage, as also, there are others who are in a state of liberation. Those who are in bondage may also be in different conditions of progress and may have accordingly different kinds of knowledge and power. The impurities associated with the soul may be regarded as green (*āma*) and ripe (*pakva*), and in these two forms they are responsible for the commission of all actions leading to birth and rebirth. But even though all souls are associated with *mala* or impurities, they are pervaded in and through by Śiva; and as the *malas* are purged, the proximity of Śiva becomes more

manifest, and the individual becomes more and more pure, until he becomes like Śiva. The differences of the souls are only due to the conditioning factor of the *mala*. It is in accordance with the nature and condition of the *mala* that one soul appears to be different from the other. The root cause for all the suffering in the world is the impurities, and it is the function of the divine doctor, Śiva, to lead us through knowledge far away from the impurities. Knowledge alone is a means by which all sins may be removed. It may be objected that, since God is all-powerful He could liberate human beings without making them undergo suffering. To this question it is suggested in reply that misery and suffering constitute the nature of the *saṃsāra* of birth and rebirth. It has already been stated before that God's omnipotence is somehow limited by the natural conditions of the materials on which the will of God operates. The nature of the *malas* or the impurities being of the nature of sorrow and pain, it is not possible to make them painless, and for this reason, in the period in which one passes through the process of the expurgation of *malas* through *saṃsāra*, one must necessarily suffer pain. The individual souls are by nature impure and sorrowful, and it is by the administration of the order which acts as medicine, that these individuals are liberated. The cause of all impurities that generate the *saṃsāra* is the *māyā* and the material world, and these would not be set in motion in any way without the proximity of Śiva. Just as iron filings are set in motion by the presence of a magnet without the magnet's doing anything by itself, so it is by the immediate proximity of God that the world process is set in motion for its benefit. Even though God is transcendent and does not know the world, the fact of His proximity cannot be ruled out. So He remains the superintending cause of the world. All movement in the world is due to Śiva. The power by which He controls the world is His ordering will which is the same as His proximity. We are reminded of the analogical example introduced by Vācaspati in his commentary on the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, where it is said that though the *puruṣa* does not do anything, yet its proximity produces the special fitness (*yogyatā*) on account of which the *prakṛti* moves for the fulfilment of the purposes of the *puruṣa*. The example of the magnet and the iron filings is also given in that connection. As the whole world is but a manifestation of Śiva's own power, we may quite imagine that

when there was nothing in the world, He alone existed with His majestic order of will and there in the functioning of that will He was not in any way polluted by the worldly impurities.

In this connection Vāyu is supposed to say that knowledge is of two kinds, mediate (*parokṣa*) and immediate (*aparokṣa*). That which is known by reason or by instruction is called mediate knowledge. Immediate knowledge, however, can only dawn through practice of a high order, and without such immediate knowledge there cannot be any liberation.

§2

In the present section of the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā* VII. 2, we find a modification of the philosophical view as expressed in the previous section, and this deserves some special attention. In the previous section it was stated that the impurities of the individual souls were natural to themselves, and God's will had to refashion them or remould them or purge the impurities through the cycles of birth and rebirth, in accordance with the natural limitations of the individual souls, so that though God's will operates uniformly through all, the development is not uniform. The sufferings of human beings are due to the obstacles and resistance offered by the inherent impurities of different souls. For this reason it is not possible for God to liberate all souls without making them undergo the cycles of birth and rebirth and sorrow.

The view that the souls are by nature impure is found also among the Jains and among the followers of the Pāñcarātra school¹. In the Vedānta view, as explained in the school of Śaṅkara, the individual souls are no doubt regarded as the same as Brahman, but yet it is believed that the individual souls are associated with the beginningless nescience or *Avidyā* which can be destroyed later on by the realisation of the true nature of the Self. Thus in a way, the individual souls remain within a covering of impurity from beginningless time. But in the second section of the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā* that we are now dealing with, it is said that God Himself binds all beings through the impurities, the *māyā* and the like,

¹ See the relevant portion of Jainism in Vol. I (pp. 169 *et seq.*) and the philosophy of Pāñcarātra, especially of the *Ahīrbudhnyā-saṃhitā* in Vol. III (pp. 21 *et seq.* and 34 *et seq.*).

and He alone can liberate them when He is pleased to do so in accordance with the devotion of the beings concerned¹. All the twenty-four categories of Sāṃkhya are to be regarded as being due to the action of *māyā*², and they are called the *viśayas* or objects which are the bonds or ties by which the individuals are bound. By binding all beings, from the blade of a grass up to Brahman, the highest god, the great Lord makes them perform their own duties. It is by the order of the Lord that the *prakṛti* produces the *buddhi* for the service of the *puruṣas*, and from *buddhi* there arise the ego, the senses, the subtle matters (*tanmātras*), and the gross matter. It is by the same order that the different beings are associated with different bodies suitable to them. The world order is maintained in its uniform process by the will of God. This will or order of God cannot be transcended by anybody. It is in accordance with the same commandment of God as controlling all processes that one attains riches and knowledge through the performance of meritorious deeds, or that the sinners are punished. The parable of the Kena Upaniṣad is quoted to show that the powers of all deities and natural forces are derived from God. The whole world thus may be regarded as manifestations of Lord Śiva.

In different forms and functions and superintendence Lord Śiva is called by different names. Thus, when He enjoys the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* He is called *īśāna*. This *īśāna* appears in its eightfold form, technically called *aṣṭamūrti*; these are: earth, water, fire, air, the *ākāśa*, the soul, the sun and the moon. So these are the forms of Śiva as performing different functions and called by different names such as *śārvī*, *bhāvī*, *raudrī*, etc. *Raudrī* is the form in which the whole world is vibrating. The soul itself, as we have seen above, is a form of Śiva.

The proper worship of Śiva consists in giving protection from fear to all people, to do good to everybody, and to be of service to

¹ *mala-māyā-dibhiḥ pāśaiḥ sa badhmāti paśūn patiḥ,
sa eva mocakas teṣāṃ bhaktyā samyag-upāsitaḥ.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa. VII. 2. 12 et seq.

² *Māyā* is twofold: the *prakṛti* and the *buddhamāyā*. From the latter spring up the deities Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. The former is the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya into which all beings return, and for that reason *prakṛti* is called *liṅga*, whereas the classical Sāṃkhya restricts the term to the *mahat* and calls *prakṛti* the *alīṅga*. There *mahat* is called *liṅga*, as it points to some original cause behind it and *prakṛti* being the ultimate cause does not point to any other original cause behind it. See *ibid.* VII. 2. 34. 7 et seq.

everybody. It is by satisfying all people that God becomes satisfied. Any injury done to any living being is an injury done to one of the forms of God itself.

We have seen above that the whole world is a personification of God. This pantheistic doctrine should be distinguished from the monism of the Vedānta as explained by Śaṅkara and his followers. In the Vedānta the reality is Brahman as *sac-cid-ānanda*, and everything else that we perceive is but an imposition on the reality of Brahman. They are ultimately false and their falsehood is discovered when the person attains liberation. So the world appears, but there may be a time when it may absolutely disappear before a liberated person. Here, however, the material world as such in all its various forms of the living and non-living is regarded as but different real forms of God, which are controlled by God, and are set in motion by God for the benefit of the souls, which latter again are but forms of God.

In this connection the question is raised as to the way in which God pervades the world as the male and the female powers. In reply to such a question Upamanyu is supposed to have replied that the energy or *śakti* called the great female Deity (*mahādevī*) belongs to *mahādeva*, the Great Lord, and the whole world is a manifestation of them both. Some things are of the nature of consciousness and some things are of the nature of the unconscious. Both of them can be pure or impure. When consciousness is associated with the unconscious elements, it passes through the cycles of birth and rebirth and is called impure. That which is beyond such associations is pure. Śiva and His *śakti* go together, and the whole world is under their domination. As it is not possible to distinguish the moon from the moonlight, so it is not possible to distinguish the *śakti* from Śiva. So the *śakti* or the power of the *śaktimān*, the possessor of the power, the supreme Lord, are mutually dependent. There cannot be *śakti* without Śiva, and there cannot be Śiva without *śakti*. It is out of this *śakti* that the whole world is created through the process of *prakṛti* or *māyā* and the three *guṇas*. Everywhere the operation of the *śakti* is limited by the will of Śiva and ultimately this goes back into Śiva. From the original *śakti* as inherent in Śiva, there emanates the 'active energy' (*kriyākhyā śakti*). By the disturbance of the original equilibrium there arises *nāda*, and from that arises *bindu*,

and from *bindu* arises *sadāśiva*, and from *sadāśiva* arises Maheśvara, and from him arises true knowledge (*śuddha-vidyā*), and this is called the logos or the power of speech. This also manifests itself in the form of the alphabetical sounds. From this manifestation of *māyā* comes *kāla* or time, *niyati*, *kalā* and *vidyā*. From this *māyā* again come out the three *guṇas* constituting the unmanifested (*avyakta*). From the *avyakta* there evolve the categories as described in the Sāṃkhya. In brief it may be said that as the body is permeated by the inner controller, so the whole world is permeated by Śiva in His form as *śakti*. For this reason all the living and the non-living are but manifestations of the *śakti*. It is the supreme Lord that is associated with knowledge, activity and will, and through them all the supreme Lord controls and pervades the world. The order of the world and the world process is also determined by His will.

That which is imaginatively perceived by the supreme Lord is put into a fact by His will; so, just as the three *guṇas* arise in Him as the three manifested energies, so the whole world, which is identified with Śiva, is also the form of His energy, because it has come into being through His energy¹. This *śakti* of Śiva is the *māyā*.

The *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* refers to the *Śaivāgamas* as being instructions given by Śiva to Śivā. It seems, therefore, that the *Śaivāgamas* were written long before the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*, and it is the substance of the *Śaivāgamas* that is collected in the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* in the elucidation of the Pāsupata view. The instructions of the *Śaivāgamas* are supposed to have been given as the means for the attainment of the highest good through the mercy of Śiva, for the benefit of the devotees of Śiva².

Turning to the practical side of the attainment of direct or intuitive knowledge, we find that Śiva says that He is only properly approached through sincere faith in Him (*śraddhā*) and not by

¹ *evam śakti-samāyogāc chaktimān ucyate śivāḥ,
śakti-śaktimaduttham tu śaktaṃ śaivam idaṃ jagat.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa VII. 2. 4. 36.

² *śrīkaṇṭhena śivenoktaṃ śivāyai ca śivāgamaḥ,
śivāśritānāṃ kārūṇyāc chreyasām ekasādhanaṃ.*

Ibid. VII. 2. 7. 38 *et seq.*

It is difficult to say whether this is a reference to the Mahākāruṇika school of Śaiva thought, as referred to by Śaṅkara in the *bhāṣya* in the penultimate topic of the criticism of Śaivism. *Brahma-sūtra* II. 2.

tapas, chanting, or various postures of the body (*āsanas*), or even by instructional knowledge. Faith is the basis on which one should stand and this faith can be attained by following the natural duties of the four *varṇas* or castes and the *āśramas* or the stages of life. Faith is thus regarded not as a spontaneous emotion but as the consequence of a long traditional practice of the duties assigned to each caste and to each stage of life.

The *Śaiva dharma* consists of knowledge, action, rigid conduct, and *yoga*. The knowledge is the knowledge of the nature of souls, the objects, and the supreme Lord. Action is the purification in accordance with the instruction of the preceptor. *Caryā* or the right conduct means the proper worship of Śiva in accordance with the caste rights as instructed by Śiva. *Yoga* means the arresting of all mental states, excluding the constant thinking of God. Knowledge arises from *vairāgya* or disinclination towards worldly things, and from knowledge comes *yoga*; sense-control, called *yama*, and *niyama* remove the sins and when a man is disinclined to worldly objects he gradually turns to the path of *yoga*. In this connection, universal charity, non-injury, truthfulness, abstention from stealing, and supreme faith, teaching, performing sacrifices and meditation on one's identity with God are regarded as natural accessories. For this reason those who wish to attain liberation should keep themselves away from virtue and vice, merit and demerit. Those who have attained the state in which the stone and gold are of equal value, or have no value, need not worship God, because they are liberated beings.

Purity of mind is a hundredfold better than purity of body, because without the purity of the mind nobody can be pure. God accepts only the internal states of man (*bhāva*); that which is performed without any sincere emotion is merely an imitation. Devotion to God ought to be spontaneous, not practised for any advantage. Even when a man is attached to God for the attainment of some advantage, it may please God according to the depth of the emotion which is displayed by him. We find that the external expression of emotion as manifested in bodily movements, interest in listening to the adoration of Śiva, the choking of the voice, the shedding of tears, and the constant meditation and dependence on God, are regarded as the significant signs of a true devotee, whatever may be his caste and status in society.

We have already seen that the practical way towards liberation should be through the attainment of knowledge of the nature of souls, the objects that bind them and the supreme Lord. This knowledge should be supplemented by action in accordance with the direction of the Teacher, who in Śaiva cult is to be regarded as the incarnation of Śiva. This action called *kriyā* is to be supplemented by the prescriptive duties allotted to the different castes and stages of life in the scriptures, and the duty which consists of the worship of God goes by the name of *caryā*. This has further to be supplemented by a process of devotional meditation, with Śiva as the centre of attention, when all other mental states have been inhibited. The scriptures dealing with these subjects are twofold, one of Vedic origin, the other of independent origin. These latter are of twenty-eight kinds (like the Āgamas), called *Kāmika*, etc., which also go by the name of *Siddhānta*¹.

In VII. 1. 32 certain esoteric and obscure physiological processes are described by which one can bring oneself in contact with immortality as inherent in Śiva, the Mahādeva².

In VII. 2. 37 the *yoga* is described as being of five kinds: *mantrayoga*, *sparsāyoga*, *bhāṇayoga*, *abhāṇayoga* and *mahāyoga*. The *mantrayoga* is that in which by constant repetition of certain *mantras* the mental states becomes steady. When this is associated with breath control it is called *sparsāyoga*. When this state is further on the progressive scale and becomes dissociated from the necessity of chanting the *mantras*, it is called the *bhāṇayoga*. By further advancement of this *yoga* process, the world appearance in its various forms entirely disappears, and this is called the *abhāṇayoga*. At this stage the yogin is not concerned with the world. He

¹ H. W. Schomerus in his *Śaiva-siddhānta*, p. 3, says that there are six and sixteen schools of Śaivism, according to a commentary on *Śiva-jñāna-bodha* which we shall refer to later on. These schools as referred to by Schomerus are:

- I. Pāsupata, Māvratavāda(?), Kāpālika, Vāma, Bhairava and Aikyavāda.
- II. Ūrdhvaśaiva, Anādiśaiva, Ādiśaiva, Mahāśaiva, Bhedaśaiva, Abhedaśaiva, Antaraśaiva, Guṇaśaiva, Nirguṇaśaiva, Adhvaṇaśaiva, Yogaśaiva, Jñānaśaiva, Anuśaiva, Kriyāśaiva, Nālupādaśaiva(?) and Śuddhaśaiva.

We do not know what were the contents of these different schools of Śaivism and we cannot also identify any particular texts giving the views of any of these schools of Śaivism. In our treatment we have noted different types of Śaivism, and many of them go by the name of Pāsupata-Śaivism, but whether this Pāsupata-Śaivism was also divided into different schools having different names, it is impossible for us to judge for want of definite materials, either published or unpublished.

² See verses 45-56 (VII. 1. 32).

thinks of himself as being of the nature of Śiva, and of being one with Him, and he is dissociated from all conditions. This is called the state of *mahāyoga*. At this stage one becomes disinclined to all worldly objects of attachment, whether as experiences by the senses or as prescribed by the scriptures. Of course, this practice of *yoga* includes the practices of *yama* and *niyama* as prescribed in the *Yoga-sūtras*, and also the practice of the different postures, the breath-control (*prāṇāyāma*), the holding back of the mind from other objects (*pratyāhāra*), the practice of concentration on particular objects (*dhāraṇā*), and also meditation (*dhyaṇa*), and becoming one with the object (*samādhi*). The processes of the different kinds of *yoga* and their accessories are described in the Śaiva scriptures, and also in the *Kāmika* and the other Āgamas. So far as the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* is concerned we do not find much difference between the practices of the different accessories such as *yama*, and *niyama*, *āsana*, etc., and those that are described in the *Yogaśāstra* of Patañjali. The only important difference is that, while in Patañjali's *yoga* the mind has to be concentrated first on the gross objects, then on the subtle entities or *tanmātras*, then on the *ahankāra* or egohood, and then on *buddhi*, here in the Śaiva *yoga*, the yogin has to meditate on the divine nature of Śiva. In the *Yogaśāstra* also it is prescribed that one may meditate upon Īśvara, and it is through devotion to him that liberation may be granted to any yogin. The treatment of a yogin in *Yogośāstra* may take a twofold course: one meditation on Īśvara, the other the ascending scale of meditation on subtler and subtler categories, as a result of which the mind becomes absolutely shorn of all primitive tendencies and impressions, and becomes ultimately lost in the *prakṛti* itself, never to return again. The *Yoga* of Patañjali, therefore, seems to be a double synthesis of associating the Sāṃkhya doctrine and Sāṃkhya metaphysics with the pre-existent system of *yoga*-practice which we find in Buddhism, and the association of the theistic cult of Īśvara, who hangs rather loosely with the *yoga* system.

The *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* goes on with the description of *prāṇāyāma*, consisting of: *pūraka*, the filling of the body with air through the nose; *recaka*, the expelling of the air out of the body; and *kumbhaka*, the process of keeping the body still after inflating it. By the processes of *prāṇāyāma* one may leave the body at will.

The advancement of *prāṇāyāma* is made gradually by lengthening the respiratory and inhibitory time. In this way there are four different classes of *prāṇāyāma* called *kanyaka*, *madhyama*, *uttama*, and *para*. That which is associated with the emotional expression of sweating, shivering, etc., is due to the expression of the sentiment of bliss on account of which tears flow spontaneously and there is sometimes incoherent speech, swooning. It should be noted that such states do not occur nor are recommended in the *yoga* of Patañjali. In this connection the discussion about *prāṇāyāma* is introduced and we hear of the five *vāyus* or bio-motor forces called *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna*, and *vyāna*. The *prāṇavāyu* consists of five other types of *vāyu*, namely *nāga*, *kūrma*, *kṛkara*, *devadatta*, and *dhanañjaya* which performs the different functions of the *prāṇavāyu*. The *apānavāyu* is the bio-motor force by which all that is taken in by way of food and drink is assimilated and drawn down to the lower cavities. The *vyāna* is the bio-motor force that pervades the whole body and develops it. The *udāna* is that which affects the vital glands and the body. The *samāna* is that which provides the circulation through the body. When the functions and the forces of these *vāyus* are properly co-ordinated in accordance with the will of the yogin, he is able to burn up all the defects and maladies of the body and preserve his health in the proper manner, his power of assimilation becomes greater and his exertions become less. He becomes light in body, can move about quickly, and has energy and excellence of voice. He suffers from no diseases and has sufficient strength and vigour. He has power of retention, memory, usefulness, steadiness, and contentedness. He can perform asceticism and destroy his sins and perform sacrifice and make gifts as people should.

Pratyāhāra is effort of mind, by which the mind controls itself in relation to the objects to which the senses may be attracted. One who desires happiness should practise the virtue of disinclination and also try to attain true knowledge. It is by controlling one's senses that one can raise oneself up. When in this way the mind can be steadily attached to some object we have the state of *dhāraṇā*. This object to which the mind should be steadily attached is nothing but Śiva. In the proper state of *dhāraṇā* the mind should not be dissociated even for a moment from its object, Śiva. It is from the steadiness of the mind that *dhāraṇā* can proceed. So

by continuous practice of *dhāraṇā* the mind should be made constant and steady. The word '*dhyāna*' is derived from the root *dhyai* denoting the thinking of Śiva with an undisturbed mind. Therefore this state is called *dhyāna*. When a person is in the state of *dhyāna*, the object of his meditation is constantly repeated in the same form without the association of any other idea. This constant flow of the same sort of image or idea is called *dhyāna*¹. It is remembered that one should perform *tapa* or chanting the name or the *mantras* and pass into *dhyāna*, and when *dhyāna* is broken one should go on with *tapa* and from that again to *dhyāna*, and so on until the *yoga* is firmly attained. *Samādhi* is regarded as the last state of *yoga* in which the mind is illuminated with intuitive wisdom (*prajñāloka*). It is a state which itself seems to be nothing in essence and where the object alone shines like a limitless, waveless ocean². After fixing the mind on the object of meditation, the saint looks like a fire which is being extinguished, he does not hear nor smell nor see nor touch anything, nor does his mind think. He does not understand anything, he is like a piece of wood. So when one's soul becomes lost in Śiva one is said to be in the state of *samādhi*. It is like a lamp that burns in a steady flame. From this state of *samādhi* the saint never breaks off.

It must, however, be noted that in the course of the practice of this *yoga* many obstacles come in, and they have to be conquered. Some of these are indolence, troublesome diseases, carelessness, doubt as to the proper object of meditation, inconstancy of mind, absence of faith, illusory notions, pain, melancholia, attachment to objects. Indolence refers both to bodily and mental laziness. The diseases, of course, come through the disturbances of the three *dhātus*—*vāyu*, *pitta*, and *kapha*. Carelessness (*pramāda*) comes through the non-utilisation of the means of performing the *yoga*. A doubtful inquiry as to what may be the true object of meditation is called *sthāna-samasyā*. Absence of faith means the

¹ *dhyeyāvasthita-cittasya sadṛśaḥ pratyayaś ca yaḥ,
pratyayāntara-nirmuktaḥ pravāho dhyānam ucyate,
sarvam anyat parityajya śiva eva śivāṅkaraḥ.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa VII. 2. 37. 52-3.

² *samādhinā ca sarvatra prajñālokaḥ pravartate,
yad-artha-mātra-nirbhāsaṃ stimitodadhi-vat-sthitaṃ,
svarūpa-śūnyavad bhānaṃ samādhir abhidhīyate.*

Ibid. VII. 2. 37. 61-2.

continuance of the *yoga* process without the proper emotion. All sorrow comes through false knowledge. These sorrows are divided into three classes, in accordance with the classical Sāṃkhya classification, as *ādhyātmika*, *ādhibhautika*, and *ādhidaivika*. Disappointment is the frustration of one's desires, and causes mental troubles which are called *daurmanasya*. When the mind is drawn to various objects of desire it is said to be in a state of flirtation. When these obstacles are overcome then come other obstacles in the way of the appearance of miraculous powers.

The word '*yoga*' in the *Pāśupata-yoga* is used as a derivative from the root '*yujir yoge*,' and not from '*yuj samādhanau*,' as we find the word used in Patañjali's *Yoga*. The true *yoga* can only arise by the proper integrative knowledge of the meditation, the object of meditation, and the purpose of meditation. In meditating on Śiva one should also meditate upon the energy of Śiva, as the whole world is pervaded by them both.

Among the miraculous powers which are regarded as obstacles in the progressive path of *yoga* one counts *pratibhā*, which means the power of knowing subtle things, things that are passed, and things that are obscure from our eyes, and things that are to come in future. In the *Nyāya-mañjarī* Jayanta mentions the word *pratibhā* in an entirely different sense. He means by *pratibhā* there an inexplicable intuition as to what may occur in the future, for example, "tomorrow my brother will come." It also includes the power of understanding all kinds of sound without effort, all that may be communicated by any animal in the world, and also the power of having heavenly visions. So by these miraculous powers one may taste heavenly delights and exquisite pleasures of touch and smell of a higher order. So one may attain all kinds of miraculous powers, and one has a full command of all things that one may wish to have. It is unnecessary for us to dilate further on the various types of miraculous powers which the yogin may attain, and which may detract him from his onward path toward attaining the *mahāyoga* or the highest *yoga*, that is, the union with Śiva.

But it is interesting to notice that the same chapter on the *Pāśupata-yoga* introduces certain methods which are not to be found in Patañjali's *Yoga*. Thus in VII. 2. 38, in a description of a particular posture of *yoga*, one is advised to fix one's attention on

the tip of the nose and not to look at one side or the other. One sits down unmoved, like a piece of stone, and tries to think of Śiva and Śakti within oneself, as if they were installed in the seat of the heart, and meditates on them. One may also concentrate on one's navel, throat, palatal cavity and the spot between the eyebrows. One should think of a lotus having two, six, ten, twelve or sixteen petals, or a sort of quadrangle wherein one may place the Śiva. The lotus in the spot between the eyebrows consists of two petals which are as bright as lightning. So in the case of other lotuses having a number of petals the vowels are associated with each of the petals from the bottom upwards. The consonants beginning with *ka* and ending in *ṭa* may also be regarded as being associated with the lotus, and should be meditated upon. In rather an obscure manner the different consonants are supposed to be associated with the different petals of the imaginary lotuses, and one should steadily meditate upon Śiva and Śakti as associated with the letters of the petals.

In order to proceed on the path of *yoga* it may be necessary to meditate upon some of the recognised images of Śiva, such as the different gross images of Śiva mentioned in the Śaiva scriptures.

Meditation should at first commence with an object, and later on it becomes objectless. But the learned people always discard the state of meditation in which there is no object, and it is said that *dhyāna* consists in the stretching out of an intellectual state¹. For this reason, in the state of *dhyāna* it is the mere *buddhi*, or the intellectual state that flows on, which may often be regarded as having no object. So what is called an objectless (*nirviśaya*) *dhyāna* is only meditation on subtle entities. It is also often said that when meditation is upon some particular form of Śiva it is called *saviśaya*, and when this is in a formless state as an extension of the knowledge of self, it is called *nirviśaya*. This *saviśaya dhyāna* is also called *sabīja*, and the *nirviśaya dhyāna* is called *nirbīja*. As a result of *prāṇāyāma* and meditation, the mind becomes transparent, and then thoughts of Śiva continually recur. As we have said above, *dhyāna* means nothing more than the constant flow of an intellectual state (*buddhi*) of the form of Śiva. It is this continuous flow of

1

*tatra nirviśayaṃ dhyānaṃ nāstīty eva satāṃ matam,
buddher hi santatiḥ kācid dhyānaṃ ity abhidhīyate.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa VII. 2. 39. 5.

an intellectual state that is regarded as an object of *dhyāna*¹. Both happiness and liberation come from *dhyāna*; for this reason, one should always try to practise *dhyāna*. There is nothing greater than *dhyāna*². Those who perform *dhyāna* are dear to Śiva, not those who only perform the rituals.

¹ *buddhi-pravāha-rūpasya dhyānasyāsyāvalambanam,
dhyeyam ity ucyate sadbhis tacca sāmbaḥ svayaṃ śivah.*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa VII. 2. 39. 19.

² *nāsti dhyāna-samaṃ tīrthaṃ nāsti dhyānasamaṃ tapaḥ,
nāsti dhyānasamo yajñas tasmād dhyānaṃ samācaret.*

Ibid. VII. 2. 39. 28.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY IN SOME OF THE IMPORTANT TEXTS

The Doctrine of the *Pāśupata-sūtras*.

SOME of the philosophical doctrines of the Pāśupata system of Śaivism are discussed in the relevant sections. But the formal and ritualistic sides of the system, which have often been referred to elsewhere, as for example in the treatment of Śaivism in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, need an authoritative explanation. This is found in the *Pāśupata-sūtras* with the *bhāṣya* of Kauṇḍinya, published in 1940 by the Oriental Manuscripts Library of the University of Travancore, Trivandrum. It is said that Śiva incarnated Himself as Nakulīśa and so was the author of the *Pāśupata-sūtras*. The *bhāṣya* by Kauṇḍinya is also an ancient one, as may be judged from the style of the writing. The editor of the *Pāśupata-sūtras*, A. Śāstri, thinks that Kauṇḍinya may have lived between the fourth and sixth centuries. The *Pāśupata-sūtras* together with the *bhāṣya* of Kauṇḍinya do not give us any philosophy of Śaivism. They deal almost wholly with the rituals, or rather modes of life. It may be quite possible that such ascetic forms of life existed from early times, and that later the philosophy of Śaivism was added. Though these ascetic forms of life had but little connection with the Śaiva philosophy as propounded later, they have a general anthropological and religious interest, as these forms of asceticism remain connected with the life of those who believe in the Śaiva philosophy. In the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* of Mādhava the Pāśupata system is not identified with any form of philosophy, but with different kinds of ascetic practices. When Śaṅkara refutes the Śaiva system, he does not specifically mention any philosophical doctrines of an elaborate nature. He only brands the Śaivas as those who believe in God as the creator of the world (*īśvara-kāraṇin*). Of course, the Naiyāyika is also an *īśvara-kāraṇin* and he is also a Śaiva by faith. The other doctrines of the Naiyāyika are largely taken from the Vaiśeṣika, and Śaṅkara in his joint criticism of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika had referred to them. The Naiyāyika thus shares his theistic

conviction with the Śaivas. But while the Śaivas of the Pāśupata school lay emphasis on ascetic rituals, the Naiyāyika laid stress on logical arguments. It will therefore not be out of place if we treat the general outline of the Pāśupata sect on its ascetic side, though it may not be regarded as a contribution of philosophical value.

Kauṇḍinya, the commentator, in the beginning of his *bhāṣya*, offers adoration to Pāśupati who had created the whole world, beginning from the Brahman for the good of all. He says that the five subjects of discussion in the Pāśupata system are effect (*kārya*), cause (*kāraṇa*), meditation (*yoga*), behaviour (*vidhi*), and dissolution of sorrow (*duḥkhānta*)¹.

The teaching of the Pāśupata system is for the total annihilation of all kinds of sorrow and this teaching can only be communicated to proper disciples. When the disciple follows the ascetic practices recommended by the Lord, he attains liberation through His grace. It has been noticed before that the Śaiva is called Mahākāruṇika. In our exposition of the Śaiva thought we have examined carefully the doctrine of grace or *karuṇā*, and have also seen how this doctrine of grace is associated with the doctrine of *karma* and the theory of rebirth, in accordance with the justice implied in the theory of *karma*. But here in the *Pāśupata-sūtra* we are told that liberation comes directly from the grace of Śiva. The word *paśu* means all conscious beings, excluding the saints and the all powerful ones. Their animality or *paśutva* consists in the fact that they are impotent and their impotence is their bondage. This bondage, which means their complete dependence on the causal power, is beginningless. The word *paśu* is connected with the word *pāśa*, which means "cause and effect", and is technically also called *kalā*. All animals are thus bound by cause and effect, the sense images and their objects, and become attached to them. The word *paśu* is also derived from *paśyati*. Though the animals are all-pervasive and are of the nature of pure consciousness, they can only perceive

¹ The editor of the *Pāśupata-sūtras* gives the following list of the succession of teachers from Nakulīśa: Nakulīśa, Kauśika, Gārgya, Maitreya, Kauruṣa, Iśāna, Paragārgya, Kapilāṇḍa, Manuṣyaka, Kuśika, Atri, Piṅgala, Puṣpaka, Bṛhadārya, Agastī, Santāna, Rāśīkara (Kauṇḍinya), and Vidyāguru. The seventeenth *guru* called Rāśīkara has been identified with Kauṇḍinya by the editor. This has been done on the supposition that Kauṇḍinya occurs as the *gotra* name in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad vi. 2 and 4.

their bodies; they do not understand the nature of cause and effect and they cannot go beyond them. The Pāśupati is so called because He protects all beings. Kauṇḍinya definitely says that the liberation from sorrow cannot be attained by knowledge (*jñāna*), disinclination (*vairāgya*), virtue (*dharma*) and giving up of one's miraculous powers (*aiśvarya-tyāga*), but by grace (*prasāda*) alone¹.

The person who is regarded as fit for receiving the Śaiva discipline must be a Brahmin with keen senses. The instruction of the teacher, leading to devotional practices and exciting desire for becoming Śiva, is given out of a spirit of charity to those who wish to annihilate all sorrow.

The word 'yoga' is used to denote the contact of the self with *īśvara* or God (*ātmeśvara-samyogo yogaḥ*). The contact thus means that the person who was otherwise engaged leads himself to the supreme object of *īśvara*; or it may also mean that the contact is due to the dual approach of both God and the person, until they meet. The *yoga* must have disinclination to worldly things as the first condition.

Yoga cannot be attained by mere knowledge but one has to take to a certain course of action called *yoga-vidhi*. *Vidhi* means action. Thus we have the effect (*kārya*) which is the dissolution of pleasure and pain, the cause, the *yoga* and the *vidhi*, and these are the five categories which form the subject-matter of discussion of the *Pāśupata-sāstra*.

Describing the two kinds of perceptual knowledge Kauṇḍinya distinguishes between sense perception and self-perception. By the senses one can perceive various kinds of sense objects, such as sound, touch, colour, taste, smell and the objects to which they belong. In reality, most perceptions occur through sense-object contact, and are manifested in their totality in diverse aspects through such a contact, and are regarded as valid (*pramāṇa*). Self-perception means the totality of the relation that is produced by *citta* and *antaḥkaraṇa*, the mind and the thought. Inference (*anumāna*) is naturally based upon perception. The relationship between the thought, the mind, and the self expresses itself in diverse forms and produces diverse impressions and memories.

¹ *tasmāt prasādāt sa duḥkhāntaḥ prāpyate. na tu jñāna-vairāgya-dharma-aiśvarya-tyāga-mātrād ity arthaḥ. Pāśupata-sūtras* (commentary, p. 6).

And these lead to other kinds of awareness, or those which can be inferred from them.

Inference is of two kinds, *dr̥ṣṭa* (perceived) and *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa* (perceived through universals). The first again is of two kinds, called *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat*. *Pūrvavat* is that which is affiliated with a previous experience. It has been seen to have six fingers, and now we find it of six fingers; therefore it is the same as the previous one. When an animal is recognised as a cow on the evidence of its horns and the hanging neck, this is said to be an inference of the type of *śeṣavat*. The *śeṣavat* inference is intended to distinguish a class of things from others. As an example of *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa* (perceived through universals), it is said that as the location at different places of the same object cannot take place, one can infer that the moon and the stars which change places are travelling in the sky. Āgama or testimony is the scriptural testimony that is handed down to us from Maheśvara through His disciples. The *Pāśupata-sāstra* only admits perception, inference, and testimony; all other kinds of *pramāṇas* are regarded as falling within them.

It is the individual perceiver to whom things are proved by means of the *pramāṇas*. The object of the *pramāṇas* are the fivefold categories, namely *kārya*, *kāraṇa*, *yoga*, *vidhi*, and the dissolution of sorrow. Awareness or thought product is called *saṃvid*, *saṃcintana*, or *sambodha*. It is through these that knowledge is revealed. The process of knowledge continues from the first moment of inception to the completion of the knowledge.

Turning to the practices, it is said that one should collect ashes and bake them, and then smear the body in the morning, midday, and afternoon with these ashes. The real bathing is of course through the attainment of virtue by which the soul is purified. One should also lie down on the ashes and remain awake, for the person who is afraid of the cycles of birth and rebirth cannot have time to sleep. The ashes are to be used for bathing instead of water, both for purification and for bearing the signs of a Śaiva. The ashes (*bhasman*) are therefore called *līṅga*, or sign of a Pāśupata ascetic. We must note here that the word *līṅga*, which is often used in connection with the Śaiva doctrine for a phallic sign, is here regarded as a mere indicatory sign of a person's being a Pāśupata ascetic. The ashes which besmear the body are indicators

of the person being a Pāśupata ascetic. The *bhasman* therefore is regarded as *līṅga*. These ashes distinguish the Pāśupata ascetic from the adherents of other sects.

The Pāśupata ascetic may live in the village, in the forest, or in any place of pilgrimage, and there he may employ himself in muttering the syllable *om*, laughing, singing, dancing, and making peculiar sounds through his mouth and lips.

In introducing moral virtues, great emphasis is laid on the *yamas* consisting of non-injury, celibacy, truthfulness, and non-stealing. Next to these are the *niyamas* consisting of non-irritability (*akrodha*), attendance on the teachers, purity, lightness of diet, and carefulness (*apramāda*). Of these two *yama* and *niyama*, *yama* is regarded as being most important. Non-injury in the fashion of the Jainas is highly emphasised, and is regarded as the best of all virtues. We have translated *brahma-carya* by celibacy, but in reality it means all kinds of sense control, particularly the palate and the sex organs; association with women is strongly deprecated. Though verbal truth implying agreement of statements to facts is appreciated, it is held that the final standard of truth is the amount of good that is rendered to people by one's words. Even a misstatement or a false statement, if beneficial to all beings, should be regarded as preferable to a rigorous truthful statement. It is interesting to note that the Pāśupata system forbids all kinds of commercial dealings and trades, as they may cause pain to persons involved in mutual intercourse. Absence of anger (*akrodha*) has been enumerated above as a virtue. This includes both mental apathy consisting of jealousy, enmity, vanity and desire for the evil of others in one's own mind, as well as any action that may be committed in accordance with them. The Pāśupata ascetic has to earn his living by mendicancy alone.

It has been said above that the Pāśupata ascetic should be a Brahmin. It is prohibited for him to address women or Śūdras, except under special circumstances. Under such exceptional circumstances one should purify oneself by bathing in ashes and also *prāṇāyāma*, and the muttering of the *raudrīgāyatrī*. This prescription of practising *prāṇāyāma*, etc., in case one has to meet a woman or a Śūdra and to talk to them, is suggested for purifying the mind of the ascetic, for otherwise on being forced to meet them the ascetic may get angry in his mind, and that may cause injury to his own mind.

When the mind is purified, and one proceeds on the line of *yoga* with the Maheśvara, the supreme Lord, one attains various miraculous powers¹.

The Maheśvara, regarded also as Brahman, is beginningless and indestructible; He is unborn and without any kind of attachment. When one knows the nature of the Lord, one should take refuge in Him and follow the practices described by Him in His scriptures.

The supreme Lord is regarded as producing and destroying all things out of His nature as a playful being. The Lord is supreme as he controls the movements and tendencies of all beings. His eternity consists in his continual knowledge and action, by which he pervades all. He is called Rudra because he is associated with fear on the part of all².

The supreme Lord, being in Himself, creates, maintains and destroys the universe, that is, in Him the universe appears and dissolves like the stars in the sky. God creates the world at His will, as the world of effects exists in His own power and energy, and remains also by virtue of His power.

In explaining the position further, it is said in the *bhāṣya* (II. 5) that the category of Maheśvara is the all-pervasive one, and that the twenty-five categories like *puruṣa*, *pradhāna*, etc., are permeated by the supreme category. So also the category of the *puruṣa*, being the category of the self, is the all-pervading one, and the twenty-four categories of *pradhāna*, etc., are permeated by *puruṣa*. So also in the field of the categories, the *buddhi* is all-pervasive and the twenty-two other categories, beginning with *ahankāra*, are permeated by *buddhi*. So also the *ahankāra* is all-pervasive and the eleven senses are permeated by it; so again the eleven senses are the all-pervasive ones and the subtle five *tanmātras* are permeated by them. So also in the case of gross matter, where the same processes may be assigned to *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, *tejas*, etc.

The question is raised as regards the starting-point of difference between the cause and the effect. The writer of the *bhāṣya* (II. 5) says that it has to be understood on the analogy of a mixture of

¹ See *Pāśupata-sūtras* I. 21-37.

² *rutasya bhayasya drāvaṇāt saṃyojanād rudrah.*

Pāśupata-sūtras II. 4 (commentary).

turmeric and water; in turmeric water you have on the one hand the qualities of water, and on the other the qualities of turmeric. So when the supreme Lord is considered as being associated with the pleasures and pains that He gives to all beings, and the bodies with which He associates them, we may have a conception of a whole. So God can be associated with pleasures and pains that belong to the *prakṛti*, though He himself is absolutely unchangeable. The same analogy may explain the other categories of *pradhāna* and *prakṛti*. Being all-pervasive, the supreme Lord naturally pervades both the causal and the efficient states. The effect as identified in the cause is eternal; the cause, the Lord, is eternal, and all creation takes place in and through Him. Arguing in this way the world becomes eternal, for if the protector is eternal, the things to be protected must also be eternal. The world being eternal, the supreme Lord only connects the relevant parts of it in a relevant order. The grace of God consists in bringing about the proper association of the relevant parts.

God's will being all powerful and unlimited, He can create changes in the world and in the destinies of men according to His own pleasure. He does not necessarily depend upon the person or his *karma* or action¹. God's will may operate either as the evolutionary process or as an interference with the state of things by inducing bondage or liberation. There is, however, a limit to the exercise of God's will in that the liberated souls are not associated with sorrow again. The limit of the effect world is that it is produced, helped and dissolved or changed by the causal category, the supreme Lord. This, therefore, is the sphere of cause and effect. Those who want the cessation of all sorrows should devote themselves to the worship of the Lord Śiva and to no one else.

It is advised that the Pāśupata ascetic should not be too much delighted on the attainment of miraculous powers. He should go on behaving like a Pāśupata ascetic, smearing his body with ashes and smiling and so on, both in places of pilgrimage and temples, and also among people in general. These are called *caryā*. In this *caryā* the joy of the ascetic should be manifested in its pure form

¹ *karma-kāmināś ca maheśvaram apekṣante, na tu bhagavān īśvaraḥ karma-puruṣaṃ vā'pekṣate. ato na karmāpekṣa īśvaraḥ. Pāśupata-sūtras* II. 6 (commentary).

and not associated with any form of vanity which goes with the attainment of miraculous powers.

The process of spiritual worship can only be done through the surrendering of oneself in one's mind to the supreme Lord, and to continue to do it until the goal is reached. When one gives oneself up entirely to Śiva alone, he does not return from the state of liberation. This is the secret of self-surrender¹.

The supreme Lord, called Vāmadeva, *jyeṣṭha*, Rudra, is also called Kāla. It is within the scope of His function to associate the different beings in different kinds of bodies and in different states of existence, with different kinds of experiences, pleasurable and painful, through the process of time. The individual beings are called *kālya* as they happen to be in God or Kāla. The term *kalā* is given to the effects (*kālya*) and their instruments (*kāraṇa*). Thus, the five elements, earth, water, etc., are called *kalā* as *kārya* or effect. So also are their properties. The eleven senses together with *ahankāra* and *buddhi* are called *kāraṇa*. God Himself is *vikarṇa* or without any senses, so there is nothing to obstruct His powers of perception and action. It is God who associates all things and beings with the different *kalās* as *kālya* and *kāraṇa*. The supreme Lord is regarded as *sakala* and *niṣkala*, immanent and transcendent, but even in His transcendental aspect He has in Him all the powers by which He can extend His grace to all beings.

In the third chapter it is said that the real Śaiva ascetic may dispense with all the external practices, so that no one will recognise him as a Śaiva ascetic, and will not give him a high place in society. When the Śaiva ascetic is thus ignored by the people among whom he lives, this very degradation of him serves to remove his sins. When the ascetic bears the insults showered upon him by ignorant persons, he naturally attains fortitude. People may often abuse him as a lunatic, an ignorant man, or a dullard, etc., and in such circumstances he should get away from the public attention and fix his mind on God. With such behaviour he is not only purified but is spiritually ennobled. When a person thus moves about like a poor lunatic, besmeared with ashes and dirt, with

¹ *aikāntikātyantika-rudra-samāpa-prapṭer ekāntenaiva anāvṛtti-phalatvād asā-dhāraṇa-phalatvāc cātma-pradānam atidānam. Ibid. II. 15 (commentary).*

beard and nails and hair uncut, and when he does not follow habits of cleanliness, he is naturally regarded as an outcast. This leads him further on the path towards disinclination, and the insults he bears meekly make him advanced spiritually.

When a person is firm in *yama* and *niyama* practices, and meekly suffers the indignities and abuses showered on him by other people, he is well established in the path of asceticism.

Throughout the whole of the fourth chapter of the *Pāśupata-sūtras* the *pāśupata-vrata* is described as a course of conduct in which the ascetic behaves or should behave as a lunatic, ignorant, epileptic, dull, a man of bad character, and the like, so that abuses may be heaped on him by the unknowing public. This will enliven his disinclination to all worldly fame, honours, and the like, and the fact the people had unknowingly abused him would raise him in the path of virtue. When by such a course of action and by *yoga* one attains the proximity of the great Lord, one never returns again. India is supposed to have performed the *pāśupata-vrata* in the earliest time.

In the fifth chapter the process of *pāśupata-yoga* is more elaborately discussed. The supreme Lord is referred to by many names, but they all refer to the same being, the supreme Lord, and *yoga* means a steady union of the soul with Him. For this purpose the person should be completely detached from all objects, present, past and future, and be emotionally attached to Maheśvara¹. The union of the self with Śiva must be so intimate that no physical sounds and disturbances should lead the person away. In the first stages the attachment with Śiva takes place by the withdrawal of the mind from other objects, and making it settle on the Lord; then the association becomes continuous.

The soul or the Ātman is defined as the being that is responsible for all sense cognitions, all actions, and all attachments to objects. The constant or continuous contact of the self with the supreme Lord constitute its eternity. We can infer the existence of the self from the experiences of pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy, and consciousness. The self is regarded as unborn in the sense that it is not born anew along with the chain of sensations and other activities of the mind, or in other words it remains the same

¹ *evam maheśvare bhāvasthis tadasaṅgitvam ity arthaḥ. Pāśupata-sūtras v. 1 (commentary).*

through all its experiences. It is called *maitra* in the sense that it can remain in a state of equanimity and in attachment with the supreme Lord, when all its desires, antipathies, and efforts have disappeared.

The detachment referred to above can only be attained by the control of all the cognitive and conative senses, *manas* and *buddhi* and *ahankāra*. The control of the senses really means that their activities should be directed towards good acts, and they should not be allowed to stray away into the commission of evil deeds¹.

Kauṇḍinya says that the definition of the goal as described by Sāṃkhya and Yoga is not true. That is not the way to liberation. The teachings of Sāṃkhya and Yoga are impure. To be liberated means to be connected with Lord Śiva, and not to be dissociated from all things².

The ascetic should live in some vacant room; he should devote himself to study and meditation, and make himself steady. He should be in continuous meditation for at least six months; and as he advances on the path of *yoga*, he begins to attain many miraculous powers through the grace of the supreme Lord.

The Pāsupata ascetic should live on mendicancy and should bear all hardships like animals. The yogin who has realised his goal, is not affected by any actions or sins. He is also unaffected by any mental troubles or physical diseases.

To sum up the whole position, one may say that when one becomes absolutely detached from all one's actions and sins, one should continue to meditate by drawing one's mind from all other objects and concentrating the mind on Śiva or on some symbolic name. We have already seen that *yoga* has been defined as the continuous connection of the self with the Lord, and this is also called *sāyujya*, that is, being with God. The supreme Lord has the infinite power of knowledge and action by which He controls everything, and this Lord should be meditated upon in His aspect as formless (*niṣkala*). God should not be approached with the association of any of the qualities attributed to Him. This is expressed by the *sūtra* v. 27, in which it is said that God is

¹ *tasmād akuśalebhyo vyāvartayitvā kāmataḥ kuśale yojitāni (yadā), tadā jītāni bhavanti. Pāsupata-sūtras v. 7 (commentary).*

² *ayaṃ tu yukta eva. na mukta iti viśuddham etad darśanam draṣṭavyam. Ibid. v. 8 (commentary).*

unassociated with anything that can be expressed by speech. The supreme Lord is therefore called *vāg-viśuddha*. The ascetic should often better stay in the cremation grounds where, not having any association, he will have greater time to devote to meditation, and attain merit or *dharma* which is identified with the greatness that is achieved by *yama* and *niyama*. In this way the ascetic cuts asunder all impurities. This cutting asunder of impurities means nothing more than taking away the mind from all sense objects and concentrating the mind on the Lord (*yantraṇa-dhāraṇātmakaś chedo draṣṭavyaḥ*). This *cheda* or dissociation means the separating of the self from all other objects. By this means all the network of causes that produce the defects are cut asunder. The defects are the various sensations of sound, touch, etc., for from these we get in our minds desire, anger, greed, fear, sleep, attachment, antipathy, and delusion. Then again these defects manifest themselves in our efforts to earn things, to preserve them, to be attached to them, and to indulge in injuring others. As a result of this, one afflicts oneself and also others. When one is afflicted oneself, one suffers, and if one afflicts others, then also on account of this vice one suffers. All such suffering thus is associated with the self. The sense objects are like the fruits of a poisoned tree which at the time of taking may appear sweet, but in the end will produce much suffering. The suffering of a man commences from the time of his being born, and continues throughout life till the time of death, so one should see that one may not have to be born again. The pleasures of enjoying sense objects have to be maintained with difficulty, and they produce attachment; when they disappear they produce further sorrow. Moreover, it is hardly possible to enjoy a sense object without injuring other persons. Even in wearing ordinary apparel one has to kill many insects. So one should refrain from enjoyment of all sense objects and be satisfied with whatever one gets, vegetable or meat, by begging.

The dissociation recommended above is to be done through *buddhi*, the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is conceived as being put in motion through merit, meditation, commandments and knowledge. The *buddhi* is also called *citta*. *Citta* means to know and to give experience of pleasure and pain, to collect merit and demerit and other impressions. So, as *buddhi* is called *citta*,

it is also called *manas* and the internal organ, *antahkaraṇa*. The mind has thus to be dissociated from all sense objects by the self, and attached to Rudra or Śiva. When this is done then all intention of merit and demerit disappears; it slides away from the self like the old coil of a snake, or falls down like a ripe fruit. The self which is thus fixed in Śiva becomes static (*niṣkriya*) and is also called *niṣkala*. The mind in this state is devoid of all good and bad thoughts. When this *yoga* ideal is reached, the person becomes omniscient, and he cannot any further be drawn to any kind of illusory notions. So the liberated person, according to this *śaiva-yoga*, does not become a *kevalin* like the yogin following the Pātañjala discipline, but he becomes omniscient and has no sorrows, and this happens by the grace of God. He becomes absolutely liberated in the sense that he can arrest any future aggression of evil or time, and he is not dependent on anybody. In this way he attains or he shares the supreme power of the Lord. Neither does he become subject to all the sufferings of being in the mother's womb, or being born, and the like. He is free from the sorrows due to ignorance, from which is produced egotism, which leads one to forget that one is bound. So the liberated person becomes free from all sorrows of birth and rebirth and all bodily and mental sorrows as well.

The supreme Lord is also called Śiva, because He is eternally dissociated from all sorrows.

We thus see that there are five categories in this system. First, there is the *pati* or the Lord which is the cause, which is called by various names, Vāma, Deva, Jyeṣṭha, Rudra, Kāmin, Śaṅkara, Kāla, Kala-vikaraṇa, Bala-vikaraṇa, Aghora, Ghoratara, Sarva, Śarva, Tatpuruṣa, Mahādeva, Omkāra, Ṛṣi, Vipra, Mahāniśa, Īśāna, Īśvara, Adhipati, Brahmā, and Śiva¹. The Sāṃkhya system admits *pradhāna* as the cause, but in the Pāśupata system God, as distinguished from the *pradhāna*, is the cause.

The category of effect is the *paśu*, and *paśu* is described as knowledge, the means of knowledge, and the living beings. They are produced changed, or dissolved. By knowledge we understand the scriptures, wisdom, merit, attainable objects, values, desires, etc., leading up to the dissolution of all sorrows. The second constituent of *paśu* called *kalā* is of two kinds: as effect, such as

¹ Pāśupata-sūtras v. 47 (commentary).

earth, water, air, etc., and as the instrument of knowledge, such as *buddhi*, egoism, *manas*, and internal organs, etc. The living beings, the *paśus*, are of three types, the gods, men and animals. The category of *pradhāna*, which is regarded as cause in Sāṃkhya, is regarded as effect in the *Pāsupata-sāstra*. Whatever is known or visible (*paśyana*) is called *pāśa*, and is regarded as effect. So *puruṣa*, which is regarded as cause elsewhere, is regarded as an effect, a *paśu*, here. We have already discussed the categories of *yoga* and *vidhi* leading to the dissolution of all sorrows.

A survey of the *Pāsupata-sūtras* with Kauṇḍinya's *bhāṣya* leads us to believe that it is in all probability the same type of Lakuliśa-Pāsupata system as referred to by Mādhava in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* in the fourteenth century. It may also be the same system of Pāsupatas as referred to by Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on the second book of the second chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra*. There is no reference here to the doctrine of *māyā*, nor to the doctrine of monism as propounded by Śaṅkara. Even at the time of emancipation the liberated souls do not become one with Śiva, the supreme Lord, but the emancipation only means that by mental steadiness the devotee is in perpetual contact with Śiva, and this is what is meant by the word *sāyujya*. We also hear that, though God is omnipotent, He has no power over the liberated souls. Apparently the world and the beings were created by God, but this Pāsupata system does not make any special effort to explain how this world came into being. It is only in acknowledging Śiva as the instrumental cause of the world in this sense, that this Pāsupata system is very different from the Śaiva system of Śrīkaṇṭha and of the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā*, where the monistic bias is very predominant. Here we have monotheism, but not monism or pantheism or panentheism. It may also be pointed out that the Pāsupata system as represented in this work is a Brahmanical system. For it is only Brahmins who could be initiated to the Pāsupata doctrines, but at the same time it seems to break off from Brahmanism in a variety of ways. It does not recommend any of the Brahmanical rites, but it initiates some new rites and new ways of living which are not so common in the Brahmanical circle. It keeps some slender contact with Brahmanism by introducing the meditation on the syllable *om*. But as regards many of its other rituals it seems to be entirely non-Vedic. It does not refer to any of the Dravidian works as its

source book, and yet it cannot be identified with the Pāśupata system of Śrīkaṇṭha or the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā*.

It is also important to know that the Pāśupata system of the *Pāśupata-sūtras* has but little connection with the idea of *prakṛti* as energy or otherwise, as we find in the Purāṇic Pāśupata system. None of the categories of Sāṃkhya appear to be of any relevance regarding the creation of the world. About Yoga also one must always distinguish this *Pāśupata-yoga* and the *Pāśupata-yogas* referred to in the Purāṇas or in the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali. The word *yoga* is used in the sense of continuous contact and not the suppression of all mental states (*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*), as we find in the *Pātañjala-yoga*. The emphasis here is on *pratyāhāra*, that is, withdrawing the mind from other objects and settling it down to God. There is therefore here no scope for *nirodha-samādhi*, which precedes *kaivalya* in *Pātañjala-yoga*. It may not be impossible that the Śaiva influence had somehow impressed upon the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali, which apparently drew much of its material from Buddhism, and this becomes abundantly clear if we compare the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on the *Yoga-sūtra* with the *Abhidharmakosa* of Vasubandhu. The *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* that we now possess was probably later than the *Yoga-sūtra*, and it therefore presumed that the metaphysical speculations of Sāṃkhya could be explained without the assumption of any God for which there is no proof. The *Yoga-sūtra* did not try to establish Īśvara or God which is also the name for Śiva, but only accepted it as one of its necessary postulates. As a matter of fact, none of the systems of Indian philosophy tried to establish God by any logical means except the Naiyāyikas, and according to tradition the Naiyāyikas are regarded as Śaivas.

In this connection, without any reference to some Āgama works to which we may have to refer later on, we can trace the development of the Pāśupata system in the tenth, eleventh, and up to the fourteenth centuries. It has been said before that the Īśvara-kāraṇins, referred to by Śaṅkara, may refer to the Naiyāyikas, and now I shall be referring to *Gaṇakārikā*, a Pāśupata work attributed to Haradattacarya, on which Bhāsarvajña wrote a commentary, called the *Ratnaṭīkā*. Bhāsarvajña is well known as the author of the *Nyāya-sāra*, on which he wrote a commentary called *Nyāya-bhūṣana*. In this he tried to refute the views of Diṇnāga, Dharmakīrti, Prajñā-karagupta, the author of *Pramāṇa-vārttikālaṃkāra*,

who lived about the middle of the tenth century and is quoted by Ratnākaraśānti of about A.D. 980. Bhāsarvajña, therefore, seems to have lived in the second half of the tenth century. The *Gaṇakārikā* consists of eight verses, and its purport is the same as that of the *Pāśupata-sūtras*. The *Pāśupata-sūtra* that we have dealt with is the same as that which is referred to as *Pāśupata-śāstra*, as the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* quotes the first *sūtra* of the *Pāśupata-śāstra*¹.

Guṇaratna in his commentary on Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* says that the Naiyāyikas are also called Yaugas and they walk about with long staffs and scanty loin-cloths, covering themselves up with blankets. They have matted locks of hair, smear their bodies with ashes, possess the holy thread, carry utensils for water, and generally live in the forests or under trees. They live largely on roots and fruits, and are always hospitable. Sometimes they have wives, sometimes not. The latter are better than the former. They perform the sacrificial duties of fire. In the higher state they go about naked; they purify their teeth and food with water, smear their bodies with ashes three times, and meditate upon Śiva. Their chief *mantra* is *om namaḥ śivāya*. With this they address their *guru* and their *guru* also replies in the same manner. In their meetings they say that those men or women who follow the practices of Śaiva initiation for twelve years attain ultimately salvation or *Nirvāṇa*. Śiva the omniscient being, the creator and destroyer of the world, is regarded as a god. Śiva has eighteen incarnations (*avatāra*), namely Nakulīśa, Kauśika, Gārgya, Maitreya, Kauruṣa, Īśāna, Para-gārgya, Kapilāṇḍa, Manuṣyaka, Kuśika, Atri, Piṅgala, Puṣpaka Bṛhadārya, Agasti, Santāna, Rāśikara, and Vidyāguru. They adore the aforesaid saints.

They further say that the ultimate being that they worship is not associated with any of the Purāṇic characteristics of Śiva, such as having matted locks, or the lunar digit in the hair, etc. Such a supreme being is devoid of all such characteristics and passions. Those who desire mundane happiness worship Śiva with such associated qualities, and as possessing attachment or passion. But those who are really absolutely unattached, they worship Śiva as unattached. People attain just those kinds of fruits that they wish to have, and the manner in which they wish to worship the deity.

¹ *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, *Nakulīśa-pāśupata-darśana: Tatredam ādi-sūtram*, "athātāḥ paśupateḥ pāśupata-yoga-vidhiṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ" iti.

Guṇaratna says that the Vaiśeṣikas also follow the same kind of external insignia and dress, because the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas are very much similar in their philosophical attitudes. Guṇaratna further says that there are four types of Śaivas—Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Mahāvratadharas, and Kālamukhas, as well as other subsidiary divisions. Thus there are some who are called Bharata who do not admit the caste rules. He who has devotion to Śiva can be called a Bharata. In the Nyāya literature the Naiyāyikas are called Śaivas, because they worship Śiva, and the Vaiśeṣikas are called Pāśupatas. So the Naiyāyika philosophy goes by the name of Śaiva and Vaiśeṣika by the name of Pāśupata. Guṇaratna says that he gives this description just as he has seen it and had heard of it. Their main dialectical works are *Nyāya-sūtra*, *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya*, Udyotkara's *Vārttika*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyā-tikā*, and Udayana's *Tātparyā-pariśuddhi*. Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāya-sāra* and its commentary *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa* and Jayanta's *Nyāya-kalikā* and Udayana's *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* are also mentioned as important works.

The statement of Guṇaratna about the Śaivas is further corroborated by Rājaśekhara's description of the Śaiva view in his *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*. Rājaśekhara further says that Akṣapāda, to whom the *Nyāya-sūtras* are attributed, was the primary teacher of the Nyāya sect of Pāśupatas. They admit four *pramāṇas*, perception, inference, analogy, and testimony, and they admit sixteen categories of discussion, namely, *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *saṁśaya*, *prayojana*, *drṣṭānta*, *siddhānta*, *avayava*, *tarka*, *nirṇaya*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitandā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti* and *mīgrahasthāna*. These are just the subjects that are introduced in the first *sūtra* of Akṣapāda's *Nyāya-sūtra*. The ultimate object is the dissolution of all sorrow preparatory to liberation. Their main logical work is that by Jayanta and also by Udayana and Bhāsarvajña.

Kauṇḍinya's commentary on the *Pāśupata-sūtras* seems to belong to quite an early period, and it may not be inadmissible to say that it was a writing of the early period of the Christian era. But whether Kauṇḍinya can be identified with Rāśikara, is more than we can say. Rāśikara is mentioned in *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*, and there is of course nothing to suggest that Kauṇḍinya could not have been the *gotra* name of Rāśikara.

Apart from the *Ratnaṭikā* on the *Gaṇakārikā*, it seems that there was also a *bhāṣya*, but this *bhāṣya* was not on *Gaṇakārikā*, but it

was the *bhāṣya* of Kaunḍinya on the *Pāśupata-sūtras* which we have already examined. In the *Gaṇakārikā*, a reference is made to eight categories of a fivefold nature and also one category of a tripartite nature. Thus in speaking of strength or power (*bala*), which must be a source of the attainment of the other categories, we hear of faith in the teacher, contentment (*mateḥ prasāda*), fortitude (that is, power of bearing all kinds of sorrow), merit or *dharma*, and also conscious carefulness (*apramāda*).

The question of *bala* or strength may naturally come when one has to conquer one's enemies. One may, therefore, ask the significance of the attainment of *bala* or strength in following a course for the attainment of liberation. The answer to such an inquiry is that strength is certainly required for destroying ignorance, demerit, and the like. These are counted as destruction of ignorance in all its dormant seats, destruction of demerit, dissolution of all that leads to attachment, preservation from any possible failure, and also the complete cessation of the qualities that lead to animal existence as *paśu* through the meditation of God.

This strength may be exercised under different conditions and circumstances. First, when one shows oneself as a member of the Pāśupata sect, smearing the body with ashes and lying on the ashes, and so on; secondly, in the hidden stage, when one hides from other people the fact of one's being a member of the Pāśupata sect, and when one behaves like an ordinary Brāhmin. The third stage is a stage when one conquers all one's sense propensities. Next is the stage when all attractions cease. These include the other behaviours of a Pāśupata ascetic, such as dancing and acting like a madman. The final stage is the stage of *siddhi*, the final emancipation.

The fifth *kārikā* refers to the process of initiation (*dīkṣā*), which consists of the necessary ceremonial articles, the proper time, the proper action, the phallic insignia of Śiva, and the teachers.

The *kārikās* then go on to enumerate the different kinds of attainment (*lābha*). Of these the foremost is knowledge. This knowledge is to be attained methodically by the enumeration of the categories of knowledge, and thereafter by a sufficient description of them as we find in the *Nyāya-sūtras*. This will also include the various kinds of *pramāṇas* or proof, the differentiation between substance and attitude, the definition of action leading up to the

final action of dissociation of all sorrows. In other philosophies the dissociation of sorrows is merely a negative quality, but in this system the dissolution of sorrow involves within it the possession of miraculous powers. This attainment of miraculous powers is called also *jñāna-śakti* and *kriyā-śakti*. *Jñāna-śakti* means *jñāna* as power. This *kriyā-śakti* consists of various kinds of powers of movement. As this system does not hold the idea of evolution or self-manifestation, the attainment of these powers is by association with superior powers. This is quite in accordance with the Nyāya theory regarding the origination of qualities. All the categories of knowledge, merit, etc., are included as being within the range of attainment. This also includes the inanimates and the animate characters such as the elements, the five cognitive senses, the five conative senses, and the *manas*.

God is called the Lord or *pāti*, because He is always associated with the highest powers; these powers do not come to Him as a result of any action, but they abide in Him permanently. For this reason He can by His will produce any action or effect which stands before us as creation and it is for this reason that the creation of the world is regarded as a sort of play by Him. This is what distinguishes Him from all other animate beings, and this is His greatness.

The whole course of *vidhi* or proper religious behaviour consists of those kinds of action which would ultimately purify the individual and bring him close to God. In this connection *tapas* is recommended for the destruction of sins and for the generation of merit. *Dharma*, also consisting of various kinds of ritualistic behaviour, is recommended for the attainment of knowledge. The continuous meditation on God with emotion (*nityatā*) and the complete dissociation of the mind from all defects (*sthiti*) are also advised. These ultimately lead to the final liberation when the individuals become associated with great miraculous powers like Śiva Himself. In other systems the liberated souls have no miraculous powers; they have only all their sorrows dissolved.

The above attainments should be made by residence with the teacher, or where people live who follow the caste and the *Āśrama* rules, or in any vacant place which is cleaned up and which has a covering on it, or in the cremation ground; or finally the aspirant

with the cessation of his body may live in fixed association with the supreme Lord.

We must now turn to the means by which the aspirant may attain his desired end. The first is technically called *vāsa*. It means many things; it means the capacity to understand the proper meanings of words of texts, to remember them, to be able to collate and complete that knowledge in association with knowledge gained in other places, the ability to criticise the teachings of opposite schools in favour of one's own school, to be able to grasp the correct meaning of texts which have been differently interpreted, to be able to carry one's own conviction to other people, the ability to speak without contradiction and repetition and without any kind of delusion, and thereby to satisfy the teacher. To these must be added the proper courtesy and behaviour towards the teacher. This latter is called *caryā*, *paricaryā*, or *kriyā*. The term *caryā* is also used to denote various kinds of action, such as smearing the body with ashes, and so on. According to the Pāśupata system the bathing of the body with ashes is equivalent to proper sacrifice, that is, *yajña*. Other kinds of sacrifice are regarded as bad sacrifices.

Bhāsarvajña follows Kauṇḍinya's *bhāṣya* in describing *caryā* as being twofold or threefold. Thus the bathing of the body with ashes, lying down, muttering *mantras*, etc., are called *vrata*, which produces merit and removes demerit. All the other recommendations found in Kauṇḍinya's *bhāṣya* as regards shivering, laughing, making noises, etc., are also repeated here. In fact, the *Gaṇa-kārikā* and the *Ratnaṭīkā* closely follow the teachings of Kauṇḍinya in his *bhāṣya*, which is regarded as the most prominent work of the Pāśupata school.

One important point in this system deserves to be noticed. God Himself is absolutely independent. The introduction of the idea of *karma* and its fruit is not so indispensable, for the simple reason that no *karmas* can produce any fruit without the will of God. All *karmas* can be frustrated by God's will. So the introduction of the *karma* theory, which is held in so high an esteem in other systems of philosophy, is here regarded as superfluous. That this was the idea of the Nakulīśa-Pāśupata philosophy from the time of the *Pāśupata-sūtras* and Kauṇḍinya's *bhāṣya* to the fourteenth century when the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* was written, is

thoroughly borne out by texts. The action of all living beings depends upon the will of God. God Himself having no purpose to fulfil, does not want *karma* as an intermediary between His will and His effect.

After considerable difficulty we obtained a copy of *Mṛgendrā-gama* from the Government Manuscript Library of Madras. It appears that this Āgama was one of the important texts of the Pāsupata sect. But the portions that we have recovered deal mainly with various kinds of rituals and they have no philosophical interest.

The Śaiva Ideas of Māṇikka-vāchakar in the *Tiru-vāchaka*.

In the present work the writer has refrained from utilising material from a Dravidian language such as Tamil, Telegu, and Kanarese. This is due to more than one reason. The first is that the writer has no knowledge of the Dravidian languages, and it is too late for him to acquire it, as it might take a whole life time to do so. The second is that this history in all its past volumes has only taken note of material available in Sanskrit. Thirdly, so far as the present author can judge, there is hardly anything of value from the philosophical point of view in Dravidian literature which is unobtainable through Sanskrit. A Tamil work could, however, be taken in hand, if there were any trustworthy translation of it, and if the work were of any great reputation. It is fortunate that Māṇikka-vāchakar's *Tiru-vāchaka*, which is held in very high esteem, has a trustworthy translation by the Rev. G. U. Pope, who devoted his life to the study of Tamil, and may be regarded as a very competent scholar in that language. It appears that Tamil was particularly rich in poetry, and we have many devotional songs both in Tamil and in Kanarese, but I do not know of any systematic philosophical work either in Tamil or in Kanarese which is not presented in Sanskrit. The Tamil literature also abounds in mythical and legendary accounts of many of the saints, which go by the name of Purāṇas, such as *Periya-purāṇa* and *Tiru-vātavurār-purāṇa*, *Nampiyāndār-nampī-purāṇa* and *Sekkilar-purāṇa*.

Tiru-vāchaka is a book of poems by Māṇikka-vāchakar. It is full of devotional sentiments and philosophical ideas, but it is not

a system of philosophy in the modern sense of the term. Pope wishes to place Māṇikka-vāchakar in about the seventh or eighth century, apparently without any evidence. R. W. Frazer, in his article on Dravidians¹, places him in the ninth century, also without any evidence. Māṇikka-vāchakar is supposed to have been born near Madura. The meaning of his name is "he whose utterances are rubies." He is supposed to have been a prodigy of intellect and was a consummate scholar in the Brahmanical learning and the *Śaivāgamas*. These Āgamas, as we have pointed out elsewhere, are written in Sanskrit verses and also in Tamil. It appears, therefore, that the background of Māṇikka-vāchakar's thought was in Sanskrit. The mythical story about Māṇikka-vāchakar, available in the *Tiru-viḷaiyāḍil* and in the *Vāṭavurar-purāṇa* as summarised by Pope, need not detain us here. We find that he renounced the position of a minister of the king and became a Śaiva ascetic. His mind was oppressed with the feeling of sadness for all people around him, who were passing through the cycles of birth and death, and had no passionate love for Śiva which alone could save them. This state of his mental agitation, and the confession of his ignorance and youthful folly, are specially described in some of his poems.

Later on Śiva Himself meets him, and from that time forward he becomes a disciple of Śiva. Śiva appears before him with His three eyes, His body smeared with ashes, and holding a book in His hand called *Śiva-jñāna-bodha*, the well-known work of Meykaṇḍadeva. Pope himself admits that the *Śiva-jñāna-bodha* could not have been written by the sixth century A.D., the supposed date of Māṇikka-vāchakar².

In the course of his career he travelled from shrine to shrine until he came to Chidambaram, where in a discussion he completely discomfited the Buddhists, partly by logic and partly by the demonstration of miraculous powers. He then returned to other devotees and set up a *liṅgam* under a tree and worshipped it day and night. It was from that time that he began his poetical compositions which are full of the glory of Śiva and His grace.

¹ In Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

² *Śiva-jñāna-bodha* is supposed to have been written by Meykaṇḍadeva in or about A.D. 1223. See article on Dravidians by Frazer in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

A study of his poems reveals the gradual evolution of his mind through various states of repentance, afflictions, sadness, and his extreme devotedness and love for Śiva. Pope, in commenting on the poetry of Māṇikka-vāchakar, says "scarcely ever has the longing of the human soul for purity and peace and divine fellowship found worthier expression¹."

The fact of the omnipresence of God is often expressed in the Śaiva songs as the sport of Śiva. The whole universe is bright with his smile and alive with his joyous movements. This idea is so much overstressed that Śiva is often called a deceiver and a maniac, and in the Pāśupata system the Pāśupata ascetics are advised to behave like mad people, dancing about and even deceiving others into thinking of them as bad people, and making all kinds of noise and laughing in an irrelevant manner. It is also supposed that Śiva would often try the loyalty of his devotees in various forms of manifestations, trying to represent Himself in an exceedingly unfavourable light. The dancing of Śiva is particularly symbolical of his perpetual gracious actions throughout the universe and in loving hearts. He reminds one of the pre-Aryan demon dancers in the burning grounds.

We assume that the teaching of Māṇikka-vāchakar is in consonance with the teaching of the *Śiva-jñāna-bodha*, which was composed at a later date. Umāpati has a commentary on the *Śiva-jñāna-bodha* which has been translated by Hoisington in the *American Oriental Society Journal* of 1895. In this book various types of liberation are described. Distinguishing the Śaiva view from other views, one may find a number of variations in conception in the different Śaiva schools. Some of these variations have already been noted in the different sections of Southern Śaivism. There are many who think that the innate corruptions of the soul can be removed, and this may lead to a permanent release from all bonds (*pāśa*). The *Śaiva-siddhānta*, however, insists that even in this liberated state the potentiality of corruption remains, though it may not be operative. It remains there in the soul as a permanent dark spot. So the personal identity and the imperfections cling together in all finite beings, and they are never destroyed even in liberation. Other sectarian Śaivas, however, think that by the grace of Śiva the innate corruptions of the soul may be removed,

¹ Pope's translation, p. xxxiv.

from which it necessarily follows that there may be permanent release from all bonds. There are other Śaivas who think that in liberation the soul acquires miraculous powers, and that the liberated persons are partakers of divine nature and attributes, and are able to gain possession of, and exercise, miraculous powers called *siddhi*. There are others who think that in emancipation the soul becomes as insensible as a stone. This apathetic existence is the refuge of the soul from the suffering and struggle of the cycle of births and rebirths. We have already mentioned most of these ideas of liberation in a more elaborate manner in the relevant sections. But according to Māṇikka-vāchakar the soul is finally set free from the influence of threefold defilement through the grace of Śiva, and obtains divine wisdom, and so rises to live eternally in the conscious, full enjoyment of Śiva's presence and eternal bliss. This is also the idea of the Siddhānta philosophy¹.

A great pre-eminence is given to the idea of the operation of divine grace (called *aruḷ* in Tamil) in the Śaiva Siddhānta. The grace is divine or mystic wisdom, to dissipate the impurities of the *āṇava-mala* and to show the way of liberation. The souls are under the sway of accumulated *karma*, and it is by the grace of the Lord that the souls of men, in a state of bondage in the combined state, are let loose and find their place in suitable bodies for gradually working out and ultimately attaining liberation. Through all the stages, grace is the dynamic force that gradually ennoble the pilgrim towards his final destination. The grace of Śiva through the operation of His energy (*śakti*) affords light of understanding, by which people perform their actions of life and accumulate their *karma* and experience joys and sufferings. The material world is unconscious and the souls have no knowledge of their own nature. It is only by the grace of Śiva that the individuals understand their state and acquire the mystic knowledge by which they can save themselves; yet no one knows the grace of Śiva and how it envelops him, though he is endowed with all sense perceptions. From beginningless time the individuals have been receiving the grace of God, but they have seldom come under its influence, and are thus devoid of the right approach to the way to deliverance.

The grace can be observed as operative when the proper *guru* comes and advises the person to follow the right course. When the

¹ Pope, *loc. cit.* p. xliv.

opposition of sins and merits is counter-balanced, Śiva's emancipating grace begins to show its work. In order to be saved, one should know the spiritual essence of *karma* and the twofold kinds of *karma*, and the joys and sorrows which are associated with them, and the Lord Who brings the deeds to maturity at the appointed time so that the soul may experience their effects.

Just as a crystal reflects many colours under the sun's light and yet retains its own transparent character, so the energy or wisdom obtained as a grace of the Lord irradiates the soul and permeates the world. Without the mystic wisdom obtained through the grace of Śiva, no one can obtain real knowledge. The soul is unintelligent without Śiva. All the actions of souls are performed with the active guidance of Śiva, and even the perception of the senses as instruments of knowledge is owed to Śiva's grace.

In the second stage we are taught how to apply knowledge for the cleansing of the soul. Those who endure the delusive sufferings of worldly experience would naturally seek relief in the grace of God as soon as they became convinced of their impurities. To a jaundiced person even sweet milk appears bitter, but if the tongue is cleansed the bitterness is gone; so under the influence of the original impurities all religious observances are distasteful, but when these impurities are removed then the teachings of the *guru* become operative.

What cannot be perceived by the senses, supreme bliss, is known by the operation of grace in a spiritual manner. The grace of God is spontaneously revealed to us. The supreme felicity is thus a gift of grace which souls cannot obtain of themselves.

Only those who are introduced to this grace can combine with Śiva in bliss. There is a curious notion that the souls are feminine and so is the *śakti* or energy, and Śiva is the Lord with whom there is a mystic unification. Śiva is perfect bliss. If there is a mystic union between the soul and the Lord, then they should become one, leaving the duality between the soul and God unexplained; it has to be assumed, therefore, that they both become one and remain divided. When the bonds are removed the devotee becomes one with God in speechless rapture, and there is no scope for him to say that he has obtained Śiva. Those who obtain release, and those who attain the state of *samādhi*, are never torn asunder from the Lord. In that state all their physical actions are under the

complete control of the Lord. There thus comes a state when the knower, the mystic knowledge, and the Śiva appear no more as distinct, but as absorbed in one another.

Though those who enter this state of *samādhi* gain omniscience and other qualities, yet while they are on this earth they know nothing whatever except the supreme Lord, the object of their mystic knowledge. All their sense-organs are restrained and sink deep into their source and do not show themselves. Within and without the divine grace stands revealed. In this mystic enlightenment the phenomenal universe is only seen in God.

In the *Vāṭavurār-purāṇam* as translated by Pope there is an account of the controversy of Māṇikka-vāchakar with the Buddhist teachers in Chidambaram. The controversy does not manifest any great knowledge of Buddhism on either side. The disputation hangs round this or that minor point and lacks logical co-ordination, so that it is unprofitable to follow it up. It is also extremely doubtful if that controversy were in any way responsible for the loss of prestige on the side of Buddhist thought, which must have been due, from the ninth century onwards, to the rise of various South Indian sects which quarrelled with each other, and also, mainly, to political reasons.

Māṇikka-vāchakar and Śaiva Siddhānta.

We read in Śaṅkara's commentary (II. 2. 27) that he mentions the name *Siddhānta-śāstra* written by Śiva Himself, and he gives us some specimen ideas of these which can be covered within two concepts: (1) that the Siddhāntas assume God to be the instrumental cause, against the Vedānta view that God represents the whole of reality and that there is nothing outside Him. He also (2) refers to the Śaiva doctrine which acknowledged three categories, the *pati*, *paśu*, and *pāśa*. Among the Śaivas he refers to the Mahā-kāruṇikas, Kāpālikas, etc. As I have often said, it is extremely difficult to discover with any exactitude the sort of Śaivism that Śaṅkara designates by the name Siddhānta, as also to define the characteristics of the systems that he wanted to refute. We have now before us a system of Śaivism which goes by the name of Śaiva Siddhānta and a whole lot of works regarded as the works of the Śaiva Siddhānta school. Much of it, particularly in

the way of commentaries, is written in Tamil: some of it is available in Sanskrit. A sort of Śaivism very similar to this is found in the *Vāyavīya* section of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*. It is said in those sections that the original doctrine of that philosophy was written in the Āgama works as composed by the successive incarnations of Śiva. The same teachings are to be found also in Tamil Āgamas, which have the same authority and content. Pope says that the Śaiva Siddhānta system is the most elaborate, influential, and undoubtedly the most intrinsically valuable of all the religions of India. This seems to me to be a wild exaggeration. The fundamental facts of Śaivism are composed of Vedāntic monism and Sāṃkhya, and sometimes the Nyāya doctrines have also been utilised. This latter refers to the Pāśupata school of Śaivism, as has been noted elsewhere. It is also doubtful if it is peculiarly South Indian and Tamil, for we have similar doctrines in the *Vāyavīya-saṃhitā* and also in a somewhat variant form in the Northern Śaivism. There are many statements by Pope which seem to have no factual value, and if the present work had any polemical intention, it would be necessary to criticise him more definitely.

Some people say that the oldest form of Śaivism is the old pre-historic religion of South India, but I have not found any evidence to show the exact nature of an existent pre-Aryan, Dravidian religion which could be identified with what we now know as Śaivism. It is as yet very doubtful whether the pre-Aryan Dravidians had any systematic form of philosophy or religion differing from that of the kindred classes of other aborigines.

In our view the *Pāśupata-sūtra* and *bhāṣya* were referred to by Śaṅkara and were probably the earliest basis of Śaivism, as can be gathered by literary evidences untrammelled by flying fancies. We are ready to believe that there were ecstatic religious dances, rites of demon-worship, and other loathsome ceremonials, and that these, though originally practised for ancestor-worship and the like, were gradually accepted by the earliest Pāśupatas, whose behaviour and conduct do not seem to affiliate them with the Brahmanic social sphere, though holders of such Śaiva doctrines had to be Brahmins. Castelessness was not a part of the earlier Pāśupata Śaivism. In a separate section we shall try to give an estimate of the evolution of the concept of Śiva from Vedic times. The affirmation that one little Christian Church on the east coast

of India exerted its influence on the dominant Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava faith in the country lacks evidence. We have found that as a rule those who held the Sanskritic culture hardly ever read even Pāli texts of Buddhism, though Pāli is so much akin to Sanskrit. On this account we find that the reputed disputation of Māṇikka-vāchakar with the Buddhists is uninteresting, as it does not seem that Māṇikka-vāchakar or the Ceylonese knew much of each other's faith. Pope's statement, that Kumārila Bhatta preached the doctrine of a personal deity in the South, is absolutely wrong, because the Mīmāṃsā view as expounded by Kumārila did not admit any God or creator.

Māṇikka-vāchakar, probably of the ninth century, was one of the earliest saints of the school of thought that goes by the name of Śaiva Siddhānta. Probably about a century later there arose Nāṇasambandar and other devotees who developed the doctrine further. Their legendary tales are contained in the *Periya-purāṇa*. But it is peculiar that King Bhoja of Dhāra, who wrote a Śaiva work of great distinction called *Tattva-prakāśa*, does not take any notice of these Tamil writers. Similarly Mādhava, also in the fourteenth century, does not mention any of these Tamil writers. We are told that thereafter came fourteen sages, called *Santāna-gurus* (succession of teachers), who properly elaborated the system of philosophy known as the Śaiva Siddhānta. One of these was Umāpati, who lived in A.D. 1313. He was thus a contemporary of Mādhava, though Mādhava makes no reference to him.

The thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries were periods of great theistic enterprises in the hands of the Śaivas and the Śrīvaiṣṇavas. In interpreting *Tiru-vachakam*, Umāpati says that the real intention of all the Vedas is summed up in three mystic words: *pati*, *paśu*, and *pāśa*, the Lord, the flock, and the bond. These are the three categories of the Śaiva Siddhānta system. But we have already pointed out that there were no special peculiarities of the Śaiva Siddhānta; it was referred to by Śaṅkara in the eighth century and it formed the cardinal doctrine of the Pāśupata school of Śaivism, and also to the schools of Śaivism as we find them in the *Vāyaviya* section of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa*. The *pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa* are equally eternal, existing unchanged and undiminished through the ages. This *pati* is none else but Śiva, who is called by various names, such as Rudra, *paśūnām-pati*, Śiva, etc. Umāpati

says that Śiva is the supreme Being, is neither permanently manifested nor unmanifested; He is without qualities or distinguishing marks, free from all impurities, absolute and eternal, the source of wisdom to innumerable souls, and not subject to any fluctuations. He is immaterial and of the nature of pure bliss. He is difficult of access to the perverse, but He is the final goal of those that truly worship Him. Śiva is thus described to be *niṣkala*, without parts, perfect in Himself, but is capable of manifestation, and in order to energise in souls the various constituents of that eternal aggregate of impurity which constitutes the bond, He assumes a *sakala* nature, that is, one composed of pieces of spiritual bodies. He is formless and has the form of wisdom. He creates, preserves, and consigns all to the power of *māyā*, but He is the ultimate refuge who never leaves us. He dwells everywhere and pervades all things as fire pervades all wood. He offers His boon only to those who approach Him for it.

Turning to the groups of animate beings called *paśu*, it is suggested that from beginningless time an infinite number of souls must have obtained their release. Generally there are three kinds of impurities—darkness, deeds (*karma*) and delusion. When delusion is removed, darkness may still continue. The souls can perceive objects through sense organs only when their functions are supplemented by some innate divine faculty. All beings are infested with original impurities. The threefold impurities which constitute the bond are directly known by Śiva.

Para-śiva or the supreme Lord and Parā-śakti are two in one. Śiva is pure intelligence (*jñāna*) and Śakti is pure energy (*kriyā*). Out of their union, evolves (1) *icchā-śakti*, which is a combination of *jñāna* and *kriyā* in equal proportion; (2) *kriyā-śakti* which is a combination of *jñāna* and *kriyā* with an excess of *kriyā*; and (3) *jñāna-śakti*, which is a combination of *jñāna* and *kriyā* with an excess of *jñāna*, also called *aruḷ-śakti*. The *aruḷ-śakti* is the *jñāna-śakti* active at the time of the liberation of the souls, while as *tirodhāna-śakti* it is active at the time when the souls are fettered.

To sum up the position of the Śaiva Siddhānta as far as we can understand it from authoritative translations of Tamil works, and also authoritative studies of Tamil literature like Pope and Schomerus, we find that the souls which pervade the body are themselves inanimate, and the intellectual apparatus by which

things are perceived are also unconscious. Conscious experience can only originate by the energy of Śiva. This energy, like a ray of sun, is the original *śakti* or energy which is indistinguishable from Śiva. The Śaiva Siddhānta school is in direct opposition to the Cārvāka school which denies the existence of any creator. The Śaiva Siddhānta school argues for the existence of a supreme Being who evolves, sustains, and involves the phenomenal universe. The whole universe, constituted of all beings, male and female, and those which are without life, but which come into phenomenal existence, subsists for a while and then subsides; but yet, as we have said before, this does not clarify our knowledge regarding the nature of the physical world and of the souls. It does not explain how beings became associated from the beginning with impurities called *āṇava-mala*. Even at the attainment of release the souls could not be united or become one with God. Other forms of Śaivism have attempted to follow slightly diverse lines to avoid these difficulties.

Though *śakti* is regarded as a part of Śiva—and this has led to many mystical aspects of Tantra philosophy—yet the relation of the individual devotees to God is one of servitude and entire self-surrender. It has none of the amorous sides of rapturous love that we notice among the Vaiṣṇava saints, the Ārvārs.

Tiru-vāchakam may in some sense be regarded as a spiritual biography of Māṇikka-vāchakar which records his experiences at different times of his life and explains. The work is full of his religious experiences and enthusiasm, showing different states of religious pathology. Thus he says:

What shall I do while twofold deeds' fierce flame burns still out,—
Nor doth the body melt,—nor falsehood fall to dust?
In mind no union gained with the "Red fire's honey"
The Lord of Perun-turrai fair!¹

Shall I cry out, or wait, or dance or sing, or watch?
O Infinite, what shall I do? The Śiva who fills
With rapturous image,—great Perun-turrai's Lord
Let all with me bending adore!²

He filled with penury; set me free from 'births,' my soul
With speechless fervours thrilled,—blest Perun-turrai's Lord,—
The Śiva in grace exceeding made me His; the balm
For all my pain, the deathless Bliss!³

¹ *Tiru-vāchakam*, p. 334.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 336.

Glorious, exalted over all, the Infinite,—
 To me small slave, lowest of all, thou has assigned.
 A place in bliss supreme, that none beside have gained or known!
 Great Lord, what can I do for thee!¹

All ye His servants who've become, put far away each idle sportive
 thought;
 Such refuge at the fort where safety dwells; hold fast unto the end
 the sacred sign;
 Put off from you this body stained with sin; in Śiva's world He'll
 surely give us place!
 Bhujanga's self, whose form the ashes wears will grant you entrance
 'neath His flow'ry feet!²

Śaiva Philosophy according to Bhoja and his commentators.

Mādhava in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* of the fourteenth century refers to a system of philosophy *Saiva-darśana* which rejects the view that God of His own will arranges all experiences for us, but that he does so on the basis of our own *karma* and that this philosophy is based upon the *Śaivāgamas*, supposed to have been composed by Śiva, Maheśvara. In examining the philosophy of Śrīkaṇṭha and Appaya we have seen that they speak of twenty-eight Āgamas, which were all written by Śiva or His incarnations, and that, whether in Dravidian or in Sanskrit, they have the same import. Though it will not be possible for us to get hold of all the Āgamas, we have quite a number of them in complete or incomplete form. On the evidence of some of the Āgamas themselves, they were written in Sanskrit, Prakṛt, and the local country dialects³. We also find that, though written by Maheśvara, all the Āgamas do not seem to have the same import. This creates a good deal of confusion in the interpretation of the *Śaivāgamas*. Yet the differences are not always so marked as to define the special characteristics of the sub-schools of Śaivism.

Bhoja, probably the well-known Bhoja of the eleventh century who wrote *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharana* and a commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra*, wrote also a work called *Tattva-prakāśa* which has

¹ *Ibid.* p. 336.

² *Ibid.* p. 329.

³ *saṃskṛtaiḥ prakṛtair yaś cāśiṣyāmurūpataḥ,
 deśa-bhāṣadyupāyais ca bodhayet sa guruḥ smṛtaḥ.*

Śiva-jñāna-siddhi (Mysore manuscript, no. 3726).

been referred to by Mādhava in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*. Mādhava also refers to Aghora-śivācārya, whose commentary on *Tattva-prakāśa* has not yet been published, but he omits Śrikumāra, whose commentary on *Tattva-prakāśa* has been published in the Trivendrum Series along with the *Tattva-prakāśa*. Aghora-śivācārya seems to have written another commentary on the *Mṛgendrāgama* called the *Mṛgendrāgama-vṛtti-dīpikā*. In writing his commentary Aghora-śivācārya says that he was writing this commentary, because other people had tried to interpret *Tattva-prakāśa* with a monistic bias, as they were unacquainted with the Siddhānta of the Āgama-śāstras. From the refutation of the Māheśvara school by Śaṅkara in II. 2. 37, we know that he regarded the Māheśvaras as those that held God to be only the instrumental agent of the world and the material cause of the world was quite outside Him. According to the monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkara, Brahman was both the material and the instrumental cause of the world. The world was in reality nothing but Brahman, though it appeared as a manifold world through illusion, just as a rope may appear as a snake through illusion. This is called the *vivarta* view as opposed to the *pariṇāma* view, according to which there is a material transformation leading to the production of the world. The *pariṇāma* view is held by the Sāṃkhyaists; the other view is that God is the instrumental agent who shapes and fashions the world out of atoms or a brute *māyā*, the material force. The Naiyāyikas hold that since the world is an effect and a product of mechanical arrangement, it must have an intelligent creator who is fully acquainted with the delimitations and the potencies of the atomic materials. God thus can be proved by inference, as any other agent can be proved by the existence of the effect. This is also the viewpoint of some of the *Śaivāgamas* such as the *Mṛgendra*, *Mātāṅga-parameśvara*, etc.

Śrikumāra, in interpreting *Tattva-prakāśa*, seems to be in an oscillating mood; sometimes he seems to follow the Āgama view of God being the instrumental cause, and sometimes he tries to interpret on the Vedāntic pattern of *vivarta*. Aghora-śivācārya takes a more definite stand in favour of the Āgama point of view and regards God as the instrumental cause¹. In our account of Śaivism

¹ *vivādādhyāsitaṃ viśvaṃ viśva-vit-kartṛ-pūrvakam, kāryatvād āvayoḥ siddhaṃ kāryaṃ kumbhādikaṃ yathā, iti śrīman-mātāṅge' pi, nimitta-kāraṇaṃ tu iśa iti. ayam ceśvara-vādo 'smābhīḥ mṛgendra-vṛtti-dīpikāyāṃ vistareṇāpi darśita iti.* Aghora-śivācārya's commentary on *Tattva-prakāśa* (Adyar manuscript).

as explained in the *Vāyaviya-saṃhitā*, we have seen how in the hands of the Purāṇic interpreters Śaivism had taken a rather definite course towards absolute monism, and how the Sāṃkhya conception of *prakṛti* had been utilised as being the energy of God, which is neither different from nor identical with Him. Such a conception naturally leads to some kind of oscillation and this has been noticed in the relevant places.

Mādhava sums up the content of the *Śaivāgamas* as dealing with three categories, *pati*, the Lord, *paśu*, the beings, and *pāśa*, the bonds, and the four other categories of *vidyā*, knowledge, *kriyā*, behaviour or conduct, *yoga*, concentration, and *caryā*, religious worship. Now the beings have no freedom and the bonds themselves are inanimate; the two are combined by the action of God.

Bhoja writes his book, *Tattva-prakāśa*, to explain the different kinds of metaphysical and other categories (*tattva*) as accepted by the Śaiva philosophy. The most important category is Śiva who is regarded as being *cit* by which the Śaivas understand combined knowledge and action¹. Such a conscious God has to be admitted for explaining the superintendence and supervision of all inanimate beings. This ultimate being is all by itself; it has no body and it does not depend upon any thing; it is one and unique. It is also all-pervading and eternal. The liberated individual souls also become like it after liberation is granted to them, but God is always the same and always liberated and He is never directed by any supreme Lord. It is devoid of all passions. It is also devoid of all impurities².

Aghora-śivācārya follows the *Śaivāgamas* like the *Mygendra* or the *Mātaṅga-parameśvara* in holding that the existence of God can be inferred by arguments of the Naiyāyika pattern. It is, therefore, argued that God has created the world, maintains it, and will destroy it; He blinds our vision and also liberates us. These five actions are called *amugraha*, which we have often translated, in the absence of a better word, as grace. In reality, it means God's power that manifests itself in all worldly phenomena leading to

¹ Aghora-śivācārya quoting *Mygendra* in his commentary on *Tattva-prakāśa* says: *caitanyam dṛk-kriyā-rūpam iti cid eva ghaṇam deha-svarūpam yasya sa cidghanaḥ*. This *cidghana* is the attribute ascribed to Śiva in *Tattva-prakāśa*.

² *moho madaś ca rāgaś ca viṣādaḥ śoka eva ca, vaicittaṃ caiva harṣaś ca saptaite sahaḥ malāḥ*. Aghora-śivācārya's commentary (Adyar manuscript) on *Tattva-prakāśa*, *kārikā* 1.

bondage and liberation, everything depending upon the *karma* of the individual. It is quite possible that in some schools of Śaivism this dynamism of God was interpreted as His magnificent grace, and these people were called the Mahā-kāruṇikas. *Anugraha*, or grace, thus extends to the process of creation. If it were ordinary grace, then it could have been only when the world was already there¹. This *anugraha* activity includes creation, maintenance, destruction, blinding the vision of the individuals, and finally liberating them². Śrīkumāra explains the situation by holding that the act of blinding and the act of enlightening through liberation are not contradictory, as the latter applies only to those who have self-control, sense-control, fortitude, and cessation from all enjoyment, and the former to those who have not got them³. God thus is responsible for the enjoyable experiences and liberation of all beings through His fivefold action. His consciousness (*cit*) is integrally connected with His activity. Though God is of the nature of consciousness and in that way similar to individual souls, yet God can grant liberation to individual souls with powers which the individual souls themselves do not possess. Though God's consciousness is integrally associated with action, it is indistinguishable from it. In other words God is pure thought-activity.

The *śakti* or energy of Śiva is one, though it may often be diversely represented according to the diverse functions that it performs. Śrīkumāra points out that the original form of this energy is pure bliss which is one with pure consciousness. For the creation of the world God does not require any other instrument than His own energy, just as our own selves can perform all operations of the body by their own energy and do not require any outside help. This energy must be distinguished from *māyā*. Taking *māyā* into consideration one may think of it as an eternal energy, called *bindu-māyā* which forms the material cause of the world⁴.

¹ *anugrahaś cātropalakṣaṇam. Ibid.*

² *Tattva-prakāśa, kārīkā 7.*

³ *Ibid. Commentary on Tattva-prakāśa, kārīkā 7.*

⁴ *kārya-bhede'pi māyādivan nāsyāḥ pariṇāma iti darśayati tasya jaḍa-dharmatvāt. adyām pradhāna-bhūtām samavetām anena parigraha-śaktisvarūpam bindu-māyātmakam apy asya bāhya-śakti-dvayam asti.* (Aghora-śivācārya's commentary, Adyar manuscript). Śrīkumāra, however, thinks that Śiva as

The monistic interpretation as found in Śrīkumāra's commentary is already anticipated as the Śivādvaita system in the Purāṇas, more particularly in the *Sūta-saṃhitā*¹.

Śiva arranges for the experiences and liberation of the individual souls in and through His energy alone. The fivefold action, referred to above, is to be regarded as somehow distinguishing the one energy in and through diverse functions.

The object of *Tattva-prakāśa* is to explain the Śaiva philosophy as found in the *Śaivāgamas*, describing mainly the categories of *pati*, *paśu*, and *pāśa*. The *pati* is the Lord and *paśu* is called *anu*, and the five objects are the five *pāśas* or bonds. The *anus* are dependent on God and they are regarded as belonging to different classes of bondage. The fivefold objects are those which are due to the *mala* and which belong to *bindu-māyā* in different states of evolution of purity and impurity. Śrīkumāra points out that since the souls are associated with *mala* from eternity, it comes under the sway of the *māyā*, but since the souls are of the nature of Śiva, when this *mala* is burnt, they become one with Him. The fivefold objects constituting the bondage are the *mala*, the *karma*, the *māyā*, the world which is a product of *māyā*, and the binding power².

It may be asked, if the energy belongs to God, how can it be attributed to the objects of bondage? The reply is that in reality the energy belongs to the Lord and the force of the *pāśa* or bondage can only be regarded as force in a distant manner, in the sense that the bondage or the power of bondage is felt in and through the individual soul who receives it from the Lord³.

The *paśus* are those who are bound by the *pāśa*, the souls that

associated with the *māyā* forms the instrumental and material cause of the world :
nimittopādāna-bhāvena avasthānād iti brūmah.

Such a view should make Śaivism identical with the Advaitism of Śaṅkara. Aghora-śivācārya wrote his commentary as a protest against this view, that it does not represent the view of the *Śaivāgamas* which regard God only as the instrumental cause.

¹ *Sūtasamhitā*, Book IV, verse 28 et seq.

² *malaṃ karma ca māyā ca māyottham akhilaṃ jagat, tirodhānakāri śaktir artha-pañcakam ucyate.* Śrīkumāra's commentary, p. 32.

³ *nanu katham ekaikasyā eva śiva-śakteḥ pati-padārthe ca pāśa-padārthe ca saṅgraha ucyate. satyam, paramārthataḥ pati-padārtha eva śakter antarbhāvaḥ. pāśatvaṃ tu tasyāṃ pāśa-dharmānuvartanena upacārāt. tad uktaṃ śrīman Mrgendre—tāsāṃ māheśvārī śaktiḥ sarvānugrahikā śivā, dharmānu vartanād eva pāśa ity upacaryata, iti.* Aghora-śivācārya's commentary (Adyar manuscript).

go through the cycles of birth and rebirth. In this connection Śrikumāra tries to establish the identity of the self on the basis of self-consciousness and memory, and holds that these phenomena could not be explained by the Buddhists who believed in momentary selves. These are three kinds; those which are associated with *mala* and *karma*, those which are associated only with *mala* (these two kinds are jointly called *vijñāna-kala*); the third is called *sakala*. It is associated with *mala*, *māyā* and *karma*. The first, namely the *vijñāna-kala*, may again be twofold, as associated with the impurities and as devoid of them. Those who are released from impurity are employed by God with various angelic functions, and they are called *vidyeśvara* and *mantrēśvara*. Others, however, pass on to new cycles of life, being associated with a composite body of eight constituents which form the subtle body. These eight constituents are the five sensibles, *manas*, *buddhi*, and *ahaṅkāra*, and they all are called by the name of *puryaṣṭaka*, the body consisting of the eight constituents.

Those whose impurities (*mala*) get ripened may receive that power of God through proper initiation by which the impurity is removed, and they become one with God. The other beings, however, are bound by God to undergo the series of experiences at the end of which they may be emancipated.

The bonds or *pāśa* are of four kinds: first, the bond of *mala* and the *karma*. The bond of *mala* is beginningless, and it stands as a veil over our enlightenment and power of action. The *karma* also flows on, depending on the *mala* from beginningless time. The third is called *māyēya*, which means the subtle and gross bodies produced through *māyā*, which is the fourth. Aghora-śivācārya says that *māyēya* means the contingent bonds of passion, etc., which are produced in consequence of *karma*. Even those who have not the *māyēya* impurity at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) remain by themselves but not liberated.

But what is *mala*? It is supposed to be one non-spiritual stuff, which behaves with manifold functions. It is for this reason that when the *mala* is removed in one person it may function in other persons. This *mala* being like the veiling power of God, it continues to operate on the other persons, though it may be removed in the case of some other person. As the husk covers the seed, so the *mala* covers the natural enlightenment and action of the individual; and

as the husk is burnt by fire or heat, so this *mala* also may be removed when the internal soul shines forth. This *mala* is responsible for our bodies. Just as the blackness of copper can be removed by mercury, so the blackness of the soul is also removed by the power of Śiva.

Karma is beginningless and is of the nature of merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*). Śrīkumāra defines *dharma* and *adharma* as that which is the special cause of happiness or unhappiness, and he tries to refute other theories and views about *dharma* and *adharma*. *Māyā* is regarded as the substantive entity which is the cause of the world. We have seen before that bondage comes out of the products of *māyā* (*māyēya*); so *māyā* is the original cause of bondage. It is not illusory, as the Vedāntists say, but it is the material cause of the world. We thus see that the power or energy of God behaving as *mala*, *māyā*, *karma*, and *māyēya*, forms the basic conception of bondage.

These are the first five pure categories arising out of Śiva. The category of Śiva is regarded as the *bindu*, and it is the original and primal cause of everything. It is as eternal as *māyā*. The other four categories spring from it, and for this reason it is regarded as *mahā-māyā*. These categories are the mythical superintending lords of different worlds called *vidyeśvara*, *mantreśvara*, etc. So, from *bindu* comes *śakti*, *sadāśiva*, *īśvara*, and *vidyeśvara*. These categories are regarded as pure categories. Again, in order to supply experiences to individuals and their scope of action, five categories are produced, namely, time (*kāla*), destiny (*niyati*), action (*kalā*), knowledge (*vidyā*), and attachment (*rāga*). Again, from *māyā* comes the *avyakta* or the unmanifested, the *guṇas*, and then *buddhi*, and *ahaṅkāra*, *manas*, the five conative senses and the five cognitive senses, and the gross matter, which make up twenty-three categories from *māyā*.

We thus see that these are in the first instance the five categories of *śiva*, *śakti*, *sadāśiva*, *īśvara*, and *vidyā*. These are all of the nature of pure consciousness (*cidrūpa*), and being of such a nature, there can be no impurity in them. We have next the seven categories which are both pure and impure (*cidacid-rūpa*), and these are *māyā*, *kāla*, *niyati*, *kalā*, *vidyā*, *rāga* and *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa*, though of the nature of pure consciousness, may appear as impure on account of its impure association. Next to these categories we

have twenty-four categories of *avyakta-guṇa-tattva*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, *manas*, the five cognitive senses, the five conative senses, the five *tanmātras*, and five *mahābhūtas*. Altogether these are the thirty-six categories.

If we attend to this division of categories, we find that the so-called impure categories are mostly the categories of Sāṃkhya philosophy. But while in the Sāṃkhya, *prakṛti* is equated with the *avyakta* as the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*, here in the Śaiva philosophy the *avyakta* is the unmanifested which comes from *māyā* and produces the *guṇas*.

To recapitulate, we find that the system of thought presented in the *Tattva-prakāśa*, as based on the *Śaivāgamas*, is a curious confusion of certain myths, together with certain doctrines of Indian philosophy. One commentator, Śrīkumāra, has tried to read the monistic philosophy of Śaṅkara into it, whereas the other commentator, Aghora-śivācārya, has tried to read some sort of duality into the system, though that duality is hardly consistent. We know from Śaṅkara's account of the philosophy of the Śaiva school that some Śaivas called Māheśvaras tried to establish in their works, the Siddhāntas, the view that God is only the instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the world, but not the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*). In Śaṅkara's view God is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world and of all beings. Aghora-śivācārya's pretext for writing the commentary was that it was interpreted by people having a monistic bias, and that it was his business to show that, in accordance with the *Śaivāgamas*, God can only be the instrumental cause, as we find in the case of the Naiyāyikas. He starts with the premise that God is the sum total of the power of consciousness and the power of energy, and he says that the *māyā* is the material cause of the world, from which are produced various other material products which are similar to the Sāṃkhya categories. But he does not explain in what way God's instrumentality affects the *māyā* in the production of various categories, pure and impure and pure-and-impure. He says that even the energy of *māyā* proceeds from God and appears in the *māyā* as if undivided from it. There is thus an original illusion through which the process of the *māyā* as *bindu* and *nāda* or the desire of God for creation and the creation takes place. But he does not any further explain the nature of the illusion and the

cause or the manners in which the illusion has been generated. The original text of the *Tattva-prakāśa* is also quite unilluminating regarding this vital matter. Aghora-śivācārya often refers to the *Mṛgendrāgama* for his support, but the *Mṛgendrāgama* does not follow the Sāṃkhya course of evolution as does the *Tattva-prakāśa*. There we hear of atoms constructed and arranged by the will of God, which is more in line with the Nyāya point of view.

Dealing with the nature of the soul, it is said that the souls are *aṇus* in the sense that they have only a limited knowledge. The souls are essentially of the nature of Śiva or God, but yet they have an innate impurity which in all probability is due to the influx of *māyā* into them. Nothing is definitely said regarding the nature of this impurity and how the souls came by it. Śrīkumāra explains this impurity on the Vedāntic lines as being of the nature of *avidyā*, etc. But Aghora-śivācārya does not say anything on this point. It is said that when by the fruition of action the impurity will ripen, God in the form of preceptor would give proper initiation, so that the impurity may be burnt out, and the souls so cleansed or purified may attain the nature of Śiva. Before such attainment Śiva may appoint some souls, which had had their impurities cleansed, to certain mythical superintendence of the worlds as *vidyeśvaras* or *mantrēśvaras*. At the time of the cycles of rebirth, the individual souls, which have to pass through it for the ripening of their actions, do so in subtle bodies called the *puryaṣṭaka* (consisting of the subtle matter, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, and *manas*).

Turning to the categories, we see that the so-called *pāśa* is also in reality a derivative of the energy of Śiva, and for this reason the *pāśa* may be a blinding force, and may also be withdrawn at the time of liberation. The category of Śiva or *śiva-tattva*, also called *bindu*, makes itself the material for the creation of the fivefold pure *tattvas* and the other impure categories up to gross matter, earth. These fivefold pure categories are *śiva-tattva*, *śakti-tattva*, *sadāśiva-tattva*, *īśvara-tattva*, and *vidyā-tattva*. The bodies of these pure categories are derived from the pure *māyā*, called the *mahāmāyā*. Next to these we have the pure-and-impure categories of *kāla*, *niyati*, *kalā*, *vidyā*, and *rāga*, which are a sort of link between the souls and the world, so that the souls may know and

work. Next from the *māyā* comes *avyakta*, the *guṇa-tattva*, and from the *guṇa-tattva*, the *buddhi-tattva*, from that, *ahaṅkāra*, from that *manas*, *buddhi*, the five conative and five cognitive senses, the five *tanmātras* and the five gross objects.

As we have hinted above, most of the Siddhānta schools of thought are committed to the view that the material cause is different from the instrumental cause. This material cause appears in diverse forms as *māyā*, *prakṛti* or the atoms and their products, and the instrumental cause is God, Śiva. But somehow or other most of these schools accept the view that Śiva, consisting of omniscience and omnipotence, is the source of all energy. If that were so, all the energy of the *māyā* and its products should belong to Śiva, and the acceptance of a material cause different from the instrumental becomes an unnecessary contradiction. Various Siddhānta schools have shifted their ground in various ways, as is evident from our study of the systems, in order to get rid of contradiction, but apparently without success. When the Naiyāyika says that the material cause, the relations, and the instrumental cause are different, and that God as the instrumental cause fashions this world, and is the moral governor of the world in accordance with *karma*, there is no contradiction. God Himself is like any other soul, only different from them in the fact that He eternally possesses omniscience and omnipotence, has no body and no organs. Everything is perceived by Him directly. Again, if one takes the *yoga* point of view, one finds that Īśvara is different from *prakṛti* or the material cause, and it is not His energy that permeates through *prakṛti*. He has an eternal will, so that the obstructions in the way of the developing of energy of *prakṛti* in diverse channels, in accordance with *karma*, may be removed to justify the order of evolution and all the laws of nature as we find them. The Īśvara or God is like any other *puruṣa*, only it had never the afflictions with which the ordinary *puruṣas* are associated, and it has no *karma* and no past impressions of *karma*. Such a view also saves the system from contradiction, but it seems difficult to say anything which can justify the position of the Siddhānta schools wavering between theism and pantheism or monism. In the case of the Śaṅkara Vedānta, Brahman also is real and he alone is the material and instrumental cause. The world appearance is only an appearance, and it has no reality apart from it. It is a sort of illusion

caused by *māyā* which again is neither existent nor non-existent as it falls within the definition of illusion. The different forms of Śaiva school have to be spun out for the purpose of avoiding this contradiction between religion and philosophy.

The category of Śiva, from which spring the five pure categories spoken of above (*sadāśiva*, etc.), is called also the *bindu*, the pure energy of knowledge and action beyond all change. It is supposed that this pure *śiva* or *bindu* or *mahāmāyā* is surcharged with various powers at the time of creation and it is in and through these powers that the *māyā* and its products are activated into the production of the universe which is the basis of the bondage of the souls. This movement of the diverse energies for the production of the universe is called *anugraha* or grace. By these energies both the souls and the inanimate objects are brought into proper relation and the work of creation goes on. So the creation is not directly due to Śiva but to His energy. The difficulty is further felt when it is said that these energies are not different from God. The will and effort of God are but the manifestations of His energy¹.

The different moments of the oscillation of God's knowledge and action are represented as the different categories of *sadāśiva*, *īśvara*, *vidyā*. But these moments are only intellectual descriptions and not temporary events occurring in time and space. In reality the category of Śiva is identical all through. The different moments are only imaginary. There is only the category of Śiva, bristling with diverse powers, from which diverse distinctions can be made for intellectual appraisal².

In the Sāṃkhya system it was supposed that the *prakṛti*, out of its own inherent teleology, moves forward in the evolutionary process for supplying to all souls the materials of their experiences, and later on liberates them. In the Siddhānta systems the same idea is expressed by the word *anugraha* or grace. Here energy is to co-operate with grace for the production of experience and for liberation. The fact that Śiva is regarded as an unmoved and immovable reality deprives the system of the charm of a personal

¹ Thus Śrīkumāra says, quoting from the *Mātaṅga-parameśvara* (p. 79):
tad uktam mātaṅge:

*patyuh śaktiḥ parā sūkṣmā jāgrato dyotana-kṣamā,
tayā prabhuḥ prabuddhātmā svatantraḥ sa sadāśivaḥ.*

² *tattvam vastuta ekaṃ śiva-saṃjñam citra-śakti-śata-khacitam,
śakti-vyāpṛti-bhedāt tasyaite kalpitā bhedaḥ. Tattva-prakāśa II. 13.*

God. The idea of *anugraha* or grace cannot be suitably applied to an impersonal entity.

God's energies, which we call His will or effort, are the organs or means (*kāraṇa*), and the *māyā* is the material cause out of which the world is fashioned; but this *māyā* as such is so subtle that it cannot be perceived. It is the one common stuff for all. This *māyā* produces delusion in us and makes us identify ourselves with those which are different from us. This is the delusive function of *māyā*. The illusion is thus to be regarded as being of the *anyathā-khyāti* type, the illusion that one thinks one thing to be another, just as in *Yoga*. All the *karmas* are supposed to abide in the *māyā* in a subtle form and regulate the cycles of birth and rebirth for the individual souls. *Māyā* is thus the substantial entity of everything else that we may perceive.

We have already explained the central confusion as regards the relation of the changeable *māyā* and the unchanging God or Śiva. But after this the system takes an easy step towards theism, and explains the transformations of *māyā* by the will of God, through His energies for supplying the data of experience for all individual souls. Time is also a product of *māyā*. In and through time the other categories of *niyati*, etc., are produced. *Niyati* means the ordering of all things. It stands for what we should call the natural law, such as the existence of the oil in the seed, of the grain in the husk, and all other natural contingencies. We have translated the word *niyati* as 'destiny' in other places, for want of a single better word. *Niyati* comes from *niyama* or law that operates in time and place. The so-called *kalā-tattva* is that function of *niyati* and *kāla* by which the impurity of the individual souls becomes contracted within them so that they are free, to a very great extent, to act and to know. *Kalā* is thus that which manifests the agency (*karṭṛtva-vyañjikā*). It is through *kalā* that experiences can be associated with individuals¹. From the functioning of *kalā* knowledge proceeds, and through knowledge all experience of worldly objects becomes possible.

In the Sāṃkhya system the *buddhi* is supposed to be in contact with objects and assume their forms. Such *buddhi* forms are

¹ Thus Śrīkumāra quoting from *Mātaṅga*, says (p. 121): *yathāgni-tapta-mṛtpātraṃ jantunā'lingane kṣamaṃ, tathānum kalayā viddhaṃ bhogaḥ śaknoti vāsituṃ, bhoga-pātri kalā jñeya tadādharas ca pudgalaḥ*.

illuminated by the presiding *puruṣa*. The Siddhānta system as explained in *Tattva-prakāśa* differs from this view. It holds that the *puruṣa*, being inactive, cannot produce illumination. Whatever is perceived by the *buddhi* is grasped by the category of *vidyā* or knowledge, because the *vidyā* is different from *puruṣa* and is a product of *māyā* as such. It can serve as an intermediate link between the objects, the *buddhi*, and the self. *Buddhi*, being a product of *māyā*, cannot be self-illuminating, but the *vidyā* is produced as a separate category for the production of knowledge. This is a very curious theory, which differs from Sāṃkhya, but is philosophically ineffective as an epistemological explanation. *Rāgā* means attachment in general, which is the general cause of all individual efforts. It is not a quality of *buddhi*, but an entirely different category. Even when there are no sense objects to which one may be inclined there may be *rāga* which would lead a person towards liberation¹. The totality of *kāla*, *nīyati*, *kalā*, *vidyā*, and *rāga* as associated with the *paśu* renders him a *puruṣa*, for whom the material world is evolved as *avyakta*, *guṇa*, etc. Here also the difference from the Sāṃkhya system should be noted. In Sāṃkhya the state of equilibrium of the *guṇas* forms the *avyakta*, but here the *guṇas* are derived from the *avyakta*, which is a separate category.

The Śaiva system admits three *pramāṇas*: perception, inference, and testimony of scriptures. In perception it admits both the determinate (*savikalpa*) and the indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*), which have been explained in the first two volumes of this work. As regards inference, the Śaivas admit the inference of cause from effect and of effect from cause, and the third kind of inference of general agreement from presence and absence (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*).

The category of *ahaṅkāra*, which proceeds from *buddhi*, expresses itself in the feeling of life and self-consciousness. The *ātman*, the basic entity, is untouched by these feelings. The system believes in the tripartite partition of *ahaṅkāra*, the *sāttvika*, *rājasa*, and *tāmasa*, after the pattern of the Sāṃkhya, and then we have virtually the same sorts of categories as the Sāṃkhya, the details of which we need not repeat.

¹ Thus Śrīkumāra says (p. 124): *asya viśayāvabhāśena vinā puruṣa-pravṛtti-heturvād buddhi-dharma-vailakṣaṇya-siddhiḥ, mumukṣor viśaya-tṛṣṇasya tatsādhanē viśayāvabhāśena vinā pravṛttir dṛṣṭā*.

The relation between the *māyā* and the category of Śiva is called *parigraha-śakti*, by which the mechanism of the relation is understood as being such that, simply by the very presence of Śiva, various transformations take place in the *māyā* and lead it to evolve as the world, or to be destroyed in time and again to be created. The analogy is like that of the sun and the lotus flower. The lotus flower blooms of itself in the presence of the sun, while the sun remains entirely unchanged. In the same way, iron filings move in the presence of a magnet. This phenomenon has been variously interpreted in religious terms as the will of God, the grace of God, and the bondage exerted by Him on all living beings. It is in this sense again that the whole world may be regarded as the manifestation of God's energy and will, and the theistic position confirmed. On the other hand, since Śiva is the only ultimate category without which nothing could happen, the system was interpreted on the lines of pure monism like that of Śaṅkara, wherein it appeared to be a mere appearance of multiplicity, whereas in reality Śiva alone existed. This led to the interpretation of the system of Śivādvaita that we find in the *Sūta-saṃhitā*, *Yajña-vaibhava* chapter.

The *śakti* of God is one, though it may appear as infinite and diverse in different contexts. It is this pure *śakti* which is identical with pure will and power. The changes that take place in the *māyā* are interpreted as the extension of God's grace through creation for the benefit of the individual souls. God in the aspect of pure knowledge is called *śiva* and as action is called *śakti*. When the two are balanced, we have the category of *sadā-śiva*. When there is a predominance of action it is called *maheśvara*.

The theory of *karma* in this system is generally the same as in most other systems. It generally agrees with a large part of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, but the five *śuddha-tattvas*, such as *sadā-śiva*, etc., are not found elsewhere and are only of mythological interest.

The *Śiva-jñāna-siddhiyar* not only advocates the *niyamas*, such as good behaviour, courteous reception, amity, good sense, blameless austerity, charity, respect, reverence, truthfulness, chastity, self-control, wisdom, etc., but also lays great stress on the necessity of loving God and being devoted to Him.

Śrīpati Paṇḍita's Ideas on the Vedānta Philosophy, called also the *Śrīkara-bhāṣya* which is accepted as the Fundamental Basis of Vīra-śaivism.

Śrīpati Paṇḍita lived towards the latter half of the fourteenth century and was one of the latest commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Śrīpati Paṇḍita says that he got the inspiration of writing the commentary from a short treatise called the *Agastyavṛtti* on the *Brahma-sūtra* which is now not available. He also adores Revaṇa, who is regarded by him as a great saint of the sect, and also Marula who was supposed to have introduced the doctrine of six centres (*ṣaṭ-sthala*). He adores also Rāma, who flourished in the Dvāpara-yuga, and who collected the main elements from the Mīmāṃsā and the Upaniṣads for the foundation of the Śaiva philosophy as it is being traditionally carried on.

The *Śrīkara-bhāṣya* should be regarded as a definite classification of the views of the different Śrutis and Smṛtis, and for this our chief admiration should go to Rāma. But though this work keeps itself clear of the dualistic and non-dualistic views of Vedāntic interpretation, it holds fast to a doctrine which may be designated as Viśiṣṭadvaita, and the Śaivas, called Vīra-śaivas, would find support in the tenets of the doctrine herein propounded. It may be remembered that Śrīpati came long after Rāmānuja, and it was easy for him to derive some of his ideas from Rāmānuja.

Śaṅkara, in his interpretation of the present *sūtra* "Now then the inquiry about Brahman," lays stress on the pre-condition leading to the necessity of inquiring about Brahman, and Rāmānuja also discusses the same question, and thinks that the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta form together one subject of study; but Śrīpati here avoids the question, and thinks that the *sūtra* is for introducing an inquiry as to the ultimate nature of Brahman, whether Brahman is being or non-being. According to him the *sūtra* is further interested in discovering the influence of Brahman over individuals.

He took for granted the unity of the two disciplines of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and Vedānta as forming one science, but he fervently opposes the view of the Cārvākas that life is the product of material combinations. He explains that the Cārvākas' denial of Brahman is

based on the supposition that no one has come from the other world to relate to us what happens after death. He also points out that there are other schools within the *Vaidika* fold which do not believe in the existence of God or His power over individual beings, and that the power of *karma*, technically called *apūrva*, can very well explain the sufferings and enjoyments of human beings. So, if one admits the body to be the same as the spirit, or if one thinks that there is no necessity to admit God for the proper fruition of one's deeds, the twofold reason for the study of Vedānta could be explained away.

The doubt leading to an inquiry should therefore be located somewhere else, in the nature of God, Śiva, or in the nature of the individual soul. The existence of the God Śiva as being the only reality has been declared in a number of Vedic texts. The self, which shows itself in our ego-consciousness, is also known as a different entity. As such, how can the point of doubt arise? Moreover, we cannot know the nature of Brahman by discussion, for the self being finite it is not possible to understand the nature of the infinite Brahman by understanding the nature of such a soul. Moreover, the Upaniṣads have declared that the Brahman is of two kinds, consciousness and unconsciousness. So even when there is the Brahman knowledge, the knowledge of the unconscious Brahman should remain, and as such there would be no liberation.

Now the other point may arise, that the discussion is with regard to the attainment of a certitude as to whether the Brahman is identical with the self. There are many texts to that effect, but yet the contradiction arises from our own self-consciousness manifesting us as individual personalities. To this the ordinary reply is that the individuality of our ego-consciousness will always lead us to explain away the Upaniṣad texts which speak of their identity. But the reply, on the other side, may be that the Brahman may, through *avidyā* or nescience, create the appearance of our individuality, such as "I am a man." For without such an all-pervading illusion the question of liberation cannot arise. Moreover, the pure Brahman and all the objects are as distinct from each other as light from darkness, and yet such an illusion has to be accepted. For otherwise the entire mundane behaviour would have to be stopped. So there is hardly scope for making an inquiry as to the exact nature of the Brahman, the souls and the world. For one has to

accept the ultimate reality of the transcendent Brahman which cannot be described by words. Brahman is thus beyond all discussion.

In a situation like this Śrīpati first presses the question of the existence of God as being proved by the Upaniṣadic and Śruti texts, by perception and by inference. We know from experience that often people cannot attain their ends, even if they are endowed with talent, ability, riches and the like, while others may succeed, even if they have nothing. According to Śrīpati, this definitely proves the existence of an omniscient God and His relationship with human beings. In ordinary experience, when we see a temple, we can imagine that there was a builder who built it. So in the case of the world also, we can well imagine that this world must have had a builder. The Cārvāka argument, that the conglomeration of matter produces things out of itself, is untenable, because we have never seen any such conglomerations of matter capable of producing life as we find it in birds and animals. In the case of cow-dung, etc., some life may have been somehow implanted in them so that beetles and other flies may be born from them. It has also to be admitted that in accordance with one's *karma* God awards punishments or rewards, and that the fruition of deeds does not take place automatically, but in accordance with the wishes of God.

In some of the Upaniṣadic texts it is said that there was nothing in the beginning, but this nothingness should be regarded as a subtle state of existence; for otherwise all things cannot come out of nothing. This non-being referred to in the Upaniṣads also does not mean mere negation or the mere chimerical nothing, like a lotus in the sky. Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahma-sūtra* has also refuted this idea of pure negation (II. 1. 7). In fact, the Vedas and the Āgamas declare God Śiva, with infinite powers, to be the cause of the world, whether it be subtle or gross. The individuals, however, are quite different from this Brahman, as they are always afflicted with their sins and sufferings. When the Upaniṣads assert that Brahman is one with *jīva*, the individual, naturally the inquiry (*jijñāsā*) comes, how is it possible that these two which are entirely different from each other should be regarded as identical?

Śrīpati thinks that the 'identity' texts of the Upaniṣads, declaring the identity of the individual and the Brahman, can well

be explained by supposition of the analogy of rivers flowing into the ocean and becoming one with it. We need not assume that there is an illusion as Śaṅkara supposes, and that without such an illusion the problem of emancipation cannot arise, because we have a direct and immediate experience of ignorance when we say "we do not know."

Śrīpati objects strongly to the view of Śaṅkara that there is a differenceless Brahman of the nature of pure consciousness, and that such a Brahman appears in manifold forms. The Brahman is of an entirely different nature from the individual souls. If such a Brahman is admitted to have *avidyā* or nescience as a quality, it would cease to be the Brahman. Moreover, no such *avidyā* could be attributed to Brahman, which is often described in the Śruti texts as pure and devoid of any thought or mind. If the *avidyā* is supposed to belong to Brahman, then one must suppose that there ought to be some other entity, by the action of which this factor of *avidyā* could be removed for liberation. Brahman cannot itself find it; being encased by the *avidyā* at one moment and free at another, it cannot then retain its absolute identity as one. It is also fallacious to think of the world as being made up of illusory perceptions like dreams, for there is a definite order and system in the world which cannot be transgressed. Bādarāyaṇa himself also refutes the idea of a non-existence of an external world (II. 2. 27, 28). Moreover, the differenceless Brahman can only be established by the authority of the scriptural texts or by inference, but as these two are included within our conceptual world of distinctions, they cannot lead us beyond them and establish a differenceless Brahman. Moreover, if the truth of the Vedas be admitted, then there will be duality, and if it is not admitted, then there is nothing to prove the one reality of the Brahman. Moreover, there is nothing that can establish the fact of world illusion. *Avidyā* itself cannot be regarded as a sufficient testimony, for the Brahman is regarded as self-illuminating. Moreover, the acceptance of such a Brahman would amount to a denial of a personal God, which is supported by so many scriptural texts including the *Gītā*.

Again, the Upaniṣad texts that speak of the world as being made up of names and forms do not necessarily lead to the view that the Brahman alone is true and that the world is false. For the same purpose can be achieved by regarding Śiva as the material cause of the world, which does not mean that the world is false.

The whole idea is that, in whatsoever form the world may appear, it is in reality nothing but Śiva¹.

When Bādarāyaṇa says that the world cannot be distinguished as different from Brahman, it naturally means that the manifold world, which has come out of Brahman, is one with Him. The world cannot be regarded as the body of Brahman, and the scriptures declare that in the beginning only pure being existed. If anything else but Brahman is admitted, then the pure monism breaks. The two being entirely opposed to each other, one cannot be admitted as being a part of the other, and the two cannot be identified in any manner. So the normal course would be to interpret the texts as asserting both the duality and the non-duality of the Brahman. Thus the Brahman is both different from the world and identical with it.

Śrīpati thinks that on the evidence of the Śruti texts a Brahmin must take initiation in Śaiva form and bear with him the Śaiva sign, the *līṅga*, as much as he should, being initiated into Vedic rites. It is then that the person in question becomes entitled to the study of the nature of Brahman, for which the *Brahma-sūtra* has been written². The inquiry into the nature of Brahman necessarily introduces to us all kinds of discussions regarding the nature of Brahman.

Though Śrīpati emphasises the necessity of carrying the *līṅga* and of being initiated in the Śaiva form, yet that alone cannot bring salvation. Salvation can only come when we know the real nature of Brahman. In introducing further discussions on the nature of Brahman, Śrīpati says that wherever the scriptural texts describe Brahman as differenceless and qualityless, that always refers to the period before the creation. It is Śiva, the differenceless unity, that expands His energy and creates the world and makes it appear as it

¹ *vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mṛttikety eva satyam iti śrutau apavāda-darśanād adhyāso grāhya iti cen na vācārambhaṇa-śrutiṇāṃ śivopādānatvāt prapañcasya tattādātmya-bodhakatvaṃ vidhīyate na ca mithyātvaṃ. Śrīkara-bhāṣya*, p. 6.

² *Śrīkara-bhāṣya*, p. 8. Śrīpati takes great pains to show on the evidence of scriptural texts the indispensable necessity of carrying the insignia of Śiva, the *līṅga* in a particular manner which is different from the methods of carrying the *līṅga* not approved by the Vedas, pp. 8-15.

Śrīpati points out that only the person, who is equipped with the four accessories called the *sādhana-saṃpad* consisting of *śama*, *dama*, *titikṣā*, *uparati*, *mumukṣutva*, etc., is fit to have the *līṅga*.

is, though He always remains the ultimate substratum. The world is thus not illusion but reality, and of the nature of Śiva Himself. This is the central idea which is most generally expanded, as we shall see. Brahman thus appears in two forms: as pure consciousness and as the unconscious material world, and this view is supported by the scriptural texts. Brahman is thus with form and without form. It is the pure Brahman that appears as this or that changing entity, as pleasure or pain, or as cause and effect. Such an explanation would fit in with our experience, and would also be perfectly reconcilable with the scriptural texts.

The suggestion of the opponents, that Īśvara or God is an illusory God, is also untenable, for no one is justified in trusting an illusory object for showing devotion to him. Such a God would seem to have the same status as any other object of illusion. Moreover, how can an illusory God bestow benefits when He is adored and worshipped by the devotee?

Śrīpati then tries to refute the idea of the pure differenceless Brahman, and summarises the arguments given by Rāmānuja as we have described them in the third volume of the present work; and we are thus introduced to the second *sūtra*, which describes Brahman as that from which the production of the world has come about.

Śrīpati, in commenting upon *Brahma-sūtra* I. 1. 2, says that the pure consciousness as the identity of being and bliss is the cause of the production and dissolution of the world, as well as its fundamental substratum. The Brahman, who is formless, can create all things without the help of any external instrument, just as the formless wind can shake the forest or the self can create the dreams. It is in the interest of the devotees that God takes all the forms in which we find Him¹. He also refers to some of the scriptural texts of the *bhedābheda* type, which considers the relation between God and the world as similar to the relation between the ocean and the waves. Only a part of God may be regarded as being transformed into the material world. In this way Śiva is both the instrumental and the material cause. A distinction has to be made between the concept that there is no difference between the instrumental and

¹ *bhaktāmugrahārtham ghṛta-kāṭhinyavad-dīvyā-maṅgala-vigraha-dharasya maheśvarasya mūrtāmūrta-prapañca-kalpane apy adoṣaḥ. Śrīkara-bhāṣya, p. 30.*

the material cause, and the concept that the two are the same¹. There is no question of false imposition.

The individual souls are spoken of in the Upaniṣads as being as eternal as God. The scriptural texts often describe the world as being a part of God. It is only when the powers of God are in a contractive form before the creation, that God can be spoken of as being devoid of qualities². There are many Upaniṣadic passages which describe the state of God as being engaged in the work of creation, and as the result thereof His powers seem to manifest. It is true that in many texts *māyā* is described as the material cause of the world and God the instrumental. This is well explained if we regard *māyā* as a part of God. Just as a spider weaves out of itself a whole web, so God creates out of Himself the whole world. For this reason it should be admitted that the material world and the pure consciousness have the same cause. In this connection Śrīpati takes great pains to refute the Śāṅkarite doctrine that the world is illusion or imposition. If we remember the arguments of Mādhva and his followers against the doctrine of illusion as expounded in the fourth volume of the present work, the criticisms of Śrīpati would be included in them in one form or another. We thus see that the views of Śāṅkara were challenged by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Mādhva.

Śrīpati says that the so-called falsity of the world cannot be explained either as indescribable (*anirvācya*) or as being liable to contradiction, for then that would apply even to the Vedas. The phrase "liable to contradiction" cannot be applied to the manifold world, for it exists and fulfils all our needs and gives scope for our actions. So far as we see, it is beginningless. It cannot therefore be asserted that at any time in the future or in the present the world will be discovered as false. It has often been said that falsehood consists in the appearance of a thing without there being any reality, just as a mirage is seen to be like water without being able to serve the purpose of water. But the world not only appears, it also serves all our purposes. All the passages in the Purāṇas and other texts where the world is described as being *māyā* are only

¹ *tasmād abhinna-nimtopādāna-kāraṇatvaṃ na tu eka-kāraṇatvaṃ. Śrīkara-bhāṣya*, p. 30.

² *Śakti-śāṅkocatayā sṛṣṭeḥ prakṛ-
parmeśvarasya nirguṇatvāt.*

Ibid. p. 31.

delusive statements. So God alone is both the instrumental and the substantial cause of the world, and the world as such is not false as the Śaṅkarites suppose.

In the same way, the supposition that Īśvara or the *jīva* represents a being which is nothing else but Brahman as reflected through *avidyā* or *māyā* is also untenable. The so-called reflecting medium may be conditional or natural. Such a condition may be the *māyā*, *avidyā* or the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The condition cannot be gross, for in that case transmigration to the other world would not be possible. The idea of reflection is also untenable, for the Brahman has no colour and therefore it cannot be reflected and made into Īśvara. That which is formless cannot be reflected. Again if Īśvara or *jīva* is regarded as a reflection in *māyā* or *avidyā*, then the destruction of *māyā* or *avidyā* would mean the destruction of God and of the individual soul. In the same way Śrīpati tries to refute the theory of *avaccheda* or limitations, which holds that the pure consciousness as qualified or objectively limited by the mind would constitute the individual soul; for in that case any kind of limitation of consciousness such as we find in all material objects would entitle them to the position of being treated as individual souls.

The qualities of production and destruction, etc., belong to the world and not to Brahman. How then can the production and destruction of the world, of which God is the source, be described as being a defining characteristic of Brahman? The reply is that it cannot be regarded as an essential defining characteristic (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*), but only as indicative of Brahman as being the source of the world, so that even if there is no world, that would not in any way affect the reality of existence of God. This is what is meant by saying that the present definition (I. 1. 2), is not a *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*, but only *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*. Śiva alone is the creator of the world and the world is maintained in Him and it is dissolved back into Him.

In commenting upon the *Brahma-sūtra* I. 1. 3, Śrīpati follows the traditional line, but holds that the Vedas were created by God, Śiva, and that all the texts of the Vedas are definitely intended for the glorification of Śiva. This is, of course, against the Mīmāṃsā view that the Vedas are eternal and uncreated, but it agrees with Śaṅkara's interpretation that the Vedas were created by Īśvara. In Śaṅkara's system Īśvara is only a super-illusion formed by the

reflection of Brahman through *māyā*. We have already noticed that Śrīpati regards this view as entirely erroneous. With him Īśvara or Maheśvara means the supreme God. Śrīpati further says that the nature of Brahman cannot be understood merely by discussion or reasoning, but that He can be known only on the evidence and testimony of the Vedas. He further says that the Purāṇas were composed by Śiva even before the Vedas, and that of all the Purāṇas the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* is the most authentic one. Other Purāṇas which glorify Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa are of an inferior status.

In commenting on *Brahma-sūtra* 1. 1. 4, Śrīpati says that the Mimāṃsā contention is that the Upaniṣadic descriptions of the nature of Brahman should not be interpreted as urging people to some kind of meditation. They simply describe the nature of Brahman. Knowledge of Brahman is their only end. In this interpretation Śrīpati shares more or less the view of Śaṅkara. He further says that the nature of Brahman can only be known through the Upaniṣads. No kind of inference or general agreement can prove the fact that there is one God who is the creator of the world. In all things made by human beings, such as temples, palaces, or stone structures, many people co-operate to produce the things. We cannot, therefore, argue from the fact that since certain things have been made, there is one creator who is responsible for their creations. This is a refutation of the Nyāya view or the view of many of the *Śaivāgamas*, that the existence of one God can be proved by inference.

He further says that the force that manifests itself, and has plurality or difference or oneness, is in Brahman. We cannot distinguish the force or energy from that which possesses the force. The Brahman thus may be regarded both as energy and as the repository of all energies. There cannot be any energy without there being a substance. So the Brahman works in a dual capacity as substance and as energy¹. It cannot be said that mere knowledge cannot stir us to action; for when one hears of the good or bad news of one's son or relation, one may be stirred to action. Thus, even pure knowledge of Brahman may lead us to His meditation,

¹ *bhedābhedātmikā śaktir brahma-niṣṭhā sanātani, iti smṛtau śakter vahni-śakter iva brahmādhiṣṭhānatvopadeśāt. niradhiṣṭhāna-śakter abhāvāt ca śakti-śaktimator abhedāc ca tatkarṣṭvaṃ tadātmakatvaṃ tasyaivopapannatvāt. Śrīkara-bhāṣya, p. 45.*

so the Mīmāṃsā contention that the description of Brahman must imply an imperative to action, and that the mere description of an existing entity is of no practical value, is false.

Śrīpati makes fresh efforts to refute the Mīmāṃsā contention that the Vedas are not expected to give any instruction regarding a merely existing thing, for that has no practical value. Śrīpati says that a pure power of consciousness is hidden from us by *avidyā*. This *avidyā* is also a power of the nature of Brahman, and by the grace of Brahman this *avidyā* will vanish away into its cause. So the apparent duality of *avidyā* is false, and the instruction as regards the nature of Brahman has a real practical value in inducing us to seek the grace of God by which alone the bondage can be removed. The intuition of Brahman (*brahma-sākṣātkāra*) cannot be made merely by the study of the Upaniṣadic texts, but with the grace of God and the grace of one's preceptor.

Śrīpati says that the *nitya* and the *naimittika karma* are obligatory, only the *kāmya karma*, that is, those actions performed for the attainment of a purpose, should be divested of any notion of the fulfilment of desire. Only then, when one listens to the Vedāntic texts and surrenders oneself entirely to Śiva, the heart becomes pure and the nature of Śiva is realised.

Śrīpati again returns to his charge against the doctrine of the falsity of the world. He says that since the Upaniṣadic texts declare that everything in the world is Brahman, the world is also Brahman and cannot be false. The entire field of bondage as we perceive it in the world before us would vanish when we know that we are one with Śiva. For in that case the appearance of the world as diverse and as consisting of this or that would vanish, for everything we perceive is Śiva. Brahman is thus both the substantial cause and the instrumental cause of the whole world, and there is nothing false anywhere. The world cannot be a mere illusion or mere nothing. It must have a substratum under it, and if the illusion is regarded as different from the substratum, one falls into the error of duality. If the so-called non-existence of the world merely meant that it was chimerical like the lotus in the sky, then anything could be regarded as the cause of the world underlying it.

It may be held that the Śāṅkarites do not think that the world is absolutely false, but that its truth has only a pragmatic value

(*vyavahārika-mātra-satyatvam*). To this, however, one may relevantly ask the nature of such a character, which is merely pragmatic, for in such a case the Brahman would be beyond the pragmatic, and no one would ask a question about it or give a reply, but would remain merely dumb. If there were no substance behind the manifold appearances of the world, the world would be a mere panorama of paintings without any basic canvas. It has already been shown that the Upaniṣads cannot refer to a differenceless Brahman. If any experience that can be contradicted is called pragmatic (*vyavahārika*), then it will apply even to the ordinary illusions, such as the mirage which is called *prātibhāsika*. If it is held that to be contradicted in a pragmatic manner means that the contradiction comes only through the knowledge of Brahman, then all cases of contradiction of a first knowledge by a second knowledge would have to be regarded as being not cases of contradiction at all. The only reply that the Śāṅkarites can give is that in the case of a non-pragmatic knowledge one has the intuition of the differenceless Brahman and along with it there dawns the knowledge of the falsity of the world. But such an answer would be unacceptable, because to know Brahman as differenceless must necessarily imply the knowledge of that from which it is different. The notion of difference is a constituent of the notion of differencelessness.

Neither can the conception of the *vyavahārika* be made on the supposition that that which is not contradicted in three or four successive moments could be regarded as uncontradicted, for that supposition might apply to even an illusory perception. Brahman is that which is not contradicted at all, and this non-contradiction is not limited by time.

Again it is sometimes held that the world is false because it is knowable (*dṛśya*), but if that were so, Brahman must be either knowable or unknowable. In the first case it becomes false, in the second case one cannot talk about it or ask questions. In this way Śrīpati continues his criticism against the Śāṅkarite theory of the falsity of the world, more or less on the same lines which were followed by Vyāsatīrtha in his *Nyāyā-mṛta*. It is, therefore, unprofitable to repeat these, as they have already been discussed in the fourth volume of the present work. Śrīpati also continues his criticism against the view that Brahman is differenceless on the

same lines as was done by Rāmānuja in the introductory portion of his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, and these have been fairly elaborately dealt with in the third volume of the present work.

To declare Brahman as differenceless and then to attempt to describe its characteristics, saying, for example, that the world comes into being from it and is ultimately dissolved in it, would be meaningless. According to the opponents, all that which is regarded as existent would be false, which under the supposition would be inadmissible. If the world as such is false, then it is meaningless to ascribe to it any pragmatic value.

The question may be raised, whether the Brahman is knowledge or absence of knowledge. In the first case it will be difficult for the opponent to describe the nature of the content of this knowledge. The other question is, whether the opponent is prepared to regard the distinction between the false objects (the appearance of the world) and the Brahman as real or not. If the distinction is real, then the theory of monism fails. There is no way of escape by affirming that both the ideas of difference and identity are false, for there is no alternative. Moreover, if Brahman was of the nature of knowledge, then we should be able to know the content of such knowledge, and this would be contradictory to the idea of Brahman as differenceless. There cannot be knowledge without a content; if there is a content, that content is as external as Brahman Himself, which means that the manifold world of appearance before us is as external as Brahman. There cannot be any knowledge without a definite content. Moreover, if the world appearance is regarded as having a pragmatic value, the real value must be in that something which is the ground of the appearance of the manifold world. In such a case that ground reality would be a rival to the Brahman and would challenge His oneness. In this way, Śrīpati refutes the interpretation of Śaṅkara that the Brahman is differenceless and that the world-appearance is false. He also asserts that human beings are inferior to God's reality, and can have a glimpse of Him through His grace and by adoring Him.

The central idea of the Vīra-śaiva philosophy as propounded by Śrīpati is that God is indistinguishable from His energies, just as the sun cannot be distinguished from the rays of the sun. In the original state, when there was no world, God alone existed, and all the manifold world of matter and life existed in Him in a subtle

form wholly indistinguishable from Him. Later on, when the idea of creation moved Him, He separated the living beings and made them different and associated them with different kinds of *karma*. He also manifested the material world in all the variety of forms. In most of the philosophies the material world has been a questionable reality. Thus, according to Śāṅkara, the world-appearance is false and has only a pragmatic value. In reality it does not exist, but only appears to do so. According to Rāmānuja the world is inseparably connected with God and is entirely dependent upon Him. According to Śrīkaṇṭha the world has been created by the energy of God and in that sense it is an emanation from Him, but Śrīpati refers to certain texts of the Upaniṣads in which it is said that the Brahman is both conscious and unconscious. Thus Śrīpati holds that everything we see in the world is real, and has Śiva or God as its substratum. It is only by His energy that He makes the world appear in so many diverse forms. He denounces the idea of any separation between the energy (*śakti*) and the possessor of it (*śaktimān*). Thus, if the world is a manifestation of the energy of God, that does not preclude it from being regarded as of the nature of Śiva Himself. Thus Śrīpati says that liberation can only come when God is worshipped in His twofold form, the physical and the spiritual. This makes him introduce the idea of a compulsory visible insignia of God, called the *līṅga*. Śrīpati also advocates the idea of gradation of liberation as held by Mādhva and his followers.

It must, however, be noted that, though God transforms Himself into the manifold world, He does not exhaust Himself in the creation, but the greater part of Him is transcendent. Thus, in some aspect God is immanent, forming the stuff of the world, and in another aspect he is transcendent and far beyond the range of this world. The so-called *māyā* is nothing but the energy of God, and God Himself is an identity of pure consciousness and will, or the energy of action and power.

Though, originally, all beings were associated with particular kinds of *karma*, yet when they were born into the material world and were expected to carry out their duties and actions, they were made to enjoy and to suffer in accordance to their deeds. God is neither partial nor cruel, but awards joy and suffering to man's own *karma* in revolving cycles, though the original responsibility of association with *karma* belongs to God. In this Śrīpati thinks

that he has been able to bridge the gulf between the almighty powers of God and the distribution of fruits of *karma* according to individual deeds, thus justifying the accepted theory of *karma* and reconciling it with the supreme powers of the Lord. He does not seem to realise that this is no solution, as at the time of original association the individuals were associated with various kinds of *karma*, and were thus placed in a state of inequality.

Śrīpati's position is pantheistic and idealistically realistic. That being so, the status of dream experiences cannot be mere illusion. Śaṅkara had argued that the experiences of life are as illusory as the experiences of dreams. In reply to this Śrīpati tries to stress the view that the dream-experiences also are not illusory but real. It is true, indeed, that they cannot be originated by an individual by his personal effort of will. But all the same, Śrīpati thinks that they are created by God, and this is further substantiated by the fact that the dreams are not wholly unrelated to actual objects of life, for we know that they often indicate various types of lucky and unlucky things in actual life. This shows that the dreams are somehow interconnected with the actual life of our waking experiences. Further, this fact demolishes the argument of Śaṅkara that the experiences of waking life are as illusory as the experiences of dreams.

In speaking of dreamless sleep, Śrīpati says that in that state our mind enters into the network of nerves inside the heart, particularly staying in the *purītat*, being covered by the quality of *tamas*, and this state is produced also by the will of God, so that when the individual returns to waking life by the will of God, this *tamas* quality is removed. This explains the state of *suṣupti*, which is distinguished from the stage of final liberation, when an individual becomes attuned to God and becomes free of all associations with the threefold *guṇas* of Prakṛti. He then finally enters into the transcendent reality of Śiva and does not return to any waking consciousness. So it must be noted that, according to Śrīpati, both the dream state and the dreamless state are produced by God. Śrīpati's description of *suṣupti* is thus entirely different from that of Śaṅkara, according to whom the soul is in Brahma-consciousness at the time of dreamless sleep.

Śrīpati supports his thesis that in dreamless sleep we, with all our mental functions, pass into the network of nerves in the heart,

and do not become merged in Brahman, as Śaṅkara might lead us to suppose. For this reason, when we wake the next day, we have revived in our memory the experiences of the life before the sleep. This explains the continuity of our consciousness, punctuated by dreamless sleep every night. Otherwise if we had at any time merged into Brahman, it could not be possible for us to remember all our duties and responsibilities, as if there were no dreamless sleep and no break in our consciousness.

In discoursing on the nature of difference between swoon (*mūrcchā*) and death, Śrīpati says that in the state of unconsciousness in swoon, the mind becomes partially paralysed so far as its different functions are concerned. But in death the mind is wholly dissociated from the external world. It is well to remember the definition of death as given in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* as being absolute forgetfulness (*mṛtyur atyanta-vismṛti*).

According to the view of Śaṅkara, the Brahman is formless. Such a view does not suit the position of Vīrā-śaivism as propounded by Śrīpati. So he raises the question as to whether the Śiva, the formless, is the same as the Śiva with the form as found in many *Śiva-līṅgas*, and in reply Śrīpati emphasises the fact that Śiva exists in two states, as the formless and as being endowed with form. It is the business of the devotee to realise that Śiva is one identical being in and through all His forms and His formless aspect. It is in this way that the devotee merges himself into Śiva, as rivers merge into the sea. The individual or the *jīva* is not in any sense illusory or a limitation of the infinite and formless nature into an apparent entity as the Śaṅkarites would try to hold. The individual is real and the Brahman is real in both the aspects of form and formlessness. Through knowledge and devotion the individual merges into God, as rivers merge into the sea, into the reality which is both formless and endowed with manifold forms.

Vīra-śaivism indeed is a kind of *bhedābheda* interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra*. We have, in the other volumes of the present work, dealt with the *bhedābheda* interpretation, as made by Rāmānuja and Bhāskara from different angles. In the *bhedābheda* interpretation Rāmānuja regards the world and the souls as being organically dependent on God, who transcends the world of our experience. According to Bhāskara, the reality is like the ocean of which the world of experience is a part, just as the

waves are parts of the ocean. They are neither absolutely one with it nor different from it. The Vira-śaivism is also a type of *bhedā-bheda* interpretation, and it regards the absolute reality of the world of experience and the transcendent being, which is beyond all experience. Śrīpati sometimes adduces the illustration of a coiled snake which, in one state remains as a heap, and in another state appears as a long thick cord. So the world is, from one point of view different from God, and from another point of view one with God. This example has also been utilised by Vallabha for explaining the relationship between God and the world. The individual beings or *jīvas* may, through knowledge and devotion, purge themselves of all impurities, and with the grace of God ultimately return to the transcendent being and become merged with it. So things that appeared as different may ultimately show themselves to be one with Brahman.

Śrīpati points out that by the due performance of caste duties and the Vedic rites, the mind may become purified, so that the person may be fit for performing *yoga* concentration on Śiva, and offer his deep devotion to Him, and may thus ultimately receive the grace of God, which alone can bring salvation.

There has been a long discussion among the various commentators of the *Brahma-sūtra* as to whether the Vedic duties, caste-duties, and occasional duties form any necessary part of the true knowledge that leads to liberation. There have been some who had emphasised the necessity of the Vedic duties as being required as an indispensable element of the rise of the true knowledge. Others like Śaṅkara and his followers had totally denied the usefulness of Vedic duties for the acquisition of true knowledge. Śrīpati had all along stressed the importance of Vedic duties as an important means for purifying the mind, for making it fit for the highest knowledge attainable by devotion and thought. It may be noted in this connection that the present practice of the Liṅgāyats is wholly the concept of an extraneous social group and this anti-caste attitude has been supported by some authors by misinterpretation of some Vira-śaiva texts¹. But in commenting on the first topic of *Brahma-sūtra* III. 4, Śrīpati emphasises the independent claims of the knowledge of God and devotion to Him as leading

¹ See Professor Sakhare's *Liṅga-dhāraṇa-candrikā* (Introduction, pp. 666 *et seq.*) and also *Vīra-śaivānanda-candrikā* (*Vāḍakāṇḍa*, ch. 24, pp. 442 *et seq.*).

to liberation, though he does not disallow the idea that the Vedic duties may have a contributory effect in cleansing the mind and purifying it, when the person performs Vedic duties by surrendering all his fruits to God. Śrīpati, however, denounces the action of any householder who leaves off his Vedic duties just out of his personal whim.

In commenting on *Brahma-sūtra* III. 4. 2, Śrīpati quotes many scriptural texts to show that the Vedic duties are compulsory even in the last stage of life, so that in no stage of life should these duties be regarded as optional. In this connection he also introduces incidentally the necessity of *liṅga-dhāraṇa*. Though the Vedic duties are generally regarded as accessories for the attainment of right knowledge, they are not obligatory for the householder, who may perform the obligatory and occasional duties and yet attain a vision of God by his meditation and devotion.

The essential virtues, such as *śama* (inner control), *dama* (external control), *tiṭikṣā* (endurance), *uparati* (cessation from all worldly pleasures), *mumukṣutva* (strong desire for liberation), etc., are indispensable for all, and as such the householders who have these qualities may expect to proceed forward for the vision of God. All injunctions and obligations are to be suspended for the preservation of life in times of danger. The Upaniṣads stress the necessity of the various virtues including concentration of mind leading to *Brahma-vidyā*. Śrīpati points out that every person has a right to pursue these virtues and attain *Brahma-vidyā*. This is done in the very best way by accepting the creed of Pāśupata Yoga.

The duties of a Śiva-yogin consist of his knowledge, disinclination, the possession of inner and outer control of passions, and cessation from egotism, pride, attachment and enmity to all persons. He should engage himself in listening to Vedāntic texts, in meditation, in thinking and all that goes with it in the *yoga* process, like *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇā*, and also in deep devotion to Śiva. But though he may be so elevated in his mind, he will not show or demonstrate any of these great qualities. He will behave like a child. Those that have become entirely one with Śiva need not waste time in listening to Vedāntic texts. That is only prescribed for those who are not very advanced. When a man is so advanced that he need not perform the *Varṇāśrama* duties or enter into *samādhi*, he is called *jīvan-mukta* in such a state; it depends upon

the will of such a man whether he should enter into the *jīvan-mukta* state with or without his body. When a person's mind is pure, he may obtain an intuitive knowledge of Śiva by devotion. A truly wise man may be liberated in the present life. Unlike the system of Śaṅkara, Śrīpati introduces the necessity of *bhakti* along with knowledge. He holds that with the rise of knowledge, all old bonds of *karma* are dissolved and no further *karma* would be attached to him.

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¹ The words are arranged in the order of the English alphabet. Sanskrit and Pāli technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books are in italics with a capital. English words and other names are in roman with a capital. Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones.

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